Urgent! Case Doctrines Midterms (Remedial Law)

7/27/2019 Urgent! Case Doctrines Midterms (Remedial Law)

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Case Doctrines:

1. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-in-interest

of Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, et

al.;G.R. No. 169677. February 18, 2013

Actions; separate trials; exception to the general rule; rationale. The rule on

separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,

which reads:

Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid

prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or

third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-

claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a

separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or

of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,

third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of

such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to

any party.

The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure(Federal Rules), a provision that governs separate trials in the

United States Federal Courts (US Federal Courts), x x x.

The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and

parameters whose application in this jurisdiction may be warranted because our

rule on separate trials has been patterned after the original version of Rule 42(b).

There is no obstacle to adopting such principles and parameters as guides in the

application of our own rule on separate trials. This is because, generally speaking,

the Court has randomly accepted the practices in the US Courts in the elucidation

and application of our own rules of procedure that have themselves originated

form or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the Federal Courts and the

various US State Courts.

Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant

US case law, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse

of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank

(Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was

distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby,

the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in

every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan,
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supra, that a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and

inconvenience to the parties and the courts.

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are

extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues

raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid

prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience,

or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when

separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise,

the general rule must apply. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-

in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, et al.;G.R. No.

169677. February 18, 2013

2. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of

Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No.

188056. January 8, 2013

Hierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non-observance results in

dismissal. We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme

Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of

certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction

did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An

undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the

dismissal of the recourse. In Banez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:

The court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts,

and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious

consequences, the strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from

having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower

courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and

more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it,

the Court may act

on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus

only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons justify an

exception to the policy. xxx

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial

forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of his or her grievances. As

a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance. Hence,

every litigant who brings petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchyof courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4

of Rule 65.Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice

Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); requisites; burden of proof

For a

special civil action of certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must

concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board or officer,

must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal
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nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The

burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was

issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia

Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice,G.R.

No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); when available. The writ of certiorari is

available only when any tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-

judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is

no appeal, nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law.

The sole office of the writ of certiorari, according to Delos Santos v.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

xxx is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In th is regard, mere

abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse

of discretion must be grave which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial

power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or

personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a

positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in

contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to

be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul

Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; when available.

Similarly, the petition

could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when any

tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from

an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and

enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person

aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court. The main

objective ofmandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the

part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of

mandamus does not issue to

control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct,

which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of

Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and

where the Secretary of Justices assailed issuances excluded them from the use

and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably

entitled. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice

Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
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3. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January

7, 2013

Certification against forum shopping; SPA designating counsel to sign must be

executed if party-pleader cannot sign. The need to abide by the Rules of Court

and the procedural requirements it imposes has been constantly underscored by

this Court. One of these procedural requirements is the certificate of non-forum

shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic, necessary and

mandatory for procedural orderliness.

In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the

guidelines respecting non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate

of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions of which are as follows:

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a

defect therein, xxx, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or

correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of

substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or compelling

reasons.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party

pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the

party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney

designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the

certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a certification is a

peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance

given to the court or other tribunal that there are no pending cases involving

basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Obviously, it is the

petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been

retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she]

actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Per the above

guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable

or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record

to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been signed by counsel without

the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of

the petition. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho,G.R. No. 172590. January 7,

2013

Certification against forum shopping; non-compliance is not curable by

subsequent submission unless there is substantial compliance or special

circumstance. In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed

Andersons Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum
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shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalfsans any

authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error

by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to

the filing of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial

compliance. It must be remembered that a defective certification is generally not

curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in some cases the

Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did so

only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while

avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum

shopping. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013

4. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager

of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro, G.R. No. 169005.

January 28, 2013

Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in

CA does not toll fifteen-day period to appeal; rule suspended in exceptional cases

to serve substantial justice. The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule

that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-

day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson.However, in

previous cases we suspended this rule in order to serve substantial justice.

In Barnes v. Padilla, we exempted from the operation of the general rule the

petitioner whose motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration

was denied by the CA. In the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of

our Decision dated September 30, 2004, we held that:

A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity

was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner.

Petitioners counsel was understandably confused with the absence of an explicit

prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the

period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which was

expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that was in

effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyers negligence without any participatory

negligence on the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the

resolution of the CA.

More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any

showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the

setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215

in Civil Case NO. Q -99-37219, as both are patently erroneous. x x x

Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the

suspension of the rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law,
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involving the issue of forum shopping, and not a factual matter involving the

merits of each partys respective claims and defenses relating to the enforcement

of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase the subject

property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and

not on mere technicalities. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest

opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the

constraint of technicalities.

After a conscientious view, we hold that a suspension of the Rules is warranted in

this case since the delay of one week and two days in the filing of the motion for

reconsideration was not occasioned by negligence on the part of petitioners

lawyer in charge of the case, the latter having a valid excuse to immediately take

leave of absence in view of her fathers sudden demise. There is likewise no

showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. Winston F. Garcia,

in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals

and Rudy C. Tesoro;G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; distinction between excess of

jurisdiction, acts without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. A certiorari

proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for

certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct

errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or

conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any

alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing

more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for

review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari.

In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does

not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction

where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,

oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion

where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic

manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of

jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.

Excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an

act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not

authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the

conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it

are wanting. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ

cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to

intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence

of a showing that there is a reason for the court to annul the decision of the

concerned tribunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the

Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed

decision or resolution. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General

Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro, G.R. No. 169005.

January 28, 2013
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5. Heirs of Gallardo vs. Soliman, G.R. No. 178952, April 10, 2013

Facts:

Petitioners Prosperidad Panlaqui-Gallardo (Prosperidad), Maria Carmen P.Gallardo-Nunag, Mario Lazaro P. Gallardo, Joy Catalina P. Gallardo, Pinky PerpetuaP. Gallardo and Lazaro P. Gallardo, Jr. are the heirs of Lazaro Gallardo (Lazaro).

Lazaro and Prosperidad are the registered owners of a parcel of land inBalingcanaway, Tarlac, Tarlac (the land). The land was placed under the coverageof Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27, and respondent Porferio Soliman(Porferio) was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-transferee thereof.

On June 2, 1995, petitioners filed a Complaint for collection of landamortizations, dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation of Deed of Transfer andEmancipation Patent against respondent Porferio before the Office of theProvincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).

The PARAD rendered its decision notwithstanding its observation thatthe Kasunduan and the Deed of Transfer were defective for non-compliance withcertain requirements of PD 27, nevertheless opined that said deeds were "withinthe context of PD 27".

Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which likewise upheld the validity ofthe Emancipation Patents following the ratiocination of the PARAD that they havebeen regularly issued.

Petitioners went up to the CA by Petition for Review. The CA issued theassailed Resolution dismissing petitioners Petition for Review on the ground thatthe verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by only fourof the six petitioners. Petitioners Mario Lazaro P. Gallardo and Lazaro P. Gallardo,

Jr. did not sign and no special power of attorney to sign in their favoraccompanied the Petition. The CA held that the certification against forumshopping must be executed and signed by all of the petitioners, or else it isinsufficient.

Issues:

Whether or not the signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping by four (4) of the six (6) petitioners is insufficient to meet the

requirements of the rule.

Ruling:

It is sufficient.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must besigned by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them isinsufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forumshopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of

justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as tosubvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantialcompliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.

This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisionsregarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores itsmandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with orits requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances,the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certificationconsidering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily HomesSubdivision Homeowners Association, it was held that the signature of only one ofthe petitioners in the certification against forum shopping substantially compliedwith rules because all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke acommon cause of action or defense.

The same position was taken in Medado v. Heirs of the Late AntonioConsing, where the Court held that "where the petitioners are immediaterelatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the

fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification ofnon forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action."

The same situation obtains in this case. Petitioners are all heirs of thedeceased Lazaro. As such, they undoubtedly share a common interest in theland, as well as common claims and defenses, as against respondents.

It was therefore error for the CA to have dismissed the Petition forReview.

6. FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANFACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. MariaOlivia Elena A. Roxas, Respondent. G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013

The Petition


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The petitioner posits that the CA erred in dismissing his petition outright withoutconsidering Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Administrative Order No. 07(otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of theOmbudsman),14 on the belief that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of thedecision of the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman can already beconsidered as an exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioner furtherargues that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to order hisdismissal from the service since under Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 (otherwiseknown as the Local Government Code of 1991), an elective local official may beremoved from office only by the order of a proper court. Finally, he posits that thepenalty of dismissal from the service is not warranted under the available facts.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General,pointed out in its Comment15that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrativeremedies since he did not appeal the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to theOmbudsman. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman maintained that under RA677016 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Office of the Ombudsman hasdisciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials. It also assertedthat sufficient evidence exists to justify the petitioners dismissal from theservice.

As framed by the parties, the case poses the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIESREQUIRES A REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE OFFICE OF THEDEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARULE 43 REVIEW.

II.

WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVERELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIR DISMISSALFROM THE SERVICE.

III.

WHETHER PETITIONERS ACT CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT TOWARRANT HIS DISMISSAL.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

Preliminary Issues

The CA committed no reversible error in affirming the findings and conclusions ofthe Deputy Ombudsman.

No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from thedecision of the Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf ofthe Ombudsman

We disagree with the CAs application of the doctrine of exhaustion ofadministrative remedies which states that when there is "a procedure foradministrative review, x x x appeal, or reconsideration, the courts x x x will notentertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resortedto and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act andcorrect the errors committed in the administrative forum." 17

Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10, 1990, providesthat:

Section 7. FINALITY OF DECISION. Where the respondent is absolved of thecharge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure orreprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent toone (1) month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all othercases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days f romreceipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petitionfor certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.[italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours]

Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from the decisionof the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a motionfor reconsideration or a petition for certiorari may be filed in all other cases wherethe penalty imposed is not one involving public censure or reprimand, suspensionof not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary. This

post-judgment remedy is merely an opportunity for the Office of the DeputyOmbudsman, or the Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain cases.

To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies whenhe filed his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy
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Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case at the administrativelevel since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he wasacting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative caseswhich are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrativeagencies

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution.18 It istasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials,save only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The OmbudsmanAct19 and the Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to disciplineelective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolvedin cases decided by this Court.20

In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,21 we pointed out that "there is nothing in the LocalGovernment Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly,the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specificmatter in question are not so inconsistent x x x as to compel us to only upholdone and strike down the other." The two laws may be reconciled byunderstanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction of the Office ofthe Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of apublic officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA6770 provides:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shallhave the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any actor omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act oromission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary

jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise ofthis primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatoryagency of Government, the investigation of such cases. [italics supplied;emphasis and underscore ours]

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupyingpositions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.22

Consequently, as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez,23 any act oromission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courtsor other investigative agencies.24

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or moredisciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which optsto take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other

tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.25

In this case, the petitioner is aBarangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade14.26Under RA 7160, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan hasdisciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, as follows:

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaintagainst any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:

x x x x

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before thesangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shallbe final and executory. [italics supplied]

Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filedwith the Office ofthe Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion ofthe sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.

The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative sanctions

Section 15 of RA 677027 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give theOffice of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. Thisprovision covers the entire range of administrative activities attendantto administrative adjudication, including, among others, the authority toreceive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordancewith its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require theproduction of documents, place under preventive suspension publicofficers and employees pending an investigation, determine theappropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees aswarranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the correspondingpenalty.28
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These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power todirectly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merelyrecommendatory. We held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio29 that:

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide theOffice of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectivelycarry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corruptgovernment officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to punish

for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinaryauthority over all elective and appointive officials of the governmentand its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exceptiononly of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it canpreventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigationwhen the case so warrants.30(italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours)

Substantive Issue

The petitioner is liable for grave misconduct

At the outset, we point out that the maintenance of peace and order is a functionof both the police and the Barangay Chairman, but crime prevention is largely apolice matter. At the time when the police officers were hauling the confiscatedequipment, they were creating a commotion. As Barangay Chairman, the

petitioner was clearly in the performance of his official duty when he interfered.Under Section 389(b)(3) of RA 7160, the law provides that a punong barangaymust "maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist thecity or municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of theirduties and functions." The PNP-CIDGs anti-water pilferage operation against thecar-wash boys was affecting the peace and order of the community and he wasduty-bound to investigate and try to maintain public order.31

7. SPOUSES MONTANO T. TOLOSA and MERLINDA TOLOSA, Petitioners,vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Respondent. . G.R. No. 183058,April 3, 2013

RTC issued an order, holding in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possessionsought by UCPB. Citing equity and substantial justice as reasons for itsdisposition, the RTC ruled that the pendency of Civil Case No. 6180 necessitatedthe suspension of the grant of UCPBs petition since there was a possibility thatthe latters foreclosure of the mortgage may be adjudged violative of the Spouses

Tolosas rights as mortgagors. While conceding that the issuance of a writ ofpossession is ministerial as a general rule, the RTC held that said function ceasesto be of said nature where the grant of the writ "will prejudice another pendingcase for the nullification of the auction sale" and "might work inequity andinjustice to mortgagors."17 With its motion for reconsideration of the foregoingorder18 further denied for lack of merit in the RTCs Order dated 31 January2005,19 UCPB filed its Rule 65 petition for certiorari which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00593 before the CA.20

On 31 May 2007, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, nullifying theRTCs 1 December 2004 Decision and granting the writ of possession sought byUCPB. Finding that the ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of possessionleft no discretion on the part of the RTC insofar as the grant of UCPBs applicationis concerned, the CA ruled that questions regarding the validity of the foreclosuresale as well as the propriety of the grant of writ can be raised by the Spouses

Tolosa in the same proceedings pursuant to Section 8 of Act 3135.

The fact that the Credit Agreement, Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgageexecuted by the Spouses Tolosa had yet to be declared invalid also led the CA toenunciate that the mere pendency of Civil Case No. 6180 cannot defeat the rightto a writ of possession the law grants to UCPB as the absolute and registeredowners of the subject realties.21The Spouses Tolosas motions forreconsideration22of this decision were denied for lack of merit in the CAs secondassailed Resolution dated 21 May 2008,23 hence, this petition.

The Issues

The Spouses Tolosa seek the reversal of the CAs assailed decision and resolutionon the following grounds, to wit:

I. THE CA REVERSIBLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIMA FACIENULLITY OF THE MORTGAGE OBLIGATION AND THE FORECLOSURE SALE

JUSTIFIED THE RTCS ORDER TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE ISSUANCE OFTHE WRIT OF POSSESSION SOUGHT BY UCPB.

II. THE CA REVERSIBLY ERRED IN ORDERING THE GRANT OF THE WRIT OFPOSSESSION SOUGHT BY UCPB DESPITE THE RULE THAT THE SURPLUS IN

THE BID PRICE SHOULD FIRST BE PAID TO THE MORTGAGOR BEFORE HE

CAN BE DEPRIVED OF POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY MORTGAGED.24

The Courts Ruling
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The petition is bereft of merit.

A writ of possession is simply an order by which the sheriff is commanded by thecourt to place a person in possession of a real or personal property.25

Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, a writ of possession may be issuedin favor of a purchaser in a foreclosure sale either (1) within the one-yearredemption period, upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of the

redemption period, without need of a bond.

Within the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may apply for a writ ofpossession by filing a petition in the form of an ex parte motion under oath,26 inthe registration or cadastral proceedings of the registered property.27The lawrequires only that the proper motion be filed, the bond approved and no thirdperson is involved.28After the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failureof the mortgagor to redeem the property, entitlement to the writ of possessionbecomes a matter of right.29 In the latter case, the right of possession becomesabsolute because the basis thereof is the purchasers ownership of the property.30

The rule is likewise settled that the proceeding in a petition for a writ ofpossession is ex-parte and summary in nature.31 As one brought for the benefit ofone party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest,it is a judicial proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person

against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.32 The issuance ofthe writ of possession is, in turn, a ministerial function in the exercise of whichtrial courts are not granted any discretion.33 Since the judge to whom theapplication for writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of themortgage or the manner of its foreclosure,34it has been ruled that the ministerialduty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the filing of acomplaint questioning the mortgage.35Corollarily, any question regarding thevalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of thewrit may, likewise, be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined inSection 836 of Act No. 3135.37

Gauged from the foregoing principles, we find that the CA committed noreversible error in ordering the issuance of the writ of possession sought by UCPB.

The record shows that UCPB caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgageon the subject realties as a consequence of the Spouses Tolosas default on their

mortgage obligation. As the highest bidder at the 4 January 2000 foreclosure sale,UCPB consolidated its ownership on 22 January 2001 or upon failure of theSpouses Tolosa to exercise their right of redemption within the one-year periodtherefor prescribed. Subsequent to the issuance of the certificates of title and tax

declarations over the same properties in its name, UCPB complied with therequirements under Act 3135 by filing its ex-parte petition for issuance of a writof possession before the RTC on 2 September 2004. Since UCPB had alreadybecome the absolute and registered owner of said properties, the CA correctlyruled that it was the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of possession infavor of the former.

In urging the reversal of the assailed decision and resolution, the Spouses Tolosa

argue that the prima facie merit of their complaint in Civil Case No. 6180 justified,at the very least, the deferment of the issuance of the writ of possession. For thispurpose, they call our attention to the supposed fact that UCPB not only failed torelease the entirety of the proceeds of their loans but also violated Republic ActNo. 376538 by failing to specify the rates of interest it charged on their mortgageobligation. Insisting that they were misled by UCPB into signing the CreditAgreement, Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgage which they impugned inCivil Case No. 6180, the Spouses Tolosa also claim that, discounting the illegalinterests and charges imposed thereon, their mortgage obligation only amountedto P14,041,000.00 and was more than amply discharged by the P17,240,000.00proceeds realized at the foreclosure sale.

Given the ministerial nature of the RTCs duty to issue the writ of possession afterthe purchaser has consolidated its ownership, it has been ruled, moreover, thatany question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or itsforeclosure cannot be raised as justification for opposing the issuance of thewrit.39 More to the point, a pending action for annulment of mortgage orforeclosure does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession.40Regardless of thependency of such suit, the purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession,without prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending annulmentcase.41 Otherwise stated, the issuance of the writ of possession remains theministerial duty of the RTC until the issues raised in the annulment case are, onceand for all, decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.42
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