US Thai Alliance

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the national bureau of asian research

nbr special report #33 | october 2011

By Catharin Dalpino

the united statesthailand allianceIssues for a New Dialogue


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the national bureau of asian research

nbr special report #33 | october 2011

CATHARIN DALPINO is the Joan M. Warburg Proessor o International Relationsat Simmons College and a Visiting Scholar in Southeast Asian Studies at theJohns Hopkins School o Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She has studiedU.S.Tailand relations or 30 years and was the Asia Foundation Representativein Tailand in the late 1980s. From 2005 to 2010, Proessor Dalpino was Directoro Tai Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School o Foreign Service at GeorgetownUniversity. She is currently the principal investigator or the National Bureau oAsian Researchs project on Te United StatesTailand Alliance: Reinvigoratingthe Partnership. She can be reached at .

Te United StatesTailand Alliance:Issues for a New Dialogue

Catharin Dalpino


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Tis essay assesses the history and evolution o the U.S.Tailand alliance, compares it to

other U.S. security alliances in Asia, and explores the challenges they all ace.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Oen hailed as the oldest treaty ally o the U.S. in Asia by virtue o the reaty o Amity

and Cooperation signed in 1833, Tailand has been a steady and enduring partner o the U.S.

in Southeast Asia. Te advent o the Cold War and U.S. engagement in the region brought

security to the oreront o relations and cemented the two countries as ormal allies, a

relationship that has served both countries well and continues today. Despite a strong

history, however, the alliance is arguably in a state o dri as the security environment in

Asia evolves, states in Southeast Asia increasingly integrate, China rises, and traditional

Cold War threats recede. Tese actors, among others, call or a new dialogue that can

propel the U.S.Tailand alliance into the 21st century.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

As the U.S. and Tailand seek to move the alliance orward, a number o issues have emerged:

Te nature o the alliance. Dierences have emerged over whether the relationship is broad

based or primarily a security arrangement. Clarity on this issue is important or public

perception, as the rationale or the alliance is less apparent now than during the Cold War.

Te signifcance o a treaty alliance with the U.S. in the 21st century. Nonally countries

increasingly receive the benets o U.S. security cooperation without alliance responsibilities,

raising questions about the relevance o ormal alliances today.

Te changing regional threat environment. Changing regional dynamics and the absenceo a Cold Warstyle threat environment have enabled Tailand to balance its relations

with regional and global powers, raising key considerations or the U.S. as it assesses its

security posture in the region.

Tailands role in the region. Te same geopolitical actors that make Tailand a desirable

ally or the U.S. suggest that Bangkok could play a larger role in the region, particularly

in regard to nontraditional security threats.


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TH E UN IT ED STATES T HA IL AN D AL LI AN CEu DALPINO

Policymakers and analysts on both sides o the Pacic are cautiously hopeul that the national

elections in Tailand on July 3, 2011, have provided traction in Tailands troubled political

dynamic, commonly traced to the popular uprising against then prime minister Taksin

Shinawatra in 2006 and his subsequent overthrow by a military coup. Since then, dueling

popular movements have polarized Tai politics and at times brought the country to a violent

brink. o the majority o Tailands international partners, any specic outcome o the elections

is less important than the need to promote political stability through widespread acceptance o acertied result. Although a signicant portion o Tailands oreign relations and international

trade has proceeded as usual in the past ve years, Bangkoks trade and security partners have

oen indicated that attempts to take their bilateral relations with Tailand to new levels have been

hindered by the countrys internal turmoil.

Tis perception that relations with Tailand are on hold extends to the U.S.Tailand alliance.

In private, some U.S. ocials and analysts have described the allianceand the broader

relationshipas being adri because o Tailands protracted political crisis. Since the beginning

o the crisis in 2006, the international and Asian regional security environments have been aected

by a number o actors: Chinas steady and continued rise as a global power, new initiatives in Asian

regional architecture, developments in U.S. security policy with other Southeast Asian countries,

and the impactglobally and in Asiao the 2008 nancial crisis in the West. Without doubt,

Tailands political troubles have made dialogue with the United States and other partners more

difcult, but it would be inaccurate to view political instability as the sole reason or possible dri

in the U.S.Tailand alliance. Instead, broader regional and global issues and trends underscore

the need or reexamining the relationship, regardless o the state o Tai politics.

Placing the alliance in the context o the changing Asian security environment requires

grappling with a number o complex issues; it also requires political will on both sides to nd

common ground in a new century. o support this process, the National Bureau o Asian

Researchs project on Te United StatesTailand Alliance: Reinvigorating the Partnership

examines perspectives on security cooperation in both Tailand and the United States and

encourages dialogue on the expanding basket o bilateral and regional security issues. An initial

workshop report on views o the U.S.Tailand alliance within the Washington policy community

was released in June 2010.

Tis second report incorporates the results o consultations over the past year in Washington,

Honolulu, Bangkok, Manila, and okyo with U.S., Tai, Philippine, and Japanese oreign aairs

ocials, military leaders, analysts, and scholars. Tese discussions ocused on the U.S.Tailand

security relationship as well as on U.S. security alliances in Asia more broadly and the challenges

they ace. Te views expressed in this essay are those o the author and should not be attributed to

any other individual or institution.

A third and nal phase o the project, made possible with the generous support o the Henry

R. Luce Foundation, ocuses more intensely on Tai assessments o the U.S.Tailand alliance andon nding common ground among U.S. and Tai policymakers and analysts, with most dialogue

activities to be held in Tailand. Te results o this dialogue will be disseminated in both Tailand

and the United States.


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NBR SPECIAL REPORTu OCTOBER 2011

The Foundations of the U.S.-Thailand Alliance

Tailand is oen hailed as the oldest treaty ally o the United States in Asia by virtue o the

reaty o Amity and Cooperation signed in 1833. From a modern perspective, which tends to equate

the word ally with security partner, this statement is only partially true. Te treaty established

Tailand (then Siam) as the rst ormal diplomatic partner o the United States in Asia, 21 years

ahead o Japan. However, cooperation was ocused not on security but on economic relations, and

the signators promised to build commercial intercourse in the parts o their respective nations

as long as heaven and earth shall endure. Only three commodities were prohibited rom being

traded: munitions, opium, and rice (the latter was not considered to be an article o commerce).

Te agreement oered the ancient kingdom o Siam and the young United States specic

advantages in a region increasingly dominated by Old World powers. In the midnineteenth

century, the Siamese monarchs were intent on avoiding the colonization that was bealling the

countrys neighbors in Burma, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and the more relationships

they could orge with Western nations, the less likely that one would be able to dominate. For

its part, the United States wanted access to markets and seaports in Asia but was hemmed in by

the prior claims o Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Portugal. On mainland Southeast

Asia, Tailand could oer the United States the best access. Tis pattern would continue into the

twentieth century, when Bangkok had the only airport in mainland Southeast Asia at which the

United States had access equal to that o the European powers.

For the most part, however, security did not gure prominently in U.S.Tailand relations until

World War II. Still inclined toward isolationism when Japan began its domination o Southeast

Asia, Washington declined Bangkoks requests or support to ward o a Japanese attack. With

Tailand under Japanese control in 1941, the Tai legation in Washington was under orders

rom Bangkok to declare war on the United States. However, legation head M.R. Seni Pramoj

disregarded the order, and the United States recognized the legation as a governmentinexile and

worked with Seni to establish the Free Tai Movement. Following the Japanese surrender, Britain

proposed a 21point plan or British control over Tai political, oreign, and economic aairs. TeU.S. veto o the British proposal helped to ensure Tai independence aer the war and, to many

oldergeneration Tais, launched the modern day U.S.Tailand security alliance.

However, the structure o the current U.S.Tailand security relationship was not established

until the early years o the Cold War and was more nely tuned during the Vietnam War. wo

agreements, one both bilateral and multilateral and one bilateral, provided that structure. Te

Southeast Asia Collective Deense reaty, also known as the Manila Pact o 1954, was partly a

response to the Geneva Accords that partitioned Vietnam and to the perception that Southeast

Asia was endangered by encroaching Communism (articulated by the Eisenhower administration

as the domino theory). Te signatoriesAustralia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the

Philippines, Tailand, the United Kingdom, and the United Stateswere bound collectively andbilaterally by the Manila Pact, which ormed the diplomatic oundation o the Southeast Asia

reaty Organization (SEAO), established in 1955. Like the North Atlantic reaty Organization

(NAO), the Central reaty Organization (CENO), and similar Cold Warera structures,

SEAO was a maniestation o the ruman Doctrine, which emphasized collective and bilateral

deense treaties to block the spread o Communism in several regions.

However, SEAO was illsuited to replicate the tight security structures o NAO. A joint

integrated command was beyond reach, and even establishing a common security vision was


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dicult. SEAO lacked a clear provision or mutual seldeense; instead, the signatories to the

Manila Pact only agreed that an attack on one member would occasion consultation and action

according to each [members] constitutional processes. Te U.S. Senate was not required to ratiy

the Manila Pact, which rendered its provisions weaker than those o treaty obligations. Although

SEAO survived on paper until 1977, at best it was regarded as insignicant; at worst, it was viewed

as a ailure. Although there were joint exercises, collective military intervention was clearly beyond

SEAOs capacity. However, the existence o SEAO and the Manila Pact was oen cited as thebasis or U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia, such as in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 1 Although

SEAO was disbanded, the signatories o the Manila Pact still generally consider the agreement

to remain in eect on a bilateral basis. In 2001, or example, then president o the Philippines

Gloria MacapagalArroyo cited the 1954 Manila Pact as the basis or the Philippines support o

U.S. intervention in Aghanistan aer September 11.

By the early 1960s, Tailand had emerged as a rontline state in the Cold Wars hot war in

Southeast Asia by virtue o its proximity to Indochina. Te Tai government and its assertive

oreign minister Tanat Khoman were justied in believing that the Manila Pact would not

adequately protect Tailand in the event o a Communist invasion. Te communiqu signed by

Tanat and U.S. Secretary o State Dean Rusk in 1962 specied that the United States regards

the preservation o the independence and integrity o Tailand as vital to the national interests

o the United States and to world peace.2 An important tenet o the 1962 communiqu was the

need or consultation and joint decisionmaking, which helped to preserve Tai sovereignty in the

alliance. Such assurances o Tai independence strengthened the alliance and paved the way or

the permanent presence o U.S. troops in Tailand and the establishment o nine joint bases.

U.S. government documents reveal that one motivation or the TanatRusk communiqu was

Washingtons desire to enlist Tailands cooperation in Laos, whose political status the Kennedy

administration considered critical to keeping Southeast Asia ree o Communism.3 Tese same

documents, however, suggest that Tanat had more complicated motivations or signing the

communiqu. While Tai policymakers considered U.S. support to be essential to maintaining

Tai independence in the increasingly perilous security environment o mainland Southeast

Asia, they did not always agree with U.S. ocials on the best means or saeguarding the region

rom Communist takeover. Tanat was particularly worried by U.S. support or the 1962 Geneva

Agreement on Laos, which consented to a coalition government that shared power between

royalist and Pathet Lao (Communist) actions. Although Tailand signed the agreement, Tanat

reused to put his name to it and had his deputy sign in his stead.

As these agreements dened ormal U.S.Tailand relations, U.S. assistance to Tailand

increased rapidly rom the early 1950s until the late 1960s. In 1950 the two countries signed an

agreement or the United States to provide training and equipment to the Royal Tai Army;

military assistance grew tenold in just three years, rom $4.5 million in 1951 to $56 million in

1 For example, the entry or SEAO in the Oxord Companion to American Military History notes that despite the purposeully vaguewording o the SEAO charter the administration o President Lyndon B. Johnson claimed in 1965 that SEAO allowed and even requiredthe buildup o U.S. orces in South Vietnam. See John Whiteclay Chambers, ed., Oxord Companion to American Military History (Oxord:Oxord University Press, 2000), 644.

2 Te text o the TanatRusk communiqu can be ound in Te Reality o Foreign Policy Remarks by Secretary Rusk, State DepartmentBulletin, March 26, 1962, 49899.

3 See Oce o the Historian, U.S. Department o State, Memorandum o Conversation with President Kennedy, May 3, 1962, ForeignRelations o the United States, 196163, vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 339, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/rus196163v24/d339. Kennedy is quoted as saying that the main reason we gave the commitment [TanatRusk communiqu] to the Taiswas togain their help in connection with Laos.


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1953.4 However, security assistance was only one aspect o the growing U.S. presence in Tailand.

In need o strong and solid allies on mainland Southeast Asia and mindul that the Communist

threat was political as well as military, Washington laid the groundwork or a comprehensive

assistance program that included transportation inrastructure, agricultural development, health,

education, and cultural exchange. Tis countrywide approach dened the U.S.Tailand alliance

or the ordinary Tai, as did the growing number o U.S. troops in Tailand. By 1968 the U.S.

military presence in Tailand was at 45,000 soldiers, not including the tens o thousands o U.S.troops in the country or rest and rehabilitation rom the Vietnam War. 5 Te 600 U.S. planes

in Tailand at the time led some Tais to reer to their country as the worlds largest stationary

aircra carrier.6

By the late 1950s, U.S. policymakers ocused increasingly on the vulnerable northeast region

o Tailand, although no doubt a good deal o that ocus was due to the northeasts strategic

location, which enabled U.S. orces to launch or support operations in Vietnam, Laos, and later

Cambodia. From the beginning o the Cold War, Tailand was drawn into the wars o the region.

It contributed 4,000 soldiers and 20,000 tons o rice to the Korean War. Because o linguistic and

cultural similarities between Tailand and Laos, Tais worked with U.S. operatives in the secret

war in Laos between 1964 and 1972. Likewise, Tailand sent 12,000 soldiers to Vietnam, with U.S.

nancial support, between 1965 and 1971 and suered 1,351 casualties.7

By the late 1960s, a decade that some Tai scholars reer to as the American period, annual

U.S. military assistance to Tailand averaged $75 million and nonmilitary assistance was $60

million. Moreover, rom 1965 to 1968 the United States invested $370 million to upgrade Tai

military bases or the temporary use o U.S. orces. Te nine joint bases provided employment or

an estimated 50,000 Tais. Under this assistance, the Royal Tai Army tripled in size during the

decade, which helped to consolidate the militarys role in government. 8

Cold War Denouement and Dislocation

At the apex o the U.S. military presence in Tailand, however, the negative aspects and

weaknesses in the alliance were becoming more apparent. Te growing antiwar movement in

Tailand converged with discontent over military rule in the Tai student population; in the

eyes o the Bangkok political classes, both the U.S. government and the Tai military suered

rom guilt by association with each other. Tis situation reached a boiling point in 1973, when a

popular movement sparked by student protests overturned the military government.

During the same period, the incremental withdrawal o the United States rom Vietnam, and

implicitly rom Southeast Asia, alarmed Tai diplomats and military leaders. Te withdrawal began

with the articulation o the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which declared that in uture Asian wars the

United States would provide military and economic assistance but would not contribute troops. Te

1973 Paris Peace Accords, which enabled the United States to withdraw its orces rom Vietnam,

4 Vimol Bhongbhibhat, Bruce Reynolds, and Sukhon Polpatpicharn, ed., Te Eagle and the Elephant: 150 Years o Tai-American Relations(Bangkok: United Production, 1982), 91.

5 Ibid., 112.

6 Authors interview with an ocial rom the Tai Ministry o Foreign Aairs.

7 Bhongbhibhat, Reynolds, and Polpatpicharn, Te Eagle and the Elephant, 92, 122.

8 Ibid., 112.


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urther disconcerted Tai policymakers and other U.S. allies in the region, including South Korea.

Last, the rapid collapse o South Vietnam in 1975 and the hasty evacuation o personnel rom the

U.S. embassy in Saigon le Tailand vulnerable. Dynamics in the region were changing rapidly,

and the Tais eared Vietnamese aggression and the renewed relationship between Vietnam and

the Soviet Union. In response, the Tai government opened a diplomatic window to China. Te

heavy ocus on the United States in Tai oreign relations was beginning to change in avor o the

traditional Tai preerence or balancing relations among several powers. However, the alliancewith the United States remained the centerpiece o Tailands strategic calculation, and this central

role was reinorced when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978.

Nonetheless, it had become obvious on both sides that the U.S.Tailand alliance required

adjustments with the end o the Vietnam War. Te maintenance o joint bases with the United

States was a political liability or Tai leaders, particularly when Washington ailed to consult

Bangkok beore using the Utapao naval airbase to launch a rescue eort in May 1975 aer

Cambodia seized the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. Moreover, Tai leaders eared that the

continued presence o U.S. troops in Tailand would antagonize Hanoi and make Tailand a

target or perceived Vietnamese ambitions on mainland Southeast Asia. For the United States

part, with the Vietnam War behind it, Washington had little interest in maintaining an extensive

military presence in Tailand. Tus, U.S. troops were withdrawn rom the joint bases in 1976.

Yet these structural changes did not signal the end o U.S.Tailand security cooperation.

Rather, the alliance became a more fexible arrangement. Security cooperation through the

International Military Education and raining (IME) program as well as other orms o military

assistance continued, albeit at lower levels. Te United States opposed the Vietnamese occupation

o Cambodia and supported the policies o Tailand and the Association o Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) toward Indochina in the 1980s. Although Tailand continued to be wary o

Vietnam during this decade, Bangkok was able to quash the threat o the Tai Communist Party

through deals made with Beijing and various other measures. With this peace dividend, the

Tai economy began growing, sometimes in double digits, and Tailand underwent a peaceul

transition rom a military government to elected civilian rule in 1988.

However, dening the alliance in this postwar period was dicult. Te raternal relationship

between the U.S. and Tai militaries, a mainstay during the American period, was dissipating.

Moreover, problems in other aspects o the U.S.Tailand relationship caused Tais to question the

utility o the alliance, or even whether such an alliance still existed. In the late 1980s, some aspects

o tradelapses in Tailands enorcement o U.S. intellectual property rights and continued U.S.

subsidies or its domestic rice sectorcreated sharp tensions. When the Oce o the U.S. rade

Representative threatened section 301 sanctions on Tailand or intellectual property violations,

many Tais elt that the United States was violating the spirit o the alliance. 9 Tis view was even

more widely held in Tailand aer the United States did not oer the country bilateral assistance

in the immediate aermath o the 1997 Asian nancial crisis. Although many Tais were stillinclined to view the alliance as encompassing the entire U.S.Tailand relationship, as it had in the

1950s and 1960s, Americans tended to disaggregate the relationship into its separate parts and saw

the alliance as conned to the security relationship.

9 Section 301 o the U.S. rade Act o 1974 authorizes the president to take appropriate action, including the imposition o sanctions,in response to a oreign government that violates an international trade agreement or takes other action that burdens or restrictsU.S. commerce.


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When the Cold War ended, the U.S.Tai security relationship was aected by the stronger U.S.

posture on democracy promotion and the complexities o Tailands democratization process. On

its website, the Tai Ministry o Deence recounts one aspect o the militarys role in politics:

Te militarys reputation as the center o political power maniested itsel

in nearly a score o coups and countercoups between 1932 and 1987. Over

the years, its role as a political instrument had detracted rom its abilities

as a proessional military orce. Doubts about the state o combat readiness

had been expressed by some members o the Tai ocer corps as well as by

oreign military observers. By the 1980s, the military had acted to increase

the proessionalism o its personnel, particularly the ocer corps, and to

modernize its units and weaponry.10

Although many observers agree that the Tai military has made concerted attempts to urther

proessionalize, civilmilitary relations have ebbed and fowed over the past two decades, as have

other aspects o Tai political development. Te 1991 and 2006 military coups had an impact on

U.S.Tai security relations. Under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, economic aid (which includes

security assistance) must be withdrawn when an elected civilian government is overthrown and

cannot be restored until the U.S. executive branch certies to Congress that civilian control has

been reestablished. Aer the 2006 coup, or example, the United States suspended Tailand

rom the IME program, postponed joint exercises, and suspended $29 million in other orms o

military assistance.11 Even aer certication, it took Tailand time to regain the countrys place in

the IME cycle; when it did, the available pot o assistance unds had shrunk with the addition o

ourteen new countries.

The Present State of the Alliance

During the Vietnam War, the countrys strategic position and the history o U.S.Tai

cooperation made Tailand a linchpin in U.S. security policy toward Southeast Asia. oday the

alliance supports the U.S. presence in Aghanistan and Iraq through the use o Tai ports and

other acilities or reueling and through Tai permission or U.S. fyovers. Te Utapao naval

airbase, which analysts consider to be the only aireld in Southeast Asia capable o supporting a

major logistical operation, still gures prominently in the security relationship. Indeed, in 2004

Tailand permitted the United States to use Utapao as a base or tsunami relie operations aer

airelds in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were overwhelmed. For a month, U.S. troops returned to

a Tai military base.

Te U.S.Tailand alliance is also the oundation or the annual Cobra Gold exercises, the

largest multinational military exercises in the world. Originally a bilateral series, Cobra Gold

has added Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia as partners. In 2011 eighteen

countries attended the exercises as observers, including China, Italy, Russia, and South Arica.

Cobra Gold has several components and oen runs as long as six weeks. In addition, the United

States and Tailand conduct numerous bilateral exercises throughout the year.

10 Ministry o Deence (Tailand) website, http://www.mod.go.th/eng_mod/index.html.

11 Emma ChanlettAvery, Tailand: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report or Congress, RL32593,February 8, 2011, 1011, http://www.as.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pd.


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Over the last decade, the challenges presented by al Qaeda and regional Asian extremist

networks opened a new area o cooperation in U.S.Tailand security relations. Bilateral

intelligence cooperation led to the 2003 arrest o Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali), a

leader o Jemaah Islamiyah. Tat same year, Tailand was granted major nonNAO ally (MNNA)

status along with the Philippines, a designation created by Congress in 1989 that grants recipients

some exemptions rom the Arms Export Control Act and conveys other minor benets. Tailand

has sent small contingents to Aghanistan and Iraq, with two Tai soldiers being killed in thelatter confict.

Tese actors combine to make the U.S.Tailand security relationship one o the stronger

anchors in the bilateral relationship. Tis has led some analysts to worry that the alliance has

become overly securitized by deault. One o the more volatile areas o the relationship has been on

the economics and trade side. Negotiations over a bilateral ree trade agreement were suspended in

2006, in part because o the Tai political situation but also because o growing public discontent

in Tailand over provisions on pharmaceuticals. Shortly thereaer, Tailand imposed compulsory

licensing requirements on some U.S. pharmaceutical rms, urther ratcheting up tensions. It is not

clear which direction U.S.Tai trade relations will go once the political situation has stabilized. In

the aermath o the 2008 nancial crisis, the United States has deemphasized bilateral ree trade

agreements and turned instead to the ransPacic Partnership (PP) sponsored by the Asia

Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC). While Tai ocials have said that they are considering

application to the PP, no concrete decision in that regard has been made.

Even though the security relationship remains strong compared to other aspects o the bilateral

relationship, it has clearly eroded over time. o some extent, this was inevitable. As power

dynamics in the AsiaPacic region have changed, particularly with the rise o China, Tailand

has pursued a natural course o increasing diversity in its oreign relations. Security relations

with other countries, including China, have grown stronger, although none has eclipsed the U.S.

Tailand security relationship.

One consequence o this broader security dynamic is the increasing diversity o the market or

military weapons and equipment. Over the past two decades, Tailand has purchased military

equipment rom China, Sweden, and the Ukraine, among others. Russia is also moving quickly up

the ladder o arms vendors, no longer selling only cutrate Cold War leovers but instead oering

higher quality weapons with attractive training and maintenance packages. Although U.S.

equipment continues to be highly desirable, it is expensive and oen comes with various orms o

conditionality. Bangkok discovered this during the 1997 economic crisis, when nancial distress

le it unable to ollow through on a contract to purchase F16s rom the United States.

Beyond changes in the regional security environment, the U.S.Tailand security relationship

was urther disrupted by the 2006 coup, which continues to cast a shadow over the relationship,

given Tailands protracted political crisis. Tai military leaders have publicly stated that they will

honor the outcome o the recent election. Both sides are aware, however, that actions similar tothose o 1991 and 2006 could automatically trigger provisions in U.S. law that would have a serious

impact on the security relationship, no matter how shortlived any suspension might be.

Last, in the past decade Tailand has aced some security challenges that are dicult to address

through the U.S.Tailand security relationship. Since 2008, a border dispute with Cambodia

has led to the episodic exchange o re and more requent sabrerattling. Bangkok has sought

to resolve this dispute through bilateral negotiations and through ASEAN. However, when the


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United States conducted joint exercises with Cambodia earlier this year, Tailand apparently

viewed this as undercutting the U.S.Tailand alliance and protested the exercises.12 A longer

term problem has been the communal confict in Muslimmajority provinces in Tailands deep

south. Casualties have exceeded ve thousand since 2004, but the consensus among Tai and

U.S. ocials is that the confict is local rather than being driven by regional or global extremist

groups. As a result, there are ew mechanisms in the militarytomilitary relationship to help

ameliorate the confict, although the United States does provide some economic assistancethrough the U.S. Agency or International Development (USAID) to help address the social and

economic root causes o the confict.

Comparative Perspectives

Although Tailand has been a security ally o the United States or more than hal a centurya

longstanding spoke in the U.S. hubandspoke conguration o alliances in Asiait diers rom

other U.S. allies in the region in several ways:

Te structure o the alliance. U.S.Tailand security cooperation is based more on precedentand mutual understanding than on a structured agreement that governs militarytomilitaryactivities. Tis is in contrast to the status o orces agreements that the United States has

with Japan and South Korea and the Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. Tese

agreements must be renewed at established intervals and thereore have builtin requirements

to examine the alliance. Tey also tend to be more controversial, since the domestic populations

in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are made aware o alliance requirements through the

renegotiations. Moreover, in the past several years, incidents involving U.S. military personnel

and citizens o these three countries have created jurisdictional issues in the alliances, which

have only heightened the controversy.

Te threat environment. Te end o the Vietnam War and the normalization o relations withinSoutheast Asiawith Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, in particulardramatically reduced threat

levels in the region. Equally, i not more, important or Southeast Asia was the normalization

o relations with China. Tese two processes, along with ASEANs enlargement and increasing

integration, have brought an unprecedented level o peace to the region, although Muslim

extremism remains a primary concern. In contrast, Japan and South Korea continue to ace

major threats originating rom the Cold War. Te lethal nature o these threats speaks to vital

U.S. security interests and has, to date, warranted the retention o permanent U.S. bases in

Northeast Asia.

While there are signicant dierences between the security environments in Northeast and

Southeast Asia, structural dierences also exist between the U.S. alliances with Tailand and the

Philippines. As a claimant to some o the Spratly Islands, Manila has greater security tensions

with China. In the past, Manila and Washington have disagreed on whether this threat should be

addressed by the U.S.Philippines alliance, and the issue is currently under review. In addition,

some extremist groups in the Philippines have had ties to regional or global terrorist networks

such as the relationship between al Qaeda and Abu Sayyawhile, as noted above, the confict in

southern Tailand is considered to be more localized. Te U.S.Philippines alliance has addressed

12 Strator Global Intelligence, Tailand: Concern Over Joint U.S.Cambodian Exercise, June 25, 2010.


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problems in Mindanao through the annual Balikatan exercises, although U.S. orces serve only as

advisors. Compared with other Asian allies o the United States, Tailand would appear to have

ewer security threats that can be addressed through its U.S. alliance.

Te United States our Asian treaty allies do have similarities, however. Each places the alliance

at the center o its security policy but recognizes that in the past decade trade with China has

grown at a aster pace than trade with the United States. Tis is even true o Australia, the other

U.S. treaty ally in the AsiaPacic. Although the U.S. export market is still o prime importance,i trade trends continue (as they are likely to do), U.S. allies in the region could conront conficts

within their own oreign policies. Because o this balancing act, smaller Southeast Asian countries

with strong ties to both the United States and China ear confict between the two powers, but they

also ear too much SinoAmerican comity.

A second common actor among U.S. allies in Asia is the dilemma o democratic allies. Te

closeness o the alliance relationship causes governments to make demands that do not always sit

well with other countries legislatures, judiciaries, or publics. In the late 1980s, or example, the

United States required that its largest trading partners in Southeast Asia (Tailand, Singapore,

Malaysia, and Indonesia) pass legislation to protect U.S. copyrights or risk sanctions. At the

time, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia had authoritarian or semiauthoritarian systems that

made it possible or such legislation to be quickly approved. Tailand, however, was in the midst

o a democratic transition, and the increasingly assertive Tai parliament took exception to

Washingtons threat. Although legislation on U.S. copyrights passed by a bare majority, several

members o parliament broke ranks to vote against the bill, causing the prime minister to dissolve

parliament and thereby nulliying the legislation. o Washingtons chagrin, in 2008 a Tai court

reused to extradite Jamshid Ghassemi, an Iranian national accused o smuggling missile parts

into the United States, because it ound that Ghassemis status as a military ocial exempted him

rom extradition. In 2004 both Bangkok and Manila had to act against popular domestic opinion

to accede to Washingtons request to send troops to Iraq. Because o the special relationship, both

sides o the alliance are oen called on to deliver results, but domestic political dynamics make it

increasingly dicult to do so.

Finally, i the hubandspoke system is less coherent now than it was during the Cold War by

virtue o the dierences in the nature and the degree o threats present in Northeast and Southeast

Asia, it can also be argued that the United States is dismantling that structure in Southeast Asia

by orging a more diverse set o security relationships. Although the United States and Singapore

are not treaty alliesin act, Singapore declined the oer o MNNA status13the bilateral security

relationship is extensive. Te U.S.Malaysia security relationship is also positive and has expanded

in the past decade through cooperation on counterterrorism and other initiatives. Likewise,

Washington has cautiously renewed its security ties with Indonesia, also aided by the demands o

the postSeptember 11 security environment.

In addition, in recent years the United States has orged security relationships with Vietnam,Laos, and Cambodia, with Vietnam receiving the most attention. Te countrys occasional

conficts with China over the South China Sea have provided considerable traction to the

security relationship with the United States in recent months. Although all three relationships are

constrained by the past and will progress only incrementally as a result, they nonetheless exempliy

the changes in U.S. security relations in Southeast Asia. Tese changes call into question what it

13 Authors interview with an ocial rom Singapores Ministry o Foreign Aairs.


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12


means to be a treaty ally o the United States in Southeast Asia in the 21st century. With a wider

spectrum o U.S. security relations and a diminished threat environment, U.S. treaty allies in the

region do not always receive greater attention or enjoy closer cooperation with the United States

than do countries with less ormal military ties.

Issues for ConsiderationTai and U.S. ocials and analysts agree that i the U.S.Tailand alliance is to be more than a

legacy alliance, a vigorous dialogue on several levels and among multiple actors on the meaning

o the relationship is required. A clear agenda or acilitating such dialogue has not yet emerged,

but various issues have been raised or consideration on either or both sides. Tey can be grouped

into broad categories as ollows:

Is the U.S.-Tailand alliance the whole o the relationship or a subset?Tere is still considerablecognitive dissonance between the United States and Tailand on whether the alliance is a

broadbased relationship cutting across several sectors or a security relationship. Each side

has been willing to play the alliance card in pressing or specic results. Tis question has

particular bearing on Tai public perceptions o the U.S.Tailand alliance, since the rationaleor the alliance is now less apparent to the ordinary Tai citizen than it was during the Cold

War. Tis situation contrasts, or example, with the U.S. alliance with South Korea, which aces

a continuing security threat rom North Korea. I it is advisable to orge stronger links among

dierent sectors o the U.S.Tailand alliance or greater coherence, which sectors deserve

more attention?

What is the signifcance (and purpose) o a treaty alliance with the United States or a SoutheastAsian nation in the 21st century?As the United States expands its security relationships with

several countries in the region, it is not clear what advantages an alliance oers over the

prolieration o strategic partnerships. Some Tai and Philippine analysts have argued that

nonally countries already receive the benet o U.S. security cooperation without the same

degree o pressure on certain policy issues. Tis view suggests that the United States needs toconsider its Southeast Asian alliance structures in a new light.

Can (and should) the U.S.-Tai security relationship be insulated rom the possibility o continuedpolitical instability in Tailand?Although there are no signs at present that another coup is

likely, security analysts in both countries have raised the possibility o adjustments that would

enable security cooperation to continue i such an event were to occur. Tey point, or example,

to the possibility o Tailand unding its own IME participation, thereby ensuring that Tai

ocers could remain in the program.

What is the signifcance o the U.S.-Tailand alliance in the context o changing power dynamics inAsia?O the United States our Asian treaty allies, Tailand arguably has the closest relationship

with China and, because o its geographical position, is the least likely to be pulled into regionalconficts involving China. At the same time, Bangkok is not sanguine about the impact o Chinas

rise on Tai interests in the region; or example, China is an increasingly dominant power in the

poorer countries o mainland Southeast Asia (specically Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar). For

the time being, Tailand seems comortable having close relations with a number o regional

and global powers. Are there scenarios in Bangkoks threat perception in which the security

environment would change or the United States would take exception to Tailands quest or

equilibrium in its oreign relations? Tese situations might include increased security relations


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1


with rising powers, such as China, or conficts with Tailands neighbors, such as the present

border tensions with Cambodia.

How can the U.S.-Tailand alliance draw on (and possibly enhance) Tailands role in the region?Te same geopolitical actors that make Tailand a desirable ally or the United States give

it the potential to play a larger role in the region. Put another way, Tailands location in

the region makes it the turnstile or a number o nontraditional security threats, ranging

rom human tracking to epidemics, but also positions it to address these regional threats.

Tailand likewise serves as a natural base or regional disaster relie eorts. Finally, its position

as Myanmars neighbor inevitably raises several security concerns, ranging rom border

instability to nuclear prolieration.

How would the U.S.-Tailand alliance fgure into the United States uture plans or its securityposture in Asia?For the past decade, U.S. deense ocials have periodically raised the possibility

o increased reliance on fexible basing in Asia, particularly i permanent bases in Northeast Asia

are dismantled. As noted above, the United States enjoys considerable access to Tai acilities,

but this access is on an ad hoc basis. A more ormal arrangement or fexible basing would

require schedules or rotating U.S. troops, prepositioning equipment, and other measures. It is

not clear what the limits o such increased cooperation would be in the U.S.Tailand alliance.

Are there possibilities or greater coherence within the U.S. alliance system in Asia? Could, orexample, the U.S. alliances with Tailand and the Philippines be triangulated? Tere appears

to be little cooperation or consultation between Bangkok and Manila on security issues as

a unction o their common status as U.S. allies. Tis contrasts with Northeast Asia, where

South Korea and Japan share common security concerns over North Korea. Although U.S.

analysts and ocials occasionally allude to the benets o greater linkages among U.S. allies

in Southeast Asia, it is not clear i such triangulation would be a natural t or Tailand or the

Philippines or on what issues such a triangular agenda would be based.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Overview

Te United States and Asias Rising Giantsu Ashley J. ellis, Carnegie Endowment or

International Peace and NBR

Special Study

International Order and the Rise o Asia:History and Teory

u Kenneth B. Pyle, University o Washington

Country Studies

China Views Indias Rise: DeepeningCooperation, Managing Dierences

uM. aylor Fravel, MassachusettsInstitute oechnology

India Comes to erms with a Rising China

uHarsh V. Pant, Kings College London

Japan, India, and the Strategic rianglewith China

uMichael J. Green, Center or Strategicand International Studies

Coping with Giants: South Koreas Responseto Chinas and Indias Rise

u Chung Min Lee, Yonsei University

Grand Stakes: Australias Future betweenChina and India

u Rory Medcal, Lowy Institute

Challenges and Opportunities:Russia and the Rise o China and India

uDmitri renin, Carnegie Endowment orInternational Peace

Regional Studies

Great Games in Central Asiau S. Enders Wimbush, German

Marshall Fund

India Next Door, China Over the Horizon:Te View rom South Asia

u eresita C. Schafer, Brookings Institution

Te Rise o China and India: Challengingor Reinorcing Southeast Asias Autonomy?

u Carlyle A. Tayer, Australian Dee nceForce Academy

Strategic Asia 201011: Asias Rising Power and Americas Continued Purpose

Strategic Asia 200910: Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability

Strategic Asia 200809: Challenges and Choices

Strategic Asia 200708: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy

Strategic Asia 200607: rade, Interdependence, and Security

Strategic Asia 200506: Military Modernization in an Era o Uncertainty

Strategic Asia 200405: Conronting errorism in the Pursuit o PowerStrategic Asia 200304: Fragility and Crisis

Strategic Asia 200203: Asian Afershocks

Strategic Asia 200102: Power and Purpose

Previous Volumes

strategic asia 201112

asia responds to

its rising powersChina and India

Strategic Asia 201112: Asia Responds to Its Rising PowersChina and India exploreshow Asian states are responding to the rise o China and India and the strategies

these states are pursuing to preserve their national interests. In each chapter, a leadingexpert investigates how a country or region perceives Chinas and Indias growth basedon geopolitical, economic, cultural, military, and historical interactions and drawsimplications or U.S. interests and leadership in the Asia-Pacic.

About the Book

Edited by Ashley J. ellis, ravis anner, and Jessica Keough

Te National Bureau of Asian Research September 2011 396 ppPaper 6x9 ISBN 978-0-9818904-2-5 $34.95 (paperback) $19.95 (PDF)

order online at www.nbr.org/publications


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US Thai Alliance