U.S. — AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM BAKU

OCTOBER 2014

U.S. — AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM BAKU

ROVSHAN IBRAHIMOV

RETHINK PAPER 17

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U.S. – AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS:

A VIEW FROM BAKU

ROVSHAN IBRAHIMOV

RETHINK PAPER 17

October 2014

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CONTENTS

1 Summary

3 The Beginning

6 The Focus on the Caspian Energy during the

Clinton Presidency

10 Rise of Geopolitical Importance of Azerbaijan

during the Bush Presidency

13 Baku’s Discontents with the Obama

Administration

15 Conclusion: The Prospect for Further

Development of Relations

19 About the Author

U.S. – Azerbaijan Relations: A View from Baku

1

Summary

Relations between the United States and Azerbaijan center on the energy sector and regional security issues. In regard to regional security, Azerbaijan fully supported the United States, and now expects the same in return. The United States understands that Azerbaijan is a strategic partner. It is one of the few Muslim countries that supported the coalition against terrorism and sent peacekeeping forces to Iraq and Afghanistan to contribute to those efforts. In addition, Azerbaijan is a critical supply point for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The United States recognized the independence of Azerbaijan on December 25, 1991, right after the affirmation of the Azerbaijani Declaration of Independence by a nationwide referendum. In March 1992, the United States opened an embassy in Baku; a few months later, Azerbaijan opened an embassy in Washington, D.C. The initial stage of relations between the United States and Azerbaijan can be summarized as high expectations on the Azerbaijani side, and lack of interest in the former Soviet republics on the United States side. As a consequence, relations between the two countries were limited to a formal exchange of diplomatic missions. During the Clinton administration, relations between the United States and Azerbaijan showed considerable improvement. The relationship was formed especially in the economic sphere, but the United States recognized that Russia was also interested in the South Caucasus region. Despite this clear delineation of spheres of interest, U.S.-Azerbaijan relations yielded a few positive outcomes. Azerbaijan was able to diminish the influence of the Armenian lobby and minimize its possible negative consequences for the future of U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. Also, increasing U.S. interests in the region counterbalanced Russian influence and helped Azerbaijan pursue a more independent foreign policy. During the Bush presidency, the two countries transitioned to a new level of strategic relations. The United States needed the support of Azerbaijan, so its priorities in the region changed. Azerbaijan made it clear to the United States that it is a reliable and stable partner. Azerbaijan also supported the United States in "Operation Iraqi Freedom", allowing the U.S. to use its air bases and deploy peacekeeping forces that participated in the Iraq War. Relations between the United States and Azerbaijan have been strained during the Obama administration. Periodically, the United States makes statements on human rights issues in Azerbaijan. In turn, Azerbaijan states its disagreement with the position of the United States and all of these statements are seen as interference in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and as a means to put pressure

Rovshan Ibrahimov

2

on that country to show more loyalty regarding American interests. It is believed that recent statements by the United States are attempts to put pressure on Azerbaijan in order to establish a clear position for this state in relation to the events taking place in Ukraine. The United States is not satisfied with the neutral, unbiased position of Azerbaijan, and feels that the country should actively express opposition to Russia's actions in Ukraine. However, it is not in Azerbaijan’s interests to spark escalation of issues with its northern neighbor. Azerbaijan expects the revision of American foreign policy towards Azerbaijan and the region. It expects a more constructive approach that considers the realities of the region and is more in line with Azerbaijan’s expectations and interests. Inadequate understanding of the region by the United States could push Azerbaijan to revise its strategic relationship and look for new relationships and economic cooperation opportunities.


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The Beginning Azerbaijan gained its independence on October 18, 1991. Restoration1 of its independence was the result of a chain of events that led to the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. These developments played a major role in the formation of a new world order that was to affect Azerbaijan’s relations not only with the United States but also with other countries. The collapse of the Eastern bloc marked an unconditional victory for the West, the United States and its allies, and their values. In the near absence of a competitor, it was expected that Western values, which include multi-party democracy and market economy, would spread throughout the Eastern bloc.

Azerbaijan built its state institutions upon these values. Azerbaijan was hoping to receive the support of Western countries in building the state and strengthening the economy. Such assistance was much needed, since Azerbaijan, like other former Soviet republics, inherited a collapsed economy and unstable political system from the Soviet Union. Moreover, since early days of the independence, Azerbaijan has been involved in a protracted conflict with Armenia, which led to the occupation of a considerable portion of Azerbaijan’s territory by the latter. Despite high expectations of assistance from the West, Azerbaijan did not receive the much-needed support. The international community was not ready to face the rapidly changing events in the area and simply did not have ready-made solutions to the political and economic problems unfolding in the

emergence of the newly independent countries. The European Union limited its efforts to helping the Central and Eastern European countries in their transition process and integrating them into the European Union. The United States also showed no interest in the countries of the former Soviet Union. At that time, all U.S. attention was diverted to the Middle East, due to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Regarding the post-Soviet region, the United States was and continues to be

1 According to the Constitutional Act on The State Independence of The Republic of Azerbaijan, adopted on October 18, 1991, Azerbaijan regained its independence, which was originally declared on May 28, 1918 when the first Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was created.

Therefore, with respect to the post-Soviet

region, the chosen strategy was seen as

the most optimal; namely, the West

actually made a gentleman's

agreement with Russia, according to which the countries of the former

Soviet Union were to remain in the Russian

zone of influence.

Rovshan Ibrahimov

4

primarily interested in fostering economic reforms in Russia and securing the nuclear weapons and storage facilities in the former Soviet republics.2 Therefore, with respect to the post-Soviet region, the chosen strategy was seen as the most optimal; namely, the West actually made a gentleman's agreement with Russia, according to which the countries of the former Soviet Union were to remain in the Russian zone of influence. It was no accident that in 1992 Russia announced a new “near abroad” policy. It was in this environment that the initial relationship between the United States and Azerbaijan began. On December 8, 1991 in the Bialowieza Forest of Belarus, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This event made it clear that the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the former Soviet republics needed to create new relationships among themselves to fill the legal vacuum and prevent anarchy in the vast post-Soviet territories. The United States recognized the independence of Azerbaijan on December 25, 1991, right after the affirmation of the Azerbaijani Declaration of Independence by a nationwide referendum. In March 1992, the United States opened an embassy in Baku; a few months later, Azerbaijan opened an embassy in Washington, D.C. However, United States initiatives in relation to the newly independent states were limited. The U.S. did not develop any special strategy towards these countries, and only contributed to European Union policies regarding the region. The countries of the former Soviet Union, in the given geopolitical situation, were left alone to find their way out of their challenges. As for Azerbaijan, shortly after the recognition of this country’s independence on February 12, 1992, the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, made a short three-hour visit to Baku. As noted in the memoirs of President Ayaz Mutallibov, Baker’s visit to Baku was not previously planned, and occurred only after negotiations.3 During his visit, Baker said that the United States had not yet determined its priorities in relation to the region, and that the South Caucasus was outside the scope of interest of his country. After his visit to Azerbaijan, Baker, speaking in the Senate, said, "In cases of discrimination and violation of the rights of minorities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, United States will provide no assistance to Azerbaijan."4 Lack of clear national priorities in the region, particularly in regard to Azerbaijan, allowed

2Svante E. Cornell, Azerbaijan Since Independence (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2011), p. 405. 3Заур Расулзаде, Аяз Муталлибов: Мне было сложнее, чем Ильхаму Алиеву Сейчас, November 18, .2013 [http://www.haqqin.az/news/11483]. 4Азербайджано-американскиеотношения и 907-ая поправка,August 24, 2012 [http://newtimes.az/ru/experts/318/#.U99hGPmSzeM].


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representatives of the Armenian lobby in the United States to put pressure on Congress to include a provision, Section 907, in the Freedom Support Act banning government assistance to Azerbaijan because of its sanctions against Armenia (even though Azerbaijan was a victim of Armenian aggression). One of the authors of the act was Senator John Kerry, the present Secretary of State; he was badly informed about the real situation around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.5 The imposition of restrictions was a clear example of the lack of direction in Washington’s policy on the South Caucasus; efforts to undo this particular provision have been fruitless to date. Another piece of legislation that limited further cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. This amendment prohibits the United States from granting most favored nation status to countries with non-market economies that restrict the right of emigration or other human rights. Despite

the fact that the restrictions were lifted in the late 80s, the amendment still affects U.S. trade relations with the former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan. The initial stage of relations between the United States and Azerbaijan can be summarized as high expectations on the Azerbaijani side, and lack of interest in the former Soviet republics on the United States side. As a consequence, relations between the two countries were limited to a formal exchange of diplomatic missions. The policy of the United States towards Azerbaijan was highly influenced by certain interest groups, mainly the influential Armenian diaspora. The legal obstacles, such as Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, not only prevented U.S.

government assistance to Azerbaijan in the following decades, but also deprived the United States of an effective instrument of the "soft power" that the U.S. was able to utilize for other countries of the former USSR. This development led to minimal relations between the United States and Azerbaijan and limited the scope of public diplomacy.

5 Cornell, Azerbaijan, p. 406.

The initial stage of relations between the

United States and Azerbaijan can be

summarized as high expectations on the

Azerbaijani side, and lack of interest in the

former Soviet republics on the United States

side.

Rovshan Ibrahimov

6

The Focus on the Caspian Energy during the Clinton Presidency Despite the rather sluggish development of relations, the general policy framework of the United States towards the region changed significantly during the Clinton administration. First and foremost, the United States supported the new countries in order to prevent Russia from regaining its earlier influence over the region and limit Iran’s efforts to play a larger role in regional politics. Second, the United States promoted the establishment of liberal regimes in the new countries. Third, the United States supported the export of energy sources in the Caspian region, as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes.6 Despite being based on an abstract formulation, these objectives have become a reference point for the further development of relations between the United States and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was also hoping to change the undesirable status quo in the South Caucasus. The dominant position of Russia and its support for Armenia led to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts by Armenian military forces. Azerbaijan had to deal with the problem of displaced persons who fled from the occupied territories; this led to deterioration in political stability. In the aftermath of the conflict, Azerbaijan experienced high government turnover. After a period of political instability, a veteran of Azerbaijani politics, Heydar Aliyev, became the president of Azerbaijan. Aliyev clearly understood that in order to change the status quo, which was not very favorable for Azerbaijan, it was necessary to draw the attention of Western countries to the region. He believed that the only trump card Azerbaijan possessed was its rich energy resources. Azerbaijan tried to attract Western energy companies to explore and develop its oil and natural gas resources. Azerbaijan not only needed Western capital and know-how in the energy sector, but it also hoped the presence of Western investment would encourage national governments to participate more actively in South Caucasus politics.7 Earlier presidents Mutalibov and Elchibey had also tried to use the energy card in achieving their domestic and foreign policy aims, but this produced some uneasiness in Azerbaijani-Russian relations and caused the eventual fall of their administrations. Taking into account the experiences his predecessors, Aliyev

6 Ibid, p. 405. 7 Rovshan Ibrahimov, “Azerbaijan`s Energy History and Policy: From Past till Our Days,” in Rovshan Ibrahimov (ed) Energy and Azerbaijan: History, Strategy and Cooperation (Baku: SAM, 2013), pp. 19-25.


7

implemented a more balanced policy, thereby reducing the negative reaction from Russia. In September 1994, Azerbaijan signed a production sharing agreement with Western companies, which is called the “Contract of the Century” for the development of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields. Among the signatories were

four American energy companies: Amoco (17.01%); Pennzoil (9.82%); Unocal (9.52%); and McDermott (2.45%). Another 5% share of SOCAR, the state-owned oil and natural gas corporation of Azerbaijan, was transferred to ExxonMobil in April 1995.8 Thus, the overall share of American companies in the project amounted to 43.8%. Azerbaijan’s patient policy for changing the regional status quo through focusing on energy issues was justified. The participation of major American companies in the consortium and their willingness to invest billions of dollars started to change the U.S. approach towards the region. President Clinton sent congratulations to Baku on the signing of the contract, noting that it was "one of the largest such agreements in history."9 Contacts with the U.S. government were not limited to an exchange of good wishes. The Clinton administration had a clear vision for the

development of relations with Azerbaijan; energy issues were made a top priority in the relations between the two countries. After the signing of the “Contract of the Century,” on September 26, 1994, the presidents of Azerbaijan and the United States met in New York. The main theme of the talks was ensuring smooth production and transport of Azerbaijani oil to the world markets.10 The American government did not remain aloof from the definition of the route for the export of "early oil"11 from the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field. There were

8 Ibid, p.23. 9 Hafiz Pashayev, “Azerbaijan-U.S. Relations: From Unjust Sanctions to Strategic Partnership,” in Alexandros Petersen and Fariz Ismailzade (eds), Azerbaijan in Global Politics, Crafting Foreign Policy (Baku: ADA, 2009), p. 114. 10 Ibid. 11 The term "early oil" stands for the crude oil produced at the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil fields that did not require extra costs to build infrastructure for exploitation. At the same time, taking into account that the main oil production from the oil fields was expected only in 2005, it was necessary

Azerbaijan’s patient policy for changing the

regional status quo through focusing on

energy issues was justified. The

participation of major American companies in

the consortium and their willingness to

invest billions of dollars started to

change the U.S. approach towards the

region.

Rovshan Ibrahimov

8

two options: the Russian route (the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline) and the Georgian route (the Baku-Supsa pipeline). In October 1995, Clinton sent a private letter to President Aliyev with the former adviser on national security, Zbigniew Brzezinski, expressing U.S. support for the construction of the Baku-Supsa pipeline. This letter showed a strong U.S. preference for bypassing Russia in exporting Azerbaijani oil, thereby diversifying oil routes and reducing dependence on a single country for transport of natural resources.12 After attracting large American oil companies to participate in the "Contract of the Century," it became possible to "balance" the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the United States. Traditionally, the Armenian lobby has been very active in the U.S. Congress. The American oil companies started to support and lobby for Azerbaijani interests. In consequence, the United States became increasingly interested in the South Caucasus region. On February 14, 1997, the United States became co-chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, whose goal was to encourage a peaceful and negotiated resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The role of the United States at that time was seen as creating an opportunity to balance the activity of the other co-chair of the group, Russia.13 The change in the attitude of the United States regarding national interests in relation to Azerbaijan strengthened bilateral relations between the two countries. This contributed to the first official visit by President Heydar Aliyev to the United States on July 27, 1997, which elevated relations between the two countries to a new strategic level. President Heydar Aliyev met with President Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and other senior government officials, as well as with representatives of the energy companies.14 These meetings again demonstrated the growing interest of the United States in Azerbaijan and the existing potential for a further expansion of relations. American energy companies and the Azerbaijan government signed new contracts to develop oil fields in the waters of the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea. Washington also signed a joint political statement.15 This joint statement by presidents Aliyev and Clinton emphasized the importance of relations between the two states for peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus region.16

to ensure steady revenue for Azerbaijan, which had serious economic problems at the time. (Ibrahimov, “Azerbaijan.” p. 32). 12 Ibid. 13 Author’s interview with former presidential adviser on foreign policy Vafa Quluzade, Baku’ May 15, 2014. 14 Pashayev, “Azerbaijan-U.S. Relations,” p. 114. 15Развитие Отношений Между США и Азербайджаном c 1990-х гг [http://atc.az/index.php?newsid=170]. 16 Pashayev “Azerbaijan-U.S. Relations,” p. 115.


9

Another important reference point in the relations of the two countries was the decision to build the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which would carry Azerbaijani oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The project was made possible through the strong political support of the United States, as expressed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit on November 19, 1999. On that day, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and President Bill Clinton, signed the Declaration of Support for the Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.17 In this way, the United States provided political support to ensure implementation of the project and reduce the likelihood of possible geopolitical challenges and risks.

The Clinton administration supported a number of other transport and energy projects that directly relate to Azerbaijan. Briefly, the United States endorsed the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline that would transport Turkmen gas to European markets. The United States even provided credit to the Turkmen government to begin fusibility work on the route of the future pipeline. However, the project was cancelled due to disagreements between the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in determining the volume of gas that each country could export through the pipeline. But the main reason for the cancellation was the change in the U.S. administration. Under the Republicans, U.S. policy toward the region changed fundamentally. During the Clinton administration, relations between the United States and Azerbaijan

showed considerable improvement. The relationship was formed especially in the economic sphere, but the United States recognized that Russia was also interested in the South Caucasus region. Despite this clear delineation of spheres of interest, U.S.-Azerbaijan relations yielded a few positive outcomes. First, Azerbaijan was able to diminish the influence of the Armenian lobby and minimize its possible negative consequences for the future of U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. As noted earlier, the Armenian lobby had affected the emerging relationship between the United States and Azerbaijan on a number of issues,

17Ровшан Ибрагимов, Визит Клинтон в Баку - восстановление статус-кво или новые тенденции?, July 20, 2010 [http://www.1news.az/authors/ribrahimov/20100720115209746.html].

During the Clinton administration,

relations between the United States and

Azerbaijan showed considerable

improvement. The relationship was

formed especially in the economic sphere, but the United States

recognized that Russia was also interested in

the South Caucasus region

Rovshan Ibrahimov

10

including economic relations. Second, increasing U.S. interests in the region counterbalanced Russian influence and helped Azerbaijan pursue a more independent foreign policy. Finally, the United States was more actively involved in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and became one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. However, this did not have a significant effect on peaceful resolution of the conflict. The emphasis was put on maintaining the status quo and preventing the resumption of hostilities. This was seen as a necessary condition for implementing the major energy and transport projects.

Rise of Geopolitical Importance of Azerbaijan during the Bush Presidency In 2001, George W. Bush became the new president of the United States, and the focus of U.S. policy towards the region shifted from the economic to the geopolitical realm. Energy projects were not a priority for the new administration; the strategic location of Azerbaijan was. The events that took place in the international arena were the main drivers of this change, in particular the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In response to 9/11, the United States, together with its NATO allies, began a full-scale operation in Afghanistan to dismantle Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and to remove the Taliban regime. NATO needed logistical support from several states in Eurasia, including Azerbaijan, to deploy its armed forces and equipment and conduct military operations on Afghanistan. To this end, on December 14, 2001 U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld arrived in Baku. As a result of the negotiations, Azerbaijan announced its unconditional support for the military operation and opened its airspace and airfields for use by the United States and its allies.18 In return, the U.S. Congress passed a bill granting the president the authority to suspend Section 907. In January 2002, President George W. Bush temporarily suspended the amendment.19 Since then, every year in January, the United States has extended the suspension of this amendment for another year so that Azerbaijan can receive foreign aid from the United States. This aid includes assistance for the strengthening of the security infrastructure. The United States has provided security assistance to

18 Ibid. 19 Общая историческая справка о 907-й поправке к «Акту в поддержку свободы» конгресса США и о деятельности Президента Азербайджанской Республики Гейдара Алиева в связи с ее ликвидацией, [http://lib.aliyevheritage.org/ru/3711428.html].


11

Azerbaijan through Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training programs. In addition, bilateral defense consultations have become the norm in the relations between the two countries. United States aid also includes improving the naval capability of Azerbaijan, as well as standardizing its airfields.20 As can be seen, the two countries transitioned to a new level of strategic relations, allowing suspension of the amendment. The United States needed the support of Azerbaijan, so its priorities in the region changed. Azerbaijan made it clear to the United States that it is a reliable and stable partner. Azerbaijan also supported the United States in "Operation Iraqi Freedom" (OIF), allowing the U.S. to use its air bases and deploy peacekeeping forces that participated in the Iraq War.21 Azerbaijan also sent a peacekeeping force to Kosovo, where they remained until its unilateral declaration of independence. Azerbaijan also sent a contingent of troops to Afghanistan who has been serving there to this day. Azerbaijan’s support for the United States continued and became even stronger after the election of Ilham Aliyev as the new president of Azerbaijan in 2003.

Despite improvement in relations between the two countries, this trend was one-sided. Deepening of the relationship centered on those areas that fell within the scope of the national interests of the United States. Azerbaijan strongly supported the United States, and its support was of great importance due to several features of the country. Azerbaijan’s support was limited on issues that conflicted with its national interests. In short, after the recognition of Kosovo's independence by Western countries, Azerbaijan, recognizing the territorial integrity of Serbia, withdrew its troops from the region. In addition, U.S. desire to establish military

bases in Azerbaijan with the prospect of using them for a possible military intervention in Iran was not well received by Azerbaijan. This topic was one of the key issues during President Ilham Aliyev’s visit to the United States on April 28, 2006. During his meeting with President George W.

20 Pashayev, p. 118. 21 Развитие Отношений Между США и Азербайджаном c 1990-х гг [http://atc.az/index.php?newsid=170].

The United States needed the support of

Azerbaijan, so its priorities in the region

changed. Azerbaijan made it clear to the

United States that it is a reliable and stable

partner.

Rovshan Ibrahimov

12

Bush, Aliyev stressed that in the case of any action against Iran, Azerbaijan would take a neutral position, and there was no possibility of using its territory to attack Iran. President Aliyev noted the agreement between Baku and Tehran in 2002, according to which Azerbaijan's territory would not be used for to put military pressure on Iran.22 For the United States, it was very important that a country whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim support her in the fight against international terrorism. At that meeting, the United States emphasized that the fighting was not aimed directly at followers of Islam and the very struggle against international terrorism was of universal value, regardless of religion. The fact that the majority of the Azerbaijani population belongs to the Shia branch of Islam played an important role in the participation of Azerbaijani peacekeepers in Iraq, where 60 percent of the population are also Shiites. In this case, the Azerbaijanis could easily make contact with the local population inspire their trust. In spite of the strategic importance of Azerbaijan to the United States, cooperation developed only within the framework of key interests of the United States. Suspension of Section 907 for periods of a year was not because Azerbaijan had satisfied the requirements, but because of U.S. strategic needs in the region. In other words, the United States needed to suspend enforcement of the provision in order to secure the help of Azerbaijan, and so only ten years after its adoption were Azerbaijan expectations met. Nevertheless, the United States was not eager to participate directly in the resolution of the problems that were of great importance to Azerbaijan, as they were not significant for its national interests. The United States did not change its position with respect to speedy resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and restricted itself to a peacekeeping mission as co-chair of the Minsk Group. First and foremost, the United States did not want to step on Russia’s foot in the region; in return, Russia did not oppose American interests in the region. In general, this period was marked by expansion of areas of cooperation between the two countries. Azerbaijan became an important strategic partner of the United States, and President Bush even had to learn the correct pronunciation of the country’s name.

22 Ровшан Ибрагимов, Ирано-азербайджанские отношения: причины «динамики деструктивизма», March 19, 2012 [ http://1news.az/authors/oped/20120319045239898.html].


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Baku’s Discontents with the Obama Administration In 2009, Barack Obama came into power and promised to undo the mistakes of the Bush administration, both within the country and in the international arena. The new president, Barack Obama, was tasked with bringing the country out of a deep financial crisis and ending costly and protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These priorities influenced relations with Azerbaijan. But overall, U.S. policy continued without changes in form or context. It should be noted that the beginning of 2010 was marked by some disappointment on the part of Azerbaijan towards United States and its foreign policy in the region. For the first time since its independence, Azerbaijan openly criticized the United States. It went so far that some people offered to reconsider the oil agreements with American companies. Azerbaijan also threatened the United States with reconsidering strategic cooperation between the two countries. It is interesting that, while the relationship between the two countries during the presidencies of Bush and Clinton showed an upward trend, the beginning of differences coincided with the start of the Obama administration. During the Obama presidency (as during the Bush administration), U.S.-Azerbaijan relations were shaped by events taking place in the international arena. This time, relations between the United States and Azerbaijan were affected by the events taking place in the region. Briefly, Turkey implemented a new concept of foreign policy to improve its relations with its neighbors. Towards Armenia, the change was formulated as “from zero relations to zero problems.” With this policy, Turkey hoped to resolve the issues concerning the tragic events of 1915 that took place during the Ottoman Empire, which were considered as genocide by the Armenians. Turkey hoped that by pursuing a liberal foreign policy, it could soften and even change the Armenian position. One of the main instruments to achieve this goal was considered to be opening the borders with Armenia, which had been closed since the start of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and establishing formal diplomatic relations. Azerbaijan immediately reacted to this policy change and reminded Turkey that the border between Turkey and Armenia had been closed since the Kalbajar region was occupied by Armenian troops in April 1993. Azerbaijan opinion was that normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations should go in parallel with Armenian withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territory. Turkey took Azerbaijan’s concerns seriously; diplomatic efforts to normalize relations slowed down and eventually stalled. Despite lack of progress in relations between Turkey and Armenia, these efforts received strong support from the United States and Western countries.

Rovshan Ibrahimov

14

Moreover, President Obama made his first transcontinental visit to Turkey April 5-7, 2009, where it was expected that the first steps towards normalization between Turkey and Armenia would be taken. President Obama invited President Ilham Aliyev to Istanbul to attend the summit, but Aliyev rejected the invitation. Aliyev did not change his decision even after a call from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Aliyev's position was understood as a protest against recent developments in relations between Turkey and Armenia that aimed at the borders between the two countries. Another significant event in the relations between the two countries was that about one-and-a-half years had passed and the United States had not yet appointed a new U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan. This also negatively affected relations, despite the fact that the United States also had not appointed representatives for number of other countries and organizations. After a year, when the position of ambassador opened up, President Obama appointed

Matthew Bryza as the ambassador to Azerbaijan, but the appointment was not approved by the Senate. 23 His term as ambassador in Azerbaijan lasted only one year, because the Senate did not approve it with this rank. In response, Bryza resigned from the State Department. Azerbaijan's dissatisfaction was not limited just to the above reasons. Baku was not happy with the position and activities of the United States on Nagorno-Karabakh as co-chair of the

OSCE Minsk Group. It should be noted that in early 2010, Congress decided to allocate aid to the separatist regime in Nagorno-Karabakh in the amount of $10 million. Azerbaijan considered any kind of direct relationship with the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh administration unacceptable, and insisted that any contact should be by consent of Baku. After the strong reaction from Azerbaijan, a number of senior U.S. government officials reached out to Baku to restore the relationship to earlier levels. This desire was also stated in a letter to President Aliyev from President Obama, which was conveyed to Baku by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Finally, on July 4, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made an official visit to Baku during her tour of the South Caucasus countries. Despite the fact that Clinton visited all three countries in the region, the main focus of her "Caucasian"

23 Мэтью Брайза назначен послом США в Азербайджане, December 30, 2010 [http://www.trend.az/news/politics/1805503.html].

In general, relations between the United

States and Azerbaijan have been strained during the Obama

administration.


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tour, without a doubt, was Azerbaijan. Clinton's visit was an attempt to restore the relationship to its earlier, friendly atmosphere. In addition, it was clear that the position of Clinton on the Karabakh issue was more cautious. In her visit, Clinton’s messages were limited to indicating that the United States would support any agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the issue. To sum up the results of the visit, it can definitely be said that the United States was concerned about the possible loss of its ally in such a strategic and rapidly changing region.24Only after Clinton visited Azerbaijan did relations between the countries become more or less stable. In general, relations between the United States and Azerbaijan have been strained during the Obama administration. Periodically, the United States makes statements on human rights issues in Azerbaijan.25 In turn, Azerbaijan states its disagreement with the position of the United States and all of these statements are seen as interference in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and as a means to put pressure on that country to show more loyalty regarding American interests. It is believed that recent statements by the United States are attempts to put pressure on Azerbaijan in order to establish a clear position for this state in relation to the events taking place in Ukraine. The United States is not satisfied with the neutral, unbiased position of Azerbaijan, and feels that the country should actively express opposition to Russia's actions in Ukraine. However, it is not in Azerbaijan’s interests to spark escalation of issues with its northern neighbor.

Conclusion: The Prospect for Further Development of Relations Relations between the United States and Azerbaijan center on the energy sector and regional security issues. In regard to regional security, Azerbaijan fully supported the United States, and now expects the same in return. The United States understands that Azerbaijan is a strategic partner. It is one of the few Muslim countries that supported the coalition against terrorism and sent peacekeeping forces to Iraq and Afghanistan to contribute to those efforts. In addition, Azerbaijan is a critical supply point for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. On this point, the closure of NATO transport routes from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and the current volatile situation in Kyrgyzstan, increased Azerbaijan's importance. Up to 40% of non-military cargo from Afghanistan is transported through the western branch of the Northern Distribution Network via territory in

24 Ровшан Ибрагимов, Визит Клинтон в Баку - восстановление статус-кво или новые тенденции?, July 10, 2010 [http://www.1news.az/authors/ribrahimov/20100720115209746.html]. 25 State's Melia on U.S.-Azerbaijan Relations, June 11, 2014 [http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/06/20140611301161.html#axzz3CYnAzrPH]

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Azerbaijan.26 Since 2001, more than 100,000 military personnel and more than one-third of equipment, fuel and food has been transported to Afghanistan through Azerbaijan.27 Another important point in the relationship that serves the interests of the United States well is Azerbaijan‘s strategic partnership with Georgia, which is an another ally of the United States in the region. Azerbaijan provides Georgia with an alternative and uninterrupted source of energy. Azerbaijan is an active player in Georgia’s economy and SOCAR is the largest taxpayer. Azerbaijan also has a close relationship with Israel. The two countries are cooperating in many areas, such as energy, the military, and agriculture. At the same time, Azerbaijan provides up to 25% of Israel’s oil needs. Given instability in the Middle East, such relations are of strategic importance for the United States, which has as one priority in the Middle East the survival and security of Israel.

Energy plays a major role in U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. Azerbaijan plays a key role in ensuring the energy security of Europe by providing alternatives to Russian routes. Azerbaijan itself initiated and implemented several energy transport projects that promote alternative energy sources for Europe.28Azerbaijan initiated the construction of the TANAP gas pipeline, which goes through Turkey, and TAP, which goes through Greece, Albania and Italy. Azerbaijan’s desire to form friendly relations with the United States 29 has not been

completely met by United States leadership. The position of the United States is to maintain relations with Azerbaijan at the same level, with minimum attention to Azerbaijan’s expectations.

26 Stephen Blank, “Azerbaijan`s Security and US interests: Time for Reassessment,” in Azerbaijan and Its Neighbourhood in 2003-2013: Reforms, Development and Future Perspectives (Baku: SAM, 2014), p.249. 27 Richard Weitz, “Global Insights: US Must Strengthen Ties with Azerbaijan,” World Politics Review, February 2, 2012. 28 U.S.-Azerbaijan Relations: Payback Time for America’s Policymakers?” Occasional Paper No. 19, Caspian Information Centre, April, 2012 [http://www.caspianinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/OP-No.-19-US-Azerbaijan-Relations-Payback-Time-for-America%E2%80%99s-Policymakers.pdf] p.2. 29 Ibid.

In regard to regional security, Azerbaijan

fully supported the United States, and now

expects the same in return. The United

States understands that Azerbaijan is a

strategic partner.


17

No doubt, high-level contacts between the two countries will continue in the future. Even if Azerbaijan is not in a position to be a catalyst for the regional policy of the United States, it should be noted that it has at least forced the United States to reckon with the interests of Azerbaijan in determining its foreign policy towards the region. Azerbaijan has to balance its foreign policy between the major players in the South Caucasus, Russia and Iran. In this complex geopolitical situation, Azerbaijan has chosen a balanced policy, lowering its foreign policy dependence. The United States sometimes ignores the reality prevailing in the region and expects to see full loyalty from Azerbaijan, even though manifestation of this kind of loyalty can be harmful to both Azerbaijan and the United States itself. Given events in the post-Soviet space (in Georgia and Ukraine), the price of such a position for Azerbaijan can be very high. If

Azerbaijan took the positions desired by the United States, it would risk losing an ally because Azerbaijan would be faced with serious geopolitical challenges. As for events in Georgia and Ukraine, the United States itself is not ready to respond to these challenges. Aside from the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia, Azerbaijan does not pursue any adventurous policies that do not have a clear format and certain results. Another confirmation of the feasibility of this position for Azerbaijan is that the United States did not support Georgia after the "five-day war" in 2008, when part of the territory of Georgia was recognized by Russia as independent states. A similar situation arose in Ukraine; Western reaction to the annexation of the Crimea and the situation in Ukraine did not meet general expectations.

In addition, Azerbaijan is trying to pursue a policy that will be predictable for the main actors in the region, reducing the risks of misunderstanding. In this regard, Azerbaijan will not see its future as a regional integration process, making it clear that it is ready to cooperate equally with everyone on the basis of mutual benefit. This is also evident in Azerbaijan's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, a clear message that Azerbaijan does not intend to enter into any alliances and will continue a neutral policy. In general, Azerbaijan expects the revision of American foreign policy towards Azerbaijan and the region. It expects a more constructive approach that considers the realities of the region and is more in line with Azerbaijan’s

In general, Azerbaijan expects the revision of

American foreign policy towards

Azerbaijan and the region. It expects a more constructive

approach that considers the realities

of the region and is more in line with

Azerbaijan’s expectations and

interests.

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expectations and interests. Inadequate understanding of the region by the United States could push Azerbaijan to revise its strategic relationship and look for new relationships and economic cooperation opportunities


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About the Author Rovshan Ibrahimov is an associate professor and the head of Foreign Policy Analysis Department at Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He received BA, MA, and PhD in political sciences at Ankara University. Dr. Ibrahimov has been working at Qafqaz University in Baku since 1999. He has served as Director for Center of Energy Studies, Head of International Relations Department, Head of Regional Studies Department, and Vice-Rector on External Affairs. A known expert on energy policy and security, Azerbaijani foreign policy, and politics of Southern Caucasus, Dr. Ibrahimov also serves as an affiliated scholar for a number of Turkish, Russian, and British think tanks. He also produces a TV program and writes columns on foreign policy. Dr. Ibrahimov is the author of more than two hundreds professional articles and commentaries. Currently he is also teaching at Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA) University.

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Documents

U.S. — AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM BAKU