U.S. National Security

Strategy

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

VOLUME 7 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 4

DECEMBER 2002

U.S. National Security

StrategyA NEW ERA

“The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and

totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom — and

a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free

enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment

to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic

freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their

future prosperity....

“Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength

and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and

principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a

balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can

choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is

safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists

and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will

extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”

— George W. BushPresident of the United States September 20, 2002

With those words President Bush submitted his National Security Strategy (NSS) to the U.S. CongressSeptember 20th. Each administration is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to submit anannual report to Congress setting out the nation’s comprehensive strategic security objectives. Thetradition began with President Harry S Truman in 1950 with NSC-68, a report that focused on theUnited States and the then-Soviet Union and calling for a doctrine of containment that dominated theensuing Cold War. Each president since then has submitted a similar document to Congress in varyingforms and with varying degrees of specificity.

This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the newly developed Bush NSS through a series ofarticles, commentary, and references from national security experts within the administration, theCongress, and the academic sector.

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice discusses the NSS in broad terms while Deputy Secretaryof State Richard Armitage examines its relationship to alliances and allies; General Richard Myerslooks at the NSS from today’s threat environment; Under Secretary of State Alan P. Larson explains theeconomic security component; and Professors Robert Lieber and Keir Lieber give a thoughtfulanalysis; while Professor Richard Kugler looks at the NSS and the impact of globalization.

U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, a publication of the Office of Political Security in the State Department’sOffice of International Information Programs, is intended to examine and advance an understanding ofcurrent trends in U.S. foreign policy issues for a global audience.

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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A NEW ERA

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4 • DECEMBER 2002

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A NEW ERA

CONTENTS

_ FOCUS

A BALANCE OF POWER THAT FAVORS FREEDOM 5

By Condoleezza RiceAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs

ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND PARTNERS ON EVERY PAGE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 10

By Richard L. ArmitageDeputy Secretary of State

THE U.S. MILITARY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 14

By General Richard B. MyersChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

ECONOMIC PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19

By Alan P. LarsonUnder Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs

_ CONGRESSIONAL FOCUS

SPEAKING TO OUR SILENT ALLIES: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 23

By U.S. Representative Henry J. HydeChairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives

_ REGIONAL FOCUS

AFRICA: A TOP POLICY PRIORITY IN THE NEW BUSH STRATEGY PLAN 28

By James Fisher-ThompsonWashington File Staff Writer, Office of African Affairs Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State

_ COMMENTARY

THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 32

By Keir A. LieberProfessor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, andRobert J. LieberProfessor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

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Editor, U.S. Foreign Policy AgendaPolitical Security — IIP/T/PSU.S. Department of State301 4th Street, S.W.Washington, D.C. 20547United States of AmericaE-mail: ejforpol@pd.state.gov

Please note that this issue of U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA can belocated on the Office of International Information Programs’ International HomePage on the World Wide Web at“http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/ijpe1202.htm”.

Publisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judith S. Siegel

Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael T. Scanlin

Managing Editor. . . . . . . . . . . . Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr.

Associate Editor . . . . . . . . . . . Wayne Hall

Contributing Editors . . . . . . . Brenda Butler

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Dannheisser

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David Denny

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Margaret Kammeyer

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carol Locke

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Margaret A. McKay

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jody Rose Platt

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jacquelyn S. Porth

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jay Richter

Reference Specialists. . . . . . . Sam Anderson

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Camille Lyon

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rebecca Ford Mitchell

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vivian Stahl

Program Assistant . . . . . . . . . Tracy Nelson

Political Security Intern . . . . Jennifer Flahive

Art Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Min Yao

Graphics Assistant . . . . . . . . . Sylvia Scott

Editorial Board . . . . . . . . . . . . James Bullock

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George Clack

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judith S. Siegel

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4 • DECEMBER 2002

A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD 36

By Richard L. KuglerProfessor and Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University

U.S. USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY FORCE: THE HISTORICAL RECORD 41

By Richard F. GrimmettNational Defense Specialist, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, U.S. Congressional Research Service

_ FACT SHEET

OVERVIEW OF AMERICA’S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 44

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

_ A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INTERNET SITES 45

Spotlighting other views and Internet links to resources on related issues

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of theWorld Trade Center were the bookends of along transition period. During that periodthose of us who think about foreign policy for aliving searched for an overarching, explanatorytheory or framework that would describe the newthreats and the proper response to them. Some saidthat nations and their militaries were no longerrelevant, only global markets knitted together by newtechnologies. Others foresaw a future dominated byethnic conflict. And some even thought that in thefuture the primary energies of America’s armedforces would be devoted to managing civil conflictand humanitarian assistance.

It will take years to understand the long-term effectsof September 11th [2001]. But there are certainverities that the tragedy brought home to us in themost vivid way.

Perhaps most fundamentally, 9/11 crystallized ourvulnerability. It also threw into sharp relief thenature of the threats we face today. Today’s threatscome less from massing armies than from small,shadowy bands of terrorists — less from strong statesthan from weak or failed states. And after 9/11, thereis no longer any doubt that today America faces anexistential threat to our security — a threat as greatas any we faced during the Civil War, the so-called“Good War,” or the Cold War.

President Bush’s new National Security Strategyoffers a bold vision for protecting our nation thatcaptures today’s new realities and new opportunities.

It calls on America to use our position of unparalleledstrength and influence to create a balance of powerthat favors freedom. As the president says in thecover letter: we seek to create the “conditions inwhich all nations and all societies can choose forthemselves the rewards and challenges of politicaland economic liberty.”

This strategy has three pillars:

• We will defend the peace by opposing andpreventing violence by terrorists and outlawregimes.

• We will preserve the peace by fostering an era ofgood relations among the world’s great powers.

• And we will extend the peace by seeking to extendthe benefits of freedom and prosperity across theglobe.

Defending our nation from its enemies is the first andfundamental commitment of the federal government.And the United States has a special responsibility tohelp make the world more secure.

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A BALANCE OF POWER THAT FAVORS FREEDOMBy Condoleezza Rice

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

“President Bush’s new National Security Strategy offers a bold vision for protecting ournation that captures today’s new realities and new opportunities,” says National SecurityAdvisor Condoleezza Rice. “It calls on America to use our position of unparalleledstrength and influence to create a balance of power that favors freedom. As the presidentsays in the cover letter: we seek to create the ‘conditions in which all nations and allsocieties can chose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economicliberty’.”

(This article is adapted from the 2002 Wriston Lecture, delivered to the

Manhattan Institute in New York City on October 1, 2002.)

_ F O C U S

In fighting global terror, we will work with coalitionpartners on every continent, using every tool in ourarsenal — from diplomacy and better defenses to lawenforcement, intelligence, cutting off terroristfinancing, and, if needed, military power.

We will break up terror networks, hold to accountnations that harbor terrorists, and confront aggressivetyrants holding or seeking nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons that might be passed to terroristallies. These are different faces of the same evil.Terrorists need a place to plot, train, and organize.Tyrants allied with terrorists can greatly extend thereach of their deadly mischief. Terrorists allied withtyrants can acquire technologies allowing them tomurder on an ever more massive scale. Each threatmagnifies the danger of the other. And the only path to safety is to effectively confront both terroristsand tyrants.

For these reasons, President Bush is committed toconfronting the Iraqi regime, which has defied thejust demands of the world for over a decade. We areon notice. The danger from Saddam Hussein’sarsenal is far more clear than anything we could haveforeseen prior to September 11th. And history willjudge harshly any leader or nation that saw this darkcloud and sat by in complacency or indecision.

The Iraqi regime’s violation of every condition setforth by the U.N. Security Council for the 1991cease-fire fully justifies — legally and morally — theenforcement of those conditions.

It is also true that since 9/11, our nation is properlyfocused as never before on preventing attacks againstus before they happen.

The National Security Strategy does not overturn fivedecades of doctrine and jettison either containment ordeterrence. These strategic concepts can and willcontinue to be employed where appropriate. Butsome threats are so potentially catastrophic — andcan arrive with so little warning, by means that areuntraceable — that they cannot be contained.Extremists who seem to view suicide as a sacramentare unlikely to ever be deterred. And new technologyrequires new thinking about when a threat actuallybecomes “imminent.” So as a matter of common

sense, the United States must be prepared to takeaction, when necessary, before threats have fullymaterialized.

Preemption is not a new concept. There has neverbeen a moral or legal requirement that a country waitto be attacked before it can address existentialthreats. As George Shultz recently wrote, “If there isa rattlesnake in the yard, you don’t wait for it to strikebefore you take action in self-defense.” The UnitedStates has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-defense — from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 tothe crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994.

But this approach must be treated with great caution.The number of cases in which it might be justifiedwill always be small. It does not give a green light —to the United States or any other nation — to act firstwithout exhausting other means, includingdiplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at thebeginning of a long chain of effort. The threat mustbe very grave. And the risks of waiting must faroutweigh the risks of action.

To support all these means of defending the peace,the United States will build and maintain 21stcentury military forces that are beyond challenge.

We will seek to dissuade any potential adversaryfrom pursuing a military build-up in the hope ofsurpassing, or equaling, the power of the UnitedStates and our allies.

Some have criticized this frankness as impolitic. Butsurely clarity is a virtue here. Dissuading militarycompetition can prevent potential conflict and costlyglobal arms races. And the United States invites —indeed, we exhort — our freedom loving allies, suchas those in Europe, to increase their militarycapabilities.

The burden of maintaining a balance of power thatfavors freedom should be shouldered by all nationsthat favor freedom. What none of us should want isthe emergence of a militarily powerful adversary whodoes not share our common values.

Thankfully, this possibility seems more remote todaythan at any point in our lifetimes. We have an

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historic opportunity to break the destructive patternof great power rivalry that has bedeviled the worldsince the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century.Today, the world’s great centers of power are unitedby common interests, common dangers, and —increasingly — common values. The United Stateswill make this a key strategy for preserving the peacefor many decades to come.

There is an old argument between the so-called“realistic” school of foreign affairs and the“idealistic” school. To oversimplify, realistsdownplay the importance of values and the internalstructures of states, emphasizing instead the balanceof power as the key to stability and peace. Idealistsemphasize the primacy of values, such as freedomand democracy and human rights in ensuring that justpolitical order is obtained. As a professor, Irecognize that this debate has won tenure for andsustained the careers of many generations of scholars.As a policymaker, I can tell you that these categoriesobscure reality.

In real life, power and values are married completely.Power matters in the conduct of world affairs. Greatpowers matter a great deal — they have the ability toinfluence the lives of millions and change history.And the values of great powers matter as well. If theSoviet Union had won the Cold War, the world wouldlook very different today — Germany today mightlook like the old German Democratic Republic, orLatin America like Cuba.

Today, there is an increasing awareness — on everycontinent — of a paradigm of progress, founded onpolitical and economic liberty. The United States,our NATO allies, our neighbors in the WesternHemisphere, Japan, and our other friends and alliesin Asia and Africa all share a broad commitment todemocracy, the rule of law, a market-based economy,and open trade.

In addition, since September 11th all the world’sgreat powers see themselves as falling on the sameside of a profound divide between the forces of chaosand order, and they are acting accordingly.

America and Europe have long shared a commitmentto liberty. We also now understand that being the

target of trained killers is a powerful tonic that makesdisputes over other important issues look like thepolicy differences they are, instead of fundamentalclashes of values.

The United States is also cooperating with Indiaacross a range of issues — even as we work closelywith Pakistan.

Russia is an important partner in the war on terrorand is reaching toward a future of greater democracyand economic freedom. As it does so, ourrelationship will continue to broaden and deepen.The passing of the ABM [1972 Anti-BallisticMissile] Treaty and the signing of the Moscow Treatyreducing strategic arms by two-thirds make clear thatthe days of Russian military confrontation with theWest are over.

China and the United States are cooperating on issuesranging from the fight against terror to maintainingstability on the Korean peninsula. And China’stransition continues. Admittedly, in some areas, itsleaders still follow practices that are abhorrent. YetChina’s leaders have said that their main goal is toraise living standards for the Chinese people. Theywill find that reaching that goal in today’s world willdepend more on developing China’s human capitalthan it will on China’s natural resources or territorialpossessions.

And as China’s populace become more educated,more free to think, and more entrepreneurial, webelieve this will inevitably lead to greater politicalfreedom. You cannot expect people to think on thejob, but not at home.

This confluence of common interests andincreasingly common values creates a moment ofenormous opportunities. Instead of repeating thehistoric pattern where great power rivalry exacerbateslocal conflicts, we can use great power cooperation tosolve conflicts, from the Middle East to Kashmir,Congo, and beyond. Great power cooperation alsocreates an opportunity for multilateral institutions —such as the U.N., NATO, and the WTO [World TradeOrganization] — to prove their worth. That’s thechallenge set forth by the president to the U.N.concerning Iraq. And great power cooperation can be

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the basis for moving forward on problems thatrequire multilateral solutions — from terror to theenvironment.

To build a balance of power that favors freedom, wemust also extend the peace by extending the benefitsof liberty and prosperity as broadly as possible. Asthe president has said, we have a responsibility tobuild a world that is not only safer, but better.

The United States will fight poverty, disease, andoppression because it is the right thing to do — andthe smart thing to do. We have seen how poor statescan become weak or even failed states, vulnerable tohijacking by terrorist networks — with potentiallycatastrophic consequences. And in societies wherelegal avenues for political dissent are stifled, thetemptation to speak through violence grows.

We will lead efforts to build a global trading systemthat is growing and more free. Here in our ownhemisphere, for example, we are committed tocompleting a Free Trade Area of the Americas by2005. We are also starting negotiations on a freetrade agreement with the Southern African CustomsUnion. Expanding trade is essential to thedevelopment efforts of poor nations and to theeconomic health of all nations.

We will continue to lead the world in efforts tocombat HIV/AIDS — a pandemic which challengesour humanity and threatens whole societies.

We will seek to bring every nation into an expandingcircle of development. Earlier this year the presidentproposed a 50 percent increase in U.S. developmentassistance. But he also made clear that new moneymeans new terms. The new resources will only beavailable to countries that work to govern justly,invest in the health and education of their people, andencourage economic liberty.

We know from experience that corruption, badpolicies, and bad practices can make aid moneyworse than useless. In such environments, aid propsup bad policy, chasing out investment andperpetuating misery. Good policy, on the other hand,

attracts private capital and expands trade. In a soundpolicy environment, development aid is a catalyst, not a crutch.

At the core of America’s foreign policy is our resolveto stand on the side of men and women in everynation who stand for what the president has called the“non-negotiable demands of human dignity” — freespeech, equal justice, respect for women, religioustolerance, and limits on the power of the state.

These principles are universal — and President Bushhas made them part of the debate in regions wheremany thought that merely to raise them wasimprudent or impossible.

From Cairo and Ramallah to Tehran and Tashkent, thepresident has made clear that values must be a vitalpart of our relationships with other countries. In ourdevelopment aid, our diplomacy, our internationalbroadcasting, and in our educational assistance, theUnited States will promote moderation, tolerance,and human rights. And we look forward to one day standing for these aspirations in a free andunified Iraq.

We reject the condescending view that freedom willnot grow in the soil of the Middle East — or thatMuslims somehow do not share in the desire to befree. The celebrations we saw on the streets of Kabullast year proved otherwise. And in a recent U.N.report, a panel of 30 Arab intellectuals recognizedthat for their nations to fully join in the progress ofour times will require greater political and economicfreedom, the empowerment of women, and better,more modern education.

We do not seek to impose democracy on others, weseek only to help create conditions in which peoplecan claim a freer future for themselves. We recognizeas well that there is no “one size fits all” answer. Ourvision of the future is not one where every personeats Big Macs and drinks Coke — or where everynation has a bicameral legislature with 535 membersand a judiciary that follows the principles of Marburyvs. Madison.

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Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, SouthAfrica, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey show thatfreedom manifests itself differently around the globe— and that new liberties can find an honored placeamidst ancient traditions. In countries such asBahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar, reform isunderway, taking shape according to different localcircumstances. And in Afghanistan this year, atraditional Loya Jirga assembly was the vehicle forcreating the most broadly representative governmentin Afghan history.

Because of our own history, the United States knowswe must be patient — and humble. Change — evenif it is for the better — is often difficult. And

progress is sometimes slow. America has not alwayslived up to our own high standards. When theFounding Fathers said, “We, the people,” they didn’tmean me. Democracy is hard work. And 226 yearslater, we are still practicing each day to get it right.

We have the ability to forge a 21st century that livesup to our hopes and not down to our fears. But onlyif we go about our work with purpose and clarity.Only if we are unwavering in our refusal to live in aworld governed by terror and chaos. Only if we areunwilling to ignore growing dangers from aggressivetyrants and deadly technologies. And only if we arepersistent and patient in exercising our influence inthe service of our ideals, and not just ourselves. _

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U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4 • DECEMBER 2002

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Late last month, as Americans prepared tocelebrate Thanksgiving, the people of SriLanka also had much to be grateful for. OnNovember 25th, the representatives of 22 nations —including the United States — came together in Oslo,Norway, to pledge political and financial support forSri Lanka’s peace process, the best hope in manyyears of bringing an end to two decades of violenceand terror.

That day was a clear reminder that even for a smallnation such as Sri Lanka, resolving conflict takes thesupport of a coalition of international partners. That day also served as a reminder that no countrycan expect to deal effectively with the challenge of terrorism, as well as the conditions that cannurture such violence, without help from othernations and institutions.

Today, at the dawn of the 21st century, the UnitedStates stands alone as a nation of unmatcheddiplomatic, economic, military, and cultural might.As a people, we have greater capacity and capabilityto protect and advance our interests in the world thanat any other time in our history. As a nation, we havegreater responsibility to exercise leadership than atany other time in our history.

Nonetheless, for all of our clout and influence, theUnited States faces some of the same securitychallenges that countries such as Sri Lanka face.

Indeed, no nation can hope to tackle successfully thedecisive challenges of this age alone.

This is a fundamental, underlying principle ofPresident Bush’s National Security Strategy. Beyonddevoting a chapter to the strategic importance ofalliances and partnerships, the document underscoreson nearly every page the necessity of cooperatingwith other nations, institutions, and organizations.International cooperation is an indispensableingredient, whether the strategy is focused onfighting the war against terrorism, sustaining regionalstability, expanding trade and development,maintaining friendly ties to global powers, or dealingwith transnational challenges such as weapons ofmass destruction, infectious disease, andinternational crime.

The U.S. commitment to international cooperationreflects not only pragmatism, but also a principle, onethat runs through our history and our vision of thefuture. As the President’s National Security Strategymakes clear, U.S. foreign policy will serve not justthe American people, but “the cause of humandignity” on every continent. This is an ambitiousagenda, one that will require us not only to prevail inthe war against terrorism, but also to apply thelessons we learn and relationships we build in thiswar to every other challenge we will face in the 21stcentury. As the lead agency in developing andmaintaining international relations now and for the

ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND PARTNERS ON EVERY PAGE:INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGYBy Richard L. ArmitageDeputy Secretary of State

“September 11th was a devastating day in American and world history, but perhaps somegood has come out of those terrible events,” says Deputy Secretary of State Richard L.Armitage. “In a sense, the National Security Strategy reflects a grand global realignmentin which all nations have an opportunity to redefine their priorities. In redefining ourpriorities, we also have an opportunity to focus international partnerships not just onwinning the war against terrorism, but on meeting all transnational challenges to states.”

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future, the Department of State, in particular, isplaying a key role in implementing this vision. Andas the president’s representative in this effort,Secretary of State Colin Powell is taking hisresponsibility for building these relationships andorchestrating the efforts of the Department with theutmost gravity and industry.

A basic responsibility for any government is toprotect the governed. President Bush’s top strategicpriority, therefore, is to protect the American peoplefrom another terrorist attack. As the recent bombingsin Bali and Kenya illustrate, however, terrorism is agrim reality around the world, and a threat to allnations and peoples. Therefore, our response — andthe effect of our policies — must be global. Whilethe United States will always reserve the right to actalone in its own interests, our national security isenhanced when other countries choose to play aconstructive, proactive role in helping the UnitedStates protect itself. Given the global ambitions ofterrorists, national security today is a function of howwell all countries protect each other, not just howwell one country protects itself.

And while coalition warfare is as old as war itself,today’s coalition against terrorism is unprecedentedin scale and in scope. In a monumental diplomaticundertaking, the United States has joined with some180 other nations to counter the threat of terrorismusing all of the tools available to us — intelligence,finance, law enforcement, and military operations.The United Nations set the stage for such acomprehensive coalition by passing Security CouncilResolution 1373, which obligated all nations toactively combat financing, recruitment, transit, safehaven, and other forms of support to terrorists andtheir backers, as well as to cooperate with othernations’ counterterrorism efforts.

America’s global network of alliances andpartnerships, many configured for Cold Warchallenges, quickly adapted to this post September11th security environment. In the immediateaftermath, for example, NATO, ANZUS [Australia,New Zealand, and United States] and theOrganization of American States for the first timeinvoked 50-year-old self-defense mechanisms.Indeed, NATO forces drawn from European nations

flew patrols over American skies in the days andmonths following the attacks. Other multilateralinstitutions changed course to meet pressing needs.The Financial Action Task Force, originallyconstituted to track funds fueling the internationalnarcotics trade, took the lead in the hunt for themoney trails that lead to terrorists. The G-8 nationsmoved to secure global networks of commerce andcommunication, including by stationing customsinspectors in each others’ ports through the ContainerSecurity Initiative. New relationships also came intoplay. For example, U.S. diplomats for the first timenegotiated with the states of Central Asia for accessand overflight rights to American and coalition forces.

This mutually reinforcing mix of ad hoc alliances andmore formal arrangements has led to a sustained andsuccessful campaign over the past 14 months.Coalition military operations have excised al Qaedafrom Afghanistan, destroying its infrastructure andkilling or capturing many of its operatives. The restremain in hiding and on the run. Intelligence-sharingand law enforcement cooperation have led to thearrest or detention of nearly 2,300 suspectedterrorists in 99 nations, and have prevented many,though unfortunately not all, attacks on civiliantargets around the world. More than 160 countrieshave frozen more than $100 million in assetsbelonging to terrorists and their supporters. In eachof these efforts, foreign policy professionals haveplayed a key role in securing the necessaryagreements and actions.

Beyond waging war and building the long-termcapacity to fight terrorism, the current internationalcoalition also has been essential to the liberation ofAfghanistan. Although this effort is partlyhumanitarian, it is also an important securitymeasure. For too long, Afghanistan served as boththe proving grounds and the launching pad forterrorists. Peace and stability for Afghanistan is inthe direct interests not only of the 23 millioninhabitants of that country, but also the neighboringnations who suffered from destabilizing waves ofdrugs, criminals, and refugees from that territory, andall of the nations of the world whose investment inthe rule of law has been put at risk by al Qaeda’sactivities.

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Decades of war have taken an extreme toll onAfghanistan. The country lacks everything from basicinfrastructure to civil society institutions, all of whichwill take considerable resources to restore. Considerthat rebuilding a paved road from Kabul to Herat willcost an estimated $260 million — at least — and thatone project alone will take the concerted resources ofJapan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Today, itwill take a sustained international political andfinancial commitment from the community ofnations, and the hard diplomatic work to get andsustain this commitment, to keep Afghanistan from chaos.

The twin campaigns to defeat terrorism andreconstruct Afghanistan are stretching globalresources and testing international resolve. U.S.leadership — and especially the diplomaticleadership of the Department of State — has beenessential to mobilizing both the resources and theresolve, with far-reaching results. As the NationalSecurity Strategy notes, “in leading the campaignagainst terrorism, we are forging new, productiveinternational relationships and redefining existingones in ways that meet the challenges of the 21stcentury.”

Like terrorism, many of the challenges of the 21stcentury will be transnational in nature, fromproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to theneed to ensure that all nations can benefit from aglobalized economy, to the spread of infectiousdiseases. Even internal unrest will continue to haveregional consequences. These transnational problemswill require transnational solutions, and the currentwar is helping the United States to develop therequisite patterns and habits of cooperation.

Cold War alliances and rivalries, reinterpreted for theage of terrorism, are showing promising signs offlexibility. In particular, as the National SecurityStrategy notes, the United States may have a newopportunity for a future where “main centers ofglobal power” cooperate more and compete less.From Russian President [Vladimir] Putin’s immediateoffer of condolences and support after the 9/11[September 11, 2001] attacks, U.S.-Russiancooperation in the war on terrorism has been path-

breaking in its breadth, depth, and openness. TheUnited States has also forged new relationships withChina, which has provided valuable assistance intracking terrorist finances. In both cases, the overlapin our current efforts is opening new possibilities fordialogue in areas that have traditionally beendifficult, including regional security issues,proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, humanrights concerns, and key trade issues, such asaccession to the World Trade Organization.

Multilateral institutions also are showing signs ofnew growth. Following extensive U.S. diplomaticefforts, the United Nations passed Resolution 1441,for example, taking a tough new stand against thethreat posed by Iraqi possession of chemical,biological, and potentially nuclear weapons. NATO,too, has retooled to meet today’s needs. At the recentsummit in Prague, NATO invited seven Europeannations to join as new members, reaffirmed itscommitment to developing updated militarycapabilities, and emphasized its new and deepeningrelationships with Russia, Central Asia, and otherregions beyond Europe.

The international recognition that underlyingcorrosive conditions — such as repression, poverty,and disease — present a threat to internationalstability is also spurring the growth of newcooperative mechanisms. U.S. leadership is key tothese efforts, as well, but will only truly be effectiveinsofar as it leverages commitments from othernations. HIV/AIDS, for example, presents astaggering public health crisis and ultimately a risk tothe stability of many regions. The United Statesmade the initial and single largest donation to a newGlobal Fund, kicked off by the G-8 [Group of Eightindustrialized nations] and endorsed by the UnitedNations, to prevent the spread and deal with theeffects of the disease. That Fund has now reached atotal of $2.1 billion [$2,100 million]. At the UnitedNations Conference on Financing for Development inMonterrey and other such venues, the United Stateshas helped to forge new approaches to internationalaid, based on principles of accountability, fiscalresponsibility, and good governance. Indeed, the U.S.has established the $5,000 million MillenniumChallenge Account — a 50 percent increase in the

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U.S. commitment to foreign assistance — which willbe dispensed according to these basic tenets.

Ultimately, these habits and patterns of cooperationwill persist because of the dual imperatives ofpragmatism and principle. First, cooperation indealing with transnational challenges is in the self-interest of so many nations, and second, nations havea dedication to certain shared values. Terrorists, forexample, present a clear and direct threat to the ruleof law, to international norms and standards forhuman dignity, and in the end, to the internationalsystem of states itself.

September 11th was a devastating day in Americanand world history, but perhaps some good has comeout of those terrible events. In a sense, the NationalSecurity Strategy reflects a grand global realignmentin which all nations have an opportunity to redefinetheir priorities. In redefining our priorities, we alsohave an opportunity to focus internationalpartnerships not just on winning the war againstterrorism, but on meeting all transnational challengesto states. Every nation in the world — from SriLanka to Afghanistan to America — stands tobenefit. _

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Let’s look back at September, when the nationwas shocked by an extremist’s attack. In theaftermath, the president declared that theextremist struck at the “very heart of the Americanrepublic.” And as happens after events like that, ofcourse Wall Street took a dive. Certainly themotivation for that attack in part came from howothers perceived America and our role in the world.For example, the Philippines was caught up in aconflict between their Muslim and Catholiccommunities. And U.S. forces were there to help.

Now, some may think I am talking about September2001. Actually I was referring to September of 1901.The point is that there are parallels over time.

A hundred years ago, the extremist attack that I wasreferring to was done by an anarchist who hatedAmerica and all it stood for. He took out his wrathby assassinating President William McKinley. Today,of course, we probably wouldn’t call him an anarchist— he’d be an extremist or perhaps a terrorist. It wasalso a hundred years ago that the nation debatedAmerica’s Manifest Destiny, as it brought in newterritories of Wake and Guam and Hawaii and they allcame under the American flag. Of course, theparallel today is the debate over the part the UnitedStates will play in globalization.

In 1901, the U.S. armed forces had to adapt to meetthe new challenges. President Teddy Roosevelt

championed many of the efforts that today we wouldcall transformation. The U.S. Navy was rankedfourth or fifth in the world. In the Atlantic, theGerman Navy had 12 battleships to the U.S.’s eight.And to fix this, Roosevelt built 24 new capital ships.This fleet was called “the Great White Fleet” that setsail in 1907. The Army underwent similar changeswhen they went to the Enfield rifle. They alsopurchased new bayonets because the old ones wouldbend in hand-to-hand combat.

But it’s not the hardware change that makes suchefforts transformational; it is the intellectual andorganizational changes. Roosevelt’s Secretary ofWar, Elihu Root, created the [National] War Collegeat Fort McNair in order to give military officers themental agility to anticipate events in this newinternational environment. He also set up the armystaff, so that the army could have a cadre of planningexperts on hand. This ensured that the army had theflexibility to meet the new challenges of going fromstrictly a U.S.-based force to one that would haveworldwide interests.

My point is that 100 years ago, those involved in ournation’s national security business wrestled withmany of the same, or certainly similar, issues that weface today. Then and now, regional powers canthreaten the nation’s interest in distant conflict. Then,as now, internal strife from religious hatreds, ethnicrivalry, tribal conflicts, can, and often does, lead to

One hundred years ago, those involved in the nation’s national security business wrestled with many of the same, or certainly similar, issues that we face today, saysGeneral Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Then and now, regionalpowers can threaten the nation’s interest in distant conflict. Then, as now, internal strifefrom religious hatreds, ethnic rivalry, tribal conflicts, can, and often does, lead tobloodletting. And then and now, U.S. troops often play a role in the crisis to restore peace.”This article is based on remarks made by General Myers at a recent event at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

THE U.S. MILITARY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF PEACE ANDSECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By General Richard B. MyersChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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bloodletting. And then and now, U.S. troops oftenplay a role in the crisis to restore peace.

But compared to 100 years ago, our 21st centurysecurity environment has, I think, two profoundchanges that makes it different. First is the presenceof transnational actors. They find sanctuary bydesign within the borders of hostile states. Or theyfind sanctuary by default within the borders of failingstates or in ungoverned areas.

The second profound change is that belligerents of alltypes have access to dramatically more sophisticatedtools. It’s probably an outgrowth of our great globaltelecommunications industry that gives hostile statesand terrorists alike access to a treasure ofinformation. The post-Cold War arms markets offerthem many different types of weapons — advancedradars, sophisticated submarines, and so forth.Unfortunately, these markets also include weapons ofmass destruction: chemical, biological, radiological,nuclear, and the know-how to make them and usethem. And this proliferation of advanced technologyaccentuates a trend in warfare that has a potentiallyprofound impact on our security.

Since the time of Thucydides, the premise of conflictbetween nations is that the stronger states coulddefeat the weaker ones. That was the commonwisdom. In the past 200 years, that’s been roughlytrue about 70 percent of the time. But as we saw inVietnam, and the Soviets saw in Afghanistan, greatpowers can fail because there’s a mismatch ininterest. What is a peripheral issue to a powerfulstate may be a core issue of survival to a weakerstate. This disparity of interest, then, can gettranslated into a disparity of commitment. It’s onereason why a weak power can overcome a strongernation’s designs.

And since 1980, one political scientist reports thatthis trend for the weaker to succeed has actuallyincreased as the weaker states have come out on topalmost half of the time in the last 20 years.

And now if you add weapons of mass destruction tothe equation, you have a case where relatively weakactors may have access to lethal power that rivals

what the strongest nations have. Weak actors canpotentially inflict unprecedented devastation on agreat nation. With weapons of mass destruction, theycan hold at risk large portions of societies.

During the Cold War, we faced the threat of nuclearconflict with a superpower, but deterrence containedthat threat because we placed at risk something theadversary held very dear. That was, in essence, theirvery existence. Today, if a weak power is a terroristnetwork with weapons of mass destruction,deterrence won’t work most of the time. Whenthey’re willing to commit suicide to further theiragenda, what do they value that we can place at risk?

This dilemma reflects the unprecedented nature oftoday’s security environment. And to meet these verydaunting challenges, the president recently publisheda new National Security Strategy. In support of that,let me tell you about three broad considerations ofthe military’s role in supporting our new nationalsecurity strategy.

The first consideration is that the United Statesmilitary has got to accomplish a multitude of tasks.We must promote security, of course, to fight and winour nation’s wars. But nothing is more central to ourmission today than to defend this nation here athome. And that’s why we’ve made a series of verysignificant changes to the way the President tells ushow to go about our business. We call that theUnified Command Plan. It’s how the president says,“Here’s what I want your various commands to do.”

One of the central things we’ve done is establish U.S.Northern Command. It stood up on October 1, 2002,so it’s a little over a month old. And to say it knowsexactly where it’s going would be a mistake. It’s gotabout a year before it gets up to what we think wouldbe its full operational capability. We gave it themission to deter, prevent, and defeat aggressionaimed at the United States. And should the necessityarise, from an act of war or an act of God, NorthernCommand will provide the talents and the skills ofour armed forces to assist and, in most cases, besubordinate to civilian authorities for whatever thecrisis of the moment is.

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Key to Northern Command’s effectiveness incarrying out the mission that I described is the flowof information. This applies to not just inside theDepartment of Defense, and not just inside this newNorthern Command, but to all the Federaldepartments and agencies that have something to dowith keeping us safe.

In our new security environment, we know thateverybody has a role — State, Treasury, Justice,Customs, intelligence agencies, the FBI and, I think,all the way down to local law enforcement agenciesand departments.

Recently, I was fortunate enough to see a programthat we’re experimenting with and that we hope tobring to fruition fairly quickly. It’s the project we callProtect America and it sounds simple. It involvesintegrating techniques in a way that has not beendone, at least inside the government. It’s a web-basedcollaborative and interactive tool that offers a lot ofpromise in integrating data from different people andallowing people to interact with that data. It’sstructured in a way that allows hands-off gathering ofdata until it becomes important to you.

These kinds of tools are absolutely essential if we’regoing to come up with the agility and the flexibilityto deal with the terrorist threat that we see today.What they’re going to enable us to do is to thinkfaster than our adversary. And I would submit thatearly on in Afghanistan we were absolutely thinkingfaster than the adversary, and therefore we were verysuccessful. I think you could make an argument nowthat we’re not thinking as fast as we need to think,that we’re not inside the decision loop, if you will, ofthe adversary. We need to speed that up.

Another complex factor is that it’s not just inside theUnited States that this information flow has to workvery well. We’ve all got to be able to interact, at leastin an informational way, certainly, with a commonfoundation, if we’re going to be effective against thisterrorist threat.

I see our new Northern Command as the catalyst tohelp the rest of government develop theseinformation-sharing techniques — from a cop on a

beat somewhere who notices something interestingand unusual going on, to the Coast Guard whichtracks shipping coming into our ports, to individualswho just want to call up and make a report. You’regoing to have to have some way to manage it in orderto avoid completely inundating the law enforcementnetwork, and that’s what I’m suggesting. These aretasks that we’ve got to do today.

At the same time, we’ve got to ensure our military isready for tomorrow. And it’s not something that wecan do tomorrow, it’s something we’ve got to dotoday for tomorrow. So we made some other changesto our Unified Command Plan. We have a commandin Norfolk, Virginia, called Joint Forces Command,and we’ve given them a primary job now oftransforming our military in terms of our exercisesand experimentation. And we removed one of thehats that this command used to have — and that wasthe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, which wasa NATO command. We’ve done it with somecontroversy, but we’ve done it. And the way it willprobably wind up is that that command in Norfolkwill also have a NATO hat that will worktransformation and the interoperability of the UnitedStates and European nations. This is still in theproposal stage, but that’s probably the way it’s goingto work out.

The second consideration is our military’s role in this,the 21st century, and geography. The question youmight ask is: Should the military be focusedregionally or should we focus more globally? Myunequivocal answer is yes. On the one hand, we’vegot to focus regionally because so often that’s wherethe interests are. That’s where we’ve got to maintaina local capability. The regional combatantcommanders — the Pacific Command, the European,the Central Command, the Southern Command —they’re out there to promote stability, to foster goodmilitary cooperation between forces, and to providethat immediate crisis response force — fromhumanitarian up to conflict.

On the other hand, we know that there are certainthreats that transcend regional and political borders.So our response must transcend those borders as well.And that means that we’ve also got to have a global

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capability that’s equal to our regional capability,which we don’t have today in most respects. This issomething that’s going to be evolving.

We did stand up a new U.S. Strategic Command inOmaha. We’ve always had a Strategic Command inOmaha, but what we did is give it a dramatically newmission by closing down what’s known as U.S. SpaceCommand in Colorado Springs and putting the twotogether with a brand-new command. We’re alsolooking at giving the command new missions thatweren’t assigned before.

These missions, I think, reflect the kinds of globalcapabilities that we need, things like missile defense.There is a need to look at such issues as global strike,information operations, and command and control,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on aglobal basis, not just regionally.

Let me explain the missile defense issue to you.Hypothetical situation: A missile is launched fromIraq into Israel. Iraq happens to be in one of ourregional commands called Central Command. Israelhappens to be in European Command. Soimmediately we have two commands involved, andperhaps Strategic Command.

Those kinds of events are inherently multi-commandand more global in nature than they are regional. Soto do the job right, we’ve got to have a globalapproach to how we integrate our missile warning,our command and control, the defensive options thatwe have, and the attack options, for that matter, thatwe have. And we need one commander that looks atthis holistically on a global basis.

So those are a couple of examples that explain whatwe’re talking about in developing a more global viewof the world. And it particularly has applicabilitywhen you think about dealing with terrorists becausethey’re not respecting any boundaries. They go backand forth very, very easily.

The third role is an issue that’s been talked about a lotlately. It’s in the national security strategy, and themilitary has a role. It’s the issue of preemption. At

times, and especially if you pay attention to a lot ofthe articles that have been written, you wonder iffolks have really read the national security strategy.

Because if you do, you’ll realize that the nationalsecurity strategy really describes using allinstruments of national power to prevent an attack. Itdescribes how preemption must include strengtheningour non-proliferation efforts, to use diplomatic andfinancial tools to keep weapons of mass destructiontechnology out of the wrong people’s hands. And ittalks about ensuring our military forces are well-equipped to deal with the weapons of massdestruction environment. It would cause anybelligerent who would want to use weapons of massdestruction to pause to think if they might be able togain their desired effect. It clearly states thatpreemption doesn’t have to include the use ofoffensive military force at all.

I would submit that this concept isn’t really new toAmericans. In fact, it was President FranklinRoosevelt (FDR) who talked about it in the daysbefore Pearl Harbor, before the U.S. was involved inWorld War II. It was during a fireside chat onSeptember 11, 1941, where FDR talked about a Nazisub that had attacked the destroyer USS GREER nearIceland. He told America, “Let us not say: We willonly defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds inhitting home or if the crew and the passengers aredrowned. The time for active defense is now.”

In addition, international law for a long time hasrecognized exactly what FDR described. A nationdoes not need to wait for attack before it acts. InFDR’s time, absorbing the unprovoked torpedo attackcost a couple of hundred lives of sailors and civilians.It certainly was a tragedy. But today absorbing a firstblow of a chemical, or a biological, or a nuclearattack, radiological attack, could cost up to tens ofthousands, perhaps more, of innocent lives. Thatwould be a catastrophe. So the questions we’ve gotto debate are: Can, or should we accept this risk?And in today’s dramatically different era, must a freepeople wait until the threat is physically presentbefore you act? Or can you act if there is some sortof mix of latent potential and demonstrated motive

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that you don’t think you’re going to be able to deter?Having an open discussion about these sorts of thingsis, I think, very, very important and very, veryhealthy.

In my view, any discussion we have in the futurealmost has to include weapons of mass destructionand the dramatic change they’ve brought to oursecurity environment. If terrorists or hostile regionalpowers have them, they can hold at risk our society

and certainly the societies of our friends and allies.

To help counter the threat, our Armed Forces areincreasing our ability to operate in a coherent and ina global manner. We’ve got to have that global viewand put this competency on a par with our regionalcapabilities. And we’ve got to talk about risk — therisk of action and, of course, the risk of inaction, andwhen the U.S. should act in its own defense. _

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The President’s National Security Strategy aimsto “help make the world not just safer butbetter.” And a world that is better will also besafer. National security and global economicprosperity are inexorably linked.

Economic strength and resiliency are the foundationof our national security. The economic dimension ofthe National Security Strategy focuses on threepriorities:

First, we must assure economic security by makingthe U.S. and global economies more resilient toeconomic shocks.

Second, we must advance a global prosperity agendaby expanding trade and investment between nations.

Third, we need to ensure poor nations participatefully in the rising tide of prosperity.

ECONOMIC SECURITY

To ensure our economic security we must focus onfour tasks in the coming years. We must developdiversified and reliable supplies of energy. We mustmake international transportation of people andgoods safe and secure. We must cut off financing forterrorists. We must ensure stability of theinternational financial system and the economicstability of key allies.

Energy Security: The National Security Strategypledges that, “We will strengthen our own energysecurity and the shared prosperity of the globaleconomy by working with our allies, trading partners,and energy producers to expand the sources and typesof global energy supplied, especially in the WesternHemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspianregion. We will also continue to work with ourpartners to develop cleaner and more energy efficienttechnologies.”

We need to secure reliable supplies of energy atreasonable prices in order to foster economic growthand prosperity, and to ensure that oil cannot be usedas a weapon. We must deal with some hard factsabout the international oil markets. Two-thirds ofproven world oil reserves are in the Middle East.Europe and Japan, like the United States, rely onimports to meet a growing portion of oil needs.Aftershocks from global oil supply disruptions willripple through the global economy. Finally, problemstates control significant amounts of oil.

Our energy security requires a robust internationalstrategy and close cooperation with other countries.Working with the International Energy Agency, wehave already established a well-tested approach toprevent sudden disruptions in the oil market fromdamaging the world economy. In the mid- to long-term, we must continue to increase and diversifyproduction of energy in the United States and in

ECONOMIC PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

By Alan P. LarsonUnder Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs

“The National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of strengthening our economicsecurity, expanding trade and investment, and promoting economic development,” saysUnder Secretary of State Alan P. Larson. “We are working to achieve these goals throughdiplomacy and by sharing the experience of our own development, based on our politicaland economic freedoms. Success in achieving these economic policy goals is a core part of our National Security Strategy.”

reliable producing countries. As part of this effort,we are undertaking to improve the climate for oilsector investment in many countries, and are activelyhelping to improve the infrastructure necessary togain access to relatively new suppliers, such as thosein the Caspian and Central Asian region.

Transport Security: Safe air travel, maritimetransport and secure borders are critical to oureconomic security and prosperity. We are workingdiligently with foreign governments and internationalorganizations to ensure the safe flow of goods andpeople across our borders. Working with theInternational Civil Aviation Organization, we aredeveloping and implementing an even more robustairport security audit program. We are strengtheningcockpit doors on aircraft as quickly as possible.Tougher visa and travel industry personnelidentification procedures are being put in place.

We also must ensure that terrorists cannotsurreptitiously transport either hazardous materials orthemselves across our sea or land borders. We havepartnered with countries around the world toimplement the Container Security Initiative and otheraspects of the G-8 (Group of Eight industrializednations) Cooperative Action on Transport Securityand the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)forum’s Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR)initiative. These steps will ensure we can screen thecontents of containers coming into the United Statesto detect possible hazardous materials, weapons ofmass destruction, and the terrorists who might usethem against us. We must also support efforts to helpthe International Maritime Organization implementshipping and port facility standards around the world.

Terrorism Finance: Terrorists receive supportthrough networks of financial backers andintermediaries. They raise money to support theiroperations through means such as common criminalactivity, including fraud, extortion, kidnapping andcorrupt trade. They also use front companies, skimprofits off legitimate businesses, and abuse charitiesand non-profit organizations. They transfer fundsthrough formal and informal financial systems, andthrough the smuggling of cash, precious metals, orgems. This exploitation of international financialnetworks and charitable organizations threatens

public safety and undermines the viability oflegitimate institutions. The international communitymust have a unified global strategy for denyingterrorists access to the financial means to commitatrocities, and for using the financial trail to locateand disrupt terrorist cells.

The United States is leading international efforts,based on international norms developed by theUnited Nations and the Financial Action Task Force(FATF), to create counter-terrorist financing regimesthat identify and freeze terrorist assets, promoteaccountability and transparency in financialtransactions, deny terrorists access to formal andinformal financial systems, and prevent abuse ofcharitable fundraising mechanisms. Together withour allies, we will provide necessary technicalassistance to countries engaged in the front-line ofthe struggle to disrupt terrorist financing.

Financial Stability of Key Allies: In the war againstterrorism, we worked to secure the support of nationsaround the world. It is in our interest to make surethat those nations engaged in the front-line of thiswar are not threatened by economic and financialinstability. We provide necessary support to thesefront-line states by working actively with othercountries, the International Financial Institutions(IFIs) and the private sector to prevent financialcrises and to more effectively resolve them when they occur. Promoting regional trade will also playan important role in fostering economic growthamong key front-line states, including Afghanistanand Pakistan.

We address financial disruptions (notably in LatinAmerica) that threaten the economic stability ofemerging markets. We work with the IFIs to provideadvice and support to countries that are trying topursue sound macroeconomic policies, providegreater transparency, adopt prudential standards, andkeep debt levels manageable and inflation low.

AN OPEN MARKET AGENDA FORPROSPERITY

The President has outlined a plan for igniting a newera of global economic growth through free marketsand free trade. The National Security Strategy notes

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that “A strong world economy enhances our nationalsecurity by advancing prosperity and freedom in therest of the world.”

Nations who would stand with us to address threatsfrom terrorism and rogue states need strongeconomic growth and stability to be able to supportour common efforts and values. The United Statescan strengthen this global coalition by promotingeconomic growth at home and in other developednations, promoting the economic development of thepoorer countries, and setting an open market agendafor prosperity.

To achieve this, we work with our major tradingpartners to spur growth and opportunity worldwide.We begin by solidifying the economic gains madeunder the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) with our closest neighbors, Mexico andCanada. One immediate consequence of stricterglobal security requirements was a temporaryslowdown in the delivery of intermediate goodsacross the borders with our NAFTA partners. TheUnited States developed smart border action planswith both Canada and Mexico, which will providegreater security while facilitating trade between thethree NAFTA countries.

Europe and Japan are vital trade and investmentpartners. They are our staunch allies in the waragainst terror — and know that their own security isat stake. Concerted efforts by the United States, theEuropean Union (EU) and Japan are imperative inimplementing the new World Trade Organization(WTO) Doha Development Agenda, which will addbillions in new opportunities and help anchor trust inmarkets and in integration, and lead the worldeconomy towards stability. Japan is mired ineconomic malaise and Europe is growing beneath itspotential. The United States and the world needJapan and Europe to be strong and healthy. We aresupporting Japan’s efforts to reform its critically illbanking sector so it will be able to fully exercise itspotential for economic leadership and growth.

The economic aspects of our critical strategicrelationships are becoming ever more important.Measures to expand trade and investment are now

central to those relationships. China has become amember of the WTO. Russia is pursuing WTOmembership. We are working closely to encouragegreater private investment in that country.

The United States has developed a comprehensivestrategy to promote free trade. In addition to ourmultilateral efforts in the WTO, we are moving aheadwith regional and bilateral trade initiatives. We beginwith a firm base of our success in the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement. A Free Trade Areaof the Americas is our next goal. Building on oursuccessful bilateral free trade agreement with Jordan,we will work to complete agreements with Chile,Singapore, Australia, the Southern Africa CustomsUnion, and others.

EXPANDING THE CIRCLE OFDEVELOPMENT

Last March (2002) in Monterrey, Mexico, thePresident said, “The advance of development is acentral commitment of American foreign policy. As anation founded on the dignity and value of every life,America’s heart breaks because of the suffering andsenseless death we see in our world. We work forprosperity and opportunity because they’re right. It’sthe right thing to do. We also work for prosperity andopportunity because they help defeat terror.”

He added, “Poverty doesn’t cause terrorism. Beingpoor doesn’t make you a murderer. Most of theplotters of September 11th were raised in comfort.Yet persistent poverty and oppression can lead tohopelessness and despair. And when governmentsfail to meet the most basic needs of their people,these failed states can become havens for terror.”

The international community acknowledged earlierthis year in Monterrey at the Conference onFinancing for Development that developing countrieshave primary responsibility for their owndevelopment, but that we must be their partners in success. That success requires that all theresources for development be unlocked and usedwell, including domestic savings, public sectorresources, trade and investment, and human talentand innovation.

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Productive investment is essential for development.Foreign and domestic private capital far outweighofficial development assistance as a source fordevelopment investment. Capital is a coward,however. It flees from corruption, bad policies,conflict, and unpredictability. It shuns ignorance,disease, and illiteracy. Capital goes only where it iswelcomed and where investors can feel confident of areturn on the resources they risk. To help create thissecure investment environment, we must encourageother nations to live by the rule of law, follow soundeconomic policies, fight corruption with transparencyand accountability, and invest wisely in their people.

Official development assistance can also play animportant role in helping countries on the road toeconomic prosperity and political stability. At theMonterrey Conference on Financing forDevelopment, President Bush unveiled hisMillennium Challenge Account Initiative (MCA)which will increase our assistance to poor nationsover the next three years to a new level — some 50percent higher than it is today. The $5,000 million innew money will go every year to accelerate lastingprogress in developing nations that govern justly,invest in their people, and promote economicfreedom and enterprise. The MCA is an investmentin our collective future. It will promote partnershipwith countries taking the often hard steps to realdevelopment, which includes promoting freedom andopportunity for their own people. It promotes sharedefforts, shared values, and shared successes. Thefriendship and better lives of those it helps is ourreturn on investment.

The United States can lead but cannot spur lastingdevelopment alone. We must work actively with thedeveloping countries themselves, with other donorsand with the IFIs to ensure a global effort to raise

living standards in the poorest regions of the world.We must hold developing countries accountable inpartnership for working to ensure that their people’slives actually improve. We must hold ourselvesaccountable for providing effective help for thosecommitted to development. We will continue toencourage the multilateral development banks tofocus on increasing economic productivity indeveloping countries. We need measurable resultsfrom programs that improve agriculture, watertreatment and distribution, education, health, the ruleof law, and private sector development. The supportfor development assistance to the very poorest shouldbe in the form of grants instead of loans.

Opening markets worldwide will also speeddevelopment for those countries making sounddevelopment efforts, including efforts to seize tradeopportunities. Increasing the trade in both goods andservices between developing countries whereenormous unmet opportunity exists, as well as withother nations, will accelerate development andprovide a foundation for a more secure and stableglobal economy. The expansion of beneficial tradeinvolving developing countries has been a majordriver behind unprecedented progress on reducingpoverty in recent decades.

CONCLUSION

The National Security Strategy recognizes theimportance of strengthening our economic security,expanding trade and investment, and promotingeconomic development. We are working to achievethese goals through diplomacy and by sharing theexperience of our own development, based on ourpolitical and economic freedoms. Success inachieving these economic policy goals is a core partof our National Security Strategy. _

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The newly revised National Security Strategyissued by the Bush Administration eloquentlylays out a comprehensive agenda to guide U.S.foreign policy through the next decade and beyond.By linking together our fundamental principles, ourlong-term goals, and the challenges we will confrontin the new century, this document provides an excellentand concise guide to thinking strategically about howthe United States can best employ its resourcestoward promoting its interests around the world.

Of necessity, a study of such sweeping scope candevote only a limited discussion to each of its manysubjects, inevitably prompting calls for moreattention to be given to one facet or another. Eachreader will have his other favorite to champion. Onethat I believe deserves much greater emphasis in ourforeign policy decision-making is the role of publicdiplomacy.

The updated National Security Strategy proceedsfrom an understanding that the power of the UnitedStates is immense and unprecedented, but it alsowisely notes that we cannot achieve all of our goalsby acting alone. We must have allies to help shoulderthe tasks, especially if we are to render ouraccomplishments secure.

There are many countries whose interests mayintersect with ours over a sufficiently broad range ofsubjects and time to merit the term “ally,” but Ibelieve that our most powerful and most enduringallies are to be found among the peoples of the world.

And public diplomacy is the most effectiveinstrument we possess for engaging them.

Public diplomacy — the collective name given toefforts by the U.S. government to explain its foreignpolicy to the world and encourage greater familiaritywith the United States by the populations of othercountries — embraces international broadcasting,exchange programs, and a range of public informationservices, along with many other programs andfunctions by a surprisingly large number of agencies.But in addition to this essentially passive approach,there is an additional capacity and a larger purposewhich have never been fully recognized, namely theuse of public diplomacy to speak directly to thepeoples of the world and enlist them in our long-termefforts to promote freedom, prosperity, and stabilitythroughout the world.

If we are to achieve this ambitious goal, we mustbegin by reversing the long neglect that hasconsigned public diplomacy to the periphery of ourforeign policy decision-making. Our initial focusmust be on stripping away the encumbrance ofmisunderstanding and disinformation that has beenallowed to distort the image of the United Statesabroad, distortions that now seriously threaten ourinfluence and security. Only then can we begin to laythe foundation for a deep and lasting connection withthe peoples of the world that is complementary to,but separate from, our relationships with theirgovernments. The necessary elements for thishistoric task are already in hand.

SPEAKING TO OUR SILENT ALLIES: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By U.S. Representative Henry J. HydeChairman, Committee on International Relations,

U.S. House of Representatives

“The updated National Security Strategy proceeds from an understanding that the power of the United States is immense and unprecedented, but it also wisely notes that wecannot achieve all of our goals by acting alone,” says U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde,chairman of the House International Relations Committee. “We must have allies to help shoulder the tasks, especially if we are to render our accomplishments secure.”

_ C O N G R E S S I O N A L F O C U S

Let me explain that task and the rewards that await usif we accomplish it.

As Americans, we are justly proud of our country. Ifany nation has been a greater force for good in thelong and tormented history of this world, I amunaware of it. We have guarded whole continentsfrom conquest, showered aid on distant lands, sentthousands of youthful idealists to remote and ofteninhospitable areas to help the world’s forgotten.

Why, then, when we read or listen to descriptions ofAmerica in the foreign press, do we so often seem tobe entering a fantasyland of hatred? Much of thepopular press overseas, often including thegovernment-owned media, daily depict the UnitedStates as a force for evil, accusing this country of anendless number of malevolent plots against the world.Even as we strike against the network of terroristswho masterminded the murder of thousands ofAmericans, our actions are widely depicted in theMuslim world as a war against Islam. Our efforts,however imperfect, to bring peace to the Middle Eastspark riots that threaten governments that dare tocooperate with us.

How has this state of affairs come about? How is itthat the country that invented Hollywood andMadison Avenue has allowed such a destructive andparodied image of itself to become the intellectualcoin of the realm overseas? Over the years, theimages of mindless hatred directed at us have becomefamiliar fixtures on our television screens.

All this time, we have heard calls that “somethingmust be done.” But, clearly, whatever has been donehas not been enough.

I believe that the problem is too great and tooentrenched to be solved by tweaking an agency hereor reshuffling a program there. If a strategy is notworking, we should not insist on more of the same.Instead, we must begin by rethinking our entireapproach.

It is increasingly clear that much of the problem liesin our ineffective and often antiquated methods. Forexample, broadcasts on short-wave radio simplycannot compete with AM and FM channels in terms

of accessibility, to say nothing of television, the mostpowerful medium of all. Shifting our efforts intothese and other broad-based media, including theInternet and others, will take time and money, butthis reorientation is a prerequisite to reaching ourintended audience.

But there is a deeper problem. According to manyobservers, we have largely refused to participate inthe contest for public opinion and thereby allowedour enemies’ slanders to go unchallenged. The effortto avoid controversy has come at the cost of potentialpersuasion and of much of the reason to listen to us at all.

The results are sobering. In testimony last yearbefore the House International Relations Committee,the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors,which oversees our international broadcasting efforts,stated that “we have virtually no youthful audienceunder the age of 25 in the Arab world.”

We have several tasks, then. We must develop boththe means of reaching a broader audience and alsothe compelling content that will persuade them totune in. These objectives will not be easy toaccomplish, especially in an increasingly competitivemedia environment, but they are prerequisite to ourhaving an opportunity to present our case in clear andpersuasive terms. Our work does not stop there, forwe must make our case not once but over and overagain and be prepared to do so for decades to come.

It is for that reason that I introduced legislation aimedat accomplishing these and other goals, legislationwhich I am proud to say has enjoyed broad bipartisansupport and which the House passed unanimouslylast July. Unfortunately, we were not able to persuadethe Senate of the merits of this legislation before bothhouses adjourned, but we shall take it up again in the108th Congress.

This bill, H.R. 3969, is divided into three sections.The first reshapes and refocuses the StateDepartment’s public diplomacy programs, includingspecifying a series of objectives to be attained andrequiring an annual plan be formulated to determinehow these are to be implemented. Far greaterprominence will be given to public diplomacy

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throughout all of the Department’s activities, andgreater resources will be made available to ensurethat these new responsibilities can be met.

The second section establishes a series of exchangeprograms focused on the Muslim world. Our purposehere is to lay the foundation for long-term change ina part of the world to which we have given far toolittle attention. As we respond to the immediateproblems before us, we must remember that the taskwe face has no obvious endpoint.

The third section of the bill reorganizes ourinternational broadcasting services in order toprepare them for far-reaching and innovative reforms.Given the importance of broadcasting to our largerpurpose, we cannot afford to be constrained by howwe have always done things. New approaches andenhanced resources will be central to any prospect ofwinning an expanded audience, and this bill is but thefirst step in that direction. To this end, the House hasauthorized $135 million to launch an ambitious effortinto television broadcasting.

Let me now turn to what I believe should be thelarger purpose of our public diplomacy efforts. Tosome, that purpose is self-evident: to provideobjective news and information, to convey anaccurate and positive image of America, and topresent and explain U.S. foreign policy.

Unquestionably, these are essential functions. If wedo them well, they will comprise an indispensablevoice of clarity regarding our foreign policy, oneotherwise absent from the world’s airways.

However, I believe that public diplomacy’s potentialis even greater. To understand that, we must firstunderstand that half of our foreign policy is missing.

Let me explain.

As the most powerful actor in the internationalsystem, the United States conducts the world’s onlyglobal foreign policy, one that dwarfs in extent andresources that of any other country. Its range extendsacross the entire spectrum, from the political andmilitary to the economic and cultural, and centers onan elaborate array of relationships with virtually

every sovereign government, from Russia to VaticanCity, with scores of international organizationsrounding out the total.

Nevertheless, for some years now, scholars havetalked about the emergence in world politics of whatthey call “non-state actors.” While the nation-stateremains the primary “actor” on the world stage, it isno longer the only one — and in certain instances,what nation-states do and don’t do is heavilyconditioned by what those non-state actors do anddon’t do.

Poland’s Solidarity movement in the 1980’s is apowerful example of a “non-state actor” which had adramatic and positive impact on the course of events.I needn’t remind you that al Qaeda has demonstrateda contrary ability to sow destruction.

Thus, it should be obvious to all that the dynamics ofworld politics are no longer determined by foreignpolicy professionals only. As important as they are,what they think and do is conditioned by what ishappening in the hearts and minds of almost 7,000million human beings on a shrinking globe in an ageof almost instantaneous information. That is whypublic diplomacy — the effort to persuade thosehearts and minds of the truth about our purposes inthe world — must be a crucial part of our foreignpolicy effort.

My point is this: Our focus on our relations withforeign governments and international organizationshas led us to overlook a set of powerful allies: thepeoples of the world.

Uniquely among the world’s powers, a dense networkconnects the United States with the populations ofvirtually every country on the planet, a network thatis independent of any formal state-to-stateinteraction. On one level, this is not surprising: asthe preeminent political, military, and economicpower, the presence of the United States is a dailyfact of life in most areas of the globe. America’scultural impact is even broader, penetrating to themost forbiddingly remote areas of the world, with arange continually expanded by the boundless reach ofelectronic media.

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But there is an even deeper connection, a bond thatderives from the universal values America represents.More than a simple wish list of desirable freedoms, attheir core is the belief that these values have universalapplication, that they are inherent in individuals andpeoples by right of their humanity and not by thegrace of the powerful and the unelected. Theyprovide hope even for those populations which havenever experienced hope.

The advancement of freedom has been a prominentcomponent of American foreign policy since thiscountry’s inception. Given the nature of theAmerican people, it is certain to remain so. But inaddition to genuine altruism, our promotion offreedom can have another purpose, namely as anelement in the United States’ geopolitical strategy.

Despite the laments and exasperations of thepractitioners of Realpolitik regarding what they seeas our simplistic and naive images of the world, wehaven’t done so badly. That virtually the entirecontinent of Europe is free and secure today is largelydue to America’s powerful and beneficent embrace,one that stretches from the landings in Normandy tothe present day.

The history of the last century taught us many lessons,one of the most important being that the desire forfreedom we share with others can be a remarkablypowerful weapon for undermining geopoliticalthreats. The prime example is the Soviet Union.

Decades of enormous effort on the part of the UnitedStates and the West aimed at containing andundermining the threat posed by the Soviet empireenjoyed considerable success. But it was only withthe advent of democracy in Russia and the othernations of the Soviet prison house that the communistregime was finally destroyed and with it the menaceit posed to us and to the world as a whole. Thisshould be a deep lesson for us, but it is one thatcuriously remains unlearned.

Candidates for the application of this lesson comereadily to mind: the list of countries posing threats tothe United States, such as Iraq, Iran, and NorthKorea, contains no democracies. All are repressive,all maintain their rule by coercion. Given the closed

nature of these regimes, the conventional toolsavailable to the United States to affect the behavior ofthese and other regimes can seem frustratinglylimited, often amounting to little more than a mix ofsanctions, condemnation, and diplomatic isolation.Despite great effort on our part, each of theseregimes continues its course toward the acquisition ofweapons of mass destruction, holding out thefrightening prospect of a vast increase in their abilityto do harm to the United States and its interests.

In our deliberations regarding our policy toward theseand other challenges to U.S. interests, we shouldremember that the fate of the Soviet empire providesan instructive example of how peaceful change canbe encouraged by those outside.

To secure its rule, the Soviet regime trained its vastpowers on all who would dissent, dividing andisolating the population —and even sending in thetanks when necessary — in an effort to deny hope toany challengers. But the West was able to providehope anyway, with the role of two individuals beingespecially important.

The first was the election of Pope John Paul II. Hisinitial message to his countrymen in Poland toldthem: “Be not afraid.” From that beginning, a massmovement took shape, Solidarity w