US Department of Justice Antitrust Case Brief - 00922-201212

8/14/2019 US Department of Justice Antitrust Case Brief - 00922-201212

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ORAL ARGUMEN T SCHE DULE D FOR NOVEMBER 4, 2003

FINAL VERSION

No. 03-5030

IN TH E U NITED STATES COURT OF APPE ALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Appellee,

COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS INDU STRY ASSOCIATION

an d SOF TWARE & INF ORMATION IN DUSTRY ASSOCIATION,

Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRIEF FOR THE U NITED STATES

R. HE WITT PATE

Assistant Attorney General

DEBORAH P. MAJ ORAS

Deput y Assistan t A ttorney General

OF COUNSEL:

RENATA B. HESS E

PHILLIP R. MALONE

PAULA L. BLIZZARD

PATRICIA A. BRINK

JEFFREY J. VANHOOREWEGHE

Attorneys

U.S . Departm ent of J ustice

CATHERINE G. OSULLIVAN

DAVID SEIDMAN Attorneys


601 D St reet, N .W.

Wash ington, D.C. 20530

202-514-4510


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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

(A) Part ies and Amici . All parties, intervenors, and amici appearing before

th e district cour t an d in t his cour t ar e listed in th e Brief of Appellant s Compu ter

and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) and Software and Information

Ind ust ry Associat ion (SIIA).

(B) Rul ings Under Review . References to the r ulings at issue a ppear in t he

Brief for Appellan ts .

(C) Related Cases . Referen ces to relat ed cases a ppear in th e Brief for

Appellants.

_________________

David Seidman

Att orn ey for t he Un ited Stat es


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

J URISDICTIONAL STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATE ME NT RE GARDIN G STATU TE S AN D RE GU LATION S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

I. TH E DISTRICT COU RT P ROP ERLY DE NIE D IN TE RVE NTION . . . . . . . . 14

A. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B. Ru le 24 Gover ns In t er ven tion in Tu nn ey Act Pr oceedin gs . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

C. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Denying

P er missive In ter ven tion for P ur poses of Appea l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

D. Appellan ts Ha ve Waived Their Claim for Int ervention as of Right ,

Which the Dist r ict Court Proper ly Reject ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HE LD THAT THE TUN NEY ACTS

P ROCE DURAL REQUIRE ME NTS WE RE SATISF IE D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

A. St an da rd of Review an d E xt en t of Com plia nce Requ ir ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

B. The United Stat es Fully Satisfied Its Procedural Obligations under

Sect ion 2(b) of the Tunney Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


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C. Microsofts Disclosures Provide No Basis for Rejecting the Decree . . . . . . 24

III. THE DECREE IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

A. St an da rds of Appella te a nd Dist rict Cou rt Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

B. The District Cour t Car efully Considered Appellan ts Objections a nd

Proper ly Rejected Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

1. Appellan ts Remedial Aims Are Inconsistent With This Cour ts

Ear lier Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2. Th e Decr ee Pr eclu des An ticom pet it ive Com min glin g . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3. The Decree Addresses J ava Appropr ia tely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4. Appellants Other Criticisms Misunderstan d the Record and th e

Decree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

CERTIF ICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION,

TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENTS . . . . 38

ADDENDUM A Statu tes a nd Regulations

ADDENDUM B Unpublished Opinions


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Aut horities upon wh ich we chiefly rely ar e ma rked with ast erisks.

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Citizens for a B etter En vironm ent v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir.1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Cooter & Gell v. Hartm arx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Davis Broadcasting In c. v. FCC, 2003 WL 21186042 (D.C. Cir. Ma y 16,

2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Diam ond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

EEOC v. N ational Child ren's Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042 (D.C. Cir.1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 16, 17

Ford Motor Co. v. United S tates, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Fun d for An im als, Inc. v. Norton , 322 F .3d 728 (D.C. Cir . 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 232 F. Su pp. 2d 534 (D. Md.

2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 237 F. Su pp. 2d 639 (D. Md.

2002), appeal docketed, No. 03-1116 (4t h Cir . J a n . 22, 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 33

* Massachu setts S chool of Law at An dover, Inc. v. Un ited S tates, 118

F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir . 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Mova Pha rm aceutical Corp. v. S halala , 140 F .3d 1060 (D.C. Cir . 1998) . . . . . . . 19

Netscape Comm un ications Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 02-00097

(D.D.C., filed J an. 22, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Sup p. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002), appealsdocketed, Nos . 02-7155, 02-7156 (D.C. Cir . Dec. 9 , 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 , 36

New Y ork v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F . Su pp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17


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S EC v. Banner Fun d In ternational, 211 F .3d 602 (D.C. Cir . 2000) . . . . . . . . . . 18-19

Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 02-01150 (N.D. Ca l.,

filed March 8, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

United S tates v. AT &T, 552 F. Sup p. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd m em . subnom Maryland v. United S tates , 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Un ited S tates v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F .2d 660 (9t h Cir . 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 21

Un ited S tates v. Central Contracting Co., 527 F. Su pp. 1101 (E.D. Va.

1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

United S tates v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir . 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir . 1995) . . . . . . . . 26, 27, 37

* Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F .3d 34 (D.C. Cir . 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F . S up p. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) . . . . . . . . . 30, 32

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F . Su pp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) . . . . . . . . passim

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) . . . . . . passim

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft, 2002 WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) . . . 3, 8, 34-35

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 2003 WL 262324 (D.D.C. Jan. 11,

2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 19

United S tates v. T homson Corp., 1997 WL 90992 (D.D.C. Feb. 27,

1997), aff'd sub nom HyperLaw , Inc. v. United S tates, 1998 WL

388807, 159 F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir . 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Statutes and Rules

15 U.S.C. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

15 U.S.C. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4


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15 U.S.C. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

15 U.S.C. 16(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Tunney Act , 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6

15 U.S.C. 16(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 19, 21, 22

15 U.S.C. 16(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 7, 14

15 U.S.C. 16(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

28 U.S.C. 1291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

28 U.S.C. 1331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

28 U.S.C. 1337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Fed. R. App. P . 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Fed. R. Civ. P . 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Fed. R. Civ. P . 24(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 12, 19

Fed. R. Civ. P . 24(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9, 11, 15, 16

Fed. R. Civ. P . 24(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11, 16

Othe r Authorit ies

3 Ph illip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenka mp, Antitrust L aw 650a (rev.

ed. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

7C Charles Alan Wright et a l., Federal Practice and Procedure 1901

(2d ed. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

119 Cong. Rec. 24,599 (J uly 18, 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

66 Fed. Reg. 59,452 (Nov. 28, 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

67 Fed. Reg. 23,654 (May 3, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7


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GLOSSARY

API Applicat ion programming in ter face.

Br . Brief of Appellants Computer and Communicat ions Industry

Association (CCIA) and Software and Information IndustryAssociat ion (SIIA).

CCIA Computer and Communicat ions Industry Associa t ion.

CIS Compet it ive Impact Sta tement .

IE Internet Explorer .

J .A. J oint Appendix.

MSL Massachuset ts School of Law.

OEM Original equipment manufacturer , a manufacturer of personal

computers.

OS Operat ing system.

PC Personal computer .

SIIA Software and Informat ion Industry Associa t ion.


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No. 03-5030

IN TH E U NITED STATES COURT OF APPE ALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Appellee,

COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS INDU STRY ASSOCIATIONan d SOF TWARE & INF ORMATION IN DUSTRY ASSOCIATION,

Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRIEF FOR THE U NITED STATES

J URISD ICTIONAL S TATEMENT

The district cour t h ad jur isdiction of th e under lying ant itru st case un der 15

U.S.C. 4 and 28 U .S.C. 1331 & 1337, and of appellant s int ervent ion m otion un der

15 U.S.C. 16(f)(3) an d Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. It den ied appellan ts motion on J an ua ry

11, 2003. Appellan ts filed a tim ely notice of appea l on J an ua ry 13, 2003.


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This Cour t h as jur isdiction r egarding th e denial of int ervention pu rsu an t t o 28

U.S.C. 1291. No party ha s appealed from the fina l judgment , and th e Cour t

cur rent ly lacks jurisdiction over an y purported a ppeal from th at order.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRES ENTED

Whet her t he distr ict cour t a bused its discretion in denying appellant s motion

for lea ve to int ervene for p ur poses of appeal of th e ent ry of a consen t jud gment .

If th e Cour t r eversed th e denial of appellan ts motion, two additional issues

would be pr esented:

A. Whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that t here

were n o procedur al obstacles to ent ry of th e consen t decree; and

B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that entry of

th e consent decree was in th e public int erest.

STATEMENT REGARDING S TATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Addendum A of the Brief of Appellants contains 15 U.S.C. 2 and 16(a)-(b).

Other per tinent st at ut es are boun d with t his brief as Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants CCIA and SIIA, two computer-industry trade associations, seek to

appeal ent ry of th e consent decree in t he govern ment s an titr ust case a gainst

Microsoft, to which t hey ar e not par ties. They sough t leave to int ervene for

pur poses of appeal, which t he district cour t denied. They now appeal th at denial.


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On J un e 28, 2001, this Cour t a ffirmed in par t, reversed in part , and vacated in

par t th e distr ict cour ts judgm ent finding Microsoft liable for violat ions of th e

Sherm an Act, vacat ed the rem edial order in its ent irety, and rema nded. United

S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en ban c) (per cur iam ). On

rema nd, th e distr ict cour t ordered the par ties to ent er into settlement n egotiat ions.

Order at 2 (9/28/01) (J.A.78). The Un ited St at es an d Microsoft rea ched a

settlement , filed with t he distr ict cour t as th e Revised Proposed Fina l J udgment

on November 6, 2001. Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Su pp. 2d 144, 150

(D.D.C. 2002) (J .A.1611). Tha t filing tr iggered pr ocedur es un der t he Tu nn ey Act,

15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), which governs th e dist rict cour ts det erm ina tion of whet her

entr y of a proposed consent decree in a government an titr ust case is in t he pu blic

interest.

After lengthy Tunn ey Act proceedings, the district cour t held th at th e par ties

ha d complied with th e Acts pr ocedur es, Un ited S tates v. M icrosoft Corp., 215 F.

Sup p. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002) (J .A.1586). It lat er condit iona lly appr oved th e decree,

subject t o a pr ocedura l amendm ent, Microsoft, 231 F. Su pp. 2d a t 202 (J .A.1656),

and t hen entered it as amended, Un ited S tates v. M icrosoft Corp., 2002 WL

31654530 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) (J .A.1658).

CCIA and SIIA joint ly moved for leave to int ervene for pur poses of appea l on

December 20, 2002. The cour t denied th eir motion on J an ua ry 11, 2003, and t his

appeal ensued.


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1The court consolidated the governments suit with one brought by twenty states

an d th e Distr ict of Columbia. Following remand, th e United Sta tes an d some sta tes

settled with Microsoft, other sta tes cont inued t o litigat e over r emedy, and t he

distr ict cour t de-consolidated t he cases. Order at 3 (Feb. 1, 2002) (J.A.1060).

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Backgrou nd. In 1998, the Unit ed Sta tes su ed Microsoft, alleging

violat ions of Sections 1 a nd 2 of th e Sher ma n Act, 15 U .S.C. 1, 2.1 After t rial, the

court found Microsoft h ad violat ed Section 2 by u nla wfully ma int ain ing its

monopoly in t he m ar ket for I nt el-compa tible PC operat ing system s (OSs) and by

un lawfully at tempt ing to monopolize the ma rket for int ernet browsers, and t ha t it

ha d violat ed Section 1 by illegally tying its Windows opera tin g system a nd it s

Int ern et E xplorer (IE) browser. The cour t order ed Microsoft t o subm it a pla n of

divestitur e th at would split t he compa ny into an OS business a nd a n a pplicat ions

business, an d ordered inter im conduct restr ictions. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 45.

On a ppeal, this Cour t affirmed t ha t Microsoft un lawfully mainta ined its OS

monopoly thr ough specific acts impeding t he em ergence of two na scent middlewar e

th reat s to th at monopoly. However, it r ejected 8 of 20 findings tha t pa rt icular acts

constit ut ed exclusionar y condu ct an d h eld th at Microsofts gener al cour se of condu ct

was n ot a n a dditional basis for liability. Id. at 50-80. The Cour t reversed the

determ inat ion t ha t Microsoft h ad a tt empted t o monopolize the browser m ar ket in

violat ion of Section 2. Id. at 80-84. The Cour t also vacat ed the judgment on th e

Section 1 tying claim, rem an ding it for r econsider at ion u nder th e ru le of rea son, id .


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at 84-97, with specific limits on t he govern men ts th eories a nd p roof on r ema nd, id .

at 95.

The Cour t vacated t he r emedial order an d rema nded for furt her proceedings, id .

at 107, becau se, nota bly, it h ad (i) dra stically (id . at 105, 107) altered the district

court s conclusions on liability, an d (ii) foun d t ha t a n evident iar y hear ing on r emedy

was n ecessary. Id. at 101-03. Recognizing th at , [a]s a gener al ma tt er, a distr ict

court is afforded broad discret ion t o ent er t ha t r elief it calcula tes will best r emedy

th e condu ct it h as foun d to be un lawful, id . at 105, the Court directed t he distr ict

cour t to reconsider wh ether th e use of th e str uctur al r emedy of divestiture is

appropriate. Id.

The Cour t dir ected t he dist rict cour t t o consider whet her plaint iffs ha ve

esta blished a sufficient cau sal connection between Microsofts a nt icompet itive

conduct a nd its domina nt position in th e [operat ing system] mark et. Id. at 106.

Absent clear[] indication of a significant causal connection between the conduct

an d creat ion or ma int ena nce of the ma rk et p ower, Microsofts u nla wful beh avior

should be r emedied by an injun ction aga inst cont inu at ion of th at condu ct. Id. at

106 (quoting 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust L aw 650a, at

67 (rev. ed. 1996)) (emph asis omitt ed). The Cour t emp ha sized th at it ha d foun d a

cau sal connection between Microsofts exclusiona ry condu ct an d it s cont inu ing

position in t he operating systems ma rket only thr ough inference, id . at 106-07, and

th at th e distr ict cour t expressly did not a dopt th e position th at Microsoft would


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ha ve lost its position in t he [operat ing system] mar ket but for its a nt icompetitive

behavior. Id. at 107.

The r emedy sh ould be ta ilored t o fit t he wr ong creat ing th e occasion for t he

remedy, th e Cour t inst ru cted, th us leaving both th e scope an d th e par ticular s of

remedy to be addressed in district cour t. Id. at 107. In deed, in rejectin g Microsofts

rehea ring petition alleging an error Microsoft claimed might suggest a par ticular

rem edy rela ted to comm ingling, Petit ion for Rehea rin g 1-2 (D.C. Cir. No. 00-5212,

J uly 18, 2001) (J.A.20-21), th e Cour t said th at [n]oth ing in t he Cour ts opinion is

int ended t o preclude th e District Cour ts consider at ion of rem edy issu es. Order

(D.C. Cir. No. 00-5212, Aug. 2, 2001) (J .A.34).

Seeking t o achieve expeditious an d effective r elief consist ent with th is Court s

guidance, the government (an d all th e plaintiff states) elected t o pursue n either t he

tying claim nor str uctur al reorgan izat ion on rema nd. J oint Sta tu s Report a t 21

(Sept . 20, 2001) (J .A.57). The cour t ordered int ense sett lement n egotia tions an d

probable media tion, emph asizing t he importa nce of expedition to effective r elief.

Order at 2-3 (Sept. 28, 2001) (J.A.78-79). Five weeks lat er, th e Unit ed Sta tes a nd

Microsoft rea ched agreem ent an d sought jud icial appr oval of th eir pr oposed consen t

decree. Microsoft, 231 F. Su pp. 2d a t 150-51 (J.A.1611).

2. Tunne y Act Proce eding . Pu rsu an t t o th e Tun ney Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h),

th e Un ited St at es filed its Competitive Imp act St at emen t (CIS) (J .A.136), on

November 15, 2001, an d th en pu blished a Revised Proposed Fina l J udgment , the


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7

CIS, and a description of th e procedur es for su bmitt ing public comm ent s on t he

pr oposed decree. 66 Fed. Reg. 59,452 (Nov. 28, 2001) (J.A.203). An unpr ecedent ed

32,392 comments resulted, many lengthy and detailed,Microsoft, 215 F. Supp. 2d

at 10, 13 (J .A.1593, 1596), occup ying 6,652 Federal R egisterpages, see id. at 10

(J .A.1593) (cit ing 67 Fed. Reg. 23,654 (Books 2-12) (Ma y 3, 2002)). [W]ith

painst aking car e, th e government sort ed these commen ts by subject m at ter a nd

responded in detail, id . at 17 (J .A.1600); see Response of th e Un ited Sta tes t o Public

Comm ent s on th e Revised Pr oposed Fina l J udgm ent (Feb. 27, 2002), (J .A.1126)

(Response), ta kin g 61 Federal R egisterpages. It also subm itt ed economics

professor David Sibleys expert declar at ion a ddr essing t he su bsta nce of the pr oposed

decree an d responding to commen ts. Memora ndu m of th e United Sta tes in Support

of Ent ry of th e Pr oposed Fina l J udgm ent , App. C (Feb. 27, 2002) (J .A.1062)

(Sibley).

Invoking the Tunney Acts flexible procedures, see 15 U.S.C. 16(f), which a llow

court s to obta in a wide ra nge of views, th e court perm itt ed extensive amicus

participation, see, e.g., Memora ndu m Opinion an d Order at 3-4 (Feb. 28, 2002)

(J.A.1380C-D) (SIIA Or der); Memoran dum Opinion an d Or der at 6-7 (Feb. 28,

2002) (J .A.1379-80) (CCIA Order ), receiving eight am icus br iefs a nd holding a

hear ing at which it hear d oral ar gument on behalf of six amici, including appellan ts.

Four months after the hearing, the district court, carefully considering objections

raised in public comments, seeMicrosoft, 215 F. Supp. 2d a t 2 n .1 (J .A.1587), ru led


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2Nine of th e sta te plain tiffs in New Y ork v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 203

(D.D.C. 2002), joined t he set tlemen t. The cour t in th eir case condit iona lly found it

to be fair , reasona ble, an d in th e public int erest , id. at 206, and, following

am endment , entered it a s th e final judgment between Microsoft a nd t hose states,

Fina l Ju dgment Pu rsu an t to Rule 54(b), New Y ork v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233

(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002). No one a ppealed from ent ry of th at decree, ident ical t o the

decree here.

3SIIA, seeking full or limited participation, nevertheless expressly [did] not

seek to inter vene. SIIA Order a t 1 (J.A.1380A).

8

th at th e par ties ha d sufficiently complied with t he Tun ney Acts procedur al

requirement s, and t ha t t he ma tt er was ripe for t he Cour ts public interest

determination. Id. at 3 (J .A.1586). It lat er issued an opinion exhau stively

reviewing th e provisions of the pr oposed decree a nd th e objections r aised in public

comment s, in light of th is Cour ts guidan ce regar ding an tit ru st consen t decrees

generally and t he pa rt icular circum sta nces of this case, seeMicrosoft, 231 F. Su pp.

2d at 152-64 (J .A.1612-23). The cour t concluded th at th e proposed consen t decree

would be in th e public int erest if modified to perm it th e cour t t o ret ain jur isdiction to

act su a spont e in decree enforcement. Id. at 202 (J .A.1656). The cour t subsequ ent ly

enter ed th e proposed decree as am ended. Microsoft, 2002 WL 31654530 (J .A.1658).2

3. Mo ti on s to In te rv e ne . Appellant CCIA twice sought to intervene in the

Tun ney Act proceeding.3 It relied on Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1) (permissive intervention

when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene), but

th e cour t, n otin g th at CCIA ha d ignore[d] th is Circuit s pr ecedent ma king Rule

24(b)(1) gener ally un ava ilable in Tun ney Act proceedings, CCIA Order at 3


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9

(J .A.1376) (citin g Massachu setts S chool of Law at An dover, Inc. v. Un ited S tates, 118

F.3d 776, 780 n .2 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (MSL )), also considered Rule 24(b)(2)

(permissive int ervent ion wh en app lican ts claim or defense an d th e ma in a ction

ha ve a quest ion of law or fact in comm on). Aware th at t his Cour t const ru es tha t

ru les claim or defense requirem ent liberally, the cour t nevert heless could n ot find

th at CCIA ha s satisfied its bur den. CCIA Order at 4 (J .A.1377). For tha t rea son,

and to avoid delay and prejudice, the court denied permissive intervention. Id. at 5

(J .A.1378). CCIA does not cha llenge tha t decision.

After th e cour t en ter ed judgment , CCIA, joined by SIIA, tried aga in, seeking

both permissive intervention and intervention as of right for purposes of appeal.

Appellan ts did not file a p leading set tin g fort h t he claim or defense for wh ich

int ervent ion is sought, requ ired by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). Ins tea d, they mer ely

alluded t o mem bers of th eir ass ociat ions with a ctu al an d poten tia l legal claims

against Microsoft arising out of facts substantially the same as those litigated in

th is case, Memoran dum of Points a nd Aut horities in Su pport of J oint Motion by

Amici Curiae CCIA an d SIIA for Lea ve to Int ervene for P ur poses of Appeal a t 10

(Dec. 20, 2002) (J .A.1742), with out specifying t he na tu re of th e claims.

The cour t d id not r epeat its discussion of claims, defenses, or comm on qu estions

of fact or law, but tu rn ed directly to an add itiona l factor: delay or pr ejudice. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). This factor, applicable if th e cour t finds t he a pplican t s claim t o

ha ve questions of law or fact in comm on with th e main action, may requir e


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11

SU MMARY OF ARGUMEN T

The dist rict cour t condu cted a careful an d compr ehen sive Tun ney Act r eview of

th e proposed consent decree in t his government an titr ust enforcement a ction,

pain sta kingly reviewing ma ssive qua nt ities of inform at ion, includin g this Court s

prior decision, the governments submissions, Microsofts submissions, amicis

submissions, an d an un precedented n um ber of public commen ts. It concluded th at

th e consen t d ecree ta kes a ccount of the t heory of liability advan ced by Plain tiffs, th e

actu al liability imposed by the a ppellate cour t, t he concern s of th e Plain tiffs with

regard to future technologies, and the relevant policy considerations, and that, with

one minor amen dment , its ent ry is in t he public interest . Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d

at 202 (J .A.1656). Appellan ts , privat e tr ade associat ions repr esent ing ma ny of

Microsofts r ivals, noneth eless seek t o int ervene for t he pu rpose of pursu ing th eir

own vision of relief. In so doing, they ignore th e legal st an dar ds governin g

intervent ion a nd distort th e pur pose of the Tunn ey Act.

I. The dist rict cour t pr operly exercised its discretion in denying perm issive

int ervent ion for pu rposes of app eal. Appellan ts n eith er filed a compla int in

intervention, see Fed . R. Civ. P. 24(c), nor ident ified a ny claim or defense tha t

would sh ar e quest ion[s] of law or fact with th e governm ent s a ction. Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(b)(2). Becau se no liability issues r ema in for a ppellate r eview or a hypothet ical

rem an d, inter vention would not cont ribu te t o th e efficient r esolut ion of

contr oversies, th e point of perm issive int ervent ion.


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12

Appellan ts a ddr ess int ervent ion a s of right only in a footn ote a t t he end of th eir

brief, thu s waiving an y claim to it. But t he cour t pr operly denied it. Here,

app ellant s only claimed int erest relat ing to th e property or t ra nsa ction which is th e

subject of the action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), is a generalized one in determinative

docum ents they assert to exist without an y basis despite govern ment denials

th e cour t foun d supported by t he r ecord,Microsoft, 215 F. Su pp. 2d a t 12 (J.A.1595).

Such flimsy claims pr ovide no basis even for limit ed int ervent ion t o app eal with

respect t o docum ent disclosur e (which appellan ts n ever sought ), much less

intervent ion t o appeal th e judgment .

Becau se inter vention was pr operly denied, no oth er issu es ar e properly before

th e Cour t. Only if appellant s were permitt ed to int ervene for pu rposes of appealing

th e entr y of the judgment would appellant s oth er issues be pr esented.

II . Cont ra ry to appellan ts claims, th e governm ent fully complied with Tu nn ey

Act pr ocedura l requirements. It explained th e unu sua l circum sta nces giving rise to

th e decree, CIS at 7-9, 61-62 (J .A.142-44, 195-96); described t he decrees pr ovisions

an d th eir fun ctions in det ail,Microsoft, 215 F. Su pp. 2d a t 13 (J.A.1596) (citin g CIS

at 17-60 (J .A.152-94)); described and evalu at ed th e alter na tives it consider ed, see 15

U.S .C. 16(b)(6),Microsoft, 215 F. Su pp. 2d a t 15-17 (J.A.1597-99); and produced all

th e document s it consider ed deter mina tive in form ula tin g th e decree, 15 U.S.C.

16(b) of which ther e were none. The extensive public comm ent dem onst ra tes t ha t

th e governm ent s disclosur es fully served th e stat ut ory pur pose. Similar ly,


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13

Microsofts disclosur es r elat ing t o its widely known, CCIA/SIIA Br. 57-58, lobbying

activities were sufficient t o inform th e district cour t wheth er t here ha d been

improper cont acts between t he U nited St at es an d Microsoft, Microsoft, 215 F. Su pp.

2d at 21 (J .A.1602-03) an d th ere were n one.

III. The distr ict cour t pr operly foun d th e decree to be in th e public int erest . In

crit icizing it, a ppellant s pervas ive error is t o misread th is Cour ts guida nce

concern ing cau sat ion. Becau se th is Cour t foun d th e ant icompet itive effect of

Microsofts conduct only through inference, 253 F.3d at 107, sweeping equitable

relief aimed a t t erm ina tin g illegal monopoly an d th e like is impr oper a lth ough

th e decree goes well beyond simply pr ohibitin g th e pr ecise condu ct foun d u nla wful,

see, e.g., 231 F . Su pp. 2d at 189-90 (J .A.1645) (requ ired licensin g of comm un icat ions

protocols)

Appellan ts more specific compla int s a re ill-foun ded. For exam ple, th e decree

does prohibit an ticompet itive comm ingling by assur ing th at an y comm ingling

lacks the an ticompet itive asp ects t his Cour t recognized. And the decree

app ropriat ely add resses J ava -rela ted as pects of Microsofts condu ct. The Un ited

Sta tes a nd t he cour t h ad sound r easons for n ot elevating Sun Microsystems J ava

product to a preferr ed position among middlewar e. Appellant s rem ain ing

complaints were all addr essed in th e Tunn ey Act proceeding; that appellants repeat

th em here neith er gives th em greater weight nor shows the district cour t t o ha ve

abused its discretion.


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23/56

4But seeUn ited S tates v. Becht el Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981) (Tun ney

Act a ppeal by sett ling defenda nt ).

5S eeUnited S tates v. AT &T, 552 F. Sup p. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd m em . sub

nom. Maryland v. Un ited S tates, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); United S tates v. Th om son

Corp., 1997 WL 90992 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997), affd su b nom .Hyperlaw, In c. v.United S tates, 1998 WL 388807, 159 F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (unpublished table

decision). In MSL , th is Cour t a ffirm ed denia l of int ervent ion for pu rposes of appea l

except with r espect t o a na rr ow question r egarding determina tive docum ents. 118

F.3d at 785. We kn ow of no appellate decision other th an MSL reviewing a Tun ney

Act denia l of int ervent ion for pur poses of appeal.

15

F.3d at 779; see 119 Cong. Rec. 24,599 (July 18, 1973) (Remarks of Sen. Tunney)

(statute was not intended to broaden the existing right of intervention).

Pa rt ies to a sett led case ar e unlikely to appeal entr y of th eir settlement as a

consent decree,4 yet Congress made n o special, alterna tive arr an gement for a ppeals.

And so far as we kn ow, Tunn ey Act dist rict cour ts h ave only ra rely gran ted

intervent ion before t he pu blic int erest determ inat ion (an d t hen only for str ictly

limited pu rposes), an d h ave permitt ed later intervention for pur poses of appeal only

twice (neither appeal resulting in decree reversal).5

C. The Dis tr ict Court Properly Exercised I ts Discret ion in Denying

Pe rmiss ive Intervent ion for Pu rposes of Appea l

Appellan ts do not cont end on a ppeal th at an y sta tu te confers a conditiona l right

to int ervene, Fed R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1); th ey now seek per missive int ervent ion only

un der Ru le 24(b)(2), which pr ovides tha t a court ma y gran t in ter vention when an

app lican ts claim or defense an d th e ma in a ction ha ve a quest ion of law or fact in

common. If tha t condit ion is sa tisfied, [i]n exercising its discretion th e cour t s ha ll


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16

consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of

th e rights of the original pa rt ies. Id. These r equisites r eflect t he r ules pur pose:

promoting t he public int erest in t he efficient resolution of cont roversies. 7C

Char les Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 1901, a t 230 (2d ed.

1986).

The first requisite appears to limit permissive intervention to circumstances in

which th e put at ive int ervenor seeks t o become involved in a n a ction in order to

litigate a legal claim or defense on th e merit s,Natl Childrens Center, 146 F.3d at

1045 (recognizing exception for intervention to challenge confidentiality orders),

with th e app ar ent goal of disposing of relat ed cont roversies togeth er. Absent

claims or defenses with common questions of law or fact, there is no efficiency from

adding parties. S eeMSL , 118 F.3d at 782 (litigative economy, reduced risks of

inconsist ency, an d increa sed inform at ion are t he hoped-for adva nt ages of

int ervent ion). And, as th e second requisite esta blishes, even the benefits of

simu lta neously resolving related cont roversies will not just ify subjectin g the pa rt ies

to th e original litigat ion t o prejudice or u ndu e delay.

Not only did appellant s fail to file the pleading set tin g fort h t he claim or

defense for wh ich in ter vention is sought th at Rule 24 (c) requires, cf.Diamond v.

Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76-77 (1986) (OConnor, J ., concur rin g) (discus sing rela tionship

between pleading requirement of Rule 24(c) and claim or defense in Rule 24(b)(2)),

but th ey have not other wise identified th e claims a lleged to ha ve questions of law or


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6Netscape Com m un ications Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 02-00097 (D.D.C., filedJ an . 22, 2002); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 02-01150 (N.D. Ca l.,

filed Mar ch 8, 2002). Net scape ha s app ar ent ly sett led. S ee Pr ess Release, AOL

Time War ner , AOL Time War ner an d Microsoft Agree to Collabora te on Digital

Media Initiatives and Settle Pending Litigation (May 29, 2003), available at http://

media.aoltimewarner.com/media/press_view.cfm?release_num=55253203.

17

fact in common with th ose in t he m ain action, see p. 9 supra; Br. 19-20 (referr ing t o

un specified an tit ru st claims ass ociat ed with t wo mem bers of app ellant

associations). Appellan ts n am e only Netscape a nd Su n Microsystems a s ha ving

an titr ust claims. But t hose two firms ha ve filed their own an titr ust a ctions against

Microsoft,6 an d neith er h as sought to litigate a legal claim or defense on t he m erits,

Natl Childrens Center, 146 F.3d at 1045, in th is case. The penden cy of an other

action in which an applican t can protect its r ight s ordinarily coun sels against

permissive intervent ion. S eeRoe v. Wad e, 410 U.S. 113, 125-27 (1973). Although

th e Cour t passed over t his factor in MSL , see 118 F.3d at 778, 783, subsequen t

langua ge suggests its pertinen cy, seeNatl Childrens Center, 146 F.3d at 1045. In

an y event , appellan ts failur e even to ident ify claims or comm on issu es, leaving it to

th e cour t to ferret th em out, just ified the denial of permissive int ervention.

Moreover, it is un likely th at app ellant s could h ave ident ified claims or comm on

issu es whose resolut ion in th is proceeding would promote efficiency. As in MSL , the

only substantive issue on appeal would be whether the district court properly

app lied th e Tunn ey Act, 118 F.3d at 782. In MSL , a rem an d might conceivably

ha ve led to a tr ial on th e merits, wh ere th e overlap of legal and factua l issues in t he


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7Thus, we need not here cont end th at an a ppeal would lead to undu e delay. The

consent decree is curr ent ly in force, as is an ident ical a nd u ncha llenged decree in

th e litigation between Microsoft an d th e sett ling sta tes, see note 2 supra. This

appeal, of cour se, creat es indust ry un certa inty, but so too do th e Massachusett s an d

West Virginia a ppeals in New York v. Microsoft.

18

two plaint iffs subs ta nt ive ant itr ust claims m ight pr oduce efficiency gains. Id.

Her e, the t ria l is over, and liability was affirm ed. Litigation efficiency can best be

promoted t hr ough a ppr opria te u se of th is cases sett led findings a nd conclusions in

oth er cases involving relat ed claims. S eeIn re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation,

232 F . Supp. 2d 534 (D. Md. 2002) (collat eral es toppel effect of find ings from

governments case); see also 15 U.S.C. 16(a).7

D. Appel lants Have Waived Their Claim for Intervent ion as of Right ,

Which the District Court P roperly Rejected

In th e last portion of one footnote long a fter t he section of their brief

addr essing int ervention a ppellant s note tha t t hey sought intervent ion of right

below an d assert t ha t its denial was revers ible err or. Br. 52 n.16. This footnote does

not sa tisfy Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (requ iring a sta tem ent of cont ent ions an d t he

reasons for t hem, with citat ions t o the au th orities an d par ts of th e record on which

the appellant relies), and the point should be deemed waived. S ee, e.g.,Davis

Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 2003 WL 21186042 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2003) (appellants

opening brief offers only a per functory ar gumen t on t his issu e in a footn ote, a nd we

should therefore consider the argument waived); S EC v. Bann er Fund Intl, 211


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28/56

20

district cour t case from an oth er circuit th at rests on a discredited view of

determ inat ive docum ents, seeMicrosoft, 215 F. Supp. 2d a t 12 n .12 (J .A.1595)

(explaining how MSL , 118 F.3d at 784, conflicts with th at view). Allowing

intervent ion of right based solely on a bald assert ion t ha t t here m ust be

deter mina tive docum ent s would effectively confer on non-part ies an a ut oma tic right

to appea l, for wh ich Congress d id not pr ovide in t he Tu nn ey Act.

In a ny event, th e Cour t in MSL san ctioned int ervent ion only for t he limited

pur pose of seeking docum ent disclosur e, see 118 F.3d a t 782, 784, not for cha llenging

th e public int erest det erm ina tion. Appellant s sough t no such limit ed review below,

an d do not seek it here. Even if appellants were ent itled to intervene to seek

disclosur e of docum ent s, th ere would be n o basis for reversin g th e distr ict cour ts

refusal to allow t hem to intervene for th e broader pu rpose of cha llenging the term s

of the decree.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE TUNNE Y ACTSP ROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WERE S ATISFIED

A. St andard o f Rev iew and Extent o f Compli ance Requi red

No appellat e decision s pecifies th e sta nda rd of review for Tun ney Act p rocedur al

determ inat ions, but we believe tha t t he proper stan dar d is abuse of discretion. The

ultimate public interest determination is reviewed under that standard, see p. 25

infra, and a s appellan ts a ckn owledge, the Acts procedur al requ iremen ts ser ve to

inform t ha t deter mina tion, Br. 51. The distr ict cour t is well placed to judge wheth er

th e part ies actions ser ve th at fun ction. It would be par adoxical to subject su bsidiary


29/56


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22

decree. S ee CIS a t 7-9 (J .A.142-44) (describing t his Cour ts decision, t he na rr owing

of issues a nd t he r easons for it, an d th e distr ict cour ts order regar ding negotia tions);

61-62 (J.A.195-96) (rea sons for avoiding furt her litigation, an d r easons for not

seek ing a brea k-up of Microsoft, includ ing th is Cour t s decision). Appellan ts do not

point t o any unu sua l circumst an ces th at should have been, but were not, disclosed

un der Section 16(b)(3).

Second, th ere is no merit to appellan ts complaint th at th e govern ment did not

disclose th e ma terials a nd docum ents which th e Un ited Sta tes considered

deter mina tive in form ula tin g th e proposed decree. 15 U.S.C. 16(b). We explained

th at t here were no such docum ents. CIS at 68 (J .A.202). This Cour t ha s said that

th e sta tu te r efers at th e most to docum ents th at ar e either smoking guns or t he

exculpatory opposite. MSL , 118 F.3d at 784. The district cour t, noting th at t he

trial record revealed the documents on which the government heavily relied in

proving liability, found that the

record of th is case su pports t he governm ent s position tha t t her e exists no

docum ent so significan t th at it could be consider ed alone, or in combina tion

with oth er docum ent s, to be a smoking gun. In t he abs ence of an y

allegation of bad fait h or r eason t o conclude other wise, see HyperLaw, Inc. v.

United S tates, 1998 WL 388807, at *3, 159 F .3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(un published t able decision), the Cour t concludes t ha t t he Un ited Sta tes h as

sat isfied its disclosur e obligat ions wit h r egard t o deter mina tive docum ent s.

15 U.S.C. 16(b).

215 F. Supp . 2d at 12 (footn ote omit ted ) (J .A.1595). Appellan ts pr ovide no bas is for

tr eat ing the cour ts accepta nce of th e governm ent s repr esent at ion a s an a buse of

discretion.


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23

Third, appellan ts a ssert th at th e government should have provided a complete

description of the set tlemen ts condu ct r emedies, Br. 54, but th e Act r equires only

an explana tion of the pr oposa l for a consen t judgmen t, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)(3). And, as

th e cour t n oted, t ha t explan at ion occupies th e bulk of th e CIS, which deconst ru cts

each section a nd definition in th e proposed fina l judgm ent , detailing th e scope of th e

decree a nd t he condu ct it prohibits. 215 F. Supp. 2d a t 13 (J.A.1596) (citin g CIS at

17-60 (J .A.152-94)). Consider ing th e relevan t p ort ion of th e CIS, th e comment s,

an d th e legislat ive hist ory, th e inform at ion in t he CIS comport s with t he

underlying goals of subsection b(3). Id. Appellan ts fail to demonstr at e an y error,

mu ch less a n a buse of discret ion, in t ha t conclusion.

Similar ly, app ellant s cont end t he CISs description an d evalua tion of

alternatives to such proposal actually considered by the United States, 15 U.S.C.

16(b)(6), is ina dequa te. The CIS explain s why, following rema nd, th e Unit ed Sta tes

decided not to cont inu e to seek a brea k-up rem edy. CIS at 8, 61 (J .A.143, 195). It

explains t he r easons for differen ces between t he int erim condu ct provisions of th e

Initial F inal J udgment (which th is Cour t vacat ed) an d t he pr ovisions of th e consent

decree. Id. at 61-62 (J .A.195-96). And it describes and evalua tes oth er specific

rem edies consider ed. Id. at 62-63 (J .A.196-97). Accord ingly, th e distr ict court

considered ap pellant s crit icisms a nd r easona bly rejected t hem in light of th e CIS,

sta tu tory pur pose, an d legislat ive hist ory. 215 F. Supp . 2d at 15-17 (J .A.1597-99).


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24

Appellan ts misconceive th e na tu re of th e CIS, treat ing it as if it were a n end in

itself. The CIS begins a pu blic dialog, and a s th e court p oint ed out , the volum e and

qua lity of th e public comm ent s it stimu lat ed shows it accomplish ed its pu rpose. 215

F. Sup p. 2d at 13 (J .A.1596). The cour t is th en inform ed not only by th e CIS, but by

th ose public comm ent s as well as by th e governm ent s resp onse, which her e

supplemented th e CIS in addressing alterna tives. S ee Response 71-413

(J.A.1175-1339) (respondin g t o comm ent s concern ing d efinitions an d provisions of

proposed decree), 414-425 (J.A.1340-46) (comparison with decree this Court vacated),

426-448 (J .A.1346-58) (discussing other proposed r emedies). The cour t in th is case

did not wan t for inform at ion, an d it did n ot abuse its discretion in finding th e

governm ent s disclosur es adequ at e.

C. Microsof ts Disc losures Provide No Bas i s for Reject ing the De cree

Appellan ts also compla in t ha t Microsofts r equired disclosur es, see 15 U.S.C.

16(g), were inadequ at e becau se th ey covered a per iod beginn ing with t he last roun d

of sett lement n egotiat ions th e cour t ha d ordered, rat her th an th e period since

1998. Br. 57-58. (Actually, Microsoft amen ded its disclosu re to cover th e period

beginn ing with issua nce of th is Cour ts ma nda te. S eeMicrosoft, 215 F. Su pp. 2d at

19 (J .A.1601).) Whichever da te govern s, however, t he cour ts conclusion t ha t t he

disclosur e was adequat e was not a n abuse of discretion.

First , the r ecord a dequat ely disclosed to the cour t wh at appellants th emselves

claim wa s widely kn own th at since 1998 Microsoft ha s engaged in su bsta nt ial


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25

lobbying. Br. 57-58. CCIA itself subm itt ed with its pu blic comm ent th e 22-page

Declar at ion of Edwa rd Roeder (J.A.599) devoted to t he topic. See also Comments of

Relpromax Antit ru st I nc., Exhibit 10, Exhibit A, Att achm ent s 1, 9-43 (lobbying da ta

an d r eport s), ava ilable at ht tp ://www.usdoj.gov/at r/cas es/ms_tu ncom/ma jor/

mtc-00030631_ex10.pdf.

Second, the cour t foun d th at th e point of th e sta tu tory provision is to requir e

th e disclosur e of inform at ion sufficient t o inform th e Cour t as to wheth er t here ha s

been some improper cont act between the Un ited Stat es and t he defendan t.

Microsoft, 215 F. Supp. 2d a t 21 (J .A.1603). The cour t obviously foun d itself

sufficient ly inform ed an d th e disclosur es sufficient . Appellan ts offer n oth ing to

suggest t ha t t hese findings were an a buse of discretion or t ha t t here was a ny

improper cont act between t he U nited St at es an d Microsoft.

III. TH E D ECR EE IS IN TH E P U B LIC IN TE RE ST

A. Standards of Appel late and Dis tr ict Court Review

En tr y of a consen t decree is r eviewed for a buse of discretion. E.g., Citizens for a

Better En vt v. Gorsuch, 718 F .2d 1117, 1120 n .5 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see alsoMicrosoft,

253 F.3d a t 105 (equita ble relief lies within a distr ict court s discretion).

In determ ining wheth er to ent er a consent decree in a govern ment a nt itru st

case, a distr ict cour t pr operly looks for a mbiguities, ina dequa te en forcement

mechanisms, positive injury inflicted on third parties, and especially whether the

discrepan cy between th e rem edy and un disputed facts of ant itru st violations could


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8Litigat ing the r emedy in th e sta tes case against Microsoft produced a resu lt

similar to the sett lement her e and, becau se there was n o settlement , left t he

possibility t ha t Microsoft would seek S upr eme Court review even a s t o liability.

And th ere was no guar an tee tha t th e United Stat es could have obtained by

litigation a decree as sa tisfactory as t ha t it obtained th rough settlement .

26

be such as to render the decree a mockery of judicial power,MSL , 118 F.3d at 782.

Its role is not, however, t o substitut e its judgment for t ha t of the E xecut ive Bran ch.

Un ited S tates v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1460-61 (D.C. Cir. 1995). This Cour t

set out th e goals of a r emedy, Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 103, and a decree is in t he

public interest unless the remedies [are] so inconsonant with the allegations

cha rged a s t o fall outside of the rea ches of the p ublic int erest ,Microsoft, 56 F.3d at

1461. The cour t pr operly consider s litigat ion risk , id . & n.8; see alsoMicrosoft, 231

F. Su pp. 2d at 174 (J .A.1631) (ta king rem edy-rela ted litigat ion r isk int o accoun t in

evalua tin g proposed decree),8 an d accords significan t weight to th e governm ent s

predictive judgm ent s a bout th e efficacy of remedial pr ovisions (as it would even in a

fully litigated case, seeFord Motor Co. v. United S tates, 405 U .S. 562, 575 (1972)).

S ee 231 F. Supp. 2d at 170-71 (J .A.1628) (deference to govern men ts pr edictive

judgment regarding efficacy).

B. The District Court Careful ly Conside red Appel lants Object ions an dPrope rly Rejected Them

The district court, carefully explaining each provisions likely effect, see, e.g.,

Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 170 (J.A.1628) (uniform license provision); see also

Response,passim , consider ed an d rejected a ppellant s compla int s. Appellan ts brief


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27

demonst ra tes th at th ey would prefer different relief th an th e government secur ed,

but it fails to establish th at th e district cour t a bused its discretion in concluding th at

th e decree falls well with in th e reaches of th e public int erest . We respond concisely

to appellan ts length y list of complaint s, as t he Cour ts Or der of Mar ch 26

presum ably ant icipated in dividing t he n orm al word a llocat ion between adverse

part ies to the underlying antitru st case.

1. Appel lants Reme dial Aims Are Incon sis tent With This Courts

Earl ier De cis ion

Appellants want the decree to terminat[e] Microsofts monopoly, Br. 30, but

th is Court s finding of a cau sa l connect ion bet ween Microsoft s exclus iona ry cond uct

an d its cont inuing position in t he operating systems ma rket only thr ough inference,

253 F.3d at 106-07, stands in th e way. The government never alleged, and n o cour t

foun d, t ha t Microsoft acquiredits monopoly un lawfully. S eeid . at 58 (addr essing

only monopoly main ten an ce); 56 F.3d at 1452. The decree, th erefore, should

terminat[e] any quantum of monopoly Microsoft possessed only because of conduct

th is Cour t foun d to ha ve violated Section 2, wheth er t he r emedial means addr esses

conduct or str uctur e. Microsofts un lawful condu ct removed or red uced na scent or

potent ial th rea ts , 253 F.3d at 79, posed by technologies or pr oducts t ha t might

ha ve mat ur ed into viable alterna tive development platform s, mightha ve led to

cross-platform applications development, and ultimately mighthave weakened th e

app licat ions bar rier to ent ry and encour aged new OS compet ition. Such compet ition

mighthave constrained or eliminated Microsofts monopoly power. S eeid . at 107 (no


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28

findin g th at Microsoft would h ave lost it s position in t he OS m ar ket but for it s

an ticompet itive beha vior). Such a t enu ous cau sal conn ection is not enough t o

esta blish an y qua nt um of illegal m onopoly for t he decree to ter min at [e].

Microsofts un lawful condu ct m at ter s an d mu st be st opped: it would be inimical

to th e pur pose of th e Sher ma n Act t o allow monopolists free rein t o squa sh n ascent ,

albeit u npr oved, compet itors at will. Id. at 79. Such condu ct, despite its un cert ain

results, cf. Br. 31 n .9, just ifies a finding of liability ba sed on inferr ed causa tion, see

id ., an d just ifies injunctive relief tha t goes beyond th e pr ecise condu ct found illegal

as t he r elief her e clear ly does, see,e.g., 231 F. Su pp. 2d a t 189-90 (J .A.1645)

(requ ired licensin g of comm un icat ions p rotocols), 191-92 (J .A.1646-47) (requ irem ent s

related to interoperation with Microsoft server operating system products), 202

(J .A.1656) (decree addr esses conduct only relat ed to Microsofts a nt icompet itive

conduct). But t he ten uous cau sal conn ection found by th is Cour t cann ot just ify

appellants preferr ed mar ket engineering, based on a presum ption t ha t pa rt icular

na scent th reat s would ha ve mat ur ed so as t o significan tly lessen or elimina te

Microsofts monopoly power. With n o st ronger caus al link from cond uct t o monopoly

th an th is Cour t foun d, th e remedy properly focuses on t ar geted prohibitions an d

related a ffirma tive requirements designed to permit n ascent th reat s to flour ish in

the futu re.


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29

2 . The Decree Prec l udes Ant icompeti ti ve Commi ngli ng

Appellants complain, Br. 25-29, the decree fails to prohibit commingling of

softwa re code despite t he finding th at some unla wful commingling occur red in

Windows 98. But th is Cour ts conclusion th at some ant icompet itive comm ingling

occurred, see 253 F.3d at 66, did not r equire t he pr ohibition of comm ingling, as t he

Cour t lat er explained, see p. 6 supra. The district cour t foun d th at th e end-user

focus of Sections II I.C an d III .H, wh ich allow OE Ms t o remove end-user access t o

Microsoft Middleware Products and to feature competing middleware instead,

carr ies a great p oten tia l for t he ad van cemen t of compet ition. 231 F. Supp. 2d at

181 (J.A.1638). These provisions eliminat e wha t th is Cour t saw as th e

anticompetitive effect of commingling, which was the disincentive to OEMs to

inst all n on-Microsoft middlewar e pr oducts. Id. at 180 (J.A.1637); see 253 F.3d at 66

(the comm ingling foun d deter s OEMs from pre-inst alling rival browsers, th ereby

redu cing t he rivals usa ge sha re an d, hen ce, developers int erest in r ivals APIs).

Appellan ts cont end t ha t developers will write for th e IE/Windows APIs, not

competing middleware APIs, if th e code rema ins present , an d th erefore t ha t a

remedy for the anticompetitive effect of commingling must remove Microsofts code,

not just en d-user a ccess; they asser t, with out explana tion, tha t Microsofts liability

was pr edicat ed on the un lawful int egra t ion of IE . . . code. Br. 27. (Appellant s

claim t ha t en d u sers mu st be allowed to rem ove code, not just access, Br. 27-29, is a

min or var iat ion on the sam e them e.) As th e dist rict cour t explained, however, Non-


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30

par ty cries for removal of softwa re code as a r emedy appea r t o reflect a subst an tive

misunderstanding of the commingling liability in this case. Microsoft, 231 F. Su pp.

2d at 180 (J .A.1637). The liability theory proved, foun d, an d affirmed viewed not th e

presence of code, but rivals [browser] usage share, as determining developers

int erest in r ivals APIs a s a n a ltern at ive to Microsofts APIs. Microsoft, 253 F.3d a t

66. Tha t is the mechan ism th rough which comm ingling of browsing an d non-

browsing code in a single file pr oduced a n an ticompet itive effect.

Comm ingling, combined wit h oth er r estr ictions, redu ced rivals browser u sage

sha res by deter r[ing] OEMs from pre-inst alling rival browsers. Id. An OEM is

un willing t o inst all a second browser becau se an OEM mu st t est a nd tr ain its

support st aff to answer calls related t o every softwa re pr oduct preinst alled on th e

machine. Id. at 64. S ee alsoUn ited S tates v. M icrosoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 49

(D.D.C. 1999) (Fin ding of Fa ct 159: sup port costs increase becau se th e

redu nda ncy can lead t o confusion am ong n ovice user s). If a second browser is n ot

insta lled, it will not be used, an d it will therefore n ot at tr act developer a tt ention to

its APIs. In cont ra st , an OE M who removes end-user access to Microsofts product

avoids h aving t o support it , becau se rem oving th e mea ns of access is from t he u sers

persp ective . . . equivalent to rem oving th e program itself. Id. at 51 (Fin ding of Fa ct

165). The rem edy th us elimina tes th e disincentive to inst all non-Microsoft


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9Code with no end-user access may nevertheless be run and thus conceivably

result in t ra ining costs an d t he like, but th is Cour t concluded t ha t Microsoft could

not be held liable for Windows overriding of users default browser preference in

limited circumst an ces for valid techn ical rea sons. 253 F.3d at 67. Code necessar y

to lawful aspects of Windows is not code th e rem edy should requ ire be rem oved.

31

products and thereby has the effect of precluding commingling that would have the

an ticompetitive impact t his Court explained.9

3 . The Decree Addres s es Java Appropri a te l y

Appellants complain, Br. 29-34, the decree fails to (i) address Microsofts

un lawful condu ct t owar d Sun s J ava , and (ii) put Sun s pr oduct in a s favora ble a

competitive situ at ion a s it conceivably might ha ve rea ched absen t Microsofts

violat ion. Their compla int s fail to demonst ra te an a buse of discret ion.

The decree a ddresses J ava-relat ed actions th is Cour t foun d un lawful, 253 F.3d

at 75-78, thr ough prohibitions on exclusive dealing an d ret aliat ion, Sections I II.A,

III.F, and III.G, see 231 F . Supp. 2d at 164-65 (J .A.1622-24), 169-70 (J .A.1627-28)

181-83 (J .A.1637-40); see alsoid . at 165-68 (J .A.1623-27) (Microsoft Midd leware

Product includes functionality provided by . . . Microsofts Java Virtual Machine;

Microsoft Platform Software included Microsoft Middleware Products; Non-

Microsoft Middleware Product broadly defined; referenced provisions accordingly

apply). Appellan ts n itpick, Br. 33 n.12, but t he government an d th e cour t a nswered

th eir point s. 231 F. Sup p. 2d at 184 (J .A.1640); Response 264-269 (J .A.1268-70).

Alth ough t he s ingle insta nce (ended over five year s a go by court order ) of

Microsofts a tt empt ing to deceive J ava developers int o unwitt ingly writing Windows-


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33

device would likely result in decrea sed inn ovat ion a nd pr oduct impr ovemen t); see

also Sibley 80 (J.A.1113) (provision would impr operly preordain ma rk et

out comes), an d t he dist rict cour t ga ve similar r easons for r ejection in New York v.

Microsoft, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 188-90. Tellingly, app ellant s note tha t an oth er cour t

gran ted Su n t his rem edy as pr elimina ry relief against Microsoft, Br. 33, but omit

th at th e gran ting cour t would ha ve made th e same decision a s did J udge Kollar -

Kotelly were [it] called upon t o consider th e propriety of a m ust -carr y remedy in t he

context of deter minin g wheth er t o app rove th e proposed consen t decree in th e

Depart ment of Ju stice action. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 237 F.

Su pp. 2d 639, 656 (D. Md. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 03-1116 (4th Cir. J an . 22,

2003).

4. Appel lants Other Cri t ic i sms Misunders tand the Record and the

Decree

Appellants other criticisms fault the decree for not aiding Microsofts

competitors in ways unr elated to the un lawful conduct in this case. Thu s, for

example, th ey note th at th e decree n eith er ma ke[s] Windows API specificat ions

ava ilable t o direct OS compet itors nor requ ire[s] Microsoft t o disclose API

specifications for its middlewar e. Br. 38 n.13. This is tr ue, but t hese disclosur es

ar e unr elated to the cases liability th eory. The government never alleged th at

with holding OS API specificat ions from OS compet itors, or middlewar e API

specifications from middlewar e compet itors, was an ticompet itive.


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Similar ly, app ellant s compla in t ha t th e decrees API disclosur e pr ovisions

require Microsoft to reveal only those APIs used by Microsoft Middleware to

interoperat e with t he Windows Operat ing System Pr oduct, id . at 39 (quoting

decree Section III.D). Again , th is is tru e, but ir relevan t. The governm ent s case

rest ed on t he t heory th at Microsoft h ad a cted a nt icompet itively in a n effort t o boost

its own middlewar e an d stifle rival middlewar e becau se th ose products posed a

poten tia l plat form th reat . 231 F. Supp. 2d at 187 (J .A.1642). Section III.Ds

disclosure requirements prevent competitive products from being disadvantaged by

compar ison to Microsofts middlewa re t echnology, id ., by insu ring tha t non-

Microsoft middlewar e can use t he sa me APIs as t he Microsoft m iddleware with

which it compet es. Moreover, th e limit at ions on disclosur e appellan ts criticize do not

mea n[ ] . . . th at a Microsoft competitor can never offer middlewar e for u se on

Windows tha t does more th an compa ra ble Microsoft middlewar e. Br. 40. We

explained CCIAs err or ea rlier, Response 280 (J .A.1275) (noting t ha t ea rly web

browsers a chieved t heir r esults even t hough Microsoft th en h ad no compar able

middleware), and th e resu lts comput er pr ogramm ers can achieve ar e obviously not

limited t o wha t a n OSs APIs pr ovide; progra mm ers can writ e th eir own code.

Appellan ts claim th e decree is fat ally am biguous, Br. 42-46 (referr ing t o

Microsoft Middleware, Windows Operating System Product, interoperate, and

server opera tin g syst em pr oduct), but th e distr ict cour t, which ret ain s enforcement

jur isdiction, 2002 WL 31654530, at *16 (J .A.1669-70) (Fin al J udgm ent ; cour t ret ain s


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12The distr ict cour t r ejected just such pr oposals for similar rea sons in New Y ork

v. Microsoft. S ee 224 F. Su pp. 2d a t 185-86, 241-45.

13The claim is also factu ally misleading. The au toma tic deletion r equires u ser

confirm at ion, moves not deletes icons, a nd mu st be u nbias ed with r espect to

Microsoft pr oducts an d n on-Microsoft pr oducts, so tha t it is not u sed a s a sword

with wh ich Microsoft can a tt ack its compet itors. 231 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79

36

public interest, nor was an overall-procompetitive decree that included them. S ee 231

F. Supp. 2d at 175 (J .A.1632). Appellan ts a lso ar gue th at t he disclosur e provisions

should ha ve been mu ch more sweeping, so as t o un fett er th e opera tin g syst em

ma rk et. Br. at 36 (proposing an open source an d portin g requ iremen t). But t heir

pr oposals have no appar ent r elat ion t o Microsofts an tit ru st violat ions, rest ing

inst ead on appellan ts incorr ect r emedial th eory, see pp. 27-28 supra, tha t would

require sowing Microsofts fields with salt.12

Appellants critique of the decrees Technical Committee provisions, Br. 48-49,

simply misu nder sta nd[s] th e role of th at comm itt ee, 231 F. Sup p. 2d at 199

(J.A.1654). The cour t a na lyzed appellan ts crit icisms, id . at 198-200 (J .A.1652-54), as

did th e governm ent , Response 382-392 (J .A.1322-28), explain ing th e

misconceptions. In short, th at expert comm ittee is th ere to assist th e Depar tm ent

with t echn ical issues an d is not intended a s a substitu te for t he enforcement

au th orit y of th e United St at es. 231 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (J .A.1653).

Fina lly, appellan ts erroneously claim t ha t th e decree affirma tively ha rm s

someone (OEMs, p resu ma bly) becau se Section III(H)(3) gra nt [s] to Windows . . . t he

ability au toma tically to delete icons on t he desk top. Br. 49-50.13 The decree


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(J .A.1635-36).

37

pr ovision is not a gra nt ; it rest ricts wha t Microsoft ma y do. In a ny event , a distr ict

cour t should not r eject a n otherwise adequa te r emedy simply becau se a t hird pa rt y

claims it could be better tr eated. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 n.9.

CONCLUSION

The Court should affirm the denial of intervention, or, in the alternative, affirm

the final judgment in the a ntitru st case.

Respectfully submitted.

_______________________________

R. HE WITT PATE

Assistant Attorney General

DEBORAH P. MAJ ORAS

Deput y Assistan t A ttorney General

OF COUNSEL:

RENATA B. HESS E

PHILLIP R. MALONE

PAULA L. BLIZZARDPATRICIA A. BRINK

JEFFREY J. VANHOOREWEGHE

Attorneys


CATHERINE G. OSULLIVAN

DAVID SEIDMAN

Attorneys


601 D St reet, N .W.Wash ington, D.C. 20530

202-514-4510

In it ia l filing: June 18 , 20003

Final version: August 6, 2003


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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION,

TYP EFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYP E S TYLE REQUIREMENTS

1. This brief complies with t he type-volume limita tion of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)

an d th is Cour ts Ord er of Mar ch 26, 2003, becau se th is brief cont ain s 8,988 words ,

excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) andCircuit Rule 32(a)(2), an d, I h ave been in form ed by coun sel for Microsoft, Microsofts

brief cont ain s fewer th an 5000 words.

2. This brief complies with t he typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) an d

Circuit Ru le 32(a)(1) and th e type st yle requirem ent s of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6)

because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using

WordP erfect 10.0 in 12 point New Cen tu ry Schoolbook.

_________________________

David Seidma nAtt orn ey for t he Un ited Stat es

Dat ed: August 6, 2003


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STATUTORY ADDENDUM


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ADDENDUM A Statutes and Regulat ions

15 U.S.C. 16(c)-(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1


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A-1

The Tunn ey Act: 15 U.S.C. 16. Ju dgm en ts

(a) See Brief for Appel lants at A-3.

(b) See Brief for Appel lants at A-3.

(c ) Publ ica t ion o f s ummari es i n news papers

The Un ited Sta tes sh all also cau se to be published, commen cing at least 60 da ys

pr ior t o the effective da te of the jud gment described in su bsection (b) of this s ection,

for 7 da ys over a period of 2 weeks in n ewspaper s of genera l circulat ion of the distr ict

in which th e case h as been filed, in t he Distr ict of Columbia , and in su ch oth er

districts a s th e cour t m ay direct

(i) a su mm ar y of th e ter ms of th e proposal for t he consen t judgmen t,

(ii) a su mm ar y of th e compet itive impa ct st at emen t filed un der su bsection (b)

of this section,

(iii) an d a list of th e ma ter ials an d docum ent s un der su bsection (b) of th is

section which th e Un ited Sta tes sh all ma ke a vailable for pur poses of mean ingful

public commen t, an d th e place where such m at erials an d docum ents ar e available

for public inspection.

(d) Considerat ion of publ ic comm ents by Attorney Gene ral and publ icat ion

of respon se

Dur ing th e 60day per iod a s specified in su bsection (b) of th is section, a nd such

additional time as t he United States ma y request an d the court may grant, th e

Un ited Stat es shall receive and consider an y written comm ents r elating to the

pr oposal for t he consen t judgmen t su bmitt ed un der su bsection (b) of th is section. The

Att orn ey Genera l or his designee sha ll esta blish pr ocedures t o car ry out t he

pr ovisions of th is subsection, but such 60day t ime period sha ll not be sh orten ed

except by order of th e distr ict cour t u pon a showing tha t (1) extra ordin ar y

circum sta nces require such shortening an d (2) such sh ort ening is not a dverse t o th e

public int erest . At the close of th e period dur ing which su ch comm ent s ma y be

received, the U nited St at es sha ll file with th e district cour t an d cause t o be publishedin th e Federa l Register a r esponse t o such comm ents.


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A-2

(e) Pu bl ic interest dete rminat ion

Before ent ering an y consent judgment pr oposed by the Un ited Sta tes u nder th is

section, th e cour t sh all determine th at th e entr y of such judgment is in th e public

interest . For the pu rpose of such determina tion, the cour t m ay consider

(1) th e compet itive impact of such judgm ent , including t erm ina tion of alleged

violat ions, p rovisions for enforcement an d m odificat ion, du ra tion or r elief sough t,

anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other

considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;

(2) th e impact of ent ry of such judgmen t u pon th e public genera lly an d

individuals a lleging specific injur y from t he violat ions set fort h in t he compla int

includin g consider at ion of th e pu blic benefit, if an y, to be derived from a

determina tion of th e issues at tr ial.

( f) Procedu re for publ ic interest de terminat ion

In ma king its deter mina tion un der su bsection (e) of this section, th e cour t ma y

(1) tak e t estim ony of Governm ent officials or expert s or su ch oth er exper t

witnesses, upon motion of any par ty or par ticipant or upon its own motion, as th e

cour t m ay deem appr opriat e;

(2) appoint a special ma ster an d such outside consu ltan ts or expert witn esses

as th e cour t ma y deem appropriate; an d request an d obtain t he views,

evalua tions, or advice of any ind ividua l, group or a gency of govern men t withrespect t o an y aspects of th e proposed judgmen t or t he effect of such judgm ent , in

such mann er a s th e court deems a ppropriate;

(3) au th orize full or limited pa rt icipat ion in proceedings before t he cour t by

interest ed persons or agencies, including a ppeara nce amicus curiae, inter vention

as a par ty pur sua nt to the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure, examinat ion of

witnesses or docum enta ry mat erials, or par ticipation in an y oth er ma nn er an d

extent which serves th e public interest as t he cour t m ay deem appr opriat e;

(4) review an y comment s including an y objections filed with th e Un itedSta tes u nder subsection (d) of th is section concern ing th e proposed judgment an d

th e responses of th e United St at es to such comm ents a nd objections; an d

(5) ta ke such other a ction in th e public interest as t he cour t m ay deem

appropriate.


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A-3

(g) Fi l ing of w rit ten o r oral comm un icat ions w ith the dis trict court

Not lat er t ha n 10 da ys following th e dat e of the filing of any pr oposal for a

consen t judgm ent un der su bsection (b) of th is section, each defenda nt sha ll file with

th e distr ict cour t a description of an y and a ll writ ten or oral comm un icat ions by or on

beha lf of such defendan t, includin g any an d all writt en or ora l comm un icat ions onbeha lf of such defendan t, or oth er p erson, with an y officer or em ployee of the Un ited

Sta tes concerning or relevan t to such pr oposal, except t ha t an y such commu nicat ions

ma de by counsel of record a lone with th e Att orn ey Genera l or t he em ployees of th e

Depart ment of Ju stice alone sh all be excluded from th e requiremen ts of this

subsection. Pr ior to the entry of an y consent judgment pu rsu an t to the ant itru st

laws, each defenda nt sha ll certify to the distr ict cour t t ha t t he r equirements of this

subsection h ave been complied with an d t ha t such filing is a tr ue a nd complete

description of such communications known to the defendant or which the defendant

reasonably should have known.

(h) Inadmiss ibi l ity as evide nce of proceeding s before the dis trict court and

the compe t i tive impact s tatement

Pr oceedings before th e distr ict court un der subsections (e) an d (f) of this s ection,

an d th e compet itive impa ct st at emen t filed un der su bsection (b) of th is section, sha ll

not be adm issible against a ny defendan t in a ny action or pr oceeding brought by a ny

other pa rty against such defendant under t he ant itrust laws or by the United Stat es

un der section 15a of th is title nor const itu te a ba sis for t he int roduction of th e consen t

judgment a s prima facie evidence against such defendan t in a ny such a ction or

proceeding.


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ADDENDUM B Unpubl ished Opinions

Davis Broadcasting In c. v. FCC, 2003 WL 21186042 (D.C. Cir . May 16, 2003) . . . B-1


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Copr. West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

B-1

Slip Copy

(Cite as: 2003 WL 21186042 (D.C.Cir.))

Only the Westlaw citation is currently

available.

This case was not selected for publication in

the Federal Reporter.

Please use FIND to look at the applicable

circuit court rule before citing this opinion.

District of Columbia Circuit Rule 28(c). (FIND

CTADC Rule 28.)

United States Court of Appeals,

District of Columbia Circuit.

DAVIS BROADCASTING INC., of

Columbus Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, Appellee.

Clear Channel Broadcasting Licenses, Inc., et

al., Intervenors.

No. 02-1109.

May 16, 2003.

Appeal from an Order of the Federal

Communications Commission.

Before: EDWARDS, SENTELLE, and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

*1 This cause was considered on appeal from

an order of the Federal Communications

Commission and was briefed by counsel. It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the order

of the Federal Communications Commission

("FCC" or "Commission") is hereby affirmed.

Appellant Davis Broadcasting, Inc. ("Davis")

challenges an FCC decision approvingassignments of six broadcast radio licenses in

or near Columbus, Georgia, from Cumulus

Licensing Corp. ("Cumulus") to Clear Channel

Broadcasting Licenses, Inc. ("Clear Channel").

See In re Solar Broadcasting Co., Inc., 17

F.C.C.R. 5467, 2002 WL 424319 (2002)

("Solar Decision" ). Davis claims that the FCC

arbitrarily and capriciously failed to designate

an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 47 U.S.C.

309(d)(2), (e) to consider "substantial and

material question[s] of fact" before approvingthe applications to assign. In particular, Davis

argues that the Commission ignored "serious

questions about the applicants' qualifications

based on conduct and transactions involving

Davis' radio market" that appellant raised in a

petition to deny. See Appellant's Br. at 31. We

disagree.

Most of the alleged misdeeds concern licenses,

stations, and even parties different from those

immediately involved in the appealed

assignment determination. The one exception

is Davis' contention that the pre-assignment

Local Marketing Agreement between Cumulus


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify tha t on th is 6th day of August , 2003, I cau sed copies of th e foregoing

Brief for t he U nit ed Sta tes (Fina l Version) to be served electr onically in a ccordan ce

with Fed. R. App. P. 25(c)(1)(D) and by first class mail upon the following:

Kenneth W. Star r

Elizabeth P etrela

Kirkland & Ellis

655 Fifteent h Str eet NW

Suite 1200

Wash ington, DC 20005

kenn eth _st ar [email protected] lan d.com

elizabet h_pet rela @dc.kirk lan d.com

Counsel for Appellants

J ohn L. Warden

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

125 Broad Street

New York, NY 10004

wa rden j@su llcrom.com

Bradley P. Smith

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

1701 Penn sylvan ia Ave. NW

Wash ington, DC 20006smith br@su llcrom.com

Counsel for Appellee Microsoft Corp.

____________________________

David Seidma n

Documents

US Department of Justice Antitrust Case Brief - 00922-201212