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USING DECISION TREES TO DIRECT THE PLANNING THOUGHT-PROCESS:

AN ENHANCEMENT TO THE PLANNING METHODOLOGY

A the.sls p r e ~ e I l t . e d t<>' t h e c ~ a c u l t ? O f t h ~ . c t f ~ ~ \ ArmyCdmmand a h d G e n e ; r a l s t a f f C q l 1 ~ g e i n pa r t i a l

fu l f i l lme ;n to f : t n ~ ; . r ~ g u i r e m e 1 ) . t s fo r thec c c c d e g r ~ e

, " , ' " "" ,"

:. MASTER OF MILITiRh.AAT AND SCIEN9E 'c

byc c

NG KOK WAN "MAJ, SINGAPORE:ARMED c FORCES

B Sc (Hons), Imperial College 'cUniversi tyc of London, 1986

M Sc ( Industr ia l Engr) , Nationa;LU;niversi ty :o f Singapore, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1995

Approved fo r publ ic re lease; dis t r ibut ion i s unl imited .

19951006 015



USING DECISION TREES TO DIRECT THE PLANNING THOUGHT-PROCESS:

AN ENHANCEMENT TO THE PLANNING METHODOLOGY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staf f College in par t i a l

ful f i l lment of the requirements for thedegree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

NG KOK WAN, MAJ, SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

B Sc (Hons), Imperial College, University of London, 1986M Sc (Indust r ia l Engr) , National University of Singapore, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1995

Approved for public re lease; distr ibut ion i s unlimited.

Accesion For

NTIS CRM"I

OTIC TlIB

Una.Jnounced

Justification

By---------------------

Distribution I

Dist

ft-(

Availability Co

Avail and ISpecial



MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Ng Kok Wan

Thesis Ti t l e : Using Decision Trees to Direc t the Planning Thought-

Process: An Enhancement to th e Planning Methodology.

Approved by:

O ~ 1 . t ~ , Thesis Committee Chairman= - ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ - = - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - -

~ ~ ~ ____~ ~ ~ ~ ____~ = - = - ________________ Memberarc G. Mil le r , B.B.A.

Accepted t h i s 2nd day of June 1995 by:

~ ~ ~ ~ _~ = - ' _ ~ t11__ ___~ ~ ~ = -_________________ Direc tor , Graduate DegreeP h i ~ . diDokes, Ph.D. Programs

Th e opinion and conclusions expressed here in a re those of th e s tudent

au thor and do no t neces sar i ly r ep resen t th e views o f the U.S. Army

Command and General S t a f f College or any o ther governmenta l agency.(References to t h i s s tudy should inc lude the foregoing s ta tement . )

ii



ABSTRACT

USING DECISION TREES TO DIRECT THE PLANNING THOUGHT-PROCESS: AN

ENHANCEMENT TO THE PLANNING METHODOLOGY, by MAJ Ng Kok Wan,

SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES, 11 9 pages .

This s tudy deve lops a plann ing methodology to enhance th e c u r r e n t

procedure fo r analyz ing f r i end ly courses of ac t ion (COAs). I t w i l l

p a r t i c u l a r ly enhance th e way we cons ider enemy unce r t a in ty during

p lann ing .

Operat ions planners do n o t always account fo r poss ib l e enemy r eac t ions

r igor ous ly when formulat ing f r i end ly COAs. To overcome t h i s , th e s tudy

proposes to make th e cons ide r a t ion o f enemy opt ions a more i n t eg ra l pa r t

of the planning methodology.

Th e planning methodology we propose i s b u i l t around th e concept t h a t a

COA can be represented as a branch o f a dec i s ion t r e e . It models the

choice o f f r i end ly opt ions as dec i s ion po in t s and enemy r esponses as

chance even t s . P lanners ' mil i t a ry judgments about p o s s i b l e enemy

ac t ions a re represented as p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Ends ta tes are rank-ordered .

The dec is ion t r ee cons t r uc t i s used to d i r e c t th e conduct o f th e

wargame. I t focuses the p lann ing thought -p rocess on forec los ing enemy

opt ions and inducing th e enemy to t ake ac t ions o f our cho ice . The

dec is ion t r ee i s a l so used as an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l to compare COAs and to

gain i n s i g h t s in to how b e s t to accomplish the miss ion .

This s tudy demons t ra tes th e use o f t h e proposed methodology with abr igade defense scena r io . I t concludes t h a t th e proposed methodologyenhances COA ana lys i s and f a c i l i t a t e s b e t t e r plann ing .

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writ ing t h i s t hes i s has been a very rewarding experience fo r me .

I have been i n t e r es t ed in the app l ica t ion of dec is ion ana lys i s to

t a c t i c a l problems fo r a fe w years . Thinking about the sub jec t and

wri t ing a t hes i s about it, I wa s to d iscover , were e n t i r e ly d i f f e re n t

propos i t ions . I t was through the encouragement and suppor t of many

people t h a t I found the sus tenance to complete t h i s work.

I cannot , in t h i s page, acknowledge a l l who have in one wa y or

ano ther contr ibuted to my t hes i s - the re were too many. I would l i ke to

give spec ia l mention to the fol lowing remarkable people who have made

the d i f fe rence fo r me.

I thank my wife, Boon Chin and my son, Ernes t for t h e i r

sp i r i t ua l suppor t . Without t h e i r suppor t , I would not have succeeded in

any endeavor .

I thank the members of my t h e s i s committee, Dr David Bi t t e r s ,

LTC Larry Ground and LTC Marc M i l l e r . They have given me immense

encouragement and have he lped , in no smal l measure, c l a r i f i ed my

thoughts . Specia l thanks to Dr Bi t t e r s , whose meticulous guidance and

pa t i ence I have corne to admire and would hope to emula te .

iv



TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER

ONE.

TWO.

THREE.

FOUR.

INTRODUCTION

I n t r oduc t ion

Def in i t i on of the Problem

Sign i f i cance of the Study

Scope . . . . . . . .

Limi ta t ions .....Layout o f th e ThesisEndnotes

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT .

I n t r oduc t ion

T ac t i ca l Decis ion-Making Process

Fix ing a Planning Methodology . .

The Problem with th e Synchron iza t ion Matr ix

Fie ld Resea rches . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary of I nves t iga t ion in to the Planning Methodology.

A t t r i b u t e s o f an Id ea l Planning Methodology

Decis ion Analys i s

Conc lus ionEndnotes ....PLANNING METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

I n t r oduc t ion

Decis ion Tree Primer .....Use o f Decision Tree i n T ac t i ca l Problems

A Simple T ac t i ca l Problem . . . . . . . .

Towards th e Proposed Planning Methodology

Endnotes

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

I n t r oduc t ion

OPLAN WHITE .

Courses o f Act ion Analys i sComparison with Analys i s us ing Synchron iza t ion Matr ix

Evalua t ion o f the Proposed Planning Methodology

Conc lus ionEndnotes

v

ii

iii

i v

v i i

1

1

3

6

7

8

911

12

12

12

23

24

28

31

34

35

38

40

43

43

43

46

48

56

58

59

59

60

6991

92

96

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FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IntroductionThe Thesis StatementThe Approach . . . .

Concept of the Proposed Planning Methodology

Applicat ion of the Proposed Planning MethodologyRecommendations . . .

Concluding Remarks

APPENDIX: SAMPLE SYNCHRONIZATION MATRICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

v i

99

99

99

100

10 3

104

10 5

10 6

10 8

117

119



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Table Page

1 . Table of Relat ionship between Steps in Estimate of theSituat ion an d Steps in Tact ical Decision-Making Process 15

Figure

1 . Synchronization Matrix 22

2. Jane 's Decision Tree 44

3. Sketch of the Situat ion: The Division Planning Vignet te 49

4. Decision Tree of the Division Planning Vigne t t e . . . 51

5. Decis ion Tree Construct with Several Decision Cycles 57

6. Sketch of the General Enemy Situat ion .... 61

7. Sketch of the 55th Mechanized Divis ion 's Defense Plan 62

8. Course of Action 1 67

9. Course of Action 2 69

10. Framework of the Decision Tree 77

11. Decision Tree - Branches A to D 79

12. Decision Tree - Branches E to H 84

13. Two-Stage Decision Tree to El i c i t Probabi l i ty Assessment 87

14. The Completed Decision Tree 88

v i i



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In r espec t o f mil i t a ry method, we have, f i r s t l y , Measurement;

secondly, Est imat ion of Quant i ty ; t h i r d l y , Calcu la t ion ;

f our th ly , Balancing of Chances; f i f th ly , Victory .

Su n Tzu, A rt of War

I n t r oduc t ion

Thinking about mil i t a ry opera t ions some 2,500 years ago, Sun

Tz u had found th e need to lay down a plann ing methodology. In h is A rt

of War, he wrote of a four-s tep method t h a t comprises Measurement,

Est imat ion o f Quant i ty , Calcula t ion and Balancing o f Chances.

Working from the Chinese manuscr ip t , l e s t the essence be l o s t

in t r ans la t ion , measurement meant surveying and measurement of th e

ground; es t imat ion of quan t i ty meant es t imate o f s t r eng th and

d ispos i t ion ; ca lcu la t ion meant t h ink ing about enemy moves and own moves;

f ina l ly , balancing of chances meant weighing the opt ions in the l i g h t of

enemy p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 1He as ser ted t h a t the use o f t h i s method would

br ing about v i c t o r y .

Two and a h a l f mil lennia did not d i lu te the re levance of h is

methodology to mil i t a ry plann ing . Th e s teps in the u .S . Army planning

methodology, in f a c t those of most modern armies, bear remarkable

resemblance to t h i s anc ien t method. That Sun Tzu ' s plann ing methodology

s tood the t e s t of t ime t e s t i f i e s to the constancy o f the fundamentals :

the t e r ra in , the enemy and s e l f .

This t h e s i s i s about tw o th ings ; the U.S. Army plann ing

methodology and the c e n t r a l i t y o f th e enemy in it.

1



Mil i ta ry of f ice rs recognize tha t one of the key a c t i v i t i e s in

ba t t l e is th e management of uncer ta in ty and t h a t the key uncer ta in ty on

the b a t t l e f i e l d i s genera ted by th e enemy. War i s a con tes t o f w i l l s .

To bend the enemy to our w i l l , we must fash ion our ac t ions to f rus t ra te

those of the enemy. I t fol lows t h a t a thorough grasp of enemy

in ten t ions i s e s s e n t i a l . The adversary unders tands th i s too. They w i l l

pro tec t t h e i r i n t en t ions from discovery fo r as long as poss ib le .

Indeed, they wi l l even t ake s teps to ac t ive ly deny them to us by the

cunning use of decept ion. Try as we may, we cannot always discover

enemy i n t en t ions .

Consequently , and prudent ly , m i l i t a r y plann ing doc t r ine has

evolved so t h a t it advoca tes plans be based on enemy capab i l i ty r a the r

than i n t en t ions . 2 M i l i t a r y planners wi l l fashion a robus t p lan t h a t

guards aga ins t a l l foreseeable enemy p o s s i b i l i t i e s and r educes

uncer ta in ty by i n i t i a t i ng ac t ions aimed a t discover ing o r , even b e t t e r ,

l im i t ing the adversa ry ' s opt ions .

A plann ing doc t r ine based on enemy capab i l i ty a l so serves a

more important f unc t ion . I t condi t ions the mind of th e commander and

s t a f f to recognize dangers and o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Without t h i s prepara t ion

of the mind, the commander i s l e ss l i k e ly to d iscern emerging pa t t e rns

in th e th ick of b a t t l e . Lacking s i t u a t i o n awareness , the commander i s

more l ike ly to be deceived by the enemy and more hes i t an t to e x p l o i t

good fo r tune if he sees it.

While there i s almost un iver sa l accep tance of t h i s planning

doc t r ine by mil i t a ry s t a f f s p a s t and presen t , h i s to ry i s f i l l ed with

examples of mil i t a ry un i t s being su rp r i s ed by th e enemy. In many o f

these cases , p lanners e i t h e r d id not foresee the f u l l range of enemy

poss i b i l i t i e s or had been menta l ly condi t ioned by a c ra f ty enemy to plan

aga ins t a s ing le enemy i n t en t ion . The former i s due to incompetence and

2



th e l a t t e r i s due to inadequa te planning t h a t pred i sposes one ' s

s u s c e p t ib i l i t y to decep t ion .

His to r i ca l ly , i n t e l l igence fa i lu res have been c i t e d most

f requent lyas

th ereason

fo rbe ing

sur pr i sed ,as i f

t h i s absolves the

opera t ions planners from the ca r d ina l s in o f not fu l ly account ing fo r

enemy p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Mil i ta ry planners should f ind t h i s r eason to

j u s t i f y f a i lu r es unaccep tab le . I f we cannot p r e d i c t enemy in ten t ions or

fo recas t th e outcomes o f b a t t l e , then th e objec t o f mil i t a ry planning

ought to be to th ink through and plan fo r a l l fo reseeab le poss i b i l i t i e s ,

enemy and own.

Def in i t i on o f th e Problem

Motiva t ion

The mot iva t ion fo r th i s t h e s i s i s t h a t ba t t l e f i e l d unce r t a in ty ,

espec ia l ly ~ h a t posed by the enemy, i s inadequate ly cons idered in the

planning process . Severa l observa t ions l ed to t h i s pe r cep t ion .

Planning s t a f f s appear to have unconsc ious ly b u i l t plans based

on enemy in ten t ions r a ther than enemy capab i l i ty . Planners tend to

i den t i fy the "Most Likely Enemy Course o f Action" f a i r ly e a r l y in the

p lann ing p rocess , usua l ly a t a s t age where i n t e l l igence has not

developed the s i t u a t i o n adequate ly . Although t h i s i s only a sub jec t ive

judgment to f a c i l i t a t e plann ing , p lanners of t en take it as f a c t and base

f r i end ly courses of ac t ion so le ly on what i s perce ived to be the enemy

i n t e n t i o n .3 This tendency to exclude th e p o s s ib i l i t y of o the r enemy

in ten t ions locks planners in to a s ing le t r a in o f thought .

Given th e unce r t a in ty , it i s qu i te remarkable t h a t most

f r i end ly courses of ac t ion (COAs) do not cons i s t of more cont ingency o r

branch plans . So ld i e r s o f t en lament t h a t the plan does not surv ive the

f i r s t con tac t with the enemy. This be ing the percept ion, perhaps we

should make plans t h a t are more robus t aga ins t enemy r e a c t i o n s . In t h i s

3



work, we wi l l propose t h a t a f r i end ly eOA i s only complete when it

cons i s t s o f the main branch and several o ther branches t ha t counterac t

poss ible enemy r eac t ions .

The most r e a l i s t i c mil i t a ry t r a in ing i s a f ree-playing two

s ided s imula t ion exercise with a supe r -compe ten t opposing fo rce (OPFOR)

Faced with an i n t e l l i gen t adversary , every planning mis take i s

accen tua ted by ~ l o s s e s " on the ground. Many of the l essons learned t h a t

u n i t s take home r e l a t e to the f a i lu r e to an t i c ipa te what the enemy can

do in th e ~ b a t t l e . " This observa t ion in i t s e l f i s not d is tu rb ing

because u n i t s are supposed to l ea rn from t he i r mistakes in exerc i s es .

But if u n i t a f t e r un i t makes s imi la r mistakes in an area so cen t r a l to

our business , there should be a cause fo r concern.

Problem s ta tement

We pos tu la te t h a t there i s a sys temat ic er ro r in th e planning

methodology; in the way planning s t a f f s are taught to d ea l with enemy

uncer ta in ty when they are bu i ld ing f r i end ly courses o f ac t ion . This

i nab i l i t y to grasp the array of enemy opt ions blocks t he i r ab i l i t y to

bu i ld f lexib le p lans . Observa t ions sugges t t h a t the planning

methodology con t r ibu tes to the tendency fo r s t a f f s to ~ e m b a r k " on a

t r a in of thought t h a t i s on a s ing le t r ack to a f ina l product : a

synchronized opera t ions plan.

In def ining the problem, we have a gl impse of a poss ib le

so lu t ion . Taking th e analogy fu r ther , it i s not the f a u l t of the t r a in

but the people who l ay the t r acks . In t ry ing to f ix the t r a in , we would

have missed the po in t . We th ink t h a t th e t racks should be l a id through

a l l foreseeable enemy courses of ac t ion . The planning methodology

should promote t r ave l through a l l these p a r a l l e l t r acks . Th e

des t ina t ion should pe rhaps be a robus t plan of act ion r a the r than j u s t

one t h a t i s synchronized. Having thought through the enemy opt ions a t

4



var ious s tages o f the ba t t l e , th e commander a lso wi l l be menta l ly b e t t e r

condi t ioned to i n f luence the b a t t l e .

The Planning Methodology

In th e U.S. Army context , the Tact ica l Decision-Making Process

(TDMP) i s the doc t r ina l ly prescr ibed procedure fo r solving mil i t a ry

problems. I t i s the thought process tha t underg i rds the planning

ac t i v i t y ca l l ed the Est imate of the Si tua t ion . Associa ted with th e

Est imate of the Si tua t ion i s a planning methodology t h a t sought to

produce a plan o f ac t ion to so lve a t a c t i c a l problem given a mission by

the higher headquar te r s .

The Est imate of the Si tua t ion i s a four-s tep pr ocess . I t

s t a r t s with Mission Analys i s , fol lowed by Course of Action Development,

Course of Action Analys is and f i n a l l y the Decis ion. This process w i l l

be descr ibed fu r ther in Chapter Two.

In t h i s work, we a re i n t e r es t ed in th e Courses of Action

Analys is (COA Analys is) s t ep . I t i s here t ha t de ta i l ed plann ing o f th e

. courses of act ion occurs . For b r e v i t y , the planning methodology t h a t

ac tua l ly spans the whole Est imate w i l l r e f e r to t h a t p a r t of the

methodology t ha t accompanies th e COA Analys is s tep .

Th e purpose o f the COA Analys is s tep i s to t ake the broad

concepts of pos s ib le f r i end ly courses of ac t ion and develop each of them

in to de ta i l ed plans of ac t ion . I t also pro jec t s poss ib le future

outcomes of each plan . One of these plans eventua l ly w i l l be se lec ted

by the commander fo r execu t ion .

The a c t i v i t i e s t h a t take place during the COA Analys is involve

or gan iza t ion of in format ion , modeling o f uncer t a in t i e s , app l ica t ion o f

judgment, ana lys i s and eva lua t ion of opt ions and prepara t ion fo r a

dec i s ion . These are the exact areas for which the d i sc i p l i n e of

dec i s ion ana lys i s prov ides t oo l s . I t i s a t th e i n t e r f ace between th e

5



mil i t a ry t ac t i ca l dec is ion-making process and dec is ion ana lys i s t h a t we

wi l l begin our search fo r a poss ib le so lu t ion to the problem t h a t we

have j u s t def ined.

Primary and Secondary Quest ions

The pr imary ques t ion of the t h e s i s i s : Ca n we use a dec is ion

ana lys i s approach to enhance th e cur ren t method of analyz ing f r i end ly

courses of ac t ion , p a r t i c u l a r ly when dea l ing with enemy uncer ta in ty ,

.during the Est imate o f the S i t u a t i o n process?

Th e primary ques t ion yields the fol lowing secondary ques t ions :

1. What are the perce ived inadequac ies of the cur ren t method

and are they widely observed?

2. What a re the cons ide r a t ions in designing an i d e a l method of

ana lys i s?

3. What are the enhancements brought about by th e proposed

method?

Signi f icance of the Study

The s tudy has tw o d i s t i nc t p a r t s . Th e f i r s t p a r t i s the

development of a list of a t t r i b u t e s of an i d e a l planning methodology.

Surveying ex tan t l i t e r a t u r e and s t a r t i n g from f i r s t pr inc ip les , we w i l l

t ake a f resh look a t what a planning methodology should do fo r mil i t a ry

planne r s . This list o f a t t r i b u t e s can be used as a s t a r t i n g po in t fo r

f u r t h e r research on areas r e l a t ed to t a c t i c a l plann ing .

The second p a r t o f th e s tudy develops and recommends an

enhancement to the cur ren t u.S. Army plann ing methodology. I t

spec i f ica l ly addresses the perce ived inadequacy of the presen t planning

methodology to dea l with enemy uncer ta in ty . The proposed method w i l l

use dec is ion t r ees to nudge planners in to th inking through a l l enemy

opt ions a t var ious s tages of th e plan . Th e rearrangement o f thought

6



sequences i s aimed a t promoting i n s igh t s across the enemy opt ion

domain. 4 This idea w i l l be developed a t l ength in t h i s t h e s i s .

Although the proposed way of using dec i s ion t r ee as an a id to solving

t ac t i ca l problem i s by no means new, i t s s ign i f icance when s e t in th e

context of a plann ing methodology has no t been appr ec i a t ed . This t hes i s

w i l l demonstra te th e u t i l i t y of dec i s ion t r ees as p a r t o f the planning

methodology.

Scope

I t i s probably benef i c i a l to s t a t e here what t h i s t hes i s i s not

about . Although it invo lves an app l ica t ion of dec i s ion theory , the

proposed methodology i s not mathemat ical . Th e depth o f mathemat ica l

unders tanding requi red i s well within the grasp of a l l mil i ta ry

o f f i c e r s .

Th e proposed methodology i s also not about quant i fying the

outcomes of th e f r i end ly courses of ac t ion . Th e use o f numbers ( tha t

i s , probab i l i t i e s and scores given to outcomes) in th e proposed

methodology seeks to sharpen th e dec i s ion maker ' s apprec ia t ion o f th e

bounds of r ea l i t y and not y ie ld a dec i s ion d i r e c t l y . In o t h e r words,

the use of numbers i s a means not an end.

I t i s also not within the scope of t h i s s tudy to look a t

knowledge e l i c i t a t i o n a t any l eng th . This can be a sub jec t o f future

s tudy . In t h i s work, the method of quant i fying mil i t a ry judgments i s

d i r e c t assignment of va lues on var ious decimal sca les .

This work i s not about automating the dec is ion support system

(DSS) al though th elist

of a t t r i b u t e s o f an i d e a l planning methodology

can be he lp fu l to DSS developers .

7



Limita t ions

Th e research for t h i s t hes i s i s based e n t i r e ly on open source,

unc lass i f i ed l i t e r a t u r e . As an i n t e rna t iona l o f f i c e r , the au thor ' s

percept ion of the inadequacies of the plann ing methodology comes from

severa l sources :

1. Unclas s i f i ed mate r ia l such as p a s t Master of Mil i t a ry A rt

ans Sc ience t he se s , Army Research I ns t i t u t e t echn ica l r epor t s , U.S. Army

Fie ld Manuals, U.S. Army Command and Genera l Sta f f Col lege i n s t r u c t i o n a l

mater ia l and U.S. Army per iod ica l s .

2. P r a c t i c a l planning exerc i ses with U.S. Army s tuden t s during

the Command and General S t a f f Of f i ce r s ' Course and conversa t ions with

U.s . Army of f ice rs with experience e i t h e r as p a r t i c i p a n t s or c o n t r o l l e r /

observers a t the Nat ional Tra in ing Center .

3. Observat ions from th e Cente r fo r Army Lessons Learned

(CALL) database .

Informat ion gleaned from these sources i s taken to be

i nd ica t ive of the cur ren t t r ends in U.S. Army t a c t i c a l planning.

However, not having been phys ica l ly p resen t in t ac t i ca l plann ing

s i t u a t i o n s of ac tua l un i t s under f i e ld cond i t ions , th e author l acks

awareness of th e spec i f i c con tex t in which the inadequacies occur . So

the s tudy cannot address deeper i s sues tha t may have been the r oo t of

the problem. Thus, the re i s a poss i b i l i t y t h a t the proposed so lu t ion

w i l l not address th e problem as h o l i s t i c a l l y as one would l i k e .

On the o ther hand, viewing the U.S. Army plann ing doc t r ine from

the out s ide does confer cer t a in advantages . Living outs ide the paradigm

sometimes prov ides a new perspec t ive . However, one has to recognize

t h a t there a re l imi t a t ions to the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a l te rna t ive

perspec t ives . The o u t s id e r ' s so lu t ion may not always be r i g h t fo r the

i n s ide r .

8



One can specu la t e t h a t perhaps u.s. Army t a c t i c a l plann ing has

focused excess ive ly on synchroniza t ion s ince th e promulgat ion o f AirLand

Bat t l e Doctr ine and t h a t the re ma y a need to balance t h i s t r end by

sh i f t ing towards deeper cons iderat ion of enemy capab i l i ty dur ing

planning. This i s the o u t s id e r ' s perspec t ive .

I t i s equa l ly p laus ib le t h a t perhaps what i s r i g h t fo r now i s

j u s t synchroniza t ion because the u.s. Army i s quan t i t a t ive ly and

q u a l i t a t i v e ly ahead of a l l its l i k e ly adversa r ies . Mistakes made in the

es t ima t ion of enemy i n t e n t can be redeemed r ap id ly a t lo w c o s t through

super io r speed and f i repower. I f t h i s i s c o r r e c t , then th e premise of

th e t h e s i s w i l l be f lawed. This i s th e l imi t a t ion of t aking the

o u t s id e r ' s view.

This by no means diminishes th e value o f t h i s work. An

appr ec i a t ion o f a l te rna t ive perspec t ives always adds c l a r i t y to the

reasons why one i s doing something r i g h t . I t also a l e r t s one to the

changes in s i t u a t i o n t h a t wi l l cause th e a l t e r n a t i v e perspec t ives to be

r e levan t .

Layout o f th e Thes is

This chap te r provided the in t roduc t ion to the problem t ha t

motivated the t h e s i s . I t def ined what th e s tudy hopes to improve and

ou t l ined the s t r a t egy to do it.

In Chapter Two, Li te r a tu re Survey and Concept Development, we

sh a l l survey the tw o pr inc ipa l areas on which th e top ic converges: The

U.S. Army Tact ica l Decision-Making Process and the d i sc i p l i n e of

dec is ion a n a l y s i s . Asser t ions made in the I n t r oduc t ion chapter , wi l l be

cons idered in grea te r de t a i l . Through ana lys i s of the mater ia l

surveyed, we w i l l develop a list of a t t r i bu t e s fo r an i d e a l planning

methodology. Th e list wi l l be the yards t ick with which we w i l l measure

the enhancements t h a t th e proposed plann ing methodology can br ing .

9



Chapter Three , Planning Methodology Development, develops the

idea o f using decis ion t r ees to dea l with enemy uncer ta in ty when

planners bu i ld f r i end ly courses o f ac t ion . I t w i l l i l l u s t r a t e , through

the use of a shor t v igne t t e , the benef i t s o f r ep resen t ing enemy

uncer ta in ty in t h i s way. This chap te r wi l l conclude with the proposa l

o f a planning methodology tha t we env i s ion wi l l enhance the cur ren t u . s .

Army planning methodology.

Chapte r Four presen ts a Case s tudy Analys is . Th e proposed

planning methodology developed in the previous chapter w i l l be appl ied

to a br igade defense scenar io as an i l l u s t r a t i o n . OPLAN WHITE, a

scenar io employed as p a r t of the t ac t i c s curr iculum o f the U.S. Army

Command and Genera l S ta f f Off icer Course , w i l l be used in an app l ica t ion

of the proposed method. Th e po ten t ia l o f the new method w i l l be

eva lua ted.

Chapter Five , Conclusions and Recommendations, w i l l h igh l igh t

the f indings o f the s tudy and recommend areas for fu ture s t u d i e s .

10



Endnotes

'With c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sub t l e ty of the Chinese language, Sun Tzu

used one ideogram to descr ibe each s tep of t h i s method. The four words

are du, meaning to measurement or survey; l i ang , means to es t imate

quan t i ty ; shu, to ca lcu la t e or count ; cheng, to weigh.

2 In th i s context , enemy capab i l i ty means what the enemy i s

capable of doing. It i s based on the t e r r a in , weather , s t r eng th , the

capab i l i ty o f h is weapon sys tems and o ther r e levan t f ac to r s . An enemy

i n t en t ion i s one of the ways the enemy propose to a c t . Thus, each enemy

course of ac t ion desc r ibe s one of th e poss ib le enemy i n t en t ion .

Conceptual ly , the re fo re , enemy capab i l i ty encompasses a l l poss ib le enemy

i n t en t ions .

3 Each enemy course of ac t ion desc r ibe s ac t ions the enemy w i l l

adopt given an i n t en t ion . In t h i s context , we can use Enemy Course of

Action and Enemy In ten t ion in te rchangeably .

4 We coined th e phrase Enemy Option Domain to mean the s e t of

opt ions open to the enemy given a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n .

11



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE SURVEY AND CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

... we are pr i soner s of our mental images about what we t h ink

might happen in the fu tu re . I f we have not thought about it,

we wi l l not consider it.1

I n t r oduc t ion

Th e purpose o f t h i s chapter i s th reefo ld : F i r s t , we w i l l

survey th e s t a t e of the tw o pr inc ipa l areas on which the top ic

converges: Tact ica l Decision-Making Process (TDMP) and Dec is ion

Analysis (DA). In th e sec t ion on TDMP, we w i l l descr ibe the planning

methodology in cu r ren t U.S. Army doc t r ine . We w i l l then di scuss th e

d i sc ip l ine of dec i s ion ana lys i s with p a r t i c u l a r focus on dec i s ion t r e e s .

Second, we wi l l look in to records t ha t d e t a i l problems

experienced by use r s of th e cur r en t plannirrg methodology. This wi l l

e s t a b l i sh whether i t s inadequacies , as perce ived in the Problem

Def in i t i on sec t ion in Chapter One, e x i s t . This wi l l prov ide cues as to

what enhancements are necessary .

Third, we wi l l formula te a s e t o f a t t r i b u t e s o f an i d e a l

planning methodology. This w i l l be the ya r ds t i ck of our compara t ive

s tudy. Analysis o f cur r en t and proposed methodologies wi l l be based

upon these a t t r i b u t e s .

Tact ica l Decision-Making Process

Foundat ion o f TDMP

The US Army advoca tes a sys temat ic approach, grounded in the

sc i en t i f i c method, to solve t a c t i c a l problems. Known as th e Tact ica l

12



Decision-Making Process , t h i s seeks to apply thorough, c l e a r and

unemotional ana lys i s of f ac t s and assumptions while recogniz ing the need

fo r an i n f us ion of ba t t l e exper ience and mil i t a ry judgment . Thus, th e

US Army has t r a d i t i o n a l l y viewed m i l i t a r y dec is ion making as both

sc ience and a r t .2

TDMP cons i s t s o f s ix broad s teps :3

Step 1. Recognize and def ine th e problem.

Step 2. Gather f ac t s and make assumptions to determine the

scope of and th e so lu t ion to problems.

Step 3. Develop poss ib le so lu t ions .

Step 4. Analyze each s o l u t i o n .

Step 5. Compare the outcome o f each so lu t ion .

Step 6. Selec t th e bes t so lu t ion a v a i l a b l e .

Th e Art and Science of TDMP

There a re s teps within t h i s process , such as S teps 4 and 5,

t h a t are r ead i ly and e f f i c i en t l y dea l t with by sc i en t i f i c ana lys i s .

Other s teps , espec ia l ly Step 3, require a s t ronger blend of c r e a t i v i t y -

the realm o f mil i t a ry a r t .

Step 6, Selec t ion o f the Best Solu t ion , i s the f i n a l ob jec t ive .

Th e use of the term "bes t " sugges t s a sc i en t i f i c procedure o f

opt imiza t ion towards cer t a in goa l s . In r ea l i t y , these goal s are by no

means t ang ib le or s imple to quan t i f y . Various i n v e s t i g a t i o n s in to what

they should be and even whence they should be der ived , d id no t turn up

un iver sa l ly accepted so lu t ions .4

Some of the sugges ted goals (a lso

known as se lec t ion c r i t e r i a ) are ease of suppor t by var ious combat

elements of the Ba t t l e f i e ld Operating System or f ac to r s such as expected

c a su a l t i e s , dur a t ion of ba t t l e and l ike l ihood o f success . Th e dec is ion

maker w i l l probably need to cons ider a l l these f ac to r s and perhaps more.

However, the re la t ive degree of importance o f each f ac to r could not be

13



p r e c i s e l y determined . Consequent ly , th e s e l e c t i o n o f a b e s t so lu t ion

could be viewed as an a r t .

From t h i s discuss ion of the a r t and sc ience o f the dec is ion

process , one sees t h a t dec is ion sc ience only prov ides t o o l s to

f ac i l i t a t e decision-making. In the complex mil i t a ry environment ,

app l ica t ion o f decis ion-making too l s cannot produce a dec i s ion .

Considerable syn thes i s t akes p lace in the deci s ion-maker ' s mind a f t e r

the var ious ou tpu t o f decis ion-making too l s are made a v a i l a b l e . Thus,

sc i en t i f i c ana lys i s i s the b r idge between tw o crea t ive processes : the

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of poss ib l e so lu t ions ( a l t e rna t ives ) and th e dec is ion

i t s e l f . S c i e n t i f i c ana lys i s in TDMP should aim to :

1 . Arrange an unst ruc tured problem in to a l o g i c a l framework by

which ana lys i s can proceed.

2. Account sys t ema t i ca l ly fo r known f a c t s , assumptions and

unce r t a in ty .

3. Pr o jec t th e consequences o f dec is ion made.

4. Presen t c lea r ly i n t e r a c t i o n s among inf luenc ing f ac to r s .

5 . Allow the app l ica t ion of sub jec t ive mil i t a ry judgment.

We sh a l l draw on these poin t s again in developing th e c r i t e r i a

fo r comparison l a t e r in t h i s chapter .

Est imate o f th e Si tua t ion

The Est imat ion o f the Si tua t ion has been th e doc t r ina l ly

accepted means o f t a c t i c a l dec is ion making in th e US Army s ince 1909. 5

I t wa s conceived as an planning a c t i v i t y t h a t "culminates in a dec is ion

upona

def in i t e plan o f a c t i o n . " Since 1932, th eUS

Army Fie ld Manual,

FM 101-5, has descr ibed the mil i t a ry decis ion-making process and the

Estimate o f the S i t u a t i o n . From a " t r a in o f thought sequence" in 1932

vers ion o f FM 101-5, the procedure fo r the Es t imat ion o f the Si tua t ion

evolved in to an e labor a t e problem solving methodology. Although the

14



employment of the sc i en t i f i c method had been the bas i s of the es t imate

process ea r l i e r , it wa s only in the 1968 vers ion of FM 101-5 t ha t TDMP

in i t s cur ren t form wa s f i r s t advocated fo r t h i s planning a c t i v i t y .

Est imate o f the Si tua t ion cons i s t s o f four s t eps which

corresponds with the TDMP as shown in Table 1 .

Est imate of the Si tua t ion Tac t ica l Decision-Making Process

Step l. Mission Analys is . Step l. Recognize and def ine

problems.

Step 20 Gather f ac t s and make

assumptions.

Step 2 . Course of Action Step 3 . Develop poss ib le so lu t ions .

Development.

Step 30 Course o f Action Step 40 Analyze each so lu t ion .

Analys is ( including a

comparison of courses Step 5 . Compare the s o l u t i o n s .

of ac t ion) .

Step 4. Decis ion . Step 6. Se lec t the bes t so lu t ion

ava i lab le .

Table 1. Table of Rela t ionship between Steps in Est imate of th e

Si tua t ion an d Steps in Tac t ica l Decision-Making Process .

In th i s work, we a re i n t e r es t ed in Step 3 in the Est imat ion of

the Si tua t ion a c t i v i t y : Course o f Action Analys is . Cur rent ly , u .S .

Army i s in the p rocess of upda t ing FM 101-5. The most up to da te

descr ip t ion of the Est imate of the Si tua t ion i s found in the CGSC

s tuden t t e x t ST 101-5 Command and S t a f f Decision Processes (Jan 94) . ST

101-5 descr ibes Course of Action (COA) Analys is as a c r i t i c a l ana lys i s

approach t h a t cons i s t s of three main plann ing a c t i v i t i e s : wargaming,

15



r i sk assessment and comparison o f wargaming r e s u l t s . I t s main

ob jec t ives are :

1 . To take the seve r a l broad concep ts genera ted in the eOA

Development s tep of the Est imate of the S i t u a t i o n and develop each of

them in to synchron ized eOAs t h a t are executable .

2 . To gain r e a l i s t i c and de ta i l ed in s igh t s in to poss ib le

b a t t l e f i e l d events and ac t i v i t i e s by v i sua l i z ing the flow o f b a t t l e .

3 . To unders tand the r i sks assoc ia t ed with each course o f

ac t ion .

4. To f ac i l i t a t e dec i s ion making by develop ing dec is ion

suppor t t oo l s .

The main a c t i v i t i e s o f eOA Analys i s w i l l be descr ibed in tu rn .

Wargaming

Th e U.S. Army uses the wargame as the p r i n c i p a l planning

a c t i v i t y . This a t t empts to pro jec t a l t e r n a t e futures brought about by

the adopt ion of d i f f e r e n t eOAs in i n t e r ac t ion with an i n t e l l i g e n t

adversary . Data genera ted by th e wargame a re developed in to dec is ion

support products t h a t f ac i l i t a t e deci-sion making. Th e U.S. Army a lso

uses wargame to bu i ld d e t a i l e d e ~ A . By v i s u a l i z i n g the flow of b a t t l e ,

planners a t t empt to orches t r a te var ious ba t t l e f i e l d elements to apply

overwhelming combat power a t a dec i s ive t ime and place .

Through wargames, planners ga in i n s i g h t . Viewing th e space-

t ime r e la t ionsh ips between b a t t l e f i e l d e n t i t ie s s t imula t e s ideas t ha t

might not otherwise emerge. Therefore, wargames both guides the

p lanne r s ' thought processes and al low them to add f ine sse p r ogr e ss ive ly

to the e ~ A .

At th e s t a r t of the wargame, planners p repare seve r a l poss ib l e

enemy eOAs and more than one f r i end ly eOAs. Enemy eOAs are opt ions

ava i lab le to the enemy based on t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s and c o n s t r a i n t s

16





4. Decide how much d e t a i l to add to the wargame based on t ime

a v a i l a b l e . This impl ies p lanners should n ot s a c r i f i c e breadth fo r

dep th .

From elements elements o f t h i s guide, one concludes t h a t even

if t ime i s a c o n s t r a i n t , planners should not reduce t h e i r plann ing

e f f o r t by downplaying th e most important source of uncer ta in ty on the

b a t t l e f i e l d - the enemy. In prac t i ce , planners do not always observe

t h i s ru le . This could be a t t r ibu ted to an inadequacy in th e cur r en t

planning methodology. Fur ther di scuss ion o f the inadequacies of cur r en t

wargaming procedures w i l l be presented l a t e r in t h i s chap te r .

Assessment o f Risk

The second plann ing a c t i v i t y during eOA Analysis i s r i sk

assessment . Planners seek to minimize tw o types o f r i sk s : l os ing men

and equipment and choosing a eOA t h a t would f a i l to achieve the des i red

r e s u l t .8

ST 101-5 prescr ibes a f i v e - s t e p r i sk assessment procedure in

which planners look fo r condi t ions most l i k e ly to cause mission f a i lu r e

and othe r acc idents ( inc lud ing f r a t i c ide ) when wargaming each e ~ A . The

procedure suggests the use o f a dec i s ion t r ee to d e t e c t hazards

assoc ia t ed with th e eOA.9

Planners can e l imina te unnecessary r i sks by

ad jus t ing the eOA o r imposing measures to minimize exposure to r i sks o r

both . Although ST 101-5 ment ioned the use of dec i s ion t r ees to help

i den t i fy r i sks in the e ~ A , there wa s no demonst ra t ion o f how t h i s could

be done.

Risk assessment i s an i n t eg ra l pa r t of a good plann ing

methodology. Current p lanning methodology, as descr ibed in ST 101-5,

recommends t h a t "p lanners wargame a eOA and then perform r i sk assessment

before they proceed to the next."lO This seem to sugges t t h a t r i sk i s

not con t inua l ly assessed dur ing p lann ing . I f the plann ing p rocess does

18



no t assess th e r i sks as planners conduct the wargame, subsequent

cons ide r a t ion o f r i sk s could wel l be cursory.

Comparison of Wargame Resul t s

A ll e f f o r t dur ing COA Analys is aims to a s s i s t the commander in

decis ion-making. In the u.s. Army, th e wargame plays the c e n t r a l ro le

in analyzing COA. Planners use the wargame and the records of wargame

r e s u l t s to frame th e problem, sys temat ica l ly account fo r a l l r e levan t

in fo rmat ion , pro jec t consequences of dec i s ions , provide a t r ansparen t

framework fo r th e app l ica t ion o f judgment and pr e sen t the r e s u l t s in a

manner t h a t f ac i l i t a t e s dec i s ion . A ll w i l l come to naught if records o f

the wargame do no t por t r ay the ana lys i s cor r ec t ly to the dec i s ion maker.

A po in t planners of ten do not apprec ia te i s t h a t wargame record keeping

i s more than a means to an end; it a f fec t s th e end i t s e l f . The wa y

records are kept in f ac t inf luences the conduct of the wargame.

Recording the Wargame

Some of main purposes and func t ions of wargame records are as

fol lows:

1 . Wargame records capture da ta t h a t w i l l even tua l ly help

planners rank the COAs in terms of t he i r r e l a t i v e mer i t for a dec i s ion .

After a COA has been chosen by the commander, i t s wargame record forms

the bas i s o f the plan of ac t ion .

2. Wargame records of the chosen COA can be s impl i f i ed and

used as dec is ion cues and synchoniza t ion a ids fo r the commander during

the course o f the b a t t l e . The U.S. Army uses the Decis ion Suppor t

Template (DST) and the Synchronizat ion Matr ix from wargame records fo r

t h i s purpose. More e labora te descr ip t ions o f the DST and

Synchronizat ion Matr ix w i l l be presented l a t e r in th i s chap te r .

19



Wargame records should also note poss ib le branches of the COA.

Due to enemy ac t ions , oppor tun i t i es o r cont ingenc ies could a r i s e .

Devia t ions from the plan as a r e s u l t of these s i t u a t i o n s are known as

branches . The ab i l i t y to i den t i fy and note branches in wargame records

enables the commander and planning s t a f f to do th e fo l lowing:

1 . Promote the recogni t ion of a l te rna te fu tures and prepares

the commander to guard aga ins t such e v e n t u a l i t i e s .

2. Evalua te th e f l ex i b i l i t y o f the eOA ( tha t i s , the ab i l i t y

to r e a c t to oppor tun i t i es and con t ingencies ) .

3. Serve as a reminder to plan fo r the branch.

4 . Note the s t a r t i n g assumptions during the development of the

branch plan .

As a l luded to ea r l i e r , th e wargame record ing technique can

inf luence the way wargame i s conducted. Suppose the recorq i s arranged

in a matr ix form. There i s a tenoency for p lanners to work towards

f i l l i ng the nex t box in the mat r ix . The subconscious goal i s to fill

the mat r ix . The record keeping method i s in f ac t the plann ing

methodology. I I I t i s no t undes i rable tha t t h i s should be the case if

the record keeping method (b e it a t ab le or t imel ine) i s th e in tended

way to guide the p lanner s ' thoughts . Conversely , if the cur ren t

planning methodology cons i s t en t ly produces COAs t h a t a re inadequa te in a

p a r t i c u l a r area , for ins tance fa i lu re to an t i c ipa te enemy ac t ions , th e

cause could be the record keeping method. We sh a l l see how record

keeping i s done in the U.S. Army.

ST 101-5 descr ibes two techniques to record th e wargame

r e s u l t s . They are the Nar ra t ive Technique and th e Sketch Note

Technique. Under the Sketch Note t echn ique , planners can make use o f a

wargame worksheet o r a Synchroniza t ion Matr ix . 12The synchroniza t ion

matr ix has become the prefe r red way to record wargame r e s u l t s in th e

U.S. Army and we s h a l l look a t t h i s in de t a i l .

20



Synchronizat ion Matrix

The AirLand Bat t l e doc t r ine adopted by th e US Army in the 1980s

ca l l ed fo r th e synchroniza t ion of combat power as one o f i t s t e n e t s .

Synchronizat ion i s def ined in the U.S. Army caps tone doc t r ina l manual FM

100-5, Opera t ions as " the arrangement of the b a t t l e f i e l d a c t i v i t ie s in

t ime, space and purpose to produce maximum r e l a t i v e combat power a t the

dec i s ive point ."13 Concerned with the lack o f a formal way to apply the

t ene t o f synchroniza t ion in the p lann ing methodology, Long descr ibed a

method to do so in Synchronizat ion of Combat Power a t the Task Force

Level: Defining a Planning Methodology.14 In it, he developed th e format

and use of a Synchronizat ion Matrix. This has s ince been es tab l i shed as

p a r t of th e p lann ing methodology fo r a l l t ac t i ca l - l eve l planning s t a f f s .

Th e synchroniza t ion matr ix i s now used as the pr inc ipa l record keeping

too l dur ing th e wargame.

The Synchronizat ion Matrix concept i s s imple . I t i s a t ab le on

which a l l f r i end ly and enemy b a t t l e f i e l d a c t i v i ti e s are arranged on a

common t imel ine . Th e t ime axis runs hor izon ta l ly across the t a b l e .

Each row of th e t ab le records the a c t i v i t i e s of a combat element (or

Ba t t l e f i e ld Opera t ing System): In te l l igence , Maneuver Forces, Combat

Engineers (normally r e f l ec ted as M obi l i t y /Counte r - mobi l i t y /Sur v iva l ) ,

F i re Support , A ir Defense A r t i l l e r y , Command and Contro l and Combat

Serv ice Support . The format o f the synchroniza t ion matr ix i s

i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 1.

In te l l igence planners w i l l record the i n i t i a l enemy events o f

the enemy COA in f i r s t t imeframe on the synchroniza t ion matr ix .

Planners w i l l then consider f r i end ly ac t ions of a l l combat elements to

counterac t enemy ac t ions and ensure synchroniza t ion. The enemy

r eac t ions to f r i end ly ac t ions wi l l be recorded in the nex t t ime frame

under cons idera t ion . In tu rn , planners cons ider a l l f r i end ly ac t ions

wi thin th i s t imeframe before proceeding to th e nex t . F i l l i n g up the

21



H-X H-HR H+X H+X

TIME

I ENEMY COA

N

NAIT

TAI

E

COLLECTION

L ASSETS

PIR/IR

M SECURITY

A

MAIN

N BATTLE

AREA

E

U RESERVE

V

DEEP

E BATTLE

R

REAR

F DIRECT

I SUPPORT

R

E REINFORCING

S

E MOB

N

G C-MOB

R

SURV

A

D

A

CMD CMD GRP

& MAIN CP

CTRL REAR CP

CBT

SVC

SUPT

DECISIONPOINTS

Figure 1 . Format of th e Synchronizat ion Matrix

22



the synchroniza t ion matr ix in th i s manner corresponds to the a c t i o n

reac t ion-coun te rac t ion procedure for the conduct of the wargame.

Informat ion organ ized in t h i s wa y helps co- or d ina t e the ac t ions

of a l l combat e lements in t ime to exp lo i t t he i r synergy. When planners

work on a t imel ine , the impl i c i t task i s to reduce space to t ime

i n t e r v a l s . The l inkage between th e two i s speed . Planners apply

experience and m i l i t a r y judgment to de te rmine the speed a t which

b a t t l e f i e l d a c t i v i t i e s are accomplished. Working backwards from a po in t

in t ime a t which a l l combat power w i l l be brought to bear , p lanners

sequence dec i s ion po in t s a t which to launch var ious ba t t l e f i e ld

a c t i v i t i e s .

Fixing a Planning Methodology

It i s in s t ruc t ive to cons ider how Long r es t ruc tu red the

planning methodology to promote synchroniza t ion in t a c t i c a l planning.

This wi l l i l l u s t r a t e th e au thor ' s hypothes i s t h a t the record keeping

method def ines the plann ing methodology and inf luences the planning

thought process . Long perce ived t h a t the t e n e t of synchroniza t ion wa s

n ot appl ied in planning. An i ne f f ec t ive wa y to solve the problem would

be to append Synchronizat ion to a long list of planning f ac to r s .

Ins tead, he des igned a record keeping method to accompany and guide the

thought process . Fi l l i n g the columns of th e synchroniza t ion matr ix and

fol lowing a t ime l ine compels planners to th ink about synchroniza t ion a t

each s tep . Consequently , the synchroniza t ion matr ix as a record keeping

method a f f e c t s th e planning process in a fundamental way. More than

j u s t an embedded s tep , it def ines the plann ing methodology.

To f u r t h e r show how a record keeping method can i n f luence th e

thought process , cons ider an a l te rna t ive approach. Suppose the

prescr ibed method were to fill in the enemy and maneuver rows f i r s t on

the synchroniza t ion ma t r ix . This would de te rmine the maneuver plan .

23



o ther combat elements would fill in th e r e s t of the mat r ix subsequent ly

in suppor t o f the maneuver plan . I f need be, maneuver planners would

make minor changes to th e base plan to make suppor t f eas ib le . This

would bea

d i f fe ren t way o f ar r iv ing a t synchroniza t ion; the focus of

thoughts now would be on opt imiz ing suppor t o f a maneuver p lan . Most

U.S. Army planne r s , having been schooled in the ~ s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n matr ix

paradigm", would dismiss us ing the synchroniza t ion matrix t h i s way as

s i l l y . However, t h i s i s a p e r f e c t l y p laus ib le plann ing methodology. In

many armies, inc luding the U.S. Army, t h i s appears to be the predominant

mode of planning fo r combat se rv ice suppor t ( l o g i s t i c s ) .

Nevertheless, the r e l a t i v e des i r ab i l i t y o f the p lann ing

methodology i s not the po in t he r e . I t i s to show t h a t the record

keeping method has profound impact on the thought process i t s e l f . Th e

i n t e n t of t h i s t hes i s i s to propose a method to improve how planners

dea l with uncer ta in ty posed by the enemy. Recognizing the connec t ion

between th e wargame record ing method and th e thought process wi l l

sugges t how to enhance the planning methodology.

Th e Problem with the Synchroniza t ion Matr ix

While the synchron iza t ion matr ix i s an exce l len t method fo r

synchroniza t ion, it does no t adequate ly r ep resen t uncer ta in ty posed by

enemy ac t ions .

The matr ix can deal with only one enemy COA a t a t ime . In the

planning process , a COA wi l l be cons idered in re la t ion to severa l enemy

COAs. Correspondingly, seve r a l synchroniza t ion matr ices must be

developed. Users wi l l agree t h a t t h i s i s a t ime-consuming t a sk . As the

synchroniza t ion m atr ix became the most preva len t way to record wargame

r e s u l t s , it a lso became a requi red produc t o f th e planning process . 15

When planning t ime i s a cons t r a in t , the re i s a n a t u r a l tendency to be

produc t -o r ien ted . With no c lea r doc t r ina l s ta tement on how to

24



abbrevia te th e wargaming process under a t ime cons t r a in t , many planning

s t a f f s f a l l in to what could be descr ibed as th e "Most Likely Enemy eOA

Trap."16 Planners work with one enemy eOA so as to produce a reasonab ly

de ta i l ed synchroniza t ion matr ix fo r p r e s e n t a t i o n . This can cause the

commander and s t a f f to overlook enemy opt ions no t perce ived as "most

l i ke l y . " Planners tend to th ink d e t e r m i n i s t i c a l l y .

Another problem i s t h a t va r i a t ions to th e enemy eOA are

d i f f i c u l t to represent in the synchroniza t ion matr ix . Like f r i end ly

forces , the enemy w i l l have branches to t he i r p lans . Since the

synchroniza t ion m atr ix does not a l low planners to r ep resen t enemy eOA

branches eas i ly , t h i s inh ib i t s them from consider ing th e f u l l range o f

enemy opt ions during plann ing .

Consider ing one enemy eOA a t a t ime also presen ts some

p r a c t i c a l problems. When a s ing le eOA i s wargamed aga ins t s evera l enemy

eOAs, severa l synchroniza t ion matr ices needs to be developed; one fo r

each p a i r o f f r i end ly and enemy eOAs. Since planners bu i ld the eOA as

each wargame proceeds , th e s ing le eOA could evolve on s ig n i f i c a n t ly

d i f fe ren t paths because it i s p i t t ed aga ins t d i f f e r e n t enemy s i t u a t i o n s .

How to c o l l a t e these few d i f f e r e n t paths in to branches of the same eOA

can be a problem. Planners have to look fo r the dec is ion po in t s for

d i f fe ren t branches , the s p l i t po in t s o f d i f f e r e n t routes and perhaps to

ad jus t the pos i t ion ing o f forces and so on.

There i s a more fundamental problem when planning i s done

aga ins t one enemy eOA a t a t ime . I t i s about the ease with which

planners can form i n s igh t s dur ing the conduct of the wargame. Planners

are l e ss l i k e ly to see what opt ions a re open to th e enemy a t a

p a r t i c u l a r po in t in the ba t t l e when they work through enemy eOAs one a t

a t ime . Not be ing able to see th e f u l l range of enemy opt ions , planners

are l e ss l i k e ly to see what appr opr i a t e f r i end ly ac t ions to t ake in

order to accomplish the miss ion .

25



I f we have a methodology t h a t cues planners to look a t a l l

poss ib le enemy opt ions a t the t ime under cons ide r a t ion , they can take

pos i t ive ac t ions to forec lose enemy opt ions r a the r than r eac t ing to the

enemy. They can also determine which opt ion to induce the enemy to

take . These i n s igh t s are poss ib le because we are "working across th e

enemy opt ion domain." I t i s no t t h a t plann ing with synchroniza t ion

matr ix does no t allow t h i s to happen. Th e suggested approach make such

i n s igh t s more acces s ib le to the average planner . The idea of working

across th e enemy opt ion domain i s no t new. Th e event template i s in

f a c t const ruc ted on such a concept .

Event Template

The In te l l igence Prepara t ion of the Ba t t l e f i e ld (IPB) i s the

process by which the i n t e l l igence s t a f f suppor t s m i l i t a r y dec i s ion

making. FM 34-130, In te l l igence Pr epa r a t ion o f the Ba t t l e f i e ld i s the

u.s. Army doc t r ina l manual t h a t desc r ibe s how t h i s i s done. One product

o f th i s process i s th e formulat ion o f enemy COAs. Doctr ine requires

planners to i den t i fy the f u l l s e t of enemy COAs ava i lab le to t h r e a t

fo rces to avoid being su rp r i s ed . In te l l igence planners cons ider enemy

doc t r ine , environmental f ac to r s (such as weather and t e r r a in ) and enemy

i n t e n t to come up with a s e t o f enemy COAs. Col lec t ive ly , these

descr ibe what th e enemy i s capable of doing.

In te l l igence planners dep ic t enemy COAs graph ica l ly by means o f

s i tua t ion t empla tes . Th e e s se n t i a l elements o f the s i tua t ion templates

are geographic loca t ions of enemy forces , t h e i r expected maneuvers,

loca t ions of t h e i r in tended ob jec t ives and t ime phase l i n e s to r e l a t e

t ime and space . Each enemy COA i s depic ted by one (or more if

necessary) s i tua t ion t empla tes .

Doc t r ina l ly , the u.s. Army t akes the conserva t ive approach and

plans on enemy capab i l i ty r a the r than enemy i n t en t ions . In a s tep

26



cons i s ten t with t h i s approach, i nd iv idua l s i t u a t i o n t empla tes (each

r epr e sen t ing an enemy eOA) a re superimposed to produce the event

t empla te . This procedure epi tomizes what we have e a r l i e r ca l l ed

"working across th e enemy opt ions domain." The c o n t r a s t s between

i nd iv idua l s i tua t ion t empla tes s t and ou t as areas of i n t e r e s t in the

even t t empla te . I n t e l l i g e n c e planners gain numerous i n s i g h t s from th e

even t templa te . These inc lude key geographic loca t ions o r t ime windows

a t which enemy fo rces need to choose between t h e i r opt ions . For the

i n t e l l igence planner , observing the enemy a t these po in t s w i l l enable

him to p iece toge ther the enemy i n t e n t . The event t empla te i s the bas i s

o f the i n t e l l igence co l l ec t ion e f f o r t .

For th e opera t ions planner , it i s a t these geographic l oca t ions

and t ime windows t h a t appr opr i a t e ac t ions can l everage d isp ropor t iona te

e f f e c t s . We can forec lose the enemy's most favorab le opt ions or fo rce

them to take unfavorable opt ions . Working across the enemy opt ion

domain not only prevents be ing su rp r i s ed b u t promises oppor tun i t i es to

se ize th e i n i t i a t i v e and d i c t a t e the tempo o f the b a t t l e .

Dec is ion Suppor t Template

For comple teness , we inc lude a b r i e f di scuss ion o f the Decision

Suppor t Template (DST). The Dec is ion Suppor t Template i s a dec is ion

making a id for the commander in b a t t l e . It conso l ida t e s a l l e s se n t i a l

in fo rmat ion and dec i s ion cues requi red by th e commander to exer t

inf luence in a dynamic b a t t l e f i e l d . I t i s the re fo re th e u l t imate

product of the p lann ing e f f o r t . The bas ic elements o f in fo rmat ion in

th e Dec is ion Support Template are :

17

1 . An over lay based on the opera t iona l map t h a t inc ludes

pr o jec t ed enemy and f r i end ly schemes o f maneuver with b ranch plans .

2 . The Event Template.

3 . The Synchron iza t ion Matr ix of the se lec ted eOA.

27



4. Commander's Cr i t i c a l Informat ion Requirements (CCIR) .1 8

These i t ems help the commander to r ap id ly make sense o f the

fragments of b a t t l e f i e l d in fo rmat ion f lowing to him. He can then bu i ld

an accura te p ic tu re of the s i tua t ion upon which he can make changes to

the plan and i n f luence the b a t t l e . Par t o f t h i s process invo lves a

thorough grasp of the opt ions open to the enemy a t var ious po in t s i n t he

b a t t l e . I f the commander has a robus t p lan t h a t has an t i c ipa ted these

enemy opt ions , e f f o r t requi red to e f f e c t b a t t l e f i e l d command and con t ro l

w i l l be reduced.

Fie ld Researches

The U.S. Army Research I ns t i t u t e fo r Behavioral and Socia l

Sciences (ARI) es tab l i shed the For t Leavenworth Fie ld Uni t to enhance

command and con t ro l capab i l i t i e s of the Army. ARI research f indings in

t a c t i c a l planning performance in the U.S. Army from 1973 to 1993 were

covered comprehensively in Fal l esen ' s Overview of Army Tact ica l Planning

Performance Research. 19 This r epor t drew on s tud ies o f t a c t i c a l

plann ing performance by ARI, cont rac ted sources and th e U.s. Army Cente r

of Army Lessons Learned (CALL). I t s conclusions support our percept ions

of the problems encountered in th e t a c t i c a l planning pr ocess . Fol lowing

are h igh l igh t s of research f indings r e levan t to th i s work.

In t ime-const ra ined planning, the re i s uncer ta in ty about how to

t a i l o r the t ac t i ca l planning process when t ime i s too shor t to do th e

e n t i r e Est imate of the Si tua t ion . Under these c i rcums tances , the re

t ends to be increased focus on th e end product . Fa l leson repor ted t h a t

a f u l l es t imate process was never used in th e U.S. Army Command and

General S t a f f O f f i c e r s ' Course exerc i ses he obse rved . 20 Student e f f o r t

appeared to be focus on synchroniza t ion matr ix complet ion. Simi la r

t endencies sur faced in the f i e ld . Here, the emphasis was on prepara t ion

and execut ion. A ba t ta l ion commander sa id :

28



. . , Increased decis ion making t ime d i r e c t l y r educes planning

t ime , r ehear sa l t ime and subordina te planning and prepara t ion

t ime. These l a t t e r ac t i v i t i e s have much higher payoff than theposs i b i l i t y of a r r iv ing a t an inc rementa l ly be t t e r course of

ac t ion .21

These observa t ions support an ea r l i e r po in t : important

planning f ac to r s ( fo r example, the synchroniza t ion matr ix) must be an

i n t e g r a l pa r t of the produc t . For the p lanning f ac to r to be considered,

they must l i e on the pa th o f l e a s t re s i s t ance for the s t a f f .

This a l so shows the d i rec t ion U.S. Army doc t r ine can take on

abbrevia t ing the t a c t i c a l decis ion-making process . ARI t a c t i c a l

planning researchers speak favorably about using Natura l i s t i c or

Recogni t ion Primed Decision-Making (RPD)22 in s i tua t ions where rapid

dec is ions a re requi red , pa r t i c u l a r l y in lower echelon commands. In the

RPD process , the decis ion maker chooses on a s ingle opt ion r ap id ly .

This i s genera ted from pr i o r exper ience and i s eva lua ted to see if it

sa t i s f i e s minimal c r i t e r i a of the cur ren t problem. A process of

"progress ive deepening" i s then used to cons t ruc t the complete plan of

ac t ion . In l ine with t h i s development , the proposed enhancement to the

planning methodology should be capable of suppor t ing an abbrevia ted

dec is ion-making proc e s s .

F a l ~ e s e n ' s repor t a lso observed t ha t planners f requent ly did

not pred ic t enemy r eac t ions nor es t imate the probab i l i t y of mission

accomplishment . 23 This was a t t r i bu t e d to lack of exper ience as wel l as

to the lack of data fo r wargame pro jec t ions , e spec ia l ly in the a rea of

a t t r i t i o n . Par t i c ipan t s i n the s tudy also gave a "no t very conf ident"

ra t ing to t he i r r e s u l t a n t es t imates (2 on a 5-po in t sca le o f

conf idence) .

The author agrees tha t l ack of confidence in wargame data can

i nh i b i t planners from making pred ic t ions about the enemy and probab i l i t y

o f the mission accomplishment . However, ARI researchers and

par t i c ipants of the s tudy probably missed the po in t about the use of

29



probab i l i ty f igures and quant i fying the outcomes in wargames. I t i s

easy to lose s igh t o f th e means and th e ends o f wargaming. Numbers

sharpen the mind to the i s sues by adding v i s u a l impact to them. They

are no t intended to be absolute pred ic t ions about the fu tu re .

Fal lesen a l so r epor t s that . in 1992, according to CALL, 75% o f

the d iv i s ions and corps undergoing war f igh te r exerc i ses (Bat t le Command

Train ing Program) d id no t develop seque l s . Fi f ty - th ree pe r cen t of th e

un i t s did no t use IPB product s to develop cont ingency p lans . These

i ns t ances of incomplete planning a re probably due to a poor grasp o f th e

f u l l range of enemy opt ions .

In Observation on Command and S ta f f Performance dur ing CGSC

Warr io r ' 91, Fal lesen and Michel found t ha t :

The lack o f contingency planning wa s a s ign of fa i lu re to

make plans more robus t cons ider ing the l ack of ce r ta in ty aboutenemy i n t en t ions . 24

They fu r ther say t ha t :

The s tuden t s gave very little thought to how the i n i t i a lplans could go wrong. They were never observed consider ing

branches in e i t h e r enemy ac t ions o r t he i r own ac t ions . 25

Fal lesen c i t ed o ther sources to show t h a t these observa t ions were no t

r e s t r i c t e d to CGSOC s tuden t s bu t also extended to d iv i s ion s t a f f s . 26

The fa i lu re to develop cont igency plans can be a t t r i b u t e d to

cur ren t planning methodology. The synchroniza t ion matr ix considers one

enemy COA a t t ime . This does no t cue planners to consider o the r enemy

opt ions t ha t can e x i s t a t var ious po in t s in th e b a t t l e . Even if othe r

enemy opt ions a re i den t i f i ed , th e urge to complete the synchroniza t ion

matr ix causes planners to come back to the other enemy opt ions l a t e r and

dea l with them as cont igency p lans . Thus, planners unwi t t ingly f a l l

in to th e "most l i k e ly enemy COA t r a p . " In f a c t t he r e i s no bas i s ,

except for the p lanner s ' preconcep t ion , fo r saying t h a t one enemy opt ion

or another i s more l i k e ly . Since cont ingency plans a re unconsc ious ly

30



accorded a lower pr i o r i t y , they may never get due cons iderat ion or may

be disregarded amongst o ther p res s ing planning a c t i v i t i e s .

Fal lesen recognized d i f fe rence in ind iv idua l exper t i s e as an

impor tant f ac to r in the performance o f plann ing t a sks . He c i t ed the

work of MacMillan, Enti.n and Ser fa ty , who compared qua l i ty o f planning

performance by 3 expe r t s and 26 othe r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . 27 28 In

comparison, the exper ts :

1 . Generated more de ta i l ed course of ac t ion .

2. Focused immediately on c r i t i c a l unknowns.

3. Understood the complexity of the s i tua t ion be t t e r .

4. Understood the sequencing of events be t t e r .

5. Had more concern about outcome r i s k s .

6. Iden t i f i ed more p o t e n t i a l problems.

7 . Ant ic ipa t ed changes in the t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .

8 . Planned cont ingency opera t ions .

These are th e essence o f success f u l plann ing . Th e main purpose

o f a plann ing methodology i s to lead planners through these impor tant

po in t s asa

matte r of course . As planners apply t h i s methodology,it

becomes hab i tua l to t h ink l i ke an exper t . Following a wel l des igned

plann ing methodology, an average planner has the g r e a t e s t l ike l ihood of

producing an exper t p lan .

Summary of Inves t iga t ion in to the Planning Methodology

In summary, l e t us r ecap i tu la t e th e key conclus ions o f our

i nves t iga t ion in to the planning methodology.

Analys is of the U.S. Army Tact ica l Decision-Making Process and

Est imate o f the Si tua t ion29 showed t h a t d i f f e r e n t par t s of th e process

draw on d i f f e r e n t pr opor t ions o f c r ea t i v i t y (ar t) and ana ly t i ca l ab i l i t y

(science) of the planne r . Planning a c t i v i t i e s l eading up to and

31



inc luding COA Development are viewed as crea t ive pr ocesse s . Arguably,

th e choice o f a course of act ion also l i e s in th e rea lm o f mil i t a ry a r t .

Th e ac t i v i t i e s t h a t br idge COA Development and the dec i s ion requi re

ob jec t ive eva lua t ion and lend themselves more r ead i ly to sc i en t i f i c

t r ea tment . These inc lude the ana lys i s and comparison o f COAs. I t i s on

t h i s p a r t of the Est imate of th e Si tua t ion (and i t s corresponding p a r t

of the TDMP) t h a t t h i s t hes i s focuses .

Looking a t the pos i t ion COA ana lys i s and comparison occupy in

the TDMP, we conclude t h a t th e purpose of the planning a c t i v i t i e s in

t h i s s tep of the Est imate o f th e Si tua t ion should inc lude framing the

problem, sys temat ica l ly account ing fo r known parameters , pro jec t ing

outcomes of dec i s ions , present ing parameters inf luenc ing the outcomes

and f ina l ly applying mil i t a ry judgments . The procedure fo r doing these

ac t i v i t i e s i s ca l l ed the planning methodology in t h i s t h e s i s .

In the U.S. Army, the wargame i s the key component of the

planning methodology. It a t t empts to i n t eg ra te a l l r e levan t in fo rmat ion

to pro jec t the outcomes o f each COA in view o f enemy capab i l i ty .

Although the wargame a t t empts to pred ic t outcomes, it i s b ut a means of

gain ing i n s igh t s in to the t a c t i c a l problem. In U.S. Army app l ica t ion ,

the wargame i s also used as a means to b u i l d a de ta i l ed plan .

Wargame records are kept to capture key assumptions and data

genera ted by th e wargame. These serve as a bas i s fo r se lec t ing a COA

and formulat ing a plan o f ac t ion , and can be used as a dec i s ion cue fo r

the commander to exercise ba t t l e f i e l d command and c o n t r o l .

We showed t h a t the wargame record ing method has deeper

s ign i f icance . It can dr ive th e way a wargame i s conducted and

ind i rec t ly inf luence the t r a in of thought during th e wargame. Thus, we

surmise t ha t the record ing method def ines the planning methodology.

Using Long's 1989 work on the synchroniza t ion matr ix as an i l l u s t r a t i on ,

we have seen how a planning methodology can be e f f e c t i v e l y improved to

32



address a perce ived problem. We argue t h a t the b e s t way to remedy a

def ic iency in the p lann ing p rocess i s to change the recording method.

Th e synchroniza t ion matr ix i s examined to see if it has caused

the presen t inadequcies in the plann ing methodology. Th e

synchroniza t ion matr ix al lowed planners to look a t only one enemy eOA a t

a t ime. So, planners a re denied i n s igh t in to enemy opt ions a t each

s tage o f the b a t t l e . Th e i nab i l i t y to form i n s igh t "across the enemy

opt ion domain" con t r ibu tes to a poor grasp o f poss ib le enemy ac t ions .

This in turn l eads to a fa i lu re to a n t i c i p a t e .

A survey o f r e s u l t s o f f i e ld s tud ies conducted on t a c t i c a l

plann ing conf irmed many of our obse r va t ions . Fai lure to plan f o r

cont ingenc ies appeared to be preva len t .

One p a r t i c u l a r ly use f u l s tudy (MacMillan e t a ll developed a

list o f charac te r i s t i c s of exper t planning. A good plann ing methodology

should guide inexper ienced m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s through the s teps in th e

expe r t planning process so t h a t they too can turn out cons i s t en t ly good

p lans .

We commented t h a t it i s f u t i l e to a t t empt to improve a planning

methodology by appending ano ther heading to a list o f plann ing f ac to r s .

Th e plann ing methodology must be designed so t ha t the planner works

through th e prescr ibed t asks and so t h a t the product w i l l bear the

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a robus t p l an . This i s analogous to working through

the synchroniza t ion matr ix to produce a synchronized eOA.

From the foregoing f indings , we can now cons t ruc t a list of

a t t r i b u t e s o f an i dea l plann ing methodology. This i s to serve as a

yards t ick by which proposed enhancements to the cur ren t methodology can

be measured.

33



At t r ibu tes of an Idea l Planning Methodology

1. I t must serve the func t ions o f the eOA Analys i s s tage of

the Est imate of the Si tua t ion . They are :

a . To arrange an uns tructured problem in to a l og ica l

framework.

b . To account sys temat ica l ly fo r known f ac t s , assumptions

and uncer ta in ty .

c . To pro jec t the consequences of decis ion made.

d. To presen t c lea r ly i n t e r ac t ions among inf luencing

f ac to r s .

2. I t must allow the app l ica t ion o f sub jec t ive mil i ta ry

judgment.

3 . I t must consider exp l i c i t l y a l l foreseen enemy eOAs and

account fo r the as soc ia ted uncer t a in t i e s .

4. I t must re ta in the wargame as a cen t r a l f ea tu re and must

l eave a wargame record t h a t can:

a . Allow synchroniza t ion of combat elements and sequencing

of the ba t t l e f i e l d events .

b. Fac i l i t a t e the ac t ion- reac t ion-coun te rac t ion procedure.

c . Allow cons iderat ion of a l l feasib le enemy opt ions a t

any t ime .

d . Allow branches o f a eOA to be represented and maintain

t he i r v i s i b i l i t y throughout the planning process .

e . Provide dec is ions cue fo r command and con t ro l purposes .

5. I t must presen t wargame r e s u l t s such t h a t it makes i n s igh t s

more acces s ib le to the planner .

6. I t should f ac i l i t a t e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l problems,

c r i t i c a l events and key i n t e l l igence gaps in the eOAs.

7. I t should a l low sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s so t h a t the e f fec t s of

changing assumptions can be apprec ia ted.

34



8. I t should encourage planners to th ink about uncer ta in ty and

a l te rna te outcomes. Planners could be thus be primed to an t i c ipa te

problems and oppor tun i t i es in b a t t l e .

9. I t should be capable of suppor t ing an abbrevia ted decis ion-

making process , such as RPD.

10. I t should suppor t c l a r i t y in decision-making by a l lowing

the user to t r ace how the dec is ion wa s made.

11. I t should be perce ived (b y th e planning s t a f f ) to be worth

the t ime and e f f o r t to produce.

Dec is ion Analys is

We have e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the main inadequacy in th e Est imate of

the S i t u a t i o n process i s the way planners dea l with enemy uncer ta in ty .

One branch of dec i s ion ana lys i s s tud ies normative dec i s ion making. I t s

goal i s to pursue c l a r i t y of ac t ion .30 This gives the dec is ion-maker

the assurance tha t he has chosen the bes t dec is ion based on a l l

c u r r e n t l y ava i lab le in fo rmat ion and c o n s i s t e n t with the pr inc ip le o f

choice he has se lec ted . 31This process p rov ides the dec i s ion maker a

sys temat ic and a t r ansparen t way o f making a dec i s ion . I t t r acks not

only the dec is ion bu t a lso how the dec i s ion i s made.

In th i s work, the focus i s no t so much on the dec i s ion i t s e l f ,

but on the p rocess o f organiz ing ava i lab le in fo rmat ion with a view

toward gaining i n s i g h t s . The b e s t so lu t ion t h a t th e dec i s ion ana lys i s

too l f inds can of course be the bas i s of the dec is ion. More

impor tant ly , through sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s , planners can look a t how th e

so lu t ion w i l l change when the re a re changes to the input da ta ( tha t are

based on mil i t a ry judgment) . This type o f higher o rder ana lys i s opens

the minds of planners to b e t t e r dea l with uncer ta in ty , and focuses them

on key in fo rmat ion gaps .

35



In t h i s sec t ion , we survey the sub jec t o f dec i s ion ana lys i s to

look fo r too l s t h a t can serve our purpose. We want to i den t i fy those

most adep t a t modeling i n t e r ac t ions between courses of ac t ion of tw o

adversa r ies .Two

t h a t are p a r t i c u l a r ly wel l su i t ed are:Game

Theory and

Decis ion Trees . We wi l l look a t them in tu rn .

Game Theory

Game theory wa s es tab l i shed as a branch o f mathematics to deal

with c o n f l i c t s invo lv ing tw o or more p layer s . I t wa s in t roduced by vo n

Neumann and Morgenstern in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior . 32

Game theory involves independent cho ices in compet i t ive s i t u a t i o n s

invo lv ing r a t i o n a l dec is ion makers . In the s imples t form, tw o

adversa r ia l p layer s , each having a choice of tw o or more s t ra teg ies

(courses of a c t i o n ) , v i sua l i zes th e outcomes of a l l combinat ions of

s t r a t e g i e s . Th e outcome of each p a i r of s t r a t e g i e s i s d iamet r ica l ly

opposi te in u t i l i t y (mi l i t a ry worth) to t h a t o f the adversary . That i s ,

a gain fo r Player A i s a loss to the same degree for P layer B. This i s

known as a zero-sum game. Using a procedure ca l l ed the maximin theory ,

the b e s t s t r a t egy i s s e l e c t e d .

Game theory i s r ich in the breadth of s i t u a t i o n s it can cover .

I t extends to s i t u a t i o n s of increas ing complexi ty: s i t u a t i o n s where

the re i s a need to keep the choice of s t r a t egy sec re t (mixed

s t r a t e g i e s ) , games invo lv ing more than two playe r s (n-person games) and

games where playe r s have d i f f e r e n t motives (nonzero-sum games). The

scope o f th i s t hes i s prec ludes a de ta i l ed exposi t ion o f t h i s i n t e r e s t i n g

and extens ive f i e ld of s tudy . However, an exce l len t in t roduc to ry survey

can be found in Zagare 's Game Theory: Concepts and Appl i ca t ions . 33

Mil i ta ry app l ica t ions of game theory have been cons idered by

Haywood. 34 He r e t rospec t ive ly modeled the essence of the dec is ion

36



problems i n t he Bat t l e of Bismarck Sea in 1943 and the Bat t l e of

Avranches Gap in 1944 as two-player zero-sum games.

While game theory i s a powerfu l method fo r analyz ing and

prescr ib ing a dec i s ion , the au thor f inds it d i f f i c u l t to use as a

na tu ra l means o f recording a wargame. I t does not permi t adequa te

model ing of th e dynamics of ba t t l e f i e ld ac t ions fo r the purpose o f

bui ld ing the COAs. I t i s a lso d i f f i c u l t to use for the purpose of

sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s .

Decis ion Tree

The dec i s ion t r ee method views the dec i s ion problem in terms of

a sequence of dec i s ion po in t s , chance events and outcomes. These are

ar ranged in chronologica l order and graph ica l ly presented as a t r ee with

branches . Emanating from dec is ion po in t s a re th e poss ib le a l t e r n a t i v e s

(COAs) ava i lab le a t tha t t ime . Emerging from th e chance nodes are

branches represent ing poss ib le chance events . Attached to each branch

i s a probab i l i ty f igure denot ing the l ike l ihood o f i t s occurrence .

Chance even t s are by def in i t ion even t s beyond the dec is ion maker ' s

con t ro l . As the s i t u a t i o n unfo lds , only one o f the chance events

as soc ia ted with the chance node w i l l occur . The pr inc ip le of choice

employed in dec i s ion t r ees invo lves op t imiz ing the expected u t i l i t y .

The dec i s ion t r ee method f inds many app l ica t ions in th e

mil i t a ry environment . I t i s t augh t as p a r t of th e founda t ion course in

the u .S . Army Command and General S t a f f Off icer s ' Course. Student t ex t

ST 25-1, Resource Planning and Al loca t ion , devotes a chapter to th i s

t echnique .35

In th e Command and General S t a f f Off icer s ' Course ,

dec is ion t r ees are used to model numerous mil i t a ry problems. Major

c las ses o f app l ica t ions inc lude determina t ion of t a c t i c s and weapon mix,

formula t ion o f ru les of engagement, mil i t a ry resource a l loca t ion and th e

37



choice of a COA under th e uncer ta in ty of enemy ac t ions . The l a s t c las s

o f app l ica t ion i s o f primary i n t e r e s t in t h i s t h e s i s .

The number o f mil i t a ry examples shows t h a t m i l i t a r y of f ice rs

have no d i f f i cu l t y th inking in terms o f the dec is ion t r ee formalism.

The e x p l i c i t r ep resen ta t ion of i n f luenc ing f ac to r s and the chronologica l

arrangement o f dec i s ions , chance even t s and outcomes appeal to t h e i r

i n tu i t i o n .

However, it appears t h a t t he dec i s ion t r ee method has no t

enjoyed wide app l ica t ion out s ide the classroom environment . The use o f

dec i s ion t r ees in the TDMP rece ives only a b r i e f mention under r i sk

assessment sec t ion o f ST 101-5. 36Th e l ack o f d o c t r i n a l advocacy may be

a reason . Another reasons may be tha t planners d id n ot see the

p o t e n t i a l of dec is ion t r ees as a too l fo r planning and ana lys i s .

In the fo l lowing chapters , we wi l l a t tempt to use the dec is ion

t r ee as the pr inc ipa l component o f th e plann ing process . We wi l l

exp lore i t s p o t e n t i a l to co r rec t the cur ren t def ic ienc ies in dea l ing

with enemy uncer ta in ty during plann ing . Th e qua l i ty of the enhancements

to the planning methodology, if any, w i l l be assessed.

Conclusion

In t h i s chapter , we surveyed ex tan t l i t e r a t u r e on the U.S. Army

t a c t i c a l decision-making process , the t a c t i c a l planning process and

dec i s ion ana lys i s . We did t h i s with a view toward enhancing the cur ren t

planning methodology, t h a t dea ls with the COA ana lys i s s t age o f th e

Est imate o f the Si tua t ion .

Wes t a r t e d with the propos i t ion t h a t the re a re inadequac ies in

the way planning s t a f f s dea ls with enemy uncer t a in t i e s during planning.

Some manifes ta t ions o f these can be seen in opera t ions plans t h a t do no t

c a t e r to cont ingenc ies , branches and seque l s . These plans f requent ly

f a i l to an t i c ipa te enemy ac t ions during b a t t l e . Soldiers have lo w

38



confidence t h a t the plan can "survive the LD/LC" ( tha t i s , the s t a r t l i n e

o f combat opera t ions) .

The l i t e r a t u r e survey sugges t s tha t our propos i t ion i s cor r ec t .

It also y ie lds i n s igh t s in to the causes of the problem and how it can be

resolved. A list o f a t t r i b u t e s o f an i d e a l plann ing methodology i s

d i s t i l l e d from the f indings of the survey. This list prov ides a

yards t ick to measure the ef fec t ivenes s o f our proposed enhancements to

the plann ing methodology.

39



Endnotes

1 John L. Pete rsen , "Forecas t ing: It's Not Poss ib le , " Defense

In t e l l i gence Journa l Vol 3 No 2 (Fa l l 1994) , (The Jo in t Mi l i t a ry

In te l l i gence College Foundat ion, VA), 37-45.

2 U.S. Army Command and General St a f f College, ST 101-5 Commandand St a f f Decision Processes , s tude n t t e x t , (Fort Leavenworth KS:

USACGSC, Jan 94) , 1-2-1

3 Ib id . , 1-2 -1 .

4 John A. Advise, Tac t ica l Decision Making: A Proposed

Evalua t ion C r i t e r i a Model fo r the In fan t ry B a t t a l i on ' s Tac t ica l Est imatedur ing Offens ive Opera t ions , MMAS t he s i s , (Fort Leavenworth KS: U.S.

Army Command and General St a f f Col lege , 1993); Walter E. Kretchik , The

Manual Wargaming Process : Does our Current Methodology Gives Us t h e - -

Optimum Solut ion? , monograph, (Fort Leavenworth KS: School of Advanced

Mil i t a ry Studies , AY 1991-1992); James M. Milano, Tac t ica l Wargaming

a f t e r H-Hour: An Unst ruc tured Mental Process , monograph, (Fort

Leavenworth KS: School of Advanced Mil i t a ry Studies , AY 1991-1992);Kevin B. Smith, Th e Calculus o f War: The Role and Use o f Quant i ta t ive

Decision Aids a t the Tac t ica l Level o f War, MMAS t h e s i s , (FortLeavenworth KS: U.S. Army Command and General St a f f College , 1993); W.

Edward Shi r ron, An Optimum Method of Wargaming a Tac t ica l and

Opera t iona l Course of Act ion as an In t eg ra l Pa r t o f a Corps Commander's

and G3's Est imate o f the Si tua t ion in a Time-Compressed Environment,

(Fort Leavenworth KS: U.S. Army Command and Genera l St a f f College ,.1984) .

5 Rex R., Michel , His to r i ca l Development of the Est imate of th e

Si tua t ion , U.S. Army Research In s t i t u t e Research Report 1577, (For tLeavenworth KS: For t Leavenworth Fie ld Uni t , Oct 1990) 3.

6 C ri t i c a l event s are i de n t i f i e d by planners as impor tant

per iods of a b a t t l e . For example, c r i t i c a l event can inc lude r i ve r

c ros s ing , act ions on th e ob jec t ive and j o i n t force ac t ions in anengagement a re a .

ST 101-5, 1-8-1 to 1-8-11.

8 Ib id . , 1-8-24 .

9 I b i d . , 1-8-25.

10 Ib id . , 1-8-24.

11 This s ta tement i s a genera l i za t ion . In the US Army, the

planning methodology i s based on wargames. Therefore th e record keeping

device i s the wargame record (of which synchroniza t ion mat r ix i s atype) . Elsewhere , the planning methodology could be based on de t a i l

examinat ion of the t e r r a i n , t ime and space and r e l a t i ve combat power.

Other t ypes of record keeping devices , such as a gra ph ic a l por t r aya l of

the COAs with t ime phase l i ne s , could wel l be more e f f i c i e n t . In any

case , th e record keeping device i s th e ma ni fe s t a t i on o f the i n t ended

though t proc e s s . I f one inadequa te ly mi r ro r s the o ther , the methodology

would be hard to fo l low.

12 ST 101-5, 1-8 -9 .

40



13 U.S. Army, Fie ld Manual 100-5 Opera t ions (Washington D.C. :

Headquar te r s , Department o f the Army, June 1993) , 2-8 .

14 Clyde L ., Long, MAJ, U.S. Army, Synchronizat ion of Combat

Power a t th e Task Force Level : Def in ing a Planning Methodology, MMAS

thes i s , (Fort Leavenworth KS: 1989)

15 ST 101-5, IV-4. to 5, In the recommended br ie f ing format ,

Synchroniza t ion Matr ix i s r equ i r ed f o r the wargame br i e f and the

dec i s ion br i e f . Since synchroniza t ion matr ix of the chosen COA w i l l

form p a r t of the Decis ion Support Template, it i s also requi red for the

OPLAN/OPORD br i e f .

16 In di scuss ions with CPT(P) Dean Taylor, MI, US Army, in

February 1995, CPT Taylor coined the phrase "Most Like ly Enemy Course of

Action Trap ." Like th e au thor , he too wa s concerned about plannings t a f f s s inking in to a mental r u t . Planners f a l l in the " t r ap" when a l l

COAs are , for reason o f expediency, only cons idered aga ins t what i s

assessed to be the most l ike ly enemy COA. His f i r s t -hand exper ience as

an observer / con t ro l l e r in NTC ind ica ted t h a t fa l l ing in to t h i s t r ap i s

preva len t in un i t s . These un i t s are most suscep t ib le to "an t i c ipa t ion"f a i l u r e .

17 ST 101-5, I - 10 - l l .

18 Commander's Cr i t i c a l Information Requirement are impor tantelements of in fo rmat ion requi red by the commander to accomplish th e

miss ion . CCIR are in the form of ques t ions determined by th e commander

ear ly in th e p lann ing process . A l a rge p a r t of the i n t e l l igence

co l l ec t ion e f f o r t i s devoted to answering these ques t ions .

19 Jon J . Fa l l e sen , Overview of Army Tact ica l PlanningPerformance Research, Technical Report 984, (Alexandria , VA: U.S. ArmyResearch I ns t i t u t e fo r Behaviora l and Socia l Science, 1993).

20 Ib id . , 13.

21 I b i d .

22 Gary A. Kle in , "S t r a t eg ies of Decision Making," Mil i t a ry

Review (May 1989): 56-64.

23 Fal lesen, 22.

24 Jon J . Fal lesen and Rex R. Michel , Observation on Command and

S t a f f Performance dur ing CGSC Warrior '91 , ARI Working Paper LVN-91-04,

(For t Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Research I ns t i t u t e fo r Behaviora l and

Soc ia l Science, 1991).

25 Ib id . , 5.

26 Fal lesen, 27.

27 MacMillan, Ent in and Ser fa ty , Def in ing and AssessingExper t i se in a Complex Domain - Measures based on Theory, 37th Annual

Meet ing of th e Human Factors and Ergonomic Socie ty (Oct 11-15, 1993).

28 Fal lesen, 36.

41



29 For c l a r i t y , the r e l a t ionsh ip between the Tact ica l DecisionMaking Process (TDMP) and th e Est imate o f the S i t u a t i o n (EoS) i s

exp la ined : the EoS i s the se r i es of plann ing a c t i v i t i e s to ar r ive a t a

plan of ac t ion while the TDMP i s the prescr ibed thought process for

solving genera l m i l i t a r y problems. In t h i s t h e s i s , we are i n t e r e s t e d in

cases when the TDMP i s appl ied to the EoS.

30 K.L. Poh, "An Overview of Decision Theory," Student Text fo r

Decis ion Analys is module of the Masters o f Science degree course ,

(Singapore: Nat ional Univers i ty of Singapore, July 1993): 1 .

31 Th e normative model of dec i s ion making prescr ibes th e course

of ac t ion t h a t the dec i s ion maker should t ake to achieve goal s most

e f f i c i en t l y . Th e dec i s ion i s based on a se t of dec i s ion norms

( therefore normat ive) . Two examples of such norms are th e pr inc ip le of

opt imiz ing the expected u t i l i t y and the maximin theory. These are also

known as pr inc ip les o f cho ice . Normative dec is ion making models y ie ld

an opt imal so lu t ion , if one can be found, given a l l r e levan t in fo rmat ion

and a s e t o f norms to fo l low. Normative dec is ion making cons t r as t s withdescr ip t ive models. The l a t t e r desc r ibe s th e outcome o f th e

a l te rna t ives . A dec i s ion i s made based on the eva lua t ion o f thedescr ibed outcomes cor responding to a s e t of se lec t ion c r i t e r i a .

Usual ly , descr ip t ive models a re used when normative models are notapp l icab le .

32 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern , Theory o f Games and

Economic Behavior, (Princeton, NJ : Pr ince ton Unive r s i ty Press , 1944).

33 Frank C. Zagare, Game Theory Concepts and Appl ica t ions , Sage

Unive r s i ty Papers se r i e s on Quant i ta t ive Appl ica t ions in the Soc ia l

Sciences , se r i e s no. 07-041. (Beverly H i l l s CA: Sage Publ i ca t ions ,

1984) .

34 Oliver G. Haywood, "Mi l i t a ry Decision and Game Theory,"Opera t ions Research, Vol . 2 (November 1954) , 365-385.

35 USACGSC, ST 25-1, Resource Planning and Al loca t ion , s tuden t

t e x t , (Fort Leavenworth KS: U.S. Army Command and General S ta f f College ,1995). 6-1 to 6-22.

36 ST 101-5, 1-8-25 .

42



CHAPTER THREE

PLANNING METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

Reasoning i s commonly as soc ia ted with log ic , but it i s obvious

t h a t the impl i ca t ions o f what i s ord inar i ly ca l l ed log ic are

meager indeed when uncer ta in ty i s to be faced. I t has of ten

been asked whether log ic cannot be extended, by pr inc ip les as

acceptable as those of logic i t s e l f , to bear more fu l ly on

uncer ta in ty .

Savage, Th e Foundations o f S t a t i s t i c s .

I n t r oduc t ion

In t h i s chapter , we wi l l develop a planning methodology t ha t

addresses the uncer ta in ty posed by th e enemy more adequate ly than the

cur ren t one does .

For comple teness , th e chapter wi l l begin wi th a b r i e f primer on

dec is ion t r e e s . This wi l l be fol lowed by an i l l u s t r a t i on o f how the

dec is ion t r ee method so lves a s imple but s i g n i f i c a n t t a c t i c a l problem. 1

Th e discuss ion t h a t fol lows h igh l igh t s how the idea of th inking across

the enemy opt ion domain helps planners form i n s i g h t s .

From conclus ions drawn from the so lu t ion o f th e s imple t ac t i ca l

problem and from ideas developed in Chapter Two, we wi l l extend the

method to dea l with courses o f ac t ion with severa l dec i s ion po in t s .

Decision Tree Primer

A dec i s ion t r ee i s a gr aph ica l r ep resen ta t ion o f the essence o f

a dec i s ion problem. The problem i s modeled as a sequence of dec i s ions ,

chance events and outcomes. These are arranged in chronologica l o r de r .

43



Figure 2 shows a dec is ion problem represented in dec i s ion t r ee

form. This i s the well-known p a r t y problem, used by Howard as an

example to teach dec i s ion ana lys i s .c

The hos te s s , Jane , wants to decide

the b e s t loca t ion to hold h er par ty given the uncer ta in ty o f weather .

LOCATION WEATHER

0

Sunny 0.90.4

Rain

0.60.2

Sunny0.4

0.4

Rain

0.60.5

Figure 2. Jane ' s Decis ion Tree

Decis ion po in t s are represented by squares in the dec i s ion

t r ee ; chance events are represented by c i r c l e s . In the par ty problem,

th e dec is ion per t a ins to th e loca t ion of th e par ty and the chance event

invo lves sun or ra in as s t a t e s of na tu re . Lines jo in dec i s ion and

chance events . Lines or ig ina t ing froma

dec is ion po in t (square)

r ep resen t courses o f ac t ion ava i l ab le . The hos te s s , has the choice of

holding th e par ty outdoors , on the porch or indoors . When a

44



p a r t i c u l a r course of ac t ion has been adopted a f t e r dec i s ion ana lys i s ,

the l ine represent ing t h i s course of ac t ion could be made bold or an

arrowhead could be added to ind ica te t h a t i s th e wa y to go. Lines

or ig ina t ing from a chance event ( c i r c le ) rep resen t the d i f f e r e n t

outcomes t h a t could happen a t t h i s p o i n t . Numbers appea r on each of the

l i n e s . These are p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t the corresponding event w i l l

happen. Here, the probab i l i ty of sun i s 0 .4 and the probab i l i ty o f ra in

i s 0 .6 . The sum of probab i l i t i e s or ig ina t ing from a chance event node

i s always 1 .

There i s an outcome a t the end o f each branch o f the dec is ion

t r e e . Each outcome i s charac te r ized by the se t of dec i s ions and events

a long i t s pa th . In the par ty problem, the re are s ix poss ib le outcomes:

outdoor par ty in the sun, outdoor par ty in the ra in , porch par ty in th e

sun and so on. For ana lys i s , a number i s a t tached to each outcome.

This i s known as th e u t i l i t y . I t r ep resen ts how much one would pr ize

t h i s outcome over another . u t i l i t y i s f requent ly represented by d o l l a r

values . However, in genera l , u t i l i t y could be some ordered sca le on

which the r e l a t i v e des i r ab i l i t y of outcomes could be measured. Jane

obviously values an outdoor par ty in the sun most by ass igning a u t i l i t y

o f 1 to it. Th e l e a s t des i rab le outcome i s an outdoor par ty in the

r a in , to which a u t i l i t y of 0 i s ass igned. Th e assignment of values to

the outcomes could be as ob jec t ive as a formula to ca lcu la t e pr o f i t

margins or as sub jec t ive as a numerica l score to denote one ' s f ee l ings

about var ious outcomes.

The purpose of dec is ion t r ees or dec is ion ana lys i s in genera l

i s to opt imize ( tha t i s , e i t h e r to maximize or minimize) the u t i l i t y .

Optimizat ion i s done by choosing the pa th t h a t y ie lds the bes t expec ted

value . So, if the u t i l i t y represents r i s k , one would want to choose th e

course t h a t minimize the expected r i s k . I f th e u t i l i t y r ep resen ts

pr o f i t , one would want to choose the course t h a t maximizes expected

45



p r o f i t . The expected value i s the sum of the product s of u t i l i t i e s of

outcomes and t he i r probab i l i t i e s of occurrence , over a l l poss ib le

outcomes. In Jane ' s dec i s ion t r e e , th e expected value fo r a par ty

outdoors i s computed by (0.4 x 1 + 0.6 x 0) = 0 .40 . Simi la r ly , the

expected value fo r a par ty on the porch i s (0.4 x 0 .9 + 0 .6 x 0.2) =

0 .48 . Using the same computat ion procedure, the expected value fo r a

p a r t y indoors i s 0 .46 . This process i s sometimes ca l l ed r o l l i n g back

th e t r ee because the dec i s ion maker computes th e expected value

backwards along th e branches of the dec is ion t r e e . Th e par ty problem

r equ i res th e maximizat ion o f u t i l i t y . Hence, Jane should decide to hold

h e r par ty in the porch under cur ren t assessment of uncer ta in ty about th e

weather because t h i s course o f ac t ion yie lded the h ighes t expected value

( u t i l i t y ) o f 0 .48 .

Us e of Decis ion Tree in Tac t ica l Problems

Th e idea i s to decompose a course o f ac t ion (eOA) in to

component ba t t l e f i e ld dec is ions and a c t i v i t i e s and ar range them

sequen t ia l ly onto a dec i s ion t r e e . Poss ib l e enemy r eac t ions in the

dec i s ion t r ee are modeled as chance even t s . Using judgment, the planner

ass igns the l ike l ihood o f occurrence ( in th e form of a probab i l i ty ) to

each enemy opt ion . Having const ruc ted the dec is ion t r e e , the planner

then assesses the mer i t o f each branch. On a sca le o f 0 to 10, th e

planner ranks the pro jec ted outcomes of each branch. Zero means the

l e a s t des i rab le outcome with r espec t to the mission and te n means the

b e s t outcome. This i s a pure ly m i l i t a r y judgment . The nex t s tep i s to

r o l l back th e dec i s ion t r ee to compute the expected value as soc ia ted

with each eOA. In a t a c t i c a l problem, the ob jec t ive i s to f ind the eOA

t ha t wi l l y ie ld th e b e s t outcome. Thus, th e planner should choose the

branch with t he h ighes t expected value .

46



We have sa id t h a t the i n t e n t of using numbers in th e planning

methodology i s not to quan t i f y th e outcomes and make a dec i s ion based on

sub jec t ive data but to gain a more thorough apprec ia t ion o f the

i n t e r ac t ions between enemy and own a c t i o n s . So fa r we have a ranking of

eOAs based on th e p lanner ' s mi l i t a ry judgment about th e l ike l ihood o f

occurrence of enemy eOAs and values represent ing the r e l a t i v e

des i r ab i l i t y of these outcomes. We should n ot base our dec i s ion so le ly

on sub jec t ive da ta .

In our context , we should also be care fu l not to base dec is ions

so le ly on th e expected value . Using the expected value to se lec t a eOA

impl ies t h a t we w i l l g et a super io r outcome in th e long run a f t e r many

r epe t i t i ons of the e ~ A . However, we can only f igh t a ba t t l e once .

Th e ana lys i s should cont inue with ques t ions such as :

1 . What le d to th e choice o f t h i s eOA? What are the

con t r ibu t ions o f each branch to the expected va lue?

2. Are the expec ted values sens i t ive to s l i g h t changes in th e

quan t i t i e s represent ing the mil i t a ry judgments about the enemy? I f so,

what are these judgments and by ho w much must they change to a f f e c t the

dec is ion? What are the ranking o f the eOAs as a r e s u l t of such changes?

3. Are the value judgments of the outcomes c o n s i s t e n t with th e

commander's in tent? Are the expected values sens i t ive to changes in the

value judgments about th e outcomes? I f so, by how much must they change

to a f f e c t the dec is ion?

From these ques t ions about the sens i t i v i t y of the dec is ion t r ee

so lu t ion , one can gain an unders tanding o f how enemy uncer ta in ty af f ec t s

our t ac t i ca l so lu t ion . By means o f sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s , the planner

can also focus on the key uncer t a in t i e s t o ge t the maximum incremental

r e tu rn .

Looking a t the f u l l range of outcomes r e f l ec ted by th e dec is ion

t r ee broadens the p lanner ' s mind to the bounds of r ea l i t y . S e n s i t i v i t y

47



ana lys i s on the value judgments sharpens th e apprec ia t ion o f th e

commander 's i n t e n t fo r the b a t t l e .

Curren t plann ing methodology in e f f e c t holds an enemy COA

cons t an t while working through an own COA, then proceeds to th e nex t

enemy COA. Planners may overlook some enemy opt ions . Decis ion t r ee

r ep resen ta t ion al lows the planner see a l l poss ib le enemy opt ions a t a

p a r t i c u l a r t ime. In t h i s way, the dec is ion t r ee heigh tens the p lanner ' s

s i t u a t i o n awareness and thus enab les more f l ex ib le plans to be b u i l t .

A Simple Tact ica l Problem

To i l l u s t r a t e the p o t e n t i a l o f the dec i s ion t r e e , we wi l l model

a s imple t ac t i ca l problem in which the COAs involve a s ing le dec i s ion .

This scenar io comes from a planning exercise used in t a c t i c a l

i n s t ruc t ion in th e United S t a t e s Army Command and General S t a f f

O f f i c e r s ' Course (CGSOC).

A Divis ion Planning Vignet te

B r i e f l y , the scenar io i s as fol lows: 3 The enemy cons i s t s of tw o

Krasnovian motorized r i f l e d iv i s ions , advancing abreas t towards the

west . Th e Blue force, X Corps, cons i s t ing p r i n c i p a l l y o f one mechanized

d iv i s ion and tw o armor d iv i s ions , i s mounting a mobile defense to

des t r oy Krasnovian (Red) f o r ce s . Th e scenar io i s s e t in Germany. Th e

Corps ' concept of ope r a t ion i s to use the mechanized d iv i s ion as an

anv i l while holding a two-armor d iv i s ions s t r ik ing fo rce to h i t the

advancing motorized r i f l e d iv i s ions from the south f lank. X Corps ' deep

and covering fo rce ba t t l e s wi l l shape the b a t t l e f i e l d in such a way t ha t

the southern Re d d iv i s ion wi l l move su b s t a n t i a l l y fa s te r than th e

nor thern Red d i v i s i o n . Th e Blue two-divis ion s t r ik ing fo rce can then

a t t ack the enemy piecemeal ; the sou thern Red d iv i s ion f i r s t , then the

nor thern Re d d i v i s i o n .

48



s tudents play the ro le of the s t a f f of one d iv i s ion executing

the a t t ack . The decis ion problem occurs in the per iod between the

southern f igh t and the nor thern f igh t . Blue forces are in a has ty

defense posture a f t e r the f i r s t f igh t ( in which we des t royed the

southern Red d iv i s ion) . There i s uncer ta in ty about how the nor thern Red

d iv i s ion would r eac t to the dest ruct ion of the southern Red divis ion and

the presence of Blue forces on t he i r south f lank. The ske tch map

dep ic t ing the s i t u a t i o n i s a t Figure 3.

c=:>

Areas

Restrictive

to Mobility

xX

Chokepoints - - ' - - ~ ~ - - - -

(-)

MRD

PLPL ---l ___ - - - - ~ J L - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - G A M M A GAMMA RAY

MY x[9 [9

Armor Brigades in Hasty Defense

Figure 3. Sketch of the Si tuat ion: the Divis ion Planning Vigne t t e .

49



There are tw o chokepoin ts between the Blue forces and the

an t i c ipa ted enemy ax i s o f advance. 4 Th e i n t e l l igence o f f i c e r ' s (G2)

ana lys i s y ie lds th ree pos s ib le enemy courses of ac t ion , as fol lows:

Enemy Course of Action 1: Red sees Blue forces as

su b s t a n t i a l l y weakened by th e f igh t with the sou thern Re d d iv i s ion .

Being deple ted in combat power, Blue forces a re thus in has ty defense .

Th e nor thern Re d d iv i s ion wi l l con t inue the advance with a weak screen

deployed in th e south f lank.

Enemy Course of Action 2: Red suspec ts a t rap and perce ives

t h a t Blue i s poised for an a t t ack in to t he i r south f lank if they

cont inue the advance . Re d t u r ns south and occupies the chokepoints in

prepara t ion fo r passage of ano ther Re d fol low-on d iv i s ion from a

subsequent echelon.

Enemy Course of Action 3: Red's percept ion i s as in Course 2.

Ant ic ipa t ing a t r ap , it moves nor th out of Blue X Corps sec to r .

Th e Decision Problem

During the f r i end ly COA development process , s tu dent p lanners

have to cons ider the me r i t s of secur ing th e chokepoin ts l eading in to the

nor thern area of opera t ions .

Securing them beforehand can f a c i l i t a t e f u tu r e ope r a t ions and

preven t the enemy from occupying them as blocking pos i t ions . On the

o ther hand, it can r evea l Blue i n t en t ion ea r ly and can d iver t the enemy

ou t of th e Corps sec to r .

Not secur ing the chokepoints has th e reverse e f f e c t . Also, it

makes it more l i k e ly fo r Re d to proceed in to th e t r ap .

Th e planner cons t ruc t s a dec i s ion t r ee , as shown in Figure 4,

to r ep resen t and analyze th e problem. 5 At the dec is ion po in t , t he r e

are two a l t e r n a t i v e s : secure th e chokepoints or por t r ay weakness by

main ta in ing the cur ren t has ty defense posture u n t i l t ime to commence th e

50



a t t ack . I f Blue por t r ays weakness, planners assess t h a t the re i s a 0.8

probab i l i ty the Red wi l l cont inue the advance in to th e t r a p . In th i s

case , Blue can a t t ack in to t h e i r f l ank . On a sca le o f 0 to 10, planners

judged t h a t t h i s outcome would score 8. On th e o ther hand, the re i s a

0.2 chance t h a t Re d wi l l s e t up a has ty defense a t th e chokepoints .

Then, Blue w i l l have to a t t ack in to has ty defenses . This l e ss favorable

outcome get a score of 4. I f Blue chooses to secure the chokepoints ,

Red can adopt one of th ree ac t ions with these cor responding

probab i l i t i e s :

1 . A probab i l i ty o f 0.4 t h a t Red wi l l con t inue the

advance, in which case Blue can execute a v i o l e n t f lank a t t ack as a

r e s u l t of the secured chokepoints . This was judged the most des i rab le

outcome with .a score of 10.

§]EN HASTY OEF IN CHOKEPOINT

REMAIN IN POSITION .24 HARD FIGHT

EN PASSES THROUGH

8.8

ATTK FLANK

EN FORCE THROUGH1 0 ATTK FLANK

.4

SECURE CHOKEPOINTS EN ATTK CHOKEPOINTS5 HARD FIGHT

6.1.3

EN DIVERTED NORTH2 FAIL MISSION

.3

Figure 4. Decis ion Tree of Divis ion Planning Vignet te

51



2. A probab i l i ty of 0.3 tha t Red wi l l a t t ack Blue ' s blocking

pos i t ions . Blue has the advantage of f ight ing from defens ive posi t ions

but loses i n i t i a t i v e . Blue planners value th i s outcome a t 5.

3 . A probab i l i ty of 0.3 tha t Red wi l l d ive r t to the nor th .

Blue wi l l f a i l to des troy the enemy. This outcome i s va lued a t 2 .

To eva lua te the dec is ion t r e e , the expected value of each COA

i s computed. For the Por t ray Weakness opt ion, the expected value i s 7.2

( tha t i s , 0.2 x 4 + 0.8 x 8) . The expec ted va lue of the Secure

Chokepoint opt ion i s 6.1 . Given these probab i l i ty assessments of the

enemy COA and value judgments about the worth o f the outcomes, the

be t t e r COA i s the Por t ray Weakness opt ion (with an expec ted va lue of

7.2) .

Se n s i t i v i t y Analysis

The be t t e r COA i s to remain in a has ty defense to por t ray

weakness. The ques t ion i s , what has to change to make th e o ther COA,

Secure Chokepoint, the be t t e r dec i s ion .

Fi r s t , we review the va lue judgments about the outcomes. The

ques t ion i s whether the values ass igned to the outcomes are cons i s t en t

with the commander 's i n t e n t . Mistakes in the value judgments wi l l cause

the ana lys i s to be mis leading . Although sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s can deal

with uncer t a in t i e s in our own value judgments, it t akes cons iderably

longer t ime to do so . The re su l tan t ana lys i s wi l l also involve so many

"what i f s " tha t it tends to cloud the i s sues . The way around th i s i s to

ge t agreement for the va lue judgments of the outcomes from the commander

or from h is s ta tement of i n t e n t .

In our scenar io , the commander highly values a t tack ing the

enemy from the f lank (score o f 8). Fur ther , he desi res a f lank at tack

tha t passes through th e chokepoints with ease (score of 10) . The

commander a t taches a lower value to a ba t t l e aga ins t enemy has ty defense

52



a t the chokepoint (scores 4) bu t f ee l s it i s b e t t e r , if t h i s should be

the case , t h a t we f igh t from pr ev ious ly secured p o s i t i o n s (score o f 5) .

Th e wors t outcome i s caus ing the enemy to d i v e r t nor th from our sec to r

(score of 2 ) .

Conduct ing t h i s ana lys i s of fe r s th e p lanne r a thorough grasp of

the poss ib le ends ta tes . Having gained consensus for these va lue

judgments , we wi l l hold them cons t an t throughout the remainder of the

a n a l y s i s .

Next, we look a t the con t r ibu t ions to th e expec ted value . One

can see t h a t the expec ted va lue i s the sum of con t r ibu t ions from a l l

chance events (enemy op t ions ) . Th e task here i s to f ind ways to weaken

the "bes t " eOA and improve the "poorer" eOA within the l imi t s of our

assessment of the s i t u a t i o n .

For the Por t ray Weakness eOA, one con t r ibu t ion i s 0.8 (0.2 x 4)

from the branch where th e enemy occupies the chokepoints . Th e o ther

branch, in which the enemy con t inues west, gives the main con t r ibu t ion

o f 6.4 (0.8 x 8 ) . Th e reason why th i s eOA i s nominally recommended i s

l a rge ly due to the high l ike l ihood o f ca tching Red on the f lank. What

if Re d commander were more caut ious and the re fo re l e ss l i k e ly to

cont inue west in to our t r ap? I f the probab i l i ty of each opt ion becomes

now even ( tha t i s , 50-50 chance) , th e expec ted va lue becomes 6.0 (0.5 x

4 + 0.5 x 8 ) . Th e dec i s ion wi l l now be in favor of the o ther eOA s ince

t h i s expected value i s l e ss than 6.1 . We asked the G2 if an even chance

between enemy opt ions i s p laus ib le . Th e G2 sa id it i s poss ib le but

given our unders tanding of Re d doc t r ine , it i s un l ike ly to be l e s s . He

thought it more l i k e ly fo r Red to con t inue west if they see the

chokepoints are n ot occupied . To prevent a su rp r i se Blue a t t ack from

the south f lank, Red can h a s t i l y l ay obs tac les , s e t an t i - t ank (AT)

t r aps , use a p e r s i s t e n t chemical agent or choose a combinat ion of these

53



to secure t he i r south f l a nk . Some conc lus ions of t h i s pa r t of the

ana lys i s were:

1 . I f we choose the Por t ray Weakness COA, we should t ry to

forec lose the Re d opt ion to occupy the chokepoints and defend them.

2. I f Red heads west , our a t t ack in to t he i r f lank must account

fo r enemy r eac t ion such as has ty obs tac les , AT t r aps and a chemical

a t t ack .

For the Secure Chokepoint COA, we look a t the con t r ibu t ions

t ha t wi l l cause th e expec ted va lue to be low. We note t ha t the smal les t

i s 0.6 (0.3 x 2 ) . This i s as soc ia ted with the enemy being d iver ted ou t

o f the Blue Corps sec to r . Based on the commander 's i n t e n t to des t roy

the enemy, t h i s i s t he poore s t outcome because we have f a i l ed in our

miss ion . By t h i s s imple ana lys i s , we have i de n t i f i e d what appears to be

the most c r i t i c a l f a i l u r e mode a t t h i s s tage . This i s also the main

f ac to r t ha t prevents us from secur ing the chokepoints . We conclude tha t

Blue must do the utmost to foreclose the Enemy Diver ted North op t ion .

I f we manage to deny Re d t h i s opt ion , the l ike l ihood t ha t Red w i l l adopt

one of the tw o remaining opt ions wi l l be h ighe r . We w i l l then -at tempt

to force the enemy not to a t t ack our pos i t i ons a t the chokepoints . This

w i l l be d i f f i c u l t if Red discovers our presence a t the chokepoint s . I f

we are discovered, the enemy i s ce r ta in to engage us t he re . The

expected va lue wi l l thus be 5.0 .6

At t h i s s tage , the Secure Chokepoint

COA i s still poorer than the Por t ray Weakness COA (expected va lue o f 7.2

wi th a poss ib le worst value o f 6 .0 ) . Th e ques t ion i s what can we do to

remain undiscovered . I f Blue succeeds in remaining undiscovered in the

chokepoint un t i l the a t t ack , the pr i ze i s the achievement of the bes t

poss ib le outcome (score of 10 ) . Some conc lus ions from t h i s pa r t of the

ana lys i s were:

1. We must do the utmost t o p re ve n t Re d from being d iver ted

from our sec to r .

54



2. We must no t be discovered in the chokepoints if we want to

occupy them.

3 . This COA has the p o te n t i a l of ach iev ing the b e s t outcome.

Ins igh t

While drawing conclus ions from t he dec i s ion t r ee ana lys i s , the

p lann ing s t a f f gained in s igh t s t h a t had not occurred to them e a r l i e r .

The f i r s t wa s tha t the enemy can avoid ba t t l e by d iver t ing nor th from

our sec to r . This r e s u l t s in a r eques t to the Corps to c lose the

nor thward approach. A combinat ion of av ia t ion , long range a r t i l l e r y ,

rapid mining and su rve i l l ance asse t s wi l l be concent ra ted the re to

preven t Re d from moving nor th . This reorders the i n i t i a l pr i o r i t y o f

a t tack ing deeper enemy fol low-on echelons a t t h i s s tage . As a r e s u l t ,

fol low-on echelons w i l l have to be d e a l t with l a t e r .

The nex t i n s igh t occur red as we t r i ed to forec lose enemy

opt ions . We wanted to ac t ive ly lu re th e enemy in to the t r ap . Adopt ing

one COA or the o ther would l ead to l e s s than s a t i s f a c to r y r e s u l t s . A

b e t t e r idea , obta ined by examining t he dec i s ion t r ee ca re fu l ly , wa s to

i n i t i a l l y por t r ay weakness by remaining in has ty defense loca t ions .

I n i t i a l enemy reconnaissance would r e p o r t an open road to the west ,

Red's ob jec t ive . As Red fo rces moved in to our t r ap , an in tense program

o f counter - reconnai s sance and counter f i r e would a t t empt to remove t h e i r

reconnaissance capab i l i ty .7 At the appropr ia te t ime, e lements of the

Blue fo rce would secure th e chokepoints . As Re d forces ente red the

t r ap , the bulk o f the Blue fo rces would then r ap id ly s t r i k e them on

t he i r f l anks through secured chokepoints . Having ar r ived a t t h i s

concep t of opera t ion, a l l combat e lements (Ba t t l e f i e ld Operat ing

Systems) synchronize t h e i r suppor t .

By dec i s ion t r ee ana lys i s , it became c l e a r to planners t h a t the

key to the success wa s to produce condi t ions t h a t would crea te the b e s t

55



chance of lu r ing the enemy in to the t r a p . Planners thus se lec ted the

most pruden t eOA under enemy uncer ta in ty . They adopted the Por t ray

Weakness eOA with an a t t empt to b l ind the enemy. I f success f u l , they

would proceed to secure the chokepoin ts to f a c i l i t a t e ope r a t ions . In

t h i s way, th e dec i s ion t r ee ana lys i s had yie lded i n s igh t s tha t in turn

c l a r i f i ed what ought to be done.

Towards th e Proposed Planning Methodology

Th e proposed planning methodology wi l l be used dur ing the

wargame s tage of plann ing . I t w i l l guide th e thought process in th e

wargame and a id ana lys i s of th e plan as it i s b u i l t . Th e major change

to the flow o f th e wargame t h a t dec i s ion t r ee - based methodology br ings

i s to the planning sequence . With th e new methodology, planners wi l l

complete wargaming o f a l l branches o f enemy opt ions before proceed ing to

the nex t even t . Th e main wargame record ing method wi l l be the

cons t r uc t ion o f the dec i s ion t r e e .

Th e bas ic idea o f the proposed plann ing methodology i s to model

a eOA as a se r i e s o f ba t t l e f i e l d dec i s ions t h a t roughly cor re sponds to

our own dec i s ion-cyc le . I t i s thus an ex tens ion of the one-dec is ion eOA

t h a t was cons idered in th e d iv i s ion plann ing v i g n e t t e .

Modeling the eOA as a se r i e s o f ba t t l e f i e l d dec i s ion i s a lso

cons i s ten t with th e a c t i o n - r e a c t i on- coun te r ac t ion paradigm t h a t i s

adopted fo r the wargame. This w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the flow of the wargame.

Figure 5 shows th e dec i s ion t r ee cons t ruc t t o r epr e sen t a eOA with

seve r a l dec i s ion cyc les .

For the dec is ion t r ee to be usefu l , the number of branches on

it should be kept manageable. Th e p l an n e r has to dec ide what th e

e s se n t i a l f ac to r s are and how much d e t a i l to usefu l ly i nc lude . In the

nex t chapter , we w i l l r e f ine t h i s plann ing methodology and apply it to a

br igade planning scena r io .

56



Battle

I·Action Reaction

Friendly

Options

Enemy

Options

. . . ..Counteraction I Reaction I

Figure 5. Decision Tree Const ruc t wi th Severa l Decision Cycles

57



Endnotes

1 A s imple decis ion problem cons i s t s of one dec i s ion . In t h i s

t a c t i c a l scenar io , the courses of ac t ion are comple te ly spec i f i ed by one

decis ion: to secure the chokepoints or no t .

2 Ronald A. Howard, "The Par ty Problem," (1991) .

3 The planning exercise wa s pa r t of t a c t i ca l ins t ruc t ion dur ing

C320 Corps and Divis ion Combat Opera t ion of the CGSOC: Exerc ise DEPUTY

DAWG. Students play the d iv i s ion s t a f f o f the 25th Armor Divis ion which

i s pa r t of the U.s . X Corps.

4 A chokepoint i s a narrow rou t e o f movement t ha t i s r e s t r i c t ed

on e i t he r s ide by t e r r a i n . Therefore , a smal l mil i t a ry force can

e f fec t ive ly con t ro l movement. through it.

5 The decis ion t r ee was ac tua l ly used dur ing the p lanning

exerc i s e . Having unders tood the problem, the author cons tructed the

decis ion t r ee within 10 minutes .

6 We reasoned t ha t if Blue has somehow induced Red no t to be

d iver ted from the sec to r and if th e enemy discovers our chokepointpos i t i ons , the enemy w i l l a t t ack our pos i t i on (p robab i l i ty o f 1 ) . The

expected value in t h i s case i s 5 .0 (1 x 5 . 0 ) .

7 Counte r - reconna issance means l e t ha l and non- le tha l a t t acks to

reduce the enemy's capab i l i t y to ga ther informat ion and to produce

in te l l igence . Counte r f i r e a re f i r e s and e lec t ron ic a t tacks intended to

des t roy enemy's i nd i r e c t f i re systems.

58



CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

There have been hopes t h a t a mathemat ica l theory employed in

con junct ion with a quan t i t a t ive concept of [mi l i ta ry] worth

w i l l tend to e l imina te b ias and emot iona l inf luences from ourdec i s ions . These hopes appear l a rge ly unfounded.

1

Haywood

I n t r oduc t ion

In t h i s chapter , we wi l l apply the proposed plann ing

methodology to a br igade defense miss ion . Th e scenar io in OPLAN WHITE

i s used because it i s f ami l ia r to many U.S. Army o f f i c e r s .2

The U.S.

Army Command 'and Genera l S t a f f Col lege (CGSC) uses th i s scenar io to

t each the foundat ion t ac t i c s course, C310 Fundamentals o f Combat

Opera t ions . We also c h ~ s e th i s scenar io because CGSC prov ides the

schoo l ' s so lu t ion to the t a c t i c a l problem. Obvious ly, t h i s so lu t ion i s

based on the cur ren t planning methodology. Thus, we can use it as an

i l l u s t r a t i o n of the product o f the cur ren t approach.

A b r i e f descr ip t ion of OPLAN WHITE w i l l be fol lowed by the

app l ica t ion of th e proposed planning methodology to p lan a br igade

miss ion . Th e two br igade courses of ac t ion (COAs) developed in OPLAN

WHITE w i l l be analyzed using the dec is ion t r ee cons t ruc t .

Th e new methodology wi l l then be eva lua ted aga ins t th e list of

a t t r i b u t e s of an i d e a l planning methodology developed in Chapter Two.

We wi l l assess i t s e f f i c a c y c r i t i c a l l y and draw some conclus ions .

59



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

OPLAN WHITE

In troduct ion

OPLAN WHITE i s the Opera t ions Plan (OPLAN) of the no t iona l 55th

Mechanized Divis ion to de f ea t the f i c t i t i o u s 2d Nebraski i Army. The

ba t t l e i s s e t in the v ic in i t y of For t Leavenworth, Kansas. The

Nebraski i Army a t t a c k s from th e nor th . I t adopted t ac t i c s and

or gan iza t ion s imi la r to t h a t of th e former Sovie t Union.

For t h i s exerc i se , we assume the ro le of the p lann ing s t a f f o f

the 3rd Brigade o f the 55th Mechanized Divis ion.

General Enemy S i t u a t i o n

Facing 55th Mechanized Divis ion i s the 2d Nebraski i Army with

tw o Motorized Rif le Divis ions (MRDs), one Tank Divis ion (TD) and one

Independent Motorized Brigade (IMR Bde) .

Our i n t e l l igence assessment ind ica ted t h a t the 2d Army i s

organized as fo l lows:

The f i r s t echelon cons i s t s of two MRDs, which w i l l be a t tack ing

abreas t from nor th , with the miss ion of des t roying th e defending U.S.

Army br igades . Th e weste rn MRD, the 3d MRD, wi l l be th e main e f f o r t .

The eas te rn MRD, the 9th MRD, w i l l be the suppor t ing e f f o r t .

The second echelon cons i s t s of one TD, the 2d TD. Depending on

which f i r s t echelon MRD has more success , t h i s TD wi l l pass through t h a t

zone and break out towards th e Kansas River. I t s immediate ob jec t ive i s

to c ross the r i v e r and defea t U.S. forces in t h a t v i c in i t y . I t s

subsequent miss ion i s to turn e a s t to l ink up with the Nebrask i i 1 s t

Army, thus complet ing the enci rc lement of Kansas City , t h e i r ul t imate

mil i t a ry ob jec t ive . Th e 42 d IMR Bde i s the 2d Army r ese rve .

The sketch o f th e genera l enemy s i tua t ion i s show in Figure 6.

Th e complete i n t e l l igence es t imate can be found in th e Advance Book t h a t

accompanies the C310 course . 3

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Figure 6. Sketch of the Genera l Enemy Si tua t ion

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55th Mechanized Divis ion OPLAN

In OPLAN WHITE, the 55th Mechanized Divis ion wi l l defend i t s

sec to r wel l forward (north) o f Kansas River . Th e d iv i s ion commander

in tends to mount an area defense forward of a l ine des ignated as Phase

Line BLUE (PL BLUE)." The ske tch of th e d iv i s ion defense plan i s shown

in Figure 7. Af te r accept ing ba t t l e handover from the Corps ' Armored

Cavalry Regiment, the d iv i s i on ' s av ia t ion br igade wi l l conduct guard

_ - - - ~ _ r PL 6REcN

I~ c ; l 1 ".I."..._ ~ . . . . . J . . - - __ _ x ~ . - _____ .Jr ) . ] (

Figure 7. Sketch o f the 55th Mechanized Div i s ion ' s Defense Plan

62



opera t ions nor th o f the main defense area . Th e 2d Brigade and 3d

Brigade defend abreas t in th e eas te rn and western sec to r s r espec t ive ly .

Th e 2d Brigade i s the d iv is ion ' s main e f f o r t . 1 s t Brigade, th e

d iv is ion ' s reserve , occupies Assembly Area LYNX and prepares to

coun te r a t t ack Nebrask i i fo rces pene t ra t ing PL BLUE. Th e d iv is ion ' s deep

opera t ions w i l l delay and d i s r u p t follow-on forces so t h a t th e enemy can

only in t roduce t he i r forces in to ba t t l e in a piecemeal fashion.

The d iv i s ion has tw o contingency plans (CONPLAN) to preven t

enemy pene t ra t ion o f PL BLUE. Th e f i r s t requires the 1 s t Brigade to

coun te r a t t ack in to the 2d Brigade sec to r . Th e second, named CONPLAN TOP

HAT, guards aga ins t th e p o s s ib i l i t y of the enemy s h i f t i n g i t s main

e f f o r t in to 3d Brigade sec to r . s CONPLAN TOP HAT w i l l be a c t i v a t e d if

the 3d Brigade i s weakened considerably in the main defense ba t t l e and

if the re are ind ica t ions t h a t the f i r s t echelon regiment (5 th TR) of the

second echelon d iv i s ion (2 d TD) i s a t tack ing in to 3d Br igade - sec to r .

Th e 1 s t Brigade w i l l pass through the 3d Brigade sec to r and f lank th e

approaching TR from the west.

3d Brigade ' s Mission

Assets Avai lab le

Th e 3d Br igade ' s miss ion i s to defend the eas te rn s ec to r ,

a l lowing no pene t ra t ion o f enemy forces south of PL BLUE. This i s the

suppor t ing e f f o r t of the d iv i s ion . To accomplish t h i s , the d iv i s ion has

given it four mechanized infant ry companies, four tank companies and one

armored vehicle-mounted an t i - t ank weapons company (BTV company). These

forces can be t a i lo red in to two ba t ta l ion - ta sk force commands.

Addi t iona l ly , the br igade wi l l rece ive command of TF 4-77, a ba t ta l ion

t a sk force cons i s t ing of tw o mechanized i n f an t ry companies, one tank

company and one BTV company, upon the complet ion of th e d iv i s iona l guard

b a t t l e . The br igade an t i c ipa tes tha t TF 4-77 w i l l be reduced to 65%

63



s t r eng th but can be r es to red to a t l e a s t 70% combat ef fec t ivenes s in a

few hours .

Terra in

The br igade a rea of opera t ion (AO) i s bounded on the e a s t by

the Missour i River; on the south by the Kansas River ; on the west by

St ranger ' s Creek and on the nor th by the Bat t l e Handover Line t r aced by

Phase Line (PL) GRAY. PL BLUE, which runs e a s t to west across our AO

approx ima te ly div ides it in to tw o ha lves . South o f PL BLUE, th e AO i s

open and f l a t . Consequently , the defense ba t t l e wi l l t ake place in more

defens ible t e r r a in , nor th o f PL BLUE. This area can be ca tegor i zed in to

th ree sub-areas in terms o f t e r r a in c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : west , c e n t r a l and

e a s t . In the west , we have broken t e r r a in . Tr ibu ta r ies to St ranger ' s

Creek cu t deep ravines in to th e ground which r e s t r i c t nor th - sou th

movement. Th e c e n t r a l area i s open and a lmos t f l a t . This i s the high

speed approach fo r massed armor. Th e t e r r a in in the e a s t i s h i l l y with

patches o f wooded areas . I t i s thus r e l a t i v e ly more r e s t r i c t i v e to

massed armor. A ll th ree sub-areas are cu l t iva ted but in our t imeframe,

the crops are harves ted. This improves i n t e r v i s i b i l i t y . The weather

has been dry and so the ground can suppor t armor movement throughout the

AO without problems. Coupled with the f a c t t h a t the area i s wel l - se rved

by roads and t r acks , the AO has e x c e l l e n t armor maneuvering po ten t ia l .

Enemy

The enemy fac ing the 3d Brigade i s the 9th MRD. The d iv i s ion

es t imates t h a t th e Corps covering fo rce and the d i v i s i o n a l guard b a t t l e s

can des t roy the f i r s t echelon regiments of th i s MRD. Upon ba t t l e

handover from the d iv i s iona l guard fo rce , the 3d Brigade w i l l meet the

second echelon regiments (one tank and one motor ized r i f l e regiment) of

64



the 9th MRD and the Independent Tank Bat ta l ion (ITB).6

spec i f i c enemy forces it has to face .

These are th e

I f th e enemy perce ives t h a t th e at tack in the 3d Brigade sec to r

i s going wel l , he can s h i f t h is f i r s t echelon tank regiment of the

second echelon tank d iv i s ion in to the sec to r . This i s th e contingency

fo r which the 3d Brigade wi l l prepare .

Enemy Courses o f Action

Planners fo r the 3d Brigade ar r ived a t two enemy courses o f

ac t ion (enemy COAs) , as follows:

Enemy COA 1. Th e enemy a t t a c k s with two regiments abreas t ; th e

main e f f o r t in th e west and a suppor t ing e f f o r t in th e e a s t . Their

miss ion i s to rupture the defense and open a gap through which th e ITB

can pass . They w i l l then cont inue to des t roy the defending br igade .

Th e ITB wi l l a t tempt to secure a cross ing across the Kansas River to

f ac i l i t a t e future opera t ions .

Enemy COA 2. The enemy a t tacks with two regiments abreas t ; the

main e f f o r t in the e a s t and a suppor t ing e f f o r t in the west . Simi la r to

COA I , t h e i r miss ion i s to rupture the defense and open a gap through

which the ITB can pass . They w i l l then cont inue to des t r oy the

defending br igade .

Common to Both Enemy COAs. Having defea ted defending fo rces in

t he i r a t tack zone, the enemy wi l l a t tempt to cont inue t he i r advance

south . I f , however, th e defending fo rce in the adjacent zone i s still

holding ground, they have the opt ion of execut ing a f lank a t t ack to

des t r oy the r es i s t ance . For example,if

th e regiment in the west has

penetrated forward defenses , it can e i t h e r cont inue i t s advance south or

hook e a s t to des t roy the remaining defending fo rces (from the f lank) in

the adjacent regiment ' s a t tack zone.

65



I f the pene t r a t ion of the defenses i s success fu l and if the

enemy perce ives an imminent co l lapse o f the forward defense, the second

eche lon tank div is ion can be channeled through the breach. The enemy i s

l i ke l y to lead with a tank regiment (poss ib ly the 5 th TR). This

regiment ' s mission i s to secure a bridgehead on the south bank o f the

Kansas River . The r e s t of the second echelon tank d iv i s ion can pass

through the same breach in the 3d Brigade sec to r , cross the r i ve r and

cont inue to enc i rc l e Kansas Ci ty .

3d Brigade ' s Courses of Act ion

3d Bde planners formula ted concepts fo r tw o courses of ac t ion

(COA) as fol lows (see Figures 8 and 9):7

COA 1 . On order , the 3d Brigade defends in sec to r with tw o

ba t ta l ion- ta sk forces abreas t to des t roy second eche lon reg iments and

the ITB of the f i r s t eche lon div is ion and defea t one r eg iment of the

second eche lon d iv i s ion forward of PL BLUE. A balanced task force i s

the main e f fo r t in the west , with a mechanized infant ry-heavy task force

as the suppor t ing e f f o r t in the eas t . Th e Brigade accepts ba t t l e

handover from d iv i s iona l guard force a t PL GRAY. Main Bat t l e Area (MBA)

task forces des t roy a t t ack ing r eg iments and the ITB o f th e f i r s t echelon

div is ion forward o f PL BLUE. The suppor t ing e f fo r t prevents enemy

access to the town of LEAVENWORTH. Th e Brigade ' s p r i o r i t i e s fo r deep

opera t ions a re to de lay and d i s rup t the commitment of the ITB and then

to de lay and d i s rup t the commitment of the regiment from the second

eche lon d iv i s ion . MBA task forces a re respons ib le fo r t h e i r own f lank

secu r i ty . I n i t i a l l y , one t ank-heavy company team i s the br igade rese rve

in assembly area (AA) RAT. On complet ion o f rearward passage, TF 4-77

(a mechanized infant ry-heavy t a sk force) reve r t s to br igade con t ro l ,

moves to AA RAT, reorganizes and on order rece ives at tachment of the

tank-heavy company team and becomes the br igade reserve . Pr i o r i t y o f

66



commitment of the reserve i s to block pene t r a t ion o f PL BLUE in the

wes tern sec to r . The br igade reserve o r the 55th Mechanized Division

provides Level I I I response in the br igade rea r area .o

After defea t ing

the regiment from the second echelon d iv i s ion , the Brigade r ees t ab l i shes

defenses between PL BLUE and PL ZULU and prepares to at tack in zone to

complete th e des t ruc t ion of the remaining enemy forces and to

rees tab l i sh the border .

Pl YEllOW (HEll

Pl lULU

- .1.______ 1 - - - - - ~ (Aurse o( ~ c r i o " , sAerch

Figure 8. Course of Action 1

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eOA 2. On order , the 3d Brigade defends i n s e c t o r with two

ba t ta l ion - ta sk forces abreas t to des t r oy second eche lon regiments and

th e ITB of the f i r s t echelon d iv i s ion and defea t one regiment of the

second echelon d iv i s ion forward o f PL BLUE. MBA un i t s accepts ba t t l e

handover and a s s i s t th e rearward passage o f d iv i s iona l guard fo rce

elements a t PL GRAY. A tank-heavy task force in the west i s th e main

e f f o r t and defends in s ec to r , des t roying one regiment and the ITB from

the f i r s t eche lon d iv i s ion . A mechanized infant ry-heavy task force in

the e a s t i s the suppor t ing e f f o r t and defends in sec to r , des t roying one

regiment from the f i r s t echelon d iv i s ion . Main and suppor t ing e f f o r t s

shape the ba t t l e f i e ld by prevent ing enemy forces from pene t ra t ing PL

SILVER, se t t ing the condi t ions for a br igade coun te r a t t ack by a task

force . MBA task forces are r e spons ib l e fo r t h e i r own f lank secur i ty .

Th e Br igade ' s p r i o r i t i e s fo r deep ope r a t ions are to de lay and d is rup t

th e commitment of the ITB and then to de lay and d is rup t the commitment

of the regiment of the second echelon d iv i s ion . A mechanized i n f an t ry

company team i s the br igade reserve in AA BOLD; i t s pr i o r i t y of

commitment i s to the main e f f o r t . Th e br igade reserve or the 55th

Mechanized Divis ion p rov ides Level I I I response in the br igade r e a r

a rea . On complet ion o f rearward passage, TF 4-77 r ever t s to br igade

con t ro l , moves to AA FIX, reorganizes and on order , becomes the b r igade

coun te r a t t ack f o r ce . On order , TF 4-77 moves a long ax i s STRIKE and

coun te r a t t acks to defea t the regiment from th e second echelon d iv i s ion

in the v ic in i t y of ob jec t ive MELEE, prevent ing pene t ra t ion o f PL BLUE.

Th e Brigade r ees t ab l i shes a coherent de fense between PL SILVER and PL

YELLOW, con t inues to defend s e c t o r and prepares to t r a n s i t i o n to th e

of fense to complete the des t ruc t ion of the remaining enemy f o r ce s .

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Pl GUT (BHlJ

Pl llll0W (HeA)

Pl 1tHOW (liSA)

-'------- I ------Ctlurse of Ktion 2 sketch

Figure 9. Course of Action 2

Courses o f Action Analys is

In t roduct ion

8lU[

Before we apply the proposed planning methodology to COA

ana lys i s , it is worthwhile to s e t it in con tex t . The methodology is

app l ied during th e wargame. The dec i s ion t r e e t h a t w i l l be presented i s

cons t ruc ted as the wargame proceeds . Enemy opt ions and f r i end ly opt ions

a t each decis ion po in t and chance events are assessed as the s i tua t ion

develops in the wargame. Mil i ta ry judgments ( sub jec t ive inputs) such as

69



p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f occur rence o f enemy ac t ions and the outcomes o f events

r ep resen t the " fee l" planners ge t from wargaming the scenar io . The

sequence of cons t ruc t ion of the dec i s ion t r ee d ic ta te s the sequence of

wargaming.

Wargaming Sequence

Sta r t ing with the f i r s t c r i t i c a l event of th e wargame, th e

genera l sequence i s to complete one f r i end ly eOA before s t a r t i ng the

next . Af ter planners have wargamed a l l f r iendly eOAs, they can move on

to the next c r i t i c a l event . Th e reason fo r th i s approach i s t h a t when

a t ten t ion i s focused on the i s sues within the same event , it w i l l

f a c i l i t a t e the comparison of eOAs.

I f t ime i s a cons t r a in t , planners can wargame the most

promis ing eOA f i r s t in i t s e n t i r e ty ( tha t i s , wargame a l l c r i t i c a l

events wi th one eOA f i r s t . ) This scheme allows t h ~ m to complete a plan

in the t ime ava i l ab le .

Using th e act ion- react ion-counteract ion cyc le , p lanners wi l l

wargame the f i r s t branch to completion and then s t a r t on the nex t

branch. Within each branch, planners w i l l incorpora te a l l enemy opt ions

given the s i t u a t i o n a t tha t po in t in t ime, then formulate f r i end ly

ac t ions to counte r them. Ou r ac t ions may p r e c ip i t a t e yet more poss ib le

enemy ac t ions . This in tu rn r equ i res the planner to formulate ano ther

s e t of coun te rac t ions . This process i s fol lowed un t i l the end of the

c r i t i c a l event o r when the enemy has been defea ted. This wargaming

sequence w i l l be demonstrated us ing OPLAN WHITE as an example.

Suggested Steps fo r the Proposed Planning Methodology

Th e fol lowing are the suggested s teps for the proposed planning

methodology:

1 . Iden t i fy the c r i t i c a l events to wargame.

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2. Iden t i fy the s i mi l a r i t i e s and d i f fe rences in th e f r i end ly

COAs within th e c r i t i c a l event . Common par t s of the COAs need only be

wargamed once.

3. Ident i fy the main elements of uncer ta in ty posed by the

enemy.

4. Es tab l i sh a pre l iminary sca le o f values (or mil i t a ry worth)

of pos s ib le outcomes. This s tep encourages th e planner to t h ink about

the ends ta tes of the c r i t i c a l event and r e in fo rces the p lanner ' s

unders tanding of the commander 's i n t e n t . This pre l iminary va lue sca le

serves as a guide fo r the planner to main ta in consis tency in ass igning

numbers to th e dec i s ion t r ee tha t r ep resen t r e l a t i v e des i r ab i l i t y of the

outcomes.

5. S ta r t th e wargame, fo l lowing th e wargaming sequence

prescr ibed above. To record the wargame, planners cons t ruc t the f i r s t

branch of the dec is ion t r e e . As the wargame y ie lds r e s u l t s , planners

fill in the probab i l i t i e s of occur rence o f enemy opt ions and record the

reasons fo r t h e i r assignment. Simi la r ly , planners fill in the values o f

the outcomes.

6. Record i n s igh t s as they occur dur ing the wargame. Ins ights

are a r a r e and per i shab le commodity. Whether app l i cab le or not , they

serve as mental cues which may be use f u l l a t e r .

7. Perform pre l iminary sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s o f the dec is ion

t r ee when th e f i r s t COA wargame i s completed. The purposes a re to

unders tand the dynamics of the ba t t l e , to see where c r i t i c a l points in

th e ba t t l e occur and to i den t i fy what ac t ions a re requi red to forec lose

enemy opt ions t h a t can br ing unfavorable outcomes.

8. Go to the nex t c r i t i c a l event using the same COA if t ime i s

a cons t r a in t . Otherwise, wargame the same c r i t i c a l event us ing the nex t

COA.

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9. Perform a sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s of the dec i s ion t r ee a f t e r

a l l eOAs are wargamed. Th e main purpose i s to compare the eOAs. We

wi l l also f ind, if poss ib le , the b e s t "composi te" eOA from a l l those

t h a t are cons idered. Th e i n s igh t s genera ted during t h i s ana lys i s can

probably y ie ld ideas for decep t ion and suppor t ing e f f o r t s from o ther

combat e lements .

10. Synchronize e f f o r t s of the combat elements in each COA.

11. Repeat from s tep 2 onwards fo r next c r i t i c a l event .

We w i l l now demonstra te th e use of th e proposed planning

methodology by applying it to the 3d Brigade plan of OPLAN WHITE.

Ident i fy C r i t i c a l Events

The 3d Brigade plan envis ions a defense in two phases . The

f i r s t invo lves defense aga ins t the second echelon regiments o f f i r s t

echelon d iv i s ion and the ITB. In th e second phase, 3d Brigade defends

aga ins t a tank regiment from the second echelon d i v i s i o n . I f the

defense goes awry in the f i r s t phase and the 3d Brigade i s overrun, it

i s poss ib le t h a t the second phase be car r i ed ou t by th e 55th Mechanized

Div is ion ' s reserve (1s t Brigade) by execu t ing Cont ingency Plan TOP HAT.

Thus, we i den t i fy the whole f i r s t phase as one c r i t i c a l event to wargame

and the second phase as th e o ther . For t h i s t h e s i s , we w i l l demonstra te

the use of the proposed planning methodology with the f i r s t c r i t i c a l

event , the i n i t i a l defense .

Iden t i fy S im i l a r i t i e s and Differences between COAs

In both COA 1 and 2, the 3d Brigade w i l l defend with tw o

b a t t a l i o n - t a sk forces (TFs) abreas t , with th e main e f f o r t in th e western

sec to r ( l e f t TF or LTF), the suppor t ing e f f o r t in th e eas te rn s ec to r

( r igh t TF or RTF) and with a company team as the i n i t i a l r ese rve . Only

the composi t ion of the LTF and th e i n i t i a l reserve a re d i f f e r e n t . In

72





2. Th e place on the b a t t l e f i e l d a t which we i n f l i c t the damage

on th e enemy.

3 . Th e involvement of reserves to i n f l i c t the damage.

We wi l l expla in each l eve l in t u r n .

Fi r s t , we pre fe r des t ruc t ion of the enemy to j u s t i t s defea t .

Dest ruc t ion means phys ica l des t ruc t ion of the enemy's combat power such

as t anks , a r t i l l e r y pieces and personnel . Defeat means th e el iminat ion

o f the enemy's ab i l i t y to car ry o ut i t s in tended miss ion . Defea t ing th e

enemy wi l l probably r equ i re the phys ica l des t ruc t ion o f a por t ion o f h is

force . However, t h i s f a l l s shor t of t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n . In an enemy

a t t a c k , we have defea ted it if it i s forced to r e t i r e from the

b a t t l e f i e l d or to t ake up has ty defense pos i t ions .

Th e next l e v e l of preference i s the place a t which we have

stopped the enemy. This comes from our percept ion t h a t the enemy i s

l e ss l ike ly to commit. i t s second echelon fo rces (5th TR) in to our sec to r

if we de f ea t them forward of our pos i t ion . I f we allow pene t ra t ion ,

whether de l ibe ra te ly or not , the enemy commander may perce ive weakness

in th e defense and commit more forces in to our sec to r in th e hope of

crea t ing a breach . Hence, we va lue an outcome which s tops the enemy

forward r a the r than in s ide our defense area .

Third, we pre fe r an outcome t ha t wi l l de f ea t the enemy without

th e commitment of our reserve to one tha t does. Th e commitment of

reserve e n t a i l s add i t iona l r i s k s . I t i s more des i rab le , in our search

fo r a good COA, if we can eng ineer a deployment t h a t l e s sens the number

of "moving par t s . "

Given t he se cons iderat ions , a pre l iminary sca le of values o f

the outcomes, on a sca le between 0 (worst) and 10 (best) can be

const ruc ted as fo l lows:

1 . Destroy the enemy forward of th e defense area wi thou t

commitment of reserve - 10.

74



2. Destroy the enemy forward o f th e defense area wi th

commitment o f r e se rve - 10.

3. Destroy the enemy within the defense area wi thou t

commitment of r e se rve - 9 o r 10.

4 . Defeat the enemy forward o f the defense area without

commitment of r e se rve - 9 or 10.

5 . Destroy the enemy within the defense area with commitment

of rese rve - 7 or 8.

6. Defeat the enemy forward of the defense area with

commitment of reserves - 6 or 7.

7. Defeat th e enemy within the defense area without commitment

o f rese rve - 7.

8. Defeat the enemy within the defense area with commitment o f

re se rve - 5 o r 6.

On the o ther end o f the spectrum, we have to rank poor

outcomes. I f we should face a rupture of the defenses , we w il l . a t t ach

higher va lue to an outcome tha t l imi t s a pene t r a t ion and allows the

commitment o f a d iv i s ion countera t tack than to one in which the enemy

breaks through PL BLUE. We append tw o more ends ta tes to the list as

fo l lows:

9. Block enemy pene t r a t ion a t PL BLUE a f t e r forward defense

posi t ions overrun - 4.

10. Defense f a i l s and the enemy breaks through PL BLUE - O.

This sca le i s intended as a guide for cons is tency and need no t

be appl ied too s t r i c t l y . Planners may have o ther reasons why ce r ta in

outcomes do not adhere to t h i s pre l iminary sca le ( for example, one may

accept a margina l ly poorer outcome i f , say , it permi ts a ga in of

pos i t i ona l advantage as a consequence) . More important ly , t h i s exercise

makes planners th ink about the poss ib le outcomes of the ba t t l e and t he i r

r e la t ion to the miss ion and commander 's i n t e n t .

75



S t a r t th e Wargame and Cons t ruc t the Decision Tree

Framework

In the c r i t i c a l event we consider ( the i n i t i a l defense) , the

essence o f th e t a c t i c a l problem i s to compare the outcome of COAs 1 and

2 under the uncer ta in ty of the loca t ion of enemy main e f f o r t . The

immediate outcomes are whether the LTF and RTF sec to r s can hold or break

aga ins t enemy a t t a c k . Thus, the re a re four poss ib le combinat ions o f

immediate outcomes as shown in the dec i s ion t r ee depic ted in Figure 10.

Th e enemy can and wi l l gather i n t e l l igence on our d i spos i t ion .

This wil l a f f e c t t h e i r choice as to where the main a t t ack should go. We

es t imated t h a t the re i s a g r e a t e r chance t h a t the enemy w i l l conduct th e

main a t tack in th e west i f they be l ieve our LTF i s weak (COA 1 ) . To

r e f l e c t t h i s , we ass ign a probab i l i ty of 0.7 to t h i s branch. On th e

o ther hand, if the enemy discovers a s t r ong LTF (COA 2) , they are l e ss

l i k e ly t o pu t in the main a t t ack in the west . We ass ign a 0.5 chance to

t h i s branch, as shown in Figure 10.

This i s a l l one can reasonably judge now. The ass ignment o f

probab i l i t i e s to the immediate outcomes ( tha t i s , to var ious

combinat ions o f LTF and RTF holding or breaking) should be done l a t e r

when the wargame y ie lds some b a s i s fo r es t imat ion .

We wi l l now wargame, in tu rn , what we must do when each outcome

occurs , s t a r t i ng with t he dec i s ion marked "A."

COA 1

Branch A

We r e c a l l th e s t a r t i n g cond i t ions a t our dec i s ion po in t marked

"A " (see Figures 10 and 11) . We have deployed a ba lanced task fo rce as

the LTF (2M/2T), a mechanized infant ry-heavy task force as th e RTF

(2M/T/BTV) and a tank company in r ese rve . TF 4-77 has r ever ted to

76



COR I

C0A2

l.TF =LTF HOLDS

: LTF BREAkS

R.TF : RTF HOL DS

:M( :: RTF e.REAKS

MAIN: W ,sPT : E

MAIN; W j SPT: E

NAIN : E ; SPT: W

ENEMY ATTACK

LTF RTF

A~ l F ~ ~ "--\( p1:( ((n: C

\ ~ P ( [ Q J LTJ: RTF

L'TF

~ R T F *-*llF

L71= RTF E

L7F >t( [£J,________ ~ ~ ~ _ _

H

I/Nv\EDIATE OUTCOME

Figure 10. Framework of the Decision Tree

77



Brigade command a t 65% s t r eng th and i s in the process of r eo rgan iza t ion .

I t would not be ava i lab le fo r the i n i t i a l f igh t . The enemy has chosen

to commit i t s main a t t ack in the west and a suppor t ing a t t ack in the

e a s t . On branch A, we have a favorable outcome with both LTF and RTF

defenses holding. Th e a t tack ing regiments are defea ted forward of the

defense area. Th e LTF i s s ig n i f i c a n t ly weakened in th e tank ba t t l e in

open count ry . Th e next even t in the wargame i s the ITB a t tempt ing to

break through the weakened sec to r .

We have tw o opt ions : To cont inue to f igh t as deployed o r to

commit the tank company reserve by re inforcing the LTF. In the l a t t e r

case , we w i l l have to c a l I o n TF 4-77 before the have a chance to

reorganize fu l ly if the re i s a con t ingency . When the ITB a t t acks , we

envis ion two poss ib le outcomes: I t wil l e i the r be defea ted forward of

f r iendly defense area or break through th e forward defenses . In case

th e ITB has broken through, we w i l l launch TF 4-77, whether reorganized

o r not , to dea l with it. Figure 11 shows a l l branches as soc ia ted with

COA 1.

On branch A, we have ass igned p r o b a b i l i t i e s and the eva lua ted

the outcomes. Rol l ing back the t r e e , we see t h a t both f r iendly ac t ions

have about equal mer i t . At t h i s po in t , our ai m i s not to choose one

ac t ion or the o ther but to recognize the opt ions we have and to p lan for

t h e i r employment. From the ana lys i s , we sa w tha t the tank company

reserve may be committed as fol lows:

1 . Reinforce LTF or RTF se c t o r . Planners should the re fo re

iden t i fy the routes to t ake and co-ord ina t ion measures necessary for

l ink -up .

2 . Countera t tack, as p a r t o f TF 4-77, e lements of the ITB t h a t

have pene t ra ted th e forward defense a r e a . Planner should consider where

the coun te ra t t ack w i l l occur .

78



HIS BI"MIc.SJ

Cammo

,+- ruerve 0 ·3 IT!> 0 2 ~ t M 7

Fo, hi:: , , ~ Deployed Tt"Iro",s"

LTF 8·5 0 -6 ITS ~ f e a t e 4 9 D"rlroyed 8RTF fwd Df de F A' - - 0-A!S-7!

ITS DefeafydTB BllUlkSK

CommH reserve o-s7-2 . Tl1rD .gl1

I \ I ~ TQI\IcCo . Res. ( ) . ~

;3.rTf:> Dpstroyed

8

6 a-H'd5

ltWnch Ta.nk Co.

• r ~ 1 1 I10t L Colhm"it 7F4-77 En 0 Des'tro t'd7

into cA aR.IGHT

7En Defeatoed b

Lau"ch TanK '-<>.R e . ~ to Re', nF RT

0 ,4 J: n Destroved;>

En Deflea-te.d5

Cornrn"f- 11= 4-77 0,5 e" [);!str°ted'7

IntD EA LAMP

En, Defeat\>d fwd 7EI"1 Defeated

60· ; Of D e f A ~

D''-

0, 7 En not" Defet;:l+t>tt p ~ O / ' l l M i + TF 4 - 77 0·4- E.., ~ S t " r o 9

IrrtD LTF ~ C t t > ( ' I.D.wnch Tanl<:.CD_ Qes

5o Rei..,f. RTF i

LTF ~ e t 1 ' O g r t l d e s +D!'A ~ A M P iTF4-77 protec.ts

4..eft Flanl<- of RTF,

[±E]

5

RTF r1!:t1""g "",de.s -to

EA BR.'(1H"T j

TF 4-77 protects En DQfQa+<M 4-..+-"F/"nkDf I.TF,

Thr"' .. ,h PI- 81-LA!?0

2.,00 4

CoIIFLAN TOP

0 '5 0-. e,nu:lksAT j

0MA'tntoi" i<es fr>r T h r o u ~ ~ PI- e , W ~ c o n + i ~ ~ ~ l e s '

Figure 11. Decision Tree - Branches A to D

79



Branch B

On t h i s branch, the LTF s e c t o r holds while the RTF sec to r i s

vulnerable to pene t ra t ion . Resul t s o f the wargame sugges t t h a t up to a

motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n and th e ITB can break through. We have tw o

pr inc ipa l opt ions : Launch the tank company reserve to block th e

pene t ra t ion or re in fo rce the RTF.

As we wargamed the f i r s t opt ion, we sa w a need to p lan for an

engagement area (EA BRIGHT) to defea t or des t roy enemy forces t h a t have

pene t ra ted th e defense area . There i s also a need to prepare f igh t ing

pos i t ions fo r the reserve fo rce so they can conta in th e enemy in th e

engagement area nor th o f th e pos i t ions . We also r ea l i zed the need to

r econs t i tu t e ano ther reserve once the tank company has been committed.

TF 4-77 may have to r eac t to cont ingenc ies before they have been fu l ly

reorganized.

For the opt ion t h a t requires re in fo rcement of the RTF, th e main

problem i s t iming . Planners have to i den t i fy th e i nd ica to r s of imminent

col lapse of the RTF s e c t o r so t h a t launch of th e reserve can be wel l

t imed. Although the re in fo rcement opt ion i s d i f f i c u l t to execute wel l ,

it holds promise of defeat ing the enemy forward of the defense area , an

outcome t ha t i s prefe r red to a pene t ra t ion .

From the Branch B example, one can see how planners can gain

unders tanding o f the t a c t i c a l problem when it i s broken down in to par t s

and ana lyzed using a dec i s ion t r e e .

Branch C

Branch C i s s imi la r to Branch B in terms of opt ions a v a i l a b l e .

In t h i s case , the engagement area (EA LAMP) and prepared f igh t ing

pos i t ions wi l l be placed a s t r i d e the high-speed avenue of approach.

Compared to Branch B, we have a lower chance o f s topping an enemy

pene t ra t ion in the LTF sec to r because of th e l e ss defens ible t e r r a in .

80



Branch D

On t h i s branch, we plan for the worst case . We are f aced with

the imminent col lapse of the both se c t o r s . Up to a regiment- s ized force

has broken through. We have th ree opt ions :

1 . Reinforce the RTF with the tank company reserve , l e t the

LTF f igh t a r e t r ogr ade ba t t l e and occupy block pos i t ions south of EA

LAMP with TF 4-77 t aking up pos i t ions between the RTF and new pos i t ion

of th e LTF to pro tec t the l e f t f lank o f the RTF.

2 . Reinforce th e LTF with the tank company reserve , l e t the

RTF f igh t a r e t r ogr ade ba t t l e and occupy block pos i t ions sou th o f EA

BRIGHT with TF 4-77 t aking up pos i t ions between the LTF and new pos i t ion

o f the RTF to pro tec t the r i g h t f lank o f th e LTF.

3. Let the LTF and RTF f igh t re t rograde b a t t l e s to . PL BLUE

while secur ing the l i ne of depar ture for the 1 s t Brigade to execute

CONPLAN TOP HAT (d ivis ion coun te r a t t ack plan) .

On th i s branch , it i s evident t h a t prepared f igh t ing pos i t ions

in depth and engagement areas BRIGHT and LAMP a re impor tan t . Planners

can also see the danger of an enemy f lank a t tack in to the adjacent

sec to r , fo r example, in th e case where enemy breaks through in the LTF

sec to r and hooks e a s t to des t roy the RTF from the f lank. To counter the

hook, TF 4-77 needs to take up pos i t ion to pro tec t the l e f t f lank o f th e

RTF.

Another poss ib le outcome i s t h a t th e RTF f a i l s to defea t th e

enemy desp i te re in fo rcement of the reserve tank company. Here, th e plan

i s fo r th e RTF to f igh t a re t rograde ba t t l e to p o s i t i o n s south of EA

BRIGHT, in the p rocess drawing the enemy in to EA BRIGHT. TF 4-77 w i l l

then a t tack in to the west f lank of th e enemy t rapped in EA BRIGHT. From

the ana lys i s , planners also see t h a t the mirror- image scenar io can

happen. The enemy can break through in the RTF sec to r ins tead .

81



Cognizant of a l l th e poss ib le ways t h a t TF 4-77 can be committed,

planners then pos i t ion TF 4-77 and synchronize i t s movement to r e a c t to

poss ib le con t ingenc ie s . This i s th e advantage o f what we c a l l working

across the enemy-opt ion domain. Planners can look a t a l l poss ib le enemy

opt ions a t once and look fo r a so lu t ion to counter a l l o f them. Using

t he dec i s ion t r ee cons t ruc t to order the sequence of wargaming al lows

planners to gain i n s igh t in to the problem r ead i ly and de te rmine what has

to be done.

Pre l iminary Conclusions a f t e r Analys i s o f COA 1

The pre l iminary conclus ions a f t e r analyz ing COA 1 are as

fol lows:

1 . There i s a need to prepare tw o se t s of f igh t ing pos i t ions

fo r th e tank company reserve in th e depth of the br igade defense area :

one s e t of pos i t ions to the r e a r of the RTF sec to r and one to the r ea r

of the LTF sec to r . To defea t the enemy forward of these f igh t ing

pos i t ions , engagement areas BRIGHT ( in the eas t ) and LAMP ( in the west)

wi l l be es tab l i shed .

2. I t appears t h a t planners pre fe r to use the tank company

reserve to r e in fo rce forward defense sec to r s r a the r than to use it to

f igh t in a depth pos i t ion . This r e f l ec t s the preference to engage the

enemy forward of the defense area . Planners perce ive t h a t th e enemy

second echelon d iv i s ion i s l e ss l i k e ly to be channeled in to the br igade

s e c t o r when no pene t ra t ion occurs . Th e key problem, the re fo re , i s to

determine th e cor r ec t t ime to launch the r e se r ve .

3. Due to th e need to reorganize TF 4-77, the tank company

reserve w i l l most l i k e ly be launched f i r s t .

4. TF 4-77 i s an important element in th e br igade ' s defense

plan . I t should be pos i t ioned to ensure i t s su rv ivab i l i ty and i t s

ab i l i t y to r e a c t to cont ingenc ies . We envis ion t h a t TF 4-77 wi l l occupy

82



an area in the br igade ' s r e a r f o r r eor gan iza t ion , only to be ca l l ed

forward to a pos i t ion in th e cen te r of th e br igade ' s s e c t o r on or de r .

eOA 2

For the c r i t i c a l event t h a t we are wargaming, the o n l y .

d i f fe rences between eOA 1 and eOA 2 are the fol lowing:

1 . Th e LTF i s now a tank-heavy t a sk fo rce with th ree tank and

one mechanized companies (3T/M).

2. Th e reserve i s a mechanized company in s tead o f a tank

company.

3. The names o f the engagement areas a re changed to preven t

confus ion . EA DARK and EA SPOT are es tab l i shed in the e a s t and west

r espec t ive ly .

Th e r e s t o f the d e t a i l s remain th e same.

The main branches t h a t r ep resen ts eOA 2 a re marked "E", "F",

"G" and "H." Figure 12 shows a l l branches as soc ia ted with eOA 2. Since

th e pos i t ion and composi t ion o f forces a re l a rge ly s imi la r to those in

eOA 1, f r i end ly ac t ions , the enemy r eac t ions and our counterac t ions are

s imi la r . The values we a t tached to the outcomes under s imi la r

circumstances a re l o g i c a l l y the same. Th e d i f fe rence l i e s in our

assessment of the r e l a t i v e l ike l ihoods of the outcomes. In the

fol lowing descr ip t ion of th e branches , we w i l l cover the main

d i f fe rences and prov ide suppor t ing r a t i o n a l e .

Branch E

Th e s i tua t ion on branch E cor responds to t h a t on branch A. The

branches are i d e n t i c a l because we t h ink the d i f fe rences between eOA 1

and eOA 2 wi l l n ot change the r e s u l t s s ig n i f i c a n t ly .

83



Figure 12. Decis ion Tree - Branches E to H

84



Branch F

Branch F cor responds to branch B. The mechanized company

reserve i s l e ss powerful than th e tank company reserve we have in COA 1.

Hence, in t h i s COA,we

reduce th e l ike l ihood o f the reserve defea t ing

enemy fo rces tha t have pene t ra ted th e RTF sec to r .

Branch G

Branch G corresponds to branch C. As in branch F, we have

reduced the l ike l ihood of success for the mechanized reserve to de f ea t

enemy fo rces t h a t have pene t r a t ed the LTF sec to r .

Branch H

Branch H corresponds to branch D. Again, due to th e weaker

mechanized reserve , we have reduced i t s chance of success in th e sec to r

it has re inforced compared to the cor responding s i tua t ion in COA 1.

Conclusion a f t e r Analys is of COA 2

The pre l iminary COA 1 conclus ions (with s l i g h t changes to

account fo r d i f fe rences in composi t ion of the LTF and the reserve) apply

to COA 2 as wel l .

Completing the Analys is

Having analyzed a l l th e poss ib le branches to t he i r respect ive

ends ta tes , we can r e tu rn to th e framework s tage ( r e fe r to Figure 10) .

We w i l l now complete the computat ion of the expected values of COA 1 and

2 and conduct sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s .

F i r s t , we w i l l assess the l ike l ihood o f the var ious scenar ios

as soc ia ted with branches A to H under the uncer ta in ty o f th e loca t ion o f

th e enemy main a t t ack . The r e s u l t of the wargame has enabled us to

a s se s s these probab i l i t i e s with b e t t e r conf idence .

85



Consider , fo r example, the branch in which we have chosen eOA 1

and the enemy chooses to put in the main a t tack in the west . We have to

decide the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of th e fo l lowing:

1 . LTF holds , RTF holds .

2. LTF holds , RTF breaks .

3. LTF breaks , RTF holds .

4. LTF breaks , RTF breaks .

One wa y to do th i s i s to assume tha t what happens to th e LTF i s

independent of what happens to th e RTF.9 We can cons t ruc t a tw o s tage

dec i s ion t r ee to e l i c i t an ob jec t ive assessment .

We judge t h a t if the enemy's main a t t ack i s in the west , there

i s a 50% chance t h a t the LTF wi l l hold. Faced with a suppor t ing a t tack ,

we th ink t h a t the re i s a 80% chance the RTF w i l l hold . Figure 13 shows

th e two-s tage dec i s ion t r e e .

We r epea t the p rocess fo r eOA 1 aga ins t an enemy main a t tack in

the eas t , eOA 2 aga ins t an enemy main a t t ack in the west and f ina l ly eOA

2 aga ins t an enemy main a t t ack in the e a s t .

Th e assessment o f the l ike l ihood of th e immediate outcomes

( tha t i s , whether LTF and RTF holds or no t ) , t oge the r with t he h ighes t

expected values from branches A to H, completes the dec i s ion t r ee we

have f i r s t cons t r uc t ed in th e framework s tage . Expected values of both

eOAs a re computed. Figure 14 shows the completed dec i s ion t r e e .

Based on expected values , eOA 2 appears to be be t t e r than eOA

1 . However, we caut ion t h a t it i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to base the

recommendation o f a eOA so le ly on expected values . Addi t iona l ana lys i s

of the completed dec i s ion t r ee can y ie ld f u r t h e r i n s igh t s in to the

t a c t i c a l problem.

86



RTF Hold0.5 x 0.8 = 0.4

LTF Hold0.8

0.5 RTF Break0.1

0.2

RTF Hold0.4

LTF Break 0.8

0.5 RTF Break0.1

0.2

Figure 13. Two-stage Decision Tree to E l i c i t Probab i l i ty Assessment

Looking a t the dec is ion t r ee in Figure 14, we can make tw o

genera l observa t ions :

1. Regardless of which eOA i s adopted, we have a good chance

of succeed ing in t h i s p a r t of th e mission ( tha t i s , the i n i t i a l defense)

if one or both sec to r s hold . Th e l ike l ihood of success becomes very lo w

if both sec to r s f a i l .

2. Regardless of which eOA i s adopted, an enemy break through

in the RTF sec to r i s margina l ly more manageable than a break through in

the LTF sec to r . This r e s u l t i s not su rp r i s ing s ince the h i l l y RTF

s e c t o r i s more defens ib le .

Th e ques t ion we must ask now i s : What makes eOA 2 a b e t t e r

course of ac t ion? Let us examine th e con t r ibu t ions o f the branches to

the expected va lues . Th e main con t r ibu t ions to the high expected value

o f eOA 2 comes from branches in which the LTF holds . In o ther words, we

w i l l be l e ss success f u l if the enemy succeeds in breaking through th e

LTF sec to r . Therefore, we should t ake ac t ions to forec lose the

87



MAIN: Wi.5PT: E

0 '7

CONT!2.16UTJONS

3-48

0-4-1

7·27 2-78

COR I 0-3 3-4W: SAL TF ( / l 1 ) MAIN: E -, SPT: WE ME-Ct-l TF. (;;' ' ' '/T IBTV)

RES: T

0-49

6·26

IMAIN':. W j SPT: E

O-O!7

7-92 ~ - 3 5

0-40 LTF RTF

0·32 1.Tl= R.TF

0·48

o 8 ):sF:(. RTF

0'12 - * ~ 0·72 L'TF RTl=

0-18

0-08

0-5D L7f: RTF

O-s /3-s f / - - - - = . - = - . . : . - - = - . : - - . . ! : . = _ _ ~

NAIN : E i SPT: W '/

0-50 Lrr .>t(

l..TF =LTFJ.10LDS

= TF 8REAkS

R..TF = TF HOLDS

ftr( ::: RTF eReAKS

ENEMY AriA CK

Figure 14. The Completed Decision Tree

88

o c o ~ RTFo - o o ~ ~

IJv\MEDIATE OUTCOIY1E

7-/4

7-14-

4-12.

g'70

7·/4

7-16

4·33

[J 8-70

[J 7-14



p o s s ib i l i t y of the LTF sec to r co l laps ing . We w i l l ensure t h i s by making

the LTF the main e f f o r t and heavi ly resourc ing t h i s e f f o r t with combat

suppor t .

Th e next ques t ion i s : How can we improve eOA I? We observed

t h a t the pos i t ive con t r ibu t ions fo r the expected value o f eOA 1 come

from branches in which we hold ou t aga ins t th e suppor t ing a t t ack . For

example, one can r e f e r to th e branch in eOA 1 in which th e enemy main

at tack i s in the west and the suppor t ing a t t ack i s in the e a s t (top

branch of Figure 14) . Th e main con t r ibu t ions to the expec ted va lue of

7.460 ( tha t i s , 3.480 and 2.856) come from branches in which the enemy

suppor t ing a t tacks were defea ted. Th e same pa t t e rn occurs in th e othe r

branch o f eOA 1. Thus, we should ensure t h a t our suppor t ing e f f o r t

(RTF) a t l e a s t overmatches th e enemy suppor t ing a t t ack . To improve eOA

1, we a lso need to induce the enemy to put the main at tack in the LTF

sec to r . Last ly , we note t h a t the ac t ions to improve eOA 1 also improves

eOA 2.

Summary of Analys is and the Recommended eOA

Based on the foregoing, eOA 2 should be recommended. Th e t ank

heavy t ask force (LTF) in the wes t , the main e f f o r t , ensures t h a t th e

LTF sec to r holds aga ins t enemy a t t ack . Th e mechanized-heavy task fo rce

(RTF) in the eas t , th e suppor t ing e f f o r t , i s adequate to dea l with an

enemy regiment- s ized suppor t ing a t t ack .

We w i l l conceal the concent ra t ion of tanks in the LTF sec to r so

t h a t the enemy i s more l ike ly to launch the main a t t ack in to the LTF

sec to r .

Upon the imminent col lapse of a forward defense sec to r , th e

mechanized company reserve wi l l be ordered to r e in fo rce t h a t sec to r .

Th e pr i o r i t y i s the LTF sec to r , fo l lowed by th e RTF sec to r .

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TF 4-77 w i l l occupy assembly area FIX in th e br igade r e a r to

reorganize . On order , TF 4-77 moves forward to occupy assembly area

CENTRAL as the br igade r ese rve . In order of pr i o r i t y , TF 4- 77 ' s

poss ib le t asks are to r e in fo rce th e LTF; r e in fo rce the RTF; a t t ack by

f i r e in to EA SPOT o r EA DARK from prepared f igh t ing pos i t ions ; p ro tec t

the f lank of the RTF or the LTF.

EA SPOT in the west and EA DARK in the e a s t w i l l be es tab l i shed

behind the forward defense sec to r s . Here, enemy fo rces t h a t have

pene t ra ted forward defenses wi l l be des t royed by d i r e c t , i n d i r e c t and

a i r -de l ive red f i repower .

Synchron iza t ion

I ns t ead o f cons t ruc t ing a s ing le monol i th ic synchroniza t ion

matr ix , we propose tha t planners cons t ruc t many modular but smal le r

synchroniza t ion matr ices t i ed to key even t s . Some of the key events

i d e n t i f i e d are the commitment of the mechanized company reserve in to th e

forward defense sec to r s , synchroniza t ion of b a t t l e f i e l d e lements in the

engagement areas and commitment of TF 4-77. As a sugges t ion, these

modular synchroniza t ion matr ices can perhaps be pegged to i nd ica to r s

t h a t the key event i s imminent .

For example, the launching of re in fo rcement can be based on an

i n d i c a t o r for the co l lapse o f a sec to r . The planner e s t ima te s tha t the

sec to r wi l l co l lapse if the task fo rce lo ses more than h a l f i t s

s t r eng th . Working backwards, the planner accounts for deployment, l ink

up, movement and r eac t ion t ime i n t e r v a l s to determine th e l a t e s t t ime to

launch. Suppose th e t ime i n t e r v a l i s 30 minutes . Th e planne r then

es t imates th e losses t h a t can occur in 30 minutes . Let us say t h a t one

s ix th of the task fo rce ' s s t r eng th can be deple ted during t h i s t ime.

Therefore, the i nd ica to r tha t w i l l l ead to th e l aunch ing o f the

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re in fo rcement can be when th e TF in the sec to r l ose s about one- th i rd o f

i t s s t r eng th .

Th e cur ren t method o f iden t i fy ing named areas of i n t e r e s t

(NAIs) can still be used . Th e i nd ica to r t h a t i n i t i a t e s the modular

synchroniza t ion matr ix i s an observa t ion o f the t a r g e t a t th e NAI.

Comparison with Analys is us ing Synchronizat ion Matr ix

Using a synchroniza t ion matr ix to guide planning forces the

planner to cons ider one enemy COA a t a t ime. The matr ix i s no t des igned

to record o ther pos s ib le enemy opt ions . In theory , planners wi l l

complete a synchroniza t ion matr ix fo r each combinat ion o f enemy COA and

f r i end ly COA. Complete ana lys i s o f a COA can only be done when one can

assess the COA's performance aga ins t a l l th e enemy COAs. In prac t i ce ,

the whole process i s t ime-consuming and f requent ly not completed. This

l eads to inadequate ana lys i s .

In the benign environment o f th e U.S. Army Command and S t a f f

College, s tuden t s seldom complete th e whole planning pr ocess . Th e

f tschool ' s so lu t ions" given to s tuden t s a t the end of the 3d Brigade

planning exe r c i se (o n which t h i s case s tudy i s based) cons i s t s o f tw o

synchron iza t ion mat r i ce s : one fo r COA 1 and one fo r COA 2. These a re

reproduced in t h i s t hes i s a t Appendix. One observes t h a t the

synchron iza t ion matr ices a re both based on a s ing le enemy COA t h a t i s

perce ived to be th e ftmost l i ke l y . " Presumably, these mat r ices a re

in tended to be samples of th e complete s e t of synchroniza t ion matr ices

t h a t are produced. However, the au thor t h inks t h a t a l ea rn ing po in t i s

missed when s tuden t s do not see how to i n t eg ra te and analyze in fo rmat ion

between synchroniza t ion matr ices of th e same COA but fo r d i f f e r e n t enemy

COAs. Students would have r ea l ized t h a t it i s very d i f f i c u l t . But when

th i s ana lys i s i s not done, planners cannot sys temat ica l ly discover where

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the enemy can thwar t our wel l - synchron ized plan and de te rmine how to

forec lose enemy opt ions or bend the enemy to our w i l l .

Examining the synch roniza t ion matr ices of eOAs 1 and 2 of th e

3d Br igade , one f inds a wel l - t ime tab led ba t t l e t h a t assumes the enemy to

be a compliant ac to r . There i s noth ing in th e matr ix t ha t a l e r t s the

planners to p o t e n t i a l problems with the p lan . There i s nothing in th e

matr ix t h a t sugges t s what o ther opt ions the enemy has .

To show t h a t an important p a r t of th e ana lys i s i s amiss , l e t us

look a t th e use of the reserve and TF 4-77. From the s ing le enemy eOA

in the synchroniza t ion matr ices , p lanners cannot appr ec i a t e the scope

and nature o f the tasks for which the r e se r ve and TF 4-77 should be

prepared. Th e synchroniza t ion matr ix approach to plann ing does not

compel the planner to cons ider the ways he can launch t he r e se r ve , much

l e ss inves t iga te which i s most appropr ia te . In the sample

synchroniza t ion matr ices , th e planner can only ass ign a pr i o r i t y sec to r

o f commitment to the reserve with no guidance concerning l i k e ly

s i t u a t i o n s they can face and what i s expected o f them. Th e f a u l t of the

cur ren t planning methodology i s t h a t it does not support deeper

a n a l y s i s .

Evalua t ion of the Proposed Planning Methodology

We w i l l use th e yards t ick t h a t i s developed e a r l i e r in t h i s

t hes i s to eva lua te the proposed plann ing methodology. I t s assessment

w i l l be based on i t s app l ica t ion to the case s tudy.

Funct ion

The methodology serves the func t ion of eOA ana lys i s wel l . The

dec i s ion t r ee cons t ruc t ar ranges an uns t r uc tu r ed problem in to a l o g i c a l

framework by which ana lys i s can proceed . Fact s , assumptions and

uncer ta in ty are sys temat ica l ly accounted fo r in the branches of the

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t r e e . Th e t r ee cons t ruc t al lows the planner to see c lea r ly th e

i n t e r ac t ions between opt ions , uncer ta in ty and ends ta tes . Th e

in fo rmat ion t h a t i s presented in the dec is ion t r ee cons t ruc t permi t s

planners to gain i n s igh t in to the problem more r ead i ly than wi th the

pr e sen t synchroniza t ion matr ix arrangement . Ins igh ts in to the problem

l ead to c l a r i t y of what needs to be done to br ing about success .

Appl ica t ion of Subjec t ive M i l i t a r y Judgment

Th e dec i s ion t r ee cons t ruc t al lows planners to apply sub jec t ive

mil i t a ry judgment . They can asse ss the l ike l ihood of enemy response to

our ac t ions and make value judgments on the outcomes ( ends ta tes ) .

Planners base these sub jec t ive judgments on the wargame. The key

a t t r i bu t e of the methodology i s the t rea tment of these sub jec t ive

judgments during a n a l y s i s . We recogn ize t h a t sub jec t ive m i l i t a r y

judgments a re s o f t . Numbers a t tached to these s o f t judgments are

in tended to a id ana lys i s . Carefu l no t to t r e a t s o f t judgments as hard

data , the proposed methodology a t taches higher impor tance to the

sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s with a view towards gain ing i n s igh t r a the r than

choosing a COA based on comparison of expected va lues .

Cons idera t ion o f A ll Foreseen Enemy COAs

The dec is ion t r ee cons t ruc t e x p l i c i t l y considers a l l foreseen

enemy opt ions . Uncer ta in t ies as to what th e enemy wi l l do and our

es t imate of how our ac t ions w i l l inf luence the enemy's ac t ions a re

represented as probab i l i t i e s on the dec is ion t r e e .

Fa c i l i t a t i o n of the Wargame

During th e development o f the methodology, we recognize t h a t

the wargame i s c e n t r a l to U.S. Army plann ing doc t r ine . We r ea l i zed

during concept development t h a t th e wargame record ing method has an

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impact on the p lann ing thought -p rocess s ince it s t e e r s the conduct o f

th e wargame. Hence, we proposed t h a t wargame records should be kept in

the form of a dec i s ion t r e e . Recording the wargame as a dec i s ion t r ee

f ac i l i t a t e s the ac t ion- r eac t i on- coun te r ac t ion cycle s ince these have

s imi la r s t r u c t u r e . Decis ions and outcomes a r e chr ono log ica l ly arranged

in the dec i s ion t r ee so planners see c lea r ly the sequencing of

b a t t l e f i e l d even t s . Th e new methodology proposed t h a t synchroniza t ion

among combat elements (Ba t t l e f i e ld Operat ing Systems) can be performed

in a modular fash ion a f t e r the dec i s ion t r ee ana lys i s r evea l s what needs

to be done to b e s t accomplished the miss ion . We cannot eva lua te how

use f u l a decis ion t r ee r ep resen ta t ion (wi th modular synchroniza t ion

matr ices ) i s as a dec is ion cue fo r th e commander in b a t t l e . However, we

t h ink th e commander w i l l be more conf ident , enter ing the ba t t l e with a

robus t p lan, having thought through the enemy opt ions and having made

plans to counter them.

Promotion o f Ins igh ts in to the Tact ica l Problem

Th e case s tudy ana lys i s showed tha t planners can gain i n s igh t

in to the problem more r ead i ly when in fo rmat ion i s presented in a

dec is ion t r ee form. With a dec is ion t r e e , the planner i s able to look

a t ac t ions and outcomes as soc ia ted with var ious enemy op t ions . He w i l l

be able to see what ac t ions are needed to forec lose enemy opt ions and

bend th e enemy to our w i l l . He wi l l also be able to see how to ar ray

fo rces to b e s t dea l with cont ingenc ies .

Iden t i f ica t ion of Problems, Cr i t i c a l Events and In te l l igence Gaps

Decis ion t r ee ana lys i s al lows th e planner to sys temat ica l ly

i d e n t i f y p o t e n t i a l problems, c r i t i c a l events and key i n t e l l igence gaps

in the COAs. During sens i t i v i t y ana lys i s , planners can be cued to these

cont ingenc ies . For example, when the planner runs out o f own opt ions or

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f inds t h a t we are unable to forec lose poor outcomes, he recogn izes them

as cues fo r p o t e n t i a l problems. Decis ion t r ee ana lys i s can show where

the re i s a d r a s t i c d i f fe rence in outcomes t h a t hinge on the success of

an ac t ion . This i s a cue fo r a c r i t i c a l event . In cases where enemy

opt ions lead to vas t ly d i f fe ren t outcomes, t h i s i s the cue fo r an

i n t e l l igence gap.

Encouragement o f Planners to Think about Uncer ta inty

Using the dec i s ion t r ee cons t ruc t to s t e e r the wargame,

planners are encouraged to th ink about uncer ta in ty and a l te rna te

outcomes. As a r e s u l t of th i s menta l prepara t ion , planners heighten

t he i r s ens i t i v i t y to emerging pa t t e rns as the ba t t l e unfolds . This in

tu rn enables them to an t i c ipa te problems- and oppor tun i t i es in b a t t l e .

Suppor t of an Abbreviated Decis ion Making Process

Given a plann ing t ime cons t r a in t , the proposed planning

methodology advoca tes t h a t planners do not forgo complete ana lys i s of

enemy eOAs. Using the dec is ion t r e e , planners can choose to complete

ana lys i s o f one f r i end ly eOA a t a t ime. Thus, they w i l l have a robus t

plan o f ac t ion a t the end of plann ing one e ~ A . In t h i s way, the

methodology suppor t s an abbrevia ted dec is ion making pr ocess .

Planners save planning t ime using the dec is ion t r ee approach

compared to the synchroniza t ion matr ix approach because the former cu t s

away dupl ica ted par t s of the enemy eOAs. When consider ing the planning

e f f o r t , th e bas i s o f comparison i s between th e dec is ion t r ee of a s ing le

eOA and poss ib ly s evera l synchroniza t ion matr ices ( s ingle eOA versus the

complete s e t of enemy eOA) .

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Trac ing of the Decis ion

Laying th e wargame record ou t in a dec i s ion t r ee gives complete

v i s i b i l i t y to the dec is ion maker. Th e conclus ions of the COA ana lys i s

can be t r aced to th e con t r ibu t ing f ac to r s . Missed opt ions can be noted.

Th e dec i s ion maker can t r ace th e dec i s ion made and ho w it i s reached.

Acceptance by th e Planning S t a f f

Th e commander and s t a f f must f e e l t h a t th e dec i s ion t r ee

ana lys i s methodology cons i s t en t ly br ings about a good plan in reasonab le

t ime. The product of the ana lys i s , t he dec i s ion t r ee i t s e l f , must a lso

be use f u l f o r command and con t ro l purposes . In the case s tudy, we were

unable to eva lua te the l a t t e r requ i rement . However, the au thor remains

conf ident t h a t the dec is ion t r ee as an ana lys i s t oo l wi l l be helpful in

br ing ing about cons i s ten t plann ing success . When commanders and

plann ing s t a f f r e a l i z e the p o t e n t i a l of the methodology, they w i l l

accep t it.

Conclusion

In t h i s chapter , we have appl ied the proposed planning

methodology to a br igade planning problem. We f ind t ha t the COA

ana lys i s using the dec is ion t r ee al lows planners to ar r ive a t i n s igh t s

t h a t are not commonly acces s ib le when us ing the synchroniza t ion matr ix

approach. One impor tan t a t t r i b u t e of the dec is ion t r ee t h a t con t r ibu tes

to the ease o f forming i n s igh t s i s t h a t it enables planners to cons ider

ac t ions and outcomes of var ious enemy op t ions . Working across the

enemy-opt ion domain then permi t s the planner bu i ld a robus t p lan t h a t

can counter most if not a l l enemy op t ions .

Th e methodology possesses most of the a t t r i b u t e s o f the i d e a l

plann ing methodology which we discussed in Chapter 2 . No matte r how

good a planning methodology i s , th e pe r cep t ion o f the use r i s key to i t s

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acceptance as the norm. In the next chapter , we will recommend how to

promote acceptance of the methodology and offer some conclusions.

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Endnotes

1 Oliver G. Haywood, J r . , COL, U.S.A.F . , Mil i t a ry Doctrine of

Decis ion and the von Neumann Theory of Games, a s tuden t t h e s i s , (Maxwell

A ir Force Base: Th e A ir War College , 1950) ,67 .

2 The top h a l f o f U.S. Army o f f i c e r s a t th e rank o f major a t tendCommand and General S ta f f Off ice r s ' Course a t For t Leavenworth.

3 U.S. Army Command and Genera l S ta f f College (USACGSC),

" In te l l igence E s t ima te , " C310 Fundamentals o f Combat Opera t ions , Advance

Book, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, August 94), 199-213.

4 USACGSC, "OPLAN WHITE," C310 Fundamentals of Combat

Opera t ions , 283-292.

5 USACGSC, "CONPLAN TOP HAT," C310 Fundamentals of Combat

Opera t ions , 309-313.

6 Nebrask i i doc t r ine organizes t he i r a t tack ing formations in to

echelons (ech). These echelons are nes t ed and extend from ba t ta l ions(bns) to regiments ( regts) to d i v i s i o n s (divs) , armies and f ron t .

Normally, each formation organizes i n to no more than tw o echelons . For

our purpose, s impl i f i ed to allow a grasp of the concept , th e defendingfo rce w i l l meet Nebrask i i fo rces in the fo l lowing order : 1 s t ech r eg t s

o f 1 s t ech div, 2d ech r e g t s o f 1 s t ech div, 1 s t ech r eg t s o f 2d ech div

and 2d ech r eg t s of 2d ech div . This does not inc lude a d d i t i o n a l

reserve fo rce a t each format ion . They can normally be found in the

v ic in i t y o f th e format ion ' s 2d echo .Using the same nes t ing concept, one

can ex t rapo la te to higher and lower fo rmat ions .

7 Extrac ted from p r a c t i c a l exerc i se so lu t ion o f CGSC C310

course .

8 Level I I I denotes a su b s t a n t i a l r ea r th rea t such as ana i rborne / a i rmobi le force .

9 Th e assumption i s reasonab le because r i g h t task fo rce and l e f tt ask fo rce have separa te command elements .

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas fo r solving

problems, nor can it mark th e narrow pa th on which th e sole

so lu t ion i s supposed to l i e by p lan t ing a hedge o f pr inc ip le on

e i t h e r s ide . But it can give th e mind i n s igh t in to the g r e a t

phenomena and o f t he i r r e l a t ionsh ips , then l eave it f ree to

r i se in to the higher realms of a c t i o n . There th e mind can use

i t s i nna te t a l e n t s t o capac i ty , combining them a l l so as to

se ize on what i s r i g h t and t rue as though t h i s were a s ing le

idea formed by t he i r concent ra ted pres sure - -as thoughit

werea

response to the immediate cha l lenge r a the r than a product ofthought .

Clausewitz , On War

In troduct ion

In t h i s conc lud ing chapter , we w i l l draw t oge the r th e key

po in t s of the t h e s i s and h i g h l i g h t th e f indings o f t h i s s tudy. We wi l l

presen t some thoughts about implement ing the proposed plann ing

methodology. Fina l ly , we wi l l recommend poss ib le areas fo r fu ture

s tudy.

Th e Thesis Statement

We s t a r t e d with t he pe r cep t ion t h a t the cur ren t U.S. Army

plann ing methodology cannot deal with enemy uncer t a in t i e s adequate ly .

As a consequence, use r s o f t h i s methodology do not always account fo r

poss ib le enemy r eac t ions r igorous ly when formulat ing f r i end ly courses o f

ac t ion (COAs). The cur ren t approach l eads planners to think t h a t

synchroniza t ion i s the pr imary o b j e c t i v e o f planning. This i s sometimes

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done a t the expense of a more thorough cons idera t ion o f a th inking

enemy.

While cur ren t methodology does turn out wel l - synchronized plans

of ac t ion , it has neglec ted another func t ion of planning. One of th e

key func t ions o f planning i s to menta l ly prepare the commander to face

the uncer ta in ty o f the b a t t l e . During planning, the commander t akes a

menta l journey down a l l poss ib le pa ths in to the fu ture to v i sua l i ze how

the ba t t l e can unfold . Having considered the p o s s i b i l i t i e s , he can

s t a r t to bui ld a robus t plan; one t h a t can counte r most if not a l l enemy

op t ions .

War i s a con tes t o f wi l l s between combatants . Thus, the enemy

and what he i s capab le o f doing i s c e n t r a l to planning f r iendly COAs.

Therefore, a planning methodology t h a t does not adequately consider

enemy ac t ions cannot be s a t i s f a c to r y .

This s tudy seeks to develop a planning methodology tha t can

enhance the cur ren t procedure for analyzing f r iendly COAs, p a r t i c u l a r ly

when dea l ing with enemy uncer ta in ty .

Th e Approach

We began t h i s s tudy by examining the Tac t ica l Decis ion Making

Process employed by th e u.s. Army to p lan a miss ion . The planning

ac t i v i t y i s ca l l ed the Est imate of the Si tua t ion . We note t h a t the s tep

in which planners ac tua l ly bu i ld COAs i s the COA Analys is s tep of the

Est imate o f the Si tua t ion .

In the COA Analysis s tep , planne r s adopt a methodology tha t i s

ch ie f ly based on a se r ie s of wargames. During the wargames, planners

play out severa l f r iendly COAs aga ins t a l l poss ib le enemy COAs. Using

an ac t ion- reac t ion-coun te rac t ion cyc le , planners bu i ld COAs as th e

wargame proceeds. Based on ana lys i s o f th e wargame r e s u l t s o f each COA,

the commander chooses the bes t f r iendly COA. In th i s study, we are

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concerned with the conduct o f th e wargame and how to analyze i t s r e s u l t s

so we can gain th e most from it.

In the course o f t h i s s tudy, we discovered an i n s i g h t t h a t

determined th e approach we w i l l t ake to f ix the plann ing methodology.

We r ea l i zed tha t the method by which planners record th e wargame r e s u l t s

shapes th e conduct o f the wargame. This in tu rns i n f luences th e t r a i n

of thoughts . We conclude t h a t the b e s t way to make enemy cons ide r a t ions

an i n t e g r a l p a r t of th e planning methodology i s t o i ncor por a t e them in to

th e wargame recording method.

Th e Problem with Synchron iza t ion Matr ix

Pr esen t ly , planners record wargame r e s u l t s on a synchroniza t ton

ma t r ix . This can block the plann ing thought -p rocess from v i s i t i ng l e ss

obvious but poss ib le enemy opt ions . Using the synchroniza t ion matr ix

tends to make planners th ink de te rmin i s t i ca l ly . To fill up events on a

t imel in e , the planner must hold some b a t t l e f i e l d var iab les cons tan t .

Th e prescr ibed wa y to do t h i s i s to hold the enemy COA cons tan t .

Therefore, each synchroniza t ion matr ix records a f r i end ly COA aga ins t

one enemy COA. In theory , planners have to work out severa l

synchroniza t ion matr ices to r ep resen t d i f f e r e n t combinat ions of f r i end ly

COAs and enemy COAs. In prac t i ce , t h i s i s seldom done due to t ime

pres sure . Consequently , thorough ana lys i s o f th e f r i end ly COAs aga ins t

a l l poss ib le enemy ac t ions f requent ly i s not completed.

The use of a synchroniza t ion matr ix to d i r e c t plann ing can

cause ano ther fundamental problem. By planning aga ins t one enemy COA a t

a t ime, planners deny themselves i n s igh t s in to what needs to done to

b e s t to accomplish th e miss ion . To unders tand t h i s po in t , l e t us

consider an analogy. In a personnel records database , each record in

the database conta ins severa l types o f in fo rmat ion ( f i e ld s ) . One f ie ld

conta ins he ight in fo rmat ion about the ind iv idua l . I f a database user

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wants to know about th e he igh t pr o f i l e o f a l l the personnel , he or she

can view one record a t a t ime or can conso l ida te a l l the he igh t

informat ion onto one r epor t . Planning aga ins t one enemy COA a t a t ime

i s l ike viewing da tabase records one a t a t ime. I t i s be t t e r , perhaps ,

to view what opt ions a re open to the enemy a t c r i t i c a l po in t s in t ime

during the b a t t l e . Present ing enemy opt ions in a t ime snapshot w i l l

al low us to discover which opt ions need to be forec losed and which

opt ion we want to induce hi m to t ake . We ca l l ed t h i s "working across

th e enemy-opt ion domain." We sa w t h a t th i s i s a be t t e r wa y o f looking

a t enemy COAs because the cor r e l a t ion it of fe r s makes it easy fo r

planners to gain in s igh t . Th e synchroniza t ion matrix i s not des igned to

open t h i s perspec t ive up to th e p lanner . We wi l l descr ibe th e r e s u l t of

th i s kind of aggrega t ion in the next sec t ion of th i s chap te r .

Using th i s approach, we can see t h a t the proposed planning

methodology w i l l :

1 . Reorder the sequence of events in the wargame. We w i l l

plan aga ins t a l l poss ib le enemy opt ions a t a p a r t i c u l a r c r i t i c a l po in t

before proceeding to the nex t one.

2. Change the presen ta t ion format o f the r e su l t s . Th e way we

record wargame r e s u l t s d i r e c t s the planning thought -process . I t thus

a f fec t s the qua l i ty o f the plan.

3. Enhance the way to analyze the wargame r e su l t s . By

organiz ing wargame r e s u l t s in a b e t t e r format , ana lys i s w i l l be more

l ike ly to br ing for th in s igh ts .

The proposed planning methodology wi l l r e s to re the cen t r a l i t y

of the enemy to mission planning and help bui ld opera t ions plans t ha t

a re more r e s i l i e n t to uncer ta in ty posed by th e enemy.

102



concept of the Proposed Planning Methodology

Th e need to r ep resen t enemy opt ions a t var ious t imes during th e

ba t t l e prompts us to look a t th e dec i s ion t r ee cons t ruc t . The idea i s

to dep ic t a f r i end ly COA as a branch o f a dec i s ion t r e e . I t models the

choice o f f r i end ly opt ions as decis ion po in t s and enemy responses as

chance events . P lanners ' m i l i t a r y judgments about the l ike l ihood of an

enemy ac t ion occur r ing and o f an outcome o f the ba t t l e are represented

as p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Th e probab i l i ty f igures are express ions o f t h e i r

b e l i e f s based on wargame r e su l t s . The poss ib le ends ta tes o f the ba t t l e

a re rank-ordered to express th e degree to which they suppor t miss ion

accomplishment .

Using Decis ion Trees to Direc t the Planning Thought-Process

Th e main aim o f using decis ion t r ees in t h i s methodology i s not

to p resc r ibe a dec i s ion . The i npu t of m i l i t a r y judgments are too

sub jec t ive , in most cases, to produce any bas i s fo r dec i s ions . Th e main

aim i s to d i r e c t th e thought process dur ing p lann ing . Th e i n t e n t i s to

fo rce planners to th ink about enemy opt ions and th e f r i end ly ac t ions

requi red to counter them. In fol lowing the dec is ion t r ee cons t ruc t ,

planners wi l l sys temat ica l ly consider a l l enemy opt ions . Planners wi l l

bu i ld th e f r i end ly COA, one s tep a t a t ime , always focusing t he i r

thoughts on th e enemy and h is c a p a b i l i t i e s and how to f r u s t r a t e him or

bend him to our w i l l .

However, the re w i l l be little mot iva t ion to use dec i s ion t r ees

if th e end product has no value . The completed dec is ion t r ee can be

used fo r deeper a n a l y s i s . Planners can use it to compare COAs. More

impor tant ly , they can d i s t i l l the b e s t of a l l the f r i end ly COAs to merge

them in to one robus t p lan . Th e c u r r e n t methodology also seeks to

perform s imi la r ana lys i s . However, th e proposed plann ing methodology

103



has the p o t e n t i a l to perform it more e f fec t ive ly because in fo rmat ion i s

presented in a b e t t e r way.

Synchron iza t ion

Synchron iza t ion o f combat elements (Ba t t l e f i e ld Operat ing

Systems) remains an impor tan t planning t a sk . However, in th e proposed

plann ing methodology, we sugges t t h a t planners cons t ruc t smal le r modular

synchroniza t ion matr ices t i ed to key even t s . Planners cur r en t ly draw a

s ing le synchroniza t ion matr ix on a cont inuous t imel ine t h a t spans each

eOA. Although it i s always poss ib le to group var ious combat ac t i v i t i e s

t h a t appea r on a cont inuous t imel ine in to modules, th e apprec ia t ion o f

th e s ign i f icance of the key even t s can be l o s t in t he p r ocess .

Appl i ca t ion o f th e Proposed Planning Methodology

This work i l l u s t r a t e s th e app l i ca t ion of the proposed planning

methodology us ing two t a c t i c a l planning v igne t t es . Th e f i r s t shows how

it can be used to analyze a p a r t of the d iv i s ion eOA fo r an a t tack

miss ion . Th e second shows how it can be extended to dea l with f u l l eOAs

( tha t i s , eOAs with mult ip le dec i s ion po in t s ) fo r a br igade defens ive

b a t t l e .

In both i l l u s t r a t i v e examples , th e new methodology enabled

planners easy access to i n s igh t s in to what needs to be done to bes t

accomplish the miss ion . They show how th e methodology compels planners

to ask the "what i f " ques t ions about enemy's and f r i end ly fo rces '

op t ions . Th e t a sk of bu i ld ing a robus t p lan becomes e a s i e r because

planners have been guided sys temat ica l ly to wargame a l l foreseeable

cont ingenc ies and have been a s s i s t e d in iden t i fy ing what ac t ions are

necessary to counter them.

Having seen the a p p l i c a t i o n o f th e proposed plann ing

methodology, we eva lua te i t s performance aga ins t a se r i e s of c r i t e r i a

104



regarded as a t t r i bu t e s o f an i d e a l plann ing methodology. We conclude

t h a t th e methodology does enhance the cur ren t procedure o f COA Analys is

and f a c i l i t a t e b e t t e r planning.

Recommendations

Tr i a l Implementa t ion

Decis ion t r ees may seem in t im ida t ing to some a t f i r s t . In

f ac t , they are no more d i f f i c u l t to unders tand than the dec i s ion

matr ices widely used in the u.s. Army. The top ic o f dec i s ion t r ees i s

covered in the core curr iculum of many undergraduate courses as well as

a t the u.s. Army Command and Genera l S ta f f Off ice r s ' Course (CGSOC).

Therefore most Army o f t i c e r s w i l l have been exposed to t he i r use .

However, th e main purpose of using dec is ion t r e e s in th e

proposed plann ing methodology d i f f e r s from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l use in

dec i s ion a n a l y s i s . We do not seek to p resc r ibe a dec is ion based so le ly

on the expected value p r i n c i p l e . I t s main purpose i s to d i r e c t the

thought process dur ing mission planning. The way wargame r e s u l t s are

presented in th e decis ion t r ee format also makes it e a s i e r for p lanners

to gain i n s i g h t .

Th e CGSOC core curr iculum course , C430 Resource Planning and

Alloca t ion , a l ready conta ins a module t h a t sugges t s an app l ica t ion of

the dec is ion t r ee technique to a t a c t i c a l problem. However, it uses th e

t r a d i t i o n a l ana ly t i ca l approach. Th e C430 course can perhaps in t roduce

s tuden t s to the wa y we propose to use t he dec i s ion t r e e .

Th e u.s. Army can also conduct a t r i a l implementa t ion o f th e

proposed planning methodology in the Command and Genera l S t a f f Off icer s '

Course . Th e new methodology could be t aught to a group o f s tuden t

vo lun teer s . This experimental group could form a planning s t a f f to

p a r t i c ip a t e in a plann ing exerc i se toge ther with a con t ro l group. I f

105



the exper iment i s succes s fu l , fu r the r development of the concept could

then t ake p lace .

Future Stud ie s

In t h i s work, we represented m i l i t a r y judgments about outcome

l ike l ihoods with p r o b a b i l i t i e s and rank-ordered pr e f e r ences o f outcomes

by a s imple sca le of m i l i t a r y worth. However, we have not been r igorous

about how th i s in fo rmat ion should be e l i c i t e d .

In the a rea o f in fo rmat ion e l i c i t a t i o n , we should s tudy how

methods t h a t have been developed to improve accuracy of inpu t in to the

dec i s ion ana lys i s process can be app l ied to th e proposed plann ing

methodologX'

Th e l ack of a sca le o f mil i ta ry worth i s a big obs tac le to

advances in mil i ta ry dec i s ion making. Unlike c i v i l i an businesses t ha t

can of ten reduce th e b a s i s of dec i s ions to cos t , the b a s i s fo r choosing

between courses of ac t ion l acks a c l e a r cu t measure o f ef f ec t iveness . A

way o f determining a s ing le composi te measure of mil i ta ry worth i s a

worthy sub jec t fo r fu r the r s tudy .

Concluding Remarks

We d id not address the use o f computers , automation and command

and con t ro l in fo rmat ion sys tems in t h i s work. They w i l l have a profound

impact on mil i ta ry decis ion-making in the fu tu re .

We see increased r e l i ance on computer s imula t ions . Attempts

are also being made to automate par t s of the planning pr ocess . We th ink

t h a t these developments wi l l make t h i s work more impor tan t , not l e s s .

Computer s imula t ions w i l l make wargames more thorough and

f a s t e r but wi l l not make more sense o ut o f th e increased volume of da ta .

Th e proposed plann ing methodology guides planners as to what s imula t ions

are to be performed and in what sequence during th e wargame. I t also

106



provides a systematic framework for analyzing the data. Information

presented in a decision t ree allows planners to have easier access to

insights in to the t a c t i ca l problem. Since computer technology i s no

sUbstitute for human crea t iv i ty and insight , the planning methodology

ca n form the bridge between technology and the user .

107



APPENDIX

SAMPLE SYNCHRONIZATION MATRICES

In the fo l lowing pages of t h i s appendix, we have reproduced 3d

Br igade ' s synchroniza t ion matr ices for COA 1 and COA 2. Due to page-

s i ze r e s t r i c t i o n s fo r t h i s t h e s i s , each synchroniza t ion matr ix i s broken

down and pr in ted on four pages . Th e synchroniza t ion matr ix of COA 1 i s

pr in ted on pages 109 to 112. That fo r COA 2 i s pr in ted on pages 11 3 to

116.

These synchroniza t ion matr ices a re samples given to Command and

General S t a f f Off ice r ' s Course s tuden t s a f t e r they had par t i c ipa ted in a

planning exerc i se .

10 8



TIME

THREAT

ACTION

SF0

EcUs

V NE A

N I

T

:

AI

il c

E L

OsF E

IRES

IREAR

10:EP

I ~ ~ ~ ' R

E T

R

A

e 2

TEM

5

0

Synchronization Matrix for eOA 1

0-1

O-dayH-hour

IH+ 10 H+24

IH,

Nebruk. Front 0600 1600 2000 0600 2000 06

forces continueI

' II· ec h dlY attack. aero.. bOld.,.

preparation fo r

combat.

IAi r aUacks throughout diw .. lOf (ph .. . 1 and 2).

Increased

intal collection. SO, aetMty beQln•. conUnu" IhrouQhout tIM operauon.

I Enemy.

I

National and corps 20ath cover begins

systems monitor (H-hour).

Nebraskii forces.

Monitor natl /corps Corps confirms Build OB from corps

reports__ div. enemy Intentions and div reports.at H + 8.

1. 2, 3, 4, and 5 -

Increase local Secure move.security.

occupation.

p r ~ ! n ~ ~ r l ~ o v e ~ I ~ : ~ : ; ' : : u · ~ : ' ; . · - ( ~ BOE mov•• H +10 to H+I8.prepares defense H+ 18

Inc lu""emanee to H+54. 208th pa. begins H • 46. -

NA Deploy to AA RAT.Raco" counterattack routes

and potential BPs.

NARISK: no bde TCF.Div TCF? Bde res?

NA8<18 priority Is 2d-ech reg,.

ollal_dlY.

Prepare to support Move into sector.

SOF incursions. Protect movement.Monllor .tatu. 01 2-642 FA.

Area damage control Establish barrier plan

Construct def pos Prepare for mobility (PL GRAY to PL

(survivability and ops in support of ZULU,_

deception). bde move.

Passive: self-protection.Active self-protection.

Protect movement. Priority to protectWarning/control statuses: Change warninglYELLOW/TIGHT. control statuses?

prep of de f pos. _

Maintai lal Minimize radio.

profileIvt 'LAN WHITE 10.

TAC CP opnl.

OPSEC. , OPOREstb flank liaison.

Main CP in place.

Dispers el camouflage. Move CI then III.

FSe preps to spt V.IX_

Continue maintenance bd e mo v to de f Estb eSA_and resupply ops.sector.

Minimize movement

Prep de f pos nearOttawa

Conceal movementintentions.

109



24 H + 48 H + 54 H + 56 H + 58 H+60 H+

f a I I.()() 18002000 0600 1200 1400 (FEBA)

Baule. hlndov8' begins I - - - - - - - - IcI 2d·ech regll/1.t .ch dlY c0mtnlUed r- o m ~ . t e I H ~ i e o " , " r . end / tonl enemy CAS {ph4"1 3 .nd '

I Ph .... 3 .n d

551h Avn guard Battle handover MBA defense DP 10: div atk hels

begins H + 48. begins H + 54. begins H + 58. to TA l 11

What is disposit ion 2d-ech bns of 2d- 2d-ech div_

of 2d-ach regts of ac h regts?

1st-ech div7 IITS7

1, 2, 3, 4, and 51. 2. and 5. then 6 6 and 7. Ihen 8

and 7. and 9.

Area TA l 1.

TF security elementl TP' MCt.II1ty ~ . " t a engeQe, Flank security. -at BHl; secure dl. ~ " " l : h t o 4 . l l i h p a . t . . . n . q guard force withdrawal

Ht5 l tDHtsa .

55th Avn Bde begins MBA TF. rudy al H • 5. ; MBA TFs ~ o . o r security lTF and RTF each engage

guard (H +48). avo bde begins p . 'Olee wltl'l.drawal H + S6 and destroy 2 bnltto H +53- MBA delens.

208th pas begins H+.6 . - f----- Complete H+ 50. H + ~ l o H + 5 3 . begins H+53-H+S8lo H+6-4_

Recon counterattack routes TF 4-77 begins paa; TF 4-77 closed In AA RAT

and potential BPL Tank co tm priority alch 10 3d Bde H +53-by H+60; beginsrectOa n zatlon.

to LTF.

2d·ech bns of 2d-ech8de priority i. ITS.

regts, then ITB.then regl of 2d-echdlv_

Prep to assist battle Support handover. Priority to LTF.Monitor s!.tlu. 01 2-642 FA. handover. RTF. then res.

2-642 FA assumes R55th Avn Bde pas.

Bde CFL effectiveTA l 1.

mission at H +SO. H+ 58.

Barrier plan (P l Surylvabillty posSurvivability pos ZULU to Pl BLUE'. (PL ZULU to PL

(PL YELLOW to BLUE).

PL ZULU).

FASCAM7

Priority to protect Protect bent. hendover. Priority to C2 an d

prep 01 del pos.Chlnge werningl

CSS.control Itatused

TAe controls battle TAC CP repositions.

handover.00 boundaries Main CP controls

effective H + 58. close f ight.

Prepare to relit Refit TF 4-n.

TF 4-77. Begin intensive Priority: LTF. RTF.Prestock CI V.

mad andmalnt evac. then ras.

CI IV _ _ engineers.

Conceal size.location.

intentions of bde

res.

llO



60 H+64 H+68 H +72 H+ 75 H+I

100 -000 ~ d . " h On./2.l-ooh . . . . . 0200 06001,1 Kh·div commined ITII eomm'ued.

1000

"ont .nemy CAS (phu • 3 .n d 4,..I-«l\ f ~ V 2 d - . e n dIw

, All' .U.ckt t h r o ~ h o u t div MeIOf (phu • '-4'

IPh....

3 .n d .. fh . .

" . .. . 2 and 3 ,i,.,

DP 10 : div atk hels DP 11 : div atk hels DP 17: where isto TAl 17 to TAl 27 2d-ech div7

DP 16 or 17 : Decision to commitwhere is th e ITB7 TF 4-77.

Decision to commit

bd e res.

2d-ech div.2d·ech bns of regt

from 2d-ech div.

12 . 13 . 14 . and 15. 12 . 13 . 14. 15. Band 9 then 13. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 .

1 .2 . and 5.6. and 7. 14. and 15. an d 18 .

Area TAl 1. Area TAl 2.Area TAl 3.

Flank security.

LTF and RTF each engage l TF fights. destroy. 1 bn LTF lightl. dOitrov. ITB LTf ftghtl. d. f . I 1 bra vtc "" TFs eslabli,h contact with TF

Ind deslroy 2 bn.. vic PL ZULU; RTf lightl. between PL ZULU and BlUIEH.7ceoH.n. 4-77; RTF d.fend .RTF fIohtll. de fu " 1 bn

H+S8to H>64. destroys 1 bn vic Pl PL BLUE; RTF delend. Pl YELLOW andLTF .n d TF 4-77 def.nd. d. ru ,

YELLOW. south of PL YelLOW. Pl lULU by H.71. ' bn vic Pl BLUE.

WARNORO toTf 4·n committed,

assume_ center sector atTF 4·n ready It H +68- TF 4-77. H+7S'.Tank co 1m to TF 4-n. Rlsle no reserve.

Bde priority is ITB. Primary larget i. Primary target i. 42Ihen regt of 2d-ech 2d·ech div lead IMR Belolfdlv. element•. committed.

1-- Priority to TF 4-77.

then LTF.

TAl 1. TAl 2.Move CFL1 TAl 3.

MOVE CFL1

Surylvability pos Mobility support to(PL ZULU 10 PL -

TF 4-77.BLUE).

TAC CP repositions. TACQI opnL

WARNORO to TF 4-771 TF 4-77 becomesMain CP control. .. il d.1 lector 10< TF main effort at

close fight. 4-n.H+99.

Maintenancelsupply

priority to TF

4-77.

111



- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

76 H+ 80 H + 84 H+88 H+ge

r I100 1400 1800 2200 0600

1 dl'l comtnmH. I.clew- lphaM' 1-41.

Ph.... 2 and 3 fi, •• .

Where I. 42 IMR Bda?

12 . 13 . 14. 15 .and 18. 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . nd 5.

ut,bl i ,h contace with TF TF 4·17 auum,. left "Clot.

77; RTF d.f.nd,. d.fend, vtC; Pl BlUe; RTF

"; Ind TF 4·71 d,flnd. detut d.fend, Vfc: Pt ZULU.

bn vic PL BLUE.

l TF now bde re,erve;·

move. to AA;

~ e F o ~ ; ~ l e l ; priority to

Primary target I. 42IMR Bde If

commlHed.

Priority to TF 4-77. Priority to TF 4-77.

then LTF. then RTF.

TAl 3.

Mobility support to Priority to

TF 4-77. countermobility:

TF 4-77.then RTF.

Priority to

reorganizing units.

Priority to TF 4-77.

then RTF. thenres.

11 2



TIME

THREAT

ACTION

/

SF0c

E Us

V NE A

N I

T

B A

AI

T

cL

OsE

RES

0REAR

DEEP

I ~ ~

ING

S Ay

S I 2TEM

5

l.;

p

2

Synchronization Matrix for eOA 2

0- 1

D-dayH hour H+ 10 H+ 24 H<

Nebraska Front 0600 1600 2000 0600 2000

forces continueI

111-eeh dlv , "uk , .cross bord.,

preparation forA,r .n.ck, Ihroughoul d,v •• to, (ph.... 1 and 2).

Icombat.

Incre.sed I Enemy

in el collection. so , activity begin.: conUnu•• throughout 11'1. o ~ r . U o n . I

:National and corps 208th cover begins

systems monitor (H-hour).

Nebraskii forces.

Monitor natl lcorps Corps confirms Build OB from corpsenemy Intentionsr e po r t s - d i v .at H+ 8.

and div reports.

1,2,3,4, and 5. -

Increase local Secure move,security.

occupation.

prepare det po;( - d ~ c ; p t l o n •. p r r : o ~ ~ r t T o v e BDE moves H+10 to H +18-

M.intllln'r.lupply prepares defense H +18Inc .urveillanc. to H +54. - 208111 pas begins H + 46. -

Recon counterattack routesNA Deploy to AA BOLD.

and potential BPs.

NARISK: no bde TCF.Div TCF? Bde res?

NA

Prepare to support Move into sector.

SOF incursions. Protect movement.

Monitor status of 2·642 FA.

Area damage controlPrepare for mobility

Establish barrier plan

Construct def pos (PL GRAY to PL

(survivability and ops in support of SILVER).

deception). bde move.

Passive: self-protection,Active self· protecti on.

Protect movement. Priority to protect _Warning/control statuses: Change warning/YElLOW/TIGHT. control statuses?

prep of def pos.

Maintain normal Minimize radio

profi le (deception)IV - ..AN WHITE

TAC CP opn!.

OPSEC. ,OPORD

Estb flank liaison.

Main CP in place.

Disperselcamouflage. Move CI IV III,

FSB preps to sp t V, IX .

Continue maintenance bd e mo v to de f Estb BSA.and resupply ops.sector.

Minimize movement.

Conceal size, location,Prep def pos near Intenllons of bde res.

Ottawa

Conceal movementIntentions.

113



·24

00

H+48 H + 54

2000 0600 1200Battle: hand over begins

I 2d·ech ,egls/1 sf ech dl\, committed

Enemy . r ly In ,ange (phue 2 liresl.

55th Avn guard Battle handover

begins H + 48. begins H + 54.

What is disposit ion 2d·ech bns of 2d ·

of 2d·ech regts of ech regts?

1st-ech div? !ITB?

H + 56 H+ 58 H+ 60 Hi

1400 [FEBAJ 1800 2000 22

(Comple.e

I Helieep!." end Ironl enemy CAS (phues 3 And ·

MBA defense OP 10: div alk hels

begins H + 58. to TAl 17

2d·ech div.

1, 2. 3, 4, and 5.1 ,2 . and 5. then 6 6 and 7. then 8

an d 7. and 9.

Area TA l 1.

TF security elements TF lecUrity . rement l .nCOl•••• Flank security. -at 8Hl; secure dlv withdraw t h r o ~ " p u I ~ n ••guard force withdrawal

H.56 10 H SI.

551h Avn Bde begins MBA TFs ready at H +54: MBA TFs cover security LTF and RTF each engage

guard (H + 48). avn bde begIns pas force withdrawal H + 56 and destroy 2 bns,

208th pas begins H+46. _ ' - - Complete H + 50. H+54 to H +56.to H + 1j8. MBA defense H + 58 to H + 64.begins H+58. I ~ " ~ ( 2. . (0; ' " " . ~ f " ! .

TF ~ · 7 7 begins pas; TF 4·77 closed In AA FIXRecon counterattack routes

Mech co 1m priority atch to 3d 8da H +56. by H +60; beginsand potential BPs. reorganization.

to LTF.

2d-ech bns of 2d·ech8de priority is ITB.

regts, t hen ITB.then regt of 2d·echdiv.

Prep to assist battle Support handover. Priority 10 LTF,

handover. RTF, then res.

55th Avn 8de pas.TA i l .2·642 FA assumes R Bde CFL effective

Monitor status of 2·642 FA.mission at H + 50. H+ 58.

Barrier plan (PLSurvivability pas SILVER to f'L BLUE).

(PL YELLOW toSurvivability pasPL SILVER).

Primary/alternate. (PL SILVER to PL -FASCAM? BLUE).

Priority to protect Protect battle handover. Priority to C2 and

prep of de! pos.Change warningl

CSS.control statuses?

TAC controls battle TAC CP repositions.

handover.00 boundaries Main CP controls

effective H + 56. close fight.

Prepare to refit Assist 55th Avn pas.

TF 4-77.Refit TF ~ · 7 7 . Begin intensive Priority: LTF. RTF.Prestock CI V. med and

then res.malnt evac.

Ct IV - Engineers.

Conceal size, locatIon,

Intentions of bde res.

114



,60 H+64 H+68 H+72 H+76 H+

- 1000 141lO 2000 2200 0200 06002d·ech bn,/2d'ICh ,egl ,1

1, t ech·dlv committed ITS commiued

',ont enemy CAS (ph.... 3 and 4, 1,t-ech N'ql'2d. . , dlY

IAir e ruc b throughout dlv .ector ( ph i ' " 1_ .0

I Ph.... 3 and" fi,.,. PhaMI 2 end 3 f., ••

DP 10: div atk hels DP l l -d iv atk DP 16 or 17:to TAl 17 hels to TAl 2 Decision to commit

bde counterattack.

2d-ech div_2d-ech bns of regt

from 2d-ech div.

12 . l3 . 14 . and 15. 12. 13. 14. 15. 8 and 9 then 13 . 12. 13. 14. 15.

1.2. and 5.6. and 7. 14. and 15. and 18 .

Area TA l 1. Area TA l 2. ObI MELEE(TAl 3).

Flank security.

l TF and RTF each engage RTF d.,troy. one bn south of RTF del.nd, vk: Pl SILVER. ATF dl f • a one bn vtc t RTF defends; LTF block•.and destroy 2 bns. PL ZULU; LTF dnlroy. one lT f de.troy. ITB PL SILVER to PL SILytk : ~ . ~ .. .." TF 4-77 destroys one bn

I ~ ~ : ! ! ~ ~ " > ~ ~ ~ " · t d \ h I ~ 1 f 1 bn PL lULU 10 PL SllVE .. PL BLUE. l T' "Ohll. bIoclU one bn ( + ) viC Obi MELEE.: , . ~ ~ " ' " " 1,":'/!-4l'", t"elJfJ ITB 'ric PL BLUE. ; " lL , / IN

TF 4-n ready at WARNORD TOH+66. TF 4-77. Move r- - Pas _ Contact Mech co tm prforlty

to TF 4-77.

8da priority is ITB. Primary target is 2d- PrImary target Is 42then regt of 2d-ech ech dlv lead IMR Bde If committed.div. elements_

I- PriorIty to TF 4-n,then LTF, then

TA l 1. TA l 2. RTF.Move CFL?Estb RFL

Survivability pos Mobility support to(subsequent) PL counterattack.

Survivability pos SILVER to PL BLUE.

(PL SILVER to PLBLUE).

Priority to bdePriority to counter-

counterattack. attack.

TAC CP repositions. TAC CP Opn!.TF 4-n becomes

Main CP controls main effort at

close fight. H+76.

IPriority to counter-

attack.

11 5



76 H+80 H+ 84 H+ 88 H+ 96

iJO 1400 1800 0ti00

r"I dly commtned IlUQ'hcut dlV • .elcr (pha, • 1_.0.

IPhu. , 2 and 3 fues.

Where is 42 IMR Bde?

12. 13. 14 . 15 .

an d 18 . 1. 2. 3. and 5.

Obj MELEE

{TAl 3).

RTF defends; LTF blocks. TF 4-77 assumes leff

TF 4· n destroys one bn sector vic PL SILVER.( • ) vic obi MELEE. RTF defends vic Pl

SILVER. I

LTF to AA;

Mech co tm prlorlty reorganize.

to TF 4..77.

Primary target Is 42IMR Bde If committed.

Priority to TF 4-77. Priority to TF 4-77.then l TF. then then RTF.RTF.

Mobility support to Survivability Posns.r- PL SILVER TO PL

BLUE

Prior i ty toPriority to counter·

attack. reorganizing units .

Priority to counter- Priority to TF 4-n.

attack. then RTF.

116



BIBLIOGRAPHY

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U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College. Advance Book, 310

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For t Leavenworth KS: U.S. Army Command and General S ta f f College,January 94.

Student Text 25-1, Resource Planning and Alloca t ion . For t

Leavenworth KS: U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College , 1995.

Ar t i c l es and Per iod ica l s

Haywood, Oliver G. "Mi l i t a ry Decision and Game Theory," OperationsResearch, Vol . 2 (November 1954) , 365-385.

Kle in , Gary A. " S t r a t e g i e s of Decision Making," M i l i t a r y Review (May1989) , 56-64.

Petersen, John L. "Forecas t ing: It's Not Poss ib le , " Defense In te l l igence

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Research . Technica l Report 984. (Alexandria , VA: U.S. ArmyResearch I ns t i t u t e fo r Behaviora l and Socia l Science , 1993.

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11 8



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