Use of Force By Police: An Overview of National and Local Data

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

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ARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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FIC

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OF JUSTICE PRO

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AM

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BJA

NIJ

OJJ DP BJSO

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U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Justice Programs810 Seventh Street N.W.Washington, DC 20531

Janet RenoAttorney General

Raymond C. FisherAssociate Attorney General

Laurie RobinsonAssistant Attorney General

Noël BrennanDeputy Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis Jan M. ChaikenDirector, National Institute of Justice Director, Bureau of Justice Statistics

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice Bureau of Justice StatisticsWorld Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs

Use of Force by PoliceOverview of National

and Local Data

Contributors:

October 1999

NCJ 176330

Kenneth Adams

Geoffrey P. Alpert

Roger G. Dunham

Joel H. Garner

Lawrence A. Greenfeld

Mark A. Henriquez

Patrick A. Langan

Christopher D. Maxwell

Steven K. Smith

Jeremy Travis Jan M. Chaiken

Director, National Institute of Justice Director, Bureau of Justice Statistics

Robert J. Kaminski

Program Manager, National Institute of Justice

Points of view expressed by contributors to this report do not necessarily represent theofficial positions or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice and the Bureau of Justice Statistics are components of the Officeof Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Office of JuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

Acknowledgments: This report is indebted to many individuals and organizations for theirvaluable assistance and insights. Special thanks are extended to the law enforcement agen-cies that cooperated with the researchers whose findings appear in this report. In so doing,the following agencies demonstrated the type of leadership so critical to the advancement ofpolicing practice and policy: Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department,Colorado Springs (Colorado) Police Department, Dallas (Texas) Police Department, Eugene(Oregon) Police Department, Miami-Dade (Florida) Police Department, St. Petersburg (Florida)Police Department, San Diego (California) Police Department, San Diego County (California)Sheriff ’s Department, Springfield (Oregon) Police Department, and the many departmentsthat have participated in the use-of-force database project of the International Association ofChiefs of Police.

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Foreword

jurisdictions, and offers a researcher’s sug-gestions for a future research agenda onpolice use of force, with special attentiongiven to issues of excessive force.

Research consistently demonstrates that asmall percentage of police-public interac-tions involve use of force. Various datasources, including police use-of-force reports,civilian complaints, victim surveys, and ob-servational methods, confirm this basic find-ing. For example, the 1996 pilot test of thePPCS found that about 1 percent of peoplereporting contacts with police said that offic-ers used or threatened force. Beginning inJuly 1999, the PPCS is being fielded to amuch larger sample than responded to the1996 test, and the results will be presentedin a report next year. In the years ahead, itis expected that the PPCS will provide thebasis for a legislatively mandated annualreport by the Attorney General documentingthe prevalence of the use of excessive force.

NIJ-sponsored research at the local levelfound that, in the context of the subsetof police-public contacts involving adultcustody arrests, police used physical force(handcuffing excluded) in less than 20 per-cent of 7,512 arrests studied (chapter 4).Even in those instances, police primarilyused weaponless tactics, such as grabbing orholding, which is consistent with the viewthat relatively minor types of force dominatestatistics on police use of force. That view

Law enforcement officers are authorizedto use force in specified circumstances,

are trained in the use of force, and typicallyface numerous circumstances during theircareers when use of force is appropriate—forexample, in making some arrests, restrain-ing unruly combatants, or controlling a dis-ruptive demonstration. When the level offorce exceeds the level considered justifiableunder the circumstances, however, the activi-ties of the police come under public scrutiny.

Incidents involving the use of excessive forceby the police frequently receive attentionfrom the media, legislators, and, in someinstances, civil and even criminal courts.Whether the excessive force is aberrantbehavior of individual officers or is a patternand practice of an entire law enforcementagency, both the law and public opinioncondemn such incidents.

This report is one in a series of publicationsby the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)that seek to inform public discussion byexamining police use of force from many per-spectives. The report provides an overviewof the state of research knowledge aboutpolice use of force, updates progress on thenational BJS Police-Public Contact Survey(PPCS) and the database project of the Inter-national Association of Chiefs of Police, pro-vides the latest findings from NIJ-supporteduse-of-force research projects in several local

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Use of Force by Police

is further supported by research indicatingthat in incidents involving resistance by sus-pects, their injuries resulting from police useof force were typically minor (chapter 5).

Ongoing research by NIJ and BJS seeks toprovide the perspective, insight, and factualdata needed by police and others to addressuse-of-force issues constructively. Throughthis and other policing research, we seekto advance our goal of assisting lawenforcement agencies in protecting the

public, enhancing the safety of the commu-nity and officers, and building widespreadsupport among those they serve.

Jeremy TravisDirectorNational Institute of Justice

Jan M. Chaiken, Ph.D.DirectorBureau of Justice Statistics

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Contents

Foreword .............................................................................................................................. iii

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... vii

1. What We Know About Police Use of Force ................................................................ 1by Kenneth Adams

2. Revising and Fielding the Police-Public Contact Survey ................................... 15by Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Patrick A. Langan, and Steven K. Smith

3. IACP National Database Project on Police Use of Force .................................... 19by Mark A. Henriquez

4. Measuring the Amount of Force Used By and Against the Police inSix Jurisdictions ........................................................................................................... 25by Joel H. Garner and Christopher D. Maxwell

5. The Force Factor: Measuring and Assessing Police Use of Force andSuspect Resistance ....................................................................................................... 45by Geoffrey P. Alpert and Roger G. Dunham

6. A Research Agenda on Police Use of Force ............................................................ 61by Kenneth Adams

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 75

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Executive Summary

For example, about 1 percent of people whohad face-to-face contacts with police saidthat officers used or threatened force, ac-cording to preliminary estimates based onthe Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 1996 pretestof its Police-Public Contact Survey (chapter2). In 7,512 adult custody arrests, anotherstudy (chapter 4) notes that fewer than oneout of five arrests involved police use ofphysical force (defined as use of any weapon,use of any weaponless tactic, or use of severerestraints). That can be considered a lowrate in view of the study’s broad definitionof force.

Also known with substantial confidence isthat police use of force typically occurs at thelower end of the force spectrum, involvinggrabbing, pushing, or shoving. In the studyfocusing on 7,512 adult custody arrests,for instance, about 80 percent of arrests inwhich police used force involved use of weap-onless tactics. Grabbing was the tactic usedabout half the time. About 2.1 percent of allarrests involved use of weapons by police.Chemical agents, such as pepper spray, werethe weapons most frequently used (1.2 per-cent of all arrests), with firearms least oftenused (0.2 percent).

From a police administrator’s point of view,these findings are predictable. Officers aretrained to use force progressively along acontinuum, and policy requires that officersuse the least amount of force necessary to

Recent developments have heightened concern about police use of force. Theyrange from well-publicized incidents involv-ing allegations of excessive force to the onsetof “aggressive” policing, whose frequentemphasis on zero-tolerance enforcement issometimes regarded as encouraging use-of-force abuses. No matter what specific eventtriggers concern about police use of force,how is the public to assess whether suchforce is, in the aggregate, a major problem?One way is to examine what research hasunearthed.

Overview: What Do We Know AboutPolice Use of Force?As discussed in chapter 1, research-basedknowledge about police use of force can beplaced into three categories. The first per-tains to knowledge that can be accepted withsubstantial confidence as “fact.” The secondrelates to use-of-force knowledge that can beaccepted only with modest confidence be-cause, for example, additional research iswarranted. The third category consists ofknowledge yet to be developed throughresearch—that is, what is not yet known.

Known with substantial confidence

Known with substantial confidence is thatpolice use force infrequently. The data indi-cate that a small percentage of police-publicencounters involve force.

The organization of theexecutive summary par-allels that of the reportas a whole; that is, theorder of topics highlightedin this summary tracksthe chapter sequence. Oc-casional cross-referencesto specific chapters areintended to assist readersin locating more detailedinformation.

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accomplish their goals. The kinds of policeactions that most arouse the public’s con-cerns—such as fatal shootings, severebeatings with fists or batons that lead to hos-pitalization, and choke holds that cause un-consciousness or even death—are not typicalof situations in which police use force.

When injuries occur as a result of the useof force, they are likely to be minor. In onestudy (chapter 5), researchers found thatthe most common injury to a suspect was abruise or abrasion (48 percent).

Another research finding that can be ac-cepted with substantial confidence is thatuse of force typically occurs when police aretrying to make an arrest and the suspect isresisting. This conclusion is based on fourtypes of data: arrest statistics, surveys of po-lice officers, observations of police behavior,and reports by the public about their encoun-ters with police.

The foregoing findings leave open the issueof excessive force because issues of propor-tionality are not clearly addressed. Researchfindings suggest, however, that many de-bates over excessive force will fall into gray

areas where it is difficult to decide whetheran officer acted properly, given credible evi-dence that use of force was necessary.

Known with modest confidence

Regarding what is known with modest confi-dence about police use of force, chapter 1identifies three conclusions suggested byresearch data:

● Use of force appears to be unrelated to anofficer’s personal characteristics, such asage, gender, and ethnicity. This conclusionshould be accepted with caution, however.Additional verification is needed.

● Use of force is more likely to occur whenpolice are dealing with persons under theinfluence of alcohol or drugs or with men-tally ill individuals. Research findings inthis area are inconsistent, however. Fur-ther investigation, with an emphasis onimplications for training, could lead to areduction in the risk of force and injuryfor both police officers and civilians.

● A small proportion of officers are dispro-portionately involved in use-of-forceincidents. More research is needed.

About this reportThis report is one of a series of use-of-forcepublications (see Bibliography, page 75)generated by research supported by theNational Institute of Justice or Bureau ofJustice Statistics. The data and findingsherein contribute to a better understandingof the extent and nature of police use offorce and of the circumstances under whichsuch force is applied.

A major objective of chapter 1 is to providean overview of what is known (and notknown) about police use of force andthereby help readers put the issue in per-spective. The next two chapters are updatesof two national projects. One is designed tocollect data on police-public contacts, includ-ing those involving police use of force, froma nationally representative sample of per-

sons age 12 or older. The other seeks toencourage as many local law enforcementagencies as possible to submit voluntarilyand anonymously use-of-force data to acentral database for analysis.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the local level.They present use-of-force findings basedon data acquired from nine police agencies.

The final chapter looks ahead by proposinga research agenda on police use of force,with special attention given to issues ofexcessive force.

Thus, this report begins with an overviewof what is known about police use of force,proceeds to outline what is being learned,and concludes with a proposed plan forfuture research.

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Executive Summary

Among what is not known

As stated in chapter 1: “The incidence ofwrongful use of force by police is unknown.Research is critically needed to determinereliably, validly, and precisely how oftentransgressions of use-of-force powers occur.”

Researchers and practitioners both tend topresuppose that the incidence of excessiveforce by police is very low. If use of force isuncommon, and civilian complaints are in-frequent, and civilian injuries are few, thenexcessive force by police must be rare. Thatconclusion may indeed be correct, but to theextent that it hinges on official police statis-tics, it is open to serious challenge.

Current indicators of excessive force, such ascivilian complaints and civil lawsuits, are allcritically flawed. The difficulties in measur-ing excessive force with complaint andlawsuit records have led academics andpractitioners to redirect their attention toall use-of-force incidents. Theoretically, un-derstanding all use-of-force incidents helpsput wrongful use of force in perspective.

As one example of how understanding alluse-of-force incidents can help put excessiveforce in perspective, the study of 7,512 adultcustody arrests (chapter 4) makes thisobservation:

“ . . . most arrests involve no force, excessiveor otherwise. When force is used, it typicallyinvolves less severe forms of tactics andweapon use. These findings provide a contextfor understanding excessive force, which weknow can involve low-level acts of force . . .as well as the acts of force that result inphysical injury or death of civilians. Arreststhat involve no force, however, cannot in-volve excessive force and arrests that involvelow levels of force are less likely to involveexcessive force.”

Additional gaps in use-of-force knowledgeinclude the following:

● The impact of differences in police organi-zations, including administrative policies,hiring, training, discipline, and use oftechnology, on excessive force is unknown.Although many conditions that arguably

lead to excessive force by police seem ob-vious, or appear to be a matter of commonsense, a great need for systematic re-search in this area exists.

● Influences of situational characteristicson police use of force and the transac-tional nature of these events are largelyunknown. For example, little is knownbeyond research indicating that situationsmost likely to involve police use of forceare interpersonal disturbance and violentpersonal crime, and situations when sus-pects attempt to flee or physically resistarrest. Those findings, however, do notaddress the transactional, or step-by-stepunfolding, of police-public encounters. Wassuspect resistance the result of police useof force, or did police use force after expe-riencing suspect resistance?

Updates on Two National ProjectsIn 1996, the Bureau of Justice Statistics(BJS) and the International Association ofChiefs of Police (IACP) initiated projects in-volving collection of data encompassing po-lice use of force. Both are currently ongoing.

The BJS survey

To learn more about police use of force re-quires an understanding of the reasons forand the results of police-public encounters.As a step toward developing that under-standing, BJS supplemented the NationalCrime Victimization Survey with a pilot testof its Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS) in1996 (chapter 2).

Among the findings was a preliminaryestimate that about 1 percent of people re-porting contacts with police indicated thatofficers used or threatened force. In themajority of those instances, respondents saidthat their own actions, such as threateningpolice, may have provoked officers.

In July 1999, a second test of PPCS wasfielded to a much larger sample than thatused in the 1996 pilot test. In addition, BJSanticipates adding items to its periodic sur-veys conducted among nationally representa-tive samples of those confined in local jails

“NCVS is based on inter-views conducted with anationally representativesample of U.S. house-holds and has become ahighly useful platform fortesting new question-naires and periodicallyimplementing supple-ments.” —Greenfeld, etal., page 15 of this report.

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and prisoners held by State and Federalauthorities. The new survey items wouldprovide, for the first time, information aboutrespondents’ interactions, including use offorce, with police during the arrest precedingincarceration.

The IACP database project

Initiated in 1996, the IACP database projectis designed to collect use-of-force informationfrom law enforcement agencies across theNation (chapter 3). To promote accurate re-porting and overcome potential reluctanceof agencies to participate, IACP decided thatprovision of data would be both voluntaryand anonymous.

Collected data pertain to reported use offorce stemming from police responses to callsfor service, whether or not those responsesresulted in arrests. About 150 agencies areexpected to contribute data for the 1998–99data year. Among preliminary findings:

● Based on 1995 data reported by 110 agen-cies, the police use-of-force rate was 4.19per 10,000 responded-to calls for service,or 0.0419 percent.

● Based on data reported for 1996–97, 87percent of 62,411 use-of-force incidentsinvolved officers using physical force. Of-ficers used chemical force in 7 percent ofthe incidents, firearms in about 5 percent.

● Based on available data for 1996–97, about10 percent of 2,479 officers using force sus-tained injuries, less than 1 percent serious.About 38 percent of subjects were injureddue to police use of force, with 1.5 percentsustaining major injuries.

Because the data are not yet nationallyrepresentative, conclusions about nationaluse-of-force trends should not be attempted.

Two Local-Level StudiesOne of the local-level studies measured theamount of force used by and against policein six jurisdictions. The other measured andassessed police use of force and suspect re-sistance in three jurisdictions and developed

the force factor, a measure of the level offorce used by officers relative to the level ofresistance by suspects.

Study on the amount of force used insix jurisdictions

The six-jurisdiction study (chapter 4) gath-ered data about officers’ and suspects’ behav-iors in connection with 7,512 adult custodyarrests (arrests in which suspects are trans-ported to a detention facility, in contrast tobeing issued a summons to appear before ajudicial officer). The researchers focused onthe amount of force used by and against po-lice, with the expectation that this informa-tion would inform issues surrounding theuse of excessive force. For instance, excessiveforce is typically but not necessarily associ-ated with more severe forms of force thatcould or do result in injury or death.

Emerging from the research is a more completeunderstanding of the frequency with which cer-tain types of tactics are used and what types ofweapons are displayed, threatened, or actuallyused. The consistent findings across all sixjurisdictions are that most arrests (more than80 percent) did not involve force by police (ex-cluding handcuffing) or by suspects. In 98 per-cent of arrests where force was used, no weaponwas used, threatened, or even displayed. Whenpolice used some form of weaponless tactic (hit-ting, kicking, wrestling, etc.), the most frequenttactic involved only grabbing (about half thetime).

In addition to providing data on the use ofweapons and weaponless tactics, the studyidentified three other elements, sometimesincluded in the concept of use of force:

● Restraints. In about 82 percent of all7,512 arrests, officers reported use ofhandcuffs. Leg cuffs were used in 0.9 per-cent of arrests. Officers used more severerestraints in 0.4 percent of arrests. Re-straints were not used in approximately16 percent of arrests.

● Motion. Pursuit on foot and by car oc-curred in 3 percent and 2.4 percent, re-spectively, of all arrests. Pursuit did not

“...IACP designed theproject from the outset toreflect operational reali-ties of modern, street-levellaw enforcement, includ-ing the very meaning of‘police use of force,’ de-fined as the amount offorce required by police tocompel compliance by anunwilling subject.”—Henriquez, page 20 ofthis report.

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Executive Summary

occur in 94.4 percent of arrests. Suspectflight most frequently occurred by foot (in4.7 percent of arrests). In 93.5 percent ofarrests, suspects did not flee.

● Voice. In 61.2 percent of arrests, policereported they used a conversational tonewith suspects.

Among the measures of force used by policeofficers that were developed by the research-ers are physical force and physical force plusthreats. The study found that 17.1 percentof arrests involved physical force (use of aweapon, weaponless tactic, or severe re-straint) and that 18.9 percent entailedphysical force or the display or threateneduse of any weapon.

To better distinguish between different typesof force—such as between grabbing and kick-ing—the researchers developed a maximumforce measure, which involved officers’ rank-ing 60 hypothetical types of force in terms oftheir severity on a scale from 1 (least force-ful) to 100 (most forceful). When the mea-sure was applied to the types of force officersreported using, the study found that theranking score for commanding a suspect todo something (1.3 percent of all arrests)was 22; for using handcuffs (57.3 percent ofarrests), 28.2; and for displaying a handgun(2.2 percent of arrests), 55.4. The averageranking score for the types of force used inall arrests was 30.

The researchers state that their findingsare beginning to provide a stable picture ofpolice behavior and the amount of force thatpolice use in arrest situations, but they notethe findings remain tentative given thesmall number of jurisdictions involved inthe research, among other reasons.

Study on police use of force andsuspect resistance

The study collected use-of-force data fromthree law enforcement agencies— policedepartments in two Oregon cities and onecounty department in Florida (chapter 5).The areas served by the Oregon departmentswere considered one site.

The two-city Oregon site of Eugene/Springfield. Researchers analyzed 562 po-lice actions, 57 percent of which were takenby officers responding to calls for service and33 percent by officers reacting to situationsthey had observed. The most common type ofincident (25 percent) confronting officers wasstreet violence. Most police action (76 per-cent) was taken to apprehend or control aperson.

Officers often used more than one verbal orphysical control tactic per incident. For in-stance, 93 percent of 546 incidents involvedat least two tactics; 87 percent, at least three;and 41 percent, at least four. The pattern oftactic use that emerged corresponds to thetraditional use-of-force continuum. The firsttactic used in an incident is nearly alwaysthe least severe use of force on the con-tinuum; the second is almost always the sec-ond-most lenient; and so on, with very fewexceptions.

Of 504 reported incidents in which force wasused, 1.8 percent resulted in injury to officers.They were most at risk for injury when wres-tling, striking, or taking a suspect to theground.

The level of force used by the department’sofficers relative to the amount of the sus-pects’ resistance—the force factor—averagedslightly higher than the amount of resistanceencountered. On average, more force thanresistance was used. This does not necessar-ily imply that the level of police force wasexcessive. For example, an officer may justifi-ably use more force than does a suspect togain control of a situation.

The Florida site. The study focused on datain 882 official Control-of-Persons Reportsprepared by officers’ supervisors in theMiami-Dade Police Department. Ninety-seven percent of suspects resisted.

The type of resistance most often reportedwas actively resisting arrest (36 percent), fol-lowed by assaulting the officer (25 percent).Twenty one percent of suspects attempted toescape or flee the scene. The most commontype of force used by suspects was striking or

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hitting the officer (44 percent). Initially calmsuspects were least likely to resist officersbut were the most likely to flee and the mostlikely to resist with a gun or assault officerswith a vehicle.

The most common type of suspect injury wasa bruise or abrasion (48 percent of those in-jured), followed by lacerations (24 percent),and gunshot injuries (4 percent). The chanceof suspect injury was significant no matterwhat type of force was used by police. Forexample, officer use of fists entailed an 81percent chance of suspect injury; use of aPR-24 baton, a 67 percent chance; and use ofa handgun, a 48 percent chance.

Suspects who were reportedly impaired byalcohol or drugs were no more likely to resistofficers than sober suspects. When they didresist, however, they were more likely thannonimpaired suspects to directly assault theofficer and more than twice as likely to usea gun.

The most common type of force used by officerswas use of hands and arms (77 percent of use-of-force incidents). In 64 percent of incidents,officers grabbed or held suspects. There wereno statistically significant differences in thelevel of force used by male and female officers.The ethnicity of an officer did not affect thegeneral level of force used or whether force wasused.

Data suggest that officers are significantlyat risk for injury when they use force, par-ticularly when they strike a suspect withtheir fists (48 percent chance) or use theirhands and arms to control a suspect (43 per-cent chance). Because most use-of-force inci-dents involved use of hands, arms, or fistsby officers, they are most at risk for injurywhen using precisely the types of force thatthey report using most frequently.

Police officers’ use of force in relation to sus-pect resistance—the force factor—averagedslightly less force than the resistance en-countered. Data indicate that officers aremore likely to be injured when using lessforce than that used by resisting suspects.

A Proposed Research AgendaThe development of a research agenda onpolice use of force, with special attentiongiven to issues of excessive force, should beguided by these general considerations.

● Research should provide new knowledgethat significantly increases our under-standing of the problem.

● Research should be policy relevant.

● Research activities, taken as a whole,should be comprehensive and systematic.

Within that general framework, more workis required on what various people—generalpublic, minorities, police administrators, pa-trol officers, judges, offenders, etc.— have inmind when they refer to excessive force andhow they adjudge specific instances of policebehavior when questions of excessive forcearise. This research is important because so-cial problems often require shared solutions,and shared solutions require a common basisof understanding and mutual respect fordifferences in views.

Also needed is more and better data onpolice use of force. Most discussions occur inan empirical vacuum where arguments aremade without the benefit of solid, usefulinformation.

Research is required on how use of force bypolice varies across time, cities, and indi-vidual police departments. Research also isneeded on individual, situational, and orga-nizational factors related to variations inuse-of-force levels, along with excessive forcelevels and should focus on the relation be-tween excessive use of force, meaning thefrequency with which police use force, andexcessive force, meaning instances in whichpolice use more force than is necessary.

Finally, interventions, changes, and reformsthat may mitigate police use-of-force prob-lems should be identified, documented, andevaluated.

1

What We Know AboutPolice Use of Forceby Kenneth Adams

1

Ambrose Bierce, a social critic known for his sarcasm and wit, once described thepolice as “an armed force for protection andparticipation.”1 In this pithy statement,Bierce identifies three critical elements ofthe police role. First, by describing the policeas “armed,” their ability to coerce recalci-trant persons to comply with the law is em-phasized. Because police carry weapons,it follows that the force they use may havelethal consequences. The capacity to usecoercive, deadly force is so central to under-standing police functions, one could say thatit characterizes a key element of the policerole.

Second, the primary purpose of police isprotection, and so force can be used only topromote the safety of the community. Policehave a responsibility for safeguarding thedomestic well-being of the public, and thisobligation even extends in qualified ways toprotecting those who violate the law, who areantagonistic or violent toward the police, orwho are intent on hurting themselves. Indealing with such individuals, police mayuse force in reasonable and prudent ways toprotect themselves and others. However, theamount of force used should be proportionalto the threat and limited to the least amountrequired to accomplish legitimate policeaction.

Third, the concept of participation empha-sizes that police and community are closelyinterrelated. Police are drawn from thecommunity, and as police they continue to

Kenneth Adams, Ph.D.,is Associate Professorand Chair of the Crimi-nal Justice Faculty,School of Public andEnvironmental Affairs,Indiana University–Indianapolis.

operate as members of the community theyserve. The community, in turn, enters into asolemn and consequential relationship withthe police, ceding to them the power to de-prive persons of “life, liberty, and the pursuitof happiness” at a moment’s notice and de-pending on them for public safety. Withoutpolice, the safety of the community is jeopar-dized. Without community support, policeare dispossessed of their legitimacy androbbed of their effectiveness.

This three-element definition of policemakes it easy to understand why abuse offorce by police is of such great concern. First,there is the humanitarian concern that po-lice are capable of inflicting serious, even le-thal, harm on the public. Second, there is thephilosophical dilemma that in “protecting”the whole of society, some of its constituentparts, meaning its citizens, may be injured.Third, there is the political irony that police,who stand apart from society in terms of au-thority, law, and responsibility, also are partof society and act on its behalf. Thus, rogueactions by a few police, if condoned by thepublic, may become perceived as actions ofthe citizenry.

Recent developments in policing have el-evated concerns about police use of forcebeyond ordinarily high levels. In particular,community policing, which is becoming wide-spread as a result of financial incentives bythe Federal Government, and “aggressive”policing, which is becoming widely adoptedas a solution to serious crime problems, have

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come to the fore as perspectives of choiceby policing experts. Community policingemphasizes the role of the community as“coproducers” of law and order in conjunctionwith the police. Communities naturally varyin attributes, and they vary in how they aredefined for the purposes of community polic-ing. Consequently, some communities look toadd restrictions on police use of force, whileothers are satisfied with the status quo, andstill others seek to ease current restrictions.Regardless of the community’s orientationon this issue, community policing means in-creased levels of accountability and respon-siveness in key areas, such as use of force.Increased accountability hinges on new in-formation, and new information stimulatesdebate.

The other emerging perspective is “aggres-sive” policing, which often falls under therubric of broken windows theory, and, as astrategic matter, is concerned with intensify-ing enforcement against quality-of-life andorder maintenance offenses. The influence ofaggressive policing can be seen in the prolif-eration of “zero tolerance” enforcement strat-egies across the Nation. The concern is thatthe threat posed by petty offenders may beexaggerated to the point that use of forcebecomes more commonplace and abuses offorce more frequent.

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-ment Act of 1994 mirrored congressionalconcern about excessive force by authorizingthe Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Depart-ment of Justice (DOJ) to initiate civil actionsagainst police agencies when, among otherconduct, their use of force reaches a level con-stituting a pattern or practice depriving indi-viduals of their rights. DOJ exercised thatauthority when, for example, it determinedthat an urban police department engaged insuch conduct and negotiated a consent decreethat put in place a broad set of reforms, in-cluding an agreement by the department todocument its use of force and to implementan early warning system to detect possibleabuses.2

Use-of-force concerns also are reflected inthe attention the media give to possibleinstances of police abuse. An accumulationof alleged abuse-of-force incidents, widelyreported in the media, encourages over-generalization by giving the impression thatpolice brutality is rampant and that policedepartments across the Nation are out ofcontrol. For example, Human Rights Watchstates, “Allegations of police abuse are rife incities throughout the country and take manyforms.”3

Before considering the details of recentresearch efforts on police use of force, it isuseful to summarize the state of our knowl-edge.4 We know some details about policeuse of force with a high degree of certainty.These items represent “facts” that shouldframe our understanding of the issues. Otherdetails about police use of force we know insketchy ways, or the research is contradic-tory. These items should be subject to addi-tional research using more refined methodsof inquiry. Finally, there are some aspects ofpolice use of force about which we know verylittle or next to nothing. These items repre-sent critical directions for new inquiry.

As is often the case with important policyquestions, the information that we are mostconfident of is of limited value. In manycases, it does not tell us what we really needto know, because it does not focus squarelyon the important issues or is subject tocompeting interpretations. Conversely, theinformation that is most critical for policydecisions often is not available or is very dif-ficult to obtain. Such is the case with policeuse of force. The issues that most concernthe public and policymakers lack the kindsof reliable and solid information that ad-vance debate from the realm of ideologicalposturing to objective analysis. Nonetheless,it is important to take stock of our knowl-edge so that it is clear which issues can beset aside and which should be the target ofefforts at obtaining new knowledge.

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Chapter 1: What We Know About Police Use of Force

What, then, is the state of knowledge regard-ing police use of force? We begin with issuesabout which we have considerable informa-tion and a high degree of confidence in ourknowledge. Discussed next are issues whereknowledge is modest and considerably moreresearch is merited. Finally, we concludewith issues that are critical to debates overpolice use of force and about which littleknowledge exists.

What We Know With SubstantialConfidence About PoliceUse of ForcePolice use force infrequently.

Whether measured by use-of-force reports,citizen complaints, victim surveys, or obser-vational methods, the data consistentlyindicate that only a small percentage ofpolice-public interactions involve the useof force. As Bayley and Garofalo observed,police-citizen encounters that involve use offorce and injury are “quite rare.”5

Because there is no standard methodologyfor measuring use of force, estimates canvary considerably on strictly computationalgrounds. Different definitions of force anddifferent definitions of police-public interac-tions will yield different rates6 (see sidebar“Working definitions”). In particular, broaddefinitions of use of force, such as those thatinclude grabbing or handcuffing a suspect,will produce higher rates than more conser-vative definitions. The Bureau of JusticeStatistics’ (BJS) 1996 pretest of its Police-Public Contact Survey resulted in prelimi-nary estimates that nearly 45 million peoplehad face-to-face contact with police over a12-month period and that approximately1 percent, or about 500,000 of these persons,were subjected to use of force or threat offorce7 (see chapter 2). When handcuffing isincluded in the BJS definition of force, thenumber of persons increases to 1.2 million.

Expanding and contracting definitions of“police-public” interactions also work to af-fect use-of-force rates but in an opposite wayfrom definitions of force. Broad definitions of

police-public “interactions,” such as calls forservice, which capture variegated requestsfor assistance, lead to low rates of use offorce. Conversely, narrow definitions ofpolice-public interactions, such as arrests,which concentrate squarely on suspects, leadto higher rates of use of force.

The International Association of Chiefs ofPolice (IACP) is in the process of compilingstatistics on use-of-force data being submit-ted by cooperating agencies (see chapter 3).These data indicate that force is used inless than one-half of 1 percent of dispatchedcalls for service. From this point of view, onemight well consider police use of force a rareevent. This figure is roughly consistent withthe preliminary estimate reported by BJS,although the IACP figure is subject to thereporting biases that may exist in policeagency data. Furthermore, IACP data arenot yet representative of the national picturebecause of selection bias; the estimate isbased on a small percentage of police depart-ments that voluntarily report information onuse of force.

Garner and Maxwell found that physicalforce (excluding handcuffing) is used infewer than one of five adult custody arrests(see chapter 4). While this figure hardlyqualifies as a rare event, it can be consideredlow, especially in light of the broad definitionof force that was used.

In characterizing police use of force as infre-quent or rare, the intention is neither tominimize the problem nor to suggest thatthe issue can be dismissed as unworthy ofserious attention. Society’s ends are bestachieved peaceably, and we should strive tominimize the use of force by police as muchas possible. However, it is important to putpolice use of force in context in order to un-derstand the potential magnitude of use-of-force problems. Although estimates may notcompletely reassure everyone that police aredoing everything they can to minimize theuse of force, the data do not support thenotion that we have a national epidemic ofpolice violence.

“Thus, the Commissionconcludes that factorssubstantially contributingto misperceptions aboutuse of physical anddeadly force by lawenforcement officersinclude...[f]ailure to ap-preciate the relative infre-quent use of physical anddeadly force by law en-forcement personnel....”—New York State Com-mission on Criminal Jus-tice and the Use of Force,Report to the Governor,Vol. 1, New York: NewYork State Commissionon Criminal Justiceand the Use of Force,May 1987: 6.

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Working definitionsPolice use of force is characterized in a va-riety of ways. Sometimes, these character-izations are functionally interchangeableso that one can be substituted for anotherwithout doing injustice to the factual inter-pretation of a statement. At other times,however, differences in terminology can bevery consequential to a statement’s mean-ing. For example, “deadly force” refers tosituations in which force is likely to havelethal consequences for the victim. Thistype of force is clearly defined and shouldnot be confused with other types of forcethat police use.

In contrast, “police brutality” is a phraseused to describe instances of seriousphysical or psychological harm to civilians,with an emphasis on cruelty or savage-ness. The term does not have a standard-ized meaning; some commentators preferto use a less emotionally charged term.

In this report, the term “excessive force” isused to describe situations in which moreforce is used than is allowable when judgedin terms of administrative or professionalguidelines or legal standards. Criteria forjudging excessive force are fairly well es-tablished. The term may also include withinits meaning the concept of illegal force.

Another purpose for emphasizing the infre-quent nature of police use of force is to high-light the methodological challenges of tryingto count or study infrequent events. In thisregard, methodological approaches canvary considerably in terms of cost efficiency,reliability, and precision of information ob-tained. In BJS’s 1996 pilot household surveyof 6,421 persons, 14 respondents, or roughly1 in 450, said that they were subjected touse of force or threat of force by police over ayear’s time. The household survey approachhas the benefit of providing national-levelestimates based on data that are free ofpolice agency reporting biases. However, asnoted by BJS, the preliminary estimates

derived from such a small number of respon-dents are subject to a wide margin of error.This issue is particularly important if oneis interested in tracking changes over time,because a very small change in reporting canhave a very large impact on estimates. In thesurvey’s continuing development, the nextpilot test will use a sample about 10 timesthe size of the 1996 pilot test as well asinvolve a redesigned questionnaire.

Police use of force typically occurs at thelower end of the force spectrum, involv-ing grabbing, pushing, or shoving.

Relatively minor types of force dominatestatistics on police use of force. Garner and

Reference also is made to “excessive useof force,” a similar, but distinctly different,term. Excessive use of force refers to highrates of force, which suggest that police areusing force too freely when viewed in theaggregate. The term deals with relativecomparisons among police agencies,and there are no established criteria forjudgment.

“Illegal” use of force refers to situations inwhich use of force by police violated a lawor statute, generally as determined by ajudge or magistrate. The criteria for judg-ing illegal use of force are fairly wellestablished.

“Improper,” “abusive,” “illegitimate,” and“unnecessary” use of force are terms thatdescribe situations in which an officer’sauthority to use force has been mishandledin some general way, the suggestion beingthat administrative procedure, societal ex-pectations, ordinary concepts of lawfulness,and the principle of last resort have beenviolated, respectively. Criteria for judgingthese violations are not well established.

To varying degrees, all of the above termscan be described as transgressions ofpolice authority to use force.

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Maxwell (see chapter 4) observed that policeuse weaponless tactics in roughly 80 percentof use-of-force incidents and that half thetime the tactic involved grabbing the sus-pect. Alpert and Dunham (see chapter 5)found that in Miami 64 percent of use-of-force incidents involved grabbing or holdingthe suspect. In the BJS pilot national survey,it was estimated, preliminarily, that about500,000 people were “hit, held, pushed,choked, threatened with a flashlight, re-strained by a police dog, threatened with oractually sprayed with chemical or pepperspray, threatened with a gun, or experiencedsome other form of force.”8 Three-fifths ofthese situations, however, involved onlyholding. Finally, Pate and Fridell’s survey oflaw enforcement agencies regarding use offorce and civilian complaints also confirmsthat minor types of force occur more fre-quently than serious types.9

As a corollary finding, when injuries occur asa result of use of force, they are likely to berelatively minor. Alpert and Dunham (seechapter 5) observed that the most commoninjury to a suspect was a bruise or abrasion(48 percent), followed by laceration (24 per-cent). The kinds of police actions that mostcaptivate the public’s concerns, such as fatalshootings, severe beatings with fists or ba-tons that lead to hospitalization, and chokeholds that cause unconsciousness or evendeath, are not typical of situations in whichpolice use force. These findings reassure usthat most police exercise restraint in the useof force, even if one has concerns over thenumber of times that police resort to seriousviolence.

From a police administrator’s point of view,these findings are predictable. Officers aretrained to use force progressively along acontinuum, and policy requires that officersuse the least amount of force necessary toaccomplish their goals.

Another affiliated finding is that policerarely use weapons. According to Garner andMaxwell (see chapter 4), 2.1 percent of adultcustody arrests involved use of weapons bypolice. Chemical agents were the weapons

most frequently used (1.2 percent of arrests),while firearms were the weapons least oftenused (0.2 percent of arrests). Most policedepartments collect statistics on all firearmdischarges by officers. These data consis-tently show that the majority of dischargesare accidental or are directed at animals.Only on infrequent occasions do police usetheir firearms against the public. One impli-cation of these findings is that increasedtraining in how to use standard police weap-ons will be of little value in dealing with day-to-day situations that involve use of force.Training, if it is to be effective in reducingthe use of force, needs to focus on how togain compliance without resorting to physi-cal coercion.

Use of force typically occurs when policeare trying to make an arrest and thesuspect is resisting.

Research indicates that police are mostlikely to use force when pursuing a suspectand attempting to exercise their arrest pow-ers. Furthermore, resistance by the publicincreases the likelihood that police willuse force. These findings appear intuitivelysound given the mandate that police haveregarding use of force. Police may use forcewhen it is necessary to enforce the law or toprotect themselves or others from harm. Thefindings also seem logical in view of policetraining curriculums and departmentalregulations. Alpert and Dunham (see chap-ter 5) find that police almost always followthe prescribed sequence of control proce-dures they are taught, except when suspectresistance is high, in which case they tend toskip the intermediate procedure.

The conclusion that police are most likely touse force when dealing with criminal sus-pects, especially those who are resistingarrest, is based on four types of data: arreststatistics, surveys of police officers, observa-tions of police behavior, and reports by thepublic about their encounters with police.

Arrest statistics show that resisting-arrestcharges often are involved in situations inwhich officers use force. The interpretation

“The first tactic used inan incident is nearly al-ways the least severe useof force on the continuum,and the second…is nearlyalways the second-mostlenient.” —Alpert andDunham, page 48 of thisreport.

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of this finding is ambiguous, however, be-cause officers may bring such charges in anattempt to justify their actions against asuspect. Some commentators even would ar-gue that resisting-arrest charges are a goodindication that police officers acted inappro-priately or illegally. Because we are relyingon official reports by officers who are in-volved in use-of-force incidents, and becausethey have self-interest in presenting thesituation in the most favorable light possible,we cannot rely on arrest records alone indetermining what happened.

Fortunately, other research is available tohelp clarify the situation. The pilot nationalhousehold survey by BJS included a series ofquestions about the respondent’s behaviorduring contact with police.10 The preliminaryanalysis revealed that of the 14 respondentsin the sample who reported that police usedor threatened force against them, 10 sug-gested that they might have provoked theofficer to use force. The provocative behav-iors reported by suspects include threaten-ing the officer, assaulting the officer, arguingwith the officer, interfering with the arrest ofsomeone else, blocking or interfering with anofficer’s movement, trying to escape, resist-ing being handcuffed, and resisting beingplaced in a police vehicle.

Research by Alpert and Dunham (see chap-ter 5) confirms that criminal suspects arenot always cooperative when it comes toarrest. In almost all (97 percent) cases inwhich police officers used force in a Floridajurisdiction, the suspect offered some degreeof resistance. In 36 percent of use-of-forceincidents, the suspect actively resisted ar-rest, and in one-quarter of the incidents thesuspect assaulted the officer. The research-ers observed that the most common type ofsuspect force was hitting or striking a policeofficer (44 percent).

Garner and colleagues, after using statisticalcontrols for more than 50 characteristics ofthe arrest situation, the suspect, and the po-lice officer, found that forceful action by sus-pects was the strongest and most consistentpredictor of use of force by police.11 Further-more, they found that while 22 percent of

arrests involved use of force by police, 14percent of arrests involved use of force bysuspects. Police officers in Phoenix com-pleted a use-of-force survey after each arrestto generate these data.

Finally, Bayley and Garofalo tallied 36 in-stances of force used by police or suspectsout of 467 police-public encounters observedfirsthand by researchers.12 They found thatin 31 incidents police used force against sus-pects and in 11 incidents suspects used forceagainst police.

One implication of the research is that thedecision to use some level of force probablyhas legal justification in most cases. Force islikely to be used when suspects resist arrestand attempt to flee. Also, in a significantnumber of instances, suspects use forceagainst the police. These findings leave openthe issue of excessive force, since issues ofproportionality are not clearly addressed.However, the findings do suggest that manydebates over excessive force will fall intogray areas where it is difficult to decidewhether an officer acted properly, becausethere is credible evidence that the use offorce was necessary.

What We Know With ModestConfidence About Police Useof ForceUse of force appears to be unrelated toan officer’s personal characteristics,such as age, gender, and ethnicity.

A small number of studies suggest that useof force by police is not associated with per-sonal characteristics, such as age, gender,and ethnicity. Bayley and Garofalo concludedthat use of force is not related to age, al-though it may be related to experience.13

Worden, in an analysis of observational dataon 24 police departments in 3 metropolitanareas, concluded that the personal character-istics of police officers do not have a substan-tively significant effect on use of force.14

Likewise, Garner and colleagues reportedthat the race of suspect and officer is notpredictive of use of force.15 However, they

Regarding suspect forceas a consistent predictorof police use of force: “Thisremained true when con-trolling for the possibilitythat some suspect use offorce could be areaction to police use offorce.” —Garner, et al. (seenote 11).

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found that incidents involving male policeofficers and male suspects are more likely toinvolve force. Alpert and Dunham (see chap-ter 5) found that officer characteristics are oflittle utility in distinguishing between forceand nonforce incidents.

Hence, gender and ethnicity appear unre-lated to use of force. Given the limited re-search in this area, these conclusions shouldbe accepted with caution and additional veri-fication of these findings is needed.

It is widely accepted in criminology thatviolence, along with a wide variety of otherrisk-taking and norm-violating behaviors, isa young man’s game. Thus, we should expectthat young, male police officers should useforce more than their female colleagues orolder officers. The fact that this is not clearlythe case seems surprising.

A lack of relationship between age and gen-der, on the one hand, and use of force, on theother, may be a function of police hiring anddeployment practices. Retirement plans keepthe age of police officers lower than that ofmost other occupations, and seniority, whichis derivative of work experience, often bringsmore choice in work assignments, includingduties that limit one’s contact with criminalsuspects on the street. Both these tendenciesserve to constrain variation in the age ofpolice officers who are exposed to potentiallyviolent situations. This may attenuate therelationship between age and use of force.However, it is equally plausible that youngmale officers are assigned to high-crimeareas where frequent use of force is neces-sary to gain compliance. Finally, it is possiblethat exposure to the police culture works toencourage the use of force, thus counterbal-ancing the decline in aggressivity that comeswith age as demonstrated in criminologicalstudies. More research is needed to disen-tangle these relationships.

The finding that an officer’s race is unrelatedto the propensity to use force runs counter tothe argument that racial animosity lies atthe heart of police abuse. Indeed, Alpert andDunham’s research (see chapter 5) indicatesthat officers are more likely to use force

against suspects of their own race. The lack ofrelationship between race and use of force, aswell as between gender and use of force, isprobably disheartening to those who arguethat integration of police agencies along ra-cial and gender lines will do much to reducethe incidence of police violence. Again, moreresearch is needed to understand the situa-tion of minority and female police officerswith regard to their use of force.

Use of force is more likely to occur whenpolice are dealing with persons underthe influence of alcohol or drugs or withmentally ill individuals. More researchis needed.

Police come across a wide variety of situa-tions in their work. They encounter problemsthat range from relatively minor to seriousto potentially deadly. They also interact withpeople exhibiting various mental states, in-cluding persons who are hysterical, highlyagitated, angry, disoriented, upset, worried,irritated, or calm.

Two situations that often give police officerscause for concern are when suspects appearto be under the influence of alcohol or drugsand when civilians appear to suffer fromserious mental or emotional impairments.The concern stems from the fact that in suchsituations a person’s rational faculties ap-pear impaired. In dealing with problem situ-ations, officers most often talk their way,rather than force their way, into solutions.For this reason, when a civilian is in a highlyirrational state of mind, the chances of thepolice officer having to use force presumablyincrease and the possibility of injury to bothofficer and civilian increases as well.

Research carried out for the President’sCommission on Law Enforcement and Ad-ministration of Justice observed that alcoholuse by either a suspect or an officer in-creased the chances that force will be used.16

Garner and colleagues found that alcoholimpairment by suspects was a consistentpredictor of police use of force, while drugimpairment predicted increased use of forcefor some but not all measures of use offorce.17 In contrast, Alpert and Dunham (see

“Suspects reported asimpaired were more thantwice as likely than sobersuspects to use a gun toresist the police.” —Alpertand Dunham, page 51 ofthis report.

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chapter 5) observed that alcohol or drug im-pairment of suspects was unrelated to policeuse of force or subsequent injury. That find-ing is interesting because, although im-paired civilians did not demonstrate anincreased propensity to resist an officer’sactions, when they did resist they were moreinclined to do so by actively resisting or as-saulting the officer.

Part of the disparity in findings between thePresident’s Commission’s research and morerecent studies may be attributed to the factthat police officers today are better trainedin how to deal with impaired civilians. Mostpolice officers now receive training in a vari-ety of violence reduction techniques, and thisdevelopment is partly attributable to con-cerns over the President’s Commission’sfindings and over the frequency with whichpolice now are called to respond to large-scale violence, such as riots.

Questions about how police deal with civil-ians who appear to have impaired mentalstates are important from administrativeand practical points of view. Police officersare expected to exercise restraint in dealingwith impaired civilians, while at the sametime they need to be cautious about protect-ing their safety as well as the safety of othercivilians. This puts them in a precarioussituation, one in which mistakes of judgmentor tactics can have grave consequences.

From a practical standpoint, police regularlyencounter civilians with impaired mentalstates, which makes the problem more thanacademic. Alpert and Dunham (see chapter5) found that in 42 percent of use-of-forcesituations, suspects appeared to be underthe influence of alcohol or drugs. Overall, theresearch on whether police use force morefrequently in relation to civilians with im-paired mental states is inconsistent. Furtherinvestigation, with an emphasis on implica-tions for training, could reduce the risk offorce and injury for both police officers andcivilians.

A small proportion of officers are dis-proportionately involved in use-of-forceincidents. More research is needed.

We often are told that a small number ofpeople are responsible for most of the pro-ductive or counterproductive work in an or-ganization. For example, we hear about the80/20 rule in organizational management.That is, 20 percent of the workers accountfor 80 percent of the work. Policing has itscounterpart explanation for deviant or ille-gal behavior. It is called the rotten apple orrogue officer theory, and it is often used toexplain police corruption. Recently, a varia-tion of this theory has become the principalexplanation for use-of-force problems in po-lice departments. In this context, we speak of“violence prone” police officers and we pointto these individuals as the reason why adepartment has problems with the use offorce.18

People with extraordinary work perfor-mance, either good or bad, are noticeablewhen compared with their colleagues, andtheir salience leads us to think that theirwork is highly consequential to the good for-tunes or misfortunes of an organization. Theutility of this perspective for police manag-ers attempting to deal with illegitimate useof force lies in the presumed concentration ofproblem behaviors in the work force. If onlya handful of police officers accounts for mostof the abuses, then effective solutions tar-geted at those individuals should deal withthe problem. The nature of the solution, be itemployee selection, training, oversight, ordiscipline, is less important than its degreeof effectiveness and its ability to be directedat the problem group of employees.

The Christopher Commission, which investi-gated the Los Angeles Police Departmentsubsequent to the Rodney King incident,highlighted the “violence prone” officer theory.19

The Commission, using the department’sdatabase, identified 44 officers with 6 or morecivilian allegations of excessive force or im-proper tactics in the period 1986 through1990. For the 44, the per-officer average forforce-related complaints was 7.6 comparedwith 0.6 for all officers identified as havingbeen involved in a use-of-force incident for theperiod January 1987 through March 1991. The44 officers were involved in an average of 13

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use-of-force incidents compared with 4.2 forall officers reported to be using force.

Put another way, less than one-half of1 percent of the department’s sworn officersaccounted for more than 15 percent of alle-gations of excessive force or improper tac-tics. The degree of disproportion (30:1) isstriking and suggests that focusing effortson a handful of officers can eliminateroughly 1 out of 7 excessive force incidents.This finding has led many police depart-ments to implement early warning systemsdesigned to identify high-risk officers beforethey become major problems. Most of thesesystems use administrative records, such asdisciplinary records and citizen complaints,to monitor officer performance for possibleproblems.

The concept of an early warning system forrisk management of problem police officers isnot new. In the early 1980s, a report on policepractices by the United States Commissionon Civil Rights found that “‘(e)arly warning’information systems may assist the depart-ment in identifying violence-prone officers.”20

Consequently, it was recommended that “(a)system should be devised in each departmentto assist officials in early identification ofviolence-prone officers.”21

Until recently, these systems received limitedacceptance, owing in part to concerns overpossible abuses. The abuses include use ofinaccurate information, improper labelingof officers, misuse of confidential recordsregarding discipline and other personnelmatters, and social ostracism by peers andcommunity for officers identified as problem-atic. There also were concerns about limitedresources and about increased legal liabilityfor the organization and individual officers.

As Toch observes, the violence-prone officerparadigm often is based on a variety ofloosely articulated theories of violent behav-ior.22 The theories include concepts such asracial prejudice, poor self-control, and egoinvolvement. Furthermore, these theoriesoften overlook the possibility that greater-than-average use of force may be a product ofsituational or organizational characteristics.

For example, an officer’s work assignmentmay involve a high-crime area that containsa high proportion of rebellious offenders.Also, divisive, dehumanizing views of theworld, such as “us-them” and “good guy-badguy,” that facilitate violent behavior may besupported by the organizational culture.Further, administrative views of work rolesand products, communicated formally orinformally, that emphasize crime controlthrough aggressive police behavior mayencourage confrontational tactics that in-crease the chances of violent behavior byeither civilian or police officer. Unless thereasons for violence propensity are accu-rately identified, the effectiveness of inter-ventions targeted at violent police officers isa hit-or-miss proposition.

Of the 44 officers identified by the Christo-pher Commission in 1991, 14 subsequentlyleft the department as of October 1997. Ofthe 30 remaining officers, two had a use-of-force complaint that was sustained afterreview between 1991 and 1997.23 This lownumber may be due to a variety of reasons,such as difficulties in sustaining citizencomplaints, reassignment of work duties,negative publicity leading to a change inbehavior, or greater circumspection whenengaging in misconduct. However, the find-ing also may reflect regression to the mean.This is a statistical phenomenon postulat-ing that extreme scores gravitate towardthe mean or average score, thereby becom-ing less extreme over time.

For example, groups of police officers whoreceive many citizen complaints, or who aredisproportionately involved in the use offorce, or who frequently are given poorperformance ratings, will tend to become“better” over time, in the sense of statisti-cally looking more like the “average”officers, even if nothing is done about theseproblems. Statistical regression representsa serious threat to the validity of earlywarning systems based on the assumptionthat extreme patterns of behavior persistover extended periods of time.

“...a significant number ofofficers...repetitively mis-use force and persistentlyignore the written policiesand guidelines of the De-partment regarding force.By their misconduct, thisgroup of officers tarnishesthe reputations of the vastmajority of LAPD officerswho do their increasinglydifficult job of policingthe City with courage,skill, and judgment.” —Independent Commissionon the Los Angeles PoliceDepartment, Report of theIndependent Commissionon the Los Angeles PoliceDepartment, Los Angeles,CA: Independent Com-mission on the Los Ange-les Police Department,1991: 31.

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What We Do Not Know AboutPolice Use of ForceThe incidence of wrongful use of forceby police is unknown. Research is criti-cally needed to determine reliably,validly, and precisely how often trans-gressions of use-of-force powers occur.

We do not know how often police use force inways that can be adjudged as wrongful. Forexample, we do not know the incidence ofexcessive force, even though this is a veryserious violation of public trust. We couldpull together data on excessive force usingpolice disciplinary records and court docu-ments, for example, but the picture would besketchy, piecemeal, and potentially deceiving.When it comes to less grave or less precisetransgressions, such as “improper,” “abusive,”“illegitimate,” and “unnecessary” use offorce, the state of knowledge is even moreprecarious.

In discussing this issue, we will concen-trate on excessive force, because thesetransgressions are of utmost concern to thepublic and because well-established profes-sional and legal criteria are available tohelp us evaluate police behavior. Notwith-standing a generally agreed-upon terminol-ogy, we should recognize that developing acount of excessive force that is beyond alldispute is an unworkable task. This is sobecause difficult judgments are involved indeciding whether use of force fits the crite-ria for these categories in a given situation,and reasonable people will disagree in suchjudgments. We clearly need more accurate,reliable, and valid measures of excessiveforce if we are to advance our understand-ing of these problems.

Academics and practitioners both tend topresuppose that the incidence of excessiveforce by police is very low. They argue that,despite their shortcomings, agency statisticsprovide a useful picture of the use-of-forceproblem. These statistics show that mostofficers do not engage in force on a regularbasis, that few people are injured by policeuse of force, that only a small number ofpeople complain about police misconduct

involving use of force, and that only a hand-ful of these complaints are sustained.

The argument has appeal. We believe thatthe vast majority of police officers are profes-sionals who respect the law and the public. Ifuse of force is uncommon, civilian complaintsare infrequent, and civilian injuries are few,then excessive force by police must be rare.That conclusion may indeed be correct, butto the extent that it hinges on official policestatistics, it is open to serious challenge.

Current indicators of excessive force are allcritically flawed. The most widely availableindicators are civilian complaints of exces-sive force and civil lawsuits alleging illegaluse of force. Civilian complaints of excessiveforce are infrequent, and the number of sub-stantiated complaints is very low. These fig-ures are consistent with the argument thatexcessive force is sporadic. However, com-plaint mechanisms are subject to selectionand reporting biases, and the operation ofcomplaint systems, which typically is man-aged by police, wields considerable influenceon whether people will come forward tocomplain.

Civil lawsuits against police are exceedinglyrare relative to the number of times thatpolice use force. Because the legal process ishighly selective in terms of which claims getlitigated, lawsuits are a very unreliable mea-sure of illegal use of force. With both civiliancomplaints and lawsuits, small changes inadministrative practices can have a largeimpact on the magnitude of the problemmeasured in these ways.

The difficulties in measuring excessive andillegal force with complaint and lawsuitrecords have led academics and practitionersto redirect their attention to all use-of-forceincidents. The focus then becomes one ofminimizing all instances of police use offorce, without undue concern as to whetherforce was excessive. From this perspective,other records, such as use-of-force reports,arrest records, injury reports, and medicalrecords, become relevant to measuring theincidence of the problem.

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From a theoretical perspective, understand-ing all use-of-force incidents helps us to putwrongful use of force in perspective. How-ever, because political, legal, and ethicalissues are very serious when we are dealingwith excessive force, pressures to know theincidence and prevalence of these eventswith precision will always be present.

As a corollary of our current inability tomeasure excessive force, we cannot discernwith precision changes in the incidence ofthese events over time and across places.This means that we can neither determinewhether excessive force problems aregetting better or worse nor determine thecircumstances under which those problemsare more or less severe.

The impact of differences in police orga-nizations, including administrativepolicies, hiring, training, discipline,and use of technology, on excessive andillegal force is unknown. Research iscritically needed in this area.

A major gap in our knowledge about exces-sive force by police concerns characteristicsof police agencies that facilitate or impedethis conduct. Although many of the condi-tions that arguably lead to excessive or ille-gal force by police seem obvious, or appear tobe a matter of common sense, we still greatlyneed systematic research in this area. Weneed to know, for example, which organiza-tional characteristics are most consequen-tial, which characteristics take on addedsignificance in various environments, andwhich characteristics are redundant orderivative of other characteristics.

Many formal aspects of the organization—such as hiring criteria, recruit training, in-service programs, supervision of field officers,disciplinary mechanisms, operations of inter-nal affairs, specialized units dealing with eth-ics and integrity, labor unions, and civilianoversight mechanisms—plausibly are relatedto levels of officer misconduct. It makes sensethat poorly educated, badly trained, looselysupervised, and inadequately disciplined of-ficers are likely to be problematic, and thatwhen such officers are in the majority, the

organization is on the road toward disaster.Yet, we lack research that systematicallyaddresses these questions.

Less formal aspects of police organizations—officer morale, administrative leadership,peer culture and influence, police-communityrelations, relations with other governmentagencies, and neighborhood environments—also plausibly have a part in levels of officermisconduct. Alienated officers who do nothave a clear vision of their role and responsi-bilities and who are working in disorganizedagencies and interacting with the publicunder stressful circumstances probably aremore likely to abuse their authority, includ-ing their authority to use force. Researchthat systematically addresses these ques-tions is lacking.

Methodological investigation of relationsbetween organizational elements and use-of-force transgressions will help explain policemisconduct at a theoretical level. More im-portantly, research on these questions willallow us to deal effectively with police misbe-havior. Faced with serious misconduct prob-lems in a police agency, we need to focusscarce resources on those aspects of policeorganizations that are most clearly related toensuring proper conduct of officers with re-gard to use of force. Generalized efforts toreform police organizations that are expectedto reduce misconduct problems tend to beinefficiently focused and thus appear clumsy,inadequate, and misinformed.

Research must focus on establishing therelative cost-effectiveness of various strate-gies to reduce or eliminate police misconduct.Furthermore, only strategies that are solidlygrounded in theory, practice, and empiricalresearch will provide reliable solutions withpredictable costs and benefits.

Influences of situational characteristicson police use of force and the transac-tional nature of these events are largelyunknown. More research is necessary.

Research on police-citizen encounters revealsthat use of force by police is situational andtransactional. That is, police respond to

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circumstances as they first encounter themand as they unfold over time. For example,Bayley and Garofalo observed that the situa-tions most likely to involve police use of forceare interpersonal disturbance and violentpersonal crime.24 Beyond this, however, wedo not know much about the types of eventsthat enhance the likelihood that police willuse force.

Similarly, we have noted that when suspectsattempt to flee or physically resist arrestpolice are more likely to use force. We alsonoted that in many cases both police andsuspects use force against each other.However, these findings do not address thetransactional nature of police-public encoun-ters in that they do not describe the step-by-step unfolding of events and interactions.Knowing that police use force if suspectsphysically resist arrest, it matters if policeuse force without provocation and the sus-pect responds by resisting or vice versa.

A variety of situational elements plausiblyare related to police use of force. If police arecalled to a scene where there is fighting, theymay have to or believe they have to use forceto subdue the suspects. If they are called to adomestic dispute where emotions are run-ning high, they may have to or believe theyhave to use force to gain control of the situa-tion. If they are called to intercede with acivilian who is recklessly brandishing aweapon, they may have to or believe theyhave to use force to protect themselves andothers. Use of force in such circumstancesmay be justifiable, but to the extent that it ispredictable, we can prepare officers for theseencounters and devise alternative strategiesthat minimize or eliminate the use of force.

Some situational factors may increase thechances that force of questionable legitimacywill be used. For example, officers sometimesuse force on the slightest provocation follow-ing a high-speed car chase, when adrenalinelevels are high. They may use force more fre-quently when they are alone, because theyfeel more vulnerable or believe that they canget away with it. They may use force morefrequently as a way of emphasizing theirauthority when suspects are disrespectful

or when there is a hostile audience to theencounter. At this point, however, knowledgeabout the types of police-citizen encountersin which police are likely to use force isrudimentary.

Police-public encounters are transactional inthe sense that all the actors in a situationcontribute in some way to its developmentand outcome. Understanding the transac-tional nature of police use of force is impor-tant because it emphasizes the role of policeactions in increasing the chances that forcewill be used.

From this perspective, it is possible tominimize the use of force by modifying thebehavior and tactics of police officers. Byunderstanding the sequences of events thatlead police to use force, we can gain a greaterdegree of control over those situations andpossibly redirect the outcome. But we haveonly a basic understanding of the transac-tional nature of use-of-force situations, de-spite the fact that sequences of actions andinteractions are highly germane to determin-ing whether use of force was excessive orillegal.

Organization of the ReportThe next four chapters of this report focuson major research studies dealing with po-lice use of force. They represent significantprojects currently under way to understandpolice use of force.

Two of the projects are attempts at measur-ing the incidence of police use of force na-tionwide. BJS has developed a national-leveldata collection effort using a household sur-vey methodology to investigate police-publicinteractions, with a component on use-of-force issues (see chapter 2). IACP is collect-ing data on police use of force through avoluntary reporting system (see chapter 3).

Two other projects on police use of force in-volve citywide investigations across severallocations. Chapter 4 reports on research insix jurisdictions; the research is importantbecause it identifies factors associated withuse of force and because it addresses difficult

13


measurement issues. Focusing on three po-lice agencies, chapter 5 discusses researchthat centers on the use of force by both policeand suspects; the research is importantbecause it contributes significantly to under-standing the transactional nature of police-citizen encounters.

The final chapter outlines suggested direc-tions for future research. A selected bibliog-raphy concludes this report.

Notes1. Bierce, Ambrose, The Devil’s Dictionary,New York: Dover, 1958: 101.

2. “Justice Department Consent DecreePushes Police to Overhaul Operations,”Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 1, 1998, C–1.

3. Based on an investigation in 14 cities,Human Rights Watch described the brutalitysituation as follows: “(p)olice officers engagein unjustified shootings, severe beatings,fatal chokings, and unnecessarily roughphysical treatment in cities throughout theUnited States, while their police superiors,city officials and the Justice Department failto act decisively to restrain or penalize suchacts or even to record the full magnitudeof the problem.” Human Rights Watch,Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality andAccountability in the United States, NewYork: Human Rights Watch, 1998: 1, 27.

4. A previous summary of research on policeuse of force can be found in McEwen, Tom,National Data Collection on Police Use ofForce, Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofJustice, Bureau of Justice Statistics andNational Institute of Justice, April 1996,NCJ 160113.

5. Bayley, David H., and James Garofalo,“The Management of Violence by PolicePatrol Officers,” Criminology, 27(1)(February1989): 1–27; and Bayley, David H., andJames Garofalo, “Patrol Officer Effectivenessin Managing Conflict During Police-CitizenEncounters,” in Report to the Governor,Vol. III, Albany: New York State Commissionon Criminal Justice and the Use of Force,1987: B1–88.

6. Adams, Kenneth, “Measuring the Preva-lence of Police Abuse of Force,” in AndJustice For All: A National Agenda for Un-derstanding and Controlling Police Abuse ofForce, ed. William A. Geller and Hans Toch,Washington, DC: Police Executive ResearchForum, 1995: 61–97.

7. Greenfeld, Lawrence A., Patrick A.Langan, and Steven K. Smith, Police Use ofForce: Collection of National Data, Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureauof Justice Statistics and National Institute ofJustice, November 1997, NCJ 165040.

8. Ibid.

9. Pate, Anthony M., and Lorie A. Fridell,with Edwin E. Hamilton, Police Use of Force:Official Reports, Citizen Complaints, and Le-gal Consequences, Vols. I and II, Washington,DC: The Police Foundation, 1993.

10. Greenfeld, Lawrence A., Patrick A.Langan, and Steven K. Smith, Police Use ofForce: Collection of National Data.

11. Garner, Joel, John Buchanan, TomSchade, and John Hepburn, UnderstandingUse of Force By and Against the Police,Research in Brief, Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Justice, National Instituteof Justice, November 1996, NCJ 158614.

12. Bayley, David H., and James Garofalo,“The Management of Violence by PolicePatrol Officers”; and Bayley, David H., andJames Garofalo, “Patrol Officer Effectivenessin Managing Conflict During Police-CitizenEncounters.”

13. Ibid.

14. Worden, Robert, “The ‘Causes’ of PoliceBrutality,” in And Justice For All: A NationalAgenda for Understanding and ControllingPolice Abuse of Force, 31–60.

15. Garner, Joel, John Buchanan, TomSchade, and John Hepburn, UnderstandingUse of Force By and Against the Police.

16. Reiss, Albert J., Jr., Studies on Crime andLaw Enforcement in a Major MetropolitanArea, President’s Commission on Law

14


Enforcement and Administration of Justice,Field Survey No. 3, Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1967.

17. Garner, Joel, John Buchanan, TomSchade, and John Hepburn, UnderstandingUse of Force By and Against the Police.

18. Toch, Hans, “The ‘Violence-Prone’ PoliceOfficer,” in And Justice For All: A NationalAgenda for Understanding and ControllingPolice Abuse of Force, 99–112.

19. Independent Commission on the Los An-geles Police Department, Report of the Inde-pendent Commission on the Los AngelesPolice Department, Los Angeles, CA: Inde-pendent Commission on the Los AngelesPolice Department, 1991.

20. United States Commission on CivilRights, Who’s Guarding the Guardians? AReport on Police Practices, Washington, DC:United States Commission on Civil Rights,1981: 159.

21. Ibid.

22. Toch, Hans, “The ‘Violence-Prone’ PoliceOfficer,” 112.

23. Office of the Inspector General, Los An-geles Police Commission, “Status Update:Management of LAPD High-Risk Officers,”Los Angeles: Los Angeles Police Commission,1997.

24. Bayley, David, H., and James Garofalo,“Patrol Officer Effectiveness in ManagingConflict During Police-Citizen Encounters.”

15

2

Lawrence A. Greenfeld,Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D.,and Steven K. Smith,Ph.D., are statisticianswith the Bureau of JusticeStatistics, a component ofthe Office of Justice Pro-grams within the U.S.Department of Justice.

Revising and Fielding thePolice-Public ContactSurveyby Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Patrick A. Langan, andSteven K. Smith

supplements. The NCVS sample consists ofall household members age 12 or older resid-ing in more than 40,000 U.S. households;each household member is interviewed twiceduring a calendar year, resulting in about200,000 interviews annually.)

The PPCS pilot test involved interviews with6,421 persons during the 1996 trial period.The respondents were asked about their con-tacts with police during the 12 months priorto the interviews. Respondents interviewedin May 1996 were asked about contacts thatoccurred anytime during the period June1995 to May 1996; those interviewed in June1996 were asked about contacts betweenJuly 1995 and June 1996; and interviews inJuly 1996 covered the period from August1995 to July 1996. On average, the 12-monthreference period included 6 months in 1995and 6 in 1996.

Administration of PPCS went smoothly.Among persons who had no contact with po-lice, the interview took 1 minute, on average,to complete. Among those who had policecontact, the interview averaged 10 minutes.

Findings from the first PPCS were reportedin 1997 in the BJS–National Institute of Jus-tice publication Police Use of Force: Collec-tion of National Data.1 (See sidebar “Selectedfindings from the Police-Public Contact

T o learn more about police use of forcerequires an understanding of the rea-

sons for and the results of police-publicencounters. As a step toward developing thatunderstanding, the Bureau of Justice Statis-tics (BJS) fielded a pilot test in 1996 of thePolice-Public Contact Survey (PPCS). Its pri-mary purpose was to obtain information tohelp guide future development of a finalquestionnaire on the topic. This chapterbriefly reviews the 1996 survey, discussesimprovements incorporated into a secondpilot survey, and describes other plannedBJS efforts to learn more about police-publicencounters.

First Pilot Test of the SurveyQuestionnaireBJS supplemented the National Crime Vic-timization Survey (NCVS) with a pilot test ofPPCS during May, June, and July 1996. Theobjective was to collect answers from respon-dents to a series of questions about the na-ture and consequences of their face-to-faceinteractions with police.

(NCVS is based on interviews conductedwith a nationally representative sample ofU.S. households and has become a highlyuseful platform for testing new question-naires and periodically implementing special

16


Screen questions aredesigned to determinequickly at the beginningof an interview whethera respondent needs to beasked subsequent ques-tions. For example, if arespondent had no policecontact during the speci-fied period, subsequentquestions about the na-ture, content, and conse-quences of police-publicencounters would beomitted.

Survey.”) The 1996 PPCS was intended as apretest of the questionnaire; the survey andits findings were not meant to be viewed asa source of indepth or precise statistics onpolice use of force. Rather, survey findingsprovided empirical information to helpguide future development of an improvedquestionnaire.

Second Pilot Test of the SurveyQuestionnaireDuring the first half of 1999, BJS focused onimproving the content and administration ofthe PPCS questionnaire. Three areas of theinstrument were improved: items relating toscreen questions used to identify whether acontact occurred, the type of contact, andcircumstances surrounding the contact; thedetermination of whether force was used orthreatened, the type of force used or threat-ened, the circumstances surrounding its use,and provocative actions by the respondent;and the respondent’s perceptions of the

appropriateness or inappropriateness ofpolice conduct during the contact.

Contact screen questions

The pretest revealed a number of broadcategories of types of face-to-face contactsthat needed encoding on the questionnaire.A number of respondents reporting contactsindicated that their employment broughtthem into regular contact with police. Thiswas so for hospital workers, tow-truck driv-ers, and lawyers, among others. In addition,respondents indicated that they had contactswith police as the result of appearing incourt as jurors or witnesses.

A major area for further development of thescreening elements of PPCS relates to trafficstops. One of the major findings from theinitial PPCS field test was that many of theface-to-face contacts the public has with po-lice are in connection with traffic stops. Theymay represent an area of potentially argu-mentative interactions between police and

In 1996 the Bureau of Justice Statisticsconducted a pilot test of the Police-PublicContact Survey. Although not intended asa source of detailed or precise statistics onpolice use of force, the pilot survey did pro-vide preliminary estimates of the preva-lence of the public’s contact with police,including contacts during which policeused force. Among the survey’s findingsare the following:

• An estimated 44.6 million persons (one infive U.S. residents age 12 or older) hadface-to-face contacts with police officersduring the prior 12 months. Men, whites,and people in their twenties were themost likely to have those contacts.

• An estimated 33 percent of residents whohad contact with police had either askedfor assistance from officers or provided itto them. About 32 percent of those whohad contact with police had reported acrime, either as a victim or witness.

• For nearly half of those with contacts, theencounters were initiated by the public.For just under one-third of persons withcontacts, police initiated them.

• Age is an important factor in both thefrequency and type of police contactsexperienced. Young people were theleast likely to initiate contact with police(their contacts most often were policeinitiated), while persons age 60 or olderwere the most likely to initiate contactswith officers.

• About 1 percent of people reporting con-tacts with police indicated that officersused force or threatened force. In the ma-jority of those instances, respondents saidthat their own actions, such as threateningpolice or resisting arrest, may have pro-voked officers.

Selected findings from the Police-Public Contact Survey

17

Chapter 2: Revising and Fielding the Police-Public Contact Survey

the public and result in use-of-force inci-dents. This is likely to be true especially ifsuch stops are thought to be motivated byfactors not strictly related to law enforce-ment purposes. Recent studies in NewJersey and Maryland suggest that blackmotorists may be more likely than others tobe stopped by police.2

The PPCS questionnaire has been revisedto capture more detailed information abouttraffic stops, including more about the na-ture and frequency of traffic stops involvingpersons of different races. To gather moreinformation on the nature and conse-quences of traffic stops, BJS has added agroup of questions to the PPCS. Of particu-lar interest will be an effort to determinefrom respondents what they believe to bethe basis for stops, the reason given by theofficers for stops, and the content of theinteraction during stops, such as ticketsissued, warnings, verbal questioning,searches, and arrests. Information gatheredfrom the survey can be used to build onprior research regarding the treatment ofdifferent categories of the populace by thecriminal justice system.

Those traffic stops resulting in handcuffing,threats, or use of force will also be identified.For such incidents, new items have beenadded to the survey to ascertain potentiallyprovocative behaviors or drug or alcohol useby respondents.

Several other modifications to the question-naire were needed. For example, existingquestions about respondents’ traffic-relatedcontacts with police were modified to deter-mine whether such respondents had beenpassengers or drivers. In addition, screenquestions were added to determine explicitlywho initiated contact between respondentsand police officers. The 1996 questionnaireprovided information only on the type ofcontact; who initiated it had to be inferred(e.g., “Received a traffic or parking violation”implies the officer initiated the contact).

Determining whether force was used

The 1996 PPCS asked respondents to indi-cate whether force was threatened, used, ornot used during contacts. BJS replaced thisand substituted a list of police behaviors thatmight have occurred, including threateningor restraining respondents during encoun-ters. Handcuffing, considered a standard po-lice practice, is listed within the enumeratedgroup of police behaviors and will not betreated in the questionnaire separately fromother behaviors that might have occurredduring contacts.

Paralleling these queries about police behav-ior during contacts are questions about therespondents’ behavior during encounters tolearn about provocative actions that mayhave occurred. Such questions will apply toall respondents, not merely to those indicat-ing force had been used.

Experience with a pat-down or frisking wasasked only of those respondents who indi-cated that in contacts with the police, theybelieved that they were suspects in a crime.This was too limiting, and BJS has expandedthe use of this item to all respondents.

Similarly, questions relating to subsequentcriminal charges resulting from contactswere limited to respondents who believedthat the contacts occurred because policeconsidered them suspects in a crime. BJSwill ask such questions of all respondents.

Respondents’ characterizations of incidents

The 1996 PPCS asked respondents tocharacterize whether they believed policebehavior was proper or improper during use-of-force incidents. Such a question willbe asked of all respondents who have policecontact.

In addition, the 1996 PPCS did not ask thosewho experienced use of force whether theyperceived police behavior to have been exces-sive for the circumstances; BJS has addedsuch an item to the next version of the survey.

18


Survey Administration for SecondPilot TestBJS and the U.S. Bureau of the Censusbegan the 1999 pilot test using the revisedPPCS in July. The fieldwork will continuethrough December 1999. This will result ina national sample of respondents about 10times the size of the first pilot test. Prior tothe upcoming test, BJS redesigned the ques-tions as noted above, circulated them forcomment, and secured Office of Manage-ment and Budget clearance for the use ofthe supplement for the full NCVSnational sample.

In addition, BJS and the Bureau of theCensus conducted extensive testing of therevised instrument with volunteer respon-dents in the Census Bureau’s CognitiveResearch Laboratory.

Additional Efforts to Learn AboutPolice-Public EncountersDuring the next 3 to 5 years, BJS will beundertaking the regular periodic surveysconducted among nationally representative

samples of those confined in local jails andprisoners held by State and Federal authori-ties. BJS anticipates introducing new surveyitems that will gather information aboutrespondents’ interactions with police duringthe arrest preceding their incarceration.The new items will provide, for the first time,information on the content of those contactsbetween police and criminals, includingthe methods by which they were appre-hended, use of force during such events, andprovocative behaviors by known offenders.

Notes1. Greenfeld, Lawrence A., Patrick A.Langan, and Steven K. Smith, Police Use ofForce: Collection of National Data, Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureauof Justice Statistics and National Institute ofJustice, November 1997, NCJ 165040.

2. See Lamberth, John, “Driving WhileBlack: A Statistician Proves That PrejudiceStill Rules the Road,” Washington Post,August 16, 1998, C1.

19

Mark A. Henriquez isProject Coordinator forthe IACP National PoliceUse-of-Force DatabaseProject.

3IACP National DatabaseProject on Police Use ofForceby Mark A. Henriquez

Individual police agencies, law enforcementorganizations, and some States have long

considered collection of use-of-force data as ameans to better serve their communities andto better distinguish between misperceptionand reality of police use-of-force issues. Re-flecting this, Congress enacted legislation in1994 that, among other things, directed theU.S. Attorney General to collect data on policeuse of excessive force.

In 1995 the Bureau of Justice Statistics(BJS) and the National Institute of Justice(NIJ)—components of the Office of JusticePrograms (OJP) within the U.S. Departmentof Justice (DOJ)—proposed to cofund devel-opment of a national use-of-force databaseby the International Association of Chiefs ofPolice (IACP). One purpose of such a data-base would be quantification of the extentand types of force used by police.

Following approval of first-year funding, initialproject activities began in September 1996. Earlyin 1997, NIJ and BJS cofunded the project foranother year. Since early 1998, IACP has beenresponsible for all project funding.

The balance of this chapter discusses basicconcepts underlying IACP’s use-of-force data-base project, highlights selected preliminaryfindings derived from the database, and dis-cusses the future of the project. The chapter’saddendum provides details about key ele-ments involved in database development.

Basic Concepts Underlying the ProjectEssential to creating IACP’s police use-of-forcedatabase was the belief that data contribu-tions should be voluntary and anonymous.Also of basic importance was that the defini-tion of “police use of force” should reflect opera-tional realities of modern, street-level lawenforcement.

Voluntary and anonymous reports

Police use of force is an extremely sensitiveissue, in part because agencies and the pub-lic alike harbor preconceptions and becausedata and resulting reports could be used orinterpreted either accurately or inaccurately.

For example, the legislation directing the U.S.Attorney General to “acquire data about theuse of excessive force by law enforcement of-ficers” also makes deprivation of civil rightsunlawful as evidenced by “pattern or practice”and allows the Attorney General, throughcivil action, to “obtain appropriate equitableand declaratory relief to eliminate pattern orpractice.” Thus, if use-of-force data providedto IACP from the field—whether standingalone or accompanied by analysis—wereassociated with individual departments,litigation could result.

Under those circumstances, the law enforce-ment community would have faced thedilemma of being very reluctant to provide

20


use-of-force data, yet realizing that funda-mental elements of modern police service arepursuit of truth and subordination to thewill of the communities that agencies aresworn to serve. Therefore, IACP decided thatprovision of such data would be both volun-tary and anonymous to promote accuratereporting and overcome potential reluctanceof agencies to participate.

Reflecting operational realities

When examined from the perspective ofday-to-day law enforcement activities, manyprevious use-of-force definitions were consid-ered not sufficiently workable or functionalto be applied nationwide to all jurisdictionsand department types for the purposes ofthe IACP project. Thus, IACP designed theproject from the outset to reflect operationalrealities of modern, street-level law enforce-ment, including the very meaning of “policeuse of force,” defined as the amount of forcerequired by police to compel compliance byan unwilling subject.

The project team developed a unique soft-ware package to track the basic types offorce used by officers and suspects in typicalencounters. On the basis of data submitted

through the software, the team identified a“street continuum” of force, which consists ofthe types of force used by officers on a day-to-day basis to bring subjects under control.The IACP database consists of data on re-ported use of force stemming from policeresponses to calls for service, whether or notthose responses resulted in arrests.1 Catego-ries of force include the following:

● Physical force (use of fists, hands, feet, etc.).

● Chemical force (the discharge of Mace,pepper spray, and similar agents).

● Electronic force (the discharge of Tasers,stun guns, or other electronic weapons).

● Impact force (use of batons and the like).

● Lethal force (firearm discharge of anykind).

Additionally, IACP software enables depart-ments to track various subcategories of force,such as dog bites, edged weapons, vehicles,and nail guns. However, the project teamexcluded certain measures of force becausethey were considered to fly in the face of re-ality and practicality. (See sidebar “Measuresof force excluded from the database.”)

IACP’s project team decided to excludefrom the database certain measures offorce that the team considered were toobroad to allow agency reporting in an ac-curate and timely fashion or beyond whatpolice typically perceive or record as appli-cations of force:

• Presence of a police officer at thescene.

• Presence of a K–9 at the scene.

• Presence of chemical or electronicless-than-lethal devices at the scene.

• Verbal commands by an officer.

• Routine or voluntary handcuffing of pris-oners for transport or during field ques-tioning or investigation.

• Display or presentation of an officer’sweapon.

Although any of the above measures couldbe and are included in some academic stud-ies of police use of force, IACP excludedthem from its database to allow creation of aconcise, universally accepted, and practi-cally achievable information base on policeuse of force in the United States. Inclusion ofthe elements listed above would have overlycomplicated the project and substantiallyreduced local agency participation.

Measures of force excluded from the database

21

Chapter 3: IACP National Database Project on Police Use of Force

Selected Preliminary Use-of-ForceFindingsAlthough the database is in the early stagesof development, the level of interest andsupport from local police agencies is encour-aging. (See sidebar “Agencies contributing tothe use-of-force database.”) Nonetheless, thedata are not yet nationally representative.Conclusions about national use-of-forcetrends, therefore, should not be attemptedat this time.

But preliminary findings based on the datamay provide useful insights, however tenta-tive, into current police and subject use-of-force issues. The IACP calculation of theuse-of-force rate is based on dispatched callsfor service. For example, based on 1995 datareported by 110 agencies, the police use-of-force rate was 4.19 per 10,000 responded-tocalls for service, or 0.0419 percent. Jurisdic-tion size for 78 of those agencies was 35,000population or less; for 4 departments,500,000 population or more.

Data reported for 1995–97 indicate that of62,411 use-of-force incidents during the pe-riod, about 87 percent involved officers usingphysical force.2 Officers used chemical forcein 7 percent of the incidents, firearms inabout 5 percent.

Data received by IACP through September1998 from 26 agencies reporting for 1996

and 27 for 1997 on 2,310 police use-of-forceincidents indicate that the vast majority ofsuch incidents occurred in arrest-relatedsituations. For the 1996–97 period, thoseagencies also reported the following:

● Of 2,264 use-of-force confrontations forwhich the race of officers and subjects wasknown, 909 were intraracial (officer andsubject of the same race) and 1,335 wereinterracial.

● About 10 percent of 2,479 officers usingforce sustained injuries. Less than 1 per-cent of the injuries were major; none re-sulted in death. About 38 percent of thesubjects were injured as the result of po-lice use of force, including approximately1.5 percent with major injuries. (Dataspanning the 1995–97 period indicatethat of 75,082 use-of-force incidents,3,274, or about 4 percent, resulted inofficer injuries, all but 39 minor.)

● Of 3,972 reported incidents involving useof force, 20 resulted in complaints bysubjects.

Future of the DatabaseFrom the inception of the database projectin 1996, it has had—and is expected tocontinue to have—a three-tiered impact onpolice use-of-force policies and practices inthe United States. At the national level, the

IACP has obtained a substantial level ofuse-of-force data from participating agen-cies. Hundreds of others are establishingdeadlines for submitting data either to theirState chiefs’ organizations or to IACPdirectly:

• About 4,000 agencies have requestedthe requisite software.

• An estimated 1,000 agencies are usingthe software to capture use-of-force data.

• Some 150 agencies are expected to con-tribute data for the 1998–99 data year.

Although not nationally representative atthis early stage of project development, thereceived data provide indicators regardingpolice use of force against subjects andsubject use of force against officers. As ofthis writing, agencies representing popula-tions ranging from 1,000 to more than 1million have contributed data on thousandsof incidents. Reported use-of-force inci-dents applicable to 1996 and 1997 total24,383 and 24,033, respectively (based ondata submitted through September 1998).

Agencies contributing to the use-of-force database

For a more detailedaccount of use-of-forceproject findings, see Inter-national Association ofChiefs of Police, PoliceUse of Force in America:Research in ProgressReport on the IACP Na-tional Database Project,Alexandria, Virginia:International Associationof Chiefs of Police, April1998.

22


IACP annual report Police Use of Force inAmerica provides summary and incident in-formation to police leaders, the public, andthe media. At the State level, State associa-tions of chiefs of police increasingly use theproject to provide leadership to their con-stituent law enforcement agencies. Finally,local police agencies use IACP-provided soft-ware to capture use-of-force information per-taining to their own departments and use itfor such purposes as the following:

● To promote improved policies, training,and procedures governing departmentwideuse of force.

● To reduce potential department liabilityarising from frivolous or unfounded legalactions related to use of force.

● To contribute data to statewide use-of-force data repositories, where applicable,and to the IACP database.

The IACP database is a dynamic one. Thenumber of departments providing new or up-dated data increases almost on a daily basis.For example, from a modest beginning of

7 pilot States, database software is now inplace in more than 1,000 agencies nationwideand in the last quarter of 1998, Illinois andRhode Island joined the project, followed byMaryland and Missouri in early 1999. Newlyrecruited States may contribute data from asfar back as 1991. IACP believes that the ben-efits of its use-of-force database project willcontinue to increase as the number of contrib-uting departments approaches nationalrepresentation.

Notes1. Data submitted to IACP by any givenagency may also reflect use-of-force inci-dents resulting from responses to otherthan calls for service—for example, fromofficer-initiated contacts with the public.

2. The data for 1996 and 1997 reflect agencyuse-of-force reports received through Sep-tember 1998 and, therefore, are not yet com-plete. Although the IACP database projectstarted in 1996, some agencies supplied datafor 1995.

Addendum: Key Elements in Buildingthe IACP Use-of-Force DatabaseTo ensure the success of the database project,IACP created two advisory panels to supportinitial project activities. The first was an adhoc committee of police and justice leadersbrought together at IACP headquarters toreact to the project’s scope and give generalpolicy input and advice. This group consistedof DOJ representatives, State police, countysheriffs, local law enforcement officers andother criminal justice professionals. Consensuson key issues, such as definitions and dataelements, was achieved during the project’sstart-up phase.

A second and continuing advisory committeeconsists of representatives from each ofseven pilot State associations, discussed be-low, and a representative from the U.S. Bor-

der Patrol (Immigration and NaturalizationService). This group, from the outset, hasprovided advice on local concerns, State as-sociation perspectives, and logistical issues.This group also provides midyear and end-year input on project direction and selectedmilestones.

The SACOP role

The State Associations of Chiefs of Police(SACOP) Division of IACP laid the founda-tion for this program from its inception. Inparticular, the Virginia Association of Chiefsof Police had already instituted a statewideuse-of-force reporting program that servedas the model for IACP’s national effort. Thestrength and reach of SACOP organizationswithin most of the States provided a flexibleframework for developing and expanding theproject.

23

Chapter 3: IACP National Database Project on Police Use of Force

In collaboration with SACOP leadership,IACP initially identified seven pilot Stateassociations that would help coordinate thecontribution of information for the nationaldatabase effort: Arkansas, New Jersey, NewYork, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, andWest Virginia. DOJ also arranged early Fed-eral support by designating the U.S. BorderPatrol to contribute data.

Each pilot State association identified fivelocal police departments to contribute data tothe project. To accomplish the data collectionand transfer, IACP developed a new softwareapplication specifically for this purpose.

A three-tiered approach to data collection

Data flow was designed from the outset toemanate from local departments, throughthe respective SACOP offices, and then toIACP. The identities of all participatingdepartments are masked by use of a self-installing agency reporting code, which isautomatically appended to all local agencydata records. This code is the only means bywhich individual data records can be distin-guished from one contributing source to an-other. The SACOP organizations have thecapability to generate regional use-of-forcedata based on the anonymous recordsreported to them by departments in theirStates.

Larger departments, which maintain elec-tronic repositories of their own use-of-forcedata, have the option of reporting their data(in any data format) directly to IACP in caseswhere the appropriate SACOP office is notparticipating in the project. Even in theseinstances, the identity of the contributingagency is protected by an agency reportingcode in the same manner that the identity ofa department is protected when contributingdata through its State organization.

Software design and training

Based on the large number of data elementsrelevant to this study (see sidebar “Database

content”), it soon became clear that an auto-mated data collection system was required.The ideal system would need to:

● Be compatible across the widest possiblespectrum of computers used in depart-ments nationwide.

● Employ a graphical user interface thatwould facilitate self-instruction by theuser.

● Handle the relationship between inci-dents involving a single officer and mul-tiple subjects, multiple officers and asingle subject, and any other possiblecombination.

Staff decided on a system that could meetthese needs and was scalable in that it couldsupport the inevitable evolution of revisions,customizations, additions, and expansionsinherent in software projects of this type.

Because data flowed from local agencies toSACOP regional data repositories and fromthere to IACP, two versions of the softwarewere produced. The first, the local agency ver-sion, was intended to automate data captureat the local department level. This softwarewas equipped with a simplified data exportfunction by which the user could write thecaptured use-of-force data to a floppy disk bysimply clicking an on-screen button.

The second version of the software was in-tended for use by the SACOP data reposito-ries. The SACOP version of the softwareremains identical to the local agency versionin terms of the number and type of data ele-ments captured. However, the SACOP ver-sion is provided with an import capability bywhich data on disks originating from localagencies can easily be incorporated into theregional database. Data from each of the re-gional databases are periodically exported tofloppy disk and sent to IACP for inclusion inits database. Several software improvementshave been made.

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Guided by the broad framework of use-of-force issues and by IACP’s experience withother sensitive police policy issues, theproject team decided upon the followingelements for inclusion in the use-of-forcedatabase:

Department characteristics:

• Report year.

• Jurisdiction size.

• Department type.

• Calls for service.

• Ethnicity demographics.

• Number of use-of-force incidents by type.

• Number of force-related complaints.

• Complaint resolution.

• Types of less-than-lethal weaponsauthorized.

• Use-of-force training and policies in place.

• Administrative policies for use-of-forcecomplaint.

Incident characteristics:

• Incident time.

• Incident date.

• Incident year.

• Number of officers involved.

• Number of subjects involved.

• Number of third parties involved.

• Age of officer(s)/subject(s).

• Type of assignment.

• Duty status.

• Education of officer(s)/subject(s).

• Race/ethnicity of officer(s)/subject(s).

• Type of force used by officer(s)/subject(s).

• Officer/subject injury.

Complaint characteristics:

• Complaint time.

• Complaint date.

• Complaint year.

• Number of officers involved.

• Number of subjects involved.

• Number of third parties involved.

• Age of officer(s)/subject(s).

• Type of assignment, duty status.

• Education of officer(s)/subject(s).

• Race/ethnicity of officer(s)/subject(s).

• Type of force used by officer(s)/subject(s).

• Officer/subject injury.

• Previous complaints against officer.

• Complaint disposition.

Database content

Training for IACP database administratorswas provided in a formal class setting byIACP in August 1997. The 8-hour class pro-vided hands-on technical training in settingup, operating, and troubleshooting the use-of-force software and in the philosophy un-

derlying the project. At the conclusion of thetraining, students, all of whom were swornlaw enforcement personnel from participat-ing local police departments, were presentedwith certificates identifying them as IACPuse-of-force database administrators.

Documents

Use of Force By Police: An Overview of National and Local Data