OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: U.N. INVOLVEMENT AND U.S. UNILATERAL ACTION

Jessica HernandezHIST 4350: History of the Modern Middle East

April 29, 2015

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At the philosophic roots of political realism, Thucydides, through his The Peloponnesian

War, reveals that disputes between nations and states are always settled through power and

that what is moral or just is disregarded in the face of self-interest of powerful nations.1 In this

way, power politics always tend to shape the actions of international organizations. Despite

idealistic views that the great world power, the United States, has a responsibility to promote

the “American values” of freedom, justice, and democracy throughout the world,2 in reality

states are not motivated by ideals but by self-interest.

Political realism sees “international organizations like the UN as tools or extensions of

great powers.”3 This paper will demonstrate that the United States manipulates the United

Nations to serve its own interests in the Middle East or circumvents international consensus

altogether, in favor of unilateral action, if consent cannot be reached. This will be demonstrated

by the analysis of two events in which the United Nations was manipulated to serve the

interests of great powers: the lack of action during the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 compared

to the immediate action taken during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Followed by the

analysis of two events in which the United States acted outside of international consent in

order to further its own interests: the U.S.’s role in overthrowing the democratically elected

prime minister of Iran in 1953 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

On September 22, 1980 Iraq invaded Iran. 4 Its goals were to offset Iran’s hostility

towards the government of Iraq, to gain access to the Persian Gulf, and to gain dominance over

1 Analysis of Thucydides’ “The Melian Dialogue” in Pease, Kelly-Kate S. 2012. International Organizations. 5th. Boston: Pearson, 45. 2 Gelvin, James L. 2011. The Modern Middle East: A History. 3rd. New York: Oxford University Press, 227.3 Pease, Kelly-Kate S. 2012. International Organizations. 5th. Boston: Pearson, 121.4 Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth, 304-305.

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the region’s oil supply.5 Iraq was initially successful but the progress of the war shifted

periodically between the two nations. Iran, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, declared the conflict a

fight against secularism and Western influence. The conflict didn’t end until 1988 when both

sides agreed to a cease-fire.

Despite Iraq’s clear violation of article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter6, which states

“all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against

the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,”7 the Security Council8 did not

brand Iraq as an aggressor in the conflict.9 The international community provided arms and

financial assistance to both Iraq and Iran, the U.S. even aiding both states simultaneously.10 The

SC, as well as individual states, claimed neutrality at the beginning of the conflict, in fact, the SC

did not issue a mandatory resolution demanding a cease-fire until Resolution 598, seven years

after the conflict began.11 Before Resolution 598, relevant resolutions called for a cease-fire

between Iran and Iraq,1213 but it wasn’t until 1987 that the SC determined that a breach of the

peace had occurred and demanded a cease-fire.14 Except for a quick remark in Resolution 598 in 5 Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth, 304-305.6 Henceforth referred to as UN Charter.7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, art. 2(4) available at Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth, Appendix, 535-556.8 Henceforth referred to as SC.9 Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth, 305.10 Overt aid to Iraq and covert aid to Iran via the “Iran-Contra Affair.” Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 551.11 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 551.12 UN Security Council, Resolution 479 (1980) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2244th meeting, on 28 September 1980, 28 September 1980, S/RES/479 (1980), available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/13 UN Security Council, Resolution 514 (1982) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2383rd meeting held on 12 July 1982, 12 July 1982, S/RES/514 (1982), available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/14 UN Security Council, Resolution 598 (1987) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2750th meeting, on 20 July 1987, 20 July 1987, S/RES/598 (1987), available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

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which the SC deplores “the initiation of the conflict,”15 Iraq is never mentioned as an aggressor

in any SC resolutions pertaining the conflict with Iran.

On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait.16 The rulers of Kuwait were forced into exile and

Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, declared Kuwait Iraq’s nineteenth province.17 The year following

this attack saw a number of unsuccessful attempts by the international community to persuade

Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.18 Finally, on January 16, 1991, a coalition of UN forces began a

campaign against Iraq, ultimately driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait on February 28, 1991.19

On the very same day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the SC issued Resolution 660 in

which it acknowledges that an “invasion” had occurred “by the military forces of Iraq,”

determines that “a breach of international peace and security” had occurred, and demands an

immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces.20 The stark differences between the SC’s approach to the

two situations can clearly be seen. Whereas in the Iraqi invasion of Iran, the SC lagged seven

years before declaring a breach of the peace and demanding a cease-fire, the reaction to the

Kuwaiti invasion was virtually instantaneous. The SC demanded a withdrawal of Iraqi forces

within the first relevant resolution and three months later, with Resolution 678, threatened

15 UN Security Council, Resolution 598 (1987) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2750th meeting, on 20 July 1987, 20 July 1987, S/RES/598 (1987), available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/16 Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth, 181-182. 17 Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth, 181-182.18 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 522.19 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 523.20 UN Security Council, Resolution 660 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting, on 2 August 1990, 2 August 1990, S/RES/660 (1990), available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

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military action if Iraq did not comply within two months,21 and when Iraq failed to comply, the

SC followed through with the use of force.

The disparity in the international community’s attitude to the two situations is striking.

The SC had a tepid reaction to the invasion of Iran and was unwilling to protect Iran but was

zealous in its defense of Kuwait. The discrepancy can be attributed to the relative interests of

dominant powers at the time of each conflict. During the conflict, neither Iran nor Iraq had

close military ties to any of the permanent members of the SC. In fact, Iran was perceived to be

a threat to the rest of the world.22 Mark Weisburd, professor of international law, delineates

the risks posed by Iran at the time:

The Iranian government had called for the overthrow of the governments of various of its neighbors and had been linked to anti-government activity in Iraq itself. Iran’s rejections of the rules of international intercourse was graphically illustrated by its continued detention of the American hostages it seized in 1979, which reduced sympathy for the invaded state, as did the risk its perceived instability was seen as posing for the world’s oil supply.23

Other states failed to react not simply because the attack on Iran didn’t jeopardize their own

interests, but because there were powerful incentives that crippling Iran would actually serve

their interests.24

21 UN Security Council, Resolution 678 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting, on 29 November 1990, 29 November 1990, S/RES/678 (1990), available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/22 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 554.23 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 554.24 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 554.

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Kuwait on the other hand, was closely tied to Western members of the SC, especially

the United States.25 Protecting the “friendly Emirate” from Soviet proxies was a vital interest to

the West; Kuwaiti oil production had a noticeable impact on oil markets and was a significant

source of income for American companies, such as the Gulf Oil Company, which owned nearly

half of the stock in the Kuwaiti Oil Company. 26 Not only that but Kuwaiti oil is a major factor in

keeping the world balance of power. U.S. hegemony depends largely on “its ability to provide

the world with access to oil at relatively low prices.”27 The Iraqi invasion threatened that ability

therefore challenging U.S. leadership. Kelly-Kate Pease, professor of international relations,

explains the alarm of Western powers at the Iraqi invasion:

The SC did not ignore the Iraqi invasion; it reacted because it directly threatened the interests of many of the permanent members. If Iraq’s aggression were not reversed, there would be a permanent shift in the balance of power in the Middle East, and perhaps the world. Iraq was perceived as dangerous because its population was Muslim, its leaders nationalist, and its agenda aggressive. Middle Eastern oil is crucial to the military and economic security of Europe and the United States. Iraq’s control over such a significant portion of the world supplies was an unacceptable risk as it could manipulate oil prices or impose boycotts in times of conflict.28

For these reasons, the international community was ready to act in Kuwait’s defense without

hesitation and with a powerful use of force.

Now let’s look at instances in which the Unites states has acted outside of international

laws without international consensus or consent. In 1951, Iranians elect Mohammad Mossadeq

25 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 554.26 Winger, Gregory. 2012. "Twilight on the British Gulf: The 1961 Kuwait Crisis and the Evolution of American Strategic Thinking in the Persian Gulf." Diplomacy & Statecraft 23 (4): 661.27 Pease, Kelly-Kate S. 2012. International Organizations. 5th. Boston: Pearson, 122-123.28 Pease, Kelly-Kate S. 2012. International Organizations. 5th. Boston: Pearson, 122.

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as their prime minister and he quickly renationalizes Iran’s oil production.29 At the time, Iran’s

oil production had been largely under British control through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,

later BP.30 Diplomatic negotiations had failed to resolve the conflict over the nationalization of

oil production and in 1953 a coup overthrew Mossadeq and reinstated the Shah Reza Pahlavi to

power, who then became a close ally to the U.S.31

Although the United States’ involvement in the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s prime minister

has been “an open secret” for years,32 in 2011 the CIA declassified documents that show how

the U.S. and U.K. engineered the coup which ousted Mossadeq. 33 The CIA used Iranian media

and propaganda to foment anti-Mossadeq sentiment; they used press, handbills, and even the

clergy to weaken Mossadeq’s government. 34 Crowds of rioters were “paid for by American

dollars” that were given to clergy and riot leaders to instigate protestors.35 Although it isn’t

known exactly how far up the chain of command the order to initiate a coup came from, one of

the declassified documents reveals that “The military coup that overthrew Mossadeq and his

National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy,

conceived and approved at the highest levels of government."36

29 Joneidi, Khashayar. 2013. "CIA documents acknowledge its role in Iran's 1953 coup." BBC, August 20. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23762970.30 Joneidi, Khashayar. 2013. "CIA documents acknowledge its role in Iran's 1953 coup." BBC, August 20. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23762970.31 Joneidi, Khashayar. 2013. "CIA documents acknowledge its role in Iran's 1953 coup." BBC, August 20. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23762970.32 Unknown. 2013. "Declassified Documents Reveal CIA Role in 1953 Iranian Coup." NPR, September 1. Available at: http://www.npr.org/2013/09/01/217976304/declassified-documents-reveal-cia-role-in-1953-iranian-coup.33 Joneidi, Khashayar. 2013. "CIA documents acknowledge its role in Iran's 1953 coup." BBC, August 20. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23762970.34 Dan Merica, Jason Hanna. 2013. "In declassified document, CIA acknowledges role in '53 Iran coup." CNN, August 19. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/19/politics/cia-iran-1953-coup/35 Gasiorowski, Mark J. 2012. "The Causes of Iran's 1953 Coup: A Critique of Darioush Bayandor's Iran and the CIA." Iranian Studies 45 (5): 671.36 Dan Merica, Jason Hanna. 2013. "In declassified document, CIA acknowledges role in '53 Iran coup." CNN, August 19. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/19/politics/cia-iran-1953-coup/

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The United States’ aim in engineering the coup was to reinstate the pro-Western Shah

who would safeguard the West’s oil interests in Iran.37 The U.S. and the U.K. saw Iranian oil as a

major source of income to finance post-WWII economic rebuilding.38 Another concern was

Soviet influence in Iran; as a BBC article quoted from one of the declassified documents, “it was

estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if that happened it

would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the

Middle East.”39 To this day, the CIA’s involvement in the coup has colored U.S.-Iran relations.

Resenting the U.S.’s “unquenchable thirst for oil,”40 Iranian politicians still use the coup to

foment anti-American sentiment in the nation.41

Another circumstance in which the United States acted unilaterally was during its 2003

attack on Iraq, this time in the full view of the international community. After the UN coalition

succeeded in driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, the SC imposed a number of restrictions

and requirements on the Iraqi government, one of which was “to destroy or render harmless its

chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons stocks and production facilities for those weapons,

to agree to inspection by international authorities as part of the implementation of these

obligations, to agree never to develop such weapons, and to submit to ongoing monitoring of

its compliance with the nondevelopment requirement.”42 In January of 1993, however, Iraqi

37 Dehghan, Saeed Kamali, and Richard Norton-Taylor. 2013. "CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup." The Guardian, August 19. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup.38 Joneidi, Khashayar. 2013. "CIA documents acknowledge its role in Iran's 1953 coup." BBC, August 20. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23762970.39 Joneidi, Khashayar. 2013. "CIA documents acknowledge its role in Iran's 1953 coup." BBC, August 20. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23762970.40 Gelvin, James L. 2011. The Modern Middle East: A History. 3rd. New York: Oxford University Press.41 Dan Merica, Jason Hanna. 2013. "In declassified document, CIA acknowledges role in '53 Iran coup." CNN, August 19. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/19/politics/cia-iran-1953-coup/42 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 523.

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troops entered Kuwait and, at the same time, Iraq was interfering with the weapons inspections

system, causing an airstrike attack on Iraq by France, the U.K., and the U.S. as a response.43

Although this attack was afterward condoned by both the UN Security-General and the SC,44 a

number of subsequent issues and disputes45 over Iraq’s further noncompliance caused a

deterioration of SC consensus and a division between permanent members. While the United

States insisted on the SC taking action against Iraq, France and Russia made it clear that they

would veto any resolution calling for the use of force against Iraq.46 On March 17, 2003, the U.S.

abandoned its efforts to obtain SC consent and President Bush issued an ultimatum in which he

vowed the U.S. would commence military actions against Iraq if Saddam Hussein didn’t leave

the country within forty-eight hours.47 On March 19, 2003, the U.S. and the U.K. began military

operations against Iraq and disbanded Saddam’s regime.48 Despite opposition to the use of

force by Germany, France, Russia, and China, among others,49 no enforcement action was taken

by the international community to prevent the U.S. from using force, nor was there a

punishment afterward for its use of unilateral action.

After the attacks of 9/11 the U.S. government called for a “global war on terror” and

became increasingly concerned with “the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction falling

43 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 523-524.44 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 524.45 Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth, 183-187.46 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 526, 529.47 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 529.48 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 530.49 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 528-529.

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into the hands of terrorists or ‘rogue states’ such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.”50 The U.S.

tried to link Saddam Hussein to al-Qaeda to justify its attacks on Iraq, but when it was met with

skepticism, the U.S. focused on Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction.51 No

evidence of Iraqi weapons programs were ever found52 and the administration then provided

their ultimate justification for the war in Iraq: “By liberating Iraq and imposing democracy

there, the United States would create a model for the democratic transformation of the entire

region and dry up the authoritarian swamp that breeds terrorism.”53 James L. Gelvin, historian

of Middle Eastern studies, provides another reason for the U.S. attack on Iraq:

“The fact that Saddam Hussein not only remained in power but thumbed his nose at the sanctions imposed by the international community after the war made a mockery of America’s claim to dominance of global affairs.”54

The reason boils down to little more than the United States’ embarrassment over being

undermined by Saddam Hussein.

As we have seen, the United Nations is a tool used by the United States to further its

goals and interests, and when that tool fails the United States abandons its ideals of democracy,

freedom, and justice in its quest to maintain power and hegemony in the world arena and will

act unilaterally and without global consent when it deems necessary. As the Athenians put it,

“the powerful exact what they can and the weak grant what they must.”55

50 Gelvin, James L. 2011. The Modern Middle East: A History. 3rd. New York: Oxford University Press, 279.51 Gelvin, James L. 2011. The Modern Middle East: A History. 3rd. New York: Oxford University Press, 280.52 Weisburd, Mark A. 2004. "The War in Iraq and the Dilema of Controlling the International Use of Force." Texas International Law Journal 39 (4), 542.53 Gelvin, James L. 2011. The Modern Middle East: A History. 3rd. New York: Oxford University Press, 280.54 Gelvin, James L. 2011. The Modern Middle East: A History. 3rd. New York: Oxford University Press, 279- 280.55 Analysis of Thucydides’ “The Melian Dialogue” in Pease, Kelly-Kate S. 2012. International Organizations. 5th. Boston: Pearson, 45.

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A few final considerations, however, are essential. During research on UN involvement

in the Middle East a considerable caveat of the UN Charter was discovered: There are no

requirements in the UN Charter that direct SC action. Because the UN Charter gives the SC a

great amount of discretion in what type of action it will take or in whether it will become

involved in a situation at all, SC action cannot be expected to be consistent. The lack of action in

the Iran-Iraq war may seem hypocritical, but it was not illegal by international law, “the Council

is simply under no legal obligation ever to do anything.”56

And the lack of repercussion over U.S. unilateral action? As Wesiburd shows, the

burdens and responsibilities imposed upon “Great Powers” to maintain world order necessarily

require them to have a special status and immunity among nations, the absolute veto being

one of them as well as disproportionate leniency when they break or bend international law. 57

Even though the current UN system has been shown to be unreliable and easily cast aside by

powerful nations, we are working with a system that doesn’t leave much of an alternative.

Bibliography

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Garamone, Jim. 2013. "Obama Describes Core US Interests in the Middle East." U.S. Department of Defense. September 24. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120847.

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Gasiorowski, Mark J. 2012. "The Causes of Iran's 1953 Coup: A Critique of Darioush Bayandor's Iran and the CIA." Iranian Studies 45 (5): 669-678. doi:10.1080/00210862.2012.702555.

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—, Resolution 514 (1982) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2383rd meeting held on 12 July 1982, 12 July 1982, S/RES/514 (1982), http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

—, Resolution 598 (1987) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2750th meeting, on 20 July 1987, 20 July 1987, S/RES/598 (1987), http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

—, Resolution 660 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting, on 2 August 1990, 2 August 1990, S/RES/660 (1990), http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

—, Resolution 678 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting, on 29 November 1990, 29 November 1990, S/RES/678 (1990), http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

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Winger, Gregory. 2012. "Twilight on the British Gulf: The 1961 Kuwait Crisis and the Evolution of American Strategic Thinking in the Persian Gulf." Diplomacy & Statecraft 23 (4): 660-678. doi:10.1080/09592296.2012.736332.

Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th. Thomson Wadsworth.