US Dependence on Strategic Nuclear

Weapons

Does shifting to “zero” make sense?

Keith Hansen

June 15, 2012

IntroductionIntroduction

Context – challenge facing Washington policymakers

Request – cover basics and key issues

Proposal – two-part presentation

Context – challenge facing Washington policymakers

Request – cover basics and key issues

Proposal – two-part presentation

Outline of TopicsPart 1

Outline of TopicsPart 1

Key nuclear weapon issues

History of US dependence on nuclear weapons

Development of US strategic nuclear arsenal

Efforts to reduce arsenal

Cost of maintaining & modernizing arsenal

Key nuclear weapon issues

History of US dependence on nuclear weapons

Development of US strategic nuclear arsenal

Efforts to reduce arsenal

Cost of maintaining & modernizing arsenal

Outline of TopicsPart 2

Outline of TopicsPart 2

Challenges of maintaining & modernizing nuclear arsenal

Determining size and mix of nuclear weapon systems

Differences over current role & utility of nuclear weapons

Is going to “zero” feasible and desirable?

Challenges of maintaining & modernizing nuclear arsenal

Determining size and mix of nuclear weapon systems

Differences over current role & utility of nuclear weapons

Is going to “zero” feasible and desirable?

Terminology & ConceptsTerminology & Concepts

Strategic delivery vehicles: Bombers, ICBMs, & SLBMs/SSBNs (triad) Bombs & warheads

MIRVs

Strategic vs. tactical weapons

Offensive vs. defensive weapons

Weapon systems

Strategic delivery vehicles: Bombers, ICBMs, & SLBMs/SSBNs (triad) Bombs & warheads

MIRVs

Strategic vs. tactical weapons

Offensive vs. defensive weapons

Weapon systems

Key Issues Part 1

Key Issues Part 1

Why did the US develop its strategic nuclear arsenal?

How did the US arsenal develop?

Bureaucratic competition between services (Air Force vs. Navy)

How has technology affected size, composition & effectiveness?

Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal

Why did the US develop its strategic nuclear arsenal?

How did the US arsenal develop?

Bureaucratic competition between services (Air Force vs. Navy)

How has technology affected size, composition & effectiveness?

Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal

Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?

Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?

What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?

Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs?

Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?

Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?

What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?

Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs?

Key IssuesPart 2

Key IssuesPart 2

History of US dependence on nuclear weapons

History of US dependence on nuclear weapons

WWII: German threat & ending the war vs. Japan

Cold War: deterring Soviet aggression & ensuring stability

Strategic weapons vs. intercontinental threat

Tactical weapons vs. theater/regional threat

WWII: German threat & ending the war vs. Japan

Cold War: deterring Soviet aggression & ensuring stability

Strategic weapons vs. intercontinental threat

Tactical weapons vs. theater/regional threat

Development of US Strategic Nuclear Arsenal

1945-1991

Development of US Strategic Nuclear Arsenal

1945-1991

A few bombs to thousands of bombs & warheads

Multiple types of delivery vehicles: Bombers – IRBMs – ICBMs – SLBMs - Cruise

missiles

Advances in technology: Range, solid fuel, miniaturization, MIRVing &

accuracy

A few bombs to thousands of bombs & warheads

Multiple types of delivery vehicles: Bombers – IRBMs – ICBMs – SLBMs - Cruise

missiles

Advances in technology: Range, solid fuel, miniaturization, MIRVing &

accuracy

Cold War Strategic Nuclear Force Structure

(~10,000 operational bombs/warheads)

Cold War Strategic Nuclear Force Structure

(~10,000 operational bombs/warheads)

Bombers – B-52s, B-1s & B-2s

IRBMs – Jupiter & Pershing IIs

ICBMs – Titan IIs, MM IIIs, & Peacekeepers

SLBMs – Poseidon, Ohio SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles

Cruise missiles – ALCMs, SLCMs & GLCMs

Bombers – B-52s, B-1s & B-2s

IRBMs – Jupiter & Pershing IIs

ICBMs – Titan IIs, MM IIIs, & Peacekeepers

SLBMs – Poseidon, Ohio SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles

Cruise missiles – ALCMs, SLCMs & GLCMs

Efforts to Reduce Strategic Nuclear Arsenal

Efforts to Reduce Strategic Nuclear Arsenal

SALT II (1979) - capped growth (~10,000 bombs/whds)

INF (1987) – eliminated all IRBMs & GLCMs

START (1991) - reduced bombs/whds to 6,000

SORT (2002) - reduced bombs/whds to ~3,500

New START (2010) - reducing bombs/whds to ~1,550 (by 2018)

SALT II (1979) - capped growth (~10,000 bombs/whds)

INF (1987) – eliminated all IRBMs & GLCMs

START (1991) - reduced bombs/whds to 6,000

SORT (2002) - reduced bombs/whds to ~3,500

New START (2010) - reducing bombs/whds to ~1,550 (by 2018)

Today’s Strategic Nuclear Force Structure

Today’s Strategic Nuclear Force Structure

Smaller (heading to 1,550 bombs/whds)

Bombers – B-52s & B-2s (bombs & ALCMs)

ICBMs – MM IIIs

SLBMs – Ohio class SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles & SLCMs

Smaller (heading to 1,550 bombs/whds)

Bombers – B-52s & B-2s (bombs & ALCMs)

ICBMs – MM IIIs

SLBMs – Ohio class SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles & SLCMs

Cost of Maintaining & Modernizing Arsenal

Cost of Maintaining & Modernizing Arsenal

Delivery vehicles, bombs & warheads

Dismantling, refurbishing, or converting

Some upgrades & replacements are needed

Military installations & industrial base

Ensuring safety & reliability

Delivery vehicles, bombs & warheads

Dismantling, refurbishing, or converting

Some upgrades & replacements are needed

Military installations & industrial base

Ensuring safety & reliability

Who is involved?Who is involved?

Department of Defense – OSD, USAF & Navy

Department of Energy – various labs & Nevada test site

Industry

Congress

Department of Defense – OSD, USAF & Navy

Department of Energy – various labs & Nevada test site

Industry

Congress

Conclusion - Part 1Conclusion - Part 1

Questions & Comments? Questions & Comments?

Review of Part 1Review of Part 1

History of strategic nuclear arsenal

Build up & build down

Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal

History of strategic nuclear arsenal

Build up & build down

Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal

Key IssuesPart 2

Key IssuesPart 2

Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?

Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?

What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?

Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs?

Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?

Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?

What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?

Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs?

What should be the size of our strategic nuclear arsenal?

Should we go to “zero”??

What should be the size of our strategic nuclear arsenal?

Should we go to “zero”??

Those (e.g. Shultz & Nunn) who argue for “zero” say:

Not useful vs. today’s threats Save money; will never be used US needs to lead global nuclear

disarmament Will help stop proliferation

Others argue for caution

Those (e.g. Shultz & Nunn) who argue for “zero” say:

Not useful vs. today’s threats Save money; will never be used US needs to lead global nuclear

disarmament Will help stop proliferation

Others argue for caution

STRATCOM & Global Strike Command

2012

STRATCOM & Global Strike Command

2012

Future reductions (beyond New START) depend on a new Nuclear Posture Review, negotiations with Russia, and our national strategy in the next decade.

US can reduce further and manage the risk by properly managing the arsenal and discussing the right size.

Future reductions (beyond New START) depend on a new Nuclear Posture Review, negotiations with Russia, and our national strategy in the next decade.

US can reduce further and manage the risk by properly managing the arsenal and discussing the right size.

Kissinger & Scowcroft2012

Kissinger & Scowcroft2012

Goal is strategic stability & prevention of use

Lower numbers should be the result, not other way around!

Lower numbers do not guarantee stability! Mix is critical.

Verification of reduced numbers is essential to stability!

Not just a US and Russian issue; requires all nuclear powers.

Goal is strategic stability & prevention of use

Lower numbers should be the result, not other way around!

Lower numbers do not guarantee stability! Mix is critical.

Verification of reduced numbers is essential to stability!

Not just a US and Russian issue; requires all nuclear powers.

Rand Study2012

Rand Study2012

Nuclear weapons are playing an increasing role in China

Russia also gives priority to its nuclear arsenal because of China and NATO

In many parts of the world, nuclear weapons are not seen as old fashioned.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been ineffective in preventing proliferation violations (e.g. Iran, North Korea & Syria)

Strategic surprise and nuclear blackmail are real threats

Nuclear weapons are playing an increasing role in China

Russia also gives priority to its nuclear arsenal because of China and NATO

In many parts of the world, nuclear weapons are not seen as old fashioned.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been ineffective in preventing proliferation violations (e.g. Iran, North Korea & Syria)

Strategic surprise and nuclear blackmail are real threats

Obama Administration’s Position

2012

Obama Administration’s Position

2012 Nuclear Posture Review (2010)

Continued reliance on nuclear weapons Continued modernization Nuclear use policy

“1251” reports to Congress tied to New START ratification

Guaranteed continued modernization of arsenal

Nuclear Posture Review (2010)

Continued reliance on nuclear weapons Continued modernization Nuclear use policy

“1251” reports to Congress tied to New START ratification

Guaranteed continued modernization of arsenal

NATO’s Nuclear Declaration2012

NATO’s Nuclear Declaration2012

“Nuclear weapons remain a core component for deterrence … the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies …”

“As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

“Allies concerned will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective …”

“Nuclear weapons remain a core component for deterrence … the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies …”

“As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

“Allies concerned will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective …”

Current Fiscal Constraints & Political Battles

Current Fiscal Constraints & Political Battles

Congressional deficit reduction deal

Major cuts to Defense budget

Likely to restrict modernization plans

Some in Congress already sounding alarm bells

Congressional deficit reduction deal

Major cuts to Defense budget

Likely to restrict modernization plans

Some in Congress already sounding alarm bells

Conclusion – Part 2Conclusion – Part 2

Nuclear weapon issues are complex and multifaceted.

They evoke passionate and heated debates.

Experienced and thoughtful people can differ.

Even Reagan proposed “zero” in 1986.

Nuclear weapon issues are complex and multifaceted.

They evoke passionate and heated debates.

Experienced and thoughtful people can differ.

Even Reagan proposed “zero” in 1986.

Key QuestionsKey Questions1. Is the possession of nuclear weapons still required for our

national security?

2. If so, what nuclear force posture makes the most sense in today’s world?

3. What are the threats to our national security?

4. Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?

5. Will any president give up our nuclear deterrent in the foreseeable future?

6. How would you advise the President?

1. Is the possession of nuclear weapons still required for our national security?

2. If so, what nuclear force posture makes the most sense in today’s world?

3. What are the threats to our national security?

4. Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?

5. Will any president give up our nuclear deterrent in the foreseeable future?

6. How would you advise the President?