U.S. Cold War Foreign Policy and the Neglect of East Timor: An Apology for Henry Kissinger

8/14/2019 U.S. Cold War Foreign Policy and the Neglect of East Timor: An Apology for Henry Kissinger

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An Apology for Henry Kiss inger

U.S. Cold War Foreign Policy and the Neglect

of East Timor: An Apology for Henry Kissinger

daniel henebery

the island of imor lies in the southeastern corner of the Indone-sian archipelago. For hundreds of years, imor was divided betweetwo colonial powers: the Dutch, who controlled the western halof the island, and the Portuguese, who controlled the eastern ha

as well as an enclave on the western half and a few small ouislands. Te western half of the island became part of the newlyated nation of Indonesia in 1949 when the Dutch granted independence to its Southeast Asian colonies. Portuguese imor, howeveremained a badly neglected backwater of Portugals colonial holdings. In the wake of the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Lisbothe Portuguese Government renounced any claim to those colonial

possessions and expressed interest in starting them on the roadindependence. Under pressure from Indonesias military leadershipPresident Suharto reacted in the summer of 1975 by making cvert and overt attempts to seize the colony that winter. Against taggression stood a vaguely leftist East imorese organization callFretilin, and its military wing Falintil led by Xanana Guzman anrepresented abroad by Jose Ramos-Horta, which sought immediate

independence for East imor. Te ill-equipped Fretilin melted intothe mountains of central imor, and waged a guerilla war fornext 24 years. In 1999, Indonesia relinquished control of the teritory and a U.N. sponsored provisional government took chargeuntil imor became fully independent in 2002.1

In January 2002, Te East imorese Provisional Govern-


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j o u r n a l o f u n d e r g r a d u a t e r e s e a r c h

ment (UN AE ) created the East imor Commission or Recep-tion, ruth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) in order to ascertain re-sponsibility or the invasion and 24-year occupation by Indonesia.On 19 January 2006 the President o East imor, Xanana Guzman,submitted that report, entitledChega! (Enough! in Portuguese) tothe United Nations; eleven days later the ull report was made public. Te extensive report details the only ofcial investigation everconducted to determine exactly what happened in the twenty- our

years rom the initial invasion in late 1975 to the difcult process oindependence in 1999.2

wo pages in the Responsibility section o this report dea with the role the United States played in the invasion o East imoTe report examines what the United States knew about Indone-sias intentions, what its motivations were, and the exact nature othe United States role in the invasion. It concludes that the United

States ailed to support the right o the East imorese people tsel -determination, and that its political and military support wereundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation. 3

Te report deduces that the U.S.s assessment o the impor-tance o good relations with Indonesia was the primary motivating

actor or the United States, and that the emphasis on Indonesiacombined with the assumption that the invasion could not be re-

versed was what maintained that position o inaction or twenty- ouyears even though it was ully within the abilities o Henry Kissingand other policymakers at the time to dissuade the Government oIndonesia.

Tis assessment coincides with the near universal consensuso the rather small group o cold war scholars such as Matthew Jdine, Noam Chomsky, Brad Simpson, and Christopher Hitchens4 as

well as members o concerned activist organizations such as the Eaimor Action Network (E AN). Tey hold that because the United

States did not intervene, did not cease its sale o arms, and essetially gave Indonesiacarte blanche to do as it pleased in East imor,the United States is partially to blame or the 24-year occupationand, by extension, all o the abuse that occurred in that time. Henr


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Kissinger, in particular, is the target o much criticism or his rothis event. Christopher Hitchens, even went so ar as to argueHenry Kissinger ought to be tried as a war criminal or his pathis event.5

Te limitation on this position is not in its spirit. Te crimecommitted in East imor can be counted the 20th among the worsto this century. Estimates as to the number o people killed r

rom 102,800 to as many as 300,000.6 Rather, the dominant in-

terpretation o the East imor invasion has tended to judge theevents outside the proper context o mid-1970s old war oreipolicy, which ollowed it rom the mid-1970s. As a consequenthere is a temptation to judge the motivations or the actions opolicymakers such as Henry Kissinger based on present standard with no eye to the Cold War mentality which dominated policythat era. While it is tempting to heap all the blame on Kissing

shoulders, it is more important to understand how easily Kissingcould have cast aside all consideration or East imor or the saU.S. interests. In order to learn rom this mistake it is rst neceto understand how it could happen so easily. Tus, the best wayexamine the invasion is to understand East imor as Kissinger d When this is done properly the question, what else could have bdone? becomes harder to answer.

o this end I shall evaluate the United States role in thedonesian invasion o East imor, using the declassi ed documenthe National Security Archive gave to CAVR in combination witother period documents obtained through the Freedom o In or-mation Act. In this way I will clari y that Kissingers actions, wcertainly supportive o the invasion, refected the U.S. oreign polimindset o his time. While these actions were reprehensible, the p

vailing logic could not have allowed or any other outcome.o ground this examination in the mindset o U.S. polic

makers in 1975, I will rst examine the historical backgroundSoutheast Asia and the United States role there in the years leadup to the invasion. Next, I will examine the invasion itsel andthe United States responded during and in the early a termath o


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to the President or National Security A airs at the time, admittas much in a report delivered to Assistant Secretary o State oEastern A airs William A. Harriman. Tere is little or no sensenational or territorial identity, Rostow wrote o East imor, as tPortuguese have pursued a policy designed to isolate the populatio

rom the outside world. Hence he concluded, Portuguese imocould hardly exist as an independent entity. Realistically, it has oone possible utureas a part o Indonesia. Te report acknowl-

edged that Indonesia maintained no ofcial claim to East imor butobserved that, they do have a right to press, under the U.N. chaor economic social and political progress.7 Tus, the U.S. rowned

on Portuguese neglect o East imor, and recognized the optimcourse or the colony lay in integration into Indonesia.

Te United States, however, could not endorse an Indonesiantakeover o East imor. Te paragraph entitled U.S. Interests pin-

pointed the determining actor o policy in imor as preservingU.S. naval bases in the Azores, to which, the document stated, attach great importance.8 Te document reveals that, surprisingly,the deciding actor had nothing to do with Indonesia. Te UnitedStates resolved to side with Portugal in order to preserve its milibases in the Azores. Te lesser importance o Indonesia in this pore ects the mentality be ore the all o South Vietnam, when

spread o communism in Europe was still seen as the greater thTere is, however, evidence o some concern. Te memo impliedthat i Indonesia were to invade East imor, it would be highlyrimental to U.S.-Indonesian relations and would make large scaleconomic aid impossible.9 Tis concern is one which also arises in1975. Unable to condone Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian ag-gression or East imorese independence the document suggests that

the United States best course o action would be to maintainstatus quo by using various incentives and warnings to encouraIndonesia to re rain rom acting aggressively in imor. Te couro action suggested in the report, and the actors and assumptio which governed it, bear a signi cant resemblance to those o acade later. Te decision not to act in de ense o East imor was


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an arbitrary or hasty decision on the part o one administration, burather the implementation o a long-standing element o the UnitedStates oreign policy in Southeast Asia.

Next, there is the question o the state o Indonesias intenal political situation in 1975. Te political situation in Indonesiain the months and years leading up to the decision to invade wadeeply scrutinized by the United States due to the importance oIndonesia to the American oreign policy in Southeast Asia. o un

derstand the political situation in Indonesia at the time, one mustunderstand the crucial role the military played in the IndonesianGovernment. President Suharto was, like his American counterpart,the Commander-in-Chie o his armed orces, but Suharto owed amore to his military chie s and advisors than the president o thUnited States. Tis is due in part to historic precedent and in partto the act that Suharto himsel was once a general. Many o

embassy dispatches and the CIA brie ng papers mention not onlySuhartos intent but also what his generals were urging him to doIn these papers and other accounts Suharto seems ar more reluctantto press orward on the compulsory takeover o East imor thahis generals. Suhartos main concern was maintaining good relations with the United States, which he speculated any aggression againstEast imor would sour. Brad Simpson, the director o the National

Security Archives Indonesia/East imor Documentation project,speculates that the generals, unlike Suharto, were motivated by aperceived threat posed by an independent nation in a region notori-ously prone to separatist sentiment, by the lure o possible economicgain in the orm o oil which was known to exist in the imorbetween imor and Australia, and by the assumption that the subjugation o imor would be simple and quickly resolved.10

Te event that de ned Indonesias internal political situa-tion, at this time occurred in 1965 with a coup attempt, allegedlyconducted by thePartai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the IndonesianCommunist Party. On 1 October 1965, several Indonesian generals were kidnapped and subsequently executed by various junior of-cers. In the a termath o these assassinations, a new government w


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declared. General Suharto, with the backing o the army violentsuppressed the coup and denounced PKI as the perpetrator. Dis-credited or ailing to denounce the PKI or its supposed role,sufering rom ill health, President Sukarno yielded his position tGeneral Suharto in 1966. Suhartos denunciation o the PKI ignitea urious anti-communist backlash. Between 1965 and 1966, abou500,000 alleged communists were killed by the Indonesian Army

and Indonesian vigilante groups. Te

violence that ollowed the coup deci-mated the PKI and de nitively estab-lished Indonesia as an anti-communistnation.11

As declassi ed State Departmentdocuments reveal, however, the PKIhad no role in the coup. Rather, the

coup, the denunciation o the PKI, thebacklash, and the trans er o power toSuharto were all part o a plot by theIndonesian Army to oust Sukarnos re-gime or one o their own which wouldtake a harsher stance against commu-nism. Although the State Department

was privy to all o this in ormation, iturned a blind eye since the entire event would ensure that a wedge would be

driven between Indonesia and the communist powers in the world.12In the a termath o the coup, Suharto initiated his N

Order Government, which was ar more authoritarian than itspredecessor. It banned the PKI along with labor parties, and inst

tuted state-sponsored censorship o the press. Meanwhile, Indonesiabegan to take a more active role in the international communitySuharto paid particular attention to Western nations while distanc-ing himsel rom China, which had maintained riendly relatio with the Sukarno regime. Suharto also opened Indonesia to Westeraidsomething his predecessor had re used to do.13

Suharto seems farmore reluctant topress forward on thecompulsory takeoverof East Timor than hisgenerals. Suhartos

main concern wasmaintaining goodrelations with theUnited States, whichhe speculated anyaggression against

East Timor wouldsour.


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to involve itsel in events transpiring on the island o imor, bunonetheless urged the general to advise his government to act withprudence.19

Perhaps most important was Indonesias placement on themap. As an archipelago o islands between mainland Asia and Autralia, Indonesia was in a unique position to control the sea lanes between the Paci c and Indian Oceans. Te Strait o Malacca, whichpasses between the Malay Peninsula and the island o Sumatra, an

Indonesian territory, in particular is o vital importance both to world trade and the U.S. Navy. A huge amount o shipping passethrough this strait every year including oil rom the Middle Easbound or Japan, a U.S. ally.20 Essentially, the southwestern cornero the Paci c Ocean revolved strategically and economically aroundIndonesia.

Indonesias geographic and economic signi cance enhanced

its political signi cance in the battleground o the Cold War. Tus,the United States policy o containment looked to Indonesia as acountry o particular importance. In contrast to Indonesias per-ceived importance, then, East imor did not seem to merit seriousconsideration in the mind o Henry Kissinger.

II: Invasion

Troughout the period o Indonesian aggression against Eastimor, rom the winter o 1974 to the winter o 1975, the Indon

sians made an efort to maintain the aade o legitimacy. PresidentSuharto regarded with apprehension the Indonesian takeover o East

imor, as he realized that it would cause an uproar in the international community, especially in Australia and the United States,

with whom Indonesia had good reason to maintain close ties. wicein the months leading up to the invasion, major Indonesian policychanges towards East imor occurred immediately a ter Suhartoconsulted with President Ford and Henry Kissinger: once, on 5 July1975, just be ore Suharto rst declared the possibility o integratingEast imor into Indonesia; and on 6 December 1975, the day be ore


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Indonesia invaded.21 On the other hand, as Suharto also had to dea

with internal pressure rom his generals, he adopted a cautiousproach to the invasion and continuously tested the waters with thUnited States.

While overt military action against East imor commencedon 7 December 1975 with an airborne invasion o Dili, Indonesimilitary preparations actually began in January 1975. At that timea military project known as Operation Komodo was launched with

the aim o undermining stability in Portuguese imor so as tocredit the possibility o gradual independence that Fretilins leadership had proposed earlier in the previous year. Tis operation bega with a airly overt propaganda campaign designed to stir up riries between Fretilin, UD (the imorese Democratic Union), and Apodeti in East imor. 22 In 1975 these political groups were distin-guished by their difering ideas o what East imors uture ought

be. Apodeti, by ar the smallest group, supported integration inIndonesia; UD initially supported autonomy under Portuguesesovereignty, but a ter the Portuguese indicated they had no interein such an arrangement, violence broke out between these twotions and UD ultimately sided with Apodeti against Fretilin. Temost popular o the groups, Fretilin won control o East imormoved the country toward ull independence in spite o Indonesi

best eforts to the contrary.Ten, in February o 1975, the Indonesian military carried

out an amphibious exercise in South Sumatra, which the UniteStates Consulate in Surbaya viewed as a rehearsal or a possiblesion o East imor. Te consulate reported being struck by similaties between terrain and style o this exercise, and [what] wouldinvolved in [an] Indonesian operation to seize Dili. Te exerciseobserved in February matched in great detail the operation to taDili later in December o that year. Just as with the actual inva[the] exercise included [a] vertical envelopment [an] amphibiousassault o nearby beach area[s], and naval bombardment23 WhileU.S. intelligence noted this event, the general population ignoredthe exercise with no major newspaper in the United States coveri


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either the operation or the ways in which it oreshadowed the actuainvasion.

In East imor, Operation Komodos initial goals o propa-ganda and intelligence gathering began to expand greatly in March.Te Indonesian military initiated a second operation, Flamboyan, which would work concurrently with Operation Komodo, but em-phasize the use o East imorese insurgentsprimarily Apodetimemberswho might directly infuence the political uture o East

imor. Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces Command, or-dered that a special orces group begin training or operations in tborderlands o East imor. In late April, these soldiers deployed to Atambua, the Komodo headquarters, and began training Apodetivolunteers and conducting reconnaissance patrols into East imorin preparation or intervention.24

Teir chance came later that summer. Te Portuguese an-

nounced on 17 July that East imor would be ully independent bythe summer o 1976, and on 29 July that district elections wouldtake place. Te results o that election heavily avored Fretilin, withUD winning roughly a third o the popular vote and Apodeti lenearly unrepresented. A ter the vote, UD made an attempt to seizecontrol o Dili, but Fretilin swi tly responded and be ore the eno August East imor was under Fretilins control.25 Soon a ter, the

Apodeti volunteers and the Indonesian Special Forces, crossed intoEast imor with the intent o initiating an insurgency along theborder and undermining Fretilins control o East imor, both prac-tically and in the eyes o the international community. As govern-ment-controlled Indonesian press played up the turmoil in imor,Indonesia hoped that the image o an island about to rip itsel apin civil war would be enough or Portugal to authorize Indonesia t

intervene militarily.26

Indonesian orces began to openly assist in the border in-cursions shortly be ore 8 October, when Henry Kissinger was in-

ormed by his sta that Fretilin had reported increased Indonesianmilitary activity o the increased aggression.27 wo months later, on7 December 1975, Indonesia made its intentions absolutely explicit,


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other and none seeking our help. 29 At President Ford and Henry

Kissingers meeting with President Suharto in December 1975, Pres-ident Ford articulated the above policy to the Indonesian president.He assured President Suharto that our country-to-country relation-ships are very important and vowed to continue the U.S.s stronginterest in and infuence in the Paci c, Southeast Asia, and Asiadespite the severe setback o Vietnam.30 Fords statement empha-sized the primacy o U.S.-Indonesian relations and did not deal spe-

ci cally with East imor, however, only giving a broad outline o thU.S.s policy priorities in Southeast Asia. Later in the conversation,Suharto directly asked how the U.S. would react to any action takenby Indonesia in East imor. Kissinger urged Suharto: It is impor-tant that whatever you do succeeds quickly, adding that he wouldbe able to infuence the reaction in America i whatever happens,happens a ter we return. Tis way there would be less chance o

people talking in an unauthorized way.31

rue to his word, almostimmediately a ter the invasion, Henry Kissinger announced that theUnited States would not recognize Fretilin as the legitimate govern-ment o East imor, at the same time making no acknowledgemento Indonesias claims to East imor.

Tis course o action still le t the United States and Indonesia with a dilemma which Kissinger alluded to in his brie ng to Fo

prior to the December meeting with Suharto. Kissinger cautionedFord that any overt Indonesian military move into the territory,[would] inevitably us[e] U.S.-supplied weapons in the process.32

Te weapons used in the invasion o East imor would undoubt-edly be provided to Indonesia as a result o programs such as thForeign Military Sales Act (FMS) and the Military Assistance Pro-gram (MAP), both o which had become the primary source o a

or Indonesias military. By the terms o those programs, howeverthese weapons could only be used or de ensive purposes. Te lawsurrounding FMS and MAP state that any country which was oundin substantial violation o the terms under which the aid was give would be immediately ineligible or the direct aid granted by MAand the cash sales, credits, or guarantees o ered through the FMS


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Act.33 Kissinger knew that the Indonesian invasion o East im

would require the use o U.S. military equipment in an overtlyensive role. Tis use o these weapons, he eared, could incitegress to compel a withdrawal o U.S. aid much in the same waU.S. withdrew support to urkey due to its use o weapons agaiCyprus. Tis withdrawal o support, in turn, would create a ri t btween the United States and Indonesia, something which both side wanted to avoid.34

In order to preserve an amicable relationship with the U. while continuing to pursue its policies in East imor, Indonesineeded to maintain the appearance o impartiality. Tus, Indone-sia launched a propaganda campaign designed to obscure the trunature o the violence in East imor. In the latter part o 1975state-controlled newspaper, theIndonesian Times , ran two or threearticles a week about East imor designed to propagate misin o

mation about the situation there to suggest that Indonesia had thpopular support o the East imorese. On 5 December 2006,instance, theIndonesian Times reproduced East imors declarationo integration. UD , Apodeti, and two other minor political partiessigned this document requesting ormal integration o East imointo Indonesia. Between them, these parties claimed they had thsupport o the majority o East imor.35 On another occasion, when

the Indonesians began using AC-47 Spooky gunships againstFretilin, theIndonesian Times reported that East imorese native andadvocate abroad, Jose Ramos-Horta, had accused Australian civilians o using a private airplane to bomb Fretilin positions.36 Temost in amous example o deception occurred on 16 October 19 when ve Australian journalists were killed in Balibo while atteming to validate Fretilins claim that there were Indonesian soldieactively participating in the violence in the borderlands. In responsIndonesia blamed the violence on Apodeti and even went so ardiscredit the reporters story by characterizing them as combatantsDays later, theIndonesian Times ran an article which suggested Aus-tralian civilians had been discovered in East imor supplying armto Fretilin.37 Collectively, these articles refect the extent to which


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the Indonesian government went to obscure their activities.In addition, Kopassus utilized, as much as they could, the

Soviet military hardware that remained in Indonesian arsenals romthe Sukarno era in order to avoid violation o the treaty and to dguise the act that they were supplying Apodeti with arms. Te In-donesian Special Forces armed themselves and their Apodeti allies with Soviet-style AK-47 assault rifes and 90mm Yugoslavian rocketlaunchers. Tough the quality o these arms was in erior, the Indo-

nesians did not use the M-16 and other readily available Americanarms until a ter the invasion had taken place. In the rare cases whthey could not avoid using U.S. arms, such as the AC-47 gunshipthe Indonesian markings were painted over and their use denied.38

Tis propaganda was more or consumption by the generalpopulation in Indonesia, the U.S., Australia and elsewhere than byU.S. policymakers. Te CIA was aware at least in September o the c

vert military action o Kopassus39

and Henry Kissinger was in ormedo the increase in overt Indonesian activity in early October.40 As aras the general public in the U.S. was concerned, however, the situation in imor seemed ar less interesting. TeNew York Times ran adozen or so articles on East imor be ore the invasion, all o whreported a version o events which closely mirrored Indonesias account as presented in theIndonesian Times . Both newspapers report,

and ail to report, the same acts about the situation in East imoFor instance, like its Indonesian counterpart, theNew York Times repeatedly described Fretilin as le tist or Maoist, implying thatthe confict in East imor was one o communist expansion. A StateDepartment report rom the same period, in contrast, more aptlycharacterized Fretilin as primarily a nationalist movement and onlyvaguely le tist, with no major connections to the worlds major

communist powers.41

In general, Indonesias strategy or maintaininggood relations with the United States in the course o their subjugation o East imor largely relied upon a campaign o misin ormation. Te Indonesian military reasoned (correctly) that relatively ewpeople would care about East imor due to its small size, low impotance, and its dubious status as an independent nation.


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However, there is some indication that Indonesian propa-ganda may have had an efect within the upper echelons o Upolicymakers, as well. In one o Henry Kissingers staf meetings August o 1975, Assistant Secretary Habib re erred to Fretilin acommunist-dominated group.42 Kissingers own interpretation oFretilin is not clear, nor is the degree to which he believed thatcommunist powers o the world would attempt to exploit an indpendent East imor. As long as the invasion succeeded quickly

saw little chance that any trouble would come o East imor.reasoned that to do anything at all would only draw attention to tinvasion and the U.S.s connection to it, and that the best courseaction would be to do nothing and deal with the opposition whit arose. Domestic opposition to the invasion was predictable an(as will be shown in the next section) could be circumvented. Innational opposition was limited to a hand ul o nations who w

unlikely to act on East imors behal and the United Nations.Te most likely oreign power to come to East imors astance was the Peoples Republic o China, one o the ew natiorecognize the sovereignty o East imor and a source o undsEast imorese government in exile in Mozambique. Te Chineseeven toyed with the idea o dispatching arms and advisors to imbut re rained due to Indonesian naval superiority.43 Furthermore,

the small ethnic Chinese population in East imor represented asigni cant orce in the countrys economy.44 Despite this, the U.S.did not ear that East imor would become the Cuba o South Asia. During President Suhartos meeting with Henry Kissinger anPresident Ford, the question o Chinese aggression was discusse When Suharto asked what likely Chinese oreign policy changcould be expected in the wake o the all o South Vietnam, H

Kissinger replied, We believe that China does not have expansionaims now. We cannot predict what the situation will be in ve yeRight now their rst concern is the Soviet Union and their secoVietnam.45 Kissinger believed that despite their sympathies towardsFretilin, the Chinese would not risk an international incident oveEast imor.


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0

Te initial reaction rom the United Nations was swi t anddirect. On 12 December 1975, the United Nations General Assem-bly passed a resolution calling on Indonesia to withdraw its troops.Indonesia balked at this, and on 22 December the U.N. SecurityCouncil passed a resolution to dis-patch a act nding expedition andagain called or Indonesia to removeits troops. A third such call was issued

on 22 April 1976.46

Te United Statesand Indonesia reacted predictably. TeUnited States abstained in all o thosevotes, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan,the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. re-ceived instructions to vote againstor abstain rom any resolution that

would antagonize Indonesia. For itspart, Indonesia maintained its de ensethat it had the support o the East i-morese, and did little else apart romprotesting the calls or its withdrawal. According to the CIA, the Indonesiansdid not take seriously the U.N.s resolutions and regarded them as

mere slap on the wrist.47

Te invasion o East imor presented U.S. policymakerssuch as Henry Kissinger with a difcult choice between alienatingIndonesia and creating a potentially unstable, le tist country in anarea which had considerable signi cance or U.S. strategic interests.In addition, the U.S. risked alienating Indonesia either by prevent-ing them rom invading, or by allowing the invasion to take plac

and thereby risk breaking the terms o FMS and MAP. Given sucha choice, Kissinger and Ford ollowed what they perceived would bthe least detrimental course in terms o U.S. interests in the regioas a whole. Te initial response o the United States, in giving tacapproval and support or Indonesias invasion with the hope o minimizing the political repercussions rom the use o U.S. weapons

The most likelyforeign power tocome to East Timorsassistance was thePeoples Republic of China, one of the fewnations to recognizethe sovereignty of East Timor and asource of funds forthe East Timoresegovernment in exilein Mozambique.


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ultimately did not turn out as Kissinger had hoped it would. TU.S. had encouraged Indonesia to see that the invasion was carriout quickly and without much trouble. Yet, Fretilin had escapeand continued to resist in the mountains. Tus, the United Statescontinued to ace pressure rom the U.N. General Assembly, rCongress, rom East imor itsel , and rom Indonesia or yearsthe invasion took place.

III: Aftermath of the Invasion

Te Indonesian occupation o East imor lasted until 1999, when Indonesian troops withdrew and the U.N. provisional govern-ment took control in East imor. In actuality, however, a sensecomplacency with the Indonesian occupation in East imor onlygrew in the United States as time went by. While concerned part

in the U.S. continued to protest the occupation, the issue generallreceded rom the spotlight it had never occupied. Te bulk o Upolicy changes with regard to the 24 year occupation o East ioccurred in the rst ew years, and though the issue was not oten a terwards its importance aded greatly.

Henry Kissinger had hoped that the invasion o East im would end quickly and with minimal con ict. In this way, the

mer colony would be peace ully incorporated into Indonesia and thgovernments o the United States and Indonesia could avoid embarassment. Tis assumption seemed reasonable at the time since Eas

imor had been a possession o another country or over ourdred years. However, perhaps due to the brutality o the Indonestactics used leading up to the invasion, this did not come to p As a report rom the U.S. Consulate in Surabaya predicted in e

1975, Indonesias logistics capabilities and support rom the populace were insufcient support or a campaign in the difcult terraino imors interior.48 Fretilin used this to its advantage, retreatingto the interior and holding out or the twenty- our year durationthe occupation. Indonesia thus ound itsel entangled in a situatio

rom which it could not easily extricate itsel .


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Indonesia responded brutally to East imorese resistance, with numerous attempts to purge the interior o Fretilin orces.Tese attempts claimed the lives o ar more East imorese civilianthan they did o members o Fretilin; by 1999, countless imoresehad lost their lives. Tese atrocities were mostly ignored by the in-ternational community, due to apathy and to the stranglehold Indo-nesia had on in ormation moving in and out o imor. Nonetheless,allegations o human rights violations sur aced, and Indonesia was

orced to revert once again to a campaign o misin ormation to coceal its policies in East imor. In 1980, the Chie o In ormatio Afairs at the Indonesian Embassy issued a press release enumeratingthe bene ts Indonesia provided or the people o East imor anddenying any wrongdoing by the government o Indonesia.49

Tough the United States had intended to distance itsel asmuch as possible rom the invasion, Indonesias problem became the

United States problem. As U.S. policymakers in the State Depart-ment had anticipated, Indonesias use o U.S. weapons in the inva-sion did not go unnoticed by the U.S. Congress. Almost immediate-ly, lawmakers such as Senator om Harkin and Senator Gary Hartbegan to protest that the Indonesians had used U.S. weapons in anofensive role, thus calling into question the validity o Indonesiasparticipation in the MAP and FMS programs.50 Tis was something

which Henry Kissinger desperately wanted to avoid, since cutting ofIndonesia rom military aid would both weaken the U.S.s key allySoutheast Asia and compromise the U.S.s reputation in the area.

On 14 April 1976, Senators Hubert Humphrey and Cli -ord Case launched a Congressional inquiry to determine whether

U.S. FMS and MAP aid to Indonesia should continue in light othe illegal use o U.S. arms in East imor. Te senators requested

in ormation rom the State Department on the use o Indonesian weapons in East imor, citing concern over the legality o this use American weapons as well as concern that precedent would encour-age other countries involved in the program to use in a more aggressive manner the weapons the U.S. had given them.51 In response,the State Department dispatched a summary o the events which


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transpired in 1975.52 Based on this, the congressional inquiry con-

cluded that the issue o continued military aid or Indonesia shobe tabled until the Security Assistance Bill or the scal year 1 was put orward. Te Senate Foreign Relations Committee recom-mended, however, that no urther aid be provided to the Government o Indonesia.53

Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, wanted to avoid anyterruption o aid to Indonesia or ear that it would harm U.S.-I

nesian relations. o this end, the StateDepartment prepared a contingencyplan whereby the U.S. would continueto provide aid to Indonesia indirectly,i the congressional inquiry led to atermination in Indonesias participa-tion in MAP and FMS. Te memo-

randum which details this warns thatin the event o a congressional suspen-sion in aid, there would be no othermeans to prevent a strong Indonesianreaction other than to have programs

ready on basis o which we can hope ully reassure Indonesiansthey will still have access to equipment o American type and m

acture.54

In addition to nding ways to circumvent a congressionaban on military aid to Indonesia, Kissinger and the State Deparment made eforts to deceive Congress. For instance, when the congressional inquiry requested speci c in ormation on exactly whic weapons were used and in what capacity, the State Departments rport did not include this in ormation, although the National Secu-rity Council had compiled a very detailed account o U.S. militequipment used by Indonesia by 12 December 1975.55

Kissinger also realized that there would not be a congressnal suspension in aid i Congress already believed aid had beenof. Tere ore, while no cutof in aid was ever authorized, Kissingeattempted to make Congress believe it had been. A memo r

These atrocities weremostly ignored bythe internationalcommunity, dueto apathy and to

the strangleholdIndonesia had oninformation movingin and out of Timor.


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the State Department dated 17 May in ormed General Scowcro tthat, at Secretary Kissingers direction, [the Department o State]in January 1976 quietly stopped certi ying to [the Department oDe ense] the delivery o urther military equipment to Indonesia. While this did not constitute an ofcial suspension in aid, withoutthis certi cation, the Department o De ense could not give any weapons or training to the Indonesian Military.56 In actuality, how-ever, aid to Indonesia never ceased. In Kissingers sta meeting on

June 1976 Kissinger asked Assistant Secretary Habib i the militarsupply position had been reopened with Indonesia. Habib repliedthat the supply position ha[d] never been shut down. o this, Kissinger retorted, Come onyou know what Im asking you. Habibanswered that, new commitments [were] being made.57 A less am-biguous example is the State Departments reply to an Australianinquiry as to the uture o U.S. aid to Indonesia. Australia asked

were true that aid was being suspended. In reply, the Department oState assured its ally that, there had been no suspension o aid athat Secretary [Kissinger]was rm in his desire to avoid any sucaction.58 Kissingers e orts to preserve the ow o U.S. military ato Indonesia succeeded, despite Congresss threats to the contrary.In 1977, the year in which Indonesian aid was scheduled or congressional review, Indonesia received an additional $23.1 million in

FMS credits.59

Tough the cuto o aid had been avoided, the U.S. stildesired that Indonesia end the con ict in East imor as soon as posible. Despite the best e orts o Indonesia and the U.S. to minimizthe political allout o the invasion, the Soviet Union, China, anmany third world and nonaligned countries were still leveling criti-cisms at both nations. Te United States, in turn, began to tailorits military aid grants to t the needs o the Indonesian problem

imor in the hope that this would expedite the destruction o Fretilin and bring an end to the con ict. Te U.S. began to provide OV10F Bronco attack/observation aircra t,60 which had been used togood e ect in Vietnam as an anti-insurgency plat orm. Te aircra tcould also be used in the deployment o chemical de oliants and h


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bicides, which would deprive insurgents o concealment. Over timethe situation in East imor reached a stalemate. Fretilin could npush the Indonesians out o the country, and Indonesian militar

orce could not dislodge Fretilin rom the countrys highlands.Meanwhile, the United States grew complacent, i not com

ortable, with the situation in East imor. For the policymakersthe time, East imor became a non-issue. Henry Kissinger has rarspoken o his role in East imor, and his substantial memoirs do

mention imor at all. Carters and Fords memoirs similarly avoithis issue.61 Jimmy Carters silence on this issue is particularly not worthy as human rights were one o the major tenets o hispolicy. In act, rom approximately 1977 on, East imor disappealmost entirely rom high level State Department and White Houdocuments. In a 1977 memo entitled East Asia: Where do WStand, Where are We Going? rom Jimmy Carters National Sec

rity Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the subject o East imor is nementioned. Moreover, the issue o human rights in Asia is mtioned only once towards the end, at which point Brzezinski writOur example , remains our most e ective source o infuence. Noeven in a similar memo written speci cally about the United Statrelations with Indonesia does the topic o East imor arise.62

Te East imorese, recognizing that their only chance o

independence lay in moving external powers to pressure Indonesito end the occupation, became as vocal as they possibly couldthe international stage. As a result, the champions or East imbecame that group o scholars and concerned individuals who suported East imor in the ways they could. Jose Ramos-Horta capaigned endlessly or his country; however, his pleas ell on deaIt was not until late in the Clinton administration that U.S. polic

reed rom Cold War concerns, began to withdraw aid and pressthe Indonesian government to end the occupation o imor. WhenSuharto resigned, it became only a matter o time be ore Indonestroops were nally withdrawn.


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Conclusion

oday East imor is one o the worlds newest, smallest, anpoorest countries. Its passage to independence is a truly remarkableaccomplishment, as East imor had next to no support and yet wasable to sustain itsel using stolen andhomemade weapons or twenty- ouryears in the ace o extreme brutality at

the hands o Indonesia. When NoamChomsky says that the United Statesinaction in East imors time o need was criminal, he is correct.63 But howcould this have happened?

As it turns out, quite eas-ily. Te decisions made and policies

implemented by Henry Kissinger andhis State Department, while certainly distaste ul, coincided with thelogic o the Cold War. Furthermore, any potential course o actionin which the United States sided with East imor against Indonesia was inconceivable due to the state o Southeast Asia in 1975. I1975, the all o South Vietnam was a huge blow to U.S. interests Asia. It seemed as though the domino theory was about to be co

rmed. Indonesia represented a chance or the U.S. to stop commu-nism in an area which held immense importance or U.S. strategicinterests, while to the United States, East imor represented nothingmore than a stumbling block.

Kissinger had two courses o action. Te U.S. could side witha poor, le tist, strategically unimportant colony which had lackeddetermination or centuries, and whose viability as an independent

nation was in doubt. Alternatively, the United States could side witha large, airly well-of, rmly anti-communist nation, that was alsoa producer o oil, de acto gatekeeper o the sea routes between theIndian and Paci c Oceans, and an established ally o the UnitedStates. Perhaps that is why Kissinger rarely spoke o East imorhnever saw it as signi cant enough to mention.

The United Statesgrew complacent,

if not comfortable,with the situationin East Timor. Forthe policymakers atthe time, East Timorbecame a non-issue.


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Te eleventh o July 1995, however, was one o the rarecasions on which Henry Kissinger spoke on his role in East imHe was con ronted by Constancio Pinto, a native o East im who once acted as the head o the East imorese undergroundseveral years be ore being arrested and tortured. Pinto asked Hery Kissinger about his justi cation or the United States inactidespite its oreknowledge o the event. Kissinger replied, We hso many problems to deal withWe had just been driven out

VietnamWe were conducting negotiations in the Middle East andLebanon had blown up. He also pointed out that Goa, a ormPortuguese colony had previously been absorbed into India withouincident and that Angola, another Portuguese colony was racked bcivil war. In both these cases, the United States had ample reanot to become involved, and East imor seemed at the time to haelements o both. He went on to admit that, regrettably we were

ever thinking about imor....Nobody had the oggiest idea o wh would happen a terwards.Now theres been a terrible human tragedy in imor.64 Indeed, 1975 was, as Kissinger points out, a verdifcult year or the United States, and nowhere more so thanSoutheast Asia. A ter the all o South Vietnam and Cambodia,last thing the United States wanted was another signi cant oreipolicy loss in that region.

Finally, Kissingers response to Pinto matches the sentimeno the meeting transcripts, dispatches, and memoranda detailing thpolicy choices made regarding Indonesia and East imor in 1975It is difcult to trust Kissingers memoirs in this matter, as it seethat his choice to abstain rom mentioning East imor, and to barever mention Indonesia, re ects the negative light in which the isscasts him; the act that this portion o his memoirs was publishe

1999, the same year that East imorese Independence was assuremay also have in uenced the admission. Kissingers memoirs doveal that in 1975 the U.S. government was primarily concerned wthe de eat o South Vietnam, the expansionism o North Vietnathe collapse o Cambodia, and the improvement o Sino-Americarelations.65


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Te CAVR report is entirely correct when it states that theUnited States was partially responsible or the invasion o East imoLikewise, it is appropriate or individuals such as Noam Chomskyand the members o E AN to express indignation at this ailurin U.S. oreign policy. However, tocriticize the decisions o policymakersthree decades a ter the act, withoutan appreciation or either the events

which infuenced those decisions, oror the mindset o the Cold War thatramed them, serves little purpose.

Without this kind o understanding,one cannot claim to have learned romthe mistakes made by Henry Kissingerand ellow policymakers which caused

the tragedy in East imor.

Endnotes

1Costancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine. East Timors Unfnished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance (Boston, MA: SouthEnd P), 1996, 1-59; James Dunn, East Timor: a Rough Passage to Independence (Double Bay, Australia: Longueville Books), 1983, 45-101.2Commission or Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor.International Center or Transitional Justice. 21 Nov. 2006 Available romhttp://www.ictj.org/en/news/ eatures/846.html3Ibid., 91-92.4 Jardine and Pinto, 1-3; Foreword by Noam Chomsky in Richard Tanter,Desmond Ball, and Gerry Van Klinken, eds., Masters o Terror: Indonesias

Military and Violence in East Timor (New York: Rowman & Littlefeld), 2006, ix-x; Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beauti ully: the United States, the Indonesian

Invasion o East Timor and the International Community, 1974-76.Cold War History 5 (2005): 305; Christopher Hitchens, Trial o Henry Kissinger (New York: Verso), 2001, 90-95.5Christopher Hitchens, interview by Eugene Jarecki,The Trials o Henry Kissinger , 2002, DVD.6For low estimates o the number killed, see Romesh Silva and Patrick Ball,The Profle o Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999.Benetech Human

Indonesiarepresented a chancefor the U.S. to stop

communism in anarea which heldimmense importancefor U.S. strategicinterests, while to theUnited States, East

Timor representednothing more than astumbling block.


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Rights Data Analysis Group 2006, 21 Nov. 2006 . For a higher estimate see Gabriel De ert,Timor Est: Gnocide Oubli.Droit dun Peuple et Raisons dEtats (Paris: Editions LHarmattan), 1992.7Memo rom Walt Rostow to William Harriman, Indonesia and PortugueseTimor, 5 February 1963, attained through FOIA request by author.8Ibid.9Ibid.10 Simpson, 286.11 Douglas Ramage,Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge), 1995, 23-24.12

John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder (Madison, WI: University o WisconsinPress), 2006, 176-178.13 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia(Ox ord: Ox ord University Press),1998, 70-71, 77, 147-162, 181.14F. Thomas, State Department Report: Indonesia: Current Political Situation,19 September 1974, retrieved rom the National Security Archives courtesy o Brad Simpson.15 Ibid16

C.A. Fisher, Indonesia: a Giant Astir.The Geographical Journal 138 (1972):154. Available rom http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0016-7398%28197206%29138%3A2%3C154%3AIAGA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K.17 Memo rom Henry Kissinger to Gerald Ford, Meeting with the IndonesianPresident, 5 July 1975, 2, attained through FOIA request by author.18 Memo rom W. Lord to Kissinger, US Strategy in Asia: Trends, Issues, andChoices, 16 October 1975, attained through FOIA request by author.19 Memo rom T. Barnes to Gen. Scowcro t, Your meeting with IndonesianLeader General Ali Moertopo, 23 October 1975, retrieved rom the NationalSecurity Archives courtesy o Brad Simpson.20 Michael Lie er and Dolliver Nelson, Confict o Interest in the Straits o Malacca,International Affairs 49 (1973): 190-203. Available rom http://links.

jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28197304%2949%3A2%3C190%3ACOIITS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K 21 Telegram 1579, Memorandum o Conversation between President Ford andPresident Suharto, 5 July 1975, 6, attained through FOIA request by author;Transcript o Meeting Between Kissinger, Ford, and Suharto, 6 December1975, 10, attained through FOIA request by author.22 Ken Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesias Special Forces (Jakarta: Equinox),2003, 205-207.23 Memo From U.S. Consulate in Surabaya to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, JointMilitary Exercises Using East Java Forces Relevant to Portuguese Timor, 20February 1975, retrieved rom the National Security Archives courtesy o BradSimpson.


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0

24Conboy, 179-237.25Telegram 108443, Department o State Press Summary, 4 September 1975,20, attained through FOIA request by author.26From September 1975,the Indonesian Times ran two to three articles a weekon the situation in East Timor; these articles contain some o the more blatantclaims: Children Smashed to Death Against Rocks,Indonesian Times 1Oct. 1975: 1; No Invasion o East Timor,Indonesian Times 9 Oct. 1975: 1;Apodeti, UDT Forces Advancing,Indonesian Times 15 Oct. 1975: 1.27Transcript o Secretary Kissingers Sta Meeting, 8 October 1975, 19; Telegram1103537, Cables to Security Council about Portuguese Timor rom Fretilin,

11 October 1975. Both retrieved rom the National Security Archives courtesy o Brad Simpson.28Robert Miller, Briefng Memorandum: Reported Indonesian Interventionin Timor and US Interests. 7 December 1975, 2, retrieved rom the NationalSecurity Archives courtesy o Brad Simpson; People Resistance Forces LiberateDili, Indonesian Times 8 Dec. 1975: 1.29Department o State Briefng Paper, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor, 21November 1975, 2, attained through FOIA request by author.30

Ibid.31Transcript o Meeting Between Kissinger, Ford, and Suharto, 6 December1975, 1-2, attained through FOIA request by author.32Department o State Briefng Paper, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor, 21November 1975, 2, attained through FOIA request by author.33Department o De ense Brie , Legal Implications, 1 December 1975,retrieved rom the National Security Archives courtesy o Brad Simpson.34Memo rom W. R. Smyser to Kissinger, 4 March 1975; Transcript o SecretaryKissingers Staf Meeting, 17 June 1976, 24-27; Kissinger, Enclosure to StateDepartment Brie ng Paper, Indonesia and East Timor, 21 November 1975. All retrieved rom the National Security Archives courtesy o Brad Simpson.35Proclaimation o Integration o Portugese Timor in Indonesia.IndonesianTimes, 5 Dec. 1975, A4.36Conboy, 224; Horta Accuses Australians o Bombing Timor.IndonesianTimes , 4 Oct. 1975, A1.37Telegram 3070 From US Embassy Canberra to Secretary o State Kissinger,Timor: Investigation o Death o Five Australian Journalists, 28 April 1976.Retrieved rom the National Security Archives courtesy o Brad Simpson.;Australian Civilians Supply Arms to Fretilin?Indonesian Times, 14 Oct. 1975, A1.38Conboy, 211.39CIA Brie 151-75. 29 September 1975. 8-10. From the CIA electronic archiveat University Park, MD40Transcript o Secretary Kissingers Sta Meeting, 8 October 1975, 2.


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54 Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Thomas Barnes, Contingency Planning for Military Supply to Indonesia, National Security Council, 18February 1976. Retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of BradSimpson.55 Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Col. Clifton Granger, IndonesianUse of MAP Equipment in Timor, National Security Council, 12 December1975. Retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.56 Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Thomas Barnes, Military EquipmentDeliveries to Indonesia, National Security Council, 17 May 1976. Retrievedfrom the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.57

Transcript of Secretary of State Kissingers Staff Meeting, 1 June 1976, 22. Attained through FOIA request by author

58 Telegram 0886 From U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, AustralianQuery RE: U.S. Military Assistance, 27 February 1976. Retrieved from theNational Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.59 Telegram 215034 From Department of State to U.S. Embassy in Jakarta,FMS Financing for Indonesia, 8 September 1977. Retrieved from the NationalSecurity Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.60

Telegram 303047 From U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to Henry Kissinger, 1October 1977. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/00000002.pdf 61 Henry Kissinger,The Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999);

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Gerald Ford, ATime to Heal,(New York: Harper & Row, 1979)62 Zbigniew Brzenzinski, Memorandum for the President, East Asia: WhereDo We Stand? Where are We Going? 16 May 1977; Zbigniew Brzezinski,Memorandum for the President, Initiatives to Deepen Relations withIndonesia. 1 August 1977. Retrieved from the National Security Archivescourtesy of Brad Simpson.63 Matthew Jardine and Noam Chomsky, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1999), 7.64 Henry Kissinger, Ask Kissinger East Timor Action Network. Available fromhttp://etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm.65 Henry Kissinger,The Years of Renewal , 463-598, 868-901.


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Documents

U.S. Cold War Foreign Policy and the Neglect of East Timor: An Apology for Henry Kissinger