US INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPACT ON THE REGIONCHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION1.1Identification of the ProblemOn the morning of 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda carried out four coordinated attacks on U.S. soil. Following the attack, the U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden and al-Qaeda leadership, but the Taliban, then in charge in Afghanistan refused. Consequently, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001 with the United Kingdom, later joined by Canada, Australia, France and other mainly western allies. The objective of the operation was to dismantle Al-Qaeda, the Islamic terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden and to remove from power the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist regime led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, which at the time controlled 90 per cent of Afghanistan and hosted the Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan.The U.S. and its allies quickly drove the Taliban from power and captured all major cities and towns in the country. In December 2001, the U.N. Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to oversee security in the country and train the Afghan National Army. In 2003, NATO assumed leadership of ISAF, with troops from 43 countries, however, Only a portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operate under NATO command; the rest remained under direct American command. On 2 May 2011, U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan. On 21 May 2012 the leaders of the NATO-member countries endorsed an exit strategy for withdrawing NATO-led forces from Afghanistan by 2014. Historically, issues in Afghanistan have had a way of affecting the interest of several world and regional powers, which has made it experience several external interventions and meddling in its internal affairs. So, the US is not the only foreign country with strategic interest in Afghanistan. The Pakistan and India, both have long standing rivalry and strategic objectives in Afghanistan, which have contributed to the dynamics of local politics and stability of the nation. Same is the case with Russia, Iran and other Central Asian countries. The presence of the US in Afghanistan has affected the way and manner these nations pursued their interests. Similarly, the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan will also have significant impact on future developments in Afghanistan in particular, and other regional countries in general. 1.2The Statement of the ProblemAfter twelve years of fighting in Afghanistan the U.S. war in Afghanistan is considered the longest war in history, surpassing even the Vietnam War, and the Soviet Unions extended military campaign in Afghanistan. With the expanded operation, it costs the U.S. taxpayers nearly $100 billion per year, a sum roughly seven times larger than Afghanistans annual gross national product (GNP) of $14 billion and greater than the total annual cost of the new U.S. health insurance program. Thousands of American and allied personnel have been killed or gravely wounded. The American public has begun to worry and to question whether U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan warrant this level of sacrifice. President Obama, earlier tried to justify the expenses as been necessary to degrade Al Qaedas infrastructure in Afghanistan, but has also agreed on the need to wind down the operation in Afghanistan and withdraw US forces in 2014. The US interests in Afghanistan is now seen to be limited as the initial objectives set out for the intervention in that country have apparently been achieved. It is now believed the Al-Qaeda no longer pose significant threat to the US homeland neither can they use Afghanistan as a base. The conflict in Afghanistan is now commonly perceived as a struggle between the Karzai government and an insurgent Taliban movement that is seeking to gain relevance in the power equation of the country. It has therefore, been argued that the US needs to redefine its interests in Afghanistan and chart a new course to advance them.This study therefore seeks to determine what US strategic interests in Afghanistan are, and to provide an analysis of those interests and their impacts in the region.

1.3HypothesisThe research will be based on the following hypotheses:a.Despite announcement of withdrawal of forces in 2014, US will continue its sizable military presence in Afghanistan for a longer period in order to gain sufficient time to secure its national interests.b.The South Asian and Central Asian countries including Iran will be drawn into Afghanistan with conflicting interests following US drawdown. 1.4Research QuestionsaWhat is the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan to the US, Europe and Central Asia that have led to interferences in its internal affairs by several world and regional powers?. b.What are the strategic objectives of the regional countries like Pakistan, India, Iran, China and Central Asian countries in Afghanistan? c.What could be the US post withdrawal situation in Afghanistan and its probable impact on the regional security?1.5Research ObjectivesThe main objective of the research is to examine the strategic interests of the US in Afghanistan and its impact in the region. The specific objectives of the research are as follows:a.To determine the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan to the US and other regional South Asian countries like Pakistan and India. b.To determine specific US interests in Afghanistan and impact of the pursuit of the interests on the South Asia region. c.To determine the interests of such other countries as Pakistan, India and Iran in Afghanistan.

1.6Literature Review

Ahmed Rashid in his book, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (February 26, 2013), critically analyzed the strategic events that led to US invasions and chronological development of the situation in Afghanistan. The author has nicely painted a picture of post US withdrawal Afghanistan scenario and its multi-dimensional impacts on the region.

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed (2002) in his book titled, The Great Deception originally published as The War on Freedom How and Why America Was Attacked provided some insights into the plot behind September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Nafeez undertakes meticulous research of the background events and motivations of the participants of the terror attacks leading up to and following the infamous September 11 attacks on US territory.

Norman Friedman (2003) in his book titled, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and Americas - New Ways of War offers an in-depth analysis of the radically new tactics and strategy used by the US in Afghanistan. He sets the Afghan War in the wider context of the war against terrorism, and explores the rationale for it and the consequences of the 11 September attacks. Angelo Rasanayam (2005) in his book titled, Afghanistan A Modern History, traces the tragic history of Afghanistan from the Nineteenth Century geo-political Great Games to present times. He further traces the countrys development from the succession of Abdul Rahman Khan, the Iron Amir in 1880, through the period of the demise of the Taliban. Mel Gurtov (2006), in Super Power on Crusade, documented the account of the foreign and national security policies of the President George W. Bushs administration. Gurtov opined that the notion that US foreign policy is said to move in cycles: between isolationism and internationalism, bilateralism and multilateralism, generosity and stinginess, involvement in and disengagement from global issues is incorrect.

The blueprint that was formulated and printed by The Commission on Americas National Interests (2000) has identified the hierarchy of the US national interests as vital interests, extremely important interests, important interests, and, less important or secondary interests. Topping the list are vital national interests, which are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americas survival and well-being as a free and secure nation. Comments:The above mentioned books cover a wide spectrum of discussion on conceptual framework of security, and security dimensions, economic aspects, foreign policy issues and historical perspectives of US-Afghanistan relations and so on. The books examined security concerns of the regional countries in view of US and NATO occupation of Afghanistan. More books will be studied and analyzed to prove or disprove the hypothesis of the research at hand. Journals/ Newspapers.Journal of International Affairs, BIISS Journal, Strategic Analysis and other different Journals, Newspapers and Internet web sites will be consulted for the research.1.7Research MethodologyThere are mainly two methods of research, qualitative and quantitative and this research is based on qualitative method focusing on descriptive mode of analysis. The secondary sources that will be used are books, documents of USA, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and other countries, relevant articles published in different journals around the globe. Primary sources of research would be interviews of professional diplomats, experts on Political Science and International Relations; interaction and exchange of views in different seminars, workshops and symposiums. Detailed, systematic and critical analysis of the events/subjects will be developed sequentially right from the beginning. In the process, correlations between the variables will be made and deductions or major conclusions would be drawn in order to develop the subsequent chapter or event logically while evaluating various subject matters of the Group Research Paper.

1.8Scope and LimitationsThe time-line of the analytical part of this paper will cover the period of pre-September 11 until the present time. This research aspires to bring into open discussion some pertinent issues and questions regarding the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, their subsequent decade long military presence and the future of the situation that have yet to be answered or thoroughly examined. The research intends to highlight the US national interests in particular the ones that are related to its intervention in Afghanistan relating to its war on terrorism. Finally, this research seeks to examine the current geo-strategic and security situation of Afghanistan and also the impact of the proposed post withdrawal announcement by USA in 2014. Endeavour will also be made to analyze the socio-economic interest of Iran, Central and South Asian countries.1.9Theoretical and Conceptual FrameworkThere are a good number of theories and schools of analysis regarding nation and international security issues; some of which include: Realism, Neo-realism, liberalism, Copenhagen School (CS) of thoughts, Critical theory, Constructivism. The two major analytical theories in International Relations study: Liberalism and Realism, interpret different approaches to control and manage global insecurity. Realist theory explains that human nature is greedy and selfish. Individuals only look after their personal interests. This theory assumes that the international system is primarily anarchic as there is no central authority, nor an arbitrator. As a result, states must protect their national security and the needs of citizens by any means necessary. This theory proposes the military strength of a country as a source of security and also the prime method of preserving territorial integrity and state security as well as sovereignty. The Realist approach to tackling insecurity relies acutely on individual state power, rather than collective efforts of the international community.

Liberal theory believes in the inherent goodness of mankind to conduct peace-keeping relations in the international system. States rely on mutual cooperation to tackle global issues. Managing security issues, according to this theory, requires the involvement of international institutions, along with the cooperation of states. Liberal theorists strongly believe in the power of collective security. This is a protective measure used by a group of allied states. When one state is threatened unlawfully, united opposition is shown by the other supporting states. The goal is to stop the aggressor while creating security in the international system. Collective security can be best described by the concept of one for all, all for oneDespite its ambiguity, the concept of national interest remains of central importance in any attempt to describe, explain, predict, or prescribe international behavior. Theodore A. Coloumbis and J.H. Wolfe (1978) agreed that in international relations, the primary justification of state action is national interest. There is a major division of opinion in the field of international relations between those who felt that national interest can be arrived at objectively and scientifically, and those who see the definition of national interest as a struggle among various subjective views and preferences, a struggle in which the national interest is the political outcome.

1.10Conceptual Framework Fig 1.1 Paul R. Votti & Mark V. Kaupi, 2007. International Relations & World PoliticsIn Realist perspective, explanations of Operational Framework at Figure 1.1 are as follows:1.States are actors in global politics with separate national interests in the world without a central authority to regulate their activities.2.States are often assumed to be rational or purposive actors, in pursuing various objectives understood to be consistent with their separate interests.3.States will exploit opportunities to handle threats, and are required to mobilize its capabilities in order to exert power as to achieve its objectives & to protect its interest.

Fig 1.2 Dependent (DV) and Independent Variables (IV) a.The dependent variable is the US military presence in Afghanistan.b.The independent variables are:i.Politics - Democracy and Alliances are the utmost important aspects in US national interestsii.Economics - Control of natural resources ie. oil and gas, and to ensure Americas Multinational Company survivabilityiii.Power/Military - US ability to sustain its role as global hegemony poweriv.Threats - Russia and other neighbouring countries of Afghanistan i.e. Eurasia and Central Asia, and, Al-Qaeda and other non-state actors1.11Chapter OutlineChapter One of the research work gives the background, statement of the problem, research methodology and theoretical framework. Chapter Two analyzed the historical background of Afghanistan US relations and its impact in the region. In Chapter Three, the socio-economic interest of Iran, other Central and South Asian countries in the region will be discussed, while Chapter Four evaluate the impact of post-withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on regional security. The research will be concluded in Chapter Five with relevant recommendations made.

CHAPTER 2US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPACT IN THE REGION

2.1Historical Background of Afghanistan The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a landlocked country in south-central Asia.[footnoteRef:1] It is bordered by Pakistan in the south and east, Iran in the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north, and China in the far northeast. Afghanistan has been an ancient focal point of the Silk Road and human migration. The land is at an important geostrategic location, connecting East, South, West and Central Asia, and has been home to various cultures through the ages. The region has been a target of various invaders since antiquity, including Alexander the Great, the Mauryan Empire, Muslim armies, and Genghis Khan, and has served as a source from which many kingdoms, such as the Greco-Bactrians, Kushans, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Timurids, and many others have risen to form empires of their own. [1: National Intelligence Council Report dated 19 Apr 2002 at public website at www.odci.gov/nic]

The political history of modern Afghanistan began in the 18th century with the rise of the Pashtun tribes (known as Afghans in Persian language), when in 1709 the Hotaki dynasty established its rule in Kandahar and, more specifically, when Ahmad Shah Durrani created the Durrani Empire in 1747 which became the forerunner of modern Afghanistan. Its capital was shifted in 1776 from Kandahar to Kabul and most of its territories ceded to neighboring empires by 1893. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in "The Great Game" between the British and Russian empires. On August 19, 1919, following the third Anglo-Afghan war, the nation regained controlled over its foreign affairs from the British.2.2Geography of Afghanistan. Land-locked Afghanistan comprises 652,230 square km. Its capital city is Kabul. Other major cities are Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Konduz. Its terrains are mainly rocky, mountainous desert, and there are many river valleys where an agricultural economy and many villages exist. There are 34 provinces variously bordering Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with the Vakhan corridor of

the Hindu Kush range in the northeast to China. Its climate is dry, with cold winters and hot summers. Afghani population as registered in July 2009 counts 28.4 million people. Afghanistan is a multi-tribal, multicultural country composed of the Pashtun in the south which constituted 42 per cent, the Tajik 27 per cent in the central and north, the Hazara 9 per cent, Uzbek 9 per cent and lesser others.

2.3Geo-Strategic and Geo-Political Importance of AfghanistanThe foundations of the modern Afghan state are said to have been laid by Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 18th Century. There was strategic rivalry between Britain and Russia for supremacy in Central Asia, which began around 1813. The British were determined to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state, being worried about the prospect of a Russian invasion of India. Constant efforts were made by the British and Russians to influence the politics of Afghanistan, through diplomacy, espionage and sometimes by applying force. Afghanistan has historically and geographically been the link between Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. From a geopolitical point of view, controlling Afghanistan is vital for controlling South Asia. Historically, the conquest of Afghanistan had played a significant role in the invasion of India from the west through the Khyber Pass.Since the 8th Century B.C., Afghanistan has incessantly been shaken by external invasion or internal conflict. Geography had placed it such that it became a natural theatre for the imperial powers fighting to control trade routes and expand influence, as well as the object of a political Buzkashi between local feuding leaders. Great emperors like Darius I, Alexander the Great, Kanishka, Genghis Khan, Timur, Babur and Nadir Shah all fought for their way through Afghanistan. But it has never been completely conquered or colonised. This is the paradox of Afghanistan it is the most invaded place in the world but yet unconquerable.[footnoteRef:2] Because of repeated invasion or attack, regimes were always weak and susceptible. Yet its society has been resilient and uncompromising towards foreign rule. [2: Menon,Aditya, Afghanistan: Most invaded, yet unconquerable, Times of India, Feb 6, 2010]

2.4Afghanistan as nightmare for invadersThe British invaded Afghanistan and occupied the capital city of Kabul in 1830s, The British were seeking to turn Afghanistan from a crossroads to a roadblock for other nations. They put in place a hand-picked monarch named Shah Shoojah. But Shoojahs collaboration with non-Muslim occupiers earned him the hatred of many Afghans. Shoojah had no control outside Kabul, the capital. An uprising against Shoojah led to the first of two devastating Anglo-Afghan wars. The British occupiers were violently driven out a few years later. They totally misread the complexities of the nature of the people and land they invaded. A chaotic uprising turned into outright disaster when the invaders, forced to retreat, were all wiped out as they fled, and this became the story of the UKs first invasion of Afghanistan from 1839 until 1842. Following the communist coup that ended its constitutional monarchy, Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in December 1979 but were ousted in 1989. This was followed by a period of protracted civil war that ended with the ultra conservative Islamist Taliban taking over. The Taliban was believed to be a haven for the Al-Qaeda training camps that spawned the 9/11 attacks on the USA.

Then the current war started following the September 11 World Trade Center bombings. The United States blamed Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda for the crime. The U.S. government demanded that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden, but they refused. Within a few weeks the United States began a bombing campaign that culminated into the invasion of Afghanistan. Though the Taliban regime was toppled and bin Laden killed the insurgent Taliban militants are still fighting in Afghanistan. Observers say, All foreign forces invading Afghanistan must learn that it is easy to enter, but very difficult to leave Afghanistan.[footnoteRef:3] Invaders have always found it difficult to successfully conquer Afghanistan and govern it peacefully; hence it always appears to be a nightmare for foreign invaders. [3: A Brief History of Afghanistan in the past 1000 years - A speech delivered by Adam Ritscher in Duluth, Minnesota (2002), www.afghangovernment.com/ Retrieved on May 23, 2013.]

2.5US strategic interests in Afghanistan

US presence in Afghanistan was triggered in 2001 by the September 11 attacks on the US. The US has two vital strategic interests in Afghanistan, which are to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against the United States and to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven that could significantly enhance Al Qaedas ability to organize and conduct attacks on the United States. The other vital objective of U.S. is to keep the conflict in Afghanistan from propagating instability in any other place in Central Asia, as the huge oil reserve in that region is of strategic interest to the US.

2.6Impact of US presence in the regionThe invasion of Afghanistan by the US has impacted other countries in the region in various ways. Now, let us see the country wise impact of US presence in the region. 2.6.1BangladeshBangladesh has no border line with Afghanistan. But its role is proactive and together with USA, China, India Pakistan, Afghanistan and other stakeholders work for the success of the ongoing dialogue with the Talibans to isolate the extremists and empower the moderates as democratic and tolerant Afghanistan prepares to join other South Asian nations following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan.[endnoteRef:1] [1: ]

The United States has sought Bangladesh's engagement in restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan[footnoteRef:4]. According to Bangladesh Government, Bangladesh's engagement was sought for the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan; and to that effect Bangladesh was requested to provide economic and development assistance, render training facilities to Afghan security and law enforcement agencies. Bangladesh has already offered assistance in education and health sectors of Afghanistan as a member of the SAARC. [4: Lawrence,Quil and Jackie Northam, Alan Greenblatt, For Invaders, A Well-Worn Path Out Of Afghanistan December 6, 2010, (www.democraticunderground.com) Retrieved on May 24, 2013.]

Bangladesh wants to expand its role in the UN peacekeeping, but not willing to send armed forces to Afghanistan in combat role. Prime Minister of Bangladesh has proposed to form a regional task force against terrorism to which the US has given an in principle approval.[footnoteRef:5] But Bangladesh has been generally critical of the US presence in Afghanistan, while being keen on fighting terrorism. [5: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/09/report-responders-died-ground-zero-illnesses/ Retrieved on May 24, 2013.]

Now the US feels the states likes Bangladesh have abilities, potentialities to act; to work for global peace and prosperity. Bangladesh needs to stay on the track towards democracy and maintain steady economic growth to maintain present impetus to contribute in keeping peace throughout the world, but not in war. The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh recently said that Afghanistan could be benefited from Bangladesh's home-grown ideas like micro-credit, non-formal education and empowerment of women and gender mainstreaming.[endnoteRef:2] [2: ]

2.6.2PakistanAccording to US security experts, islamist extremism in Pakistan is concentrated within the tribal areas in its northwest frontier, and largely confined to its Pashtun minority (which comprises about 15 percent of the population). Although Pakistans reputation was severely damaged by the Bin Laden raid, its co-operation would be crucial for U.S in order to achieve a settlement with the Taliban. Among the neighbouring states, Pakistans fate is the most entangled with Afghanistan, because, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP, the former North-West Frontier Province - NWFP) and Balochistan function as the main shelter and supply-route into Afghanistan for the insurgents. Approximately 1.7 million officially registered refugees from Afghanistan are currently living in Pakistan[footnoteRef:6]. Pakistan is in critical position for the provision of logistical support to Afghanistan. It remains the principal artery for transporting supplies and fuel to Afghanistan. Extremists have continued using the Afghan-Pakistani border areas as a safe area for them. Therefore, Islamabads co-operation in the efforts of the allied forces against insurgents or in a probable settlement between the insurgents and the Afghan government are very important. [6: Afghanistan 19191928: Sources in the India Office Records". BritishLibrary. January 1921. Accessed on 18 March 2013. Afghan mission visits Europe and USA to establish diplomatic relations]

The United States claims that it favours democratic rule, human rights, and economic development in Afghanistan. The U.S. also believes that stable and prosperous democracies are less likely to threaten their neighbors or to challenge core U.S. interests. Helping the Afghan people rebuild after decades of war is on moral grounds. Some Pakistani politicians think that such discord is creating threat to the stability of the Pakistani state and the security of Pakistans nuclear arsenal. If the Pakistani government were to fail due to influence of radical extremists, or if terrorists were able to steal or seize a weapon or sufficient nuclear material, then the danger of a nuclear terrorism incident would increase significantly. So, it is important that U.S. strategy in Afghanistan avoids making the situation in Pakistan worse.

2.6.3IndiaIndias focus in Afghanistan is on preventing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. It stands against the possibility of a Taliban return to power and has invested significantly in boosting the capacities of Afghan government. India-Pakistan relations are a key factor in New Delhis contribution to the development of the Afghan security forces. India is interested in strengthening its economic power in the region.The increasing partnership between India and Afghanistan has caused some anxiety for Pakistan who sees Indian presence in Afghanistan as a threat to them. After the ASP was signed between New Delhi and Kabul, there was an instant reaction from Islamabad that in such an agreement the fundamental principle of ensuring the stability in the region must be taken into account[footnoteRef:7]. This reaction shows the degree of anxiousness of Pakistan over the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan. [7: Afghanistan 19191928: Sources in the India Office Records". British Library. January 1921. Accessed on 18 March 2013. "Afghan mission visits Europe and USA to establish diplomatic relations"]

The two countries collaboration has developed over the past decade, especially in more sensitive areas such as counter-terrorism and defense. With such a favorable climate, the US thinks that India could work to shape a clear and prudent Afghanistan strategy. The two countries have a common vision for Afghanistans future: a stable, developing and self-sustaining country contributing to the regions progress. At present, India has stronger ties with the Afghan government and people than perhaps any other country.The U.S. has a fundamental interest in developing a strategic partnership with rising democratic power India as it increasingly contributes to a stable order in the AsiaPacific. The U.S. thinks that the growing strategic challenge presented by a rising China should contribute to an increase in cooperation between Washington and New Delhi in defense and other key sectors, such as space, maritime security, and nuclear nonproliferation[footnoteRef:8]. [8: Evans, Alexander, The United States and South Asia after Afghanistan, December 2012, Asia Society, (AsiaSociety.org/USandSouthAsia)]

2.7Assessment of the Current Situation in Afghanistan The war in Afghanistan in general and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in particular can be said to have resulted in the positive achievement of major national interests of the US and its allies. The US succeeded in routing the Taliban Regime and further succeeded in capturing, killing, Al Qaeda operatives including Osama bin Laden. The flip side is the almost total destruction of Afghanistan and the loss of large numbers of civilian life. Against this backdrop that an assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan would be examined:a. Politics. Before the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Afghanistan was neutral in its foreign policy. Between 1979 and 1989, Afghanistans foreign policy reflected that of the Soviet Union. Afghanistans foreign relation improved dramatically after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and most countries now maintain diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. In 2002, Afghanistan six bordering countries signed a Good Neighbour Declaration that pledged to respect Afghanistans independence and territorial boundaries. Afghanistan is a land locked country but in the centre of all the states in the region. The relationship with the six neighbouring countries are:

(1)Pakistan. Afghanistan has had many differences with its neighbour Pakistan. Many in each country maintain visceral distrust and prejudice toward the other. Strained relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan result from the separation of Pashtun tribes, the growing Islamist insurgency on both sides of the border. The presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Pakistans border provinces and Afghanistans increasing relations with India further strained the relationship. Pakistan wants to minimize Indias influence in Afghanistan to avoid being surrounded by unfriendly states. Afghanistan and Pakistan are engaged in dialogue through the United States-sponsored Tripartite Commission to resolve bilateral issues. Economically, Pakistan is Afghanistans vital corridor to the Arabian Sea, while Afghanistan is a vital connection for Pakistan to the natural resources of Central Asia.

(2)Iran. Relationship between Afghanistan and Iran are generally good. Iran opposed the Soviet occupation and the Taliban. During the Soviet occupation, Iran supported Afghan resistance and provided financial and military assistance to rebel leaders who pledged loyalty to the Iranian vision of Islamic revolution. Afghanistans relations with Iran have improved since the fall of the Taliban. Iran has been active in Afghan reconstruction. There is a dispute over water rights on the Helmand River, which irrigates Afghanistans southern agricultural region before flowing into Iran. Other issues between Iran and Afghanistan include Afghan expatriates and refugees in Iran, Iranian support for warlords in Afghanistans border provinces, and Iranian concerns for the Shia minority in Afghanistan.

(3)Russia. When the Taliban was in power, Russia became disenchanted with the Taliban for supporting Chenchen insurgents and for providing a sanctuary for terrorist groups active in Central Asia. This resulted in Russian support for the Northern Alliance. Afghan relations with Russia have improved since the fall of the Taliban. In the early 2000s, Russia pledged to assist Afghanistan in building military and business establishments, clearing landmines, and developing oil and gas facilities. There are, however, remnants of mistrust between both countries and outstanding Afghan debts to Russia that date back to the soviet era.(4)Tajikistan. Afghanistans role in Tajikistans long civil war complicated relations. Tajik insurgents used Afghanistan as a base for military operations, and about 100,000 Tajiks took refuge in Northern Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Tajikistan provided assistance to the Northern Alliance because of the Talibans harsh treatment of Afghanistans Tajik minority.(5)Uzbekistan. Relations between Afghanistan have been limited. Uzbekistan has forced harsh border controls to prevent the entry of narcotics smugglers and Islamic fundamentalists from Afghanistan. Uzbekistans ongoing support for Uzbek warlords who control parts of Afghanistan has also been a source of contention.

(6)India. In the early 2000s, India offered a range of assistance projects worth US$600 million to establish diplomatic missions throughout Afghanistan. India expanded the package in 2006.

b. Economy. Afghanistan is the poorest country in Asia, and one of the poorest in the world. Security threats remain the most significant deterrents to economic development. Afghanistan relies heavily on foreign troops and international aid. However, in the aftermath of the NATO-led invasion in 2001, domestic and international initiatives are working to revitalize the economy by developing government institutions, constructing and repairing nationwide infrastructure, developing public and private industries, and developing natural resources. Afghanistan is taking steps to exploit its resources, especially precious stones and newly discovered oil and natural gas. Afghanistan is transitioning to a free market economy and creating incentives for foreign investors. Improvements have been made to the banking sector, tax policy, and customs regulations. A new currency has been established, and inflation is under control. These policies have created potential economic growth in various sectors, but the need for development and reform in many areas remains.

(1)Resources. In the 1980s, natural gas accounted for 56 percent of export revenue. However, the Soviet Union capped natural gas fields before withdrawing troops in 1989. Since then, Afghanistan has not been able to benefit from these resources until recently. In 2006, the US Geological Survey completed a 2-year assessment of oil and natural gas potential in Afghanistan and discovered many more resources than expected. Reports claim that Afghanistan has 18 times more oil resources and more than three times the natural gas resources previously known. Northern Afghanistan contains 100 billion to 1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, 0.4 billion barrels to 3.6 billion barrels of oil, and 126 million barrels to 1,325 million barrels of natural gas liquids. Afghanistan also has deposits of barites, bauxite, beryllium, chromium, coal, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, manganese, mercury, nickel, salt, silver, sulfur, talc, tin, uranium, and zinc. Other precious and semi-precious minerals include alabaster, amethyst, beryl, emerald, jade, lapis lazuli, quartz, ruby, sapphire, and tourmaline. Agricultural resources include grazing land and fertile soil land for growing crops in the northern province of Kondoz and the southern province of Helmand. However, Afghanistan has a significant water shortage.

(2)Industry. Afghanistans industrial sector once processed large quantities of sugar, textiles, and chemical fertilizers, and exported hundreds of millions of dollars worth of gas. By 2004, however, almost all Afghan industry had been destroyed by years of conflict, and reconstruction efforts were focused more on the slow rebuilding of national infrastructure than on industry. Industry faces many challenges in Afghanistan. Regional warlords often extort or take resources from private firms, and corruption in the construction sector also deters prospective investors and hinders many projects.(3)Agriculture. Afghanistans rough terrain and arid climate leave little land use for agriculture. Only 12 percent of land is arable, and not all of that is actually used to cultivate crops. Prolonged and severe drought adds to the challenges of growing food and raising livestock. Despite these obstacles, 70 to 85 percent of people in Afghanistan rely on agriculture for their livelihood. Almost 40 percent of Afghanistan legitimate GDP is agricultural, but poor conditions have forced millions of rural Afghans to rely on food aid. (4)Foreign Investment. Many obstacles deter foreign investors in Afghanistan. The lack of sea access and adequate infrastructure makes exporting products expensive. Customs regulations and property laws are underdeveloped. The banking system is also underdeveloped and raises little revenue. Basic necessities such as water and electricity are unreliable, even in Kabul. Another major obstacle is nationalized industry. Some of the most attractive industries, such as oil, gas, and precious stones, are state-owned and unavailable to foreign investors. Despite these challenges to foreign investment, Afghanistans new government is creating liberal trade laws, tax reforms, and incentives to encourage much needed foreign investment. Incentives to foreign investors include 100 percent foreign ownership and the ability to transfer all profits abroad. The Afghan Investment Support Agency assists foreign investors with required documents and information on starting a business enterprise. c. Social. About 40 percent of the Afghan labour force of 15 millions are unemployed, many of whom have moved to urban areas. Basic services are non-existence. These factors have contributed to crimes and lawlessness. Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant negative factors in Afghanistans fragile political and economic order over the past 25 years. In 2007, poppy cultivation and opium production reached record highs. Afghanistan is now the source of 92 percent of the worlds illicit opium. UN officials estimate that in-country illicit revenue from the 2006 opium crop was US$3 billion. Afghan president Hamid Karzai has identified the opium economy as the single greatest challenge to the long-term security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan.

d. Security.The security situation in Afghanistan remains critical to foreigners. In view of US, UK and NATO decision to withdraw their respective troops by 2014 in phases, the UN had endorsed Afghanistan proposal to expand security forces of the army to more than 170,000 troops and police 134,000 personnel in order the country to be able to provide its own security. There are remnants of the former Taliban regime and the terrorist Al Qaeda network in various parts of Afghanistan as well as narco traffickers and other groups that oppose the strengthening of a democratic government. These groups aim to weaken or bring down the government of Afghanistan, as well as drive Westerners out of the country.

2.7SummarySome analysts say that the US has failed not only in achieving its objectives of Afghanistan misadventure; its complete withdrawal will unleash a series of terrorist attack outside the South Asian region where al Qaeda has extended its franchise. According to an analysis by The National Interest, developments elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa will compound the emergence of this new threat in South Asia. Although al Qaeda al Jihad is based on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, it influences threat groups in North Africa, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. Groups from outside the region, notably the Middle East, are likely to return to Afghanistan and play primary and peripheral training and operational roles.[endnoteRef:3] [3: ]

CHAPTER 3ANALYSIS OF PAKISTANS AND INDIAS POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTANSince the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1980and particularly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001both India and Pakistan have increased their stakes in the affairs of Afghanistan. Each perceives Afghanistan in a zero-sum dynamics, in which one sides gain is seen as a loss to the other. India and Pakistan have different strategic goals for Afghanistan, and they adopt different strategies to achieve the goals. Once the United States ends its combat mission in Afghanistan, in 2014, the India-Pakistan rivalry will significantly contribute towards the political and socio-economic developments that will unfold in Afghanistan. It is therefore, in this perspective that an analysis of Pakistans and Indias strategic interests in Afghanistan would be examined.

3.1Pakistans Political Interests in Afghanistan

Pakistans goals for Afghanistan are mainly India-centric. Islamabad seeks a weak Kabul government, dominated by a pliant, supportive Taliban so that it can maintain strategic depth against undue Delhis influence in Afghanistan and prevent Indias power projection in the broader South/Central Asian region.

Islamabad seeks to fend off Afghan claims on Pakistani territory, which have been a consistent thorn in bilateral relations, given that no Afghan regime has ever accepted the legitimacy of the border drawn by the British in 1893, the so-called Durand Line[footnoteRef:9]. Pakistan thus, seeks to foster a friendly regime in Kabul that dampens Pashtun nationalism and concomitant calls for an independent Pashtun homeland in parts of Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Calls for a breakaway irredentist Pashtunistan would directly threaten Pakistans territorial integrity and potentially contribute to its disintegration along ethnic lines[footnoteRef:10]. [9: The Durand Line was drawn in 1893 and split ethnic Pashtuns between Afghanistan and British colonial India. NoAfghan regime has ever accepted the international boundary as legitimate. See Rashid, 2000, p. 187. See also Fair andChalk, 2006, p. 75.] [10: Weinbaum and Humayoon, 2009, p. 96. See also Weinbaum and Harder, 2008, p. 26; and Tellis, 2011, p. 1.]

Islamabad perceives Indias efforts to gain influence in Afghanistan as a deliberate strategy of encirclement that is aimed at trapping and ultimately destroying Pakistan between hostile fronts. Islamabads overriding objective in Afghanistan is therefore to block Delhis own penetration into the country by helping to foster a pro-Pakistani administration in Kabul. In addition to limiting Indian power projection in Afghanistan, Pakistan seeks to limit the extent to which other states are able to extend their influence in Afghanistan. This is particularly true of Iran, Russia, and the United States..

To some degree, Pakistan lumps the United States in with other countries that seek to exercise influence in Afghanistan to Pakistans detriment, because some Pakistani politicians view U.S. involvement in Afghanistan more as a threat than as a comfort. Washingtons diplomatic efforts to broker a peace deal between the Taliban and Kabul have added to this consternation by engendering fears that Washington will drive a settlement that does not take into account or, worse still, bypasses Islamabads own interests.

3.2Pakistans Economic Interests in Afghanistan

The government of Pakistan has spent around $300 million in development assistance to Afghanistan. Most of which has been directed toward the construction of roads and railways that would connect Pakistan to the energy-rich CARs. Islamabad and Kabul signed the AfghanistanPakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), in which Afghanistan would permit Pakistani goods to transit en route to Central Asia, and Pakistan would allow Afghan products to transit on the way to Indian markets.

Pakistan intends Afghanistan to act as a conduit for enhancing regional commerce and transportation links with the CARs, just as India seeks to do. A strong Pakistani grip on northern trade routes would diminish the value of Irans Chabahar port and the Indian-built ZaranjDelaram road (which connects to the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar highway), thereby undermining Indias efforts to expand its own economic ties with Afghanistan and Central Asia[footnoteRef:11]. Furthermore, Pakistan is eager to gain access to Central Asian natural gas. The proposed TAPI pipeline would provide as much as 15 percent of Pakistans current energy consumption. Islamabad has emphasized common historical and religious links to conclude energy deals with such countries as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and has also offered to build road and rail links throughout Central Asia. [11: Mukhopadhaya, 2010, p. 34. See also Rashid, 2000, p. 90; Meena Singh Roy, Pakistans Strategies in Central Asia,Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 4, OctoberDecember 2006, p. 802; and Ganguly and Howenstein, 2009, p. 136.]

Islamabad seeks to strengthen its trade links with the CARs by controlling both new infrastructure and the Silk Routes traditional western routes that connect Karachi with marketsin Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Pakistan has secured extensive Chinese assistance to build a port in Gwadar to serve as a gateway for trade with Afghanistan and countries beyond. In addition, through its past support for the Taliban, Pakistan has already assumed a degree of influence over the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar highway, a critical strategic artery that provides the sole non-Iranian trading route between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

3.3Indias Political Interests in Afghanistan

Countering Pakistans influence is certainly one of Indias goals, but Delhi pursues a broader range of interests in Afghanistan than simply obstructing its principal adversary. Delhis most fundamental goal for Afghanistan is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for extremists to launch terrorist attacks in India or against Indian interests in Afghanistan. Delhi seeks a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic Afghan government that can establish control over the whole country, maintain peace, prevent the return of the Taliban, and mitigate anti-India extremism[footnoteRef:12]. Achieving such an arrangement, however, requires India to counter Pakistani political influence and prevent Pakistan from becoming the sole arbitrator of the Afghan political and strategic discourse. [12: Gautam Mukhopadhaya, India, in Ashley J. Tellis and Aroop Mukharji, eds., Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, p. 28.]

3.4Indias Military Interest in Afghanistan

India has no specific military objective in Afghanistan. It has not projected military power into Afghanistan, though, some 500 personnel were deployed to protect Indian aid workers and diplomats, but with no offensive or counterinsurgency (COIN) roles. Furthermore, Delhi has provided limited training to the Afghan National Army, in India. In the recent past, however, India seems to have taken a more assertive approach regarding military cooperation with Afghanistan. As part of a strategic partnership agreement signed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in October 2011, Delhi agreed to provide light weapons, as well as training in COIN and high-altitude warfare, to the Afghan army, police, and air force[footnoteRef:13]. Perhaps, with the impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan, India may assume more military responsibility, especially in the area of training and support for the Afghan military. [13: See Shashank Joshi, Indias Strategic Calculus in Afghanistan,Foreign Policy, October 6, 2011. See also Manu Pubby, 50 Afghan Cadets Train at IMA, Indian Express, July 22,]

3.5Indias Economic Interests in Afghanistan

India provides more foreign aid to Afghanistan than to any other country[footnoteRef:14]. It is Afghanistans fifth-most significant source of development assistance and its largest South Asian donor. As of early 2011, Delhi had provided $1.3 billion in aid to Afghanistan, though subsequent pledges have raised the total amount committed since 2001 to $2 billion[footnoteRef:15]. In 2003, Delhi and Kabul signed a preferential trade agreement that reduced duties on Afghan exports, primarily agricultural goods[footnoteRef:16]. This was an extremely important accord given that fully one-quarter of Afghanistans exports are destined for Indian markets, with bilateral trade expected to reach as much as $1 billion by 2012. At present, Delhi must send commodities to Afghanistan via Iran because Pakistan prevents Indian goods from crossing its territory. Should Islamabad remove this restriction, IndianAfghan trade will expand dramatically. [14: Indias Role in Afghanistan, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 17, June 2011.] [15: The $1.3 billion figure is taken from Robert O. Blake Jr., assistant secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs,U.S. Department of State, The Obama Administrations Priorities in South and Central Asia, remarks, Houston, Texas,January 19, 2011a.] [16: Indo-Afghan Commercial Relations, Embassy of India in Kabul, undated]

The proposed 1,000-mile, $7.6 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline would carry 33 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of Turkmen gas, generating a much-needed $1.4 billion per year in transit fees for Afghanistan. India and Pakistan would receive 14 bcm/y each, representing 1.5 percent of Indias total annual energy consumption and 15 percent of Pakistans.8 The transport of Central Asian energy resources to both India and Pakistan requires stability in Afghanistan, whose territory the TAPI pipeline must cross, giving both countries strong incentives to promote security there.

Although Indias reconstruction strategy is designed to highlight Indian munificence, expand trade, and gain political advantage in Afghanistan, it is also clearly intended to undercut Pakistani influence there[footnoteRef:17]. By constructing a 220-kilometer road between the Afghan cities of Zaranj and Delaram in 20082009, for example, the Indian Border Roads Organization (BRO) connected the main Herat-Kandahar highway with existing routes leading to the Iranian port of Chabahar. (See Figure 2.1.) It is no coincidence, however, that the road will significantly shorten overland journey times to a commercial ocean outlet and will be much faster than the present network that connects Afghanistan to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar[footnoteRef:18]. [17: Geoffrey Pyatt, principal deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department ofState, Next Steps on the Silk Road, remarks to members of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry,Chennai, November 15, 2011.] [18: Sudha Ramachandran, India Takes a Slow Road, Asia Times, January 27, 2007]

To facilitate Indian companies access to Afghanistans estimated $1 trillion in minerals and raw materials, Delhi is planning to build a rail link from Hajigak, a mineral-rich area in Bamyan province, through Zaranj, and onward to Chabahar[footnoteRef:19]. India is working with Iran to build a 600-km road from Chabahar to the Iranian city of Zahedan, near the southwestern corner of Afghanistan that would follow a similar route to the rail line. These transit routes will reduce the amount of time it takes for Afghan goods to reach a major port. [19: Jayanth Jacob and Saubhadra Chatterji, Indias Track 3: AfghanIran Rail Link, Hindustan Times, November 1, 2011.]

3.6Irans Political Interests in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has become more strategically significant to Iran since the US-led invasion, although it is still limited compared to Iranian strategic interests in the Gulf region and the Levant. Afghanistan is primarily important to Iran as a means of securing its eastern flank and preventing cross-border trafficking in weapons, persons, and narcotics. Fighting in Afghanistan poses a serious threat to Irans national security, and Iran has an interest in seeing a stable, Tehran-friendly government emerge in Kabul.

Border security is a major concern for Iran in its relations with Afghanistan. Much of Afghanistans opium production occurs in its rural southwest provinces of Farah and Nimroz, both of which border Iran. The UN estimates that poppy cultivation in Farah rose by 20% in 2011, a sign that trafficking along the border is likely to continue despite heavy border controls enacted by Iran. At present, drug trafficking is a serious point of friction in Iranian-Afghan relations, and the Afghan central government shows little promise of becoming capable of reigning in opium production in the near future.

3.7Irans Economic Interests in Afghanistan

Bilateral trade between Iran and Afghanistan is difficult to measure, as neither the Iranian nor the Afghan governments, can agree on a number in their public reports. A 2010 estimate from the European Commission put the figure at nearly $11 million, while a 2010 statement from President Karzai claimed bilateral trade totaled more than $1.5 billion. Iran ranks itself as Afghanistans fifth-largest trade partner. Regardless of the actual figure, what is certain is that bilateral Iran-Afghanistan trade flows are sharply in Irans favor. Trade flows from Iran to Afghanistan dwarf those from Afghanistan to Iran, giving Tehran substantial economic leverage over Kabul. Notably, Afghanistan meets nearly half of its demand for fuel with Iranian imports.3

Iran has substantial trade and investment links in western Afghanistan, particularly in the regions most populous city, Herat. Tehrans most notable investment in the area is in railway construction: Iran began construction on its portion of the Herat-Khaf railroad in July 2006. Iran has also offered financing for new road infrastructure, power grids, schools, and mosques.5 Moreover, the Iranians have hinted that they may at some point link the city of Herat to Iran via natural gas pipeline.

3.8Central Asias Interests in AfghanistanTurkmenistan has proven oil reserves of nearly two billion barrels and natural gas reserves of approximately seventy-one trillion cubic feet (tcf); Uzbekistan has almost six hundred million barrels of proven oil reserves and more than sixty-two tcf of natural gas; while Kazakhstan has up to forty billion barrels of oil reserves and sixty-five to one hundred tcf of natural gas. The Caucasus and Caspian Sea, meanwhile, are estimated to contain more than four hundred billion barrels of oil and potential reserves, and nearly three hundred and fifty tcf of natural gas.Beginning in the late 1990s, India signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding with Kazakhstan focusing on natural gas provision and delivery, pipeline and liquefaction infrastructure development, a steel mill outside Astana, and even uranium trade for nuclear energy. These arrangements are part of the larger New Silk Road across Eurasia that includes natural gas and oil pipelines between Chinas western Xinjiang Province and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, respectively. China has sought to develop highways and railways between Xinjiang, Iran, and even Eastern Europe. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan haveinaugurateda multi-country railway that would bridge Europe and Central Asia. At the very center of all of these activities is Afghanistan, which has historically been a geographic hub of east, west, north, and south Asia.

3.9SummaryOutside the US, India and Pakistan wield the greatest influence on the economic and political dynamics in Afghanistan. The post US withdrawal Afghanistan would be partly shaped by the balance of power between these two nations in the pursuit of their strategic interests in the country. It is therefore necessary for the US to find greater roles for them in the negotiations leading up to the withdrawal era and in the socio-economic development and stability of the post war Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 4POST US WITHDRAWAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY4.1 Domestic ConsequenceUS President announced withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan but it doesnt mean that the mission in Afghanistan will end by 2014, only that it will cease to be a "combat" mission and become a "support" mission. General John Allen, the NATO commander and top US general in Afghanistan, has recommended keeping between 6,000 and 15,000 troops in the country after 2014. But the final number of any US forces in Afghanistan after 2014 would depend on the perceived strength of al-Qaida and its affiliates in the country, the progression of Afghan security forces, and the legal protection granted to US forces by the Afghan government.[footnoteRef:20] [20: Adams Richard., US Considers Complete Afghanistan Withdrawal on Eve of Karzai Visit, published by guardian.co.uk, 9 January 2013, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/08/us-afghanistan-withdrawal-military-karzai, Accessed on 14th June, 2013.]

TheUnited Stateswants to keep troops at nine bases across Afghanistan. PresidentHamid Karzai said that a larger number than expected is given Washington's scaled-back ambitions for shaping the country's future. Keeping American soldiers on the ground was in Afghans interests, he said, as long as the soldiers came with support for the Afghan government and economy. The places in which the U.S. wants to keep troops include the capital, Kabul, the sprawling Bagram Airbase, which has been the heart of operations in the east, the restive southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, and Shindand in the west, where Nato is training the Afghan Airforce, Karzai said. The other bases are in the northern hub of Mazar-i-Sharif, the western city of Herat, near the Iranian border, and eastern Gardez and Jalalabad, which is a key gateway to Pakistan and a base for drones.[footnoteRef:21] [21: Lennard Natasha., After withdrawal US Will Keep 9 Afghan bases, available at http://www.salon.com/2013/05/09/after_withdrawal_u_s_will_keep_9_afghan_bases/, accessed on 16th June, 2012.]

The most immediate concern over theUS's withdrawal fromAfghanistanis how it will affect Afghan security.The Talibanand other Afghan militants still launch regular attacks against Western force; while the Afghan military and police forces thatNATOhas been training are not yet prepared to take on the responsibility for their own security. The Defense Department found out that, despite years of training, only one of 23 Afghan brigades can operate independently. So, the United States and NATO have focused on creating a large and capable Afghan army.[footnoteRef:22] [22: Sherwell Philip., US Military Leaders Fear Afghanistan Withdrawal will Increase Soldier Deaths, Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8598832/US-military-leaders-fear-Afghanistan-withdrawal-will-increase-soldier-deaths.html, accessed on 15th June, 2013]

Recent history shows that nearly two years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, its Marxist client government was overthrown. However, there are two factors that may obviate an overthrow. First, the US is attempting to get the Taliban to participate in a peace accord with the central government, encouraging the Taliban to participate through the political process in some form of a coalition government. Secondly, the US is busy equipping the central government's military force to reach 350,000 soldiers and is providing substantial training.[footnoteRef:23] [23: Qudrat Haseena. & Kamrany Michelle., Securing Peace in Afghanistan after US Withdrawal, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/afghanistan-us-withdrawal_b_3316935.html, accessed on 16th June, 2013.]

Afghanistan may not face only disorder and anarchy but also some positive possibility that indicate peaceful and stable state. Recent history demonstrates that the population during the reign of former King Zahir Shah lived in relative peace for 40 years (1933-1973). First of all, Afghanistan's population is nearly 100 percent Muslim. Although there is a minority of Shia, the two sects have lived in peace for centuries. The only major difference among Afghans is language. There are two prominent languages, Pashto and Farsi. There are some frictions on this issue, but it is not serious, and in the city of Kabul most of the population is bilingual. Although the ethnic Pashtun population is in the majority and have dominated the government since the 1700s, the other ethnic major groups are gaining relative political power. There is no misdistribution of income, wealth, or land in Afghanistan. Therefore, peace and civility amongst the diverse ethnic groups could be a possibility as the country attempts to repair itself and prevail.Afghanistan needs peace to exploit its rich mineral resources, develop industries including food production, agriculture, tourism, construction, and infrastructure, and expand its already rapid growth of transportation and communication networks. Afghanistan's recent annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) is very favorable. If these trends continue in the postwar period, Afghanistan's per capita income could converge with and even surpass that of some its neighbors. On the other hand, the United States accepts that a diminished but resilient Taliban is likely to remain a military threat in some parts of Afghanistan long after U.S. troops complete their combat mission in 2014. The US expects that the Afghans Government must reach some sort of political accommodation with the insurgents, and that a reconciliation process needs to be led by Afghans, not Americans. Thus the No. 1 priority for the U.S. military in its final months of combat in Afghanistan is to do all that is possible to boost the strength and confidence of the Afghan forces.[footnoteRef:24] [24: Taliban Threat will Remain for Years after US Withdrawal from Afghanistan, available at http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/taliban-threat-will-remain-for-years-after-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan.php, accessed on 16th June, 2013.]

The results of a full US withdrawal could certainly be worse. After last election of Pakistan, New Prime Minister Newaz Sharif and one of the leading opponents Party Chief, Imran khan have taken direct stand against drone attacks. So, it will be difficult to continue drone strike by the US in long time against Al-Qaeda targets in Pakistans tribal territories or Afghanistan itself and there would be no U.S. bases within the drones range. Mr. Karzais bravado aside, the withdrawal of all American forces would embolden the Taliban and likely lead to the crumbling of the Afghan army and a new civil war. As it has been in Syria, that would create new room for al-Qaeda.[footnoteRef:25] [25: A US Future in Afghanistan?, The Washington Post, 2nd December 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-us-future-in-afghanistan/2012/12/01/54015ad4-3af3-11e2-8a97-363b0f9a0ab3_story.html, accessed on 16th June, 2013.]

A bleaker prognosis was offered by Dexter Filkins in a widely discussed New Yorker article last month titled After America: Will civil war hit Afghanistan when the U.S. leaves? While respectful of what the U.S. military has accomplished, Filkins was skeptical that it can endure. In his words, Afghans and Americans are under the stress of battle and without a substantial presence of American combat troops after 2014 the Afghan army could once again fracture along ethnic lines. However, two factors would reduce the likelihood of civil war. One is a commitment for a stay-behind force of, say, 15,000 to 30,000 U.S. troops to prevent a return by al-Qaeda and continue training the Afghan army and police. Second is a political strategy that moves toward national reconciliation and supports elections in 2014 for a new political leadership to replace the corrupt President Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately, this needed political transition is getting much less attention from Washington than the military pullout[footnoteRef:26]. If US want to replace a new leader for Afghanistan, who will be in place of Karzai when his term ends in 2014? The United States must do everything possible to ensure a reformer wins that election. The stakes are huge. If a warlord or corrupt politicianwins the presidency, aid will be wasted. Insurgents will have a rallying cry likely to resonate with millions of disaffected Afghans. Civil war could resume and, with it, control over large parts of the country could be lost to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Consequently it might cost more American blood and treasure, inviting jihadis in the Middle East and Asia to shoot at Americans and continuous plundering the military bases and adding to the burden of the US budget deficit. [26: Ignatious David., In Afghanistan, Soccer or Civil War?, The Washington Post, 4th August, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-in-afghanistan-soccer-or-civil-war/2012/08/03/21ac9dba-dcec-11e1-af1d-753c613ff6d8_story.html, accessed on 16th June, 2013.]

Afghanistansuppliesmore than 90 percentof the world's opium, and draws roughly a third of its GDP from the drug trade.Some worry that the withdrawal of Western troops will lead to a boom in the heroin market, from where, theTaliban finds much of its funding. Writing forGeorge Mason University's Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center,Nazia Hussain warnsthat in the wake of UStroop withdrawal, "illicit trafficking... will skyrocket." And Gen. Khodaidad, Afghanistan's former anti-narcotics chief,told the Daily Telegraphthat "with the coming exit strategy for 2014, the whole drug trade will be completely out of control. All the provinces will go more and more back to poppy."

Recent public opinion shows Afghans in and aroundKabulreveal anxieties about the US and NATO drawdown, and many say they have daydreams of leaving before chaos sets in. A recentAsia Societysurvey found that one-third of Afghans would leave the country if they could. Many express fear of theTalibans return to power even though many Afghan experts assert that the country has evolved and modernized too much for that to happen. AUSwithdrawal fromAfghanistanalso raises concerns aboutwhat will happen to the fragile social reformsthat have been made since the Talibanfell,particularly those that have improved the lives of women. The Monitor reported that some 2.4 million girls are now enrolled in school, compared to a mere 5,000 during the Taliban's reign, and that women are now able to enter politics and get jobs outside home. But many worry that there has been a creeping return to old biases, the Monitor notes. Karzai recently backed a government-backed religious council's statement that women are not equal to men and should not mix with them in public.

A full American withdrawal, or a cutback to a small presence, will invigorate the main groups battling the United States and the Karzai government. The Talibans aim is not defeat the American army; with only about 20,000 fighters, it cannot hope to do so. Its aim is to deplete the will of the US and its allies eroding support for the war by demonstrating and the continuing violence. Once foreign forces leave, the insurgents expect to face a weak Afghan government whose legitimacy has already been badly compromised by incompetence and corruption.[footnoteRef:27] [27: Kerpon Michael., Haggling over Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 15th June, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/haggling-over-afghanistan/2012/06/14/gJQAU4cUdV_story.html, accessed on 16th June, 2013.]

Dialogue with Talibans: Realizing the fact that the Taliban and other insurgents cannot be defeated or forced into a negotiated settlement by 2014, Obama started dialogue with Taliban and even opened their first political office in Doha, Qatar in June 2013. Though, Karzai was not pleased and termed it as challenge to Kabuls legitimacy, US claimed that it would accelerate peace process that might bring stability. This strategic move indicates that there can be no decisive military solution, and the Taliban wants to return to government which may force the stakeholders to compromise in power sharing.[footnoteRef:28] [28: Tharor Ishaan., The Talibans Qatar Office: Are Prospects for Peace already Doomed?, the Times, 19th June, 2013, available at http://world.time.com/2013/06/19/the-talibans-qatar-office-are-prospects-for-peace-already-doomed/, accessed on 19th June, 2013]

4.2Regional Consequence" Harsh V Pant of the Defense Studies Department, King's College London, said: "New Delhi has been contemplating the impact of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan for a while. If the US left lock, stock and barrel, India would be left to pick up the pieces."[endnoteRef:4] India is one of the biggest regional aid donor in Afghanistan and its $1.3 billion (Dh4.77bn) of projects, shows what Indian officials like to call their "soft power" to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan. India wanted to remove security threat not only from Afghanistan but also from Pakistan because India had to face similar or more security threats from Pakistan that may increase or create new threat after withdrawal of US troops. So, India has little to gain in using bin Laden's death to press Pakistan harder. India has achieved little with hawkish stances and there is recognition that it only risks strengthening Pakistan's hardliners. [4: ]

On the other side, since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States and Pakistan have maintained a strained, transactional partnership. Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistans chief executive, agreed to a limited U.S. presence at air bases, restricted use of Pakistani airspace and a logistical supply corridor for U.S. troops. Pakistani agents were instrumental in capturing al-Qaeda leaders, including Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed in March 2003. Pakistan was allocated U.S. military and economic assistance, although far less than its bill for services rendered. But tensions were inflamed by the May 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden and the NATO attack on a Pakistani border post that killed 24 Pakistani troops in November 2011. However, Pakistans leaders will continue to seek U.S. assistance even as they tirelessly pursue a government in Kabul that, after most U.S. troops withdraw in 2014, will be friendlier to them than to India. If the Pakistanis fail to ensure this negotiated outcome, they will employ allies to upend an Afghan government that they deem unfriendly.

Indian and Pakistan will not be the lone contenders in post-American Afghanistan. Neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan may also be pulled in if rump armies based on Afghanistans Tajiks and Uzveks emerge (as happened between 1992 and 2001). If Taliban success deteriorates the security situation, such armies will likely form to secure their homelands. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan emerged from sedentary communities with larger urban populations where Islam therefore has a stronger social foundation. The post-Soviet history of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan shows that they cant escape the reverberations of Afghanistans religious extremism and violence.Russia is determined to keep militant Islamic movements out of Central Asia. Moscow still has substantial economic and strategic interests that will be jeopardized if violence exists in Afghanistan. This makes Afghanistans future more important for Russia than ever.[footnoteRef:29] [29: Ibid.]

In present time, China is the most important key partner in the region. China has been able to expand its economic presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan without having to protect it. Between 1992 and 2009 alone, its trade with the five Central Asia states increased from $527 million to $25.9 billion. On the other side, China suffers Uighur problem, in recent time clashes between Uighur protesters and police has increased. If Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan, Uighur protesters may be engaged with Al-Quaeda insurgents and may harm Chinese security. For China, the stability of Afghanistan, the Stans and Xinjiang are intertwined, the more so because the Wakhan corridor, a 400 kilometer salient within Afghanistans northeastern province of Badakshan, sandwiched between Tajikistan and Pakistan, offers access to Xinjiang. Hence its not just defending the sunken costs of trade and investment that may draw China into Afghanistan, but also apprehensions about its own internal stability.[footnoteRef:30] [30: Ibid.]

Iran shares boarders with Afghanistan. In the present world, US are enemy of Iran but Iran favors US intervention in Afghanistan because there has long been blood between Tehran and Taliban. Iran supported the Heart-based anti-Taliban Tajik warlord Ismail khan. Iran also has interests South of Heart because of the insurgency rooted in the non-Persian province Sistan-Balochistan. That province contains Chahbahar and shares a 700 mile border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tehran fears that the insurgency offers its adversaries opportunities for subversion and has claimed that suicide bombings by the Baloch insurgent that has strong tie with Taliban and Al-Queada. So, withdrawal of US troops also is a source of security tension for Tehran.India, Pakistan, China and Iran will be the most deeply engaged while Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will not be able to compete with them on equal footing, but they will be disproportionately affected by the consequence of Afghanistans instability and the struggle over its future- an unenviable position.[footnoteRef:31] [31: Ibid.]

4.3SummaryThe withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would definitely pose security concerns for both Afghanistan and the South Asia region. The major fear is that of Afghanistan slipping into civil war due to resurgence of violence. There are fears whether the hurriedly trained Afghans security forces would be able to contain such tested forces as the Taliban and other militant groups. The other neighbouring countries are also concerned that in the event of insecurity in Afghanistan, the country could be used by terrorists to lunch attacks against them. There is also a concern to have a friendly regime in power to protect their strategic interests. Hence, the post withdrawal Afghanistan would be determined by the nature of the regime in power and the level of political stability established.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan is a land-locked country with great geo-strategic and political significance in both Central and South Asia. It significance has made it an object of foreign invasions in history. Several powers in history have attempted to conquer Afghanistan but have found it difficult to dominate and rule. The resilience of the people to stand up to foreign occupation has made the country to be termed a nightmare for foreign invaders. Its geo-strategic significance has also made it to be a theatre for various foreign interests and interferences.The September 11 attack on the US by the Al-Qaeda resulted in the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the US and its allies. The objectives of the invasion according to US sources were to topple the ruling Taliban Government in Afghanistan, degrade Al-Qaedas infrastructure in Afghanistan and prevent Afghanistan from being used as a safe haven by terrorists groups to attack American interests. The invasion of Afghanistan by the US forces did not only impact the social, political and economic dynamics of the country, but also the entire South and Central Asia.After about 12 years in Afghanistan, the US has decided that the strategic objectives of going to Afghanistan have been achieved and it is time to withdraw. This has also thrown up new issues and concerns within Afghanistan and the various countries with strategic interests in Afghanistan. There are anxieties as to the future of the country, the security, economic and political stability; and the nature of the government that would emerge after the withdrawal of the US forces. The regional powers India and Pakistan are jostling to ensure the emerging regime in post-US withdrawal Afghanistan is in their best interest. Russia, China and Iran are watching keenly the unfolding scenario and how it will impact on their strategic interests.So far, the Talibans are the most dominant militant group that have the capacity to topple the post- withdrawal Afghan government or engage them in a protracted civil war which will not be in the interest of anyone. Hence, efforts are on by the US to negotiate peace with the Talibans and work out a political arrangement that will guarantee peace and stability in post withdrawal Afghanistan. There is also no guarantee that other militant groups would not create trouble in order to seek attention. Therefore the stability of Afghanistan after the US withdrawal would depend largely on the dynamics of foreign interferences by nations like India, Pakistan, Russia and Iran; and the capability of the newly trained Afghan forces to hold their own in the face of the several multi-dimensional threats they would encounter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the above observations, it is recommended that:

a.The US should involve various interests groups and stakeholders in Afghanistan and the South Asia region in the search for permanent solution for post-withdrawal Afghanistan.

b.The US should ensure that India and Pakistan undertake not to interfere with the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

c.The US should ensure that a sizeable force of between 30,000 and 50,000 is retained in Afghanistan to help the local forces stabilize the country.

d.The US should galvanize international collaborative effort to muster aid for socio-economic development of Afghanistan.

GROUP MEMBERSBrig Gen Ataul Hakim Sarwar Hasan, afwc, psc-ChairmanJt Secy Md Mahbub-Ul-Alam-MemberBrig Gen Mohd Nasser bin Murad-MemberCapt (NN) Promise Zebulon Dappa- Secretary

Bangladesh Army, NDC 201322 May 2013

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Books Baylis, J. & Smith, S. Cohen, E. 2007. Strategy in the Contemporary World. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press.Boyne, W.J. Col. 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why. Forge Book by Tom Doherty Associates, LLC, New York.Burbach, R. & Tarbell, J. 2004. Imperial Overstretch George W Bush & The Hubris of Empire. Fernwood Publishing Ltd, Canada.Coloumbis, T.A. & Wolfe, J.H. 1978. Introduction to International Relations - National Interest & Other Interest. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.Church, W.F. 1973. Richelieu and Reason of State. Princeton University Press. Princeton.Evans, G. and Newnham J., 1998. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. England, Penguin Books.Evans, Alexander, The United States and South Asia after Afghanistan, December 2012, Asia Society

Forest, J.F. (ed), 2007. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives. Volume 2: Combating the Sources and facilitators. Praeger Security International, Westport, Connecticut. Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Friedman, N. 2003. Terrorism, Afghanistan, and Americas - New Ways of War. Maryland: Naval Institute Press. Giles, L. (ed), 2010. The Art of War Sun Tzu. Cosimo Books, New York.

Goodson, Larry and Johnson, Thomas H., Parallels with the Past How the Soviets Lost in Afghanistan, How the Americans are Losing

Gurtov, M. 2006. The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy, Super Power on Crusade. London. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Herring, G.C. 2008. ''From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. Oxford University Press.K.S. Natthan. 2010. Pax-Americana in Asia. IKON, UKM, Bangi.Lowther, A.B. 2007. American and Asymmetric Conflict: Lebanon, Somalia and Afghanistan. Praeger Security International, India.Morgenthau, H. J. 1958. Dilemmas of Politics. University of Chicago Press.Morgenthau, H. J. 1948. Politics Among Nations. University of Chicago Press.Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, 2002. The War on Freedom - The Great Deception. Selangor: Thinkers library. Quigley, J. 2007. The Ruses For War. New York: Prometheus Books.Rasanayam, A. 2005. Afghanistan A Modern History. New York: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd. Weinbaum and Humayoon, 2009, p. 96. See also Weinbaum and Harder, 2008, p. 26; and Tellis, 2011, p. 1

Journals And Periodicals

Afghanistan 19191928: Sources in the India Office Records, BritishLibrary. January 1921

Ahmed,SM Rashed, Bangladesh foreign policy: Breaking new grounds, The Daily Star, March 21, 2013The Daily Star, Dhaka,May 9, 2013.

John Dyrby Paulsen, Afghanistan The Regional Context, Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, NATO Parliamentary Assembly

K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, May 24, 2012

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), Andrew Exum and Matthew Irvine, Beyond Afghanistan A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia, June 2011, Center for a New American Security

Issues 2012, The Candidates Briefing Book, The Heritage Foundation, Issues 2012, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 200024999

Menon,Aditya, Afghanistan: Most invaded, yet unconquerable, Times of India, Feb 6, 201Uddin, Sifat, Bangladesh and the rise of the rest, New Age, Dhaka, May 9, 2013

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Lennard Natasha., After withdrawal US Will Keep 9 Afghan bases, available at http://www.salon.com/2013/05/09/after_withdrawal_u_s_will_keep_9_afghan_bases/, accessed on 16th June, 2012.

Sherwell Philip., US Military Leaders Fear Afghanistan Withdrawal will Increase Soldier Deaths, Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8598832/US-military-leaders-fear-Afghanistan-withdrawal-will-increase-soldier-deaths.html, accessed on 15th June, 2013

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Kerpon Michael., Haggling over Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 15th June, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/haggling-over-afghanistan/2012/06/14/gJQAU4cUdV_story.html, accessed on 16th June, 2013.

Tharor Ishaan., The Talibans Qatar Office: Are Prospects for Peace already Doomed?, the Times, 19th June, 2013, available at http://world.time.com/2013/06/19/the-talibans-qatar-office-are-prospects-for-peace-already-doomed/, accessed on 19th June, 2013

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