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From Dictatorship to Democracy: US- Greek Relations at a Critical Turning Point

(1974–1975)

Antonis Klapsis

On 15 July 1974 the Greek military junta instigated a coup in Cyprus in order to overthrow the president of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, and unite the island with Greece. The coup gave Turkey the pretext to invade Cyprus five days later and eventually to occupy almost 40 percent of the island’s territory, thus forcing thousands of Greek Cypriots to abandon their domiciles in the north and become refugees in their own country. As a result of this ethnic disaster, the military dictatorship that had ruled Greece since 21 April 1967 collapsed, opening the way for the restoration of democ-racy in Greece.

In the early hours of 24 July 1974, Konstantinos Karamanlis returned to Athens after more than ten years of self- exile in Paris. Almost immediately he was sworn in as prime minister and formed a national unity government composed of prominent politicians of diverse political backgrounds. From the very first moments of its existence, the national unity government had to deal with enormous problems, such as confrontation with Turkey both in Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea, as well as reestablishing democratic normality in Greece. Given the fact that many of the supporters of the military regime, especially within the Greek armed forces, were not willing to accept the new political situation voluntarily, Karamanlis and his collaborators found them-selves in a very difficult position. Greece was on the edge of war with Turkey,

Mediterranean Quarterly 22:1 DOI 10.1215/10474552- 1189656Copyright 2011 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.

Antonis Klapsis is an adjunct lecturer of modern and contemporary history in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Peloponnese.

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and at the same time the government in Athens had to look over its shoulder in order not to be overthrown by a group of unrepentant conspirators.

In this context, the way relations between Greece and the United States were to evolve was of critical importance. Ever since 1947, Washington had played a decisive role in Greek political and economic affairs. Greece and the United States were allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion, and Greece had been for almost three decades heavily dependent on the United States for securing its military capability in order to defend its national integrity. However, this special relationship had received a heavy blow because many Greeks believed that Washington was largely respon-sible for the establishment and the long tenure of the dictatorship from 1967 to 1974. Moreover, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus had created sentiments of great bitterness in Greek public opinion toward the US government, which was blamed by the Greeks for not doing anything to deter the invasion or even favoring a solution of Cyprus’s partition.

From the US point of view, the priority was to avoid the possibility of a Greek- Turkish war. An armed conflict between two neighbors threatened to create serious problems for NATO’s cohesion, thus damaging Washington’s interests in the region. Open hostilities between Greece and Turkey were predicted to have “a serious adverse effect on intra- NATO relationships and on the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” which would weaken NATO’s “posture against Soviet political and military pressures in the area” and possibly “cause a serious breakdown of defenses on the south-eastern flank [of NATO].”1 The US obsession with the cohesion of NATO was reflected in a message addressed by President Richard Nixon to Karaman-lis almost immediately after the latter became prime minister.2 Washington asked Athens not to push things to the limit as far as Greek- Turkish relations were concerned. The US attitude of keeping equal distance between Ath-ens and Ankara caused great disappointment in Greece, where Washington’s stance was thought favorable to the Turkish side.3

1. “The Likelihood of Conflict between Greece and Turkey,” memorandum, Washington, DC, 21 June 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969 – 1976, vol. 30 [hereafter, FRUS] (Wash-ington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2007), doc. 15, 70 – 6.2. Konstantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Events, and Texts, vol. 8 (Athens: Konstantinos G. Karaman-lis Foundation – Ekdotiki Athinon, 1996), 17.3. Ibid., 80.

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Indeed, Turkey’s intransigence led, on 13 August 1974, to the collapse of the Geneva conference concerning a solution of the Cyprus problem. The fol-lowing day Turkish troops launched a second offensive operation, which led to the occupation of approximately 38 percent of the territory of the Repub-lic of Cyprus. As a result, the Greek government immediately announced that Greece was withdrawing from the military structure of NATO, although it continued its participation in the political activities of the alliance.4 This decision reflected Athens’s disappointment concerning the US position toward the Cyprus crisis. On the day of the second Turkish military operation, the ambassador of the United States to Athens, Henry Tasca, visited Karamanlis to transmit a message from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The Greek prime minister replied that US interest had come too late and that the Greek people felt betrayed by the United States.5

This was an uncomfortable situation for the United States, which wished Greece to remain a full member of NATO. Tasca underlined that the Greeks had felt let down by their allies, who had done almost nothing to deter Tur-key from occupying a large part of Cyprus; the United States and NATO had become “the scapegoats for Greek frustration over the Cyprus problem.” Tasca believed that when the dust settled, the Greek government would even-tually realize that US assistance was strategically essential for Greece, as the latter was “a small country surrounded by hostile and potentially hostile forces” and its geographical position meant that it needed powerful friends and allies in order to survive.6 As a result, he also believed that the decision of withdrawal from the military wing of NATO had been taken by the Greek government “without adequate thought to ramifications for Greece’s future security needs.”7

In this context, Tosca was convinced that Athens’s decision to remain in the political branch of the alliance underlined the importance of the secu-rity protection that NATO provided Greece against dangers from the War-saw Pact.8 Tasca also added that there was considerable reason to think that

4. Ibid., 88.5. Ibid., 90.6. Tasca to the Department of State, Athens, 15 August 1974 [hereafter, Tasca], FRUS, doc. 20, 80 – 2.7. Tasca, FRUS, doc. 21, 83 – 6.8. Tasca, FRUS, doc. 20, 80 – 2.

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Greece intended “by its withdrawal action to put pressure on [the] alliance but not to give up the central relationship with the United States.”9 As a result, Tasca suggested that the US government should act decisively in order to maintain its dominant position in Greece:

In the short term we must act promptly along the following lines: A) Dem-onstrate that we are mindful of Greece’s importance to the US and the Western alliance and that we have not “chosen Turkey over Greece,” [and] B) Demonstrate also that we understand Karamanlis’ domestic and per-sonal problems; that we regard him as a friend and want him to succeed in restoring strong and effective parliamentary government.10

Tasca’s analysis was based primarily on an evaluation of Greece’s long- term strategic needs. From that point of view, he was right about Greece’s need of international backing in order to strengthen the security of its north-ern borders. Greece was a neighbor of three potentially hostile communist countries to its north (Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia), despite the fact that only one (Bulgaria) was currently a member of the Warsaw Pact.11 The vulnerability of Greece’s northern border created a permanent fear in Ath-ens and had greatly contributed to Greece’s decision to become a member of NATO in 1952. Nevertheless, Tasca appeared to underestimate the impor-tance and — above all — the depth of anti- American sentiment of a large part of Greek public opinion. These sentiments, which had grown during the years of the dictatorship, had become even stronger after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In this context, Tasca’s prediction that in a short while the Greek government would seek restoration of cordial relations with the United States was extremely optimistic.

The United States feared that Greece’s withdrawal from the NATO military structure might threaten US strategic interests. These implications included, for example, possible obstacles to the use by United States Sixth Fleet vessels of Greek ports, uncertainty about the future of multilateral NATO installa-tions in Greece, and the nonparticipation of Greek armed forces in NATO

9. Tasca, FRUS, doc. 21, 83 – 6.10. Tasca, FRUS, doc. 20, 80.11. Albania had been a founding member of the Warsaw Pact but formally withdrew in 1968.

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12. Tasca, FRUS, doc. 21, 83 – 6. For the implications created by Greece’s withdrawal from NATO, see also “Implications of the Greek Withdrawal from Military Participation in NATO,” intelligence memorandum, Washington, DC, October 1974, FRUS, doc. 26, 97 – 103.13. “Implications of the Greek Withdrawal,” 97 – 103.14. Tasca, FRUS, doc. 20, 80 – 2.15. Central Intelligence Agency, “Athens’ Frustrations with the US and the Prospects for the Greek Left,” Washington, DC, 29 August 1974, FRUS, doc. 22, 86 – 90.16. “Ingersoll to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” Washington, DC, 30 August 1974, FRUS, doc. 23, 90 – 3.

military exercises.12 There was also the possibility that Greek behavior might encourage other NATO members to follow a similar policy, thus creating a centrifugal tendency that could damage the alliance’s cohesion.13 For this reason, the US was deeply concerned about future political conditions in Greece, as these would definitely affect the country’s attitude toward Wash-ington. Thus, it is not surprising that the United States seemed to prefer the domination of Karamanlis and other Western- oriented political leaders (such as Georgios Mavros, for example) and was suspicious toward left- wing politi-cians, including Andreas Papandreou, since they were thought to be capable of doing “everything possible to exacerbate Greece’s relations with the United States and the West.”14

The US believed that Karamanlis did not share the average Greek citi-zen’s views about the extent of US responsibility for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus — one of the key elements underlying widespread anti- Americanism in Greece. Washington recognized that he had decided to withdraw Greece from NATO’s military side in order to placate public opinion and relieve frus-tration, as well as to further increase his own domestic popularity. It was also convinced that if Karamanlis adopted an anti- US attitude and made threats, the situation could get worse. Athens hoped to persuade Washington to influ-ence Ankara to moderate its position over the Cyprus question, and Washing-ton estimated that the Greek government wanted to avoid making irreparable damage to Greece’s relations with the United States and NATO.15 US deputy secretary of state Robert Ingersoll noted, “It will be in our interest to extend as long as possible discussions with Greece on its future NATO role in order to give time for tempers to cool and to avoid prematurely closing doors to Greek participation.”16

Despite the tensions, the United States seemed to believe that if a Cyprus

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settlement that would preserve Greek dignity could be negotiated, and if fur-ther troubles in the Aegean could be avoided, then there was a possibility for improvement in US- Greek relations. On the other hand, if Greece were forced to accept a humiliating settlement over Cyprus or if it did not receive some US backing in the Aegean controversy, the future of US- Greek relations would be jeopardized. Karamanlis would either have to take severe actions toward Washington or he would lose power; in either case, the US presence in Greece would be affected and bilateral relations would certainly worsen.17

At the same time, the United States was aware that Karamanlis was look-ing forward to a closer relationship with Western European countries, as he was motivated by the political and economic benefits of integration into the European Economic Community (EEC). Indeed, as early as 19 August 1974, president of the European Parliament Cornelis Berkouwer visited Athens in order to examine the prospect for reviving Greek relations with the EEC.18 Three days later the Greek government submitted a formal request to the EEC to ask for the immediate reactivation of the 1963 association agreement, which had been frozen during the Greek dictatorship.19 The Greek request

was accepted on 17 September 1974 by the EEC Council of Ministers.20 Moreover, in early September 1974 Georgios Mavros, who was both the vice president and foreign minister of the Greek government, visited France and West Germany, where he had long talks with leaders of the two countries.21 All these initiatives were tangible proof of the intention of Karamanlis to minimize Greece’s dependence on Washington, and Washington seemed to so understand:

Whether or not relations improve with the US, Athens will continue to strengthen its ties with France, Germany and the European Community. Relations with Europe had been frozen in the seven years of military rule, and with the return of a civilian government, a thaw was to be expected. The bad turn in relations with the US made the “European option” even

17. Central Intelligence Agency, 86 – 90. See also “Implications of the Greek Withdrawal,” 97 – 103.18. Karamanlis, 112. See also the daily Greek newspaper Ta Nea, 19 August 1974, 10.19. Karamanlis, 115 – 6.20. Ibid., 158.21. Ibid., 149 – 51.

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more important to Athens as insurance in case relations with the US do not improve significantly. For their part, France, West Germany, and the other EC members hope to reciprocate Greek interest in a closer relationship, both through bilateral and EC channels. The development of the “Euro-pean option” is limited, of course, by the requirement for the EC members to maintain some balance between Greece and Turkey (both EC associate members) and by the level of Greece’s economic development, which pre-cludes immediate full membership in the EC. The extent to which Greece receives support from the European countries, however, will influence, though it would not guarantee, the longer- term survivability of moderate policies in Greece.22

The United States did not oppose the prospect of a closer association between Greece and the EEC. Tasca suggested that Washington should encourage the Greek movement for association and favor anything that would strengthen Athens’s pro- West orientation and exclude the possibility of Greece slipping to the neutral or, even worse, communist camp.23 The pros-pect that openly anti- American, anti- NATO, and neutralist political leaders, mainly Andreas Papandreou, who was described as “more radical than the Communists,” might secure a large number of votes in the elections of 17 November 1974 haunted the Americans. Consequently, they seemed in favor of a clear victory for Karamanlis’s newly founded conservative New Democ-racy party in the election, as they believed that “the chances of Greece re- entering the military side of NATO would be best under a strong Karamanlis government.”24

The main priority for Washington concerning Greece was obviously to keep Athens, if not within the immediate sphere of US influence, at least within the Western world. Thus, the preference toward Karamanlis was dic-tated mainly by strategic reasons. From his perspective, Karamanlis, who was an experienced and — above all — a pragmatic statesman with excel-lent knowledge of the international balance of power, was certainly aware

22. “Principal Conclusions,” intelligence memorandum, Washington, DC, 5 November 1974, FRUS, doc. 28, 105 – 13.23. Tasca, FRUS, doc. 20, 81.24. “Principal Conclusions,” 105 – 13.

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25. Ibid.26. Karamanlis’s New Democracy secured 54.37 percent of the vote and elected 220 (out of 300) members of parliament.27. Karamanlis, 269 – 70.28. Ibid., 275.29. Ibid., 279 – 80.

that in the long term Greece would have to improve its relations with the United States and return to the military structure of NATO. At the peak of anti- American feelings in Greece, caused by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Karamanlis was said to have remarked to a US official that he was “the last pro- American” in Greece.25 It was expected that the United States could play a decisive role in the solution of the Cyprus question by exercising pressure on the Turkish side.

After his impressive victory in the November 1974 elections, Karamanlis and other members of his government had contacts with US officials concern-ing the situation in Cyprus.26 On 11 December 1974, for example, during NATO’s ministerial session in Brussels, Greek foreign minister Dimitrios Bit-sios discussed the Cyprus question with Kissinger.27 Six days later, Karaman-lis received a visit from the new ambassador to Greece, Jack Kubisch, during which they had an extensive discussion on the subject.28 Moreover, Athens’s intention to improve Greek- US relations was reflected in a memo delivered to Kubisch on 4 January 1975 in which the Greek government asked for Ameri-can military and economic assistance.29

Karamanlis, however, was at the same time determined to hold firm con-cerning the issue of US military facilities on Greek soil. After Greece’s with-drawal from the military structure of NATO, this issue was of critical impor-tance for both sides. Athens wanted to limit American privileges, whereas Washington sought to safeguard them in order to preserve their strategic ben-efits. Kubisch accurately put it as follows:

[I]t is our tentative conclusion that the Greeks will seek changes in our operating relationship which are more than cosmetic but less than vital. It is encouraging that the Greek side does not challenge the basic assump-tion that bilateral military cooperation with the US is important for Greece and that, in the wider context of our regional responsibilities, an effec-tive US military role is positive and stabilizing. We believe that assump-

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tion underlies the thinking not only of the Greek negotiating team but of the Greek Govt itself. Without it a true meshing of our interests would be impossible. With it there may still be difficult problems of detail but the eventual conclusion of our negotiations with the Greeks would be satisfac-tory both for us and for them.30

Greek- US talks about the revision of the existing agreements concerning these facilities began in February 1975. From the very early stages, the Greek side defined three broad objectives: (1) to reduce — but not eliminate — the US military profile in Greece; (2) to update, consolidate, and tighten existing bilateral defense arrangements; and (3) to monitor and control more directly US military activities in Greece.31 Given the determination of the Greek side, Washington was prepared to accept some changes on condition that these would not undermine basic US interests. Thus, by the end of April 1975 the two sides had already agreed on the following: (1) home porting of US war-ships in Elefsis would stop; (2) the US military base at Hellenikon would eventually be closed down; (3) an agreement concerning the suppression, limitation, and consolidation of other US facilities in Greece would follow; (4) privileges, immunities, and tax exemption for US personnel in Greece would be revised; and (5) all remaining US facilities in Greece would be placed under the command of Greek officers.32

In early February 1975, Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey on the grounds that US- supplied military equipment had been used illegally during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. That development, despite the fact that it did not derive from an initiative of the executive branch, increased hopes in Greece that US pressure on Turkey concerning Cyprus might lead to some progress on that issue. Things, however, did not go that way as Ankara was not willing to make any concessions and insisted on legalizing the solu-tion that had been imposed by the Turkish invasion.

On 29 May 1975, during a NATO summit in Brussels, Karamanlis and US president Gerald Ford had an opportunity to discuss the two most important

30. Ingersoll to Kissinger, Washington, DC, 13 February 1975, FRUS, doc. 35, 131.31. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] to Presi-dent Ford, Washington, DC, 27 February 1975, FRUS, doc. 35, 133 – 4.32. Karamanlis, 307.

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33. At the time of the invasion, the Turkish portion of the population of Cyprus was estimated at about 18 percent.34. Memorandum of Conversation, Brussels, 29 May 1975, FRUS, doc. 50, 161 – 9; Karamanlis, 413 – 8.35. Memorandum of Conversation, Brussels.

issues that affected Greek- US relations: the Cyprus question and the Greek- Turkish dispute in the Aegean Sea. Karamanlis reaffirmed that he was will-ing to agree to a solution of the Cyprus problem on two conditions: (1) that the territory to be controlled by Turkish Cypriots would be proportional to their share of the total population,33 and (2) that a Cyprus solution would allow for the return of the approximately two hundred thousand Greek- Cypriot refu-gees to their homes. Regarding the Aegean dispute, Karamanlis reminded the United States that Turkey was continually creating problems about the continental shelf and Greek airspace and was questioning fundamental Greek sovereign rights in the region.34

Ford stated that the United States was willing to contribute to a solution for both problems but did not make any concrete proposals that could help in that direction; he seemed interested only in the restoration of US military aid to Turkey. Kissinger, who was present, said that Karamanlis’s request for an analogy between the size of Turkish- Cypriot population and the territory controlled by them was just not realistic. Washington was obviously not will-ing to press Turkey, and Karamanlis was bitterly disappointed. “Instead of asking concessions from the Turks,” he exclaimed, “you seem to be asking why the Greeks won’t pay. . . . This is a case of the two sides having difficulty and the third party giving suggestions to the wrong one.”35

The discussion was obviously at a dead end. Karamanlis underlined that Greece was ready to defend its interests and fight if it had to do so. As for Turkey, in case of a war with Greece the Turks would be the first victims because they would have opened the way to the Soviets. “I may be forced to reconsider the policies of my country,” Karamanlis added, but again the only tangible promise made by Ford and Kissinger was that they would do any-thing to avert war in Cyprus and in the Aegean. In this context, Karamanlis was not willing, as Ford wished, to discuss the possibility of Greece’s imme-diate return to NATO’s military structure, despite the fact that he described himself as the most pro- Western Greek politician.

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We were forced to withdraw from the military part of the Alliance. It gave us no pleasure to do so. There was no other way. We can only change this when the reasons for this action have been removed. The causes must be lifted. If I return to the military part of the Alliance before the problem is solved and we later get into a conflict, what will happen to the Alliance then? First we must restore normality. I have explained the problems. I have not told you how they can be settled, but we hope that you will do your best to help.36

The meeting did not break any new ground. Athens and Washington could not agree, since their views on every issue (Cyprus, Greek- Turkish relations, and Greece’s return to NATO) did not seem compatible. The Greek feeling that the United States followed a pro- Turkish line was quite evident and was only further reinforced by Ford’s unwillingness to press Turkey. This was confirmed during another meeting between Karamanlis and Ford, held on 30 July 1975 in Helsinki. Once again, the US president’s main concern was to find ways to lift the embargo imposed on Turkey by Congress, and, along with Kissinger, he avoided making any specific suggestions about possible solutions to the problems.37

The second meeting between Karamanlis and Ford took place almost exactly one year after restoration of democracy in Greece and provided an opportunity for a full evaluation of US- Greek relations. The fall of the dicta-torship in Greece was accompanied by aggravation of anti- American senti-ments within Greek public opinion. Greeks believed, on the one hand, that the United States was largely responsible for the survival of the dictatorship and, on the other hand, that Washington had done nothing to prevent Tur-key from invading Cyprus. Under this public pressure, Karamanlis had no choice other than to order Greece’s withdrawal from the military structure of NATO, thus causing great apprehension to the United States. The latter wished to safeguard its position in Greece and, most important, its military bases on Greek soil, which were thought of as important for Washington’s strategic needs in the wider region. This aim could best be achieved through

36. Ibid.37. Memorandum of Conversation, Helsinki, 30 July 1975, FRUS, doc. 51, 169 – 78; Karamanlis, 489 – 90.

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an improvement of US- Greek relations. Nevertheless, the US unwillingness to help in solving problems concerning Greek- Turkish relations (mainly the Cyprus question and the dispute over the Aegean Sea) made this rapproche-ment rather difficult, despite the fact that Karamanlis was probably by far the most pro- Western Greek political leader.

Karamanlis wished to secure US assistance, but he was not willing to do so at the expense of Greek national interests. He wished to promote coopera-tion between Athens and Washington, but on the condition that cooperation would be as beneficial for Greece as for the United States. Of course, he realized the disequilibrium of power between Greece and the United States, but he was determined not to become a pawn in US strategy. Karamanlis chose to strengthen ties between Greece and France, West Germany, and the EEC and thus proved his intention to minimize Athens’s dependence on Washington. Greece was in search of alternative ways of solving its security problems, and the prospect of Greece becoming a member of the EEC would help in that regard as well as generating great economic benefits. Neverthe-less, Washington did not oppose the prospect of Greece becoming a member of the EEC, since this development would further secure the commitment of Athens to the Western world, a fact of critical importance for US interests.

Immediately after the collapse of the dictatorship in Greece, both Athens and Washington sought a new balance in their relations. However, this bal-ance was not easy to find, since some of the priorities of the two sides did not match. The United States was, above all else, interested in serving its own geopolitical priorities, and Greek public opinion was still embittered by the US position toward the Greek junta and during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The fact that Washington did not seem prepared to undertake any serious initiative in order to promote a solution of the Cyprus question or to relieve Ankara’s pressures on Athens in the Aegean Sea made things even more complicated.

In the long term, however, US officials proved to be right about at least one thing: Greece was in any case too weak and too exposed from a geopolitical point of view to attempt to break relations fully with the United States. It is evident that Karamanlis was aware of this reality, and as a result he was extremely cautious when dealing with US- Greek relations. In 1974 Greece chose not to withdraw from the political branch of NATO, and in October

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1980 (under the premiership of Georgios Rallis) it rejoined the alliance’s military structure. US- Greek relations never again took the form they had between the end of World War II and the imposition of the dictatorship in Greece. But no matter the political background of the various Greek gov-ernments after 1974 (even when Andreas Papandreou, much feared by the United States, rose to power in October 1981), these relations continued to be extremely important both to Athens and Washington.