US-­‐CHINA  SPACE  BALANCE  

 

2019  By  Harrison  Gale  and  Alexa  Ryan  West   GOVT451    

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“The earth is the cradle of humankind, but one cannot live in the cradle forever” - Konstantin Tsiolkovsky

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As technology continues to change the world, the political dynamic of nations have changed along with it. The rise of modernity and the exponential increase in technological availability has aided China’s recent rise as a world power. Initial cheap labor combined with a booming population of increasingly well educated citizens has led the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to predict that China’s economy will overtake the U.S. market in the year 2019 (Figure 1).1 They have developed from a society of cheap labor to one that is an exemplar in the sciences, technologies, engineering, and manufacturing.2 Deeply in debt to the Chinese, the U.S. is struggling to maintain its position as the world’s unipole. The United States, who has enjoyed the status as the world’s hegemon since the end of

the Cold War, is having trouble being the simultaneous forerunner in technology, manufacture, and business. Though not directly, there are many issues on which China and the United States strongly disagree. Their methods of governance

                                                                                                               1  Moulds,  Josephine.  “China’s  economy  to  overtake  US  in  next  four  years,  says  OECD.”  The  Guardian  co.  Published  9  November  2012.  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/nov/09/china-­‐overtake-­‐us-­‐  four-­‐years-­‐oecd>  (accessed  10  November  2012).  2  One  example  is  China’s  ever-­‐increasing  demand  for  robots.  For  more  on  this,  see:  Kaiman,  Jonathan.  “Chinese  demand  for  robots  increases  as  labor  costs  rise.”  The  Guardian  co.  Published  13  November  2012.  <http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/11/13/chinese-­‐demand-­‐for-­‐robots-­‐increases-­‐as-­‐labor-­‐costs-­‐rise/>  (accessed  14  November  2012).  

Figure  1  

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(communism in the former and capitalism in latter)3, issues of occupation (like that of Taiwan)4, increased scarcity of natural resources, and inability to cooperate economically5 could all serve as potential flashpoints. In addition, the longstanding international relations theory championed by Robert Jervis, which demonstrates the eminent clash of a rising power (China) with a declining power (U.S.), predicts a brewing conflict between these two nations.6

As we can see, the political, economic, and/or military clash of China and the United States in the near future is plausible. The two countries publically acknowledge tensions rising, and many attempts at negotiation over space-related issues have failed. At the same time, space is emerging as a main theater for competition and eventually conflict. If a clash occurs between China and the U.S., it is highly likely space and satellite conflict (whether kinetic, diplomatic, or cyber) will be involved due to the high levels of dependence on and uncertainty in this theater. “China sees that the United States relies on space for 80 percent of its communications and 80 to 90 percent of its intelligence gathering,” said the deputy director of the East Asia program at Defense Group Incorp in a presentation to a forum at the George C. Marshall institute, “and they see that if they can knock out search-and-find satellites, they can make us blind.”7 The following proposed hypothetical highlights what we believe to be key elements of the current China-U.S. space balance:

                                                                                                               3  For  an  in-­‐depth  analysis  on  this  highly  studied  topic,  see:  Friedberg,  Aaron.  “The  Great  Debate:  Debating  a  Democratic  China.”  The  National  Interest.  22  June  2011.  4  For  a  more  detailed  look  at  the  differing  U.S.  and  Chinese  views  over  Taiwan,  see:  Kennedy,  Andrew  Bingham.  “China’s  Perceptions  of  U.S.  Intentions  toward  Taiwan:  How  Hostile  a  Hegemon?”  Asian  Survey  Vol.  47,  No.  2  (March/April  2007),  pp.  268-­‐287,  Published  by  University  of  California  Press.  5  For  more:  Noland,  Marcus.  “US-­‐China  Economic  Relations,”  Institute  for  International  Economics.  November,  2012.  <http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchID=162.>  Also  see  Cheng,  Leonard  K.H.  1995.  "US  Attitudes  and  Policy  Towards  Investment  in  China,"  paper  presented  at  the  International  Conference  on  Sino-­‐US  Economic  Relations,  Hong  Kong,  21-­‐23  June.  6  This  theory  has  been  discussed  widely  in  International  Relations  literature.  For  a  more  detailed  examination  of  it,  see:  Jervis,  Robert.  “Theories  of  War  in  an  Era  of  Leading-­‐Power  Peace:  Presidential  Address”  APSR,  Vol.  96,  No.  1  (March  2002).  Also:  Jervis,  Robert  and  Robert  Art.  International  Politics:    Enduring  Concepts  and  Contemporary  Issues,11th  Edition  (Boston,  Mass.:  Pearson,  2013).  Another  good  book  on  the  topic  is:  Kennedy,  Paul.  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Great  Powers:  Economic  Change  and  Military  Conflict  From  1500  to  2000.  Vintage  Publishing.  For  the  theory  in  specific  relation  to  China  and  the  U.S.,  see”  Xia,  Ming.  “China:  threat  or  a  peaceful  rise?”  The  New  York  Times.  Accessed  at  <http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-­‐china-­‐politics-­‐007.html>  and  Lampton,  David  M.  Same  Bed,  Different  Dreams:  Managing  U.S.-­China  Relations:  1989-­2000  (Berkeley,  CA:  California  University  Press,  2001).  7  http://www.airspacemag.com/need-­‐to-­‐know/Whats-­‐Driving-­‐Chinas-­‐Space-­‐Program-­‐161113405.html  

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The year is 2019 and the international system is in a fragile place. The Peoples Republic of China is facing numerous issues with internal stability as its rapid economic growth begins to slow and numerous demographic issues resulting from its one child policy begin to emerge. Large numbers of disenfranchised, unwed, and unemployed or underemployed men living in urban areas are creating domestic tension.8 The PRC, cracking down to maintain power, is vehemently against any western involvement or interference.

The United States and Taiwan have decided to once again

collaborate and jointly launch a satellite. The last time this happened was 2006, when the U.S. and Taiwan sent up six globe-spanning weather and climate research satellites.1 The new satellite will be a pair of modified NOSS reconnaissance units with electronic signals intelligence deployed in GEO over the Pacific Ocean to observe the area around Taiwan and to track movement of the Chinese Pacific fleet. China’s recent plans to create more carriers and their well-hid, extremely fast Houbeis--essentially catamarans with conventional missile-launch capabilities-- warrant some checking up on, especially considering Chinese opacity concerning their policies. The U.S.-Taiwanese WESTGALE-1 is sent into orbit.

Approximately one month after being launched and correctly positioned, WESTGALE-1 goes dark. There are many potential reasons a satellite would lose ground communication. It could have been hit by orbital debris. It could be experiencing a cyber attack of some sort. It could also have been hit by a stealth and extremely fast kinetic weapon. Space is uncertain terrain, and the U.S. won’t be able to figure out for certain which of these occurred quickly enough to supplement a diplomatic or military response with proper knowledge.

The U.S. now has essential decisions to make: Should the U.S. do nothing? Should they take the potentially intentional malfunction of their reconnaissance as a hint that the Chinese are deploying their Pacific fleet towards Taiwan or across the Pacific? If so, is it worth the risk of sending the United States Pacific Carrier Fleet into battle when we have diminished communications in that region due to WESTGALE-1’s malfunction? Should the U.S. use its own ASAT capabilities to disrupt Chinese communications, altering their ability to launch their (potential) second wave of attack? If this is the case, the amount of space debris from the exploding satellites could render Earth’s atmosphere almost useless.

In this hypothetical, the global environment, U.S.-Chinese relations, and the

survival of the U.S. Pacific Carriers are all at stake. Through the research below, we

                                                                                                               8  Andrieu,  Michael.  “China,  a  Demographic  Time  bomb.”  OECD  Observer.  Summer  1999.  Organization  for  Cooperation  and  Development.    

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attempt to compare the relative space capabilities of China and the United States. We will examine their ideologies, technologies, and economies of space. From this data we can make predictions on who would rise as the victor in a space conflict, but we can also try to avoid this occurrence by making recommendations for future U.S. policy, military mandate, and research and development. To do so, we first examine outer space as a theater and why it is relevant and important in today’s world. Concepts we’ll consider are the types, advantages, and difficulties of the weaponization of space. We’ll also take a look at current international standards and law for the use of space. Secondly, we’ll look at the United State’s current space-based infrastructure, reliance on space, philosophies concerning sovereignty and space, and goals for space exploration and use in the near future. After that we will look at the Chinese equivalents, and make relevant comparisons. Finally, we will see the results of our hypothetical and through its examination we will address policy implications for the United States concerning the U.S.-China space balance and the general militarization of space.

SPACE AS A THEATER AND WHY IT’S IMPORTANT “Space isn’t remote at all.

It’s only an hour’s drive away if your car could go straight upwards” - Sir Fred Hoyle

Outer space has become crucial for modern human communication,

reconnaissance, and scientific research. As of 31 July 2012, there are officially 1,016 operating satellites in space, 436 of which are American and 120 of which are Chinese.9 Just decades ago, only a few countries had satellites and presence in space; today, over 60 countries are represented in earth’s orbit. (see Figures 2 and 3).10 Just as military applications have driven the expansion of human activity into other realms such as sea and air, space has already become a theater for war. To truly examine and understand the relative space capabilities of the United States and China, one must first examine the                                                                                                                9  Satellite  Database,  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists.  Available  at  <http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-­‐satellite-­‐database.html>  Includes  launches  through  31  July  2012.    10  “Unclassified  Summary  of  U.S.  National  Security  Space  Strategy.”  Issued  by  the  Department  of  Defense  and  the  Office  of  the  Director  of  National  Intelligence  in  January  2011.  Available  at:  <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_Jan2011.pdf>    

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context of space as a theater, the weaponization of space, and the functions and challenges of space-based infrastructure.

Figure  3  

Figure  2  

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The Story of Space

The militarization of space and the idea of space as a theater of war became an international focus during the Cold War, through the competitive Soviet-U.S. astronomical research and exploration the known today as the “Space Race.” The two nations strove to be the first to reach major goals such as sending man into space (the Soviets won, sending Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin in the Vostok spacecraft around earth’s orbit in 1961) and landing man on the moon (the U.S. achieved this in the Apollo 11 moon landing, in July 1969). The philosophy was that if it had to be a bipolar system on earth, there could at least be a hegemon in space. Tackling the frontier of space became seen as a measure of a country’s power and influence, and both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were competing to be the best.

Through tensions and knowledge brought about by the Space Race came a somewhat international consensus on how to regulate nations’ sovereignty in space. The United Nations set up the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) under General Assembly resolution 1348 in 1958.11 Out of UNOOSA’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) came the first piece of international legislature concerning space conduct, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, or OST (originally entitled the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies), signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.12 As nuclear weapons were a common theme throughout the Cold War, the treaty banned the placing of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in Earth’s orbit, on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to station them in outer space. It limited the use of the Moon to peaceful purposes, and an entire article (IV) is dedicated to prohibiting weapons testing, the conduct of military maneuvers, and the establishment of military bases, installations, and fortifications in space. Finally, the

                                                                                                               11  United  Nations  Office  for  Outer  Space  Affairs  website,  <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/OOSA/index.html>  (accessed  7  November  2012).  12“Treaty  on  Principles  Governing  the  Activities  of  States  in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer  Space,  including  the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies.”  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  in  its  resolution  2222  (XXI),  opened  for  signature  on  27  January  1967,  entered  into  force  on  10  October  1967.  Available  at:  <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html>  (accessed  7  November  2012).  

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treaty forbids any nation from claiming a celestial resource, claiming they are the “common heritage of mankind.”13 Today, over 100 states have signed to the treaty, and another 26 are in the process of its ratification. UNOOSA also created an official registration of objects launched into outer space through General Assembly resolution 1721 B (XVI).14 This obligates states to give the UN certain information about space launches and their objects in space before the launch. Interestingly enough, China did not submit any warning for their 2007 ASAT launch.

Concern over foreign intelligence assets and weapons in space drove both the U.S. and Russia developed anti-satellite capabilities early in the space race. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. and Soviets both had anti-ballistic missile interceptors, the Bold Orion (WS-199B) and UR 200 respectively. Due to limitations in guidance systems, the precision of these interceptors was dubious, and to mitigate the risk of a miss these missile interceptors were equipped with megaton class nuclear warheads. The banning of orbital nuclear weapons with the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 put an end to this, but both nations continued to develop conventional ASAT capabilities.

The Russians successfully tested co-orbital ASAT systems designed to approach targeted satellites within one or two orbits and then detonate, blasting it with shrapnel. However the U.S.-Soviet Limitations on Anti-ballistic Missile Systems Treaty of 1972 banned the destruction of “national technical means of verification.”15 This served as the basis of an implicit understanding that an attack on a satellite would constitute an attempt to compromise early warning as a precursor to nuclear attack and the other nation would respond in kind. In this way, the nuclear deterrent was sufficient to protect space infrastructure. It is unclear if this logic holds true today vis a vis the United States and China. If the Chinese were to disable a U.S. satellite via destructive means, even if the U.S. were able to successfully attribute the attack, a nuclear attack on China would still be considered a disproportionate response.

                                                                                                               13  Ibid.  14  “International  co-­‐operation  in  the  peaceful  uses  of  outer  space”  Resolution  1721  (XVI)  adopted  by  the  General  Council.  Available  at:  <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_16_1721.html>  (accessed  7  November  2012).  15Grego,  Laura.  “A  history  of  anti-­‐satellite  programs.”  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists.  January  2012.  Available  at:  <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/a-­‐history-­‐of-­‐ASAT-­‐programs_lo-­‐res.pdf>  (accessed  6  November  2012).  

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Functions of Space-Based Infrastructure

“Don’t tell me that man doesn’t belong out there. Man belongs wherever he wants to go—and he’ll do plenty when he gets there.” Werhner Von Braun

As space because more accessible and appealing as a means of gathering information and potential resources, more and more space-based infrastructure is being launched into orbit and being relied upon by private companies and nations alike. In this year alone, 64 satellites have been launched into space, 31 by the U.S. and 8 by the Chinese.16. Space-based infrastructure, like satellites and space stations, has a plethora of functions--civil, commercial, scientific, and military. Space assets have become increasingly critical for modern societies and governments to function. The U.S. relies on space for 80 percent of its communications alone, and an even high percentage of its intelligence gathering.”17

Humans use space to facilitate wireless communications networks, global positioning systems, weather monitoring, physics experiments, and more. A table summarizing some popular uses for satellite infrastructure is below: Table  1  

Function Classification of Function

Example in Orbit

Meteorological

(Weather)

Government Commercial

Electro-L1 (GOMS 2 [Geostationary Operational Meteorological Satellite 2], a Russian Government weather satellite launched in January 2011.

Communications

Military

Government Commercial

Ciel 2, operated by the Canadian corporation Ciel Satellite Group. Launched in December 2008.

Reconnaissance

Military

Helios 1A, a joint French and Spanish

                                                                                                               16  Updated  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists  satellite  database.  17  Hoversten,  Paul.  “What’s  Driving  China’s  Space  Program?”  Airspacemag.com  published  2  July  2012.    <http://www.airspacemag.com/need-­‐to-­‐know/Whats-­‐Driving-­‐Chinas-­‐Space-­‐Program-­‐161113405.html>  (accessed  10  November  2012).  

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Government military satellite launched into LEO in July 1995.

Remote Sensing

Military Government Commercial

Canopus-B (Kanopus Vulcan 1). A Russian government satellite in LEO, launched in July 2012.

Early Warning

/Launch Detection

Military Government

DSP 20 (USA 149). A United States Air Force satellite launched in May 2000.

Precision

Navigation and Timing

Military

Government Commercial

Glonass 734 (Glonass 41-3, Cosmos 2458). Russian Ministry of Defense satellite in MEO, launched in December 2009.

Issues with Space-Based Infrastructure

Space-based infrastructure poses many challenges to those who wish to use it. One major challenge of space infrastructure and conducting operations in space is the incredibly high cost. Firstly, there are challenges with manufacturing satellites, as they are highly sophisticated pieces of engineering and only a few companies on

earth have the tacit knowledge

Figure  4  

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required to build and operate successfully. The costs to produce a satellite are significant both in terms of resources required and engineering; the estimated average price of a satellite in this decade is $99 million, a $2 million rise from last decade’s average price.18 The chart in Figure 4 is from 2004 and compares production time of several space contractors.19 However, these represent the average production times, with some advanced satellites, such as the ones constructed by the NRO taking an average of twice as long, with some examples taking as long as 12 years.20

Next are the issues of actually getting the satellite into space, which is an extremely costly proposition and, once again, limited by a select number of nations technically capable of the feat. Each launch costs $50 million, and one must also consider maintenance fees and bandwidth charges. The Space Shuttle is, the most expensive U.S. space-based initiative to date. The agency launched 131 flights for the space shuttle, two of which ended in tragedy with the loss of Challenger in 1986 and that of Columbia in 2003. During these flights, the average cost per launch was from $1.2-1.5 billion. The US Congress and NASA spent more than US $192 billion on it

                                                                                                               18  Selding,  Peter.  “Space  Forecast  Predicts  Satellite  Production  Boom.”  Space.com.  Published  15  June  2009.  <http://www.space.com/6839-­‐space-­‐forecast-­‐predicts-­‐satellite-­‐production-­‐boom.html>  (accessed  1  November  2012).  19“Satellite  Manufacturing:  Production  Cycles  and  Time  to  Market.”  Futron  Corporation.  May  2004.  Available  at  <http://www.futron.com/upload/wysiwyg/Resources/Whitepapers/Satellite_Manufacturing_Production_Cycles_0504.pdf>  20  National  Commission  for  the  Review  of  the  National  Reconnaissance  Office  (NRO)  2011  Report.  Appendix  F.  Available  at  <http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/commission/app_f.htm>  

Figure  5  

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between 1971 and 201021--that’s as much as 27% of the entire 2012 defense budget (see figure 5).

Orbital debris is another factor that makes space based infrastructure

challenging, and even more immediately, raises to unknown heights the consequence of potential space warfare. Each time an accident occurs in space, like when two satellites collide (as the Russian satellite Cosmos 2251 did with U.S. communications satellite Iridium Satellite LLC in February 2009), or when any space-based creation explodes, it’s remaining pieces are thrown into earth’s orbit (see Figure 6). These small pieces are traveling around planet earth at an extremely high velocity--approximately one revolution every 90 minutes, nine times the speed of a bullet22--and could prove lethal to any other satellite, space station, or aerospace plane in orbit. Only approximately half of orbital debris is in LEO (classified as less than 2000 km from the ground).23

Both China’s 2007 ASAT launch and the U.S.’s 2008 ASAT launch that destroyed NROL-21 sent unprecedented amounts of space debris into earth’s orbit. The 2007 launch by China created a cloud of more than 3,000 pieces of space debris--the largest ever tracked.24 This debris will stay in LEO for decades, and FIGURE WHATEVER shows the extremely detrimental and rapid way this debris cloud has pervaded earth’s orbit. According to the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN), as of September 2010, 97% of the debris created by China’s ASAT test has remained in orbit (see Figure 6).25

                                                                                                               21  Pielke,  Robert.  “Shuttle  programme  lifetime  costs.”  NATURE.  Volume  472,  April  2011.  Page  38.  Available  at:  <http://www.nature.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/nature/journal/v472/n7341/pdf/472038d.pdf>  22“USA  Moves  Ahead  Next-­‐Generation  “Space  Fence”  Tracking.”  Defense  Industry  Daily.  14  November  2012.  <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Air-­‐Force-­‐Awards-­‐First-­‐Phase-­‐of-­‐Next-­‐Generation-­‐Space-­‐Fence-­‐05511/>  (accessed  14  November  2012)  23  Wright,  David.  “Colliding  Satellites:  Consequences  and  Implications.”  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists.  23  February  2009.  Available  at  <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/SatelliteCollision-­‐2-­‐12-­‐09.pdf>  24  Weeden,  Brian.  “2007  Anti  Satellite  Test  Fact  Sheet.”  Secure  World  Foundation.  23  November  2010.  <http://swfound.org/media/9550/2007%20chinese%20asat%20test%20factsheet.pdf>  [accessed  5  November  2012].  25    “Orbital  Debris  Quarterly  News”,  Volume  14,  Issue  4,  October  2010,  NASA  Orbital  Debris  Program  Office,  <http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/newsletter.html>  

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Figure  6  

There are an estimated 16,000 pieces of debris in LEO larger than 10 centimeters. Debris this size could potentially cause the target satellite complete destruction, and current satellite technology has no effective shielding for this kind of kinetic occurrence.26 This potential collision would also cause a large amount of consequential space debris. There are also another 400,000 pieces of orbital debris that range from 1 to 10 centimeters in size, capable of severe satellite damage or complete destruction. These pieces, as well as the unknown number of pieces smaller than one centimeter, are unable to be tracked by existing technologies. The vast number of pieces under one centimeter still have the capability of severely damaging a satellite (like degradation or loss of certain sensors or subsystems) if hit in a vulnerable area. The shielding that would be necessary to protect satellites from the already existing amount of space debris will increase the cost of both creating satellites and launching them from now on.27 "As every collision creates more and more objects, the problem only gets worse over time, it won't get better over time," recently expressed a head official at Raytheon, a U.S. private aerospace manufacturer.28The large amount of space debris in orbit greatly increases the uncertainty and tension in international politics surrounding space. The probability that any malfunction or destruction of a nation’s satellite is an                                                                                                                26Jones,  Kathy,  David  Wright  and  Krista  Fuentes.  “A  Minefield  in  earth  Orbit:  How  Space  Debris  is  Spinning  Out  of  Control.”  Scientific  American.  1  February  2012.  Available  at:  <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-­‐space-­‐debris-­‐spinning-­‐out-­‐of-­‐control&WT.mc_id=SA_CAT_SPC_20120202>  27  Wright,  David  (2009)  28Mount,  Mike.  “Mending  the  ‘Space  Fence’”  CNN  Online.  Published  25  October  2012.  <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/25/mending-­‐fences-­‐in-­‐space-­‐tracking-­‐the-­‐high-­‐speed-­‐danger-­‐of-­‐space-­‐debris/>  (accessed  6  November  2012).  

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offensive attack by any other country is convoluted due to the high potential that space debris was involved, which can be seen in Figure 7.

It is also of critical importance to note

that the increase in space debris is detrimental not only to the countries involved through ownership, but also the world as a whole. The issue of space debris makes satellite testing and ASAT testing a sensitive subject, since one country’s action would increase the global problem of orbital debris. It takes a piece of something that could be defensive, like research and development, and makes it offensive by damaging the terrain for everyone.

Orbital debris is only one way a satellite could be kinetically destroyed. As the Union of Concerned Scientists’ report “Securing the Skies” notes, “satellites are inherently vulnerable to various kinds of attack, both from space and the ground, as they move in predictable and repeated orbits and generally are visible to much of Earth.”29 The majority of solutions proposed to protect satellites are incredibly impractical and expensive. Active space defense weapons, known as “bodyguards,” have been proposed to defend satellites in orbit from both space-based and ground-based threats. Table 2 shows types of bodyguards proposed and explains the problems with them. There is also the main issue of space bodyguards having potential offensive uses towards other nations’ space infrastructure. Any country deploying space bodyguards would be heightening the already thick tension in space.

                                                                                                               29  Wright,  David  and  Lauren  Greco.  “Securing  the  Skies:  Ten  Steps  The  United  States  Should  Take  To  Improve  the  Security  and  Sustainability  of  Space.”  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists,  November  2010.  Pages  46-­‐52.  

Figure  7  

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Table  2  

Another idea proposed is that of space-based interceptors (SBIs), but SBIs that

could hit any object (large enough debris, another satellite, ballistic missiles) with reliability is unrealistic. True precision would require a large amount of SBIs and money for a shaky defense. Defense with SBIs is unreliable because “even if the constellation of hundreds to thousands of interceptors described above were in place, only one or two SBIs would be in position to reach any given launching missile in time to destroy it. Consequently, the defense could be overwhelmed by simultaneously launching multiple missiles from one location.”30 Also, a SBI system could not protect itself from attacks intended to remove interceptors. A final defense proposal is of space-based ground-attack weapons, but they would be 50 to 100 times more expensive than ground-based alternatives with comparable delivery times.31 Despite this and the other illustrated challenges, countries around the world are launching an unprecedented amount of machinery into Earth’s orbit. In the first half of 2012 alone, fifty satellites were launched into orbit.32 To fully understand Chinese and U.S. capabilities in space,

                                                                                                               30  Wright,  David  (2010)  page  49.  31  Wright,  David  (2009)  32  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists  satellite  database.  

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and the concern surrounding the militarization of space, we must briefly look at different kinds of potential space warfare, and the weaponization of space.

The Weaponization of Space The weaponization of space involves space weapons technologies that respond to different kinds of space warfare. Space warfare can be conducted from space (orbital), from earth’s land or sea (terrestrial), or in the air. Different types of weaponry are required for each kind of warfare. Orbital-Terrestrial war involves assaults on a terrestrial target from a weapon in space. An example of Orbital-Terrestrial weaponry would be the U.S.’s proposed development of the “Rods from God,” metal tungsten rods about 6.1 meters long and 30 centimeters in diameter that could be satellite-guided to targets anywhere on the earth within minutes (see Figure 8).33 The rods would move at more than 11,000 kilometers an hour. This weapon exploits kinetic energy to cause an explosion the same magnitude of that of an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon, but with no radioactive fallout. This weapon, though not nuclear, is capable of total destruction of even the most hardened underground silos. If deployed in space, Rods from God would create a global strike capability to any point on the globe within minutes or seconds, featuring a minimal launch signature.34 To attack a space commodity from earth, known as Terrestrial-Orbital space warfare, is currently being explored by the U.S., China, and Russia, evident from the displays of their anti-satellite capabilities (ASATs). Missiles

sent from earth can be aimed at

                                                                                                               33  http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/GH18Aa01.html  34  ibid  

Figure  8  

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satellites or other space-based infrastructure. ASATs started off as nuclear due to a lack of precision, but now because of direct descent missiles capable of better targeting, they have become conventional weapons. Currently, the U.S. uses modified missiles interceptors as ASATs, while the Chinese use their SC-19, pictured below in Figure 9.

Another important kind of space warfare to understand is conflict between air and space. Currently, both the Chinese and the U.S. are developing aerospace planes (the Shenlong Space Plane and the X-37B drone, respectively) that could have the capability of launching rockets from hypersonic velocities while in orbit.35 The race towards this development is contributing to

much of the U.S.-Chinese space tension, as the first to do so will gain a major advantage in offensive and defensive space capabilities. This would increase the feasibility of Orbital-Orbital warfare, in which aerospace planes or other space-based infrastructure able to move well in orbit, can use kill vehicles or other satellites/pieces of space debris themselves as weapons to destroy other pieces of infrastructure in orbit. This will be incredibly difficult to achieve, however, because accurate movement within space’s orbit is a technically very challenging feat, but sensors and automation capabilities will greatly expand in the near future.36

Attacking earth-based targets with earth-based weapons that travel through space is called terrestrial-orbital-terrestrial space warfare. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are the heart of this initiative. ICBMs are launched from earth and are sent through space’s orbit to take advantage of the lack of gravity and extreme speed and momentum it gains out of earth’s atmosphere. Since WWII, ICBMs have not been used to attack someone, but they were deployed in operation and served as a deterrent throughout the Cold War. ICBMs are also frequently used to test ballistic missile defenses (BMD), and are the preferred method of delivering a nuclear attack. Another

                                                                                                               35  David  (2012).  36  see  physics  of  space  security  document  in  drop  box  for  a  more  scientific  view  of  weapons  in  space.  

Figure  9  

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kind of terrestrial-orbital-terrestrial warfare uses Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems (FOBS), developed by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s.37 As opposed to placing warheads in traditional ballistic lobs, FOBs place the warhead in LEO. Summaries of these main types and other kinds of space warfare, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of some key space-weapons, are in Tables 3 and 4 below:

Table  3:  Descriptions,  and  examples  of  weaponry  in  types  of  space  war  

type of space war description example of weaponry used

Orbital-Terrestrial Assault on terrestrial target from space-based weapon or forces.

“Rods from God”

Terrestrial-Orbital Attacking a space-based target with terrestrially-based weapons.

ASAT Lasers

Terrestrial-Orbital-Terrestrial

Terrestrially-based attacks on terrestrial-based targets carried out through space

ICBMs FOBS

Space-Air

Spacecraft either support aircraft with intelligence capabilities or attack enemy aircraft with space-based weapons.

Aerospace plane

Air-Space Strikes against space-based crafts by aircraft

Aerospace planes

Air-Space-Terrestrial

Terrestrial targets attacked by aircraft through space.

Aerospace planes

Orbital-Orbital Space-based craft

Space-tug/Defunct sat

                                                                                                               37  Squadron  leader  Lapraik,  Robert.  “the  technology  of  weapons  in  space-­‐-­‐past,  present,  and  near  term.”  The  Militarisation  of  Space,  edited  by  Stephen  Kirby  and  Gordon  Robson.  Wheatsheaf  books,  sussex.  (1988.)  Pages  57-­‐71.  

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Table  4:  Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  possible  future  space  weapons.  (Source:  Neuneck,  Gotz,  and  Rothkirch)  

 

Now that we understand what is available in terms of space technology and resources, we must combine this with an understanding of Chinese and U.S. space doctrine, dependence, infrastructure, and goals. The U.S. and the Chinese differ on their projected space capabilities, collaboration with non-military space industries, and philosophies of sovereignty in space. Analyzing all of these components is necessary to truly and fairly compare the space capabilities of the two nations and the likelihood of how a conflict situation would play out.

U.S. SPACE DOCTRINE AND GOVERNMENT SPACE AGENCIES Ever since the space race with the Soviets, the United States has seen space

exploration as a rudiment of achieving U.S. interests. In fact, the U.S. 1997 Space Command shows the American ideology that space will develop, as did air and sea, into a theater for war:

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“Historically, military forces have evolved to protect national interests and investments--both military and economic. During the rise of sea commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests. During the westward expansion of the continental United States, military outposts and the cavalry emerged to protect our wagon trains, settlements, and railroads. As air power developed, its primary purpose was to support and enhance land and sea operations. However, over time, air power evolved into a separate and equal medium of warfare. The emergence of space power follows both of these models. Over the past several decades, space power has primarily supported land, sea, and air operations--strategically and operationally. During the early portion of the 21st century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare. Likewise, space forces will emerge to protect military and commercial national interests and investment in the space medium due to their increasing importance.”38 In 2009, the Aerospace Industries Association wrote a report entitled “The Role

of Space in Addressing America’s National Priorities.”39 The report explained the integral role space has in securing U.S. economic, educational, and industrial prominence. It also discusses the important role space has in American national security; in fact, three of the “big five” U.S. Intelligence Agencies--the NGA, NRO, and NSA-- have a large reliance on space. The U.S. government recognizes that space assets can provide key capabilities in the systems of armed combat vehicles, missile defense platforms, guided weapons, naval cruisers, unmanned aerial vehicles, command and control, situational awareness, missile warning, intelligence, global communications, and future combat systems.40

Currently, the United States has approximately thirteen federal space agencies (see chart below).41 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was the largest space agency until recent budget cuts in 2010, is a research agency that focuses primarily upon aeronautics, human exploration and operations, and science.42 It is interesting to note that the majority of U.S. space agencies are under the DoD. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office

                                                                                                               38  US  Space  Command  1997.  Directly  taken  from:  Webb,  David.  “Space  Weapons:  dream,  nightmare,  or  reality?”  Securing  Outer  Space,  edited  by  Natalie  Bormann  and  Michael  Sheehan.  Routledge  critical  security  studies  series,  2009.  Pages  24-­‐41.  39  “The  Role  of  Space  In  Addressing  America’s  National  Priorities.”  Aerospace  Industries  Association.  (January  2009)  Available  at:  <http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/376452main_008%20-­‐%2020090714.3.AIA%20report_space_0109.pdf>  40  Ibid.  41  “Space  sustainability  Booklet.”  Secure  World  Foundation.  2010.  Page  29.  Available  at:  <http://swfound.org/media/1808/space_sustainability_booklet.pdf>  42  “What  does  NASA  do?”  NASA  website.  Page  last  updated  25  August  2011.  <http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/what_does_nasa_do.html>  (accessed  9  November  2012)  

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(NRO), and the National Security Space Office (NSSO), are all under the DoD’s National Security Agency (NSA). The NGA is responsible for providing the U.S. Intelligence Community with continuous, accurate, and relevant geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).43 The NRO is in charge of designing, building, launching, and maintaining U.S. intelligence satellites.44 The most recent NRO launch was of the NROL-36 aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket on 13 September 2012 from Space Launch Complex-3 Vandenberg Air Force Base, in California.45 Other DoD space agencies are the Air Force Space Command (AFSC), United States Strategic Command, SPAWAR (the space division of the U.S. Navy), and the Space and Missile Defense Command (under the Department of the Army). Based on the UCS database through July 2012 ( for the recent months we relied on our own data), these U.S. agencies and private U.S. corporate currently has 436 satellites in orbit, 125 of which are owned and operated by the military.46 Table  5

 

                                                                                                               43  “About  NGA.”  National  Geospatial  Intelligence  Agency  website.  <https://www1.nga.mil/About/Pages/default.aspx>  (accessed  9  November  2012).  44  “About  the  NRO.”  National  Reconnaissance  Organization  website.  <http://www.nro.gov/about/index.html>  (accessed  9  November  2012).  45  Ibid.  46  We  chose  to  include  NavStar  satellites  as  military  because  of  their  dual-­‐use  nature  (precision  strike,  etc).  

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Each year, the United States’ Department of Defense and the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence issue a summary of the National Security Space Strategy. The most recent unclassified version of this report, 2011, reveals both tactical and strategic objectives about current U.S. space activity. It also shows us the U.S. point of view, philosophy, and doctrine concerning space capabilities, space as a theater for war, and the Chinese as competition. The report explains, “the current and future [U.S.] strategic environment is driven by three trends—space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.”47 It emphasizes the U.S.’s dwindling technological lead, the increasing availability of space technology to foreign entities, and the need to deter any aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security. The report did not advocate strategies like international collaborative research and development. The U.S. focal points seems almost aggressive and contrary to the maintained U.S. national space policy best explained by President John F. Kennedy when he said, “"We believe that when men reach beyond this planet, they should leave

                                                                                                               47  U.S.  National  Security  Space  Strategy.  Unclassified  Summary.  Released  by  Department  of  Defense  and  Office  of  the  Director  of  National  Security.  January  2011.  Available  at:  <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_Jan2011.pdf>  page  1.  

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their national differences behind them.”48 The Chinese have vocally taken notice; Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Department cited the 2008 U.S. shoot-down of NROL-21 as proof that the U.S. missile defense system “is also an offensive system.” He called the demonstration “unnecessary” and “simply an opportunity to test the U.S. missile defense system.”49

CHINESE SPACE DOCTRINE AND GOVERNMENT SPACE AGENCIES High-rank air force and military officials as well as Chinese academia have been focusing on the militarization of space for some time. Space is extremely important to the Chinese to enhance their prestige internationally, and to affirm legitimacy domestically. China continues to actively expand its capabilities to improve communication and reconnaissance capabilities across the globe, as well as researching and developing a multidimensional program to limit or deny US space dominance. 50

Figure  10

                                                                                                               48  Kennedy,  John  F.  News  Conference,  21  February  1962.  49  “China’s  angst  over  U.S.  satellite  interception.”    50  “Military  and  Security  Developments  Involving  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  2012.”  Annual  Report  to  Congress.  Department  of  Defense.  May  2012.  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Available  at:  <  http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf>  

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The Chinese space program originated in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and still maintains close ties today (see Figure 10). All space programs are under the PLA’s General Acquisitions department. Their space agencies are the Operations Department, Intelligence Department, Tech Recon Department, Informatization Department, Strategic Planning Department, and Radar/ECM Department. The relationships of these departments and the chain of command are expanded upon in the chart below. Engineering is performed dominantly by two space-owned enterprises, the Chinese Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) All Taikonauts have performed active duty in the PLA and are trained by the PLA. Space agencies recruit taikonauts from PLA air forces. Also, all launches and orbital command and control are also performed by the PLA.

This significant attention towards space in academia, military dialogue, and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization effort discredits constant Chinese claims about the peaceful purposes for space exploration, like President Hu Jintao’s assertion that the space program seeks to “create secure and harmonious airspace” through a policy “defensive in nature.”51 Internal PLA space doctrine documents, like Space War by Colonel Li Daguang and On Space Operations by Colonel Jia Junming, contain the proposition of many offensive operational actions in space.52 In his writing, Colonel Li Daguang, who is also a professor at China’s prestigious National Defense University, explains his two theories of space operations, the “Theory of Seizing Space Dominance” and the “Theory of Integrated Air/Space Operations.” He emphasizes both the direct and indirect necessity of integrating space forces with air forces, and urges, “the planning for space dominance should be an issue at the highest level for a country’s security strategy and development strategy.”53 To Li, seizing space dominance is “controlling dominance and leading dominance possessed over a certain area of space for a certain period of time,” completely contradicting the international                                                                                                                51    Shasha,  Deng.  “President  Hu  Says  China  Adheres  to  Peaceful  Use  Airspace.”  ChinaView.com.  Published  6  November  2011.  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-­‐11/06/content_12397543.htm  (accessed  6  November  2012).  52  Jia!Jun!Ming,!������![On!Space!Operations],!(Beijing,!PRC:!National!Defense!  52University!Press,!September!2002).!  52Li!Daguang,!���![Space!Warfare],!(Beijing,!PRC:!Military!Scientific!Press,!2001).!  52  (WRITTEN  WITH  CHINESE  CHARACTERS  IN  CHINASPACEWARFARE.PDF)  53    Saubert,  Kyle.  “Space  Warfare.”  Institute  for  Law,  Science,  and  Global  Security.  Georgetown  University.  8  September  2010.  page  24.  

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consensus embodied in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that no nation can claim territory in space.54 In fact, Cai Fengzhen, the most senior and widely published author in the Chinese military on space warfare and aerospace doctrine, has written, “control of portions of outer space is a natural extension of other forms of territorial control.”55 In On Space Operations, Colonel Jia Junming defines primary operational actions in space, many of which are offensive and war-like in nature (see Table 6)  

   Table  6  

Operational Actions in Space according to PLA Colonel Jia Junming in On Space Operations

1) Delivery Bringing troops, both human and otherwise, into space. Involves use of booster rockets, space shuttles, and aerospace planes

2) Reconnaissance Using satellites, space shuttles, and space stations Photoreconnaissance Electronic reconnaissance Ballistic missile early warning Maritime surveillance Nuclear explosion detection Geodetic surveys Meteorological observations

3) Communications Satellite technology and relay stations Tracking and telemetry data for space vehicles

4) Navigation

5) Situational awareness and monitoring Surveys about activities of space troops and weapons strengths Telemetry to analyze and find out technical status and condition of vehicles Remote control

                                                                                                               54  Ibid,  page  23.  55    Cai  Fengzhen,  Tian  Anping,  et  al.,  Kongtian  Yiti  Zuozhan  Xue  [Integrated  Aerospace  Operations]  (Beijing:  PLA  Press,  2006),  58.  

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6) Information Attacks High-powered electromagnetic pulse attacks Electromagnetic jamming Computer virus attacks

7) Blockade Trajectory blockade Orbital blockade Base blockade

8) Orbital destruction and attacks Space-to-space attacks Air-to-space attacks Earth-to-space attacks

9) Space-to-earth assaults Space-earth assault Earth-space-earth assault

10) Space defense Camouflage and strengthening of spacecrafts Constellation-style dispersed deployment Orbital maneuvers Counterattacks Ground joint protection

11) Deterrence Potential space deterrence Nominal space combat Actual space combat

Another area of academia that is extremely relevant and telling of Chinese space

policy is their concept of “legal warfare.” The PLA’s General Political Department has always worked on setting up legal explanations and safeguards for their international actions.56 In fact, legal warfare is an entire field of law in which they examine the process of justifying military conflict. Looking at Chinese literature on legal warfare, one notices the Chinese following the same logic of terrestrial territorial sovereignty, contrary to the principles of the 1967 OST. “Control of portions of outer space is a natural extension of other forms of territorial control,” writes PLA Major General Cai

                                                                                                               56  Wortzel,  Larry  M.  “The  Chinese  People’s  Liberation  Army  and  Space  Warfare.”  American  Enterprise  Institute.    

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Fengzhen, “space control today...is an absolute necessity for conducting modern ‘informationalized’ warfare.”57 This is in direct contrast against stated U.S. National Space Policy, in which the U.S. “rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies or any proof thereof.”58 It has been reported that U.S. State Department officials derisively refer to China’s space doctrine as their “theology.”59

From an American perspective, Chinese government intentions can be notoriously opaque, especially when it concerns the Space. After China’s 2007 ASAT test, the U.S. publically maintained its refrain from any expansion of space-related cooperation with China due to the “continued lack of transparency from China regarding the full range of China’s space activities,” and the countless unanswered questions concerning the 2007 ASAT launch.60 Major Paul Oh of the Strategic Studies Institutes authored a paper attempting to apply Chinese military doctrines to the space domain in order to gauge intent. He lists the doctrines as being Peoples War school, Local War school, and Revolution in Military Affairs school and summarizes the strategic military posture associated with each doctrine. Peoples War is concerned with global defense against an invading enemy. Local War advocates a defensive posture relative to the United States but an offensive stance relative to it's neighbors. And the Revolution in Military Affairs school champions a globally offensive posture and the development of disruptive, asymmetric technologies exceeding the capabilities of the United States. The article uses the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile program and manned-spaceflight program as case studies to determine which of the doctrines has been most prevalent in space. Although the author acknowledges that the SC-19 ASAT test of 2007 and the HQ-19 ballistic missile defense system test in 2010 possess some of the aspects of disruptive technology proscribed by the Revolution in Military Affairs school, he dismisses this possibility on the grounds that the organizational and doctrinal

                                                                                                               57  Cai  Fengzhen,  Tian  Anping,  et  al.,  Kongtian  Zhan-­  chang  yu  Zhongguo  Kongjun,.  [Integrated  Aerospace  Operations]  (Beijing:  PLA  Press,  2006),  2,  58.    58  Wortzel,  page  5.  59  Kulacki,  Gregory.  “Potential  for  Cooperation  with  China.”  Presented  at  Moving  Ahead  on  Space  Security,  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Deace.  15  December  2010.  Page  1  60  Questions  including:  What  steps  did  China  take  to  mitigate  damage  to  the  satellites  of  other  countries  due  to  space  debris  from  the  launch?  What  are  China’s  future  intentions  for  its  direct-­‐ascent  ASAT  development  and  testing  program?  What  notification  will  China  provide  for  future  ASAT  tests?  

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developments necessary to challenge American hegemony are apparently absent. Regarding the second case study, Major Oh is critical of the manned space program of the Chinese, remarking that the technology being employed has remained relatively stagnant since the 1960s. Given these case studies, he finds that the Local War school is most applicable to Chinese space doctrine and China will continue to posture itself defensively relative to the United States, while developing national strategic space assets in order to assert dominance in the region. However, recent launch trends and future projections undermine this conclusion.

COMPARING CAPABILITIES

Now that we have gone through the relative U.S. and Chinese doctrine, we should compare their space capabilities among certain areas of emphasis. We decided to evaluate China and the U.S. in the following six categories: I. Space Industry Competitiveness II. Launch Vehicles III. Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance IV. Communications V. Precision Strike Capabilities VI. Anti-satellite Capabilities Through examinations of these categories in their current state as well as projections for the future, we discover not only the answer to our U.S.-China balance hypothetical, but we also find several important policy implications emerging for the United States.

I: SPACE INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS

A good way to understand the competition in the space industry or to predict future space industry trends is to look at relative space industry competitiveness between the United States and China. Recently, the United States space industry is on the decline, so much so that a main aspect of the DoD’s National Security Space Strategy is the decreased U.S. competitive advantage in space machinery production

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due to the fact that “market-entry barriers have lowered.”61 Cross-border collaboration and trade of space technology is severely restricted for American companies due to their inclusion as “defense services or articles.” This makes them subject to the stifling International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Space technology was added to ITAR in 1999, classifying space commodities as part of the United States Munitions List (USML) after a trade issue involving the Loral satellite and China in the late 1990s, under the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act. This isolation led to the development of external space markets. The competitiveness of the United States satellite and space industry has severely decreased, as has its portion of world satellite revenues. This decrease is illustrated in figure BLAH, which illuminates the fall in relative U.S. satellite and space revenues within the duration of the enhancement of ITAR export controls on space commodities. With the little funding still available to both private and government research agencies, technological innovation still moves forward, but the US does not have the same kind of market-share that it did before imposing export restrictions. In 1999, the US made up 63 percent of world satellite manufacturing revenue. Two years later, after the export restrictions, the US plummeted to only 40 percent. Although 2009, was a colossal year in space for America (launching 23 orbital vehicles, as will be seen later), the trend has not continued from 2010-2012.

                                                                                                               61  “National  Security  Space  Strategy”  DoD  (2011)    

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Figure  11

Chinese space capabilities, on the other hand, have experience such exponential technological advancement that although they achieved their first manned space flight over four decades after the successful U.S. launch of Alan Shepard on Freedom 7, they currently pose a direct threat to the United States militarily.62 The closing down of the U.S. export market allowed for other space industrial The following graph offers a comparison between US and Chinese space launches taking place in the last four years. In 2010 China achieved parity with the US in absolute number of orbital launches.

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command head Lieutenant General Kevin Campbell expressed in early 2007 that “within three years, we can be challenged [by China] at a near-peer level.”63 Almost two years have passed since his prediction would have come to fruition, and a look at the current Chinese space program, its private sector innovation like Beidou, and Chinese academia’s emphasis on the importance of                                                                                                                62  “Time  line:  50  years  of  space  travel.”  SPACE.COM.  Published  28  September  2012.  http://www.space.com/4422-­‐timeline-­‐50-­‐years-­‐spaceflight.html (accessed 14 November 2012).  63  Wortzel,  page  1.  

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space warfare illustrate how correct he was. The following graph offers a comparison between US and Chinese space launches taking place in the last four years. In 2010 China achieved parity with the US in absolute number of orbital launches.

Figure  12

The chart above (Figure 12) projects forward through the end of 201264 and demonstrates that the Chinese are closing the gap behind the US as global space leader. The US’s retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2011 and struggle to find a viable replacement contributed to China’s space gains relative to the US. The United States has other launch vehicles at its disposal (notably the Ares V and Delta IV). By the end of 2012, China will have 106 active satellites in orbit, 38 of which are technically classified as being owned by the military and 47 of which are run by the government. Given the closed ties between the PRC and the PLA, however, and the fact that the PLA has influence in every space decision, it is likely that more than a few of these government satellites are serving a dual-use for the military such as electronic SIGINT or monitoring of communications. Of Chinese satellites in space, approximately 21 percent are used for remote sensing / gathering of ISR. Communication satellites                                                                                                                64  Based  off  data  of  all  tracked  objects  in  orbit  by  the  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists  as  of  7/31/12  and  then  updated  with  real-­‐time  launch  information  from  http://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=latest-­‐launches  and  projected  forward  using  the  National  Space  Science  Data  Center  and  assuming  no  launch  failures  between  11/15  and  12/  31.      

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account for 22 percent of Chinese total, compared with 68 percent for American assets. Hunger for spectrum bandwidth as China continues its process of “informationalizing” it’s armed forces and improving its commercial communications infrastructure will likely drive significant further investment in this sector in the coming years. Interesting trends can be gleaned from looking at recent satellite launches. China’s commitment to improving its nascent space industry is clearly evident, and by the end of the year, the PRC hopes to have 10 satellites devoted to “Technology Development” in Space (9.5 percent). In absolute terms, the US has more satellites devoted to the purpose (17) but this makes up a far smaller percent of total satellite infrastructure devoted to the development of new space technologies (4 percent) and also the proportion of these launched in recent years is significantly less.

The dwindling U.S. industry is also affecting the reliability of current U.S. satellites in orbit. Tons of satellites that will soon be defective are lacking funding for replacements. For example, the much relied-upon polar satellite known as Suomi has perhaps three years of life in it, and its replacements — the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) — are not likely to be launched until 2017 and 2022.”65

The opposite is true for the Chinese. In what was called a “rare admission,” a Chinese spokeswoman said in July 2012 that China had spent $3.1 billion on its space program from 1992 and 2005, and by the time their next manned mission is completed in late 2012, they’ll have spent $3 billion more.66 China’s space industry competitiveness is in the midst of an unprecedented rise. U.S. export restrictions created in ITAR lead to the creation and profound growth of indigenous Chinese space industries which, if the left unchecked, challenge the US’s position as global space leader. Since 2007, China has manufactured and successfully launched satellites for Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, Venezuela and Brazil with further plans to launch satellites for Turkey and Belarus by the end of this year.67

A lot of Chinese funding has gone towards the abundant civil-supported state-owned corporations that are involved in the Chinese space program. The nation’s space and satellite industries have skyrocketed since the American implementation of ITAR

                                                                                                               65  Kluger,  Jeffery.  “Flying  Blind:  America’s  Aging  Weather  Satellites.”  Time  Magazine.  Published  30  October  2012.  <http://science.time.com/2012/10/30/flying-­‐blind-­‐americas-­‐aging-­‐weather-­‐satellites/>  (accessed  2  November  2012).  66  Hoverstein  (2012).    67  UCS  launch  database  

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regulations. The Chinese State Council came up with a way to combine public and civil forces to best excel in technology and innovation, as civil sector advancement also benefits the public sector. An evaluation of China’s space capabilities by The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in April 2012 noted that “China’s commercial satellite launch business is a source of revenue for the defense industry, and China’s remote sensing community may eventually market commercial space imagery to international customers.” 68 Government funding goes towards creating special engineering universities and institutions to focus on specific initiatives, like improving launch capability. The Chinese 863 program, named after the March 1986 date of its creation, subsidizes technology development. The program gave the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the General Arms Department (GAD) control over creating synergies within China’s civilian and defense strategy and technology community. The 863 grants to qualified corporations make up a large component of China’s overall space-related research and development.69

The U.S. has found in the private American space industry a partner with whom to work. Since the retiring of the Space Shuttle in 2011, the US had limited recourse when it came to placing payloads into orbit. They would rely increasingly on the Atlas V and Delta IV heavy lift rockets, but have now began to seek new solutions from the emerging private sector. The Falcon 9, created by the private company SpaceX, has demonstrated progress in the last few years, and opened the door for private space enterprise in the United States. Companies such as SpaceX (manufacturers of the Falcon 9 Rocket and Dragon space capsule) and Orbital Sciences Corporation (makers of the Antares medium launcher scheduled to be tested at the end of this year) are vying for contracts to deliver equipment and potentially crew to the International Space Station (ISS) under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Demonstrations program, first proposed in 2006.70 NASA has awarded contracts worth up to $3.5 billion dollars

                                                                                                               68  Stokes,  Mark  and  Dean  Cheng.  China’s  Evolving  Space  Capabilities:  Implications  for  U.S.  Interests.”  U.S.-­China  Economic  and  Security  Review  Commission.  26  April  2012.  Project  2049  Institute.  Available  at  <“http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC_China-­‐Space-­‐Program-­‐Report_April-­‐2012.pdf>  69  Stokes  (2012).  70  “NASA  Seeks  Proposals  for  Crew  and  Cargo  Transportation  to  Orbit.”  Johnson  Space  Center  Website.  Published  18  January  2006.  <http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=18791>  (accessed  14  November  2012).  

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over the next 4 years to SpaceX and Orbital Sciences for twenty delivery missions. 71 The first of which (CRS-1) occurred in October of 2012. The mission was a partial success, delivering the primary cargo (the supplies) to the ISS but a partial engine failure prohibited the launch of the secondary payload, an Orbcomm commercial satellite which burned up in reentry four days later. 72 This has left modicum of bad taste in the mouths of champions to US private space enterprise, but nevertheless, the Falcon 9 and Antares (formerly Taurs II) have shown significant promise. However, these launch vehicles are unlikely to have much military application in the future and so will be largely outside the focus of this paper.

Overall, the United States space competitiveness seems to be on a steady decline, whereas the Chinese space industry is having a boom. If you look at current market trends, the effects of ITAR on the U.S.’s industry were disastrous and essentially started the expansion of the Chinese market. The United States has a partnership with the private space sector, but is beginning to rely upon their launch capabilities due to a major lack of funding. It is important to note that the Chinese government essentially owns the corporations it civilly helps, which allows their seamless cohesion and mutual gains. Finally, China’s emphasis and monetary priority for education in engineering and especially in space has earned them a younger, more efficient space industrial workforce. Today, the average Chinese space-related employee is 35-40 whereas his equivalent in the United States typically ranges from 45-60.73 Though their space programs are not yet quite up to par with that of the United States, their increasing competitiveness and exponential progress has made them a great threat to the U.S. So much so that section 1511 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act particularly states that “the United States should pursue policies that protect and enhance the United States space launch industry,” and more importantly, that “the United States should not export to the People’s Republic of China missile equipment or

                                                                                                               71  Bergin,  Chris.  “SpaceX  and  ORbital  win  huge  CRS  contract  from  NASA.”  NASA  Spaceflight.com    Published  23  December  2008.  <http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/12/spacex-­‐and-­‐orbital-­‐win-­‐huge-­‐crs-­‐contract-­‐from-­‐nasa/>  (accessed  11  November  2012)  72  To  be  fair,  the  satellite  could  likely  have  still  been  launched  and  completed  both  missions  (>95%  probability)  have  been  successfully  placed  in  orbit  by  initiating  a  second  burn,  but  the  primary  contractor  required  >99%  certainty  and  so  the  $10  million  satellite  sacrificed.  For  more:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_CRS-­‐1  73  Stokes  (2012)  page  14.  

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technology that would improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.”74

II: LAUNCH VEHICLE

“We can lick gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is overwhelming.” -Werner Von Braun

Chinese competitiveness in space depends on the nation’s sturdy launch vehicle, the four basic series of Long March (Chang Zheng; CZ) liquid-fueled vehicles. The LM series came out of the ballistic missile development program and are highly influenced by the Dongfeng-4 (DF-4) and Dongfeng-5 (DF-5) ICBM systems. The long march family has demonstrated itself to be both cost effective and reliable over the last 10 years, having fewer launch failures than even the United States.75

On 29 July 2012, the Chinese successfully tested the new Long March-5, which will come online in 2014 to replace the LM3 and LM4. The LM5 has capabilities that rival the U.S.’s most advanced rocket, the Delta 4 Heavy Launch vehicle. It can send a 25-ton payload to LEO or 14 tons into geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). Research and development on LM6 and LM7 began in September 2012. The LM6 is set to be a smaller launch vehicle capable of boosting a 500 kg payload into orbit and the LM7 is a medium-sized rocket being designed to place a 5.5-ton payload into a sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 700 km.76 Both the LM6 and LM7 will have new capabilities, but the long-awaited LM9, supposedly able to surpass the U.S. Saturn-5 in 2025, will allow China to begin lunar missions.77

The U.S. Atlas V and Delta IV rockets, currently among the most advanced in the world, are mature technologies. The next generation, NASA Space Launch System (SLS) is pictured above. However, these have been hampered by excessive delays, the first of                                                                                                                74    Second  Session:  105th  Congress  of  the  United  States.  HR  3616.  <http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/contracts/cld/hi/105-­‐261.html>    75  If  you  combine  the  US  and  China’s  Launch  failures  in  the  last  10  years  and  double  it  you  would  have  almost  as  many  failures  as  the  Russians  over  the  same  time  period.  What  do  you  mean  you  drink  vodka  after  rocket  launch?  76  Stokes  (2012).  77Bergin,  Chris.  “Preliminary  NASA  plan  shows  evolved  SLS  vehicle  is  21  years  away.”  NASA  Spaceflight.com  Published  27  July  2011.  <http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/07/preliminary-­‐nasa-­‐evolved-­‐sls-­‐vehicle-­‐21-­‐years-­‐away/>  (accessed  12  November  2012).  

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which is not scheduled for a test flight until 2017.78 The debut mission, SLS-1 will be to launch the Orion MPCV on an unmanned mission around the moon, with a manned mission to lunar orbit planned for 2021. The block II configuration, the first one to exceed the carrying capacity of the Saturn V rocket, will not be available until after 203079. As the Chinese continue to experience lunar vehicle advancement at an unprecedented rate, the U.S. can only hope to upgrade its Delta-4 until 2017 at the earliest, with more realistic projections settling between 2024 and 2030.

Figure  13

                                                                                                               78  Ibid.  79  ibid.  

Figure  14  

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III: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SURVEILLANCE

An incredibly important part of a nation’s ability to conduct space-based operations is the level of it’s intelligence gathering and surveillance. We can evaluate this based on the number of reconnaissance satellites owned by each country’s military.80 The Chinese military currently has 38 recon satellites (43% of total military satellites) and the U.S. has 36 (28% of total military satellites).81 The Chinese military

                                                                                                               80  In  this  study,  we  included  remote  sensing  and  signals  intelligence  satellites  under  the  definition  of    reconnaissance.  81  Updated  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists  Satellite  Database.  

Figure  16:  US  Next  Generation  Figure  15Next  Chinese  Generation  

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devotes more of its resources to satellite reconnaissance, and their growth trends project they will continue to prioritize recon as their economy and space industry boom.82

The U.S. still possesses peerless technology in terms of resilience, precision, and resolution. For example the U.S. commercial firm GeoEye, which provides consumers imagery data through services such as Google earth, has satellite resolution up to .41 meters.83Although the exact resolution of NRO optical surveillance is classified, two satellites given to NASA by the NRO as a result of the cancellation of the Future Imagery Architecture program have mirror diameters of 2.5 meters.84 This is believed to correspond to an image resolution less 0.1m, suitable for high quality “tier 1” imagery.85 It is unclear if NASA will find it in it’s already constrained budget to launch and operate these new satellites, but each of them is believed to have image resolution capabilities comparable to the Hubble space telescope.

What have the United States’ military and intelligence apparatuses been launching instead? For Electro-Optical imagery (EO), January 2011 the US launched USA-224 which is believed to be the next-generation variant of the “Improved Crystal” Keyhole-12 Spy developed by Lockheed Martin. This is a replacement and upgrade of existing surveillance satellite, but is likely one of three currently deployed satellites in LEO with resolution as fine or finer than 0.1m.86 It is believed these satellites use highly-classified stealth technology to evade tracking and detection, though this is difficult to confirm.87

On September 13, 2012, the US launched the classified NROL-36 payload launched from an Atlas V rocket consisted of a pair of Navy Ocean Surveillance Satellites (NOSS).88 These satellites share orbit, capture electronic signals intelligence

                                                                                                               82  Hoverstein  (2012)  83  Hoverstein  (2012)  84  Tariq,  Malik.  “U.S.  Spy  Satellite  Agency  Gives  NASA  2  Space  Telescopes.”  SPACE.COM  Published  4  June  2012.  <http://www.space.com/16000-­‐spy-­‐satellites-­‐space-­‐telescopes-­‐nasa.html>  (accessed  12  November  2012).  85  Day,  Dwane.  “Gum  in  the  Keyhole.”  The  Space  Review.  Published  22  June  2009.  <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1400/1>  (accessed  6  November  2012).  86  Easton,  Ian.  “The  Great  Game  in  Space:  China’s  Evolving  ASAT  Weapons  Programs  and  Their  Implications  for  US  Policy.”    Project  2049.  Available  at  <http://project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf>  87  ibid.  Believed  to  originate  from  Cold-­‐war  era  spy  satellites  code-­‐named  Misty.  Highly  speculative,  but  both  the  US  and  china  have  expressed  interest  in  improving  stealth  in  space  so  it  is  worthy  to  include.    88  “USA  283.”  NASA  Space  Science  Data  Center.  <http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/masterCatalog.do?sc=2012-­‐048A>  (Accessed  1  November  2012).  

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from naval vessels radio communications, and can accurately triangulate position in real time for both intelligence and targeting purposes.89

Chinese satellite surveillance capabilities, though currently inferior, have become a major priority of China’s space program. Chinese academia advised the army to accelerate and expand their space-based surveillance system. Some even advocate the need for a “space-based theater electronic information system” that covers an area of 3,000 square km.90 China recently reported nearing its second-generation synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite. The advancement of the Chinese SAR capability gives them extreme leverage, as SAR satellites are a core component of military surveillance. They use microwave transmissions to create of targets, so they can work all day, night, and in any weather--perfect for viewing ships in a wide area.91 Aided by its Project 863, CASC Eighth Academy played a leadership role in system-integrating Yaogan-1 (Y-1) in April 2006 on LM-4B, the first deployment of a Chinese SAR satellite. Subsequent improved SAR systems have been deployed, the most recent being Yaogan-13, launched from Taiyuan in November 2011.92

China has focused increasingly on electro-optical (EO) satellites augmented with electronic reconnaissance satellites to monitor radar and radio transmissions. The first EO satellite, Yaogan-2, was manufactured by CASC Fifth Academy and launched on 25 May 2007.93 More recent EO satellites, like the Shijian-111, is equipped with a camera that can able to process and image ground targets up to a 0.25 meter spatial resolution. Ministry officials have said that they are currently working on EO satellites capable of 0.1 meter spatial resolution.94 In addition, their oceanographic and meteorological satellites have advanced capabilities, some equivalent to those of U.S. satellites. Again, considering the current funding situations of China and the U.S., China has a significant chance to rival American satellite imagery and reconnaissance capabilities.

                                                                                                               89  “NOSS  Double  and  Tripple  Satellite  Formations.”  Navy  Ocean  Survailence  System.  <http://www.satobs.org/noss.htm>  (accessed  4  November  2012).  90    Ma  Genhai,  “Considerations  Regarding  China’s  Military  Use  Satellite  System  Entering  the  Next  Century,”  Journal  of  the  Institute  of  Command  and  Control  Technology(Zhihui  jishu  xueyuan  xuebao),  1999,  Vol.  10,  No.  6.  91  Stokes  (2012)  Page  28.  92  Stokes  (2012).  Page  30  93  “Successful  Launch  of  the  Yaogan-­‐2”  [������“������”],  Xinhua,  May  25,  2007,  at  http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-­‐05/25/content_6152111.htm.  94  Easton  (2012).  Page  30.  

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IV: COMMUNICATIONS Direct and clear communications are absolutely necessary for a successful space

campaign. Currently, both the U.S. and Chinese militaries devote approximately 26% of their satellites to communications functions.95 The U.S. communications network includes five Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (Milstar) communication satellites who provide secure, jam-resistant, worldwide communications for high-priority military usage. The U.S. also has nine Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) planted in a Phase III spacecraft in near-GEO orbit over 35,000 km above ground. These allow for high priority command and control communications. The U.S. has recently begun integrating Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications technology. This adds to Milstar’s low data rate (LDR) and medium data rate (MDR) capabilities while also providing extreme data rates (XDR) for a substantially smaller cost. Each of these AEHF satellites is launched on an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, costing approximately $580 million per satellite. The first U.S. AEHF launch was in April 2008.96 The Chinese have also greatly invested in their research and development concerning communications satellites. The first PLA dedicated military communications satellite, Fenghuo-1, also known as ChinaSat-22, weighted 2,300 kg and was designed to last eight years. Her successor, Fenghuo-2 (ChinaSat-22A) was launched in September 2006. The Chinese have another communications system, the Shentong-1 (ChinaSat-20) launched in November 2003 and the Shentong-2 (ChinaSat-20A) was launched on 25 November 2010. In an attempt to expand the scope of communications satellite architecture, the Chinese have also started developing data relay satellites. In April 2008 they launched Tianlian-1, for the first time allowing sensors to operate beyond line of sight of ground stations in China.97 Currently, the Chinese are working on furthering their already impressive communications network with supplemental quantum communications, an idea with the potential to come to fruition in mere decades and to place China as the forerunner for secure communications.

                                                                                                               95  UCS  database  96  “AEHF  1,2,3,4”  Gunter’s  Space  Page.  <http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/aehf-­‐1.htm>  (accessed  15  November  2012).  97  Stokes  (2012).  

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V: PRECISION STRIKE CAPABILITY The most important offensive space capability for a state to hone is a precision strike. To minimize civilian casualties and effectively eliminate targets, having reliable precision guided munitions anywhere on earth gives a nation tangible superiority. Currently, the U.S. has the ability to coordinate troop movements and to precisely strike any target on earth, one of the key factors of U.S. military superiority. These capabilities all made possible by US NavStar GPS satellites, of which there are 24 currently in use and spares held in reserve orbit.98 Current GPS satellites allow for the determination of location anywhere in the globe to a range of within 10 feet. Newer GPS Block III satellites scheduled to go online will improve this resolution to 3 feet, as well as provide new military frequencies that are more accurate, secure against spoofing and jamming, and more resilient against disruption.99

Precision strike capabilities constitute a true Revolution in Military Affairs and have fundamentally altered the way America engages in combat. In the Iraq war of 1991, approximately 10 percent of US munitions were guided by satellite. Compare this to the second Iraq war, 12 years later, where 68 percent of munitions were satellite guided.100All of these intelligently guided munitions were fired from nearby naval or air forces. However, for instances when no nearby military assets are available there is a drive for the development of the capability to strike a time sensitive target (TST) anywhere in the globe in less than one hour.101 To this end, the In November 2011, the U.S. Army carried out a successful initial of what may ultimately evolve into US’s Prompt Global Strike capability. The new system, entitled The Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, is built in a well-known and widely-used conical design (figure MEH is a sketch of the design) capable of traveling up to Mach 8 speed, approximately 9817 km per hour.102 The test was to observe the flight, collect data, and improve the current design by building new hypersonic

                                                                                                               98  UCS  data  99  "GPS  Block  IIIA."  Wikipedia.  Wikimedia  Foundation,  11  Dec.  2012.  Web.  19  Nov.  2012.  <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_Block_IIIA>.  100  Easton  (2012).  101  Grosman,  Elaine.  “U.S.  Brass  Reviews  Prompt  Global  Strike,  Muling  Submarine  Fired-­‐Arms.”  National  Journal:  Global  Security  Newswire.  Published  6  November  2012.  <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-­‐brass-­‐reviews-­‐prompt-­‐global-­‐strike-­‐mulling-­‐submarine-­‐fired-­‐arms/>  (Accessed  7  November  2012).  102  “U.S.  Hypersonic  Global  Strike  Technology  Successfully  Tested.”  NationalJournal:  Global  Security  Newswire.  Published  18  November  2011.  <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-­‐hypersonic-­‐global-­‐strike-­‐technology-­‐successfully-­‐tested/>  (Accessed  14  November  2012).  

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weapons that use boost-glide technology.103 Another example of this is the DARPA funded Hypersonic Test Vehicle (HTV) -- designed to travel in excess of Mach 20 in pursuit of its target.104 Despite these advancements U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission predict that China will have proficient anti-ballistic missile defenses against this strike capability by 2025.105 The United States is also in the testing process of an unmanned autonomous reusable space plane, the X-37B, capable of flying in Earth’s orbit.106 The craft is 8.8 meters long and 4.5 meters wide, with about the same payload storage as a Ford F100.107 The third launch of the X-37B was planned for mid-November, 2012. Aerospace planes would increase the U.S.’s precision strike by allowing missiles to take off from the plane, and a moving launch-site is advantageous for moving and unreliable targets.

The U.S. decision to tighten control over exports of space technology in 1999 contributed significantly to the Chinese desire to develop indigenous technical solutions and capabilities. In 2000, China began deployment of its navigation and global positioning system Beidou (Big Dipper) made up of COMPASS satellites to rival US GPS and Russian GLONASS systems. As of October, 2012, China has launched it’s 16th Beidou satellite, providing coverage over the entirety of China and the greater pacific region that can provide location data with a resolution as fine as 10 meters for commercial or public use, but allegedly able to be much more precise for government and military applications. By 2020, China expects to have 35 Beidou Compass satellites in orbit, capable of providing coverage to the entire globe.108

                                                                                                               103  Department  of  Defense.  “Department  of  Defense  Announces  Successful  Test  of  Army  Advanced  Hypersonic  Weapon  Concept.”  17  November  2011.  Available  at:  <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14920>  104  Hsu,  Jeremy.  “DARPA’s  Mach  20  Hypersonic  Glider  and  X-­‐37B  Space  Plane  Make  Their  Debut.”  Popular  Science.  Published  23  April  2010.  <http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-­‐04/darpas-­‐mach-­‐20-­‐hypersonic-­‐glider-­‐and-­‐air-­‐force-­‐space-­‐plane-­‐debut>  (Accessed  13  November  2012).  105A  more  detailed  assessment  of  U.S.  programs,  in  Xie  Wu,  “Four  Major  Challenges  Facing  An  Accelerated  US  ‘Prompt  Global  Strike"  Program’,”  [�“������”������  ������],  China  Daily,  June  11,  2010,  at  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqjs/jsyw/2010-­‐06-­‐11/content_446614_2.html.  106“X-­‐37b  Lands  This  Morning  at  Vandenberg.”  Santa  Maria  Times.  Published  16  June  2012.  <http://santamariatimes.com/news/local/military/vandenberg/x-­‐-­‐b-­‐lands-­‐this-­‐morning-­‐at-­‐vandenberg-­‐afb/article_31f5827c-­‐b7bc-­‐11e1-­‐80b2-­‐0019bb2963f4.html>  (accessed  11  November  2012).  107  David,  Leonard.  “Launch  of  Third  Air  Force  Secret  Space  Plane  Delayed  Again.”  SPACE.Com.  Published  2  November  2012.  <http://www.space.com/18334-­‐air-­‐force-­‐space-­‐plane-­‐x37b-­‐launch-­‐delay.html>  (accessed  4  November  2012).  108  Beidou  (site  in  Chinese)  http://www.beidou.gov.cn/xtjs.html    

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The Chinese decision to develop its own navigation network poses significant security concerns should a conflict with China ever occur. If one side is able to disable or significantly hamper a large enough proportion of guidance satellites while retaining their own ability to conduct a precision strike, it could lead to a decisive imbalance with one side potentially able to severely mitigate the second-strike capability of the other. If an opportunity is deemed likely, or even inevitable, such an opportunity for a surprise attack could be too tempting to pass up. China is actively expanding its surveillance system with precision strike in mind, calling for a “space-based theater electronic information system” that can cover an area of 3,000 sq. km.109 The recently launched trio of Yaogan 9 satellites closely mimic the characteristics of US NOSS satellites used for electronic signals intelligence and naval target tracking.110 These types of systems could empower long or medium range ballistic missiles such as the DF-21d anti ship ballistic missile (ASBM) to directly undermine the US’s ability to project naval power within range. The PLA aims to have this ability (3000 sq km) by the conclusion of its 12th 5-year plan in 2015, and total global strike capability by the conclusion of the 14th .111 The DF-21d is the most technologically impressive of the Chinese Ballistic Missile forces, but several other short and long range ballistic missiles variants are also deployed. SRC: DOD Chinese Military and Security Developments involving PRC (CMPR) 2010. Consistent with numbers presented in DoD CMPR 2012, except there are now between 100-200 additional missiles split between The CSS6 and CSS7. The 2010 Table was chosen because it contains finer detail. The PLA continues to bolster its SRBM and MRBM deployments near the South China Sea while simultaneously conducting research in more advanced spaced base weaponry. As early as 2007, the Chinese began development of an orbital aerospaceplane similar to the American X-37B, called the Shenlong Space Plane. "Shenlong is China’s effort to develop a re-entering aerodynamic spacecraft, similar to the X-37B but much smaller, " said Mark Gubrud, a postdoctoral research associate in the Program on

                                                                                                               109  Stokes  (2012).  110  Ibid.  111  Ibid.  

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Science and Global Security at Princeton University.112 The plane was seen landing from a practice flight in early September, 2012. China scholars Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins wrote “the Shenlong is very likely far less capable than the X-37B and may still be years away from yielding a vehicle with true operational capability."113 The Chinese are extremely looking forward to honing this capability, so much so that they established a separate research institute to focus on designing and developing hypersonic flight vehicles to transit the upper reaches of the atmosphere on a suborbital, rather than a traditional ballistic, flight trajectory, called the 10th Research institute (also called the Near Space Flight Vehicle Research Institute). 114The development of a maneuverable spaceplane is critical to achieve the doctrinal objective of a vehicle that can adjust altitude and reach adversaries assets in different orbits.115 This, in conjunction with research in hypersonic, advanced materials and manufacturing processes, and advanced precision strike capabilities aim to create a formidable space defense capability. In further efforts of ‘keeping up with the Joneses’’, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation unveiled the newly constructed hypersonic wind tunnel on November 2, 2012.

While the respective U.S. and Chinese aerospace planes tell us little about their comparative capabilities, what we do learn from these highly competitive tensions is that transparency between the two nations is extremely low. At the time of writing, U.S. communications outdo those of the Chinese military, but if the Chinese continue at their current rate of research and development, China’s communications have a good chance of overtaking the quality of Americas Milstar systems.

VI: ASAT

On 11 January 2007, China launched a ballistic missile from Xichang Space Launch Center. The ballistic missile, labeled SC-19 by the U.S. military and believed to be a modified version of the DF-21 (a two-stage, road-mobile, solid-fuel missile with a

                                                                                                               112  Howard,  Jacqueline.  "Shenlong  Space  Plane:  China's  Answer  To  U.S.  X-­‐37B  Drone?"The  Huffington  Post.  TheHuffingtonPost.com,  10  Nov.  2012.  Web.  19  Nov.  2012.  <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/10/shenlong-­‐space-­‐plane-­‐china_n_2110084.html>.  113  Ibid.  114Stokes  (2012)  Page  18  115  Fischer,  Richard.  “Shenlong  Space  Plane  Advances  China’s  Military  Space  Potential.”  Internatinoal  Assessment  and  Strategy  Center.  Published  17  December  2007.  <http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=174>  (Accessed  16  November  2012).  

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medium ballistic range of 2,500 kilometers for a 600 kilogram payload), contained a kinetic kill vehicle that annihilated an old Chinese FengYun-1C meteorological satellite.116 Years later, little is publicly known about the mechanics of the kill vehicle. The United States, in numerous State Department documents now declassified or released through other means, was clearly agitated by the Chinese show of anti-satellite missile (ASAT) capabilities. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a demarche to embassies in Berlin, Canberra, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Seoul, Tel Aviv, Geneva, and Tokyo requesting cooperation over formal intelligence gathering concerning the Chinese launch. Letters were sent from the U.S. to Chinese officials warning that, “your government’s continued unwillingness to provide a full explanation for its actions [is calling] into question China’s intentions in space and [undermining] trust.”117

The following year, on 21 February, the United States launched a modified missile-defense interceptor that destroyed an experimental reconnaissance satellite, NROL-21). The government claimed was carrying toxic fuel and making an uncontrolled reentry into the atmosphere.118 The intercept employed a modified Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) from the Aegis-system-equipped USS Lake Erie with a kinetic warhead using high-resolution long-wave-infrared sensors for target detection.119 The successful ASAT launch provoked messages from Beijing expressing concern over the launch’s “possible harm caused by the U.S. to our space security.”120 These two incidents are extremely important, as both nations performed international displays that they possess ASAT aptitude capable of destroying any low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite. These events are just two of many executive measures, scholarly articles, economic manipulations, military debates, and diplomatic relations

                                                                                                               116  Weeden  (2012).  117  “Request  to  allies  for  new  demarche  to  China  regarding  China’s  January  2007  anti-­‐satellite  test.”  Secretary  of  State  to  corresponding  embassies  (6  January  2008)  reference  ID  08STATE1265.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-­‐files/china-­‐wikileaks/8299317/REQUEST-­‐TO-­‐ALLIES-­‐FOR-­‐NEW-­‐DEMARCHE-­‐TO-­‐CHINA-­‐REGARDING-­‐CHINAS-­‐JANUARY-­‐2007-­‐ANTI-­‐SATELLITE-­‐TEST.html>  [accessed  5  November  2012].  118  Mineiro,  Michael  C.  “FY-­‐1C  and  USA-­‐193  ASAT  Intercepts:  An  Assessment  of  Legal  Obligations  Under  Article  IX  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty.”  Journal  of  Space  Law  Vol.  34  No.  1,  Spring  2008.  Page  322.  119  Mackey  James.  “Recent  U.S.  and  Chinese  Antisatellite  Activity.”  Air  and  Space  Journal.  1  September  2009.  Accessed  via  <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/mackey.html.>  120  “China’s  angst  over  U.S.  satellite  interception.”  Embassy  Beijing  report  22  February  2008.  Reference  ID  08BEIJING647.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-­‐files/china-­‐wikileaks/8299318/CHINAS-­‐ANGST-­‐OVER-­‐U.S.-­‐SATELLITE-­‐INTERCEPTION.html>  [accessed  6  November  2012].  

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that reflect the heightening tensions between the United States and China concerning space-based capabilities and the potential militarization of space. As China and the U.S. compete for future hegemony, military conflict is not out of the question. In fact, “China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries.”121 To be more specific, in the event of a conflict between the U.S. and China, disabling of space-based infrastructure would likely be the first move. As Secretary of the U.S. Air Force Michael Wayne stated after the Chinese demonstration, “space is no longer a sanctuary.”122 Kinetic kill weapons are not the only way to harm a satellite, and in fact have numerous drawbacks. Rocket launches are extremely difficult to hide from early-warning satellites. The ASAT also face an extremely difficult physics problem in trying to hit objects moving at hypersonic speeds through earth's upper atmosphere, especially if the object can detect the missile and maneuver itself or deploy its own interceptor. Direct energy weapons (DEW) on the other hand, allow for the possibility of strike virtually instantaneously and without warning. The US has spent billions of dollars and conducted successful experiments in using DEW for short-range interceptions of rockets, artillery, and mortar fire, high cost, power, and range constraints have limited deployment thus far. A recent notable US achievement in the field include the successful interception an Air-to-Air missile using the Airborne Laser Testbed, a Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser mounted on a Boeing 747 capable of destroying ballistic missiles mid-boost in mere seconds.123 The test was the result of $1.3 billion dollars spent on research and development of the platform over the last ten years, but despite initial successes, this technology is still a few years from deployment.

More recently, a different type of kinetic/direct energy weapon hybrid was tested that could have dramatic impacts on the space theater. The Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) was successfully flown over a test facility in Utah, discharged several bursts of High-power microwaves and

                                                                                                               121  Zhang,  Baohui.  "The  Security  Dilemma  in  the  U.S.-­‐China  Military  Space  Relationship,  the  Prospects  for  Arms  Control."  Asian  Survey  Volume  51  no.  2  (March/April  2011).  Page  311.  122  Kolleck,  Mathais.  “Space  Survivability-­‐-­‐Time  to  Get  Serious.”  Aircraft  Survivability,  Published  by  the  Joint  Aircraft  Survivability  Program  Office.  (Summer  2008)  Page  7.    123  "Airborne  Laser  (ABL)."  MissileThreat.  N.p.,  n.d.  Web.  19  Nov.  2012.  <http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.8/system_detail.asp>.  

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was able to completely disable every electronic system among seven different targets.124 The CHAMPS missile disrupts electronics similarly to an EMP but without the need to detonate a nuclear weapon. The imagined use for such a weapon is to disable active and passive radar arrays in advance of stealth bombers to limit anti-access/area-denial capabilities. It is unclear how effective such a system would be against a satellite, as they are typically hardened against cosmic radiation, but the potential to disable a satellite without having to deal with the cloud of debris is very advantageous.

The Chinese are also investing heavily in DEW such as ground-based laser or high-power microwave systems for satellite tracking, jamming, and potentially even destruction. It is rumored that they PLA is also developing EMP warheads for its DF-21 ASBM that could potentially be used to disrupt space-assets. Some of these weapon systems have been in development for over a decade, and could therefore be fairly mature.125

Soft-kill techniques provide advantages that are both tactical and strategic. They avoid adding more debris to increasingly congested orbits, are harder to attribute, and also have the potential to be reversible. An irreversible attack is complete destruction, but denial of service attacks are potentially temporary, reversible, and could allow the satellite to resume normal functions at some point in the future. However, upon initial attack, it will be unclear whether or not the attack will have permanent damage. For these reasons, at the onset of a conflict soft kill techniques are much more likely to be used. If a hard kill attack were employed, conditions would unpredictably escalate.

INNOVATION: ANOTHER FACTOR? “I have learned to use the word impossible with the greatest caution.”

-Werner Von Braun

Both the Chinese and U.S. are leading innovators in space-based infrastructure. Both are leading proponents and testers of mini-satellites. Advancements in

                                                                                                               124Johnson,  Robert.  “Boeing  Now  Has  A  Missile  that  Destroys  Only  Electronics  and  Leaves  All  Else  Intact.”  Business  Insider.  Published  23  October  2012.  <http://www.businessinsider.com/beoings-­‐counter-­‐electronics-­‐high-­‐power-­‐microwave-­‐advanced-­‐missile-­‐project-­‐2012-­‐10>  (accessed  15  November  2012).  125  Easton  (2012).  

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information technology and miniaturization are enabling the creation of more compact and capable circuitry that can be produced and deployed at significantly lower cost than conventional satellite infrastructure. Miniature satellites (Minisats) typically have a( the U.S. Air Force reports only $350,000 per satellite)126 mass between less than 500kg and have been developed and deployed with increasing frequency in recent years. The category is further subdivided into microsatellites (between 10-100 kg) and nanosatellites (1-10kg).127

Smaller satellites have numerous potential military advantages. With a smaller cross section, they are less susceptible to accidental collision with debris. They also possess a much smaller radar cross section, making them harder to hit with conventional interceptors. The ability to mass produce a multitude of small, low-cost, satellites offers the opportunity to cheaply create constellations of sensors or communication satellite relays that can be much more resilient to disruption. Additionally, even though it is nearly impossible to hide a space launch, and extremely difficult to hide objects in orbit, microsatellites can stow-away on larger satellite launches in order to obfuscate their purpose or even hide their existence. A sufficiently maneuverable microsatellite could even serve as a space-to-space weapons platform with a low chance of signature detection and an even lower chance of successfully attributing the attack.

Recently, the U.S. tested two nanosatellites developed by the USAF Space Missile Defense Command (SMDC). The satellites were designated SMDC-ONE 1.1 and 1.2.128 The advantages of nanosatellites to the US military are numerous. The ability to manufacture and launch on a much smaller timescale and at significantly lower cost and have the satellites communicate with and relay information between ground based sensors could prove invaluable in the emergency situations or in the event of a satellite loss. The SMDC-ONE nanosatellites are also designed to communicate with deployed tactical radar systems, relaying sensor data or audio communications.129 It is easy to imagine nanosatellites of this type deployed in mass in conjunction with ground or sea                                                                                                                126  USASMDC/ARSTRAT.  “SMDC-­‐-­‐ONE:  Nanosatellite  Technology  Demonstration.”  US  Army  Military  and  Space  Defense  Command.  Available  at:  <http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/SMDC-­‐One.pdf:  127  Cubesats  are  examples  of  nanosatellites  used  by  researchers  and  academics-­‐-­‐  For  more  information,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CubeSat    128  USASMDC/ARSTRAT  “SMDC-­‐-­‐ONE:  Nanosatellite  Technology  Demonstration.”  129  "SMDC-­‐ONE."  SMDC-­ONE.  Gunter's  Space  Page,  n.d.  Web.  19  Nov.  2012.  <http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/smdc-­‐one.htm>.  

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based sensors (stationary or autonomously mobile) to create a robust and intelligent network.

In China, the army is always advocating innovation, especially since their PLA modernization efforts. China’s army began the process of PLA modernization in the late 1970s. The PLA modernization changed doctrine, rearranged priorities, and upgraded weapons to adapt to modern warfare. This included limiting ground forces and investing more in equipment used in modern warfare, like satellites, long-range missiles, and cyber technology.130 The PLA calls space operations and warfare in space “informationalized,” or “information age warfare,” so it will definitely receive increasing priority (as it already has) in terms of defense budget spending.131

The Chinese experiments with microsatellites began in 2000 with the Tsinghua-1, which conducted numerous experiments pertaining to navigation, multispectral sensing, and communications. 132Other microsatellite programs included the Pixing-1 and the Banxing-1 which deployed as piggyback payloads in 2007 and 2008. Just last week, China launched four more miniature satellites into orbit, including the Fengniao 1 (FN-1) and FN-1a satellite pair featured below (Figure 17).

Figure  17

Also known as Hummersats, the duo consists of a miniature satellite (FN-1, 160kg) and a microsatellite (FN-1a, 40kg). One of the state purposes of the mission is to “Demonstrate the capability of close formation flying technologies such as: relative

                                                                                                               130  Joffe,  Ellis.  “People’s  War  Under  Modern  Conditions:  A  Doctrine  for  Modern  War.”  The  China  Quarterly,  No.  112  (Dec,.  1987).  Pp.  555-­‐571.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/653779  131  Wortzel  page  2.  132  Stokes  (2012).  

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navigation, guidance and control, intersatellite crosslink, and command.” 133 These technologies. It is easy to imagine the dual-use nature of this research. The ability to accurately coordinate close formation flying allows for an inexpensive microsatellite to share an orbit with a more vital space asset and serve as a space based interceptor to ward in the event of debris incursion or kinetic attack. This is dual-use technology because a satellite this maneuverable could theoretically also be placed in the orbit of another satellite to perform electronic or signals intelligence, jam communications or serve as a launching point for cyber attack. The BX-1 microsatellite is believed to have been an early testbed some of these capabilities, covertly surveying other satellites in orbit and even approaching within 25km of the ISS in what may have been an intelligence mission or a simulated attack run.134

The increasing congestion of space, due to debris and increasing prevalence of micro and nanosatellites has lead both the Chinese and the U.S. have been testing and innovating solutions for orbital debris. The private American firm Lockheed Martin is currently developing a “Space Fence” around the atmosphere. This fence is essentially a network of S-band ground-based radars to provide the Air Force with unequaled detection, tracking and accurate measurement of space objects, primarily in low-earth orbit.135 The improved radar system will cost the U.S. approximately $3.5 billion and will be used to identify more and smaller pieces of space debris. Apparently the new system, which should be ready for testing in 2017, "will have greater sensitivity, allowing it to detect, track and measure and object the size of a softball orbiting more than 1,200 miles in space."136 The improved space fence capabilities will allow the U.S. military to receive timely evidence of satellite breakups, possible collisions, and unexpected satellite maneuvers.

China’s current Space Target and Debris Observation and Research Center is capable of providing somewhat early warning of small debris threatening manned orbital vehicles. This was very useful during their Shenzhou-7 mission. In 2003, China’s CNSA initiated a long-term action plan (2006-2010) for the improvement of space debris detection. The plan consists of a planned space-based surveillance system, satellites,

                                                                                                               133  “SMDC-­‐-­‐ONE”  134  Easton  (2012).  135Mount.(2012).  136Mount  (2012).  

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and other objects in space.137 It also consists of enhancing the satellite laser range and the creation of an improved radar system for satellite surveillance and tracking. Though these programs seem defensive in that they are contributing to a global problem, they are absolutely fueled by national interest. All this debris surveillance could be used to track other objects in space for a military and offensive purpose.

THE BALANCE Now that we’ve evaluated current Chinese and U.S. capabilities, we can return to our hypothetical and start analyzing the U.S.-China military space balance. We looked at six capabilities that we believe to be of near-equal importance: space industry competitiveness, launch vehicles, intelligence gathering and surveillance, precision strike capability, anti-satellite capability, and communication. We considered innovation to be an aspect of the nation’s space industry competitiveness. In the table provided, we used projections to evaluate the capabilities of both nations in 2019, the year in which China’s GDP will equal and/or surpass that of the United States. Each capability is evaluated based on relevant industry and space infrastructure as well as projected trends. The country who we believe is at advantage for each capability is shaded:

                                                                                                               137  Easton  (2012)  Page  198.  

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Table  7  

*See Appendix A for relevant calculations concerning these numbers.

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The United States will have a clear advantage in ASAT capabilities, as they are further ahead in research on direct energy weapons and have found a reliable missile in the SM3. China’s currently booming space industry and innovation will propel it to the forefront of communications technology and launch vehicle capabilities. What’s most important to notice about the above balance is that the capabilities are evenly divided: the U.S. excels in three and the Chinese are at least peer-level or advanced in three. Combining their relatively equal match-up with the true danger inherent in space-based combat due to space debris rendering entire portions of orbit unusable, the one observation we make with confidence is that it’s currently too globally dangerous to engage in this sort of conflict. In our hypothetical the pair US/Taiwanese NOSS satellites are integral for monitoring fleet movements in South China Sea that would indicate an amphibious assault on Taiwan. There are currently no US EO/SAR reconnaissance satellites in the area, and it SRATCOM needs to re-establish ISR in the area immediately. The USAF Operational Responsive Space (OSR) office quickly boosts several miniature TacSats into orbit with SAR and communication payloads that detect advanced mobilization of missile boats and catamarans and amphibious assault craft, some of which are believed to be carrying DF-21d ASBM.

The US cannot risk deploying its carrier fleet for interdiction of the Chinese Navy while without disabling those missiles targeting systems. To do so would require the firing modified Standard Missiles (SM3) for direct-ascent interception of Chinese surveillance satellites over the pacific. To do so would likely be viewed as a serious escalation by the Chinese and a threat to their political sovereignty and they would likely respond by launching a wave of ground based ASAT missiles against all vulnerable US satellite infrastructure. The U.S. could attempt to intercept the ASATs, but with there is always a chance that some make it through.

Would the United States attack Chinese Satellites? Even if they can eliminate the Chinese ability to threaten the pacific fleet, ground based radar arrays would still render US satellites vulnerable. Chinese leadership, in a move of desperation fearing the full wrath of the American fleet could attempt to pursue a “scorched space” policy by creating enough space debris in various orbits to reach a point of critical mass where the debris resulting from the ensuing collisions is sufficient to render vast swaths of orbit unusable.

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Would the United States be willing to risk losing trillions of dollars in damage infrastructure in lost productivity as normal commercial activity becomes impossible? It is unclear.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS “Where there is no vision, the people perish.”

- Proverbs 29:18 The era of space competition has died with the Space Race (or it should have). To Because of its inherent danger and uncertainty, the best U.S. policy would be working towards the total de-militarization of space while enhancing more passive, defensive capabilities like reconnaissance and communications, as opposed to potentially-offensive capabilities, like DEWs and ASATs, and space-related activity dictate otherwise. To begin with, the U.S. refused to discuss diplomatic measures to enhance space security at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for the past twelve years, contrary to almost unanimous international consent.138 In early 2007, U.S. ambassador to the CD Christina Rocca said “we continue to believe that there is no arms race in space, and therefore no problem for arms control to solve.”139 In it’s detailed role for the secretary of defense and director of national intelligence and vague description of State Department involvement, the U.S. National Space Policy continues to underscore military approaches and voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) rather than diplomatic approaches and binding legal agreements.140 In the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, while main strategic objectives consist of making space a peaceful realm and strengthening stability in space, strategic approaches are increasingly militarized: “prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a derogated environment, provide improved U.S. space capabilities.”141` If the U.S. acts on these

                                                                                                               138  Wright  (2012)  Page  17.  139  Rocca,  C.  2007.  Statement  delivered  to  the  United  Nations’  Conference  of  Disarmament  on  Prevention  of  an  Arms  Race  in  Outer  Space.  Geneva,  February  13.  Online  at  http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/  political/cd/speeches07/1session/Feb13USA.pdf,  accessed  on  September  19,  2010.  140  Wright  (2012)  Page  18.  141National  Security  Space  Strategy,  Page  5.  

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strategic objectives in this fashion, other countries have no choice but to interpret U.S. attention to space as offensive, or at least militarized.

By focusing on non-offensive capabilities, the U.S. can spend time advancing not only their own, but also global interests. Increasing space situational awareness (SSA) would involve primarily reconnaissance and communications technology, and should be a main priority of United States policy not only to prevent conflict with China, but also to protect the earth from an impending issue that could shatter communications, navigation, and other basic human functions if not resolved in the near future due to space debris. SSA can provide assurance that all space actors are operating in space in accordance with established norms and guidelines, and can also serve as the foundation for verification of agreements. It can also help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust that could lead to conflict in space or on Earth. The United States currently has the most advanced SSA capabilities in the world. In 2004, through STRATCOM, the U.S. began the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program was created to encourage data-sharing in the realm of SSA with the overarching goal of ensuring safe

operations in space. Continuance of this program and attempts to make the database completely international (like working with UNOOSA’s space database) would increase overall transparency in space and greatly further the (what should be) cross-national collaborative scientific effort to reduce space debris. The United States’ system for analyzing SSA is the Space Security Network (SSN). Unfortunately, the SSN has little to

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no coverage in Africa, Asia, and South America.142 Global diplomatic efforts to combine the SSN with other SSA data collectors (like the Russian Space Surveillance System, SSS) around the world would help increase space transparency and overall reconnaissance . The SSN, or whatever the equivalent would be if international cooperation were to happen among SSA capabilities, could be a way to enforce and check the adherence to other international space agreements and peaceful regulations.

One important initiative to decreasing the appeal of potentially offensive space-related infrastructure, which the Obama administration has already begun, is the review and reworking of American export trade regulations concerning space. During Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, a joint-statement from China and the U.S. contained the message that “the U.S. and China look forward to expanding discussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit.”143 In June 2010, the White House created a new independent agency, under a cabinet-level board of directors, for overseeing all military and dual-use export licensing activity.144 The State Department (who controls the USML) and the Department of Defense are tasked to reevaluate the national security risks of removing space components from USML, and to make changes to ITAR legislation in relation to these security inquisitions. It is extremely important that the United States clarify its broad placement of space technology as USMLs. Even when space technology is still seen as such, as opposed to an item on the Commerce Control List (CCL), the process that companies have to go through and the regulatory framework in which they must operate costs companies a ton of money they could be spending on research and development.145In fact, the bureaucracy ITAR forces space technologies to go through to gain necessary trade licenses are just as harmful to U.S. space gear markets, if not more, than the restrictions on trade. This type of regulation casts space solely in a military light and

                                                                                                               142  Weeden,  Brian.  “Space  Situational  Awareness  Factsheet.”  Secure  World  Foundation.  23  November  2012.  Available  at:  <http://swfound.org/media/1800/ssa_fact_sheet.pdf>  143  Cowing,  Keith.  “If  Chang’e-­‐3  Lands,  Google  Lunar  X  Prize  Drops  by  25%.”  NASA  WATCH.  Published  14  November  2012.  <http://nasawatch.com/archives/china/>  (accessd  15  November  2012).  144    Tiron,  R.  2010.  New  Agency  will  house  export  rules.  The  Hill,  June  30  2010.  145  Stone,  Christopher.  “Space  Export  Control  Reform:  The  different  schools  of  thought  and  a  proposed  way  forward?”  The  Space  Review.  Published  15  March  2012.  <fhttp://www.thespacereview.com/article/1587/1>  (accessed  15  November  2012).  

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ignores the various and complex commercial and civil uses for space. Many see this as detrimental to U.S. interests due to the negative effect it has on the domestic satellite industry, but to create a safe space in which satellites can cohabitate is the primary step to having a secure world and eventually a secure satellite industry. Some international diplomatic initiatives we suggest are an international declaration to stop the production of ASATs and an international pledge to not attack satellites operating in accordance with the OST.146 To ensure the loss of China as a threat in the space theater, and to successively attempt to make space back into the “sanctuary” that U.S. Air Force Marshal Michael Wayne said we have lost, the U.S. must stop sending the message that it is continuing the weaponization of space and promoting international declarations against offensive space activity would be a good step in doing so. All of this movement toward cooperation seems well and good, but in reality, due to the U.S.’s past space posture and the Chinese aggressive space doctrine, cooperation will be hard to achieve. Because of China’s successful markets and their knowledge that they will soon be the premier in space capabilities, they don’t feel the need to collaborate with the U.S. on the small projects the U.S. offers in what it thinks is a show of good will. If the U.S. moved towards proposing large-scale cooperation, like Chinese admission into International Space Station projects, the diminishing of space opacity and tensions would be more possible.

“For small creatures such as we, the vastness is bearable only through love.”

- Carl Sagan

                                                                                                               146  Grego  (2012).  

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 Appendix  A:  2019  Satellite  Projections    We  made  the  following  assumptions  to  calculate  the  satellite  numbers  for  2019:  

-­‐ There  will  be  global  constant  GDP  growth  for  the  next  seven  years  -­‐ The  percent  change  in  the  number  of  satellites  launched  per-­‐year  is  equivalent  to  

the  percent  change  in  GDP*  -­‐ This  does  not  take  into  account  the  use  of  mini-­‐satellites.  

 We  got  these  numbers  by  first  taking  current  U.S.  military  and  Chinese  military  satellite  data  from  our  updated  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists  satellite  database.      U.S.  and  Chinese  Military  Satellites  in  Orbit  as  of  November  2012     U.S.   China  Total  Military  Satellites   127   88  Reconnaissance     36   38  Communications   34   23  Navigation   29   15  Research  and  Development   8   12  Early  Launch/Missile  Detections  

5   0  

 We  also  recorded  the  same  parameters  but  only  for  satellites  launched  between  January  2011  and  December  2012,  a  2-­‐year  period:    Number  of  Satellites  Launched    

US   CHINA  

 [2011-­‐2012]   17     39    We  then  took  data  from  the  International  Monetary  Foundation  (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf)  to  get  2012  annual  percentage  change  in  GDP  for  both  China  and  the  U.S.  We  used  an  article  in  Forbes  magazine,  which  subsequently  took  data  from  Itau  BBA,  the  investment  banking  arm  of  Itau  Univanco,  Brazil’s  largest  private  bank  (http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/03/26/global-­‐growth-­‐forecast-­‐2020/),  that  estimated  the  average  GDP  growth  per  year  over  the  period  2013-­‐2019.:    %  Change  in  GDP  for:   US   CHINA  2012   +2%   +7.4%  2013-­‐2019   +2.1%   +7.3%            

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Appendix  A:  2019  Satellite  Projections  Continued…    Then,  we  calculated  how  many  satellites  per  two  years,  compounded,  would  be  launched  using  our  assumption  that  %Δ  number  of  satellites  built  =  %Δ  GDP”  #  of  Satellites  launched  in:   US   CHINA  [2013-­‐2014]   17.721   41.847  [2015-­‐2016]   18.093   44.902  [2017-­‐2018]   18.473   48.18    Total  #  of  Satellites   54.287                                    134.929        Built  from  Jan          2013-­‐Jan  2019:    We  also  took  into  consideration  the  number  of  satellites  that  would  be  defunct  by  January  2019  (based  on  data  from  the  UCS  database):       US   CHINA  #  of  defunct  satellites  by  Jan  2019  

67   55  

 Total  functioning      Military  Satellites   114   167        In  Orbit:      To  the  particular  numbers  featured  in  the  balance  table,  we  took  current  percentages  of  reconnaissance  satellites  versus  all  military  satellites  (and  did  the  same  with  communications),  and  used  percentages  of  our  total  functioning  satellites.  This  worked  perfectly  for  communications,  but  in  reconnaissance,  there  is  a  diminishing  return  for  too  many  recon  satellites,  so  we  tuned  down  the  Chinese  percentage  from  their  current  48%  to  the  more  realistic  35%.      *We  made  this  assumption  based  on  the  Chinese  reiteration  that  its  military  spending  is  always  in  sync  with  their  overall  economic  development.  Their  2008  Defense  White  Paper  reads  “In  the  past  three  decades  of  reform  and  opening  up,  China  has  insisted  that  defense  development  should  be  both  subordinated  to  and  in  the  service  of  the  country’s  overall  economic  development,  and  that  the  former  should  be  coordinated  with  the  latter.”  Though  the  U.S.  philosophy  is  not  the  same,  we  found  this  to  be  a  practical  measure.