Usm-=,- pe e · Weights (NEWs) to combinations of intervening 12-inch Substantial Dividing Walls (SDNs) to provide protection to personnel from remote operations where an accidental

Usm-=,- pe AD-A250 252o rf "e - IEhIg*IhII ....Huntsville Division

RATIONALE

GUIDE FOR EVALUATING 12 INCH* SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDING WALLS (SDWs)

TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FROMREMOTE OPERATION

VOLUE II DTIC(vO~uE • I=klLVCTLP

SEPTEMBER 1991

* 92-12097ImhhIm~lmI

Form Approved

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE o[D NoO. 004.o18

A c.epam ni c tmi C i llt~n itfm a I ~ esiae soaeae tu c epns.llulqtetm I evsvu mntut•.s wahn i.gn 63.r.

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1. AGFNC USE ONY (Leave bmrn*) 12. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Ie.PtCOLA til Flni. c.& inAtkseh4. TITE AND SUB1TITLE S.FUNDING NUMBERS

IDlOE FbM. EVALUATIIqNG 52. 1ZIN.H ,SUBSTA0ZAL DOWDIW& '79-1 u'240#NU 6 2.57&WALLS (StW') T6 PRoVape PRc'reCtr•ot PR6H REM'STE IOftRA"MUI - 1^e-,= -

Mows) AZF< 2OZ0c1K. BEFAR5ourt, ADIB RAPHA..L

7. PERFQAMM4G ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND AOORESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

US Arreovr CbItg o& LWAI REPORT NUMBER

Hud4vWiot Division~Alint CERND-ED-C.DPb, ox 1600

9. SPONSOMNG/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORNGa. Sriwo: &(,cm US Aani, At -n FxJ,, Rra r w•r t •I- Oo&•' AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

b. 14&ir.r -- LS Aonvii (Tihvida &afefr 4r lko*ýu &S ulr, Q Afon£I'icAC.- £ S4V*AAAD 11 Sl7V- q3f

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABIUTY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Arotd T(P tii l dwr; (D.An&kso is Unsvi/led A

13. ABSTRACT (Maximumi 200 iiwords.)- -

This report provides installations with procedures to relate Net ED1losIveWeights (NEWs) to combinations of intervening 12-inch Substantial DividingWalls (SDNs) to provide protection to personnel from remote operations where anaccidental detonation is the hazard. Protection to be provided is IAW DoD andArmv polior: 2.3 psi maximum overpressure exposure and no hazardous fragments.The report consists of two Volumes. Volume I is a "how to" guide forinstallation use: Volume 11 is the rationale (calculations. etc) behind theVolume I. Protection from thermal e;fects from flash fires. deflaurations.etc. is not addressed in the Guide.

14. SUBECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGESRorcAmcrsbof~~s 3 ubs+fdan l JIM&i~ Walls $oftauior erocd~tdn /71?

b~sf rrofedim fra ~ octnid nf itI ddonwho'mif. ozsco17 a S1CU-ItYiCLASSIFICATiON 10. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TION OF ABSTRACT

OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT

_Uvds 'I uLOdoasidi /.,Il !.... .. O-O.780.S500

TABLE OF CONTINTS

Page

1. 0 1NTRODUCTION

1.3 SCOPI. . . . ............................................. 1-1

1.2 XCL5 ......................... 1-1

1.3 SChPl3 ................................................. 1-1

194 Pa T OF 0=_.D ........................... 1-1

2.0 SAFETYZ CRITERT

2.1 ORNRA..o.e................................... 2-1

1.2 PROTECTION Of OPgRATORS....... ... .. ............. ..... 2-1

3.0 SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDING WALLS (SOW)

3.1 GENUUAL ................................... o............... 3-1

3.2 DYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDING WALLS ........ 3-1

3.3 BLAST CAPACITY OF SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDING WALLS............. 3-1

3.4 SAND LAYER INCLUSION BEHIND SDW ......................... 3-1

3.5 SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDING WALLS RESISTANCE TO FRAGMENTS ...... 3-2

3.6 BREACHING OF 12-INCH SON ................................ 3-3

4.0 BLAST PRESSURE PREDICTION

4.1 GNERAL. .................................................. 4-1

4.2 BLAST EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE BAYS .......................... 4-1

4.3 BLAST LOADING PREDICTION ................................. 4-1

5.0 MISCELLANEOUS

SSo1 STRENGTHENING OF SOWS FOR INCREASED BLAST RESISTANCE .... 5-1

i

S.2 POTH 8ELIS..................... S-1

S.3 OPRTMtOR PftOTNCTIOU FROM HIGH INL FRSQH8. ... ....... 5-1

NTiS GRA&IF

DTIC TABUnannouncedJu3tlfiCatioy

By..... . ..__ ..:. ....__ _

DIstribut 1nj

Not Svelalb

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

FIGURE 3-1 TYPICAL 12-INCH REINFORCED CONCRETEDIVIDING WAL .... ........................ 3-4

GRZMR 3-2 FLOOa PLA. ......................................... 3-5

FIGURE 3-3 BUILDING LAYO• T ................................... 3-6

FIGURE 3-4 ALLOWuABL PEA SHocK P33ss3 VS LoAD DUATION

FIGURE 3-5 ALLOWALE PEAM SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(WAL FIXED 2-IDGES, 10' LONG) ............... , ....... 3-8

FIGURE 3-6 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(WALL FPIXID 2-EDGES, 12- LONG) .... o........ .. o...... 3-9

FIGURE 3-7 ALLOWABLE PEAK 8HOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(M61" FIrED 2-EDGES, 14' LONG).. ... . ... .o. ..... .o ... 3-10

FIGURE 3-8 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(WALL FIXED 2-BDGES, 16" LONG) .................. 3-11

FIGURE 3-9 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LORD DURATION(.ALL FIXED 2-2DGZS, 18' LONG) ......................... 3-12

FIGURE 3-10 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(WALL FIXED 3-EDGBS, 10' LONG)06 .................... ... ... 3-13

FIGURE 3-11 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(WALL FIXED 3-EDGES, 12' LONG) . ...................... 3-14

FIGURE 3-12 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOOK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION

(WALL FIXED 3-EDGES, 14' LONG) ....................... 3-1S

FIGURE 3-13 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(WALL FIXED 3-EDGES, 16' LONG) ......... ................ 3-16

FIGURE 3-14 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOOK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(WALL FIXED 3-EDGES, 18' ILONG) ....................... 3-17

FIGURE 3-1S ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(10' HIGH CANTILEVERED WALL W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-18

PIGURE 3-16 ALLOWABLE PWAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(12' HIGH CANTILEVERED WALL W/SAND MASS)............. 3-19

FIGURE 3-17 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(14' HIGH CANTILEVERED WALL V/SAND MASS) .............. 3-20

iii

FIGURE 3-18 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LORD DURATION(16' HIGH CANTILEVERED WALL V/SAND MASS) ............. 3-21

FIGURE 3-19 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(10'X1O' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-22

FIGURE 3-20 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LAWD DURATION(10'X12' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-23

FIGURE 3-21 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(10X14' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-24

FIGURE 3-22 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(10'X16' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-25

FIGURE 3-23 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(12'X10 , WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-26

FIGURE 3-24 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(12'X121 WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/ISAND MASS) ............. 3-27

FIGURE 3-25 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(12'X141 WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-28

FIGURE 3-26 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(12'1X16' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-29

FIGURE 3-27 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOOK PRESSURE Vs LOAD DURATION(14"X]1O WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-30

FIGURE 3-28 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(14'X12' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES V/SAND MASS) ............. 3-31

FIGURE 3-29 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURl VS LAOD DURATION(14'X14" WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-32

FIGURE 3-30 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHCOK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(14'X16" WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-33

FIGURE 3-31 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(16X10" WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-34.

FIGURE 3-32 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHCOK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(16'X12" WALL FIXED 2-EDGES V/SAND MASS) ............. 3-35

FIGURE 3-33 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOOK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(16'X14' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS)..... ........ 3-36

FIGURE 3-34 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(16'X16" WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-37

FIGURE 3-35 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOOK PRESSURE VS LAOD DURATION(18'X1O' WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND MASS) ............. 3-38

iv

FIGURE 3-36 ALLOWXAL PEAK SHOCK PRssURE vs LOW DURATION(18'X12' WALL FIXED 2-EDG8 Wi/SANAS8) ............. 3-39

FIGURE 3-37 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION(10SX14' WALL FIXED 2-3DGBS W/SAND NASS) ............. 3-40

FIGURE 3-38 ALIABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LORD DURATION(10]16" WALL FIXED 2-EDGES W/SAND NASS) ............. 3-41

FIGURE 3-39 PUN1TRATION DOEM VS ST•KMIG VELOCITY. ............... 3-42"

FIGURE 3-40 DESIGN CURGEB WRIGHT VERSUS STAM"DOF DISTANCE(BaRE CutRG)................. .... *................... 3-43

FIGURE 3-41 DESIGN COARGE WIGHT VERSUS STANDOFF DISTANCE(CAMSE E) " 3 ........ 3-44

FIGURE 4-1 REFLECTION PRESSURE COUFFICZENT VS STANDOFFDISTA1CE................ ...... ......... .............. 4-4

FIGURE 4-2 REFLECTION IMPULSE COEFFICIE VS STANDOFFDIS. ................................................... 4-5

TIGURE 4-3 SHOCK WAVE PARAMNTEMR ................. o ...... ........ 4-6

v

LIST OF TABLES

Page

TABLE 3-1 DYNMAIC PROPURTIZS OF 12-N0M CANTILEVER SDW ......... 3-45

TABL 3-2 DYNAMIC PROPURTI38 OF SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDINGWALL FIE T-8D8...............*o......... 3-46

TAOLS 3-3 DYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDINGWALL FIXED T 3-SIDS .... ............................. 3-47

TABLE 3-4 FRAGMENuT PENETRATION COMPARISON ....................... 3-48

vi

100 1 U!ROWCTOI

1.1

In recent years, the Department of Defense 2xplosive Safety Board (DDRSB)introduced increased protection requirements for personnel exposed to remotelycontrolled operations. One of the requirements is limiting exposure ofpeIsonnel to blast pressures not in excess of 2.3 psi. This requirement hasforced soe Army installations to relocate operators to bays sufficientlyremoved from the donor bay to comply with the new regulation. This requirementhas for the most par imposed operational constraints since intervening bayscan be occupied only when the remote operation is not in progress.

- As a result of the above, the US Army Technical Center of ExplosiveSafety saw a need for relating *at fxplosive Weight (NNW) to combinations ofintervening 12-inch SDWs.

1.2 gOakI=

The objective of this report is to form a basis for development of aguide that allow installation personnel to assess existing munitionfacilities for conformance with present safety rpquirements. It is not theintent that this guide be used for the design and construction of new munitionfacilities, but rather for the evaluation of existing facilities constructedof 12-inch Substantial Dividing Nails (SDWs). Methods for upgrading walls toresist higher blast loadings is provided.

1.3 sJ0g

a. Determine the degree of personnel fragment protection provided bycombinations of 12* SDWs interposed between operators and a donor source.

b. Guidance on field expedient methods to increase the strength of

12-inch SDWs to resist the effects of detonations greater than 15 pounds.

c. information on any portable shelter which may have application inproviding blast protection to, remote operators.

d. Guidance on use of methods to protect operators from high anglestructural/equipment debris.

e. Guidance on methods to protect operators from spillover pressure.

1.4 F•RMAT P GU1nD

This volume addresses rationale for the development of data andprocedures presented in Volume I. As directed, Volume I is developed as a"stand-41onew document. Therefore some duplication between the two volumes wasunavoidable.

Page 1-1

ILo1.S

a. Do) 605S.9-STD, July 1984, Am•nition and Explosives Safety Standards.

b. AR 38$-64, 22 May 1987, Aninmition and Explosives Safety Standards.

c. Draft THS-1300, Structures to Resist the Effects of AccidentalExplosives.

d. 15S Technical Report SL-88-22, -Spall Damage of Concrete Structures3 ,June 1988.

e. N= Technical Memorandum HS1-85-18, -Design Criteria for SubstantialDividing Wall", November 1985.

f. ICZL, Computer Program "SHOCK", January 1988.

9. NMCi, Technical Report R 823, Explosive Tests of Blast Cell, NavalTorpedo station, Bangor Annex*, May 197S.

Page 1-2

2. 0 SAMY CR IA

2.1 9*uneL

Twelve-inch reinforced concrete walls, commonly known as SubstantialDividing Walls, have been constructed for many years within DoD munitionsfacilities to limit blast effects from accidental explosions. Such walls are aspecial category of "Dividing Walls" as defined by DoD explosive safetystandards. When used as shields to protect personnel during remote operation,specific explosive limits for these walls are defined as follows:

Wall 2hickness M

12" 1S Lb.

30" 50 Lbs

36" 70 Lb.

These levels were established years ago by U.S. Army Material Command (AMC)and although long thought to provide complete protection, are now known toonly provide protection for the operator on the other side of the wall fromprimary fragments and wall spell.

With the more stringent safety criteria now in place, Department of DefenseExplosive Safety Board (DD3SB) is presently requiring installations to complywith the present requirements to assure maximum protection to facilityoperators.

2.2 2ERo ZtT OI.r sEBamie

safety criteria clearly require that personnel must not be exposed tooverpressures greater that 2.3 psi, must not be exposed to hazardous fragments(primary or secondary), and must be afforded Category 1 protection inaccordance with requirements of TMS-1300. US Army Technical Center ofExplosive Safety has in recent months provided installations with a method fordetermining the 2.3 psi boundary arc from the front, sides, and the back of athree walled cubicles without roof. For ready access, this method has beenmade an integral part of Volume I

Page 2-1

3.0 SUBSTh2AU L DIVIDING WALLS (SDWS)

This report is based on the *standard" 12-inch reinforced concreteSubstantial Dividing Walls: with #4 reinforcements each way each face andspaced at 12 inches on centers with the wall reinforcements anchored into theconcrete floor slab. A typical cross-section of SDW is shown in Figure 3-1.Also, a typical configuration of SDW ammunition building is shown in Figures

& 3-3. Most buildings cpnsiet of two-wall or three-wall cubicles runningdown the longitudinal axis of the building. Two-wall cubicle buildingstypically feature a series of lateral SDWs (cantilever walls). Three-wallcubicle buildings typically feature an additional SDW running longitudinallydown the building, bisecting the lateral SDWs along the way.

3.2 DONAMIC PROERT!ES OF SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDING WALLS

The dynamic properties of Substantial Dividing Walls. presented in Table 3-1thru 3-3 were generated using the computer program "CBARCS". The tabulatedresults are based on allowable wall rotation of i-degree as required byTMS-1300 for walls with no shear reinforcements. In all cases 3,000 psiconcrete compressive strength and 60,000 psi yield strength of reinforcementwere assumed. For the heights selected (10 to 16 feet), the cantilever wallsexhibit a very low ultimate resistance ranging from 1.73 psi for a 10' highwall to 0.68 psi for a 16' high wall. For walls fixed on two or three edgesthe ultimate resistance is, as expected, well above the cantilevered walls.This therefore suggests that wall upgrade by the addition of fixity conditionat the free end will substantially increase the wall capacity.

3.3 BLAST CAPACITY OF SU STANTIAL DIVIDING WALLS

Blast capacity of different size SDWs were developed to provide the means inrapidly determining the adequacy of SDW in providing Category I protection ata desired standoff from a donor bay. Knowing the ultimate resistance andnatural period of a specific wall, Pressure-Duration plots were generatedusing Figure 3-64 of TMS-1300 and are presented in Figures 3-4 thru 3-14.These plots are similar to P-I diagrams except that load duration was used inthe abscissa to facilitate usage by installation personnel. Once the blastloadings are determined for a specific charge weight and a standoff, a pointis plotted on the appropriate figure. The wall in question is consideredadequate in providing personnel protection if the plotted point falls belowthe curve. On the other hand, if the point falls above the curve, then thewall is inadequate In providing the necessary protection. It is evident fromthe plotted data that wall he~.ghts and fixity conditions at the perimeter ofthe elements have a significant influence on the walls capacities.

3.4 sa§n LA•ER INCWLUSION BEHIND S

An effective method in achieving greater wall resistance to blastloadin.s, is increasing the mass of the element. This results in a highernatural period of vibration of the element which affects the element response

Page 3-1

and its load carrying capacity. To determine the effects of sand layers behindwalls fixed on 2-edges (i.e. attaciment to floor and one other wall), severalruns were made using the computer progran "C3MA1M. the results are plotted inFigures 3-15 thru 3-38. Three sand thicknesses were selected for this study,namely: 1.0', 2.5', and 5.0'. The results Indicate increased load carryingcapacity with increased sand thickness. Review of the plotted data showapproximately 20 percent increase in load carrying capacity for each sandthickness considered. With 5 feet of sand the increase is 60 percent. The datapresented-in Figures 3-15 thru 3-38 is based on loose sand retained by astkuctural framing system. The use of sand bags is also an acceptablealternate providing the sand bags are restrained In place, and an adjustmentis made to the thickness to account for voids between the sand bag units. Areasonable adjustment would be to increase the sand layer thickness by 15percent (arbitxarily selected). Wall fixed on 3-edges (i.e. floor and twoother walls) were not analyzed with sand mass because of their greaterresistance to blast loadings. Also, these walls normally run down the buildinglongitudinal axis dividing the building In half.

3.5 ____YSIT.fl D1mTzusl WALT.TS 3351tA30l TO 1FUAOHI-I-

The accidental detowntion in an explosive processing facility can resultin the generation of many primary and /or secondary fragments. On contact withthe 12-inch SM, the fragment will either penetrate some distance into thestructure and be stopped, or perforate cmletely through and emerge from theback face with some residual velocity and eass. Whether partial penetration orperforation occurs depends primarily on the weight of the fragment, it'sinitial velocity, and the element it is Impacting. The effectiveness ofreinforced concrete in resisting penetration by steel fragments issubstantially less than a steel plate but greater than penetration into sand.When dealing with concrete elements consideration must also be given toperforation and spall thicknesses. For comparison purposes, Table 3-4 showsthe penetration of a design fragment into the materials discuss"ed above.

As directed in the scope, development of the guide is based on worst casemunition accident scenario of an 8-inch artillery round. From TMS-855-1, Table6-2, the design fragment weight (Wf) is 3.44 os. Using TH5-1300 methodology,and a Gurney Snergy constant of 9,100 ft/sec (Composition 8 explosives), aninitial striking velocity of 4,450 ft/sec was calculated. Note that thisvelocity differs from the velocity of 3,780 ft/sec shown in 'PW5-855-1. Itappears that the Gurney constant used in TH5-855-1 is that corresponding toTNWT type of explosive (Gurney constant of 7,600 ft/sec). The calculated valueo:m 4,450 ft/sec has been based on Composition B explosives. Note: TH43-0001-28shows 80 artillery rounds to have explosive limits of 36.30 TNT or 38.80 ofComposition B.

It is evident from Table 3-4 that a 12-inch SDW will resist the designfragment indicated above - the spell thickness of 11.7" is less than the wallthickness of 12". For a design fragment of greater mass or striking velocity,the wall may not provide the necessary protection if operators are positionedin the adjacent bay. Reevaluation must follow TH5-1300 methodology.

Page 3-2

3.6 MM Or 12-INf!H MDE

Breaching was evaluated using 15, Technical Report SL-88-22, reference d.

The report suimarizes the theories of spall, tests involving spall, and

current prediction methods. in addition, improved prediction methods areprovided. Figures 3. 1 and 8.1 of the referenced report were used to generate

Figure 3-40 and 3-41. Mhese figures show region* of ono damage",'spa•l", and

"breackh as a function of standoff distance and M3. Net ExplosLve Weight

quantities were s uypmposed on the figures to assess damage levels atspecified standoffs. For M3 of 150 Lb. bare charge, the SOM will be breached

if the standoff distance is less than 3.6", and spall is avoided if the

standoff distance greater than 14'. For M3W of 15 Lb. bare char"e, breach

occurs at a standoff distance of 0.44", and spall avoided if the standoff

distance is greater than 1.7". Since most facility bays are generally in the

realm of 12 feet, the figures suggest that breach will not control the design

since operator location will, in most probability, be dictated by

overpressures including structural adequacy of the dividing wall to resistthe blast loadings.

Page 3-3

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Page 3-.10

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FIGURE 3-8 ALLOWABLE. PEA SfOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION

- -. Page 3-11 --

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Page 3-12

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Page 3- 15

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Page 3-16...

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Page 3-18

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- - - - -U.>

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Page 3ý-19

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Page 3-21

0

"" A. ........

(5.0

1111tj-jl - - - --UJOi

a a I A 16 ?661 ° 4 we 6?09I€ 1 7 S 61B9IO

LOAD DURATION, T, HSEC

SIGURE 3-19 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE'VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-22

'12

IMM

WADii~i DUATON T, HEC

to

0 LL S PULOAD DURATION2-T

Page 3-23

N

• ALFllXED 2-RDGZS14

U3

4-)

U)

0

...... . . . ......

I

SSS1 3 £ £6789 a 3 4 s 4 1aI le


. FIGURE 3-21 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-24

4 WALL FIXED 2-KGE-S16'S

LOA DURITAOE, SAM MMS

2(

FIUR -2 ALWALEPAKSHC PESUE SLOAD DUPATOTTONE

Page 3-25

IL

i. .. . .. i¸

.... .....

04

(0

32 4 S 4 3 4 toe- 4 a 2 3 S 6 7 a9o

LOAD DURATION, T, $SEC

FIGU 3-23 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATIOU.

Page 3-26

I

*121

S_. ( ) WAMz am MCA=

40.

cn V

.. .. .....p. . .. . .

a 3 4 547095 2 3 4 S2 2 4 S 6 7 6 930



Page 3-27

- SM ! u

110 SAN

0 ...........

--- --

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I


pIGURE 3-25 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-28

O

SE

I

02 M. WALL .XE 2-1

SAN

!• 5 4 7 890 tic 3 4 5 4 7 6 tlo • S 6 7 8 SO0S



Page 3-29

O

WALL FIXED 2-EDGES -i

o.o

I A

3 o70q,o 2 2 4 s , 7 S m 90 4 s 6 7 aI 210-


O FIGURE 3-27 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-30

£

•0

-3

-3M

--. . . . .. . .. . ...

. ...... ..._

z 3 4 s62 4 7 4 go,

LOAD DURATION, T, I4SEC


Page 3-31

- r WALL FIXND 2-DGES IA

$)

............................. ..........

_ 4I7•I ( ) ,aIO 2 3 4 S 4?IIUO••ZS

.......~Pan 3-32a s sm uc u

Go $ 5 --

I so 3 4 s91 ' 3 • 4 S a 9 ONi0


S FIGURE 3-29 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-32

WALL FIXED 2-EDGES6

(INDICATES SAM) UCll•

40

S s--(.01) 44

a

i e 4 8 14Z 3 4 $ 7 a 190 2 31 4 s 6 a 0.

.€- • .LOAD DURA.T'ION, T, MSEC

FiGURE 3-30 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-33

SI 2- to

LOAHO DURATION T, EEC

... . .. . . . ...............

!Page }"34

-- -1 -, -----

-- .-...... AO-

to I, ~ I

LOAD• DURATION, T, MSEC

FIGURE 3-31 ALLOWAkE£ PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE VS LOAD DURATION .

• Page 3-34

-%

04

Wa.i .

* U)

VSILOD DU- TIO

Page....5.. . . . .

........

: €............

..... ........

LOA DUAIOTMFIGURE 3-32 ALLO)WABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURE

[O VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-35

I ta

•* 4

........ -No

. .. ..........

B4 4

LA DUAT!d T, MS,

• *..0

U) ---.

WOAD DURATIOd, 7, 145.G

FIGURE 3-33 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSUREVS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-36

N

•IAL WAXD UR-T, ) HSE

M 1

VS OA DRAIO

IPage 3ll I I I I 1 - I


IFIGM'RE 3-34 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSUREe VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-337

. . R4J6LFIXED 2--DG--

. .. . . ----

- ,-

0)m

SAN

MEL



Page 3-38

. rW! !M IXm 2- EDGEBSI

I I I I-1

I 2 3 4 S 4G ? S 9 2t0• $ 4 S ? * 2 3a 4 S 6 7 $9 3 1

LOAD DURATION, T, NSEC

FEGUTRE 3-36 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESS•,ESVS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-39

B4

'CAM.• SAM) T1nC91M

I logo

oIs

0- ' .---..-

2 3 4 567 2 3 4 S ?6 on 2 3 a £ I 1 910O



Page 3-40

............

. . .. . . .... ...

P4

qr"

LOAD DURATION, T, NSEC

FIGURE 3-38 ALLOWABLE PEAK SHOCK PRESSURES~VS LOAD DURATION

Page 3-41

100

fVe " 3,000 psal. 30 0

60 AmorPlercdug - - -- 20.0

50 cmosact k - 1.0 15.0

40- - -1.0Io j i '• i~, - I--- --46.0

. 30 - 4.0

200_ "2 0 --. t .

10.

00..l .O ... . .AII -

3

2C

2000 4.000 6000 WOO0

STlKI-- VELOCITY, Vs, fps

FIGURE 3-39 uEEHM'ATION DOM~ VS STRIKIN VELOCITY

Page 3-~42

* ~~400,nL .

200

100 .

60 i

42i SPALi

30~~ -- 1 ----

8.10..-: ;

.2 .3 .4 .6 .8 1 2 3 4 68 10 20 30 40 60 lOC

STANDOFF DISTANCE, R. FT

FIGUR 3-40 DESIGN CRAMR WEIG~r VERSS STANDOFF DISTANCE(BARE CWAGE)

Page 3-43

200 -

so

60 9

30 o

"M'20 15

: -•- ... .. 4 :: - .z .101

.-. . . . .... .....*. ... . , , -3 ..-. ...•

____...._ _.,_._..__.._.._,__ -- .11 .2 .3 .4 .6 .8 1' 2 3 4 6 8 10 20 30 40 60 100

STANDOFF DISTAKCE, R. FT

FIGURE 3-41 DRSECSI NCARCE WRICHT VeRSUS STANDOFF DISTAHCE(CASED CGARGES)

Page 3-44

DA3 3-1 VVIVAIIC tPBE3W33! OF 12-ZNU CUVZILUV3 SW

W=T sU - a-i UzsuTu 8!IVVUELg. 3 NUMMAL *MODif. -- 13 L5./KN' MIS

IOL X 100- 1.73 9.59 8S.60

OL, X 12E 1.21 4.63 123.26

1O0? -14 - 0.88 2.SO 167.77

10?. ] 168 0.68 1.46 219.12

L...Wall kengthn.P .aei 3-t

-0 Page 3-45

OMRW 3-2 D7NAISC PROP3MM3 OFv 8TJ5!lVM DI"VDZN WALL FIXRD WO-SID3rS

NAM 13 UIMN8U 3Nn81sNC3 SIvVM58 NAM.U- L nU QiUENCTDY. psi mm./1 f3

10I, X 1O 8.61 27.20 47.63

10I, X 12H 7.22 21.39 54.15

IOL 1 14H 6.23 19.08 57.67

10, 1 16H S.61 17.33 60.84

12L X 1OU 7.27 20.91 54.78

12L X 128 5.98 13.12 68.58

12L X 14H 5.15 11.19 74.76

12L X 16H 4.53 9.S2 81.49

14L X 1OH 7.27 17.63 60.00

14L X 10 S..19 10.48 77.28

141L X 14H 4.39 7.08 93.35

14L X 16H 3.86 6.11 101.07

16L X 10H 5.56 15.82 63.66

16L X 125 4.57 8.92 84.25

161L X 14H 3.89 5.83 103.51

16L X 168 3.36 4.15 121.92

18L I 10H 5.11 14.69 66.36

18L X 12H 4.08 8.02 89.22

18L X 14H 3.47 5.01 112.27

18L X 16H 3.02 3.50 133.47

W...Wall lengthH...Wall height

Page 3-46

MAUM 3-3 DIMOEZ PROWS2•IMU OF INNIEIAL DVDZ8G Ul& FIXBD !33RR3 SDES

wam stss £213u m RUSISUTNC s8!? -3 WdVM 73UMC12. pSI TA/l um

101, 1 10H 20.86 211.77 18.11

10!. I 123 19.60 186.25 19.52

101, X 148 18.59 166.87 20.77

10., X 16H 17.75 189.66 19.S9

122. X I10 16.37 110.74 24.75

122. X 122 14.49 102.13 26.07

12!. X 14H •13.74 91.63 27.78

12!. X 16H 13.13 83.33 29.33

14!. X 103 13.40 63.97 32.20

14!. ; 12H 11.79 59.06 33.96

14!. X 145 10.64 S5.13 35.49

14!. X 165 10.17 50.19 37.50

16! X 109 11.27 39.87 40.28

16!. X 12H 9.91 36.69 42.66

16L I 14H 8.90 34.32 44.61

16!. X 165 8.15 32.31 46.35

18!. I O1 9.67 27.35 48.04

18L X 12H 8.51 24.16 S2.06

18I, X 14H 7.64 22.54 54.58

18!. X 16H 6.95 21.28 56.70

W...Vatl lengthH...Uall height

Page 3-47

2A= 3-4 anhlamin OIB3Al •PoMU ccmaasou( 1)

NAMBEIAL tam3!ZO asU3U=C3

/u1D STZUN? pLh 1.90 2T5-1300FIG=RI 5-29

am 40.00 KSO-1300FIGURI 4-81

¢UCOPJ? - 7.7w 83 NOtM 3

Ttf - 10.20 2t5-1300

D2. 4-204

T* - 11,76 TM5-1300RQ. 4-207

(1) Based on 8-inch HE projectile design fragment.

a. Weight of fragment = 3.44 oz

b. Striking velocity - 4,450 feet/second

c. Xf a (Constant k)(Xf from Figure 3-39) kmO.70 for ml2d steel- (0.70) (11.0) - 7.7"

Page 3-48

4.0 BLASM PUBSSURN PUMIMCIOK

4.1 m i11

During the study it became apparent that the development of a usefulguide mut be based on simplified methods in predicting the blast loading.Installation personnel must not be burdened with tedious complicatedprocedures in estimating the blast loading requrLed for analyzing existingfacilities with SDWs. These installations do not have the necessary softwareto accomplish such a tasm, neither it is expected that they perform such acomplicated engineering function. The approach then, was arriving at a methodto reasonably predict the blast effects at a specified standoff.

4. 2 UM RPM =ism TMU M IIRTL 3

Facilities with Substantial Dividing Walls can, for the most part, beclassified as building with multiple bays. Generally, the building footprintincludes a common corridor between the cubicle bays and the building exterior.

Most building exteriors, including the roofs, are of lightweight material thatcan be classified as "frangible" elements. Recent studies have shown thatblast wave reflection occurring even with the lightest frangible material.a blast wave from an explosion in a donor bay will reflect and diffract aroundthe corners and into adjacent bays. Prediction of loadings on the structuralelemens in a donor bay is usually possible. In fact the draft TM5-1300provides adequate data to predict the blast loadings. However, procedures forpredicting initial or reflected shock wave loading in corridors of structureshaving such complex gemetry is not presently available.

4.3 Ran nOzNG rMICDION

As previously addressed, methods to predict blast loadings in multiplebay facilities is not presently available. In development of this quide,several procedures in evaluating blast effects were considered. These methodsrang"ed from blast loads in tunnels to methods described in T)S-1300. It wasconcluded, upon review of these methods, that blast effects at a standoff froma domor bay can best be predicted, to reasonable accuracy, using the comuterprgam "SHOCK" reference f. The greatest challenge was the prediction of theblast loads from the reflective surfaces in a cubicle bay assuming noaccessability to computer softwares. After a significant computer runs using"SHOCo" were made, the following were noted:

a. The incident wave shook pressure and scaled shook impulse on the blastsurface in question Is obtained from T4S-1300, Figure 2-7 (Shock WaveParameters in free air).

b. The shock pressure and scaled shock impulse from the reflectivesurfaces is approximately of the same order of magnitude as the incident wavescaled shock impulse.

c. The shock pressure from the reflective surfaces is also of the sameorder of magnitude as the incident pressure.

Page 4-1

d. the ima m average shock pressure on the element in question is the

largest of All pressure values.

*. The total scaled impulse is the sum of the reflecting surfaces valuesand the incident wave value.

f. -the impulse duration on tbe, last surface is calculated using the

traditional fogmula0 T - (2) (L'")/Pr

The preceding suggests that a reasonable total impulse from all reflectivesurfaces would be the incident wave impulse of the element in question

mltiplied by the total number of reflective surfaces. This total reflectiveimpalee when added to the Incident wave impulse of the element in question,would result in a reasonable value for design.

Fo the preceding it became apparent that multipliers (pressure andImpulse coefficient) may be necessary to wore accurately duplicate the resultsof blast loadings obtained fro the program •SnOCK* To determine thesemultipliers, several "SHOCK" runs were made In which the net explosive weightand the wall size were varied. The results were reduced to the data pointspresented in Figures 4-1 and 4-2. Shown in these figures are the multipliersrequired to bring the predicted pressures and Lpulses to those obtained frothe program *SHOCK". The data points were enveloped by an upper and lowerbound curves. Using the upper bound curve would be too conservative since theattenuation effects from the Intervening walls have not been considered. &method to reasonably estimate the blast effects of intervening wall effectsis presently not available. Therefore, using a mean curve would be mostappropriate for usage in the development of the guide.

Based on the preceding, the following method will therefore be used in

predicting the pressure and duration on the cubicle wall in question:

a. Determine the scaled distance, Z-R/ 1 '/3, to the element in question.

b. Determine the reflective pressure (pr), and scaled impulse (ir/W1/3)

from Figure 4-3.

c. Determine total scaled impulse L/W 1 / 3 - Ir/N1/ 3 + (4)(ir/wl/ 3 ).

d. Read from Figures 4-1 and 4-2 the reflection pressure and Impulsecoefficients respectively.

e. Multiply the reflective pressure from step b above by the pressurecoefficient from stop c.

f. Multiply the total scaled impulse from step c above by the impulsecoefficient from step c.

g. Multiply the predicted scaled impulse from step e above by W1/ 3 todetermine the predicted impulse (id)

h. Calculate load duration, T= 2 1r/pr.

Page 4-2

L. D•.•ign parameter.: Pressure... from step-.Load Durat4ion ... om stop ho

Page 4-3

0 Jib li vd*. "/44*o4

* •e0* 0 * .1

CC

>0 .

'0

Ii

f,)

ul

1.4

A 0 0 V3 - rz

'3 Pag 4-4~t3

CA.

00

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'M31UARO UnSZH~lNojjR00

Page 4-4

'AO

a; * * *

0040

600

I.

3c'%4

M~c 0

.2I &iimu mdiHlz a

Page 4-

100,000-

50,000 Pr = Peak reflected pressure, psi

-ir/1 3 - Scaled Reflected Impulse

psi-msllbs10,000

5,000) ir/W YSPr

1,000

500

IdI

1o0

10

5

0.5

0.1 -11 1 1 t

0.1 0.5 1 5 10 50 t00

SCALED DISTANCE, Z=R/W/-%

Figure 4-3 SHOCK WAVE PARAMETERS

Page 4-6

methods to stregthen SlD for increased blast resistance were considered.Two feasible alternates are suggested in Volume I of this guide. The proposedcncepts , if used, will allow positioning operators closer to the remotelycontrolled donor bay. ilementation of these concepts must receive approvalby DOnS staff elements, and must be designed by qualified engineers. Designverification and detailing must also include analysis of all stxucturalelements protecting the operators, such as roof and wall elements, Since mostSDW bay •ae open to a c-amon corridor, the spillover pressure around the frontmust be determined to ensure personnel are not exposed to pressures in excessof 2.3 psi.

In Volume I strengthening of mlils is discussed. Stroegthening of roofs ismore complex due to the different types of roofs that may ba exist on theinstallations. Older facilities have been constructed of corrugated cementasbestos roofing. heoe types of roofs are expected to fail at about 6 psLoverpressure, reference g. For the higher quantities of explosive the" roofsmay not be adequate to resist the spillover pressures. One method tostrengthen to roofs is by upgrading using properly designed steel deck toresist the blast loadings.

S.2 PORMMA. SUwM

Portable shelters are one method in protecting operators when the safetyrequuirements has been exceeded. At the present, standard portable sheltersare not in the inventory. Shelters designed for a specific blast loadingconditions have been designed and used on some Amy munition facilities.MLssissipi AP and Kansas AAP have used fixed-in-place shelters to protectoperators during the performance of hazardous operations. These to ourknowledge were for small quabtities of explosives. The bottom line is, thefeasibility in using portable shelters must be on case-by-case basis anddesigned to a predetermined set of blast loads.

S. 3 oPRAt•oR PRCoB.eno VI KIM M;= FMRNMMS

During a remote operation, personnel most be protected from spilloverpressure as well an fragments. The low angle high velocity fragments areresisted by intervening SDWs located between the operator and the donor bay.On the other hand, the high angle low velocity fragments must be resisted bythe structural system over the occupied bay. Most roofing systems exLsiting onArmy monition facilities, provides acceptable levels of protection tooccupants from high angle fragments. This is predicated on roof survivabilityfrom spillover pressure. When overpressures on the roof exceeds its loadcarrying capacity, the common method for protection has been the use ofexpanded metal lath positioned under the roof structural support system toprevent hazardous debris from striking the occupants. An alternate systemwould be the use of a "G"ogrid" system. Refer to Volume I for details. Thissystem is better suited for upgrading existing facilities due to ease of

Page 5-1

a•lltLons ad cost benef Lts. Actual application of these systems ust beistnalations L g' L mws, and vast stbeeve proper approvat by DDESS

Plemeents.

Page 5-2

Documents

Usm-=,- pe e · Weights (NEWs) to combinations of intervening 12-inch Substantial Dividing Walls (SDNs) to provide protection to personnel from remote operations where an accidental