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U.S. TREASURIES THROUGH A HISTORY OF CRISIS Banque Bemo sal Asset Management Unit Riad El Solh Square Esseily Building - 7th Floor P.O. Box: 11- 7048 Beirut - Lebanon Tel: +961 1 992705 www.bemobank.com Subsidiary/Sister Bank Bemo Securitization salBSEC 3rd Floor Bloc A Two Parc Av. Blg, Minet El Hosn Beirut - Lebanon Tel: +961 1 997998 Bemo Europe - Banque Privée Luxembourg 18 Bvd Royal, L-2449 Luxembourg Tel: +352 22 63 211 Paris 63 Avenue Marceau 75116 Paris - France Tel: +33 1 44 43 49 49 Acting Director - Treasury & Capital Markets : Mr. Joseph Mikhael Analyst: Ramy Saadeh CONTACT US MAY 2014 U.S. Treasuries through a History of Crisis OPEC oil price shock (1973) Second oil price shock (1980) Black Monday (1987) First Gulf Crisis (1990-1991) Mexican Crisis “Tequila Hangover” (1994) Asian financial crisis (1997) Russian financial crisis (1998) Dot-Com Bubble (2001) Subprime mortgage crisis (2008) European sovereign debt crisis (2010) Appendix (Global Charts)

US Treasuries Through a History of Crisis - Ramy Saadeh

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U.S. Treasuries through a History of Crisis:-OPEC oil price shock (1973)-Second oil price shock (1980)-Black Monday (1987)-First Gulf Crisis (1990-1991)-Mexican Crisis “Tequila Hangover” (1994)-Asian financial crisis (1997)-Russian financial crisis (1998)-Dot-Com Bubble (2001)-Sub-prime mortgage crisis (2008)-European sovereign debt crisis (2010)Appendix (Global Charts)

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Page 1: US Treasuries Through a History of Crisis - Ramy Saadeh

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U.S. TREASURIES

THROUGH A HISTORY

OF CRISIS

Banque Bemo sal

Asset Management Unit Riad El Solh Square Esseily Building - 7th Floor P.O. Box: 11-

7048 Beirut - Lebanon Tel: +961 1 992705 www.bemobank.com

Subsidiary/Sister Bank

Bemo Securitization sal—BSEC

3rd Floor Bloc A Two Parc Av. Blg, Minet El Hosn Beirut - Lebanon Tel: +961 1 997998

Bemo Europe - Banque Privée

Luxembourg 18 Bvd Royal, L-2449 Luxembourg Tel: +352 22 63 211

Paris 63 Avenue Marceau 75116 Paris - France Tel: +33 1 44 43 49 49

Acting Director - Treasury & Capital Markets : Mr. Joseph Mikhael

Analyst: Ramy Saadeh

CONTACT

US

MAY 2014

U.S. Treasuries through a

History of Crisis

OPEC oil price shock (1973) Second oil price shock (1980) Black Monday (1987) First Gulf Crisis (1990-1991) Mexican Crisis “Tequila Hangover” (1994) Asian financial crisis (1997) Russian financial crisis (1998) Dot-Com Bubble (2001) Subprime mortgage crisis (2008) European sovereign debt crisis (2010) Appendix (Global Charts)

Page 2: US Treasuries Through a History of Crisis - Ramy Saadeh

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U.S. Treasuries through History

After the new millennium, the economic impact of oil shocks became, to a certain extent, less destructive growth, thus reflect-ing a milder impact on the financial markets. However, previous responses had a decisive effect on overall inflationary develop-ments and consequently on monetary policy and treasury rates.

OPEC Oil price shock (1973) The economic measures adopted by the United States in 1971 triggered inadvertent implications on the western economies, known as the “Nixon Shock”. These measures, to a certain extent, bear the culpability of the “Oil Shock” which drove the industrialized nations into stagflation; a recession depicted as a “Malaise”. Subsequent to the unilat-eral exit of the United States from the Bretton Woods Ac-cord, thus abolishing the gold exchange standard and float-ing the US Dollar, developed countries tremendously ex-panded their currency reserves as they transitioned to free floating fiat currencies. This resulted in a depreciation of most currencies, including the US Dollar, thus reducing the value of real income, namely for OPEC countries (as oil is priced in US Dollar) which resented the state of affairs and had a penchant to substantially increase oil prices.

However, the situation was exacerbated after the “Yom Kip-pur War” and the ensuing “Operation Nickel Grass” which brought the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to proclaim an oil embargo on the 18th of October 1973. The latter drove oil prices to quad-ruple to 12 Dollars/Barrel. This surge in oil prices induced an inflationary environment coupled with a recession.

Prior to the embargo, the 1968 Vietnam War hindered the US economy as unemployment dropped, while taxes, interest rates and raw material costs rose. Treasury yields have been progressively rising due to inflationary concerns breaking the 8% level in the mid 1970. However, as the US money supply was increasing, West Germany left the Bretton Woods system in May 1971 while other countries redeemed their dollars for gold. Throughout this period, Treasury yields rose from 5.38% since March 1971 to 6.95% in July the same year. Since the 15th of August 1971, the end of US dollar/gold convertibility, treasury yields retraced their way to 5.73%. However, the depreciation of most currencies and the decrease in the value of real income drove inflation higher; Treasury yields grew in tandem reaching 7.55% in August 1973. After the accord be-tween Saudi King Faisal and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in Riyadh to use the "oil weapon" as part of the upcoming military conflict, investors sheltered in the treasuries, pushing yields to a low 6.67%. But as the inflationary repercussions of the oil embargo appeared to linger, the treasury market (and Equity market) sold off and yields reached 8.15% around the end of August 1974. Even after the end of the embargo, bond yield continued to rise topping 8.60% in 1975.

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Crude Oil Vs Benchmark yield (1971-1975)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

Federal Funds target Rate Vs Benchmark yield (1971-1975)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

S&P500 Vs Benchmark yield (1971-1975)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

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U.S. Treasuries through History

Second Oil price shock Iran-Iraq War (1980) From 1974 to 1978, the world crude oil price was relatively flat ranging from USD 12.52/ barrel to USD 14.57/barrel. However, demonstrations against the Shah of Iran commenced in October 1977, setting path towards a drastic change in the situation which materialized with the out-break of the anti-shah movement in 1978 and the seizure of the power by the Islamic republic in February 1979. On the 4th of November 1979, hundreds of Iranian students who supported the conservative Muslim cleric Ayatollah Khomeini stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking more than 60 American hostages, driving the US President Jimmy Carter to retort with a complete embargo of Iranian oil. De-spite limited global supply shortage due to the Iranian crisis (a mere 5%), the ensuing panic drove prices significantly higher. Furthermore, on the 16th December 1979, two OPEC member states announced plans to raise the price of their oil to the highest they had ever been as a diplomatic maneuver to sustain prices. These incidents precipitated the second oil crisis that burst with the Iran-Iraq War. Since the first oil crisis, OPEC supply remained relatively flat around 30 million barrels/day. As the war loomed, oil sup-ply was curtailed by 6.5 Million barrels, representing 10% from the previous year’s global supply driving oil prices to USD 39.50/barrel in 1981 as inflation peaked at 14% during the cataclysm.

The 1980 oil crisis had adversely impacted the Treasury market. Between 1975 and 1977, inflation in the US had been slightly subdued, dropping off 12% to settle below 6%; US treasuries fluctuated in parallel. But as the political unease emerged, treasury yields edge up from a sub 8% level to break above 9% by the end of 1978 and then reaching 11% by the end of 1979 driven by the swirl of events and quarrel. However, the sharp increase in yields, which reached 16% in 1981, was provoked by the amplifications of the ultimate Iraq and Iran collision. After the 1980, reduced demand from OPEC and overproduction, namely due to the expansion of non-OPEC, resulted in a glut on the world market; this ushered half a decade decrease in oil prices which bottomed at USD 14.44 in 1986.

During both oil shocks, the policy response was to assume the shock to be momentary and carry on a loose monetary policy, thrusting inflationary expectations in an inflationary setting. It was until the appointment of Paul Volker and ag-gressive money supply targets, allowing the federal funds rate to approach 20%, that the Inflation began to appease in 1981. By the end of 1983, the inflation rate had de-creased to less than 5% and during 1985 to 3% while treas-ury yields fell substantially from around 16% in 1981 to north of 6% in 1986.

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Crude Oil Vs Benchmark yield (1976-1985)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

Federal Funds target Rate Vs Benchmark yield (1976-1985)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

S&P500 Vs Benchmark yield (1976-1985)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

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U.S. Treasuries through History

Black Monday (1987) The anti-inflationary policies implemented during the 1980’s curtailed the inflation until 1986; however, at the outset of 1987, inflation appeared to accelerate moder-ately, particularly in the light of the rapid growth of money supply. During this phase, strong demand for US dollars - driven by the US financial Markets, the safe haven of US bank deposits for LATAM countries, the worldwide drug trade – brought the US dollar to appreciate against foreign currencies. However, this trend was reversed early 1985 as markets perceived the Fed to drive down the value of dollar deliberately by expanding money supply to cover the US trade gap; this catalyzed a massive drop in the dollar value. As a consequence, under the terms of the Louvre Accord, the central banks of six industrialized countries decided to limit further depreciation of the dollar and stabilize its ex-change rates within narrow band, thus suppressing mone-tary inflation. Subsequently, the Fed sold USD 8.4 Billion of government securities in one month (4% of its entire stock) in an effort to limit the expansion of money supply. This resulted in a collapse of the treasury market, yields in-creased to 8.45%, up from 7.21% in one month, compelling the Fed to alter its stance towards an expansionary one which in turn drove the dollar to depreciate once again de-spite strong coordinated intervention. Concerns of a dollar free fall and monetary inflation drove the Federal Reserve to tighten monetary policy by hiking the Federal Funds Tar-get Rate by 50 basis points in April and another 25 basis points in May 1987 to counteract exchange rate pressure. These hikes prompted instability in both the bond and cur-rency markets; treasury yields reached 8.86% after the sec-ond hike before stabilizing around 8.27% by the end of June. However, the trigger for the sell-off was Alan Greenspan’s - the newly appointed Fed Chairman - abrupt decision to fur-ther raise the discount rate by 50 basis points. Interest rates continued their ascent until the 14th of October 1987 when different events (Iran Silkworm Missiles attacks and UK Great Storm of 1987) set path to the severe market crash (507.99 points on the Dow, being more than 30%) on the 19th of October 1987, known as the Black Monday. As investors’ confidence was rattled by the melodrama of the 1929 crisis and from the war in the Persian Gulf, the US treasuries were investors’ safe haven during the crash. The yields on the 10 Years benchmark bonds dropped from 10.23% on the 15th of October to 8.72% on the 26th of Oc-tober 1987.

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Dollar Index Vs Benchmark yield (1986-1990)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

Federal Funds target Rate Vs Benchmark yield (1986-1990)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

S&P500 Vs Benchmark yield (1986-1990)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

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U.S. Treasuries through History

The Federal Reserve responded to the crash by accommodating the demand for currency and bank reserves by providing am-ple liquidity with extensive open market purchases and dropping its federal funds rate target from around 7.25% to 6.50%. De-spite inflationary concerns, the Fed remained reluctant to act after the Black Monday crash. After the first quarter of 1988, the Fed began to progressively raise its target rate from 6.50% to 9.75% by March 1989. Inflation persisted to grow during that pe-riod with CPI inflation rising from 2% in 1986 to more than 6% in 1990. During that period, treasury yields swung around 9%, budging initially upward due to inflationary pressures and then down-ward by August 1990 driven by optimism over the U.S.-led attack on Iraq during the first gulf war.

First Gulf War (1990) On the 2nd of August 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion and occupation of Kuwait forcing the Arab powers (Saudi Arabia, Egypt), the US and the western nations to intervene. By Mid January 1991, the Persian Gulf War began with a massive U.S.-led air offensive “Operation Desert Storm”. In only 42 days the Iraqi resistance had collapsed utterly and a cease fire has been declared. Prior to the War, the Fed has been tightening credit since February 1988 to soak up increasing inflationary pressures until June 1989, as signs of weakening economy were brought to light. In response, the Fed altered its policy to-wards easing credit and allowed the key rate to fall for the first time in 15 months. During the restrictive monetary pol-icy, the federal funds target rate rose from 6.50% to 9.75% and treasury yields were on the rise, mounting from 8.10% in February 1988 to 9.40% by the third quarter of 1989. De-spite the fed’s dovish stance, renewed inflationary concerns kindled by the emerging gulf tensions seesawed treasuries between 8% and 9%. As the Gulf War started, the initial market response exhibited increasing oil prices and higher yields, but this reaction soon faded and was countervailed as investors took heart that the Gulf War will be shortly won by the allied forces and the involvement of Saudi Ara-bia will not disrupt energy prices. However, the economy failed to avert a war induced reces-sion in 1991 and unemployment rates continued to climb. The Fed had previously cut the federal funds rate from just above 8% at the outset of the war to 5.75% by July 1991. Inflation receded and the Fed continued to boost the econ-omy by decreasing interest rates to 4% by the end of 1991 and to 3% by October 1992 where it resided until February 1994. Within this accommodative background, treasury yields were on a steep decline reaching 5.16% by October 1993.

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Crude Oil Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1995)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

Federal Funds target Rate Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1995)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

S&P500 Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1995)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

Page 6: US Treasuries Through a History of Crisis - Ramy Saadeh

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U.S. Treasuries through History

Tequila Crisis (1994) The catalyst of the Mexican Crisis, also known as the “Tequila Hangover” - as it spread to the Southern Cone and Brazil - has been blamed on the over-eager Federal Reserve to raise interest rates prematurely. In 1991, an exchange band allowed the fluctuation of the peso while adjusting daily to allow some appreciation of the US dollar; this ex-change was an anchor for economic policy. Due to the up-coming Mexican presidential election, an inconsistency be-tween the country’s monetary and fiscal policy emerged in 1994, as authorities were indisposed to raise interest rates or devalue the peso. In the US, by the end of 1993, the economic expansion gar-nered strength and the zero real federal fund rate was no longer justified and prompted inflationary concerns. Thus, the fed responded by increasing interest rates from 3% to 6% between February 1994 and February 1995. Treasury yields moved in tandem from 5.70% to 8% by the end of the year. Prior to this surge in yields, investors hunt the Mexi-can bonds for higher yields, but the Fed move to increase the rates and the reluctance of Mexican authorities to act narrowed the spread between the two countries. These convergences coupled with the political instability in Mexico discouraged capital flowing into the country and lead an inevitable devaluation of the Mexican Peso in December 1994. After the Tequila crisis, two main drivers drove treasury yields lower to 5.60% down from 8%: Capital outflow from Latin America that sought refuge in

the safety of US treasuries The Fed’s gain in credibility for operating and maintaining

low inflation; Markets were reassured that the central banks actions can control inflation.

As the second half of the 90’s unfolded, the Fed kept its fed-eral funds rate virtually unchanged from January 1996 through June 1999. The funds rate was maintained at 5.25% until March 1997 when it was slightly raised to 5.50% as a preemptive move as strong GDP numbers swirled inflation fears. These inflationary concerns were quite evident the bond market as treasury yields, bottoming initially at 5.60% peaked at 7%, where it was bound in a range between 6% and 7%. The Fed’s move in March confirmed its keenness to restrain inflation if needed. However, the East Asia Financial Crisis crisis hindered the Fed from further tightening policy; the funds rate were held constant for 18 months at 5.5%. Furthermore, the Russian debt default during the fall of 1998 propelled policymakers to decrease their target rate to 4.75% by cutting 25 basis points in each of September, October, and November.

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Dollar Index Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1999)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

Federal Funds target Rate Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1999)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

S&P500 Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1999)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

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U.S. Treasuries through History

The Asian Financial Crisis (1997) The growth in the East Asian region’s exports attracted high levels of foreign direct investments that manifested in surging real estate prices, while the financial deregulation prompted heavy private borrowing from foreign banks to finance speculative projects, thus creating asset bubbles. As the US Federal Reserve increased the target rate by mid 90’s to curb down inflation, the Asian countries, similarly to the Mexican scenario, appeared less attractive and foreign investments were reallocated. The paucity of foreign investments and capital inflow obstructed countries with pegged currencies to maintain their exchange rates at their levels. But the domino ef-fect didn’t set off until the failure of Somprasong Land and Finance One in early 1997. Subsequently, the East Asian Financial Crisis unfolded after the Thai government ditched effort to maintain its peg with the US dollar after the speculative attacks on the Baht. The Baht abruptly depreciated by 18% on the first day, and the speculative attack extended to other countries signifi-cantly devaluing their currencies: the Indonesian Rupiah, the Malaysia Ringitt, the Philippine Peso, the Japanese Yen and the Korean Won. During that period, safe-haven demand flowed into Treasury securities; yields dwindled from 7% to settle near 5.50% before the eruption of the Russian Crisis.

The Russian Default (1998) In the Aftermath of the Asian Crisis, in November 1997, the Russian ruble came under speculative attack costing the central bank of Russia USD 6 Billion in foreign exchange re-serve. Furthermore, the oversight of the OPEC underesti-mated the impact of the financial crisis in Asia and in-creased its output by 10% driving oil prices to plummet to USD 10/Barrel. Russian oil export revenue fell by 25% de-spite higher volumes contributing to the deterioration of the Russian Trade balance which was also impaired by a crash nonferrous metals prices. Investors turned dubious over Russia’s economic stability and ability to repay its debts driving its yields to more than 50% by the 37th of May 1998, ruling out the country’s ca-pacity to refinance its debt. On the 13th of August, the Russian stock, bond and currency markets collapsed completely eroding investors’ confi-dence. Few days later, on the 17th of August, Russia floated the exchange rate, devalued the ruble and defaulted on its debt. On the onset of the Russian Crisis, treasury yields dropped from 5.45% to 4.20% as treasuries were use as a buffer in the light of the cataclysm which extended to the US through the default, and ensuing bailout, of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund. Since the end of the Russian crisis, the U.S. economy expanded at a rapid pace, real GDP grew by 4.7% and 8.3% in the last two quarters of 1999 while unemployment dropped from 4.3% to 4% by the end of the year. This momentous growth spurred infla-tionary pressures, which were previously contained due to low energy prices. Oil prices headed sharply higher as the high-tech bubble investments swelled global demand. In response, the Fed turned hawkish and carried on progressive rate hikes until the target rate reached 6.50% where it remained unchanged until January 2001. Treasury yields moved in parallel to oil prices, mounting back to 4.5% by the end of 1998 and surging above 6% by June 1999. Furthermore, the reallocation of funds out of the bond market and into the stock bubble – dotcom bubble – has contributed in the treasuries sell-off reaching 6.75% by the beginning of the new millennium.

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Money supply Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1999)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

US Foreign Direct Investment Vs Benchmark yield (1990-1999)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

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U.S. Treasuries through History

The dotcom bubble burst (2000-2001) By 1999, the liquidity was in full swing, and equity markets were fueled by investments in Internet-based companies. The value of equity markets grew exponentially, namely the technology-dominated Nasdaq index grew five folds in the second half of the 90’s. As the economy changed pace, after the Federal Reserve rate hikes, the dot-com bubble burst on the 10th of March 2000; the burst was perceived as momentary. The 371 publicly traded Internet companies were valued at USD 1.3 trillion (8% of the entire U.S. stock market). This bubble continued to deflate at full speed and the Nasdaq lost half of its value by the end of 2000. In spite of the equity market’s calamity, the Federal Reserve continued to hike interest rates to a high of 6.50% in May 2000, thus limiting liquidity when the economy needed low rates for mortgages and investments. In 2001 the US economy went into recession and unemployment rate peaked at 6.3%. Additionally, the September 2011 terrorist attacks further exacer-bated the recession. Recognizing the contraction, the Federal Reserve retorted by cutting the target rate successively 11 times, bring the rate down from 6.50% in January 2001 to 1.75% by December the same year. Treasuries were driven by two forces, from one hand the expansionary monetary policy drove yields lower, from another hand, investors were piling up into treasuries due to shattered confidence in the stock market and political situation. After the recession, the Federal Reserve maintained its low interest rate policy, and even drove rates lower to 1% in mid 2003 where they stayed for a year spurring easy credit for banks to make loans. Treasury yields were driven to a low of 3.11%. In June 2004 the Fed reversed its stance hiking the federal funds rate target from 1% to 5.25% in July 2006 and kept at that level until September that year. Treasury yields also moved in Tandem reaching 5.25% my mid 2006.

The Subprime Crisis (2008) The euphoric bubble and convenient easy credit brought individuals to purchase houses beyond their capacity. As the fed in-creased interest rates, lowering the demand and increased the monthly payments for adjustable rate mortgages bursting the bubble as housing prices declined while more foreclosures increased supply, dropping housing prices further. These happen-ings threatened the solvability of various banks and hedge funds that invested in mortgage-backed securities and were poised to realize losses. By August 2007, banks became lost confidence in the system and were reluctant to lend each other, producing a liquidity crisis that erupted with the failure of Lehman brothers and forcing a USD 700 billion bailout, bankruptcies and government nationali-zation of Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Washington Mutual. This crisis sent the world’s economies into calamity and investors flocked to the “Safe Haven” status of the US treasuries. At the peak of the crisis, and subsequent to the ultra-accommodative Fed policy, treasury yields reached 2.10% by the end of 2008. The Fed dropped Federal Funds target rate to 0.25% where it remains until present moment. The Fed’s plans to purchase USD 100 billion in Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) and USD 500 billion in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) in November 2008 salvaged market’s confidence and was supported by an additional plan to purchase USD 300 Billion in Treasuries, USD 100 Billion in GSE and USD 750 Billion in MBS. These unconventional steps helped support treasury yields at low levels, hovering between 3.50% and 4.00% until April 2010.

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US Foreign Direct Investment Vs Benchmark yield (2000-Current) S&P500 Vs Benchmark yield (2000-Current)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

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U.S. Treasuries through History

The European Sovereign Crisis 2010 The European crisis has toppled governments, drove five economies into a second recession, extended disparities between regions and risked driving the economy into another 2008-like financial abyss. Europe teetered between the breakup of the euro, and stronger measures that would create tighter fiscal and political pact. Before 2011, the supporters of Austerity pre-vailed; disrupted countries were bailed out to avoid a liquidity trap, but were required to make strong reforms and spending cuts. However, as the crisis deepened after 2011, unemployment rose to record levels and macroeconomic indicators pointed towards a contraction, pressuring governments to call for measures to promote growth. The newly appointed President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, has implemented various steps to restore confidence in the European markets including cutting interest rates and launching a LTRO program (Long Term Refinancing Operations) which abated the tensions in financial markets and re-established sentiment by the mid 2013. As the Fed announced its second round of easing in November 2010 for USD 600 billion in Treasuries, yields shot up to 3.70%. Nevertheless, in 2011, yields ended below 2% for the first time since 1977. The Treasuries were a “go-to safe” harbor as inves-tors attempted to circumvent the European sovereign debt crisis, the US Political impasses which brought to the downgrade of the US rating to AA+ by S&P, and the announcement of a new plan, known as operation twist, which consists in purchasing ad-ditional USD 400 billion in long-term bonds while selling equivalent in short-term Treasuries. Yields remained at historic low levels, as they continued to be supported by an expansionary monetary policy and a new round of easing for USD 45 Billion MBS and USD 45 Million MBS in September and December 2012. Treasury yields commenced their uptrend from 1.62% by early May 2013 to reach a high exceeding 3% by the end of the year. The main factors were the overall improvement in the US economic outlook, the healthier pace of GDP growth and inflation. However, other driving forces for the sell off include the previous speculation, and the underway, tapering of the Fed’s monthly bond purchases.

Federal Funds target Rate Vs Benchmark yield (2000-Current) Money supply Vs Benchmark yield (2000-Current)

Source: Bloomberg, Bemo Research

Disclaimer: This report is published for information purposes only. The information herein has been compiled from, or based upon sources believed to be reliable, Banque Bemo sal does not guarantee or accept responsibility for the report’s completeness and/or accuracy. This document should not be con-strued as a solicitation to take part in any investment, or as constituting any representation or warranty from Banque Bemo sal. The consequences of any action taken on the basis of information contained herein are solely the responsibility of the recipient.

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U.S. Treasuries through History

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APPENDIX Federal Funds target Rate Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

S&P 500 Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

Dollar Index Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

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U.S. Treasuries through History

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APPENDIX Money Supply Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

Crude Oil Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

US Debt Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

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U.S. Treasuries through History

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APPENDIX S&P Volatility Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

Gold Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)

Inflation Vs Benchmark yield (1970-Current)