U.S. RESPONSES TO

SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS

Strategies for Nonviolent Outcomes

and Alternatives to Secession

Report from a Roundtable Held in Conjunction with the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S.Department of State

Patricia Carley

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

Key Points v

Preface viii

1 Introduction 1

2 Self-Determination: Four Case Studies 3

3 Self-Determination, Human Rights, and Good Governance 14

4 A Case for Secession 17

5 Self-Determination at the United Nations 21

6 Nonviolent Alternatives to Secession: U.S. Policy Options 23

7 Conclusion 28

About the Author 29

About the Institute 30

CONTENTS

- Though the right to self-determination is includedin numerous international documents, it hasnever been explicitly defined. The lack of a clearand universally accepted definition is one of theprimary reasons the United States and the inter-national community are unable to respond coher-ently to the increasing number of claims toself-determination and demands for secession.Because guidelines for U.S. policy toward self-determination movements will not be easilydrawn, the U.S. Institute of Peace’s second meet-ing on the self-determination issue focused onways the United States and the international com-munity have worked in the past, or can work inthe future, to promote nonviolent—and, it ishoped, nonsecessionist—outcomes to territorial orseparatist disputes. To create a framework withinwhich to examine U.S. policy responses, four casestudies were considered: the Kurds, Kashmir,Eritrea, and Tibet.

- The Kurds have always found themselves on theperipheries of other nations and empires and to-day are found primarily in the states of Turkey,Iraq, and Iran, with the largest number in Turkey.Because of Kemal Atatürk’s determination to cre-ate a homogeneous republic, most expressions ofKurdish identity have been repressed since thefounding of the Turkish republic in 1923. TheGulf War in 1991 and the influx of Kurdish

refugees from Iraq into Turkey heightened worldawareness of the Kurdish issue in general andhighlighted Kurdish distinctiveness. The forma-tion in the 1970s in Turkey of the KurdistanWorkers Party, or PKK, a radical and violentMarxist-Leninist organization, also intensified the issue; the PKK’s success in rallying the Kurds’sense of identity cannot be denied. Though thePKK has retreated from its original demand for in-dependence, the Turks fear that any concession totheir Kurdish population will inevitably lead to anend to the Turkish state.

- Although the Kashmir issue involves both India’sdomestic politics and its relations with neighbor-ing Pakistan, the immediate problem is the insur-rection in Kashmir itself. Kashmir’s inclusion inthe state of India carried with it provisions forconsiderable autonomy, but the Indian govern-ment over the decades has undermined that au-tonomy, a process eventually resulting inanti-Indian violence in Kashmir in the late 1980s.A lasting solution to the Kashmir problem is un-likely unless that autonomy issue is addressed.Pakistan and India have gone to war more thanonce over the Kashmir issue, and the two coun-tries are currently polarized in their positions; in-deed, the primary concern for the United Stateson this issue has been to avoid another Indo-Pakistani war. To that end, the United States mayhave to exert more effort to solve the problems in-side Kashmir, which will probably not be possiblewithout some return to the autonomy establishedin the original accession agreement.

- Eritrea is an unusual case in that it has been “re-solved”: it has successfully seceded from Ethiopiato become an independent state. Though a co-federal arrangement between Eritrea and Ethiopiahad been agreed to in 1952, the Ethiopian govern-ment under Haile Selassie began to undermine Er-itrea’s autonomy until the region was forced torelinquish its autonomy in 1962, triggering an in-surgency against the Ethiopian government. TheUnited States was not greatly involved in the dis-pute until 1990, when the Eritreans asked for aU.S. role in negotiating a resolution to the conflict.Because by this time the Eritreans had essentiallywon the war, they had no incentive to agree toanything but their long-sought aim: full indepen-dence. Neither the United States nor the members

v

KEY POINTS

of the Organization of African Unity were happyabout officially aiding the secession of Eritrea,supporting instead a state’s right to territorial in-tegrity. However, the insurgents’ military victoryover Ethiopian government forces meant that thelatter had to agree to a referendum on indepen-dence; there was thus little reason for the UnitedStates to oppose it.

- Unlike many other self-determination cases, theTibet issue has involved the U.S. governmentsince the late 1940s and has engaged a large num-ber of supporters in the United States, despite itscontinued refusal to officially support Tibetanself-determination. From 1913 to 1951, Tibetfunctioned as a de facto independent entity,though it was not officially recognized as such byother powers. In 1950, China invaded Tibet; afteran abortive uprising in 1959, the Dalai Lama wasforced to flee and the Chinese government thenimplemented more harsh measures to ensure Ti-betan assimilation. During the period whenChina was a Cold War enemy of the UnitedStates, the latter was actively involved in support-ing the Tibetan struggle against the Chinese.However, when China’s place in U.S. foreign pol-icy began to shift in the late 1960s, U.S. supportfor Tibet ended and the United States largely ig-nored the issue. Since then, the Tibetans havelaunched a campaign to secure international sup-port for their cause and have been particularlysuccessful with the U.S. Congress and segmentsof the American public. As a result, the Chinesehave stepped up assimilation efforts, leavingopen the question of the ultimate effectiveness ofthe campaign.

- Some analysts argue that these and other caseswere not really efforts at self-determination butresponses to repression by the central govern-ments in question. The United States, however,has often responded as if they were self-determi-nation movements rather than matters of humanrights and good governance. Others suggest thatthe problems stem from the international com-munity’s overemphasis on territorial integrity tothe point that central governments are led to be-lieve that no matter how badly they mistreat theirpeople, the international community will supportthe principle of territorial integrity. In any case, inthese and other situations, it was difficult for the

United States to maintain consistency in its pro-motion of human rights, because this concernhad to be balanced against other interests and re-alities.

- Bad governance may not be the only factor be-hind self-determination movements. The globalinformation revolution is making more and moregroups in the world aware of themselves andtheir status as “minorities,” a status they some-times become unhappy with whether or not theircentral government is repressive. Thousands ofgroups throughout the world are only now be-coming aware of their status, resulting in an ex-tremely dynamic situation.

- The right to self-determination remains a contro-versial issue at the United Nations, and languageon the issue for the UN’s fifty-year anniversarydocument was hotly disputed. In the end, theright to self-determination was reaffirmed, as wasa people’s right to “take legitimate action” to real-ize this right. The document also stated that self-determination is not to be exercised to theprejudice of the territorial integrity of states thatcomply with the UN Charter. One new develop-ment is the growing UN involvement in the pro-motion of elections as a mechanism for therealization of self-determination. The recognitionof democracy as the preferred system, and of elec-toral assistance as a means to that end, is eclips-ing the right to self-determination as an operativeprinciple at the United Nations.

- The best way to deal with self-determinationmovements is to focus on human rights above allother issues, emphasizing individual over grouprights in most circumstances. In addition, thegroup concerned should explore all other op-tions available short of secession. At the sametime, however, the United States should not takethe position that secession is never justified—onlythat it is the remedy of last resort in the case ofthe most serious injustices. Instead of secession,federal or confederal solutions should be pro-moted. In the face of likely concerns that conces-sions on human rights will lead to the proverbial“slippery slope” toward demands for secession,the international community must maintain apractice in which states see that good-faith effortsto address the problems will be accompanied by

vi

assurance from the international community thatit will not sanction secession. However, one com-plicating factor is the reality that any U.S. re-sponse to a self-determination or secessionistmovement will inevitably be colored by the rela-tionship of the United States with the govern-ment involved.

- Because of the extreme complexities of most self-determination movements, an overriding princi-ple of response for U.S. policymakers is unlikelyto emerge. The need for the United States to de-fine specific and overarching goals with regard tothese movements will fall victim to the more com-pelling need to juggle a host of U.S. interests that

vary from country to country. Ideally, the interna-tional community would have early warning ca-pabilities to detect when a group’s plight is goingto lead to violent secessionist demands; however,resources for developing such capabilities arelacking. Secession should continue to be viewedas a very last resort, though it should be possibleto countenance secessionist demands before agroup has experienced serious human rightsabuses amounting to genocide. It may be that inthe post–Cold War era, fostering legitimate de-mocratic institutions is the only hope for provid-ing a context within which self-determinationdemands can be addressed in a nonviolentmanner.

vii

Struggles for self-determination have becomeone of the most complex foreign policy issuesfor the United States and the international

community. The issues surrounding self-determina-tion arise not so much from whether it is a right—many human rights documents assert that it is—butfrom the lack of a clear definition of what “self-determination” means, especially in terms of itspotential implications for and impact on long-heldnotions of territorial inviolability and politicalsovereignty.

This is the second Institute report on the issue ofself-determination. The first, from a meeting held inFebruary 1995, focused on the differing legal and po-litical interpretations of what the self-determinationright includes and implies; the results of that sessionare reported in Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Ter-ritorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession (Peace-works no. 7) by Patricia Carley.

Working again with the staff of the Policy PlanningOffice at the Department of State, in March 1996 theInstitute convened a second meeting on the issuessurrounding self-determination, focusing on U.S.policy in four cases—the Kurds, Kashmir, Tibet, andEritrea—to see what lessons might be drawn fromthem for possible strategies and options for futurecases. The aim was to determine if it were possible forthe United States and the international communityactively to promote successful outcomes in territorial

or separatist disputes, outcomes that would be bothnonviolent and nonsecessionist.

The participants examined a number of questionsbearing on policy-development issues. How, theyasked, has the international community’s response af-fected outcomes in specific cases? Is there a stage atwhich actors are likely to look outside for support, in-tervention, or response? Have external actors influ-enced the outcomes of secessionist movements, andwith what tools? What might be the effects of activelypromoting nonsecessionist forms of self-determina-tion? Does the existing language on self-determina-tion—or the lack of it—affect the goals and strategies ofseparatist movements and their leaders? Is there con-sistency in U.S. policy or is it ad hoc? Does it matter?

Other Institute projects examining related issuesinclude Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Con-flicts, former fellow Ruth Lapidoth’s book-lengthstudy of the potential variety and versatility of formsof autonomy; Power Sharing and International Medi-ation in Ethnic Conflicts, by Timothy D. Sisk; Minori-ties at Risk: A Global View of EthnopoliticalConflicts, by Ted Robert Gurr; and the Ukraine andSri Lanka volumes in the Series on Religion, National-ism, and Intolerance (all published by the UnitedStates Institute of Peace Press). We hope that readersinterested in learning more about this complicatedsubject will find these publications useful.

PREFACE

viii

1

The right to self-determination is proclaimedby numerous international documents, in-cluding the United Nations Charter and the

Helsinki Final Act. However, this right has never beenprecisely defined and has thus come to denote differ-ent things to different peoples and governments atdifferent times. To examine the complex self-determi-nation issue, the United States Institute of Peace,together with the Policy Planning Staff of the Depart-ment of State, organized a series of meetings to help U.S. policymakers develop a response to self-determination demands. Experts on international lawand state sovereignty discussed the right to self-deter-mination—its origins, what it entails, and the nature ofinternational legal language sanctioning and definingit. The results of the first roundtable were publishedby the Institute in its Peaceworks series under the titleSelf-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity,and the Right to Secession.

It was plain at the first meeting that the absence ofa clear and universally accepted definition is one ofthe main problems the United States and the interna-tional community face in responding to claims forself-determination and dealing with secessionistmovements. As a consequence, guidelines for U.S.policy will not be easily drawn. It was suggested, how-ever, that alternative expressions of self-determina-tion short of secession should be considered.

Focusing on U.S. policy toward actual self-determi-nation and separatist movements and the strategiesand options available to the United States to mediateor intercede in them, the Institute of Peace and theState Department’s Policy Planning Staff held a sec-ond meeting in March 1996 to examine ways that theUnited States and the international community mightwork to promote successful outcomes to territorial orseparatist disputes, with “successful” broadly definedas nonviolent and nonsecessionist. The matter easilybecomes extremely complicated, however, as so manyissues must be considered: the tenacity with whichthe principle of territorial integrity should be upheld,and the need to balance such various and often com-peting American foreign policy goals as human rights,strategic concerns, and economic interests. The ex-tent of U.S. leverage in any given situation must alsobe taken into account, because it clearly varies andthus becomes a determining factor in a policy re-sponse.

To create a framework for wider discussion of U.S.policy responses to self-determination movements,four very different case studies—the Kurds, Kashmir,Eritrea, and Tibet—were considered. These cases werechosen not because they are necessarily the most sig-nificant self-determination cases in the world today,nor the most violent, but because—as past, current,and potential future movements—they are representa-tive of the complexity of the problem. These cases arenot exhaustive examples of all such movements, butillustrative of self-determination claims at variousstages.

SELF-DETERMINATION AS A FOREIGNPOLICY DILEMMA

To give an idea of the scope of the self-determinationissue, Institute of Peace president Richard Solomonobserved that in 1945 there were only fifty-five nation-states in the world; in 1996, there were 185. Clearly,self-determination and secession are “pressing andvery live issues, presenting enormous dilemmas” topolicymakers throughout the world as they decidewhich peoples to support in the quest for self-deter-mination. Furthermore, since there are no clear prin-ciples regulating self-determination movements, thepolitics of these situations weighs heavily on the en-tire international community. James Steinberg of theDepartment of State added that there is hardly an em-ployee at the Department who is not involved in the

1INTRODUCTION

self-determination issue in some form. Instead ofviewing the issue in abstractions, analysis is neededthat directly links self-determination to what is atstake for the United States.

Obviously, Steinberg continued, all claims to self-determination cannot be treated in the same way.Nevertheless, “defensible criteria”—a set of tools to ap-proach the issue—might be developed that take intoaccount the moral component that reflects valuesdeeply rooted in American tradition. At the same time,Steinberg said, self-determination is linked to twovery sober realities: security and stability. The issue of

stability leads to that of governance, since an impor-tant factor helping to generate stability is a structureof governance that gives people the sense that mecha-nisms exist to resolve disputes through politicalrather than violent means. Another consideration ispluralism. It is ironic that some self-determinationmovements have very undemocratic aims, such as thecreation of a homogeneous, mono-ethnic state. In ap-proaching questions of self-determination, the extentto which there is a stake in preserving pluralism mustbe taken into account.

2

THE KURDS—BACKGROUND

The Kurds, some 20 to 22 million, are the largest dis-tinct nationality group in the world without a separatestate. Today, Kurds live in many different countries,though the largest numbers are found in Turkey, Iraq,and Iran. Unlike the primary language of two of thosecountries (Turkey and Iraq), Kurdish is an Iranianlanguage, related to Persian. However, the dialects ofdifferent Kurdish groups, even within one country,are often quite distinct and sometimes not completelymutually intelligible, and group histories frequentlydiverge also. These two points are often part of an ar-gument against the notion that the Kurds (at leastthose in these three countries) could ever be united inone territory. Whatever the accuracy or relevance ofthis argument, the “problem” stems, at least in part,from the treatment the Kurdish minority has receivedin its resident countries.

In Turkey, the presence of 12 to 14 million Kurdshas been a tense issue virtually since the country was established by Atatürk in 1923. In renouncingOttoman imperialism, Atatürk proposed limitedboundaries for the new Turkish republic with the con-viction that only members of the Turkish nation livedwithin its borders. In the process, the existence of thecountry’s largest minority group, the Kurds, was disre-garded. The Turkish government has upheld this tenetof exclusively Turkish nationhood by actively promot-ing the “assimilation” of the Kurdish population,

suppressing the Kurdish language and other manifes-tations of cultural distinctiveness. In the 1970s, an un-derground group called the Kurdistan Workers’ Party(PKK) formed to promote Kurdish rights. By the early1980s, the PKK had become violent, demanding self-determination through independence from Turkey.The Turkish military has since then been engagedwith the PKK in a brutal war that has taken the lives ofthousands of Turkish soldiers and PKK members, aswell as Turkish and Kurdish civilians.

The Turkish government views the situation pri-marily as the need to combat a terrorist, secessionistorganization. However, it has for many years been ac-cused by international human rights organizations,and the European Community—and, increasingly, theU.S. Department of State—of serious human rightsabuses against the civilian population, Turkish jour-nalists, and human rights activists in its fight againstthe PKK. During the Cold War, when Turkey‘s loca-tion made it a pivotal American ally, it was perhapsmore compelling for the United States to overlook theconflict. This has become an increasingly untenableposition, however, as violence continues to rage andthe key issue—the cultural and linguistic aspirationsof the Kurds in Turkey—has not been addressed.

A KURDISH NATION-STATE

Discussing the Kurdish question, Graham Fuller ofthe Rand Corporation raised the question of whysuch a large group has no separate nation-state. Whathappened in Kurdish history that statehood eludedthem, though it was gained by so many other groupsin the region? According to Fuller, the Kurds have al-ways ended up on the periphery of various Iranianand Ottoman empires and been divided among them.Now they remain divided, no longer by empires butby the states of Turkey, with twelve million Kurds;Iran with six; Iraq with four; and Syria with one. Inpart because of these geographical partitions, theKurds are divided into separate clans and groups insuch as way as to work against broader unity amongthem. Also, they speak many different dialects of alanguage related to Persian, and their dialects are fre-quently not mutually intelligible. The Kurds have tra-ditionally lived in mountainous regions, in isolationthat tends to magnify their linguistic differences. Andthe states in which they reside have all, at varioustimes, encouraged divisions among their Kurdishpopulations, not least to discourage any kind ofbroader unity.

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2SELF-DETERMINATION

Four Case Studies

Historically, according to Fuller, there was never astrong ethnic distinction between the Turks and theKurds. In the Ottoman period, ethnic differences werenot legally recognized among the Muslims in the em-pire, all members of the Islamic umma, though theywere among such non-Muslims as Greeks, Armenians,and Jews, who were given a separate status. The factthat Kurds never had a discrete status in the past in re-lation to the Turks is one of their problems today.

The Kurds had their best chance at statehood im-mediately following World War I, Fuller continued,when Anatolia was occupied by the Allied armies andthe issue of an independent Kurdish state was on theagenda at Versailles. However, “History reversed theissue,” Fuller said. Atatürk, leading the Turkish forces,reoccupied Kurdish areas in his attempt to carve out anew Turkish republic, and the matter of an indepen-dent state for the Kurds became moot. Atatürk de-manded homogeneity for the new country, and, in theface of Allied plans regarding the Kurds, he beganearly on to deny their distinctiveness. This has been,Fuller noted, one of the worst aspects of the modernTurkish republic—the blanket repression of all Kur-dish aspirations, even, until very recently, the ac-knowledgment of a clear Kurdish identity. There wasmuch “pseudo-scholarship” in Turkey, for example, toprove that Kurdish was not really a distinct language,but essentially Turkish with a jumble of other aspectsof grammar and vocabulary. The Kurds were officiallycalled “Mountain Turks” until only a few years ago.

At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey wasthreatened by an influx of one million refugees fromIraq, most of them Kurds. The Turks appealed to theUnited Nations for help, Fuller said, and with U.S. as-sistance succeeded in getting most of the refugeesback to northern Iraq, where a protective zone was setup. Though all the refugees stayed on the Iraqi side ofthe border after that, the consequence of the episodehad already become apparent: a heightened world un-derstanding of the plight of the Kurds and, indeed, anincreased awareness of their very existence. After theestablishment of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC),for the first time in Kurdish history, Kurdish leadersfrom northern Iraq went to Ankara to talk to Turkishofficials. As a result, a certain legitimacy was accordedthe “Kurdish problem” within Turkey, to the greatregret of many Turks. Consequently, many Turksregard OPC as a Western device to divide Turkey byencouraging Kurdish nationalism. This view of usingthe Kurds against Turkey may appear fanciful to

Westerners, Fuller said, but it is perhaps not so muchif one looks at how the Kurds have in fact been usedby outsiders in the past, first by the British to gain afoothold in the oil-bearing regions of Iraq, later by var-ious other states against Iran, Iraq, or Turkey. Still,Fuller maintained that the meetings between Turkishofficials and Kurds from northern Iraq did a great dealto illustrate the fact of Kurdish differences, of theKurds as a different people.

Because of their geographic and linguistic differ-ences, the Kurds have been slow, relatively speaking,to develop a strong sense of identity. Now, when theywant to press for something, they are very aware thatthey are Kurds, but they have not, Fuller said, alwaysbeen sure how to link their awareness of identity totheir regional aspirations. However, the creation of thePKK in Turkey brought about a change. The PKK be-gan as a radical Marxist-Leninist organization thateventually became a violent and terrorist one. But thesuccess of the PKK in raising and solidifying theKurds’ sense of identity cannot be denied.

In fact, Fuller contended, the PKK is the most suc-cessful Kurdish resistance organization ever. It haschallenged the Turkish government for more thantwelve years and has yet to be decisively defeated. TheTurkish government has put forth massive efforts tocrush the PKK—at great military, financial, and humancost, and with limited success. The government hasmanaged to put a lid on it, but once the lid is lifted, theproblems are likely to return, since once any grouphas raised its ethnic self-awareness, “There is no goingback.” Not all Kurds like the PKK, Fuller said; manysupport it not because they approve of its ideology ormethods but because it is the only entity standing forthem and their rights. The Turkish government deniesthis aspect of the PKK, claiming that it is only a groupof leftist terrorists. But in fact the PKK helped to crys-tallize Kurdish awareness in Turkey and to developthe understanding that Kurds are entitled to certainrights they do not now enjoy.

The PKK has retreated from its original demand foran independent pan-Kurdistan. According to Fuller,the PKK’s demands have now been modified to some-thing like a federative state guaranteeing autonomy forthe Kurds. The Turks, however, do not believe this—they fear it is a ploy—and firmly believe that any con-cession, even of linguistic rights, will eventually meanan end to the Turkish state—the “slippery slope” argu-ment. It is true that cultural and linguistic rights forthe Kurds in Turkey could become the focal point for

4

5

a broader movement for Kurds down the road, for it isimpossible to say definitively whether they alone willsuffice. In fact, Fuller maintained, it is no exaggerationto say that what happens to the Kurds in Turkey is inpart hostage to what happens in Iraq and Iran. Iraqileader Saddam Hussein’s “unbelievably gross malad-ministration” has created the best case for Kurdishseparatism ever—how could the Kurds of northernIraq ever return to the “lion’s den” of rule by Baghdad?It is simply impossible, Fuller claimed, to predict to-day whether there will be some sort of Kurdish state inthe future.

A GLOBAL PHENOMENON

The issue of the Kurds, Fuller contended, is related tothe much wider one of ethnic and national self-aware-ness—a phenomenon that is growing all over theworld. How it is stimulated does not necessarily mat-ter; the fact is that it is stimulated and rarely fadesaway. It may be true now that the PKK is made up onlyof a handful of “troublemakers” and that the majorityof Turkish Kurds do not support it, but the issue is, atbest, a moving target. Most separatist movementshave begun with only a handful of troublemakers, afew agitators, but quickly gain a wider audience.

There is also the economic factor: Is the groupbetter off economically if it secedes? In the case of theKurds (and most other groups), it is probably true thatthey would be worse off if they seceded. However, thatis not deterring many national leaders from believingin the importance of developing some sort of nation-based foundation for the day in the future when theeconomy improves. “We must be careful,” Fuller said,“lest we think that homo economicus rules” in all self-determination cases, including the Kurdish one.

Without a doubt, Fuller said, Turkey is a function-ing democracy. It has a flourishing civil society, fairlyfree press and parliament, real elections—governmentsdo come and go. However, Fuller maintained, democ-ratic institutions are not functioning to stop the Kur-dish problem—in fact they cease to be democratic inthe context of the Kurdish problem. The press doesnot cover it; the parliament does not talk about it; civilsociety does not discuss it. The subject is not officiallyforbidden, but self-censorship is practiced. It is unfor-tunately left to the Turkish military to attempt to eradi-cate the problem.

KASHMIR–THE BACKGROUND

The conflict over Kashmir (territories of the formerprincely state of Jammu and Kashmir, including Gilgitand Ladakh along the Chinese border) has long beena source of tension between India and Pakistan and isone of the world’s most intractable disputes. Of thethree wars fought between these two countries, twohave been specifically over this territory. The territoryof Jammu and Kashmir is now divided between thetwo along a cease-fire line (referred to as the Line ofControl), but the final status of the territory—its sover-eignty—has been in dispute since decolonization in1947. Since both India and Pakistan are now consid-ered near-nuclear powers, the threat of another roundof fighting over this small territory takes on a moreominous significance.

Kashmir is the only state in India in which Mus-lims, some 12 percent of India’s estimated 890 millionpeople, represent a majority. Pakistan disputes the le-gitimacy of Kashmir’s accession to India, but India hasconsistently maintained that the territory is an integralpart of India and any future dispensation must bemade in terms of the Indian constitution. Although In-dia originally devolved considerable autonomy to theterritory (Kashmir is the only state in India with itsown constitution), in practice India has increasinglygoverned it from the center. In the mid-1960s, in re-sponse to New Delhi’s tightened grip, some Kashmirisbegan to advocate violent means to bring about achange in the territory’s status, and this movementhas grown considerably over the decades.

The situation in Kashmir has grown more tenseand violent over the past eight years. Movementswithin Kashmir have asserted new demands for inde-pendence, autonomy, or accession to Pakistan andhave stepped up guerrilla activities within the terri-tory. The influence of Islamist movements has in-creased, and India accuses Pakistan of aiding theinsurgents. On the other hand, Pakistan and a numberof international human rights organizations have ac-cused India of serious, systematic human rightsabuses. Conflict has been especially acute in the Kash-mir Valley between the Pir Panjal and Pangi rangessouth of the highest peaks of the Karakoram Moun-tains. Some estimates suggest that as many as 12,000people have lost their lives in the conflict since 1989.

The Kashmir issue involves two problems thatoverlap and greatly complicate it, according to Walter

Andersen of the Department of State. The first is do-mestic: the six-year-old insurrection in the Indian stateof Jammu and Kashmir. The second is the role the is-sue plays in India’s relations with Pakistan. There arelinks between these two problems, but they cannot,Andersen said, be solved simultaneously, though theissue arouses great passions on all sides. The Islamistsin Pakistan demand that their government make nocompromises on the matter, and the government posi-tion is that a plebiscite must be held in Kashmir to de-termine its future. In India, Hindu nationalistsdemand that the autonomy rights guaranteed to Kash-mir when it first entered the state should be discarded.The two countries are at present completely polarizedin their positions on Kashmir. India says the state is aninalienable part of the Indian union; Pakistan de-mands a plebiscite. However, the violent insurrection,as the more immediate problem, must be dealt withfirst. Not until some measure of calm is restored inKashmir will India and Pakistan begin to sort out theirdifferences, including the problem of Kashmir, andthere has been a virtual freeze in diplomatic relationssince 1994.

Jammu and Kashmir, Andersen explained, has al-ways been a distinctive state in the federal, multina-tional Indian union; it is the only state that wasaccorded constitutionally guaranteed autonomy.When the British left India, they allowed 500 or soprinces to decide whether they wanted to join India orPakistan or remain independent. Maharaja Hari Singhof the Muslim-majority princely state of Jammu andKashmir “dithered” in his decision, and as a conse-quence, Pakistan, which also claimed the region, sym-pathized with the action of tribal groups fromAfghanistan and Pakistan when they attacked the Valeof Kashmir, the core area and the center of the dispute.As a result, the Maharaja asked India’s first governor-general, Lord Louis Mountbatten, for troops to assist;Mountbatten agreed to provide them, on the condi-tion that the Maharaja also agree to accede to the In-dian Union.

The accession agreement contained two conditionsthat have caused the fundamental problems today,Andersen said. The first required the government inKashmir to consult the people to determine their polit-ical future, and the second stipulated that the Indiangovernment would protect the unique culture ofKashmir. The leader in Kashmir at the time, SheikhAbdullah, agreed to this arrangement with the under-standing that the Indians would also promote democ-racy in Kashmir. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian prime

minister, abided by one part of the bargain by protect-ing the political autonomy of Kashmir with a constitu-tional provision (article 370 in the Indianconstitution) which stated that all authority will begiven to the Kashmiris themselves, with the exceptionof authority over defense, foreign affairs, and currency.The pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, however,was not carried out; Indians argue that the election ofa constitutional assembly in Kashmir in the early1950s was the functional equivalent of a plebiscite.

The autonomy provisions outlined in article 370were official policy from 1950 on, and from 1952through 1982 the situation was relatively calm, bro-ken only by a few short periods of violence. Turnoutsin Kashmiri elections were relatively high; pro-plebiscite parties in Kashmir received approximatelyone-fifth of the vote. However, the Indian governmentbegan slowly to alter the contract with Kashmir on po-litical autonomy and to “whittle away” at Kashmir’s au-tonomy. Some of these actions were symbolic, such asreplacing uniquely Kashmiri names in public placeswith terms applicable to other Indian states. Others,however, were more substantive: India’s legal systemand elite administrative service were extended toKashmir, and the Indian president was given emer-gency powers over the region. The situation was exac-erbated further at the end of the 1980s, Andersen said,when Kashmiri politicians were manipulated by theIndian government. There was then significant riggingof elections in Kashmir in 1987, one of the factors thatled to the surge of anti-Indian violence in 1989.

The Indian government initially responded to theviolence as if it were a matter mainly of law and order.In the early 1990s, the Indian government consideredholding elections in Kashmir, the beginning of the im-plementation of what some call the “Punjab solution.”In the Punjab state, tough law and order policies wereused to isolate Sikh militants; then elections were heldto legitimate the political solution. However, this maynot work in Kashmir, Andersen contended. The mainpolitical issue in the Punjab is access to water re-sources, something that can be solved by the govern-ment; in Kashmir, on the other hand, the issue ispolitical autonomy for people who think of them-selves as ethnically different from the rest of the popu-lation in South Asia. Officials elected in Kashmirunder the conditions used in the Punjab would haveproblems establishing their credibility among Kash-miris unless they also demonstrated a commitment toautonomy. This is why, according to Andersen, there

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can be no lasting solution for Kashmir until the auton-omy issue is addressed.

The Kashmir issue is one of the flashpoints inIndia’s relations with neighboring Pakistan, whichsupports self-determination for the largely MuslimKashmiris. Today, both governments are, according toAndersen, in a “conceptual rut.” Pakistan insists on theimplementation of forty-five-year-old UN resolutionscalling for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which it knows thatIndia will not accept. On the other hand, the furthestthe Indians are willing to go is to suggest the Line ofControl (which separates Indian Kashmir from thatpart of the state held by Pakistan) as the final interna-tional boundary. However, because this solutionleaves the Vale of Kashmir inside India, Pakistan re-jects it. Both sides claim to want to avoid war overKashmir, though there have been two already: in1948–49 and 1965. (The 1971 Indo-Pakistani war wasmainly over the rebellion in East Pakistan, nowBangladesh.) There was also a “near-miss” in 1990,when the two countries almost came to blows. TheU.S. administration sent presidential envoy RobertGates to both countries, and he was able to get themto retreat from the brink of military conflict. Since1965, the Indians have refused all efforts at mediationover the Kashmiri situation with the claim that it is aninternal matter. Pakistan claims to want mediation,but essentially on its own terms.

India’s ethnic problems hardly stop with Kashmir,though. Andersen noted that ethnic discontent affectsother areas in the multi-ethnic state. The situations ofthe Bodos in Assam and the Gurkhas in West Bengalare as complicated as that in Kashmir. The Bodo peo-ple fear being overwhelmed by the Assamese, whilethe Assamese have an ethnic problem themselves,fearing they will be overwhelmed by Bengalis andBangladeshis. At the same time, the Assamese feelthreatened by increasing Bodo assertiveness. The In-dian government is fearful of the “slippery slope”precedent that it believes could occur if secession ispermitted for any ethnic group, such as the Kashmiri-speaking Muslims.

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE DISPUTE

According to Andersen, the key issue for the UnitedStates has been to avoid yet another Indo-Pakistaniwar over Kashmir. The U.S. mission in 1989–90 pro-vided sufficient political cover for both sides to with-draw their troops. The United States must be preparedto do this again if the situation warrants, and be

prepared also to suggest confidence-building mea-sures (CBMs), as Gates did in 1990. Unfortunately, theCBMs agreed to and formally adopted were neverhonored by either side. Still, tension was diminished.

There are trade-offs for both India and Pakistan inseeing the Kashmir issue resolved. Continued ten-sions inside Kashmir make the Indians look bad inter-nationally, said Andersen. On the other side, Pakistanwould gain a more secure eastern border with India ifthe Kashmir issue were resolved.

In both cases, Andersen said, the United Statesshould, despite its relatively weak leverage, suggestthat India and Pakistan take steps to solve the prob-lems inside Kashmir. Only when tensions withinKashmir diminish will either side have the politicalwill to adopt the necessary innovations to solve theirlarger bilateral problems. A number of possible solu-tions have been proposed, including the establish-ment of “soft borders,” a “condominium,” or somekind of free trade zone covering India, Pakistan, andKashmir. Nevertheless, the central issue of the turmoilin Kashmir has to be addressed first. A genuinely sus-tainable peace is unlikely unless there is a return to au-tonomy for Kashmir as stipulated in the originalpromise to Sheikh Abdullah.

To get the Indians and moderate Kashmiris to ar-rive at a political agreement, Andersen said, there al-most certainly must be a return to some version of theoriginal agreement. A return to the “diluted” 1975agreement between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdul-lah will probably be insufficient, as views in Kashmirhave hardened after six years of insurrection. EvenSheikh Abdullah’s son, Farukh Abdullah, who sup-ports a political agreement that leaves Kashmir withinthe Indian Union, has rejected the 1975 agreement.There are compelling reasons for Indians to arrive atsome settlement with the Kashmiris: The problem getsin the way of India’s desire to appear an attractiveplace for foreign investment, and it impedes India’shope of playing a significant role in world affairs. Onlywhen some semblance of peace returns to Kashmirwill the time be ripe to restart Indo-Pakistani negotia-tions on other issues.

ERITREA—BACKGROUND

Eritrea is an example of the emergence of a new statethat has been accepted by the international commu-nity. Eritrea, a colony of Italy for more than fifty years,was liberated after World War I and became a memberof the League of Nations. It was occupied by Italy

again from 1936 through 1942 and, after the end ofWorld War II, became a ward of the United Nations.In 1952, a confederal system was set up in which Er-itrea and Ethiopia would be equal and confederatedparts of the same state. In the early 1960s, however,the Ethiopian government under Emperor Haile Se-lassie began undermining Eritrea’s autonomy, essen-tially occupying the region in 1962 and incorporatingit into a centralized state. This act triggered an Er-itrean insurgency that lasted almost thirty years. Withthe downfall of the Soviet Union, by then theEthiopian government’s primary backer, the Eritreanarmy was victorious over Ethiopia’s forces. The culmi-nation was the 1991 referendum in which Eritreansvoted overwhelmingly for independence and whichthe Ethiopian government had no choice but toaccept.

The case of Eritrea is unusual. It has technicallybeen resolved, the small nation having successfullyseceded from Ethiopia and become an independentstate. According to former assistant secretary of statefor African Affairs Herman Cohen, of the Center forStrategic and International Studies, the confederal so-lution adopted in 1952 between Ethiopia and Eritreahad seemed perfect. Ethiopia’s main concern wasmaintaining access to the sea, and Djibouti, underFrench control, was its only passage. With the 1952agreement, Eritrea got maximum autonomy over itsown affairs—its primary aim—and Ethiopia got accessto the sea through Eritrea. The federal government inAddis Ababa had control only over the ports, cur-rency, civil aviation, and external defense. The situa-tion changed in the early 1960s, however, whensenior advisors of Emperor Haile Selassie suggestedthat having such a small region in his domain notunder his complete control was unacceptable to hishonor and prestige. The Ethiopian government beganslowly to undermine Eritrea’s autonomy and theconfederal relationship.

In 1962, the Ethiopian government engineered asort of Anschluss by surrounding the Eritrean parlia-ment, Cohen continued. Many in the Eritrean parlia-ment tried to escape to avoid having to vote underthreat of force; those left in the parliament eventually“voted” to join Ethiopia, and Eritrea was forced to giveup its autonomy and become simply anotherEthiopian province. Though the American consulatedescribed the event as a repressive act, the UnitedStates did not officially protest, primarily because ofthe extremely important American naval communica-tions station in Asmara. (Also, Ethiopia had sent a

battalion to fight in the Korean War, something thatwas still very well remembered and appreciated inWashington.) In Eritrea, however, the 1962 act trig-gered an insurgency against the Ethiopian govern-ment—a war for self-determination.

The 1974 coup in Ethiopia led to a change of sidesin the Cold War game as the new government ofMengistu Haile Mariam, Marxist-Leninist in orienta-tion, became a client of and dependent on Moscow.The Soviets became increasingly involved inEthiopian affairs and started a massive flow of arms tothe government. This led the United States to sympa-thize more openly with the Eritrean cause. There wereno large arms transfers to the Eritreans, however, notleast because the Eritrean rebels also referred to them-selves as Marxists, which did not help their cause inWashington. In the 1980s, the Eritreans began the tac-tically shrewd policy of supporting the Tigrean Peo-ple’s Liberation Front (from another province in thecountry), thereby expanding the opposition to theEthiopian government.

U.S. ROLE IN THE EMERGENCE OFERITREA

According to Cohen, the United States did not expectto have a large role in this conflict—and certainly notin its resolution. However, as relations with the SovietUnion began to improve in the late 1980s, the UnitedStates adopted a policy of cautious cooperation in re-solving any regional conflicts. At that time, the Sovi-ets’ worst problem was the conflict in Ethiopia,particularly due to the heavy burden of arms delivery.The Americans first suggested to the Soviets that theytry mediation between the Ethiopian government andthe Eritreans through a non-governmental organiza-tion (NGO), and in 1989–90, former president JimmyCarter attempted to resolve the conflict. This attemptwas not successful, however, because the Eritreansdid not have enough confidence in Carter and askedinstead for the official intervention of the U.S. govern-ment, thus beginning the direct role of the UnitedStates in negotiating an end to the Eritrean-Ethiopianconflict.

American officials, Cohen continued, looked firstto the original 1952 confederal agreement as a solu-tion, asking both parties to return to the status quo.This may have been acceptable to the Eritreans in themid-1980s, when they were militarily weak; by 1990,however, the insurgents were gaining the upper handand would accept only maximum autonomy. In

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1991, the Ethiopian government’s military positiondeteriorated even further, and it was willing to makegreater concessions. By this time, however, the Eritre-ans had no need to compromise at all, as they, alongwith the Tigreans, had essentially won the war. U.S.officials, then, were essentially left in the position of“picking up the pieces,” Cohen said. A conference wasconvened in London in May 1991 to work out an ac-ceptable settlement, which included a delay of threeyears before a self-determination referendum wouldbe held in Eritrea to ease the “shock” of the expectedoutcome, and the establishment of a common marketthat would give Ethiopia access to the ports. Further-more, the referendum was to include the option ofstaying in Ethiopia.

This arrangement contained an overt reference toself-determination, Cohen continued, even thoughthe overall U.S. policy for Africa has been to supportthe principle of territorial integrity. This was in agree-ment with the Organization for African Unity’s 1962principle that colonial borders, though illogicallydrawn, should remain in place to avoid even greaterbloodshed. Nevertheless, it was decided to considerEritrea a special case. However, when U.S. negotiatorsannounced at a press conference in London that theUnited States would support a referendum on self-determination, official Washington became alarmed.At that time, Cohen explained, the United States wasunder pressure from Germany to recognize self-deter-mination for Slovenia and Croatia, which was notthen U.S. policy. Nevertheless, the alarm was over-come; there was a general feeling that justice was be-ing done in Eritrea because of the violent means of the1962 annexation that robbed it of its UN-awardedsovereignty. In any case, in the meantime, the Tigreaninsurgents took control of the Ethiopian governmentand themselves agreed to a self-determination refer-endum for Eritrea. By then, Cohen said, there was noneed for outside opinion. In the end, the Ethiopianstate agreed to dismember itself.

Now, ironically, after the Eritreans voted over-whelmingly in favor of independence, Ethiopia andEritrea have in many ways returned to the situation of1952. There is a common market between them, free-dom of movement, and complete access to ports. Fur-thermore, there are Eritreans in high positions in theEthiopian government, and political relations be-tween the two states are very close. In other words,Cohen commented, they had twenty-nine years of war only to return to the original arrangement.

TIBET—BACKGROUND

A Tibetan self-determination movement is simmering,with the potential of coming to a boil in the future.Due in large part to the policies of the current regimein Beijing, which state categorically that indepen-dence for Tibet is absolutely nonnegotiable, many feelcertain that Tibet will never develop the kind of activesecessionist movement found elsewhere in the world.However, following the breakup of the Soviet Union,which would have seemed impossible only a year be-fore it occurred, it is now risky to make any categori-cal assumptions, and Tibet may serve as a goodexample of a potentially explosive situation.

Though it was never formally recognized by theLeague of Nations or the United Nations, Tibet in theperiod 1911–49 had an independent government,currency, army, judicial and postal systems, and ad-ministration. Furthermore, the Tibetan governmentenjoyed formal bilateral relations with the neighbor-ing countries of Mongolia, Nepal, India, and Bhutan,and concluded treaties with China and Great Britain.In 1949–51, the newly established People’s Republicof China (PRC), in what it described as “the peacefulliberation of Tibet,” sent military forces into Tibet andimposed a new political order that remains in placetoday. The PRC claimed and continues to maintainthat this action was supported by the people of everyethnic group in Tibet.

Although the Chinese government claims to re-spect the autonomy and cultural and religious free-dom of the Tibetan people, it has engaged inrepressive policies towards Tibetans and TibetanBuddhist religious and cultural practices. U.S. Depart-ment of State and U.S. Senate reports have repeatedlydocumented systematic human rights violations in Ti-bet, particularly against monks and nuns, not least be-cause of the Chinese government’s ideologicalhostility toward religion but also because Tibetan dis-tinctiveness is viewed as a threat. In addition, the Chi-nese government has encouraged large numbers ofChinese to emigrate to Tibet. As a consequence, theTibetans harbor strong anti-Chinese sentiments, andmany fervently assert their right to self-determinationand independence from China’s illegal occupation oftheir country. While there has been no violence re-cently—and many observers consider self-determina-tion a non-starter given the current state of politics inChina—the situation is not likely to remain static.

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Moreover, this case has a higher profile in the Westthan many others.

Tibet is somewhat different from the other self-determination cases discussed here, according toMelvyn Goldstein of Case Western Reserve Univer-sity, for a number of reasons. Its supporters have astrong historical case for their right to self-determina-tion; the U.S. government has been actively involvedin the Tibet conflict since the late 1940s; and an ener-getic and emotionally engaged group of Americansupporters has been able to insert the Tibet questioninto U.S. domestic politics via Congress and the hu-man rights community. These factors notwithstand-ing, Goldstein said, there is no U.S. governmentsupport for Tibetan self-determination and no likeli-hood that this will change in the foreseeable future.Consequently, the Tibet conflict is likely to fester. Thegenie of violence and terrorism is not yet out of thebottle, but the situation appears likely to degenerate.

The dispute over Tibet’s political status vis-à-visChina began in the eighteenth century, Goldstein con-tinued, when the Manchu dynasty sent several armiesto Tibet and imposed a “loose protectorate.” TheManchu, however, had no interest in directly absorb-ing and administering Tibet and were satisfied withposting a few Imperial commissioners in Lhasa to-gether with a small garrison. Tibet continued to beruled day to day by its own government, laws, and of-ficials.

Internationalization of the Tibet question began atthe turn of the twentieth century when the British inIndia attempted to extend their influence into the re-gion. Tibet rebuffed their overtures, Goldstein said,and the British responded by invading the country in1903–04 and imposing a treaty that gave the Empirethe right to station officials in Tibet and conduct traderelations. Despite this, Britain did not try to convertTibet into a protectorate and in fact quickly signednew agreements on Tibet with China and Russia reaf-firming Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. However, thespecter of British troops marching into Lhasa shockedthe Manchu and led them for the first time to take ac-tive steps to integrate Tibet more closely with the restof China. This integration policy did not have a lastingimpact only because the Manchu dynasty was itselfoverthrown in 1911. At that juncture, Tibet expelledall remaining Chinese officials, declaring it would ruleits country without any interference from China.From 1913 through 1951, Tibet functioned as a defacto independent polity.

However, the Chinese governments that suc-ceeded the Manchu dynasty insisted that Tibet was apart of China and must be reunited with it, Goldsteinsaid. Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United Statesimplicitly supported this by recognizing only Tibetanautonomy under Chinese suzerainty, even though itwas clear that China exercised no control over Tibetand that Britain and other countries routinely dealtwith Tibet directly.

Goldstein gave an example of how implementationof this policy helped to confound the issue. In 1948,the Tibetan government sent a “trade” delegation tothe United States that was allowed to enter the coun-try despite the U.S. policy of considering Tibet part ofChina. However, as a result of Chinese protests, theState Department refused to permit the Tibetans tomeet with President Truman unless they agreed to beaccompanied by the Chinese ambassador. The Ti-betans demurred, Goldstein continued, but did notcome away empty-handed, as the United States thenallowed them to meet the secretary of state without aChinese “escort.” Both sides later claimed that theseevents demonstrated the validity of their position.Much of the confusion over the status of Tibet todayhas its roots in such deliberate inconsistency on thepart of the Western democracies.

When the communists defeated Chiang Kai-shekin 1949 and established the PRC, Goldstein said, theyset out to reunify all provinces and territories that hadbeen part of China in the past, including Tibet. The Ti-betan government rejected Chinese claims of sover-eignty and refused to open negotiations with Chinaover “reunification,” seeking instead military anddiplomatic support from the United States, Britain,and India. According to Goldstein, however, Tibet re-ceived virtually no such diplomatic support. In Octo-ber 1950, China invaded Tibet’s easternmostprovince to force the Tibetan government to negotiatea reunification agreement. The Dalai Lama turned tothe United States and the UN for help but again re-ceived none.

Tibet then reluctantly sent representatives to Bei-jing and signed the Seventeen Point Agreement underwhose terms Tibet accepted Chinese sovereignty inreturn for the maintenance of the Dalai Lama’s gov-ernment in Tibet for the immediate future. Reforms ofthe old feudal system under the agreement would notbe implemented until the Tibetan leaders and peoplerequested them. For a number of reasons, this agree-ment lasted only eight years. In 1959, there was an

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abortive uprising in Tibet and the Dalai Lama fled toIndia. In exile, the Dalai Lama renounced the validityof the Seventeen Point Agreement, declaring Tibet anindependent country illegally conquered by China.The Chinese government also renounced the agree-ment and terminated the old Tibetan government, im-plementing “socialist reforms” that ended the feudalmanorial and monastic systems. During the devastat-ing Chinese cultural revolution of the 1960s, Gold-stein said, Tibetan religion and culture were attackedand suppressed.

THE U.S. RESPONSE

Before the communists took power in 1949, U.S.policy had consistently recognized Tibet only as anautonomous part of China, since Washington had nointerest in supporting Tibet’s political claims againstthose of its ally, Chiang Kai-shek. However, after thefounding of the PRC, Washington sought to use Tibetagainst China as part of its general China containmentpolicy. In 1951, for example, the U.S. government triedvigorously to persuade the Dalai Lama to reject theSeventeen Point Agreement. The United States, ac-cording to Goldstein, also went beyond words, ac-tively trying to undermine China’s position in Tibet.Starting in 1957, the CIA began training Tibetans tofight against the Chinese, even dropping them backinto Tibet. After the Dalai Lama’s exile in 1959, theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) continued to sup-port the Tibetan guerrilla organization, helping it es-tablish a base of operations in the Mustang area ofNepal.

Despite such aid, Goldstein said, the United Statesnever gave the Tibetans the diplomatic aid theywanted—active support on the international stage forTibet’s de jure independence. The closest they got wasthe February 1960 statement of Secretary of StateChristian Herter to the Dalai Lama. Herter wrote, “Asyou know, while it has been the historical position ofthe United States to consider Tibet as an autonomouscountry under the suzerainty of China, the Americanpeople have also traditionally stood for the principleof self-determination. It is the belief of the U.S. govern-ment that this principle should apply to the people ofTibet and that they should have the determining voicein their own political destiny.”

China, however, continued to claim sovereigntyover Tibet, and the United States did not try to changeinternational opinion in this regard. The U.S.–backed

guerrillas, moreover, were ineffectual and exerted nomeaningful pressure on China’s control of Tibet. Notsurprisingly, Goldstein continued, when China’s placein U.S. foreign relations began to shift in the late1960s, support for the guerrillas ceased. From thenuntil the 1980s, the United States largely ignored theTibet issue, considering it no longer of geopolitical orstrategic interest.

The rise of Deng Xiaoping in China at the end ofthe 1970s produced a major Chinese initiative to re-solve the Tibet question, according to Goldstein. In1979, 1980, and 1981, exiled Tibetans sent fact-finding delegations to Tibet at Deng’s invitation, andin 1982, face-to-face negotiations were held in Beijing.China was willing to afford the Dalai Lama a substan-tial degree of cultural, linguistic, and religious auton-omy in Tibet (the Tibet Autonomous Region)—andpossibly even substantial ethnic homogeneity—if heaccepted Chinese sovereignty and gave up all claimsto independence. The Tibetan government in exile,however, wanted nothing less than full political auton-omy, Goldstein said, as well as the political unificationof Tibetans living in neighboring Chinese provincesunder an autonomous Tibetan government. The nego-tiations quickly broke down.

In the meantime, Goldstein suggested, Beijing triedto win over the loyalty of the Tibetans without theDalai Lama by allowing a revival of Tibetan cultureand religion, while the Tibetans in exile launched acampaign to internationalize the issue of Tibet’s statusand, in particular, to harness American power and in-fluence as leverage for securing better terms from Bei-jing. This new initiative played to the long-standingAmerican moral commitment to human rights andWilsonian ideals and concentrated its efforts on Con-gress rather than the State Department. In one sense,Goldstein pointed out, the campaign has been remark-ably successful: Over the past decade Congress has be-come a vocal supporter of the Tibetans in exile, hasinserted statements in legislation that criticize Chinesepolicies in Tibet (including references to Tibet as a“captive nation”) and has sought to fan the flames ofopposition to China in Tibet by authorizing Tibetanlanguage broadcasts on the Voice of America (VOA)and Radio Free Asia. The emergence of the Tibet issuein American politics has also exerted pressure on theexecutive branch. Both Presidents Bush and Clintonhave met privately with the Dalai Lama (though intechnically “informal” meetings). The exiles’ positionwas also strengthened by a series of political demon-

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strations in Lhasa, led by Tibetan monks and nuns, insupport of the Dalai Lama and independence.

Despite such successes, the internationalizationstrategy of the Dalai Lama has been a disappointingfailure overall, Goldstein contended. The support ofthe U.S. government has been token—while theUnited States implores China to adhere to humanrights norms in Tibet and to preserve Tibetan cultureand religion, and periodically urges the Dalai Lamaand Beijing to negotiate their differences, it simultane-ously assures Beijing that it accepts Chinese sover-eignty over Tibet. In the end, Goldstein asserted,China is perceived as too important to risk worsenedrelations over either human rights or the political sta-tus of 5 million Tibetans. Consequently, while theDalai Lama’s successes have made Tibetan exiles andtheir supporters “feel good,” there has not been anymore movement toward a real settlement of the Tibetquestion since the campaign was launched. In fact,Goldstein said, the Tibetans are worse off, because thecampaign has led to a shift in China’s policy towardthe region.

While the international campaign was registeringsuccesses in the United States and on the streets ofLhasa, Beijing reacted predictably, Goldstein contin-ued, agitated by what it felt was unwarranted Ameri-can meddling in a strategically important part of itscountry and the political disturbances it felt were inpart fomented by the Dalai Lama and symbolic Ameri-can support for him. Beijing implemented a new pol-icy of pursuing rapid economic development despiteTibetan cultural and religious sensibilities, in theprocess pumping large amounts of money into the re-gion and creating a development boom that drewlarge numbers of non-Tibetan (Han and Chinese Mus-lim or Hui) workers into Tibet. Today, Goldsteinnoted, there are very likely more non-Tibetans thanTibetans in Lhasa, though they see themselves not ascolonists in the traditional sense but as temporaryworkers. Nevertheless, their growing numbers arechanging the character of Tibet, endangering, for thefirst time in history, Tibet’s demographic and ethnichomogeneity. The Dalai Lama deplores these devel-opments but is helpless to stop them, and his sup-porters in the United States are unwilling or unable touse U.S. power to assist him. They can hold “glitzybenefits” on his behalf, but they cannot influence Bei-jing’s policies, rendering the Dalai Lama’s victoriesthrough his international campaign largely Pyrrhic,Goldstein contended.

The Dalai Lama is now under pressure to developa strategy to counter these trends and preserve a cul-turally and demographically homogeneous home-land for his people—even if politically it is part ofChina. His options, however, are less than ideal. Hecould accept a high degree of cultural and demo-graphic autonomy in exchange for accepting Chinesesovereignty over Tibet, abandoning the demand forindependence or even political autonomy, or he couldattempt to force China to alter its current policies bysanctioning, however implicitly, a campaign of vio-lence and terrorism in Tibet. The latter strategy wouldbe personally deplorable to him, yet compromisingwith China would also be unpalatable. Nevertheless,if he chooses inaction, according to Goldstein, andthe situation continues to deteriorate, the Dalai Lamais unlikely to be able to stop his followers from resort-ing to organized violence whatever his personalviews.

IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES?

The U.S. government’s low risk policy of balancingsymbolic gestures, such as Tibetan VOA broadcastsand unofficial presidential meetings with the DalaiLama, with assurances to Beijing that the UnitedStates will not challenge its claims to Tibet has beenshortsighted and counterproductive, Goldstein as-serted. Ironically, this policy has also increased thelikelihood of violence in Tibet: By giving the Tibetansthe false impression that the United States supportsthem in their struggle against Beijing, it has encour-aged demonstrations in Tibet and the political confi-dence to resist compromise with the Chinesegovernment. It has also been a factor in Beijing’s deci-sion to jettison the strategy of ethnic conciliation in fa-vor of a new policy that emphasizes integration anddevelopment. Thus, Goldstein contended, the DalaiLama’s current dilemma is in part the unintendedconsequence of what the United States thought was alow-cost strategy.

According to Goldstein, the United States shouldinstead take an active role in fostering a compromise.It will have to halt the misleading signals from Wash-ington and replace merely urging both sides to holdtalks with a concerted effort to persuade the DalaiLama that it is in the interest of the Tibetan people toaccept the “cultural” compromise that is probably stillavailable. This will not be easy, Goldstein conceded,

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but if successful, it could prevent an outbreak of seri-ous violence in Tibet, preserve Tibet as a cultural andreligious homeland for Tibetans, and ensure that theconflict does not cause a further deterioration inU.S.–Chinese relations.

NEGOTIATIONS

According to Morton Halperin of the Council on For-eign Relations, the Clinton administration has beentrying to encourage negotiations on Tibet. The keyissue, he said, is the relation between the Tibetans’claim to independence and their approach to negotia-tions with the Chinese. The Americans have pressedthe Tibetans to approach talks making it explicit thatthey do not consider independence for Tibet to be on

the table. At the same time, there was a commitmentfrom the Chinese to hold talks if the Tibetans wouldagree not to raise independence. The Dalai Lama ini-tially agreed to this arrangement. However, the Chi-nese then pulled back, demanding that the DalaiLama withdraw his earlier claim to independence andstating that only under those terms would they bewilling to discuss autonomy. The Dalai Lama re-sponded that he was prepared not to raise the issuewith the Chinese, but not to renounce independenceentirely. There the situation stalemated, Halperinsaid. The United States believes that negotiationswould be very valuable. Unfortunately, congressionalopinion is leading the Tibetans to feel that a resort toviolence will meet with more U.S. support than islikely.

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Hurst Hannum of the Fletcher School of Lawand Diplomacy at Tufts University main-tained that in all four of the cases discussed,

repression by the central government was the primeinstigator of secessionist struggles. These self-deter-mination movements did not suddenly arise amonggroups who decided to seek the right to an indepen-dent state. Since the central government was largely atfault in all four cases, Hannum contended, it shouldnot have been so difficult for the United States to de-velop a response. The problem was, however, that theUnited States responded to each of them only interms of the right to self-determination. Today, theUnited States can more easily respond to instances ofcentral government repression by invoking widelyknown and accepted human rights norms. As soon asthe United States raised the issue of self-determina-tion in the countries discussed above, Hannum said,at the same time criticizing the governments involved,it was seen as interfering with the domestic constitu-tional arrangement in those countries, something theU.S. government would greatly resent if there were asimilar attempt to interfere in its own domestic politi-cal arrangements.

In fact, Hannum continued, it is possible to learnfrom these four cases precisely how not to respond tosuch situations. They were not issues of self-determi-nation but of human rights, and they should havebeen dealt with as such. At the same time, and in the

absence of major human rights violations, the UnitedStates should make clear that it has no position onstates that wish to separate, as long as separation isconsensual. Thus, Eritrea was not an issue of self-determination or secession—Ethiopia and Eritreaagreed to divide. If it had not been consensual, it islikely that the United States would have opposed it.

The distinction between morality and realpolitik inself-determination cases is misleading, Hannum said.If consideration of U.S. national security interests orthe spread of violence is not considered “moral” butconcern for self-determination is, there are seriousflaws in how the entire matter is viewed. Promotingself-determination, according to Hannum, is neithermore nor less moral than desiring protection from nu-clear holocaust, promoting human rights no less apolicy of realpolitik than opposing communism. Themisguided conflation of morality and realpolitik un-dervalues both the morality of legitimate security con-cerns and the realpolitik aspects of human rights,minority rights, and self-determination.

Halperin disagreed, suggesting that the main prob-lem is not that the United States unnecessarily raisedthe issue of self-determination but that there has beenan overemphasis on territorial integrity. The positionof the international community in all four cases, hesaid, has been that the primary concern was territorialintegrity. The four central governments were led tounderstand that no matter how badly they treated thepeople inside their boundaries, no matter the extentto which they abandoned their commitments to au-tonomy for various minorities, the international com-munity would proclaim the need to maintainterritorial integrity at all costs. This stance impliesalso that what happens inside a territory is the busi-ness only of the central government concerned. This,Halperin maintained, has been the main internationalmessage to central governments engaged in repres-sion, and it must change. The United States ought tobe telling those governments that if their repressivepolicies continue—and especially if they worsen—itwill be forced to support the secessionist movement.Self-determination, Halperin said, becomes justifiedunder such repressive conditions. In any case, notedPatricia Carley of the Institute of Peace, many casesmay have started out as human rights problems—thatof the Kurds, for example—but very quickly adoptedthe language of self-determination movements. Re-gardless of their human rights origin, they unques-tionably became self-determination problems.

3SELF-DETERMINATION,HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

GOOD GOVERNANCE

14

Cohen noted that the politics of the decolonizationperiod thirty to forty years ago was more straightfor-ward, solving the “easy cases” and leaving the morecomplex ones. The bottom line, he said, is that thenation-state is still the primary unit in the worldorder, and thus self-determination must be viewedwith the assumption that the nation-state should bepreserved. It is clear that many self-determinationclaims are not legitimate; however, even in those caseswhere self-determination movements have developedin response to government repression, U.S. policyshould not be to support secessionist claims but in-stead to pressure governments to “clean up their acts.”Graham Fuller responded that, in fact, there arehardly any “nation-states” in existence today. The na-tion-state as such is actually a very subversive idea, es-pecially in such places as Africa, where the attempt toestablish true nation-states would ignite a furious anddestabilizing spate of border changes. Cohen coun-tered that the correct term would then be “state” andnot “nation-state,” and it is, for better or worse, the pri-mary legal entity in the world today. At the same time,he said, the international community should be in aposition to suggest a “divorce” for groups that simplycannot live together in one state; for example, in thecases of Rwanda and Burundi, where it seems increas-ingly logical simply to split up the two warring tribes.Sudan is perhaps another case.

In the Middle East and other regions, Fuller said,many see American concern about human rights aspurely instrumental, a method of attempting toachieve U.S. foreign policy gains at the expense of itsenemies. Not a few people might argue that humanrights are not universal standards but exist only forthose people the United States cares about. If con-cerns about geopolitics continually intervene, it leadsothers to see U.S. interest in human rights as merce-nary only. Yet the United States must consider how todeal with the realities of the “superpower game,” saidDave Scheffer of the Department of State. The twoother “mega-states,” Russia and China, are both per-manent members of the UN Security Council. Everyday, the United States must weigh how far to push,when to pull back, whether to challenge certain poli-cies and goals, with the understanding that either ofthese countries can thwart U.S. aims at any time. Thequestion arises of how the United States will play thesuperpower game with these and other countries andat the same time cope with concerns about humanrights.

There need not be inconsistency between humanrights and moral concerns on the one hand and pro-moting political stability and territorial integrity onthe other, contended Robin Raphel of the Departmentof State. For any situation truly to be stable, these andother factors must balance. There may be times whenU.S. policy is distracted because a certain aspect of aparticular country is under focus, but it is one part ofa greater picture. Thus, care should be taken not to ac-cept the claim of inconsistency between human rightsand, say, business interests.

The bottom line, Hannum said, is that there simplyare not any “silver bullets” to cure all the problems re-lated to self-determination. The UN Charter did notdo away with war, even though that was its aim. In thesame way, it is not fair to criticize attempts to addressminority, human rights, and self-determination issuesby simply attacking the flaws in codes written to ad-dress them. The state system has been around formore than 400 years; “human rights”—even as aphrase—barely 50, and basic human rights covenantsonly 20. The whole “human rights project” is reallyjust beginning, Hannum said, and its fruits will notlikely be evident to the current generation. The per-spective should not be so short-term.

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Perhaps not all ethnic or minority groups are inter-ested in seeking self-determination, Cohen suggested.When one examines a continent like Africa, wherethere are at least 2,000 different ethnic groups, it is re-markable that there are not more self-determinationmovements. The most important factor may not behaving its own state but getting a fair share of re-sources. Raphel agreed that good governance and thejust sharing of resources can satisfy independencemovements. If the Indian government had not abro-gated its original agreement with the Kashmiris, forexample, and then pursued some questionable gover-nance in Kashmir, the situation would not have beenlikely to deteriorate to its current state.

Fuller disagreed, maintaining that among those2,000 different African groups, demands for auton-omy or self-determination are only likely to grow,with more and more conflicts the result. Similarly,indigenous peoples in Central America, have theirown strong cultural traditions and languages that pre-date colonization. In a world of heightened culturalself-awareness, it will not be long before they, too,

15

determine they do not want to be swept away into thelarger culture. There will obviously be, Fuller said, im-mense resistance on the part of states, though theyshould be made aware that the phenomenon is uni-versal, that few states are genuinely unaffected, andthat no one state is being singled out by outside pres-sure. This sort of message may be one way to alleviatethe fears of a central government and encourage it toimplement reforms acceptable to minority groups.

In the end, though bad governance may be a causefor this phenomenon, Fuller said, it is not the onlyone. Even reasonably good governance may not suf-fice if people believe themselves to be differentenough to want greater autonomy than is available aspart of another state. It may be that desires for auton-omy are separate from good governance, since thereexist situations in which relatively good governance ispresent and groups still want autonomy or even inde-pendence to express fully their own, separate identity.There could be good governance in China, for exam-ple, but if free enterprise were still bringing too manyHan Chinese into Tibet and threatening Tibetan iden-tity, Tibetans might have legitimate grievances. Thepresent situation is extremely dynamic, and the issueof identity is unresolved, Fuller contended; it is not al-ways possible to anticipate when such feelings maydevelop or when they will be organized into a move-ment. Furthermore, the “demonstration effect” is ex-tremely influential. It is not going to be possible toprevent Pandora’s box from opening—it already has,regardless, at least in some cases, of the quality of gov-ernance.

On the other hand, noted Scheffer, many conflictsthat are ostensibly about self-determination are not.The wars in Liberia and Angola, for example, areabout self-aggrandizement and increasing the wealthand personal gain of a leader or particular tribe, usingthe cause of self-determination as a disguise. With theend of the Cold War, local leaders are attempting togain control over others in the country, to “colonize

internally.” Without a convincing rationale for separa-tion, an increasing number of wealth-seekers fight toperpetuate their own power on the pretext of seekingself-determination. Moreover, said Cohen, not all self-determination movements are “morally correct”; inother words, the United States should not assumethat a secessionist movement by definition holds allthe claims to the moral high ground—often minorityleaders play the ethnic card merely for their own polit-ical gain.

DEVOLUTION

A related but more developed trend may be localizeddevolution, which is “the order of the day” in WesternEurope, said Charlie Jefferson of the Department ofState. In Spain, government power has devolved tothe Catalans and the Basques. It is a current in Franceand the United Kingdom also, and is happening in away that is not threatening to the central govern-ments. Whether such devolution is possible inweaker countries is a key question, however. Thoughin long-established states the trend is only likely tocontinue, outside Western Europe, more fragileyounger countries are more threatened by suchtrends. For example, this trend is definitely not hap-pening in South Asia, Andersen pointed out; in fact,just the opposite. Since independence from the colo-nial powers, many Asian states have moved towardcentralization, not necessarily because of ethnicity ornationalism but because of economic crises andplans—at least at one time—to implement socialism.Economic reform might counter the centripetal forcesin that part of the world, since decentralization is usu-ally an aspect of reform, but that has not yet begun toany great extent. There may also be a shift away fromcentralization as national parties are increasingly chal-lenged by local ones advocating a kind of states’rights doctrine.

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There is a moral right to secede grounded inthe right to self-determination, arguedChristopher Wellman of Guilford College,

and a distinction between self-determination andother rights. Currently, the international communitydoes not recognize the right to secede based on theright to self-determination. If there were such a thingas religious self-determination, it would mean that thechoice of religion is personal and individual. How-ever, if the right to religious self-determination stipu-lated that the right to change religions would begranted only if an individual were unjustly treated inhis or her own religion, most would agree that thatwould not be true religious freedom. Yet, at best, thatis what the international community claims with re-gard to political self-determination. If your countrytreats you sufficiently unjustly, then—and only then—you may have the right to secede. However, that isnot, Wellman maintained, a right to self-determina-tion; it is only a right to live without injustice. A gen-uine right to self-determination would be exemplifiedby a group’s ability to establish its own political gameregardless of injustice. This, however, the interna-tional community unequivocally denies.

The core of the secession controversy, Wellmancontinued, is territory, as one group demands part ofa state’s territory. In a moral analysis of such disputes,it is necessary to adjudicate both sides’ claims. Thisraises the question of a state’s claim to its territory

and the right to force its governance upon the whole.Wellman pointed out that the U.S. government hasthe right to force its citizens to pay taxes. One reasonoften given is the theory of consent: Americans arecommitted to the U.S. government and consent to betaxed. Similarly, this is a reason why states have aclaim to their territory, since for legitimate govern-ments, in the absence of gross injustice, there is a con-sensual relationship between the governors and thegoverned.

However, if consent is required for a state to have aclaim to its territory, it follows that where consent isabsent or withheld, an individual or group may claima secession right grounded in the right to self-determi-nation. Many existing governments lack the consentof those they govern. Moreover, individuals do not ac-tually enter into direct contracts with their govern-ment; this is usually done through such political actsas voting, that connote consent. And even with vot-ing, Wellman said, voters should not technically bebound by the outcome since the people were nevergiven the option not to be bound by the government—they have the right only to choose who will governthem. Thus, the consent theory does not actually ex-plain a government’s right to tax its citizens or astate’s claim to its territory, since some form of coer-cion already exists, regardless of whether there is con-sent.

Thus, if consent is the only circumstance underwhich a government may legitimately make demandsof its citizens, Wellman said, and if even the best,most legitimate liberal democratic governments lackthe full consent of their citizens, it follows that thereshould be unlimited political self-determination.However, most people even in the United States donot believe that consent is required for a governmentto be legitimate; most believe that some form of coer-cion (like the right to demand taxes) is acceptableeven in the absence of consent. Thus, the most popu-lar and reassuring justification for political coercion—consent of the governed—does not generally apply.

Wellman offered a functional justification for statecoercion, suggesting that citizens allow it becausestates perform the important function of securing po-litical stability and providing security against foreignenemies, preventing an otherwise chaotic and poten-tially harmful state of affairs. This is, according toWellman, the functional rather than consensual justi-fication for state coercion. However, if some group orterritory within a state could perform those functionsbetter than the state, then, according to the functional

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4A CASE FOR SECESSION

argument, it should be allowed to secede. There istherefore justification for secession if a group were toprove that it could perform certain political functionsbetter. There would likely be unpalatable implica-tions, though; for example, the United States couldmake a case for the annexation of Canada if it couldprove that it could better perform certain functions.Thus, the functional justification for state coercion,and thus a state’s claim to its territory, also does nothold unequivocally.

Nevertheless, political coercion is justified to pro-vide for a functioning political state and coercion thatprevents a group from seceding is permissible be-cause of the harm that would result. At the same time,the functional model, at least in part, allows groupswithin states to create and maintain their own entitiesbecause that is consistent with political stability. Per-haps, Wellman said, states could assess claims to self-determination from within their territory in the sameway that the United States adjudicates drivers’ li-censes—it is possible, but not automatic. Thus, stateswould not respond to every self-determination move-ment but would allow the right to be exercised bygroups of a certain size, contiguity, wealth, and abilityto function in a secure manner. This would allowsome claims to self-determination to be honored with-out allowing for unrestricted secession.

Though political self-determination must be lim-ited, it does not follow that it should be prohibited, asthe international community now suggests, Wellmancontinued. In fact, some claims to self-determinationcannot be prohibited without resorting to a com-pletely arbitrary justification. The current policy ofdogmatically clinging to territorial boundaries simplybecause they currently exist is morally tantamount,for example, to endorsing slavery and denyingwomen the right to vote because of the status quo—impermissible coercion for no morally justified rea-son. It is true that rules are necessary for politicalstability, but it is morally arbitrary to use existingboundaries to determine who gets to play at state-hood and who does not.

Furthermore, Wellman said, an increasing numberof groups are going to make this argument, includingthe growing number of groups claiming the right tosecede even in the absence of injustice—in Quebec, forexample. These groups must be given some answerjustifying the state’s control over their territory, other-wise it will appear that the international communitywants only to demonstrate its power. Groups are

lobbying, sometimes violently, to break the statusquo, and the international community can respond intwo ways: by explaining why the determination topreserve existing states is not morally arbitrary or bymaking clear that the issue is not about which groupmay exercise its right to self-determination but aboutthe importance of maintaining the existing system ofstate boundaries to avoid chaos and conflict.

In the final analysis, Wellman contended, one ofthe best methods of getting states to respect minorityrights is to allow secession. If political arrangementswere changed so that states were no longer the mo-nopolistic suppliers of sovereignty but instead suppli-ers in “competitive markets,” the state would have togovern well enough to prevent a secessionist drive.The essential point is that states do not want to loseterritory. Yet the international community is set up insuch a way that states do not have to treat their mi-norities well. If the international community were tomake it possible for groups to secede, states wouldhave more incentive to treat groups within their terri-tory well and prevent the desire to secede. Allowingfor secession within the self-determination rightcould actually secure individual rights, internal self-determination, and, perhaps ironically, territorial in-tegrity—but must not be allowed to do so at theexpense of human rights.

Clearly, the consent theory justifying governmentcoercion does not apply in the world today. Instead,Wellman said, governments are justified because theyperform certain functions, like protecting their citi-zens and organizing a judicial system. If a govern-ment is not performing these functions—if it is notprotecting people from injustice but is itself a sourceof injustice—then the state cannot maintain the claimto its territory. The international community has littlemoral recourse if it insists that groups have no right tosecede under any circumstances and must continueto endure state-imposed injustice. It is extremely im-portant, Wellman maintained, not to take these moraldynamics lightly.

THE FUTURE OF MULTI-ETHNICSOCIETIES

Timothy Sisk of the Institute of Peace pointed out thatWellman’s argument rested on two assumptions: that the international system dogmatically clings toexisting boundaries and that groups that seek self-determination are themselves coherent with a single

18

representative, party, or movement. Sisk challengedthese assumptions, noting that, since its inception,membership in the United Nations has increasedfrom 55 to 185 and that the fights within groups seek-ing self-determination are often uglier than theirfights with the central government. Two practicalproblems emerge in such situations, Sisk said. Seces-sion only serves to rearrange majorities and minori-ties and rarely solves the problem of multi-ethnicsocieties, and the issue of who genuinely representsany group is not resolved. For example, does thegroup calling for an independent Khalistan representall Sikhs, or do those calling for an independentAfrikaner homeland represent all Afrikaners? Also,what would be the threshold for determining the ac-tual desire of any group—a referendum requiring amajority or super-majority? Sisk agreed that generalcriteria based on moral grounds are needed, andthough it is true that partition, assisted by the interna-tional community, should be possible, it should be alast resort.

Wellman replied that while it is true that there aremany more states today than forty years ago, it is alsotrue that the international community consistentlyrefers to the status quo in its total lack of support forsecessionist movements whose arguments are basedon self-determination. It is also true that many self-determination movements are incoherent, and thosemay be the ones that cannot persuasively claim theright to secede, since they are the very ones unlikelyto provide a functioning government. No argumentwas made that any group with a claim to secession, re-gardless of the circumstances, should be supported.Wellman suggested that a simple majority wouldhave to be sufficient, since it would not be sustainablefor a minority to tell a majority how to live. He con-ceded that, because no system is foolproof, not all po-litical preferences within a group would be satisfied,and there will be groups all over the world that wantto secede that still would not be able to do so.

DANGER OF ALLOWING SECESSION

Allen Buchanan of the University of Wisconsinstrongly disagreed with the premise that groupsshould have a right to secede even in the absence ofinjustice. First, as Sisk noted, secession rarely solvesthe problems associated with multi-ethnic or pluralis-tic societies. Abraham Lincoln observed that when aman and woman divorce, they can go to separate

places, but when countries divorce, they remain rightnext to each other, all their animosities intact. Thereare more constructive proposals for dealing with theproblems that frequently lead to secession that focuson solutions short of secession, particularly in thearea of human rights. Wellman’s argument wouldpose a barrier to exploring such approaches as vari-ous forms of decentralization. In Wellman’s scenario,a state would make every attempt to thwart decentral-ization to prevent a region’s gaining enough politicalexperience to meet the functional justification criteriaand then agitating to secede on that basis. This would,Buchanan argued, put an end to serious efforts at de-volution and other potential solutions.

The real problem, according to Hannum, is notwhether a right to self-determination is morally ab-solute but the assumption that the right exists at all. Itis a false analogy to compare the right to self-determi-nation with slavery and women’s right to vote, be-cause self-determination is not absolute and has nonormative content. Wellman’s argument does not ad-dress the matter of the right to an independent state,because that would require an explanation of whatmoral values underlie the moral claim of the right to astate. This cannot be done with self-determination aslong as it is phrased in present terms, Hannum said.The “right to self-determination” cannot be discussedintelligently until there is some recognition of andagreement upon the moral values that underlie thephrase.

Cohen posed a hypothetical case. If there were ahomogeneous group within a state, capable of self-government, that by accident of geography also con-trolled all the oil for the larger entity, would the statehave a right to some of that oil revenue? Should a ref-erendum on secession be held in the wider entityrather than just the group or region? In response,Wellman stressed the need to distinguish the ques-tion of political self-determination from natural re-source or welfare transfers. All Ethiopia should havedetermined the status of Eritrea if all of Ethiopia had aclaim to its territory. The basis of grounds to a peo-ple’s territorial claims determines the thrust of thewhole analysis of consent and functionality.

Fuller, however, suggested that the whole discus-sion of the moral and legal right to self-determinationor secession is, in many ways, beside the point. Thereality is that people are demanding the right, andthey will kill others and shed their own blood toachieve it. The question of right and wrong may be

19

relevant, but it is not the primary consideration, sincewhat people are likely to do must be heeded over andabove whether or not they have the right to undertakethese actions.

OTHER REALITIES

The functional justification in Wellman’s argumentcannot stand, Jefferson contended, because “thecow’s out of the barn.” There are already at leastthirty-five or forty micro-states in the world with nofunctional justification for their existence, making itdifficult to deny other minority groups statehood onthis basis. Also, some states have willingly given up aportion of their sovereign powers to others—Kazak-stan to Russia, for example—raising further questionsabout the functionality argument. Many scholars nowargue that the state as it exists is no longer capable ofproviding the kind of security (economic or social, en-vironmental or police) that states were created to pro-vide. The entire moral or practical basis for the statehas crumbled significantly.

Steve Morrison of the Department of State objectedto Wellman’s argument on the grounds that it claimsthat the United States should take action based onwhether a particular group or action meets certain cri-teria. However, U.S. policymakers are always, overtlyor otherwise, weighing the costs of supporting an in-surgency movement (in, say, Chechnya or Quebec),evaluating the costs of action or inaction, with the in-evitable reality that secession or even instability is notalways undesirable. The moral aspects are of coursepart of the equation, since no society based on therule of law can hope to retain its integrity if morality iscompletely ignored in foreign policy. However, it is

only a part of a larger picture of costs. Insurgents,Morrison continued, make similar calculations. Thusthere should not be too strong an emphasis on the“rational actor” analysis, since many actors behaverandomly. It is simply impossible to establish a moralor legal yardstick against which the United Statesshould always act, because situations are too dy-namic. Wellman agreed that morality should not bethe only determining factor for U.S. foreign policy, butit is an important component of the calculus of howthe United States should respond.

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The United Nations Charter was the first inter-national document to proclaim the right toself-determination, observed Scheffer.

Though it was meant to apply to member states andnot to peoples or groups, it very quickly began to beinterpreted more widely. The 1960 UN Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peo-ples declared self-determination to be an absoluteright, though only for colonies, and the determinationwas based on territory, not ethnicity or nationality. Inrecent decades, however, the original, vaguely worded“right to self-determination” has come to mean, forbetter or worse, that all distinct ethnic groups andpeoples have the right, though exactly what it impliesremains unclear and controversial.

1995 was a significant year for issues of self-deter-mination at the United Nations, Scheffer continued.In fact, publication of the UN’s fifty-year anniversarydocument was stymied by the language surroundingthe self-determination issue. For example, the pream-ble to the eventual declaration, meant to be a “victorystatement” of sorts, announced that through theprocess of decolonization, 100 million human beingshad been assured the ability to exercise the funda-mental right to self-determination. However, therewas a prolonged dispute over the use of the word“fundamental.” The U.S. delegation opposed it, argu-ing that self-determination, though a right, is not seenas a “fundamental” right in the UN Charter; however,

the United States let the language stand when it waseventually accepted by other key delegations.

Other language was equally controversial, Scheffercontinued. For example, two delegations insisted thatthere be no reference to “colonialism” and “foreign oc-cupation” in the UN 50 Declaration. However, priorUN documents referring to self-determination hadcontained these terms and the objections were over-ruled. Two governments from the former SovietUnion insisted that any mention of self-determinationbe balanced with language on territorial integrity. Alsoin dispute was the recognition of the right of the peo-ple to “take legitimate action” to realize self-determi-nation, since it was not made clear what thederivation of legitimacy might be. These words stayedin the document, primarily because they are con-tained in the 1993 “Vienna Declaration and Pro-gramme of Action” on human rights, to which theUnited States has agreed. The final compromise lan-guage in an “operative clause” of section one of theUN 50 Declaration is as follows:

We will continue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into accountthe particular situation of peoples under colonialor other forms of alien domination or foreign oc-cupation, and recognizing the right of peoples totake legitimate action, in accordance with the char-ter of the United Nations, to realize their inalien-able right of self-determination. This shall not beconstrued as authorizing or encouraging any ac-tion that would dismember or impair, totally or inpart, the territorial integrity or political unity ofsovereign and independent states conductingthemselves in compliance with the principles ofequal rights and self-determination of peoples andthus possessed of a government representing thewhole people belonging to the territory withoutdistinction of any kind.

The language on the rights of indigenous peoples hasbeen even trickier to determine, Scheffer said. TheU.S. delegation debated whether the UN 50 Declara-tion should refer to “peoples” or “groups” and “popu-lations.” There is a strong argument underinternational law that indigenous peoples have cer-tain rights, such as self-determination and control oftheir own natural resources. This language is some-times problematic for the United States in regard toAmerican Indian tribes, for whom the United Statesprovides the right to “self-governance”; their self-determination includes the right to tribal self-gover-nance and autonomy “to the extent provided by U.S.law.” In the international context, the United States

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5SELF-DETERMINATION

AT THE UNITED

NATIONS

would prefer the discussion revolve around “groups”or “populations” and not “peoples.” In December1995, there were a series of resolutions in the GeneralAssembly referring to “indigenous people” (not “peo-ples”), though there is also a reference in one GeneralAssembly resolution welcoming the fact that a work-ing group will elaborate a draft declaration on the“Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” The difference be-tween “people” and “peoples” may seem insignificant,but it is in fact extremely charged, since the latter termmay be seen as “nations,” thereby entitled to still morerights.

Every year the United Nations adopts resolutionson self-determination, Scheffer noted. One of these in-variably involves the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and another the universal right ofpeoples to self-determination through speedy decolo-nization. The United States, Scheffer said, generallyopposes these resolutions, except for one very gen-eral one. (The U.S. opposition to the resolution on thePalestinians, Scheffer said, stems from concern that itwould interfere with the peace process.) Some ob-servers have begun to call general opposition to theseresolutions a “rut” of U.S. foreign policy, while thosemore alarmed by their ramifications say that the U.S.position is the only realistic one.

In the UN 50 Declaration, self-determination isstated as an inalienable right. According to Hannum,however, the document also states that self-determi-nation is not to be exercised to the prejudice of theterritorial integrity of states that comply with the UNCharter. The document does not confer a generalright to secession, though it does not rule it out in thecases of states that do not comply with UN principles.There is similar language in the CSCE’s CopenhagenFinal Document, which attempts to balance an open-ended notion of the right to self-determination and anabsolutist interpretation of the principle of the territo-rial integrity of existing states, which never allows se-cession even in the face of gross human rightsviolations. This, Hannum said, is a positive develop-ment.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS

One new development in the international arena isthe increasing role of elections as a procedure forachieving self-determination. The prospect that theUnited Nations has a role to play in providing elec-toral assistance and supporting democratic tenden-cies more generally has “overwhelmed” UN

discussion and activities, Scheffer said, and is evenproviding the rationale for implementing ChapterSeven authority to restore democracy, as in Haiti. Therecognition of democracy as the preferred system,and of electoral assistance as a means to that end, iseclipsing the right of self-determination by itself as anoperative principle of the UN. In other words, at theUN, one “gets further by talking about democracyand elections than about self-determination,” Scheffersaid.

Halperin pointed out that the first phase of self-determination embraced decolonization and wasconsistent with U.S. principles. The second phase in-volved not only getting rid of the colonial master butallowing for the people’s genuine consent as to howthey would be governed on their own territory. Thissecond phase, Halperin said, has gathered momen-tum and shapes the direction in which the world isnow headed. Both the United States and the UN in-creasingly voice the conviction that a government re-ceives legitimacy by virtue of elections. Accordingly,the self-determination right is coming to mean morethan just not being ruled by outsiders, but being ruledby those chosen by the people. This development iswholly consistent with U.S. principles, and the UnitedStates constantly presses this point at the UN and inregional organizations.

If secession is the last resort, the preceding issue isinternal self-determination, and elections become thebest method of achieving that, Sisk concurred. How-ever, what of the many states that do not request elec-toral assistance from the UN? It is true that consent isrequired by the central government for the UN elec-toral assistance division to become involved, Halperinsaid, and consent is unlikely to be forthcoming in thevery countries where self-determination movementsdevelop. However, states are finding it increasinglydifficult to resist asking for some sort of electoral as-sistance—it is a current they can no longer avoid. Themost dramatic example is Mexico, not one expectedto invite the help of the UN Electoral Commission. Yetthe Mexican government has come under enormouspressure to demonstrate the legitimacy of its electionsand, to that end, required some international pres-ence. This is a positive trend, Halperin asserted,though it is true that elections can sometimes pro-duce negative results. Nevertheless, it is simplywrong, in today’s context, to say that “free and fairelections” is an American notion. In fact, the conceptis embedded in a whole series of international agree-ments. In most cases, in fact, the refusal to hold elec-tions is the clearest sign of bad governance.

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In dealing with self-determination movements, theUnited States should focus on human rightsabove all, Buchanan contended, and make it clear

that the best general hope for avoiding secessionistdemands is progress on human rights. Both state gov-ernments and groups agitating for secession shouldbe put on notice that U.S. support for their cause willbe contingent on respect for human rights. Further-more, since the right to self-determination does not,outside the context of decolonization, include theright to secede, secession must be distinguished fromother forms of self-determination. Buchanan sug-gested that the United States emphasize the differentlegal and constitutional rights that can be developedwithin states to facilitate other forms of self-determi-nation. The promotion of these options can create aclimate in which states recognize a region’s legitimateinterest in self-determination without conceding thelegitimacy or acceptability of secession.

Options for self-determination, Buchanan said,could include minority cultural rights, various types ofself-administration, limited self-government functions,federalization, and possibly group participation in po-litical processes (such as proportional representationor quotas for legislative seats for minority groups). Inany U.S. efforts to promote nonsecessionist modes ofself-determination, priority should be given to cases inwhich violent secessionist crises are likely or wherethe groups seeking self-determination—particularly

many indigenous groups—are the victims of majorstate-inflicted injustices.

WHEN SECESSION IS JUSTIFIED

The United States should not take the position thatsecession is never justified, Buchanan maintained,though it should be viewed as the remedy of last re-sort in response to the most serious kinds of injus-tices. Secession may be justified when attempts tosolve problems through less radical means, such asdemands for autonomy, have failed and where thegroup in question is subjected to gross human rightsviolations amounting to genocide or is the victim of arecent and clearly unjust annexation of previouslysovereign territory. In general, though, the UnitedStates, as well as international organizations, shouldendorse and encourage the view that secession is nota general right of any group but a last resort. TheUnited States should take a firm and unambiguousposition against the idea that every people or ethnicgroup is entitled to its own state, according toBuchanan. In other words, there should be firm rejec-tion of the idea of ethnically “pure” or exclusive states,including of the principle that citizenship rights de-pend on ethnicity or religion.

Instead of secession, federal or confederal solu-tions to self-determination demands could be encour-aged, especially where “discontent groups” areterritorially concentrated. However, Buchanan said,the federal units should not be given the right to se-cede, even if a majority votes for independence, sincethat would undermine the incentive for any centralgovernment to accept federalization. Similarly, feder-alism should not be encouraged in cases where the le-gitimate redistributive functions of existing stateswould be undercut; for example, if it were to be usedby a wealthier region to avoid its obligations of “dis-tributive justice” to the poorer ones. Instead, disputesabout resource distribution should be resolved withinthe political processes of the state and not throughseparatist strategies, at least if the state meets minimalstandards of democracy (i.e., if groups with griev-ances about resource distribution are not excludedfrom participation in government).

In cases where less drastic solutions have failedand secession appears inevitable, Buchanan contin-ued, the United States should take a leadership role inregional or international efforts to help develop justterms. This is extremely important, and a goodknowledge of mediation processes is essential.

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6NONVIOLENT

ALTERNATIVES TO

SECESSION

U.S. Policy Options

Among the problems to be dealt with would be deter-mination of new borders, renegotiation of treaties,provisions for defense, division of national debt, and,above all, guarantees of minority and human rights.As a condition for recognition of the new states, therights of minorities within them must be guaranteed,human rights respected, and every effort made to de-velop democratic institutions, all of which must beopen to monitoring by the relevant international orga-nizations. At the same time, Buchanan said, theUnited States should be prepared to condemn, andeven institute sanctions against, any group that de-clares independence prematurely and any state thatrecognizes its independence. There is thus a large U.S.role when secession is actually occurring. Generally,the United States must make a distinction betweentrying to articulate standards for justifiable secessionand trying to establish good procedures for control-ling damage when secession looks inevitable. Andthis distinction must be made with the acknowledg-ment that there is much more agreement in interna-tional law and politics on procedural than onsubstantive fairness regarding all self-determinationmovements.

SECESSION MUST BE MADE DIFFICULT

Halperin stated that Buchanan’s prescriptions wouldmake clear to governments and self-determinationmovements that there is a definite bias against seces-sion, though opening the option of secession. Itseems the United States would be saying to a govern-ment that if its repression is great enough, there willbe sympathy for a secessionist movement, and sayingto a secessionist movement that there will be supportonly if all other steps have been exhausted. Fullerasked if that meant that there would be American(and international) support for a secessionist driveamong the Kurds in northern Iraq. Buchanan re-sponded that there should be international pressureon the Iraqi government to grant some significant butlimited self-government to the Kurds, not on theKurds to push for self-determination.

Before 1990, “human rights” was seen as referringprimarily to individual civil and political rights, ob-served Hannum. Since then, the international com-munity has been increasingly willing to look atminority rights, indigenous rights and the rights topolitical participation in a more expansive way, mean-ing that many concerns of groups asserting the rightto self-determination are now covered by the human

rights umbrella. Moreover, if the United States isgoing to recognize a group’s secession, it shouldrequire that the seceding group agree to respect thesame right to secession for all other groups within itsterritory, a stipulation that could have avoided blood-shed in the former Yugoslavia. It applies also toQuebec—if the right of the Quebecois to secede issupported, then the right of indigenous groupswithin Quebec to secede must also be supported. Inthe end, Hannum maintained, it is important to bringpressure to make secession extremely lengthy and dif-ficult, if not impossible, and to make sure that it willhave consequences. If, after such difficult steps, seces-sion still results through a rights-respecting processsuch as would occur in Belgium or Canada, it shouldbe allowed to continue. Most people, Hannumasserted, would not vote to secede if given the choice.Fuller disagreed, asserting that most groups wouldvote to secede if given a genuine choice. It is preciselythose cases where grievances are the greatest that thepeople are never given a choice.

GROUP VS. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Most self-determination groups do not want to se-cede, Buchanan contended. At the very simplest level,they want not to be subject to genocide, and then theywant to have basic civil and political rights. Beyondthat, they want some special rights to self-govern-ment. There is a difference, though, between a groupwhose culture is imperiled because of repression anda culture that simply is not going to survive whateverthe circumstances. Many cultures have not survivedand many today will not make it—there are currentlyno international documents or agreements that guar-antee the right to the eternal survival of every group.Groups subject to serious repression, Buchanan said,such as indigenous peoples, may be entitled to a spe-cial form of self-determination within a state, includ-ing proportional representation, home affairscouncils, reserved seats in legislatures—many thingsthat, for example, American Indian tribes have. Never-theless, Buchanan emphasized that individual rightsare primary. Group rights are essentially rights of col-lective decisionmaking that are in many cases exer-cised by elites claiming to speak on behalf of the restof the group. Strong group rights are acceptable onlywithin a framework of entrenched individual rights,particularly freedom of movement. There are a few ex-ceptions, however, such as when especially threat-ened indigenous groups need group property rights.

24

At the same time, though, even in those cases, respectfor individual rights must be encouraged.

HUMAN RIGHTS NOT ALWAYS THE ANSWER

Self-determination movements are not all humanrights matters, Goldstein contended. The situation inTibet, for example, is fundamentally a political andnot a human rights problem. If Beijing were to allowmonks to hold free demonstrations on behalf of theDalai Lama it would not end the conflict over the sta-tus of Tibet. Tibetans use human rights to gain inter-national attention for their plight, but the real issue isthat they want political control of their own territory.Practically speaking, Goldstein asked, what can bedone in a case like China? The UN Charter gives cer-tain groups considerable impetus to pursue politicalrights. The bottom line, however, is that China doesnot accept universal human rights standards, and nooutside country is likely to impose sanctions onChina for its refusal to hold a plebiscite in Tibet. Halfthe world’s governments, Goldstein said, are not fol-lowing the rules laid out by human rights documents,and in the final analysis, when other geostrategic con-cerns come into play, the United States—and mostother countries—will ignore human rights violations.If the suggestions laid out by Buchanan are not goingto be enforced in any way, then is not, Goldsteinasked, the wrong message being sent out to groupswho will believe they can expect United States or in-ternational support as long as they follow the rules.

Buchanan replied that the international commu-nity should not leave in the lurch those groups thatdo follow the rules. In the case of China, there is noreason the United States cannot be tougher than it is.Instead, it is now being unnecessarily timid, mainlybecause of business interests. The U.S. governmentshould stand up to those business interests and, bypressing human rights concerns, China couldchange—slowly, of course, and not overnight. In thefinal analysis, China needs the United States—and itsmarkets—more than the United States needs China.

THE “SLIPPERY SLOPE”

Raising human rights concerns brings with it the needto reassure countries that guaranteeing those rightswill not lead eventually to their dismembermentthrough the proverbial “slippery slope.” Many govern-ments fear that if individual rights are sanctioned,

minority rights will follow, and finally demands forthe right to secession. Fuller contended, however,that no country can ever be fully reassured that its mi-norities will never seek to break away, even if their hu-man rights are not being violated. There are generaltrends of growing national and ethnic awarenessthroughout the world and the costs of trying to pre-vent them may in the end prove more destabilizing. Itis certainly possible to legislate that the right to seces-sion is not inherent in any federal arrangement, reas-suring the central state that increased autonomy forminority groups will not lead to secessionist move-ments, but in fact the slippery slope does exist, Fullersaid, even in such legal federal arrangements. Theresimply are no guarantees against it, since few statesare immune, even those without a history of humanrights problems. Even the United States is likely to betouched by this phenomenon, whether through de-mands from Native Americans, ethnic Hawaiians, orother groups.

Buchanan acknowledged that the precedentialproblem is very real. There must be created a climatein which states see that good faith efforts to decentral-ize will be accompanied by assurance from the inter-national community that it will not sanctionsecession. Sisk suggested providing those countriesworried that acknowledging a minority’s concern willeventually lead to secessionist tendencies with infor-mation on other cases that have worked out success-fully, such as in Malaysia or South Africa, pointingout, for example, that federalism does not have to beterritorial. Similarly, elections do not have to be set upin zero-sum terms, with the outcome either consoli-dating the aims of a secessionist movement or pre-serving the status quo. There are compromises closerto the middle.

The slippery slope problem is very much on themind of the Chinese, who are convinced that too muchautonomy for Tibet will give ideas to the Uyghurs inXinjiang, among other peoples. The Uyghurs are not asorganized and well-known as the Tibetans, but theirgrievances are similar, and their organization is devel-oping. Fuller questioned why the United States shouldencourage China or any similarly repressive country tobelieve that it can repress one group as a means to con-trol another. There is gross repression of human rightsin China, against the large population of Han Chineseand minority groups that are not insignificant in size.There are 6 million Tibetans and 8 million Uyghurs—two groups larger already than the populations ofmany existing countries. Xinjiang is going to be a

25

problem for China, Fuller asserted, and it cannot beavoided, especially not if China maintains its currentpolicies.

EARLY WARNING

The essential reality beyond human rights concerns,Fuller contended, is that people are simply not happyliving inside borders arbitrarily assigned by history.As conditions continue to deteriorate, they will onlybecome more unhappy. States should be alerted thatif they do not improve their practices violent seces-sionist struggles may develop, though even improvedconditions may not halt the determination of minori-ties to seek independence.

The aim should be, then, to recognize problemsmuch earlier, and to attempt to correct them beforethey reach that stage, Cohen suggested. If the situa-tion reaches the point that the United States is forcedto choose between supporting a state’s territorial in-tegrity and a minority’s right to self-determination, itis already too late—the problem is already too ad-vanced and likely to be accompanied by significantlevels of violence. For example, the United Statesshould have dealt with the Ethiopian government be-fore it abrogated its agreement with Eritrea. Perhaps,Cohen said, there should be better reporting fromU.S. embassies on problems that could lead to self-determination movements. Such “early warning” in-formation might enable the United States to intervenebefore violence erupts.

Carley questioned the realism of alerting states tothe probable consequences of their repressive poli-cies. In many cases, the government in question is notmade up of reasonable actors who would respond—oreven care—when told they are going to have seriousproblems if they continue repressing a minority pop-ulation. Most such leaders are convinced that theycan deal with the situation, which stems only from afew troublemakers, a few terrorists, who can bestamped out with a few more weapons. Furthermore,in many such cases, the United States is tempted tooverlook repression, especially in its allies, and then isleft to cope with the fallout—such as a secessionistmovement—later.

Jefferson concurred that the United States has anunfortunate pattern of becoming beholden to particu-lar regimes for one reason, unable to press them oncertain issues, mainly human rights, regardless ofwhen violations are detected. There are many ways,Jefferson pointed out, of reproving countries that do

not respond to concerns about repression and viola-tion of human rights, including sanctions or the de-nial of most favored nation status. In several cases,however, such moves would be in direct confronta-tion with our stake in a particular regime. For exam-ple, the United States supported the government inthe Philippines for many years, despite its repressivenature, and more particularly, its war against the Mo-ros, a rebellious ethnic minority. Similarly, the nativeIndian population in Guatemala is coming to a self-re-alization, and is confronting its lesser status in that so-ciety. And the American relationship with Turkey hasprecluded realistic discussion about the Kurds.

In fact, Jefferson continued, among the four casesdiscussed, in all but the case of the Kurds, the UnitedStates witnessed an egregious violation or abrogationof a previously agreed-upon arrangement. In theEthiopian takeover of the Eritrean parliament in1962, the Indian government’s reneging on the 1947agreement with Kashmir, and the Chinese takeover inTibet and subsequent violation of the Seventeen PointAgreement, the United States essentially chose a pol-icy of benign neglect. The action was not necessarilyrecognized, but neither was it loudly condemned orresponded to. The lesson, then, is that the UnitedStates should look more closely at the consequencesof ignoring breaches of agreements, since it was the vi-olations that caused the problems in the first place.The United States, Jefferson said, should be more will-ing to see the longer term implications of these abro-gations. In Eritrea, for example, the United Statesshould have been able to see that serious troublewould erupt after the Ethiopian Anschluss. Eritreanswere a largely educated people, and there was consid-erable industry in the area, making it by far the mostdeveloped region in the country. For the United Statesto think that Ethiopia could simply “gobble it up”without any consequences, Jefferson said, was, at thevery least shortsighted.

Nevertheless, there are tremendous bureaucraticobstacles to improving early warning capacities, cau-tioned several State Department representatives. Theissue is one not only of ideals versus realpolitik, butalso of simple timing. Every diplomat is faced with im-mediate short-term and long-term goals in dealingswith any foreign government. The reality is that, un-less an issue is crucial at that moment, it gets sacrificedto the issues of the day. Something that might be aproblem only in the long run is not going to get the at-tention it might deserve. Nor would it be practical toinclude early warning on potential self-determination

26

conflicts in the State Department’s annual humanrights report, already overloaded with reports on nu-merous other special interest issues. At the same time,however, those reports could be used much morethoughtfully as a source of information on the kindsof human rights problems that tend to lead to the de-velopment of secessionist movements. There shouldbe more discussion of how current human rightsproblems, as outlined in those reports, can affectlong-term U.S. interests.

THE NEED TO OUTLINE GOALS

Hannum disagreed with placing greater emphasis onearly warning, saying that countries in which conflictsare likely to occur can be identified fairly easily. TheUnited States must first determine its goals and enun-ciate precisely what it wants to achieve. If the goal is,for example, to prevent violence, then allowing oneside in any particular conflict to win might be the bestresponse—and there would, for example, be a greaterSerbia now. Other possible goals are the promotion ofhuman rights, democracy, ethnic self-determination,or economic interests. The goal of U.S. foreign policyis more than just the avoidance of conflict; there mustbe other values, and they should be articulated moredirectly. Sisk agreed that in dealing with insurgencies,the United States should determine whether it wantsto focus on outcome—that is, whether a group’s self-determination should be recognized—or on the nego-tiation process by which parties discuss theirdifferences. He suggested that the latter is the best op-tion, but the United States must set this goal and pur-sue it. The focus should be on process, without losingsight of outcome.

Jefferson also stressed the need for the UnitedStates to formulate some underlying basis for its poli-cies. Throughout U.S. history, especially before andimmediately after World War II, American policy wasimbued with unambiguous support for self-determi-nation. For example, during the war, the United Statesclashed with the British on the issue of self-determina-tion for India, and it maintained numerous forces inIran to keep it from Russian or British domination.Furthermore, self-determination runs throughout theAtlantic Charter. It is thus very much a part of Ameri-can intellectual history. For strategic reasons, Jeffer-son asserted, the United States has moved far awayfrom that position, but the fact that the United States

had a great role in propelling the self-determinationright to prominence cannot be ignored. Without afundamental underlying basis for its foreign policyactions, “the United States is liable to find itself with abatch of ad hoc policies of convenience.”

Cohen contended that it is not possible to avoid acase-by-case policy. There are simply too many vari-ables and too many competing U.S. interests for anall-embracing principle. Goldstein concurred, notingthat in order to deal realistically with minority groups’aspirations in the next twenty years, the United Statesis going to have to approach them on a case-by-case,ad hoc basis. The United States can take a hard-lineposition on behalf of a particular group and can ago-nize over moral values and other interests, but if it isnot actually going to do something to help, hard-linepronouncements of support are likely only to causeharm. As Goldstein said, unless the United States iswilling militarily to back independence for the 6 mil-lion Tibetans, it does not help to grandstand on theirbehalf.

Moreover, U.S. leaders are eventually going have to deal with the contradictions between the twobranches of government on foreign policy interests—between what is said in Congress and what comesfrom the White House and the Department of State—or the problems and inconsistencies will continueand worsen. Solomon concurred, noting that the re-alpolitik and “moral politik” aspects of U.S. policy aresometimes reflected respectively in the administrativeand legislative branches of the U.S. government. Ti-betans are extremely sophisticated at “working theCongress,” and, as a result, the United States does in-directly give encouragement to those who want self-determination, though their aspirations willultimately fail to gain active U.S. military support.

Nonetheless, there is still a need for heightenedU.S. leadership, Scheffer said. In several of the Africancases, there was enthusiastic response to a strong U.S.leadership role, even when not accompanied by for-eign aid or weapons. U.S. diplomatic clout has made adifference. Long before secession is an issue, theremust be a recognition of the need for power sharingor local autonomy arrangements. Obviously it is notpossible to send envoys everywhere and not alwayshelpful to play an open role, but where the UnitedStates does have access, it should do everything possi-ble to make its influence felt, if only through diplo-matic channels.

27

Despite the need, outlined initially by Stein-berg, to develop a set of tools to cope withthe self-determination phenomenon, it was

apparent from the first meeting and confirmed by thesecond that it is unlikely that an overriding guidingprinciple for U.S. policy toward self-determinationmovements will soon emerge. When the issue isviewed as more than an abstraction and specific casesare analyzed, it becomes clear that there is simply noall-embracing remedy for this extremely complex andmultifaceted problem. Every suggestion or proposaloffered as a guiding principle can be opposed orfound inadequate from a variety of directions. More-over, the need for the United States to define specificand overarching goals in relation to self-determina-tion is equally complicated and infeasible. The desireto outline goals falls victim to the need to juggle a hostof American interests that vary from country to coun-try. As a result, contradictions in U.S. policy are in-evitable. U.S. policymakers should be mindful of thisbefore succumbing to the temptation loudly to pro-claim overarching principles when referring to anyone particular self-determination movement.

Ideally, the international community would havein place early warning or detection capabilities thatcould draw attention to a group’s plight before itsmembers are driven to use violent means to seek self-determination. Certainly it would be possible for the

United States and other states to react if a group’s au-tonomy rights, previously guaranteed, were pointedlydenied by a central government. However, setting upand monitoring early warning capabilities requiremore time and money from an already overburdenedand cash-strapped United Nations, or new financialresources from member states.

Most roundtable participants agreed that secessionshould be seen only as a last resort, even in the face ofgross human rights violations, and secession shouldbe made as difficult and undesirable as possible bythe international community. That addresses, at leastin part, the matter of which solution will be supportedwhen a group agitates for self-determination. At thesame time, it remains problematic that a group or peo-ple should have to experience serious human rightsabuses to the extent of genocide before secessionistdemands are considered. If the choices are to enter-tain a secessionist movement’s demands or witnessthe massive repression and even murder of a particu-lar minority group, many may come to feel that the in-ternational community is currently on the wrong side.

The brightest note in this otherwise troubling issueis that the democratic imperative as a guiding rule fordomestic politics is taking root in the internationalcommunity as never before. This does not necessarilymean that there are many more genuine democraciesin the world than in the past, but there is definitely agrowing sense in many countries that they should be.The democracy essential harks back to Steinberg’spoint that governance is key, that the existence of le-gitimate democratic institutions is a necessary—if notcrucial—element in finding a peaceful, nonsecession-ist solution to political, social, and cultural grievances.The new democratic current, which has yet to developfully—indeed, is not even a decade old—may prove tobe the only nonviolent context in which the right toself-determination can be managed.

7CONCLUSION

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29

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patricia Carley is program officerfor the former Soviet Union andTurkey at the United States Insti-tute of Peace, where she alsoworks on broader issues such asthe Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe and West-ern relations with the Islamic

world. She is the author of several Institute publica-tions, including Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Ter-ritorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession; TheWar in Tajikistan Three Years On; Turkey’s Role inthe Middle East; and The Future of the CSCE. She re-ceived her B.A. in Soviet studies from the University ofTexas at Austin and an M.A. from George WashingtonUniversity. Her other publications include the CentralAsia section of Human Rights and Democratizationin the Newly Independent States (1993), “Turkeyand Central Asia: Reality Comes Calling” in RegionalPower Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey,and Iran (M. E. Sharpe, 1995) and “The Legacy of theSoviet Political System and the Prospects for Develop-ing Civil Society in Central Asia” in Political Cultureand Civil Society in Russia and the New States ofEurasia (M. E. Sharpe, 1995).

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created byCongress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, includingresearch grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the Presi-dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. CrockerVice Chairman: Max M. KampelmanPresident: Richard H. SolomonExecutive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

30

OTHER TITLES IN THE PEACEWORKS SERIES

Creative Approaches to Managing Conflict in Africa: Findings from USIP-Funded Projects,edited by David R. Smock (No. 15, April 1997)

Police Functions in Peace Operations, by Roxane D. V. Sismanidis (No. 14, March 1997)

Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict? by Milton J. Esman (No. 13, March 1997)

Training for Peace Operations: The U.S. Army Adapts to the Post–Cold War World,by J. Michael Hardesty and Jason D. Ellis (No. 12, February 1997)

Zaire: Predicament and Prospects, by J. C. Willame et al. (No. 11, January 1997)

State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, andChile,by Wendy Hunter (No. 10, October 1996)

Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism, by Denis McLean (No. 9, June 1996)

Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis, by Vesna Pesic (No. 8, April 1996)

Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession,by Patricia Carley (No. 7, March 1996)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa, by David R. Smock (No. 6, February 1996)

NGOs and Conflict Management, by Pamela R. Aall (No. 5, February 1996)

Sources of Conflict: G. M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” andRobert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “ ‘The Coming Anarchy’ and the Nation-State under Siege” (No. 4, August 1995)

Keynote Addresses from the Managing Chaos Conference: Les Aspin on “Challenges toValues-Based Military Intervention,” and Ted Koppel on “The Global Information Revolutionand TV News”(No. 3, February 1995)

Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity, by Nancy Lubin (No. 2, February 1995)

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, by Patricia Carley (No. 1, January 1995)

Peaceworks No. 16. First published July 1997.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone. They donot necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, the Department of State, or anyother government agency.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

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Phone: 202-457-1700Fax: 202-429-6063E-mail: usip_requests@usip.orgInternet: www.usip.org

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OF RELATED INTEREST

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues of directrelevance to self-determination and autonomy.

RECENT INSTITUTE REPORTS INCLUDE:

Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession, by PatriciaCarley (Peaceworks No. 7, March 1996)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of Peace, 1550 M Street NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC; call (202) 429-3828; fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

RECENT BOOKS FROM USIP PRESS INCLUDE:

Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, by Ruth Lapidoth (1997)Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, by Timothy D. Sisk (1996)Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, by Ted Robert Gurr (1993)Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity, by David Little (1994)

For book sales and order information, call 800-868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or 703-661-1590, or fax 703-661-1501.