U.S. Marine Aviation in Koreaby Major General John P. Condon, USMC (Ret)

Supplemented byCommander Peter B. Mersky, USNR (Ret)

he first major sur-prise of the postWorld War II yearscame into play whenin late June 1950, the

United States found itself respond-ing in crisis fashion to the NorthKorean invasion of the new repub-lic of South Korea, just four yearsand nine months after VJ-Day. Thenation became involved in Korea asa result of the Cairo and Yalta con-ferences in which the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union agreedto the concept of a free and inde-pendent post-war Korea. Includedin the agreement was a joint occu-pation of the country by the twopowers, with the Soviets north ofthe 38th Parallel and the UnitedStates south. The concept of theoccupation had a general objectiveof settling down Korea for a periodso that it could learn to governitself as a nation after manydecades of Japanese rule. As theUnited States was painfully learning,however, it soon became apparentthat what the Soviets said was onething and what they intended wasquite another with respect to a

ON THE COVER: After strafing enemytroops positions, a Vought F4U Corsairpilot hunts out a suitable target for hisremaining napalm bomb. Depart-ment of Defense Photo (USMC)A133540AT LEFT: A Grumman F9F Panther jetis directed into take off position for araid against enemy positions in NorthKorea. Department of Defense Photo(USMC) A43151

free, independent, and democraticKorea. When in 1948, they refusedto participate in elections, super-vised by the United Nations toform the first National Assembly,the hopes for a united Korea died.The Soviets formed a separateCommunist state in their sector,the People's Democratic Republic ofKorea. With the elections complet-ed for the National Assembly inthe south, the Republic of Korea(ROK) was established and theUnited States trusteeship in thecountry came to an end.

On 25 June 1950, the NorthKoreans attacked with nine well-equipped infantry divisions, spear-headed by one armored divisionequipped with Soviet-built T-34tanks. The Republic of Korea'sarmy had been in existence forjust about a year and could onlyoppose the invasion with fourlightly equipped divisions and oneadditional regiment. Needless tosay, although there were somespirited but isolated small unitdefensive actions, the Republic'sforces were no match for theinvaders. The North Koreansreached out with rapidly advancingarmored columns, moving almost atwill during the first four days.Seoul fell on 28 June, and at thattime, the ROK army had 34,000troops missing, although many ofthem later returned to their units.With the capture of Seoul, theinvaders halted to regroup andthose ROK forces, which were stillintact, fell back through Suwon to

1

set up some form of new defensivepositions. The South Korean gov-ernment had displaced to Taejonwell to the south when the fall ofSeoul became imminent. This stateof near collapse was the basic sit-uation faced by the United Statesand the United Nations in theopening week of the war. It was the

A graduate of the open cockpit andsilk scarf era of Marine ColDs avia-tion, BGen Thomas J. Cushman sawservice in Nicaragua, Haiti, and theCentral Paqflc before being namedAssistant Wing Commander, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, in June 1950.He commanded the wing's Jbrwardechelon, which provided air supportfor the 1st Provisional Marine Brigadeat Pusan, and later served asCommanding General, Tactical AirGroup (X ColDs) during Inchon andthe advance on Seoul.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2108

the 56 respondents to the UnitedNations resolution, only threewere opposed: the Soviet Union,Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The United Nations participat-ing pledges were substantial andincluded aircraft, naval vessels,medical supplies, field ambu-lances, foodstuffs, and strategicmaterials. In addition to the Armyforces authorized by PresidentTruman, a naval blockade of theentire Korean coast was ordered,and U.S. Air Force units based inJapan were authorized to bombspecific targets in North Korea. It isalso important to note that thesecritical actions met with thewholehearted approval of theAmerican people. Americans alsoapplauded the strong stance of theUnited Nations, and they repeat-edly expressed their thoroughgoingpride in the responses of theirnation to the seriously deterioratinginternational situation.

first time that a Soviet-supportedstate was permitted to go as far asopen warfare in their post-WorldWar II depredations, and it consti-tuted a definite showdownbetween the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

The United States responded tothe invasion of South Korea bothindependently, and through strongsupport and leadership in a United

Nations resolution condemningthe breaking of world peace bythe North Koreans. PresidentHarry S. Truman gave General ofthe Army Douglas MacArthur,Commander in Chief, Far East, thego-ahead to send Army units intoKorea from Japan and to takeother actions in support of theshocked and shattered ROKforces. It is important to note that of

2

In response to urgent requests forAmerican reinforcements from theFar East Command, and as a resultof unit offerings and proposalsfrom the United States, the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade wasactivated on 7 July 1950. It was anair-ground team built around the5th Marine Regiment and MarineAircraft Group 33 (MAG-33), bothbased on the west coast at CampPendleton and Marine Corps AirStation, El Toro, respectively.Brigadier General Edward A.

Craig, with Brigadier GeneralThomas J. Cushman, a renownedand experienced Marine aviator,assigned as his deputy comman-der, commanded the brigade.

The time and space factors inthe activation and deployment ofthe brigade were, to say the least,something extraordinary. Acti-vated on 7 July, the unit was given

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at the same time a sailing date fiveto seven days later. In lookingback at this first of the post-WorldWar II surprises, it is again impor-tant to fully understand what theradical demobilization steps hadaccomplished. It is impossible tolist them all in this short account,but it will suffice to point out thatrifle companies were at two pla-toons instead of three, infantrybattalions at two rifle companies

instead of three, and deep cuts innormal logistic back-ups of alltypes of "ready" supplies of every-thing from ammunition to fieldrations were common. It also mustbe emphasized that normally, afterthe cutbacks and reductions fol-lowing World War II, the division-wing teams on both coasts wouldhave been very hard-pressed todeploy one reinforced brigade ofregiment-group-sized in 30 days,

let alone the seven days granted inthis case. A super performance issimply a classic understatement forthe mount-out of the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade toKorea.

In late June 1950, MarineFighter Squadron 214 was the onlyCorsair squadron operating fromEl Toro. Marine Fighter Squadron323 was in the process of returningto the air station following several

Marine Corps Air Units and Primary AircraftForward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (July—September 1950)

Marine Aircraft Group 33Headquarters Squadron 33Service Squadron 33Marine Fighter Squadron 214

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 323

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513

(Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3DSkyknight)

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2

1st Marine Aircraft Wing (September 1950 — July 1953)

Headquarters Squadron 1Marine Wing Service Squadron 1Marine Wing Service Group 17

Headquarters Squadron 17Marine Air Base Squadron 17Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17

Marine Aircraft Group 12Headquarters Squadron 12

(Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBMAvenger)

Service Squadron 12Marine Air Base Squadron 12Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12

Marine Aircraft Group 33Headquarters Squadron 33

(Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBMAvenger)

Service Squadron 33Marine Air Base Squadron 33Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33

Marine Fighter Squaclron 115(Grumman F9F Panther)

Marine Attack Squadron 121(Douglas AD Skyraider)

3

Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (Redesignated MarineAttack Squadron 212 on 10 June 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-i Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 2i4

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 311

(Grumman F9F Panther)Marine Fighter Squadron 312 (Redesignated MarineAttack Squadron 312 on 1 March 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (Redesignated MarineAttack Squadron 323 on 30 June 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-i Corsair)Marine Attack Squadron 332

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Attack Squadron 251

(Douglas AD Skyraider)Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513

(Vought F4U Corsair, Grumman F7F Tigercat,Douglas F3D Skyknight)

Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 542(Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)

Marine Transport Squadron 152(Douglas R4D Skytrain)

Marine Ground Control Squadron 1Marine Air Control Group 2Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3Marine Photographic Squadron 1

(McDonnell F2H-P Banshee)Marine Composite Squadron 1

(Douglas AD Skyraider)Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161

(Sikorsky HRS-1 Helicopter)Marine Observation Squadron 6

(Consolidated OY Sentinel, Sikorsky HO3SHelicopter, Bell HTL Helicopter)

1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion

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months of training at CampPendleton and on board theEssex-class carrier Philippine Sea(CV 47) off the California coast.Following its return, the aircraftand men of the squadron quicklyprepared to deploy. The BlackSheep of Marine Fighter Squadron214 likewise were in a high state ofreadiness, but had been "out ofpocket" when the war broke out.The squadron was enroute toHawaii on board the escort carrierBadoeng Strait (CVE 116), havingbeen awarded the privilege ofhosting the annual Naval Academymidshipman's cruise, when itreceived word of the NorthKorean invasion of South Korea.It was not long before thesquadron's commanding officer,Major Robert P. Keller, was sum-moned to Headquarters FleetMarine Force, Pacific, at CampSmith. After flying off the carrier,Keller met with Colonel Victor H.Krulak, Lieutenant General LemuelC. Shepherd, Jr.'s chief of staff.With a tone of dead seriousness

only Krulak could project, heasked Keller: "Major, are you readyto go to war?" Keller, reflecting onthe training and experience level ofthe squadron, assured him that theBlack Sheep were ready. With notime to enjoy Hawaii, the midship-men were offloaded and the carri-er made a beeline back toCalifornia in anticipation of mobi-lization orders.

As can be readily imagined,Camp Pendleton arid El Toro weretwin scenes of mad confusion asMarines arrived hourly by train,bus, and plane, and "demoth-balled" equipment of all typesarrived for marking and packing,literally at a rate measured in tonsper hour. "Sleep on the boat" wasthe order of the day as the date ofembarkation at San Diego andLong Beach for the first elements,12 July, rapidly drew closer. By 14July, all units were on boardassigned shipping and underwaywestward.

At departure, the total strength ofthe brigade was 6,534. MAG-33totaled 192 officers and 1,358enlisted men, composed principal-ly of the two fighter squadrons,VMF-214 and VMF-323, a nightfighter squadron, VMF(N)-5 13, andan observation squadron, VMO-6.An important and historic compo-nent of VMO-6 was a detachment offour HO3S- 1 Sikorsky helicopters,hurriedly assigned and moved to ElToro from the helicopter develop-ment squadron at Quantico, HMX-1. This was the first time that theUnited States Armed Services hadactually deployed helicopters in aunit mounting out for combat ser-vice overseas, although a few had

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130091

Marines of the wing's forward echelon receive their inoculations in earlyjuly atMarine Corps Air Station, El Toro, before leaving for Korea on board the escortcarrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and transport General A. E. Anderson (AP 111).

The Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) was the carrier home from which the "DeathRattlers" of Marine Fighter Squadron 323 launched their initial Korean combatmissions in August L950.

Marine corns Historical Center Photo Collection

4

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been tried out in both theEuropean and Pacific theaters atthe end of World War II on anexperimental basis. Aircraftstrength at deployment added up to60 Vought F4U Corsairs, eightConsolidated OY "Sentinels," andthe four Sikorsky HO3S-ls.

By 16 July, the brigade com-mander and a key advance partytook off by air for conferences andbriefings at Honolulu and at theFar East Command in Tokyo. Asthese meetings progressed and thepossibilities of immediate commit-ment on arrival of the main bodycame clearly into focus, an originalplan to hold the brigade in Japantemporarily was abandoned. Thiswas a result of the deterioratingposition of the United NationsCommand in Korea, which by thefourth week of the war had drawninto a perimeter-type defense ofthe port of Pusan at the southern tip

of the peninsula. On 2 August, thebrigade debarked at Pusan and on3 August at 0600, departed Pusanfor the front by rail and 50 bor-rowed Army trucks. MAG-33 ship-ping had been directed to Kobewhen the force reached far east-ern waters, and debarkation beganthere on 31 July. The fightersquadrons were flown off theBadoeng Strait to Itami nearOsaka, where they were checkedfor combat by the ground crewsand hastily transported overlandfrom Kobe. With just one refresherhop at Itami, VMF-214, now com-manded by Lieutenant ColonelWalter E. Lischeid, landed onboard the escort carrier Sicily (CVE118) for operations on 3 August,and on 5 August, Major Arnold A.Lund's VMF-323 returned to theBadoeng Strait for the same pur-pose. VMF(N)-513, under the com-mand of Major Joseph H.

5

Courtesy of cdr Peter J. Mersky, USNR (Ret)

was still considered a first-rate close air

Reinburg, was assigned to the FifthAir Force for control and beganshore-based operations fromItazuke Airfield on the southernisland of Kyushu. Its mission was toprovide night "heckler" operationsover the brigade and the Koreancombat area generally, while thetwo carrier-based units would pro-vide close air support. To furnishthe essential communications andtactical links for close air supportand general direct support to thebrigade, on arrival at Kobe a tanklanding ship was waiting to reem-bark Marine Tactical Air ControlSquadron 2 (MTACS-2), led byMajor Christian C. Lee, and theground echelon of VMO-6, com-manded by Major Vincent J.Gottschalk, for transport to Pusan.The aircraft of VMO-6 were readiedat Kobe and Itami and ferried toPusan by air. Thus the air-groundintegrity of the brigade was held

An F4U Corsair of Marine Fighter Squadron 214 launches ation, the "U-Bird"from the escort carrier Sicily (CVE 118). In its second support aircraft.major war infiveyears, as the workhorse of Ma rine Corps avi-

pit

intact as it entered its first combatless than 30 days after activation, atruly remarkable achievement.

At the time of the commitment toaction of the brigade in earlyAugust 1950, the United Nationsdefense had contracted to aperimeter around the southern-most port of Pusan. It was vitalthat the perimeter contract nomore, since the port was the logis-tic link to a viable base position insupport of a United Nations recov-ery on the peninsula. In bringingthis desirable outcome to reality,the brigade became known vari-ously as the "Fire Brigade," the"Marine Minutemen," and otherinto the breach sobriquets. In theprocess of their month-in-the-perimeter employment, theMarines were accorded the honorof restoring the confidence ofUnited Nations troops throughdestruction of the myth that theNorth Koreans were somehow

invincible. Marine aviation carriedits portion of the brigade load inthis restoration of pride andstature, once again relying on itsability to operate afloat as well asashore. Like the deployments on

board the fast carriers in WorldWar II, the basing of VMFs -214and -323 on board the escort carri-ers Sicily and Badoeng Strait onceagain showed the lasting wisdom ofthe long-standing commonalitypolicies between naval and Marineaviation.

From Sicily, in the form of eightCorsairs, came the first Marineoffensive action of the war. Led byMajor Robert P. Keller, thesquadron's executive officer, theeight VMF-214 Corsairs took off at1630 on 3 August in a strikeagainst Chinju and theCommunist-held village of Sinhan-ni. Using incendiary bombs, rock-ets, and numerous strafing runs itwas a more than suitable andimpressive greeting for the previ-ously almost unopposed NorthKorean troops. On the followingday, 21 additional sorties wereflown to help relieve the pressureon the Eighth Army southernflank. These struck at bridges, rail-roads, and troop concentrations inthe Chinju and Sachon areas. With-214 continuing the march from

Sicily Hihlightsfroni 1946 to 1951The commanding qfficer of VMF-214, LtCol Walter E. Lischeid, center, and theSicily's captain, Capt John S. 7immy" Thach, seated righi, listen intently asreturning pilots report on the results of their mission.

On the afternoon of3 August, the "Black Sheep" of VMF-214 made their first airstrikes against North Korean positionsfrom Chinju to Sachon. Earlier in the daythe squadron's 24 planes landed on board the Sicily, then cruising in theTsushima Straits, following two days of field carrier landing practice and ashort flight from Itami Air Force Base, Japan.

Sicily Highlightsfroin 1946 to 1951

6

Pusan Perimeter Air Support

the deck of the SIcily, VMF-323joined the fray from BadoengStrait on 6 August with strikes westof Chinju along the Nam River, hit-ting large buildings and railroadlines with rockets and 500-poundbombs. Because the carriers were soclose to the frontlines of theperimeter, the strikes could reachtheir targets in a matter of minutesat almost any point where supportwas requested. That the NorthKoreans realized something newhad been added was apparentwhen on 11 August, -323 teamed upwith North American F-SiMustangs of the U.S. Air Force nearKosong in what became known asthe "Kosong Turkey Shoot." In thisaction, the Corsairs hit a convoy ofmore than 100 vehicles of a NorthKorean motorized regiment, amixed bag of jeeps, motorcycles,and troop-carrying trucks, stop-ping the convoy at both ends on theroad. They got every one with thehelp of the F-51s. While hitting thejackpot in this manner was not an

every-day occurrence, the dailysorties from the two carriers soconveniently nearby, began toclimb in both number and effec-tiveness all along the length of theentire perimeter. MAG-33 aircraftwere constantly orbiting on stationover the frontline as the groundforces advanced, and communica-tions within the air-ground teamwas steady from the Tactical AirControl Parties (TACP) with thebattal.ions, all the way back to thebrigade headquarters. The air sup-port system, controlled by theactive presence of Marine TacticalAir Control Squadron 2 and VMO-6 at brigade headquarters from 6August on, worked to the won-drous amazement of the associatedU.S. Army and other UnitedNations units.

The Fifth Air Force exercisedoverall control of tactical air oper-ations in Korea, but Marine avia-tion units, as components of anintegrated Fleet Marine Force,operated in support of the brigade

7

as their highest priority, and insupport of other United Nationsunits as a lower priority. Thebrigade control organization con-sisted of three battalion Tactical AirControl Parties and one regimentalTACP, each consisting of one avia-tion officer, an experienced andfully qualified pilot, and six enlist-ed technicians. Each party wasequipped with a radio jeep,portable radios, and remotingcommunications gear. In addition,there were the facilities and per-sonnel of MTACS-2 at brigadeheadquarters, as well as thebrigade air section of the staff, oneofficer and one enlisted. The airsection was responsible for airplanning, tactical control, andcoordination of supporting aircraft.Lastly, but certainly of no lesserimportance, there was also thebrigade observation section con-sisting of the tactical air observer,three gunnery observers, and thelight observation and rotary-wingaircraft of VMO-6. When supportingother United Nations forces,Marine air units operated underthe Air Force-Army system for tac-tical air control.

The foregoing gives an abbrevi-ated description of the brigade airsupport system, which operatedvery effectively through some ofthe most rugged fighting of theKorean War. The operations in thePusan Perimeter basically weredivided during the six-week periodinto three major actions. The firstwas the counterattack in theextreme southwest which ranapproximately from 3 to 15August, and was known as theSachon offensive; the second wasthe First Naktong counteroffensive,from 16 to 19 August; and the thirdwas the Second Naktong from 3 to5 September. All three, rugged asthey were, resulted in thoroughdefeats for the Communist forcesbut were not without cost to the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130914Against a backdrop of rugged Korean terrain, an OYSentinel light observationaircraft of Marine Observation Squadron 6, piloted by the squadron's com-manding officer Maj Vincent f Gottschalk, spots concentrations of NorthKoreans for Ma rine Corsairs to sear with napalm.

brigade: 170 killed, 2 missing, and730 wounded. Estimates showedthat the brigade had inflictedalmost 10,000 casualties in killedand wounded on the enemy unitsfaced in the six weeks of its partic-ipation in the perimeter operation.

Throughout these three vitalactions the morale and confidenceof the United Nations forces facingthe North Koreans was restored.Marine air units of the brigade car-ried their part of the rebuildingprocess on a daily, and nightly,basis. In addition, Major Vincent J.Gottschalk's VMO-6 established somany "firsts" with its helicoptersduring the period that it was obvi-ous that a major tactical innovationwas in the making. The new steedthat Brigadier General Craig, hischief of staff, Colonel Edward W.Snedeker, and G-3, LieutenantColonel Joseph L. Stewart, had dis-covered clearly indicated that thehelicopter was fully capable of

working a revolution in commandobservation, inspection, and staffprocedures.

Most importantly, it was apparentfrom action in the Pusan Perimeterthat the Marine Corps air-groundteam concept was a winner. Thetight knit integration of close airsupport into the ground scheme ofmaneuver proved to be devastat-ingly effective. From 3 August to14 September 1950, the twosquadrons of MAG-33 on board thecarriers (VMFs -214 and -323) andthe shore-based night fighters ofVMF(N)-513, flew 1,511 sorties, ofwhich 995 were close air supportmissions in response to requestsfrom engaged ground troops.

The strikes by Marine aircraftnot only decimated the enemy'sforces, but they rekindled the bondbetween air and ground that char-acterizes the Marine air-groundteam. Ground Marines gainedcourage from seeing their fellow

Marines in Corsairs swoop in todeliver ordnance oftentimes within100 yards of the frontlines. Thepilots became part of the fight onthe ground and as a result gained asense of pride and accomplish-ment in helping ground troopsaccomplish their mission. CaptainJohn E. Barnett, one of the Corsairpilots summed up how aviators feltabout their relationship withground Marines: "With consum-mate conceit we doubted not thatMarines were the best pilots sup-porting the best infantry, employingthe best tactics; a brotherhoodnon-parallel. Pilots were in awe ofthe infantry, lavish praise fromwhom (regarding close air sup-port) fed our ego."

To sum up the air componentperformance in the perimeter, thewords of General Craig said it all:"The best close air support in thehistory of the Marine Corps. . . out-standing in its effectiveness." Andfrom the envious viewpoint of anadjacent Army infantiy regiment:

The Marines on our leftwere a sight to behold. Notonly was their equipmentsuperior or equal to ours, butthey had squadrons of air indirect support. They used itlike artillery. It was 'Hey,Joe—This is Smitty—Knockthe left off that ridge in front ofItem Company.' They had itday and night. It came offnearby carriers, and not fromJapan with only 15 minutes offuel to accomplish the mis-sion.

8

While there was literally no airopposition from the North KoreanAir Force because it had beenwiped out by the initial U.S. AirForce efforts at the beginning ofthe war, such accolades in additionto others were pleasant music toMarine aviation and to the brigade

For the first time in any war helicopters were used on the battlefront as liaisonaircraft and in evacuating the wounded. Although underpowered and hard-pressed to carry more than a pilot, crew chief and one evacuee, the Sikorsky HO3Swas relatively dependable.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

I

'Pr—

.1

as a whole. The performance ofthe brigade was a vital factor instopping the invasion in August.The punishment meted out to theNorth Korean units was so severethat it set them up for the crushingdefeat, which followed inSeptember.

The North Korean invasion ofSouth Korea occurred whileLieutenant General Lemuel C.

Shepherd, Jr., was enroute toHawaii to take over asCommanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific. He cut shorthis trip on 25 June when hereceived word of the NorthKorean action and immediatelyproceeded to San Francisco andthen directly to Hawaii. Followinga rapid succession of conferencesand briefings, he was off to Japanfor meetings with the Far EastCommand. History was truly madein one of these meetings at FarEast Command in which GeneralMacArthur and General Shepherdwere the major participants. In asense, it was a reunion betweenthe two because a few yearsbefore on New Britain, GeneralShepherd had been the assistantdivision commander of the 1stMarine Division when it wasunder the operational control ofGeneral MacArthur. It had longbeen a plan of MacArthur's thatshould a serious overrun of anypart of his forces occur, he wouldattempt to recoup through the useof appropriate delay followed by anamphibious landing in the enemyrear. This was the primary subjectto be discussed in the 10 Julymeeting.

The upshot of this historic con-ference was that followingGeneral Shepherd's assurance thatthe 1st Marine Division could bemade available, MacArthur asked

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1466

So great was his confidence in theMarine Corps Reserve that LtGenLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., took personalresponsibility for promising GenDouglas MacArthur that the 1stMarine Division with appropriateMarine air could be sent to Korea by 15September for the landing at Inchon.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for it, withappropriate air in the form of the1st Marine Aircraft Wing. As it wasapproved, almost immediately, itwas "less the Brigade units" whichwould revert to the division andwing upon their arrival in the the-ater. General Shepherd knew fullwell that the under-strength divisioncould hardly deploy the reinforced5th Marines to the brigade, letalone field the balance of the divi-sion, but he had an abiding anddeep faith in the loyalty and per-formance potential of the MarineCorps Reserve. The Reserve,ground and air, came through likethe proverbial gang-busters, and inless than 60 days after receivingthe initial orders, both wing anddivision made the landing atInchon on 15 September, just 67days after the 10 July conference inTokyo.

The response of the MarineCorps Reserve was so much a key

9

to the success not only of Inchon,but also to the firm establishment ofthe United Nations effort in Korea.By about 20 July, the exchangesbetween Far East Command andWashington had settled out thatwhat would be deployed forInchon would be a war-strength1st Marine Division and 1st MarineAircraft Wing. With the strengthsof the two being only at 7,779 and3,733 respectively, there was noway the war-strength manning lev-els could be reached and main-tained without drawing heavily onboth the ground and aviationorganized Reserve contingents.Division war-strength ran about25,000 and the wing about 9,500.On 19 July, President Trumanauthorized the mobilization of theMarine Corps Reserve and thingsbegan to move at a record pace.Minimum time warnings went outto all Reserve District Directors,and alerts were given to CampPendleton, El Toro, Camp Lejeune,and Cherry Point to expect literal-ly thousands of reservists in a mat-ter of days. The first reservistsarrived at Camp Pendleton and ElToro on 31 July, and by utilizingsome units and personnel of the2d Marine Division and 2d MarineAircraft Wing on the east coast, the1st Marine Division and the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing were able torealistically consider their sched-uled mount-out dates of 10-15August. Because a very high per-centage of the reservists werecombat veterans of World War II,only about 10 percent requiredany form of basic indoctrinationand training. This was a key factor,particularly in aviation, since thetotal time required from com-mencement of pilot training tooperational status was a matter ofsome two years. To be called up sosoon after World War II, was thetheme of many a barracks-roomand ready-room ballad that sus-

Inchon Landing

4II.'

1 St Marine Aircraft Wing LeadersMajor General Field Harris

peaking before a crowded gathering of the WingsClub at the Ambassador Hotel in Washington, D.C.,in May of 1945, Major General Field Harris ended his

address on Marine aviation in the scheme of NationalDefense with the words: "We are not an air force. We area part of an air-ground team. I believe we will ever be anecessary part of our Nation's air-ground-sea team. Asalways, we will aspire to be a useful and helpful arm ofthe United States Marines." A little more than five yearslater, Harris' remarks would ring true. As Major GeneralOliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st MarineDivision, wrote to Major General Harris, then com-manding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea, follow-ing the successful breakout from the Chosin Reservoir:"Never in its history has Marine aviation given moreconvincing proof of its indispensable value to theground Marines. . . . A bond of understanding [betweenbrother Marines on the ground and in the airl has beenestablished that will never be broken."

Born in 1895 in Versailles, Kentucky, he received hiswings at Pensacola in 1929. But before that he had 12years of seasoning in the Marine Corps that included seaduty on board the Nevada and Wyoming and toursashore with the 3d Provisional Brigade at Guantanamo,Cuba, and at Marine Barracks, Cavite, Philippines, and the

Major General Field HarrisDepartment of Defense (USMC) A310952

Department of Defense (USMc) A30035Major General Ghristian F Schilt

Office of the Judge Advocate in Washington.After obtaining his gold wings, Harris served with a

squadron of the West Coast Expeditionary Force in SanDiego, followed by additional flight training and assign-ments at sea and on shore, including Egypt as assistantnaval attaché. During World War II he was sent to theSouth Pacific where he served successively as Chief ofStaff, Aircraft, Guadalcanal; Commander, Aircraft, NorthSolomons; and commander of air for the Green Islandoperation. Following the war, he became Director ofMarine Aviation and in 1948 was given command ofAircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and a year later,Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and 1st MarineAircraft Wing at El Toro, California.

His Korean War service as Commanding General, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing was rewarded with both theArmy's and Navy's Distinguished Service Medal. Harrisreturned to the United States in the summer of the 1951and again became the commanding general of Aircraft,Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Upon his retirement in 1954he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant general. Hedied in December 1967 at the age of 72.

Major General Christian F. SchiltMajor General Christian F. "Frank" Schilt, Major

General Field Harris' replacement as CommandingGeneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, brought a vastamount of flying experience to his new post in Korea.

Born in Richland County, Illinois, in 1895, Schilt

10

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i/I

entered the Marine Corps in June 1917 and served as anenlisted man in the Azores with the 1st MarineAeronautical Company, a seaplane squadron assigned toanti-submarine patrol. In June 1919, on completion offlight training at Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida, hereceived his wings and was commissioned a Marine sec-ond lieutenant, beginning a near 40-year career inMarine Corps aviation.

His initial assignments were to aviation units in SantoDomingo and Haiti, and in 1927, he was assigned toNicaragua. As a first lieutenant in 1928, he received theMedal of Honor for his bravery and "almost superhumanskill" in flying out wounded Marines from Quilali.Schilt's career pattern during the interwar years consist-ed of a mix or school and flight assignments.

Prior to the United States entry into World War II,Colonel Schilt was assigned to the American Embassy inLondon as assistant naval attaché for air, and as such, trav-eled extensively in the war zones observing British air tac-tics in North Africa and the Middle East. During the war,he served as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's chief of staffat Guadalcanal, was later commanding officer of MarineAircraft Group 11, and participated in the consolidationof the Southern Solomons and air defense of Peleliu andOkinawa.

In April 1952, on his return from Korea, Schilt becameDeputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and thenext year he was given control of aircraft in the Pacificcommand. His last assignment was as Director of

Major General Clayton C. JeromeMajGen Clayton C. Jerome, USMC

Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps and upon hisretirement in April 1957, he was advanced to four-star rankbecause of his combat decorations. General Schilt diedin January 1987 at the age of 92.

Major General Clayton C.JeromeLike his predecessor, Major General Clayton C.

Jerome had a distinguished flying career.A native of Hutchinson, Kansas, born in 1901, he was

commissioned a second lieutenant in 1922 upon gradu-ation from the Naval Academy. After a year at MarineBarracks, Washington, D.C., he reported to Pensacola forflight training and received his naval aviator's wings in1925. Foreign service in China, the Philippines, andGuam followed his first duty assignment at Naval AirStation, Marine Corps Base, San Diego.

In the mid-1930s, Jerome became naval attaché for airin Bogota, Columbia, and several other Latin and CentralAmerican republics. While serving as naval attaché heearned the Distinguished Flying Cross for his daring res-cue of the survivors of a Venezuelan plane crash. Usingan amphibious plane, he repeatedly flew over thetreacherous jungles of Cuyuni in search of the wreck. Afterfinding it he made two hazardous landings on the narrowCuyuni River to rescue four survivors.

During World War II, he took part in the consolidationof the Northern Solomons and the Treasury-Bougainvilleoperation as operations officer and later chief of staff toCommander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons. He was laterCommander, Aircraft and Island Commander, Emirau,before serving with the U.S. Army in the Philippines.During the Luzon campaign, he commanded MangaldenAirfield and Marine aircraft groups at Dagupan, directingMarine air support for the Army ground operations.

Postwar duty included command of Marine Corps AirStation, Quantico; duty as Chief of Staff, Marine CorpsSchools, Quantico; and simultaneous service as Directorof Public Information, Recruiting, and Marine CorpsHistory at Headquarters Marine Corps.

He was serving as Director of Aviation and AssistantCommandant for Air when reassigned as CommandingGeneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea in April 1952.

In January 1953, Major General Jerome reported toCherry Point, North Carolina, as Commanding General,2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and Commander, Aircraft, FleetMarine Force, Atlantic. Two years later he moved to ElToro, becoming the air commander for Fleet MarineForce, Pacific. Retiring in 1959 as a lieutenant general, hedied in 1978 at the age of 77.

Major General Vernon E. McgeeA Marine aviator for more than 20 years, Major

General Mcgee assumed command of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing on 9 January 1953.

Born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1900, he enlisted in theMarine Corps in 1919 after attending Oklahoma A&MCollege. Commissioned in 1922, Mcgee served in

11

1st MAW Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr53

Major General Vernon E. Megee

infantry, artillery, and expeditionary billets beforeundergoing pilot training in 1931. A year before, whilequartermaster with the Aircraft Squaclrons, 2d MarineBrigade, in Nicaragua, he earned the Navy and Marine

Corps Medal for commendatory achievement while fly-ing as an observer and machine gunner in an attack ona large force of Sandinista rebels.

Receiving his naval aviator's wings in 1932, Megeespent the pre-war decade as a flight instructor atQuantico; student at the Air Corps Tactical School,Maxwell Field, Alabama; and commander of a Marinefighter squadron. In 1940, Major Megee was assigned tothe U.S. Naval Aviation Mission to Peru and spent the nextthree years as a special advisor to that government'sMinister of Aviation.

During World War II, he was the first commander ofan Air Support Control Unit, which was created specifi-cally to provide close air support for ground troops. Incombat operations at Iwo Jima, Megee was said to havetold his pilots to "go in and scrape your bellies on thebeach" in support of Marines on the ground. Later, atOkinawa, he commanded all Marine Corps LandingForce Air Support Control Units.

After promotion to brigadier general in 1949, Megeewas named Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, andafter receiving his second star in 1951, he served asCommanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, prior to his assignment in 1953 to command the1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea.

In 1956 he became the first Marine aviator to serve asAssistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief ofStaff. After having served as Commanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, he retired in 1959. In retirement,General Megee earned a master's degree from theUniversity of Texas, Austin, and served as superintendentof the Marine Military Academy in Harlingen. He died in1992 at the age of 91.

tamed both ground and aviationtroops on the lighter side through-out the conflict. The "two-timelosers," as they referred to them-selves, put a lot of morale-buildinghumor into Korea, but the factor ofoverriding importance was thatthey were well trained, experi-enced, and seasoned, ground andair.

Any discussion of Inchon mustbe considered incomplete if it failsto mention the difficult problemthe site itself presented to theamphibious planners. First, thetidal variation at Inchon is one ofthe greatest ranges of rise and fallon the entire Korean coastline,east or west. Secondly, theapproach channels to the landingsites essential to successful estab-

lishment of a major force ashore,were not only narrow and winding,but also were through extensivemud flats. The combination ofthese two factors alone meant thatmuch of the unloading of heavyequipment would be over mudflats at low tide with the amphibi-ous force ships on the bottom untilthe next tidal change. In order toaccommodate to this problemsomewhat and also meet the D-Day date of 15 September, andmanage to negotiate the very nar-row approach channels, it wasessential to make the approachduring daylight hours on the fallof the tide, thus deriving an assaultH-Hour of late afternoon.

While the complexities ofInchon as a site were much dis-

12

cussed, with sides taken both atFar East Command and all the wayback to Washington, GeneralMacArthur held firm in his confi-dence in the amphibious expertsof the Navy and Marine Corps. Hebelieved that any other site or datewould not yield the opportunity toquickly cut the North Korean sup-ply lines to their forces in thesouth. MacArthur was right, andInchon has achieved its place inhistory as the most audacious, dar-ing, difficult, risky—and success-ful—amphibious landing, perhapsof all time.

Major General Field Harris,commanding general of the 1st

/

/

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A29033

A Marine aviator since 1930 and aveteran of the Guadalcanal, IwoJima, and Okinawa campaigns duringWorld Waril, Col Frank G. Dailey ledthe bomb- and napalm-ladenCorsairs of Marine Aircraft Group 33from the Pusan Perimeter to theChosin Reservoir.

Marine Aircraft Wing, arrived inTokyo on 3 September, and imme-diately began to finalize the airsupport plans for the Inchon oper-ation with Far East Command, theNavy, the Air Force, and the Army.Underlying the air plan was thedecision that the sky over theobjective area was to be dividedbetween the air units of the Navy'sJoint Task Force 7, and those of XCorps. X Corps had been assignedits own organic air under corpscontrol in a manner reminiscent ofthe Tactical Air Force organizationaccorded X Army in the Okinawaoperation. The command of XCorps tactical air was given toGeneral Cushman who had beenthe brigade deputy commander toGeneral Craig in the PusanPerimeter. MAG-33, under ColonelFrank G. Dailey, was designatedby the wing as Tactical AirCommand X Corps, with principalunits being VMFs -212 and -312, inaddition to VMF(N)-542 and

VMF(N)-513. Joint Task Force 7counted on its fast carrier taskforce, Task Force 77, to gain airsuperiority in the area, as well as tofurnish deep support and interdic-tion strikes. Close support for thelanding was assigned to the taskgroup including the two small car-riers, Sicily and Badoeng Strait,still operating VMFs-214 and-323,which had supported the brigade sowell in the Pusan Perimeter.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wingdesignated MTACS-2, which hadcontrolled air support for thebrigade, to function in that capac-ity for the landing, and upon theestablishment of X Corps ashore, tothen continue to control forTactical Air Command, X Corps.

A primary and crucial objectivein the Inchon landing was Wolmi-do Island, very close in to themain landing beaches of Inchon.Preparation of Wolmi-do began on10 September with attacks byVMFs -214 and -323 with bombs,rockets, and napalm. The islandwas only about 1,000 yards wideand about the same dimension onthe north-south axis, except that along causeway extending to thesouth added another 1,000 yardsto the length of the island. At theend of the causeway, a small cir-cular islet with a lighthousemarked the entrance to the harbor.The main part of the island wasdominated by a centrally situatedpiece of high ground known asRadio Hill. The Corsairs literallyblackened the entire island withnapalm to the extent that duringthe second day of attacks, thewhole island appeared to beablaze.

When the air strikes began, FirstLieutenant John S. Perrin, a pilotwith VMF-214, recalled that sever-al North Korean military vehicles

13

were flushed out. Evidently theenemy drivers believed that amoving target would be harder tohit. Perrin said that they got theirCorsairs as low and slow as theycould and literally chased thevehicles up and down streets andaround corners in the island'ssmall industrial sector. Eventuallyall the vehicles felt the wrath ofthe blue fighters.

While the two carriers werebusy with replenishment at Saseboon the third day of the pre-landingstrikes, Task Force 77 took overthe preparation effort with exten-sive bombing attacks, augmentedby the Shore Bombardment Groupof four cruisers and six destroyers,the latter closing to within 800yards of the island. In five days ofcontinuous pounding by this com-bined air and naval gunfire,Wolmi-do was one blasted pieceof real estate as the 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, prepared to land atGreen Beach on the morning of 15September. Testifying to the effec-tiveness of the pre-landing prepa-ration, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D.Taplett's battalion had completedtheir mopping-up operations bynoon and its total casualties for theday were 17 wounded. In return,the battalion could count 136 pris-oners, 108 enemy dead, and frominterrogations of the prisoners, atleast 150 more entombed in cavesand emplacements throughout theisland. During the afternoon of 15September, from observation postsat the north tip of the island and atthe top of Radio Hill, targets werepicked out for special attentionduring the pre-H-Hour bombard-ment preparation for the landings atRed and Blue beaches at 1730.While the afternoon wore on,VMFs -214 and -323, in addition tothree squadrons of Navy ADSkyraiders, alternately blastedInchon, integrating their strikeswith naval gunfire from 1430 right

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Marines charge ashore at Inchon on 15 September After scal-ing the seawall, with the aid of ladders, they fan out rapid-

Sketch by Cpl Ralph H. Schofield, USMCRly to secure the beachhead as Corsairs of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing blast enemy targets in support of the landing.

up to H-Hour. In addition, TaskForce 77 kept a continuous strikegroup of another 12 planes overthe objective area to keep anymovement of defensive forcestoward the beaches at an absoluteminimum. With this type andintensity of air and naval gunfirepreparation, in addition to thesupport given the Red and Bluebeach landings from Wolmi-do,plus the strong element of surprisecarried by the Inchon assault, suc-cess of the operation was assured.In view of the very heavy elementof risk involved with the hydro-graphic characteristics of the harborand the many other departuresfrom normal planning patterns for

an amphibious assault of the mag-nitude of Inchon, a completelysuccessful outcome was indeedwelcome.

During the advance Out of thebeachhead, which commenced theday following the landing, the airsupport control system functionedprecisely as previously described.On the first day of the advancetoward Seoul, the obviously con-fused North Koreans learned evenmore about close air support and itseffects than they had absorbed inthe Pusan Perimeter a few weeksbefore. While the attack on D+1had barely gotten underway, justfive miles away from the advancing5th and 1st Marines, six North

14

Korean T-34 tanks were spotted inbroad daylight rumbling along theSeoul-Inchon highway withoutescort of any kind, apparentlyordered out to bust up the landing.An eight plane strike of VMF-214 hitthe enemy armor near the village ofKansong-ni with napalm and rock-ets as 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,applauded from their positionsless than two miles away. TheCorsairs destroyed two of the T-34s and a third was damaged, hutthe North Korean crews aban-doned some of the tanks and triedto take shelter in huts near the sideof the road, which were promptlynapalmed by the strike. This threwup large quantities of smoke and

-

__The assault itself was suc-

cessful only through theperfect teamwork that exist-ed between the participat-ing Naval and Marineelements. . . . Only the Unit-ed States Marines throughtheir many years of special-ized training in amphibiouswarfare, in conjunction withthe Navy, had the requisiteknow-how to formulate theplans within the limitedtime available and executethose plans flawlessly with-out additional training orrehearsal.

low, it was too late to pull out."Shortly after, 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines, with a tank escort, cameinto Kansong-ni and as they werecoming into the position, surprisedthree of the remaining T-34s,which were promptly destroyedby the escorting M-26 Pershingtanks. The close contacts betweenair and ground, as typified by thisexample, permitted the continu-ous and synergistic employment ofthe capabilities of the air-groundteam during the advance to Seouland beyond.

One of the key objectives of theassault phase and the advancetoward Seoul was the capture ofKimpo Airfield, the major airinstallation of the city, about seven

To briefly summarize all aspects miles west on the other side of theof the Inchon landing, a quote Han River from Seoul. While still infrom Rear Admiral James H. the relatively confined operatingDoyle, the veteran amphibious areas of the assault phase of thegroup commander, does the jobnicely:

operation, the forces assignedcould meet air support require-

In a destroyed banger at Kimpo Airfield, Marines found one of several near-fly-able North Korean Soviet-built aircraft. Captured by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,Marines engineers quickly made the airfield operational with temporary repairs,ready to receive elements 0fMAG-33.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A3226

Department of Defense Photo (USA) Sc348504A curious Marine passes three destroyed North Korean T-34 tanks five miles eastof Inchon. The rocket-laden Corsairs of VMF-214 knocked out the tanks, part ofa group of six ordered to break-up the landing.

led the pilots to believe that all sixtanks had been destroyed, so theyswitched to other targets in thebeachhead area.

Destruction of the tanks came ata price. Captain William F.

Simpson, Jr., a pilot with VMF-214was killed. Fellow pilot CaptainEmmons S. Maloney recalled thatSimpson 'got so involved in it, hit-ting these tanks coming up, that, healmost flew straight into the tank.By the time he realized he was too

15

,; •-S• ?.

Kimpo Airfield

On 19 September, Tactical AirCommand X Corps, GeneralCushman, established his head-quarters at Kimpo, and was quick-ly followed by Marine GroundControl Intercept Squadron 1,

MTACS-2, and VMO-6. The firstfighter squadron of MAG-33 tocheck in was Lieutenant ColonelMax J. Volcansek, Jr.'s VMF(N)-542with five Grumman F7F Tigercatslanding late in the afternoon of the19th. They also flew the first com-bat mission from the field early thenext morning when theydestroyed two locomotives nearSeoul. Corsairs of LieutenantColonel Richard W, Wyczawski'sVMF-212 and Lieutenant Colonel J.Frank Cole's VMF-312 landedshortly after -542 and also got intoaction on the 20th.

During the transition of thesquadrons assigned to MAG-33

ments. As the objective areaswidened and expanded with theadvance, however, it was essentialto bring in more shore-based avia-tion to meet the demand quicklyand with optimized dispatch on aconstantly broadening front. Thefield was captured and declaredsecure in the mid-morning of 18September. It was in such goodshape after the assault that it waspossible to almost immediatelymove in the first operating units.The first aircraft to land officially atKimpo was an HO3S helicopter ofVMO-6, piloted by Captain Victor A.Armstrong, which brought inGeneral Shepherd and his G-3,Colonel Victor H. Krulak, to conferwith General Craig, who had justarrived by jeep. Later in the after-noon, Generals Harris andCushman also arrived to makefinal plans for the deployment ofthe Marine squadrons from Japanand those that would fill out MAGs-33 and -12 for the follow-on oper-ations.

Returning to the Sicily after making the first landing at Kimpo Airfield, lstLtJohnV. Haines points out the damaged section on his Corsair which caused theunscheduled landing to his squadron commandei Lt('ol Walter F. Lischeid.LtCol Lischeid would die six days later when his Corsair was shot down over thewestern suburbs of Seoul.

16

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420281

Gen Oliver P. Smith collection, Marine Corps Research Center

TacticalAir Commandei X Corps, BGen ThomasJ. Cushman, USMC, righl andhis chief of staff Col Kenneth H. Wei USMC, meet with the commanding gen-eral of the Fifth Air Force, MajGen Earle R. Partridge, USAF left at KimpoAirfield. While the wing headquarters remained in Japan, its task was to furnishadministrative and logistical supportduring the Kimpo air operations.

to Cushman's command and MAG-33

'2

&

from MAG-12 in Japan, the opera-tional burden of Marine air sup-port was handled entirely by thetwo carrier-based Corsairsquadrons, VMF-214 and VMF-323,now administratively assigned toMAG-12. Also supporting the dis-placement of the division-wingteam into the Korean peninsulawas Major Joseph H. Reinburg'sVMF(N)-513, still operating fromItazuke Air Force Base in Japan.

The flexibility of Marine avia-tion in supporting a forward dis-placement of such magnitude withhardly a break in the continuity ofoperations is well illustrated in therapid establishment of Tactical AirCommand X Corps at Kimpo.Once again, the value of common-ality between Marine and Navalaviation was effectively demon-strated in the coverage, without abreak, of air support requirementsof the 1st Marine Division, utilizingthe two carrier-based squadrons.Regarding the capture of Kimpo,Lieutenant General George E.

Stratemeyer, Commander, Far EastAir Forces, had this to say to MajorGeneral Oliver P. Smith, the com-manding genera! of the 1st MarineDivision: "I want to take thisopportunity of expressing myadmiration and gratification for themanner in which elements of yourDivision recently captured Kimpo

Airfield and so secured it as tomake it available for use by FarEast Air Forces and Marine Corpsaircraft in shortest possible time."

Control of air support passedfrom the Amphibious ForceCommander to MTACS-2 ashoreon D+2 when the landing forcecommander (Major General OliverP. Smith, Commanding General,1st Marine Division) declared hewas ready to assume control.Requests for close air supportincreased rapidly as the enemyrecovered from the initial shock ofthe assault. For example, on 18-19September, VMFs -323, -214, and-513 flew a total of 50 close supportsorties, delivering napalm, rockets,and 500-pound bombs againsttroop concentrations in front ofthe 1st Marines, who were findingthe going a bit tougher in thevicinity of Sosa on the Inchon-Seoul highway. In addition, -513flew a total of 15 daylight closesupport missions during the period17-19 September for Army unitsalong the Pusan Perimeter, wherethe accompanying breakout to thenorth and west was being initiated.

With Kimpo in hand, the nextmajor objective became the forcedcrossing of the Han River and thetaking of essential key terrain fromwhich to launch the assault onSeoul. MAG-33 and MAG-12 made

17

their principal contributions tothese major endeavors by steadilyand rapidly increasing theirstrengths and capabilities atKimpo, and through strikes againstredeployment and reinforcingmoves by the North Koreansattempting to improve the defens-es of the city. Logistically, therewas a vehicle shortage for themovement of aviation gasoline,ammunition, and oil from the portdumps at Inchon and Ascom City toKimpo, but a timely offer from theFar East Air Force's Combat CargoCommand solved the problem.During the week of 18-24September, the Command hauled atotal of 1,545 tons of these vitalaviation supplies in from Japan.Once again the theorem that thefarther from Washington, thegreater the inter-Service cooperationwas proven, just as it was in theSouth Pacific a few years before. Inaddition to this air effort, about1,450 tons were trucked to Kimpofrom the port during the sameperiod. Also, Marine TransportSquadron 152 flew in spare partsand urgently needed groundequipment from Japan or wherev-er it could be made available,practically around-the-clock.

The crossing of the Han wasassigned to the 5th Marines in thevicinity of Haengju, and after an

Department of Defense Photo (UsMc) A130104

The Corsairs from VMF-312 take offfrom Kimpo Airfield as clock attacks on retreating North Korean forces.fast as they could be refueled and rearmed in around-the-

N 'rJ

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated PressMarine amphibious tractors plow across the muddy Han River as the planes ofMarine Aircraft Groups 12 and 33 provide close supportfor the 1st and 5th Marinesin their assault toward the South Korean capital.

advance toward Seoul and to seizevantage points in support of the1st Marines crossing atYongdungpo. Yongdungpo, theindustrial area of the city, was sit-uated on the south bank of theHan on a large sandspit. The fight-ing on the north bank and in theattack on Yongdungpo bothserved notice to the division that itwas going to be a "to the last man"

defense of the city. By the 24th,after an extremely severe minute-to-minute three days of intensive bat-

From the 19th on, both MAGs-12 and -33 flew maximum effortschedules in close support of boththe 1st and the 5th Marines in theirassaults toward the city. Typical ofthe squadron performances duringthis period was a flight of fiveCorsairs led by Lieutenant ColonelWalter Lischeid of VMF-214, whicheffectively broke up a threatenedcounterattack on Hill 105 South,held by the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines. It was one of six closesupport missions flown by -214 onthe 23d in the zone of the 5th

On the 24th, in front ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, on the east slope of Hill56, VMF-323 dropped 500-pound

Marines of the Second Platoon, Company G, 5th Marines, clean snipers out of aresidential section of Seoul. Due to the confined nature of much ofthefightingwithin the city, Marine close air support was used sparingly and at deeper dis-tances from the advancing troops.

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A3365

Marines. As a counter to the airsupport rendered during the day-light hours, Marine artillery tookover the complete support jobafter dark when the "closest" closesupport possibilities becamesomewhat diminished. When theterrain cooperates, this one-twocounter to enemy counterattacksaround the clock was most effec-tive.

tling, night and day, the 1stMarines was able to make thecrossing and the battle for Seoulwas underway.

abortive attempt during the night of19 September; the 3d Battalionaccomplished it during daylighthours on the 20th. Four Corsairs ofVMF-214 provided supporting firesagainst a key hill from which theNorth Koreans were directingaccurate fire at the crossingtracked landing vehicles. As theassault on this hill continued, theCorsairs reported enemy in num-bers hastily evacuating with strafingMarine aircraft in full pursuit. Thethree primary objectives weresecured by mid-morning and theadvance down the north bank ofthe river toward Seoul beganimmediately. The general plan wasfor the 5th Marines to continue the

18

Flying Sergeants: Enlisted Marine Aviators

ne area where the Marine Corps was probablyalone among the aviation Services was thedegree it used enlisted pilots, especially in com-

bat. Enlisted pilots were not new. France in World WarI and the Axis powers, Germany, Japan, and Italy, in WorldWar II made considerable use of their enlisted aviators.The Royal Air Force would have been in even worse straitsduring the Battle of Britain in 1940 had it not been for itssergeant-pilots. For the most part, however, the UnitedStates required its pilots to be commissioned officersand, with few exceptions, that is the way it continues tobe.

The Navy had instituted its Naval Aviation Pilot (NAP)designation in 1919 because of a pilot shortage. TheMarines, too, authorized selection of enlisted members tobecome pilots and First Sergeant Benjamin Belcher wasthe first Marine NAP in 1923.

With the country's hurried and somewhat unexpectedentry into World War II, the need for pilots transcendedthe niceties of rank and tradition. Therefore all theServices, at one time or another during the war, made useof enlisted pilots, sometimes elevating them to commis-sioned rank later. Marine ace Lieutenant ColonelKenneth A. Walsh, who scored 21 kills and earned theMedal of Honor during the war, was an enlisted pilot untilhe was commissioned in 1942.

The Marine Corps probably had the largest number ofnoncommissioned aviators (131 in 1942), and not in sec-ond-line transport squadrons; many of these NAPs laterflew helicopters and jets in very heavy action in Korea.Flying sergeants flew Corsairs and Tigercats at Pusanand Chosin, Panthers in close air support against theChinese, and OYs on dangerous artillery-spotting missions.

Technical Sergeant Robert A. Hill accumulated 76combat missions as an OY pilot, earning the moniker"Bulletproof" after coming home in planes that weremore holes than aircraft. He received a DistinguishedFlying Cross for evacuating wounded Marines nearChosin under heavy enemy fire. Marine NAPs piloted sev-eral of the R4D transports that also evacuated woundedfrom Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri during the Chosin breakout.

But the jet pilots were the glamour boys and NAPswere among the first Marine jet pilots, taking their train-ing in Lockheed TO-is along with their commissionedsquadron mates. The training met some resistance fromsenior squadron commanders, a few of whom did notwant enlisted pilots flying their new jets. NAPs were notallowed to train in jets until 1949. This provided a cadreof experienced and motivated personnel to draw uponduring the action in Korea.

This somewhat confusing situation had the addedfacet that several now-enlisted NAPs had been commis-sioned lieutenants in World War II. However, after mus-

National Archives Photo (USN) 80G-428028

The flying sergeants of VMF-212 on board the light car-rier Bataan (CVL 29). Standing from left to right are:TSgt Gail Lane, MSgt John J. McMasters, MSgt Clyde B.Casebeer, and seated from left to right, MSgt Billy R.Green, MSgt DonaldA. Ives, and MSgt Norman E. Payne,

Jr.

tering out in 1945 and 1946, many of the former Corsairdrivers regretted their decision to leave the activeMarine Corps; several missed flying such powerful aircraftas the tough F4U. The Corps also found itself short ofqualified aviators to fly its new jets and to man itsremaining squadrons.

A program was developed whereby former Marine offi-cer aviators could return as master sergeants (E-7 was thehighest enlisted rating at the time), if they re-upped 90days or less after leaving active duty. After the 90-day limit,the former aviator could rejoin as a technical sergeant, agrade below that of master sergeant.

When VMF-311 brought its F9F Panthers to Korea,several of its pilots were enlisted aviators. MasterSergeant Avery C. Snow was the first NAP to complete 100combat missions in a jet. Snow had been a captain withMarine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232 during WorldWar II.

19

One specialized squadron that made heavy use of itsNAPs was Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1),established on 25 February 1952, flying modifiedMcDonnell F2H-2P Banshees with a long nose toaccommodate several reconnaissance cameras. VMJ-1established an enviable record in Korea. Several of itspilots, who were specially trained volunteers, wereenlisted men who could double as lab technicians if thesituation warranted. Squadron crews flew 5,025 sorties,shooting 793,012 feet of film, one-third of all UnitedNations photo reconnaissance output, and at times, 50 per-cent of all Far East Air Force intelligence missions.However, even with this outstanding record, theBanshee drivers of VMJ-1 could not respond to allrequests, and as such, overall reconnaissance requirementssuffered throughout the war, primarily because of a lackof assets—mainly planes, pilots, and trained photo inter-preters. Real-time imagery for field commanders andtheir units was not available at times when it was mostneeded. This problem, although well known andaccepted, especially by the ground units, continuedthrough Vietnam, and even into the Gulf War.

Five master sergeant NAPs of VMJ-1 pose by one of theirBanshees. From left to right are: MSgt James R. Todd,MSgt Samuel W. Cooper, MSgt Lee R. Copland, MSgtMarvin D. Myers, and MSgtLowellL. Truex. As a second

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Aerial photo reconnaissance is one of the most exact-ing and dangerous jobs in all military aviation. The"recce" pilot must be more than just a good pilot; that isjust a base from which to start. He must be a crackerjacknavigator and know his camera systems inside and out,their capabilities and their limitations. And he must beresourceful, as well as have an inexhaustible supply ofcourage. Sometimes these last qualities are all thatenable him to bring the film home and successfullycomplete his mission.

Most jet reconnaissance aircraft were unarmed, rely-ing upon their speed to get them home before being inter-cepteci. During World War II, there were no specificallydedicated reconnaissance aircraft, merely modifiedfighters, which had cameras stuck in the most convenientspace, sometimes behind the pilot in the cockpit, orbelow him in the belly. The F6F Hellcat and P-51Mustang are examples of such modification. Usually,these aircraft retained most, if not all, their machine gunarmament and could therefore fight their way to and fromthe target. During Korea, however, the dedicatedphoto-Banshees of VMJ-1 were toothless and needed

lieutenant with VMF-224 during World War II, Truexshot down a Japanese "George" fighter during anengagement off Okinawa.

coirtesy of MSgt Lowell L. Truex

escorts. Sometimes another Banshee would go along,both as an escort and sometimes to ensure the coverageof the target with another camera. Air Force F-86s weresometimes called upon to shepherd the "recce" pilot. Andsometimes, the photo pilot found himself alone.

In 1952, Master Sergeant Lowell T. Truex had made hisphoto runs against installations near the Yalu River,thinking that his F-86 escort would look Out for anyCommunist fighters, which might try to come after him.However, as he looked around he found that the Sabreswere nowhere to be seen, and he also spotted a gaggleof MiG-15s taking off across the river. Hurriedly, he fin-ished his photo runs and ran for home. He found later,that the F-86s had been watching from above, had theMiGs in sight, and were ready to jump the Chinese fight-ers if they come after Truex. Recalling his time with VMJ-1, Truex said:

My memories of the photo unit, which became asquadron during my tour, and all the plankowners,are good ones. We were completely self-containedand operated with field equipment from the well-point, water tank to the generators. The techni-cians were all superior guys, who worked withenergy and diligence.

While standing squadron watches, besides flying theirregular missions, the NAPs were also required to work asdivision officers in the squadron photo lab and on theflight line. There was also the need to brief escort pilots,who were often Air Force F-86 pilots. The Sabre pilots didnot always appreciate being briefed by an enlisted avia-tor, and occasionally made things difficult for theirMarine compatriot. In Master Sergeant Truex's case, he hadto submit to annoying identification exercises before hewas allowed to conduct his brief. "I had to be verified,"he recalled, "and they wouldn't let me into their briefingroom without identification. But, I briefed the Air Forcepilots precisely, even though some of them took a casu-al attitude about escorting a Marine reconnaissancepilot."

The haughty Sabre pilots tended to look down on thebig, blue Banshee their Marine charges flew. How couldit compare with their shiny, silver F-86s? As MasterSergeant Truex again recalled:

They underestimated the Banshee's speed andclimb, as well as the intensity our missionrequired. With our small J-34 engines and big tiptanks, our F2Hs had superior range. Although theirF-86s looked good, and the Air Force did take careof us—and we certainly appreciated their pres-ence—they usually hingoed before we were fin-ished. We usually flew back alone.

Master Sergeant James R. Todd was VMJ- l's high-mis-

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sion man, completing 101 photo missions before rotatinghome. Todd flew 51 reconnaissance missions inBanshees, 10 in F9F-2Ps, 23 in F7F-3Ps, 13 in F4U-5Ps, and4 escort missions in F4U-4Bs. As he recalled: "The F4U-4B was used for armed escort only. The rest of the time,we relied on a thirty-eight pistol, a can of film and a lotof speed."

Like many of the enlisted aviators, Todd had been com-missioned a second lieutenant in World War II, althoughhe had just missed seeing combat service when the warended, having spent much of his post-wing time as aninstructor. He was mustered out in September 1946, butreturned in November. He resigned his first lieutenant'scommission, raised his hand as a private, then wasimmediately advanced to master sergeant and sent to ElToro and then to Pensacola. Arriving at the Florida air sta-tion, he joined other re-enlistees at the Naval School ofPhotography, where they learned the art of aerial recon-naissance. The training was to stand them in good steadin the coming years. By 1950, Todd and his friends hadgained a lot of experience in Corsairs and Tigercats.

In September 1951, they were sent to Korea to sup-plement the meager photographic assets at K-3(Pohang). At the time the Marines flew F7F-3Ps and F4U-5Ps. But Todd managed to check out in the F9F-2P, andthus, when VMJ-1 was commissioned the followingFebruary with brand-new McDonnell F2H-2P Banshees,he was a natural to slide into the new jet's cockpit. Fora while, though, the squadron operated five differenttypes: F7F-3P, F4U-5P, F4U-4B (for escort), F9F-2P, andF2H-2P. The props and Panthers remained until April1952.

Several of VMJ-l's enlisted aviators also worked in thesquadron's photo section, interpreting mission film.Although the squadron was administratively underMAG-33 and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, it was the AirForce at K-14 (Kimpo) that tasked the targets, which wasin keeping with the agreement with the Fifth Air Force.Occasionally, the 1st Marine Division could call in arequirement, but for the most part, Fifth Air Force calledthe shots.

Two MiGs near Chosin set on one of Todd's squadronmates, Master Sergeant Calvin R. Duke, who laid claim tobeing the oldest Marine NAP in Korea. In a dogfight thatwent from 10,000 feet to 30,000 feet, Duke outmaneuveredthe Communist fighters and ran for home at 600 miles perhour.

Enlisted aviators were an integral part of the MarineCorps' capability. However, by Vietnam, there were onlya few NAPs on active duty, and fewer still actuallyinvolved in flying duties. Some of these pioneers servedwith distinction throughout Vietnam, But by 1973, onlyfour NAPs were still on active service with the Marines,and all four were simultaneously retired on 1 February1973, closing a colorful era in naval aviation and MarineCorps history.

bombs only 100 yards from theattacking Marines, enabling themto seize the high ground. On thesame day, to further illustrate theintensity of the air support effort,VMF-212 set a squadron record forthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing forcombat operations by flying 12missions and a total of 46 single-plane sorties. When refueling,rearming, and mechanical checktimes are considered, this becamea rather remarkable achievementunder the more or less "primitive"conditions of the first five days atKimpo Airfield after moving infrom Japan.

During the difficult and veryheavy fighting in the city, therewere many occasions where closeair support could be called in witheffect. But because of the confinednature of much of the action, thepreponderance of air support wasrendered at deeper distances fromthe advancing troops. VMO-6 heli-copters and OYs rendered yeomanservice in evacuating wounded,flying constant observation mis-sions, and in providing helicoptercommunication, conference, andobservation flights for the troopcommanders.

By 28 September, the intensivefighting in the city was drawing toa close. The newly arrived 7thMarines joined the 1st and 5thMarines on the left after the assaulton the city began on the 24th, andthings began to move Out with dis-patch. By the 28th, the 5thMarines, according to plan, hadbeen placed into division reserveand the 7th was preparing to pushoff in pursuit of the North Koreansfleeing the city toward Uijongbu, 10miles to the north. On the 29th,the 1st Marines were to establishblocking positions about threemiles east of the city and the 5thwas assigned a similar mission tothe northwest at Suyuhyon. Thesemissions were carried out with rel-

atively minor difficulty, as theNorth Korean resistance appearedto be collapsing.

The 7th Marines moved out forUijongbu early on 1 October andran into firm resistance about halfway to the objective. The develop-ing firefight exposed the enemypositions and enabled VMF-312Corsairs to work them over heavi-ly during the remainder of the day.The advance was renewed the sec-ond day and again -312 was busyaround-the-clock in support oftwo battalions forcing their waythrough a tough defile on the mainroad, essential for tank and heavyvehicle passage. In addition to theclose support missions, theCorsairs caught eight trucks inconvoy and destroyed seven inone attack. It was a heavy day allaround and two Corsairs were lostto North Korean antiaircraft fire,but one landed in friendly territoryand the pilot was recovered ingood shape. On the third day,with the progress that had beenmade to that point, one battalionwas assigned to each side of theroad to mop up while the thirdpassed through on the roadstraight for Uijongbu. It soonbecame apparent that the enemywas in full flight, but the 7thMarines was in Uijongbu by after-noon. Establishment of the blockingposition there marked the lastlarge-scale fight of the Inchon-Seoul operation. The supply lines ofthe North Korean invading forceshad been cut totally and theInchon landing had crushed theNorth Korean army.

With the end of this phase ofthe war, U.S. Army and Republic ofKorea Army units began to relievethe Marine forces of their arearesponsibilities. Division unitswere issued orders for movement tostaging areas in Inchon and allwere in place by 7 October tomount out for what looked like a

22

follow-on amphibious assault onthe east coast.

A few of the major highlightsdrawn from the operation will suf-fice to summarize the division-wing performance: (1) Expansionfrom a reduced peace strength to areinforced war strength, less oneregimental combat team, was com-pleted in 15 days; (2) Movementof more than 15,000 personnel,organic heavy equipment, andpartial resupply from San Diego tothe Far East Command began inless than three weeks after theexpansion order was issued; (3)Unloading, reembarkation, andcombat loading for the Inchonlanding was done at Kobe, Japan,in seven days, including two dayslost to a typhoon in the Kobe area;(4) The 1st Provisional MarineBrigade was disengaged fromactive combat in the PusanPerimeter at midnight on 5

September, moved to Pusan, andoutloaded in combat shipping inless than seven days; (5) A suc-cessful assault landing was execut-ed at Inchon on 15 September,under some of the most adversehydrographic conditions in thehistory of amphibious operations;(6) The force beachhead line,approximately six miles from thelanding beaches, was seized with-in 24 hours of the main landings;(7) Kimpo Airfield, one of thefinest in the Far East, was captured50 hours and 35 minutes after H-Hour; (8) The Han River wascrossed, without major bridgingequipment, and Seoul was seized12 days after the Inchon landing;and (9) The effectiveness of theMarine air-ground team and closeair support doctrine was reaf-firmed with outstanding success.

Two more days of fightingremained for the squadrons ofMAGs -12 and -33 at Kimpo afterthe relief of the ground units.During the 33-day period from 7

September to 9 October, the fivesquadrons flew a total of 2,774sorties, most of them being inclose support of infantry units. Theaccolades from all units supportedunder the Marine air support con-trol system were many, and wel-come, but one from the divisionartillery commander and fire sup-port coordinator of the Army's 7thInfantry Division was particularlynoteworthy. As Brigadier GeneralHomer W. Kiefer said: "Allow me toreemphasize my appreciation forthe outstanding air supportreceived by this division. TheMarine system of control.approaches the ideal and I firmlybelieve that a similar systemshould be adopted as standard forArmy Divisions."

During the period of theInchon-Seoul operation, 15 Sep-tember-7 October, the 1st MarineDivision suffered losses of 415dead, of whom 366 were killed inaction and 49 died of wounds; sixwere declared missing in actionand 2,029 were wounded inaction, for a total of 2,450 battlecasualties. The division took 6,492North Koreans prisoner and theestimates of total casualties inflict-ed on the enemy added up to13,666, most of whom were count-ed dead on the battlefield. Thesefigures represent a ratio of betterthan 8 to 1, a thoroughly com-mendable performance consider-ing the speed with which theair-ground team was put togetherand deployed.

Before the end of the Inchon-Seoul operation, when it becameclear that the effect of the landingwas a total rout of the NorthKoreans, the Commander in Chief,Far East, was formulating plans forthe follow-up. With much pru-dence and caution emphasized

from both Washington and theUnited Nations regarding the pos-sible entry of either Soviet orChinese Communist forces intoKorea, it was decided that theUnited Nations Command couldconduct pursuit operationsbeyond the 38th Parallel intoNorth Korea. Concern over thepossible outbreak of a general warremained strong, however, and theauthority for General MacArthur toutilize his forces north of the 38thwas burdened with several limita-tions. Briefly, there could be noentry of other than Republic ofKorea forces if there was a clearindication of either Soviet orChinese entry. Also, there couldbe no attack of any type againstany portion of either Chinese orSoviet territory, including the use ofNaval or Air forces. Further, onlySouth Korean forces would be uti-lized in those provinces of NorthKorea bordering on the SovietUnion or Manchuria. It is interest-ing to note that in spite of thesequalifications, on 29 SeptemberSecretary of Defense George C.Marshall included the following ina message to MacArthur: "We wantyou to feel unhampered tacticallyand strategically to proceed north ofthe 38th parallel." Coming so soonafter the world-shaking experi-ences of World War II, there wasjustifiable cause for concern, butlimitations and cautions over andabove normal prudence certainlyadded much to the difficulties of thedecisions faced by MacArthur asthe move into North Korea wasbeing executed.

Generally, the plan was forEighth Army, commanded byLieutenant General Walton H.Walker, USA, to advance along theKaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis;the II ROK Corps in the centeralong the Kumhwa-Yangdok-Sunchon axis; and the I ROKCorps up the east coast direct to

23

Wonsan. The 1st Marine Divisionwould make an assault landing atWonsan and the Army's 7thInfantry Division would followashore in an administrative land-ing. After establishment ashore atWonsan, X Corps, under the com-mand of Major General Edward M.Almond, USA, would thenadvance west to Pyongyang, joiningup with Eighth Army. The entireforce would then advance north totwo phase lines, the second beingalong the general line Songjin in theeast, southwest to Chongju on thewest coast. Only South Koreanforces would advance beyond thesecond phase line, in keeping withMacArthur's restrictions. EighthArmy would cross the 38th Parallelon 15 October and the Wonsanlanding was set for 20 October.

As has been seen before in mil-itary operations, surprise comes inmany different packages, andWonsan indeed had its share.While the division was in thethroes of feverishly meeting itstight combat loading schedules atInchon, at 0815 on 10 October, theI ROK Corps in its rapid advance upthe east coast entered Wonsan. Bythe next day they had completedmopping up the town and wereguarding the airfield on KalmaPeninsula. MacArthur thenzigzagged back and forth with theidea of a new assault objective atHungnam, 50 miles north.However, by the time the harborcharacteristics and the availability ofboth landing craft and ships forunloading at two ports werereviewed, the original plan forWonsan was retained with D-Daystill set for 20 October.

The next surprise was a combi-nation of circumstances. First wasthe discovery that the harbor andapproaches to Wonsan were thor-

oughly sown with rather sophisti-cated Soviet mines of all kinds,from drifting contact types to mag-netic ship-counting designs. It wasdetermined that no entry for land-ing could possibly be made untilthe harbor was safely swept andthe threat eliminated. The delaysentailed in the sweeping com-bined with the early taking ofWonsan by the I ROK Corps tobring about an unusual reversal ofthe normal order in amphibiousoperations. When the assault ele-ments of the division finally landedat Wonsan, they were welcomedashore by the already well-estab-lished Marine aviation units.

Planning for 1st Marine AircraftWing operations in the northeasthad kept up with the rapidlychanging strategic situation. On 13October, General Harris flew intoWonsan and on inspecting thecondition of the field, decided tobegin operations there immediate-ly. With that decision, VMF-312flew in from Kimpo on the 14thand wing transports flew in 210personnel of the headquarters andVMF(N)-513 the same day. Twotank landing ships sailed fromKobe with equipment and person-nel of MAG-12, and Far East AirForces' Combat Cargo Command

began flying in aviation fuel. Somebombs and rockets to "get 'emstarted" were flown in on theplanes of VMF(N)-513. On the16th, VMFs -214 and -323, still onthe Sicily and the Badoeng Strait,began operations at Wonsan, cov-ering the minesweeping activitiesuntil 27 October.

With the delay of almost 10days before the beach landings

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4452

could begin, the squadrons oper-ating from Wonsan had to relyalmost totally on air resupply for theperiod. The small amount of sup-plies that did arrive by ship arrivedonly by extreme effort andmakeshift means. Edward S. John,the only second lieutenant inMarine Aircraft Group 12 at thetime, was assigned the task of get-ting 55-gallon drums of aviation

Corsairs of VMF-312 at Wonsan Airfield are serviced for thecontinuing battle against Communist forces in northeastKorea. The squadron flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 14

October, 12 days before landing craft brought elements of the1st Marine Division ashore.

One of the steady stream of Douglas R4D Skytrains that brought supplies toMarinefighter squadrons VMF-312 and VMF(N)-513 at Wonsan. The squadronswere totally dependent on airlftfor all supplies during the 10 days it took to cleara lane through the Wonsan harbor minefields.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130144

24

Ai .&*,-

C--- -'

4 it±r

change a tire.

fuel from a tank landing ship,floating clear of the minefield,ashore. In accomplishing the feat,the drums were manhandled intoWorld War II vintage landing craft,now under Japanese operation,using Korean laborers. Whenclose to the beach, the drums hadto be manually lifted over the side,as the ramp had been welded shut.Once in the surf the drums werewaded ashore through the icywater.

The squadrons also were facedwith added difficulties resultingfrom few bomb carts, trucks, andrefuelers. Consequently, the fueltrucks had to be loaded by handfrom 55-gallon drums which hadbeen rolled more than a mile fromthe dumps, also by hand. Thisslowed operations somewhat, butjudicious planning and steadyeffort maintained a useful sortierate. Armed reconnaissance flights

were flown regularly which result-ed in productive attacks on retreat-ing North Korean troops. On the24th, for example, a -312 flight sur-prised a column of about 800North Koreans near Kojo, 39 milessouth of Wonsan, and dispersed itwith heavy losses.

With the change from an assaultto an administrative landing atWonsan, the 1st Marine AircraftWing was placed under the con-trol of Far East Air Force, with del-egation of that control to Fifth AirForce, north of the 38th Parallel.This required the daily operationsschedule to be submitted to Fifth AirForce at Seoul by 1800 the previousday. Because of the distanceinvolved and the poor communi-cations that existed, it made itextremely difficult at best to getclearance back in time. This wasresolved between General Harrisand General Earl E. Partridge,

25

Commanding General, Fifth AirForce, with permission for the for-mer to plan and execute missionsfor X Corps in northeast Koreawithout waiting for Air Force clear-ance. Direction of support for XCorps was exercised for the wing byMAG-12 from 15 October to 9November. Night operations didnot begin until late in the monthbecause of delay in getting runwaylights at Wonsan, but -513 flew daymissions along with -312 from thebeginning. After the administrativelanding on the 27th, the two carri-er squadrons operated in similarfashion to the way they functionedat Inchon.

Generally, Marine aircraftreported to specified Tactical AirControl Parties at times given inthe Fifth Air Force daily order, inresponse to previous requests byground units for air support. Closeair support requests, which wereof a more urgent nature, were usu-ally handled by aircraft on runwayalert or by flights orbiting a specif-ic point on stand-by status.

As at Inchon, Major VincentGottschalk's VMO-6 was under theoperational control of the 1stMarine Division. Two helicopterswere flown from Kimpo toWonsan on the 23d and the rest ofthe squadron came in by tanklanding ship on the 27th. A flightechelon of helicopters remained atKimpo until early November at therequest of Fifth Air Force, for evac-uation of casualties of the 187thAirborne Regimental Combat Teamin the Sukchon area.

After the landing of the initialelements of the division at Wonsanon the 26th, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, was ordered to Kojo,southeast of Wonsan. The battalionoccupied positions in the vicinitywith the mission of protecting the IROK Corps supply dump there inpreparation for its displacement tothe north. It developed that a size-

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A130420Speed was of the essence for these Marine airmen in rearming their Corsair forrepeated strikes against Chinese and North Korean forces. Ground crewmen inthe foreground mix a batch qf deadly napalm while other Marines hastily

—I

¶

able remnant of North Koreantroops was in the area and a seriesof significant actions took placetoward the end of the month. Itsoon became clear that the "rem-nant" was actually a seasoned unitof experienced troops, and thatpossibly a major counterattack wasin the offing in the Kojo area.However, as it evolved, most ofthese actions were confined tonight attacks by smaller units thanwere at first suspected. Aviationsupplied the need for emergencyevacuation of wounded by heli-copter, and although there was asignificant loss in killed andwounded, there was no need toreinforce the battalion fromWonsan. Ironically, the SouthKorean supply dump had beenessentially moved out before theattacks occurred and when theNorth Koreans were finally beatenoff and dispersed, the battalionwas ordered back to Wonsan. The

Ordnance men operate a "belting"machine that inserted ammunitioninto a metal belt to be used in the20mm cannons of the Corsair. Themachine loaded the belts at a rate of6 000 rounds per hour in comparisonwith the hand operation of 500rounds per hour.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130762

ical evacuation and rescue efforts.

final loss count was 23 killed, 47wounded, and 4 missing. The bat-talion took 83 prisoners, withenemy casualties estimated at 250killed, in addition to an undeter-mined number of wounded and acount of 165 enemy dead on thebattlefield. The unit was back atWonsan by 4 November.

With the major changes in strat-egy that accompanied the collapseof the North Koreans, and therapid advances of Eighth Armyand the two Republic of KoreaArmy corps to the north,MacArthur issued new directions,which affected X Corps and theMarines. One was an order for the1st Marine Division to "advancerapidly in zone to the Koreannorthern border." With the EighthArmy entering Pyongyang on 18October, X Corps on the east coastwas being left behind and the rightflank of Eighth Army was becomingexposed. Hence the corps was

26

under pressure to move north atthe earliest. With the exception ofa significant engagement of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, in theMajon-ni area near Wonsan, similarto the action of the 1st Battalion atKojo, most of the security require-ments laid on the 1st Marines inand around Wonsan had been metby early November.

At Majon-ni, the various actionswere supported by Marine aviationin the normal manner during day-light hours, but most of the attackson the perimeter defensesoccurred at night. Evacuations ofwounded were by helicopter pri-manly, and several airdrops ofsupplies were included in the gen-eral air support. Marine losses inthese actions included 20 killedand 45 wounded. Enemy casual-ties were estimated at 525 killedand 1,395 prisoners were taken.More than 4,000 Korean refugeeswere screened at the roadblocks

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov50

In 1st Marine Division operations around Wonsan, evacuation of the woundedwas accomplished by jeep ambulance, and in the case of more seriously wound-ccl, by helicopter. The Sikorsky H035 and later Bell HTL helicopters attached toMarine Observation Squadron 6 were the cornerstones of the Korean War med-

Ih1

I'I,

along the main supply route(MSR). The MSR itself was so pre-cipitous, narrow, and difficult, theMarines lost 9 killed and 81injured along one very toughstretch known as "ambush alley."

While the 1st Marines werebusy at Kojo and Majon-ni, the 5thand 7th Marines had taken uptheir new assignments to thenorth. This meant that the divisionstretched a total of 130-road-milesfrom the 1st Marines in the south tothe 7th in the north. It would be agross understatement to only saythat this complicated the delivery ofthe usual air support by the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing to its brotherson the ground. With the arrival ofadditional Army elements of XCorps in the area, however, itbecame possible to shorten linessomewhat. The division's com-mand post was moved toHungnam on 4 November, withthe 5th and 7th Marines operatingnorth. By 17 November, the 1stMarines were at Chigyong, 14miles south of Hungnam, thusclosing the stretch to less than 60miles. This was a definite improve-ment, but Wonsan from the view-point of Marine aviation, waslooking like a by-passed Japanesebase from World War II. The con-centration of the division north ofHungnam in its march to the YaluRiver made the airfield at Yonpoincreasingly attractive to the wingbecause it was in the center of theHungnam-Hamhung area. Thismeant that response times forclose air support would be consid-erably reduced for any actions thatoccurred to the north.Accordingly, on 6 November,MAG-33 was ordered to Yonpofrom Japan, and by 10 November,was in operation there in time toreceive VMF-212 from Wonsan.On the 15th, VMF-214 wasordered ashore from the Sicily andset up at Wonsan with MAG-12

supporting the squadron as best itcould, bearing in mind that manypieces of vehicular equipmentneeded ashore are not requirednor used on board carriers. Also,because of a shortage of shippingin the Far East, it took muchlonger to move essential shore-based equipment from where itwas stored in Japan, in the case ofboth -214 and -212, to where itwas needed in Korea. This meantthat for a considerable period,bombs often had to be loaded by"muscle power," aircraft refueledby small hand "wobble" pumpsfrom 55-gallon drums, weighing450 pounds, and many other oper-ational and maintenance factorsthat revert to the hard way whenthe equipment just is not there. Itwas just another throwback to thesustaining principle of Marine avi-ation of doing the best with whatyou have got because the job mustget done—and in this case, again,it was done.

At the time of the Wonsan land-ing, the Marines had been

informed that X Corps would be apart of the dash north to the Yaluunder the revised Far EastCommand/United Nations Com-mand plans, and Eighth Armywould be doing the same on thewestern side of the peninsula. Thejump-off dates were set for 24November for Eighth Army andthe 27th for X Corps. There hadbeen many sightings and identifi-cations of Communist ChineseForces (CCF) well below the Yalu asearly as late October and in thefirst few days of November. FarEast Command press releases,however, treated these sightings asbeing only "volunteers" to helpthe North Koreans resolve theirproblems. The usual sightingreports were invariably smallgroups in remote areas, but insome instances the sightings werecharacterized also by thousands offootprints and tracks in the snow.Furthermore, in a significant five-day battle from 4 to 9 November,the 7th Marines took 62 Chineseprisoners at Chinhung-ni, enroute totheir objective at Hagaru-ri. TheChinese were interrogated andprecisely identified as part of the

The outcome of the Chosin Reservoir campaign owed much to airdropped sup-plies by the wing's twin-engine R4D transports. Assisting theAirForce's CombatCargo Command, Marine transports carried more than five million pounds qfsupplies to the front.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4841

27

124th Division, 42d Army, 13thArmy Group, Fourth Field Army.Tokyo press releases dismissedthese and other CCF contacts withthe "volunteer" label and the planremained in effect.

By the 27th, the 1st MarineDivision was concentrated in thevicinity of the Chosin Reservoir,with the command post at Hagaru-ri, the 5th and 7th Marines atYudam-ni, and the 1st Marinesalong the MSR with a battalioneach at Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, andHagaru-ri. Colonel Homer L.

Litzenberg, Jr., commanding the7th Marines, while enroute fromHagaru-ri to Yudam-ni, haddropped off Company F atToktong Pass to hold that criticalpoint for any eventuality. On 25November, Generals Smith andAlmond conferred and the newswas not good from the EighthArmy sector. The II ROK Corpshad been overrun on EighthArmy's right and the Army itselfwas falling back before a wholesaleCCF onslaught. In spite of theseresults, Almond ordered Smith toattack on the 27th as planned. Atthe time, 1st Marine Division intel-ligence had identified five moredivisions from prisoner interroga-tions, and line-crossing agents hadgiven firm indications of evenmore Chinese forces just to theimmediate north.

On the morning of the 27th, thedivision began its attack fromYudam-ni on schedule but thelead regiment had only advancedabout 2,000 yards when stiff resis-tance stopped it. On the night ofthe 27th, the CCF in great strengthattacked all Marine positions fromYudam-ni to Koto-ri, including adivision attack on Company F atToktong Pass, and a strong assaultof division-sized against the three-battalion task force of the 7thInfantry Division east of the reser-voir. As the intelligence reports

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130488

Marines who used the "daisy-cutter" inthe South Pacific ng them again for useagainst the Chinese in Korea.Attaching the bombs to the racks ofthe Corsair required delicate adjust-ments, often dfficult in the sub-zeroKorean winter weather.

were gathered and analyzed, theresults showed clearly that oppos-ing the Marines and associatedtroops in the Chosin Reservoirarea was the 9th Army Group, 3dField Army. This comprised a totalof four corps-sized armies, a forcethat added to the five divisionsalready identified by the 1stMarine Division, totaled, by someestimates, almost 100,000 sea-soned Chinese infantry troops.With the disposition of the divi-sion north of Hungnam andHarnhung, in addition to attachedunits of Royal Marines and assort-ed Army units totaling only 20,500in all, the balance of the twoforces favored the Chinese by bet-ter than 5 to 1. The fact that muchof this was known to Far EastCommand and X Corps on the25th, with Eighth Army estimating200,000 CCF in front of them, can-not go unmentioned in connectionwith General Almond's order toGeneral Smith to attack as plannedtwo days later, the 27th.

28

The situation had changed soradically and so quickly that onthe 28th, General MacArthur calledGenerals Walker and Almond toTokyo for a lengthy conference.The result of these deliberationswas a change of strategy. The pre-vious plan for North Korea wasabandoned and both the EighthArmy and X Corps were to pullback to a more defensible line tothe south. General Smith hadalready decided to start movingwithout any further delay andordered the 5th and 7th Marines tomove back to Hagaru-ri fromYudam-ni, the first leg of whatwould be a 68-mile fight throughthousands of enemy troops.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing'scommand post and attachedHeadquarters and Service units, inaddition to five fighter squadrons,had moved to Yonpo fromWonsan and Japan by late inNovember. The sixth squadron,VMF-323, was still launching itsmaximum efforts from theBadoeng Strait. Rounding out thewing's combat lineup was VMO-6with its OYs and HO3S helicopters,operating mainly from Yonpo, butalso from wherever else required.This was a crowd for Yonpo, espe-cially when it is remembered thatmuch of the ordnance and mainte-nance equipment of the squadronswas not available. Also included inthe serious shortage category wereboth transportation generally, andprovision of any form of heatedspace for bare-handed engine andaircraft engineering maintenance.

Cold weather maintenanceproved difficult. Touching themetal surface of an aircraft parkedon the flight line with bare skinwould cause the skin to stick to it.Aircraft engines had to he startedthroughout the night to keep them