MARINE CORPSINTELLIGENCEACTIVITY

Urban Warfare Study:City Case Studies

Compilation

April 1999

Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation

This is a Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Publication

Information Cutoff Date: 1 February 1999

Prepared by: Intelligence Production Division Regional Analysis Branch Europe/Eurasia Section DSN: 278-6156 COMM: (703) 784-6156

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity ATTN: MCIA 04 Quantico, Virginia 22134-5011 DSN: 278-6126 COMM: (703) 784-6126

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 1 - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Lessons Learned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Strategic Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Operational Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Tactical Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Technical Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Section 2 - Russian Experience in Chechnya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Strategic Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Operational Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Tactical Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Technical Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Section 3 - Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE:Israels Intervention into Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Strategic Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Operational Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Tactical Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Technical Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Section 4 - British Experience in Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Strategic Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Operational Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Tactical Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Technical Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Background

As the forward dUnited States militCorps (USMC) mueffectively in the Given this uniqueCorps has had mucoperating in urbanMarines have deploperations; all havin major urban cenand Bosnia have urbanized terrain (ing. Preparing forrequires continual tactics, and techno

In the future, Mariations where differconducted concurrian assistance opescale, high-intensneously within threthe Marine Corps city block war. Ivarying missions tional characteristitheir skill and detepresence of large potential difficultyfrom hostile forcesoperating in the urb

The Marine Corpand is staging URnew tactics and USMC the leading

an environment.

s has recognized these challengesBAN WARRIOR exercises to testequipment designed to make the

Lebanon during Operation PEACE FOR GALILEEin 1982; and

n British military experiences in Northern Irelandfrom 1969 to 1996, with special emphasis on theperiod 1969 to 1976 when the British Army had theSection 1Introduction

eployed expeditionary element ofary power, the United States Marinest be prepared to react quickly andmost unconventional of theaters.

warfighting mission, the Marineh experience throughout its history

environments. In this decade alone,oyed in several major peacekeepinge required a concentration of forceters. Operations in Somalia, Haiti,

proven that military operations onMOUT) are complex and challeng- the demands of urban operationsinnovations in strategy, operations,logy.

ne will face urban environment situ-ent categories and activities will beently. Missions such as humanitar-rations; peace operations; and full-ity combat may occur simulta-e city blocks. The Commandant ofhas labeled this concept the threentegrating and coordinating these each of which has its own opera-

cs will challenge Marines to usermination in imaginative ways. Thenumbers of noncombatants and the in distinguishing noncombatants will further complicate the task of

as part of URBAN WARRIOR, the Marine CorpsWarfighting Lab (MCWL) has sponsored:

n Three URBAN WARRIOR Limited ObjectiveExperiments that examined small unit combinedarms operations in the urban environment;

n Military Operations on Urbanized TerrainAdvanced Concept Technology Demonstration(MOUT ACTD) experiments that examined the useof man-portable shields and breaching technolo-gies; and

n The first Responder LTA, a medical assessmentexamining new tactical possibilities for hospitalcorpsmen in urban warfare.

Overview

In 1997, in light of the probability of future operationsin urban environments, the Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity (MCIA) was tasked to provide a preliminaryassessment of urban warfare lessons learned in supportof the CSEEA Joint Wargame. Three scenarios acrossthe spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensitywere chosen to represent urban operations. The les-sons are drawn from:

n Russian military operations in urban areas ofChechnya (with focus on the fighting in Grozny)between 1994 and 1996;

n Israeli experiences operating in urbanized southern1

U.S. force in MOUT. For example, lead in security operations.

Lessons Learn

Analysis of the Roperations in urbanstrategic, operation

Strategic Lesson

o

Military actioproblems, busearch for po

o

It is difficult towhich the mil

o

Contrary to neither short-

o

Lines of comand/or conflicwhen police a

o

Problems wican be exaceship at the op

o

Operations cacontinuity in

o

Local paramoutside assist

o

Concern for damage declforces rise.

o

When securresults, the ethe security sonnel station

o

Paramilitary oing political a

o

A distinct advconcern for th

Operational Les

o

It is importandoctrine for enough in and

o

Situation-orietactics greatland reduces l

o

Clear rules of engagement are essential in urban

ed

ussian, Israeli, and British military terrain yielded the following overallal, tactical, and technical lessons.

s

n cannot solve deep-seated politicalt can buy time for politicians to

litical solutions. get well-defined policy objectives to

itary can work steadily and logically.expectations, urban operations arelived nor low cost.mand and control are often unclearting in urban operations, especiallynd military units are intermingled.th disjointed command structuresrbated by too much senior leader-erational level.n also suffer when there is a lack ofthe senior command structure.ilitary forces are likely to receiveance.civilian causalities and property

ines as casualties among security

ity operations begin to achievenemy may start attacking targets inforces homeland and/or their per-ed abroad.perations more often aim at achiev-dvantage rather than military results.antage accrues to the side with lesse safety of the civilian population.

sons

t to have a well-developed militaryurban operations, but that is not of itself.nted training in urban warfare andy improves military effectivenessosses.

combat situations.o Even clear rules of engagement, however, are

sometimes difficult to enforce, especially in theface of mounting losses among the security forces.

o The tempo of operations in an urban environ-ment is so intense that personnel tend to burnout quickly.

o Overwhelming firepower can make up for organi-zational and tactical deficiencies in the short-run ifone is willing to disregard collateral damage.

o Urban combat is extremely manpower-intensiveand produces significant attrition of men andmateriel among the attackers.

o Psychological operations are a key element ofany military operation in an urban environment.

o Urban operations are very infantry-intensiveaffairs that produce large numbers of causalities.

o Urban operations usually stress the logistics systembecause of unusual requirements and abnormallyhigh consumption rates in some classes of supply.

o The spatial qualities and perspective of urbanand conventional warfare differ urban combatis vertical in nature, whereas conventional com-bat is horizontal.

o Special forces are useful in urban settings, butare often misused because conventional forcecommanders do not understand how to use spe-cial skills effectively.

o The large-scale movement of urban non-combat-ants can significantly hinder military operations.

o Noncombatants cannot be counted upon tobehave sensibly.

o Strategic bombing and close air support can be usedto shape the battlefield, even in an urban setting.

o Standard military unit configurations are ofteninappropriate for urban combat.

o Failure to understand the importance of civilaffairs can carry a high price.

o Amphibious operations can have an importantrole in urban warfare especially in achievingtactical surprise.2

Tactical Lessons

o

Rigorous comeven against r

o

Night operatiout in an urba

o

Forces operament not inand equipme

o

Tanks and aoperate in ciinfantry supp

o

Trained snipeto be in short

o

If patrolling irity forces, itcombat patro

o

Fratricide is ais harder to id

o

Major civiliachurches, bancally useful tions, and/oconstruction.cially useful t

o

Direct-fire arurban combaa major conce

o

Small unit lnon-commisstical success

o

Recovering ddifficult in ur

o

Intelligence, critical to suc

o

Hit-and-run afavorite tactic

o

Tracked vehicles in situatilitter the strvehicles are p

o

Helicopters abut are quite uplies to just be

o

Soldier loads must be dramatically reduced because

munications security is essential,elatively primitive enemies.ons are especially difficult to carryn setting.ting in cities need special equip- standard tables of organizationnt.rmored personnel carriers cannotties without extensive dismountedort.rs are very cost effective, but likely supply.s central to the strategy of the secu- will be different from conventionallling and must be well coordinated. serious problem in cities because itentify friend from foe.

n structures in cities (e.g., hospitals,ks, embassies) are situated in tacti-locations, command key intersec-r are built of especially solid Therefore, such facilities are espe-o urban defenders.tillery can be a valuable tool int, provided collateral damage is notrn.

eadership, especially at the juniorioned officer level, is critical to tac-in urban operations.amaged armored vehicles is more

ban areas.especially from human sources, iscessful urban operations.mbushes by small groups are the of urban paramilitary forces.

cles are preferable to wheeled vehi-ons where large amounts of rubbleeets. Otherwise, wheeled armoredreferable.

re not well suited for urban combat,seful in redeploying forces and sup-hind the forward edge of operations.

urban warfare requires greater individual agility.o Soldiers sometimes either deliberately misuse or

modify non-lethal technologies to make themmore harmful than intended by their designers.

o Very accurate and up-to-date maps are essentialfor successful urban operations.

o Shock value of artillery fire diminishes over time.

Technical Lessons

o Some military equipment will probably have tobe modified in the field to counter enemy tacticsand equipment.

o Small arms, though not decisive, play a dispro-portionately significant role in the outcome ofurban battles.

o Individual flak jackets significantly reduce urbancasualties.

o Smoke enhances survivability in urban situations,but carries significant operational penalties (e.g.,impedes visual communications, taxes drivingskills of vehicle operators, and slows the overallrate of advance).

o Mortars are highly regarded by both attackersand defenders in urban operations, but may beless effective than anticipated.

o Machineguns may be more valuable than assaultrifles for urban combat.

o Air defense guns are valuable for suppressingground targets.

o Heavy machineguns still offer good defenseagainst close air attack, especially helicopters.

o Commercial off-the-shelf technologies can beemployed successfully for military purposes incities.

o Rocket propelled grenades are omnipresent andvery effective weapons in urban combat.

o Armored vehicles require more protection whenoperating in cities and have a different distribu-tion than for a conventional battlefield.

o Remotely piloted vehicles can provide real-timeintelligence, but analysts have considerable diffi-culty achieving accurate interpretation. 3

o

The enemy often employs homemade weapons even chemical weapons against security forces.

o

Lightly protevalue in urba

o

Combat enginbulldozers, is

o

Cluster munitvided collater

o

Although avamunitions we

o

Air-deliveredmore commo

precision-guiby bad weath

o

Bunker-bustiurban warfar

o

Non-lethal teurban combemployed for

o

Extensive usecounterprodubuild up an ithe shock val

o

Conventionalable for urbabuilt-up areas

Conclusion

In the future, U.S. mid-intensity operaoped parts of the wcentage of these oMOUT. Accordingurban population increases by aboutmost pronounced gBy the year 2025, 5 billion peopledeveloping nations,will exceed the devwater, and jobs wipoverty, disease, a

will create an environment of social and economic ten-sion that might eventually find a violent outlet.cted armored vehicles have limitedn terrain.eering equipment, especially armoreda critical asset in urban combat.ions are very effective in cities, pro-al damage is not a major concern.ilable, artillery-fired precision-guidedre seldom used in urban operations. precision-guided munitions werenly employed than artillery-fired

ded munitions when not hampereder.ng weapons are invaluable fore.

chnologies were seldom used forat missions; instead, they were crowd control and riot suppression. of non-lethal weapons can becomective because demonstrators canmmunity to their effects, especiallyue of such weapons. military radios are likely unsuit-n operations and work poorly in.

forces are likely to engage in low- totions in developing or underdevel-orld. It is also likely that a large per-perations will draw U.S. forces into to United Nations estimates, theof developing countries worldwide 150,000 people each day, with therowth occurring in Africa and Asia.

three-fifths of the worlds population will live in urban areas. In some the pace of urban population growthelopment of city services. Housing,ll be in short supply, giving rise tond crime. Over-crowded conditions

The Russian, Israeli, and British examples of MOUTserve as examples of a military strategy being adoptedby weak conventional as well as non-conventional forcesaround the world. Weaker forces realizing themselvesinferior to larger, better equipped militaries in the areasof conventional battlefield tactics, heavy artillery, armor,and advanced command and control technology attempt to compensate through asymmetrical meanssuch as guerrilla warfare on urban terrain. By using thefamiliar terrain of their native cities to launch guerrillaoperations against intervening conventional armies, theChechens, the PLO, and the paramilitaries of NorthernIreland exploited the Russian, Israeli, and British forcesinability to adapt their tactics and technology to theurban environment. As this analysis has shown, theseconventional forces learned that fighting an unconven-tional war in an urban environment poses a set of diffi-culties and challenges completely alien to militarycombat in any other type of terrain. Though the Rus-sians, the Israelis, and the British demonstrated capabili-ties to adapt to the challenges faced in their respectiveMOUT, in each instance the lack of preparedness madethe operation more time consuming and costly than orig-inally anticipated.

The near certainty that the National Command Authori-ties will again deploy U.S. Marines to urban environ-ments, combined with the mandate to reduce casualtiesand collateral damage, requires that the U.S. concept forfuture MOUT address and prepare for the unique chal-lenges that will be faced. The Russian, Israeli, and Brit-ish experiences illustrate that factors such as thegranularity of urban terrain and the presence of noncom-batants can combine to create friction that can poten-tially erode the effectiveness of basic operationalcapabilities. Therefore, meeting the challenge of futureMOUT must continue to be a multi-step process requir-ing an examination of doctrine, organization, trainingand education, equipment, and support systems. As thisanalysis highlights, it is essential that U.S. military plan-ners study and understand the nature of the urban envi-ronment and its implications for operational- andtactical-level evolutions.4

The Chechen peopRussian control. FUnion, they begandence. During 199between pro-indep

In December 199Chechnya to restoaway republic. AftGrozny, 6,000 Rusattack. This attackthree directions antry riding in BMP of the anticipated

Malgobek

MozdoProkhladnyy

Beslan

Vladiko

Nazr

Zelenokumsk

Achik

GEORGIA

Stavropol'Kray

NorthOssetia

KarbardinoBalkaria

Ingush

er reaching the Chechen capital ofsian soldiers mounted a mechanized was launched simultaneously fromd featured tanks supported by infan-Section 2Russian Experience in Chechnya

le have a long history of resistingollowing the collapse of the Soviet in earnest to seek full indepen-4, Chechnya fell into a civil war

endence and pro-Russian factions.

4, Russia sent 40,000 troops intore Russian primacy over the break-

encountered heavy resistance from Chechens armedwith massive amounts of antitank weapons. TheRussian attack was repulsed with shockingly highlosses. It took another 2 months of heavy fighting, andchanging Russian tactics, to finally capture Grozny.The following Russian troop losses occurred betweenJanuary and May 1995:

The initial Russian campaign against irregular Chechenforces can be broken into two primary phases. PhaseOne, running through the end of February 1995, con-sisted of the initial intervention, the repulse of the firstassault on Grozny, and the eventual capture of the city 2months later. This phase involved some of the mostextensive urban combat of the campaign since opera-tions focused primarily on Grozny. Phase Two,extended from March through June 1995, consisted ofantipartisan operations in the Chechen countryside togain control of the rest of the country.

By late August 1996, Yeltsins national security advisorbrokered a cease-fire that eventually resulted in the totalwithdrawal of Russian security forces from Chechnya.

Kargalinskaya

GROZNYY

Kamyshev

Kalinovskaya

Chervlennaya

Gudermes

Argun

ShaliUrus-Martan

Nadterechnaya

k

avkaz

an

Sovetskoye

Kirovauya

Botlikh

Khasav'yurt

Kizlyar

ulak

etia

Dagestan

Dagestan

RUSSIA

The Republic ofChechnya

National CapitalMajor CityAdministrative BorderInternational Border

Killed Wounded Missing CapturedDefense Ministry 1,947 5,693 376 ---Total (Federal Troops) 2,805 10,319 393 1335

armored personnel carriers. Instead light resistance, Russian forces

Strategic Lesso

Lesson 1

Military operationical problems.

Almtary operations in Cgovernment frompolitical independBoris Yeltsin was tary and interior fotwo sides still openstatus, Russian ntoday is living its Even the protocol final agreement suof sovereign states

Lesson 2

Local military cpolicy guidance tand logically.

Juentered Chechnyawas reporting a vship of the Ministwisdom of the openew Russian mifound his headquPoor or conflictinthe next 2 years; rity advisor annouthe Russian regiosuch agreement haorders to cease ho

Lesson 3

ns

s could not solve deep-seated polit-ost 2 years of covert and open mili-hechnya failed to prevent the local

asserting its administrative andence from Moscow. In the end,forced to remove all Russian mili-rces from Chechnya. Although thely disagree on Chechnyas ultimate

ewspapers report that Chechnyaown life, separately from Russia.that surrounded the signing of theggested a meeting between leaders.

ommanders could not get clearo which they could work steadilyst after Russian military forces in mid-December 1994, Izvestiaisible split within the top leader-ry of Defense over the nature andration. Later that same month, thelitary commander in Chechnyaarters in tumult and disarray.g policy guidance continued overe.g., when Yeltsins national secu-nced a cease-fire in August 1996,nal military commander said nod been signed nor had he receivedstilities

The confusion generated by the minimal or conflict-ing policy guidance was exacerbated by poorlydefined lines of command and control. There was nodirect, unified chain of command for the operations inChechnya. Command and control was spread amongthe Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, andthe Federal Counterintelligence Service (successor tothe KGB) resulting in commanders not knowing whowas on their flanks nor the missions of neighboringforces. Poor lines of communications were alsoresponsible for many incidents of friendly fire.Additionally, the North Caucasus Military DistrictCommand structure (the district that included Chech-nya) was bypassed and operational decisions were sentdirectly from the Russian Minister of Defense to localcommanders. Similarly, the overall operational head-quarters lacked an on-going staff planning relationshipwith the assault units entering Chechnya from separateaxes. Poor coordination between units and servicesultimately led to slow rates of advance and sometimesopened Chechen escape avenues.

Lesson 4

Overall, Russian command lacked continuity and wasplagued by too much senior leadership at the opera-tional level. Russian units fighting in Chechnya experi-enced at least eight major changes in senior commandbetween December 1995 and August 1996. The formerCommander-in-Chief of Soviet Airborne troops, Colo-nel-General Achalov, also claimed that there was toomuch [flag-level] leadership on the scene. (Other6

sources said there were as many as 100 general officerson the operational about one general osian soldiers in Chthat the presence problem because lied to put themse

Lesson 5

Contrary to initChechnya were ncost.

At the outset ister Pavel Grachsettle Grozny inregiment and subdwas later provenInstead, it took 2 time only to lose iAugust 1996. OpeThe first Russian aexample, lost 105 carriers (APCs). Tof the 200 tanks 1994 assault on estimate that the R(400 vehicles) out 2,221 over the coualties were also hias 12.5 percent of nya through Marchond battle for Groappalling. Civilisian National Sec

estimated that 80,000 civilians were killed in the

scene. If true, that would equate tofficer per every 3,000 to 4,000 Rus-echnya.) Achalov further explainedof so many general officers was athey confused one another andlves in the best light.

ial expectations, operations ineither of short-duration nor lowof the operation, then Defense Min-ev publicly boasted that he could just 2 hours with one parachuteue all of Chechnya in 72 hours. He wrong by his own admission.months to subdue Grozny the firstt to a second rebel counterattack inrations were also far from low cost.ssault column to enter Grozny, for

of 120 tanks and armored personnelhe Russians lost about 70 percentcommitted to the New Years EveGrozny. Overall, Russian sourcesussian army lost about 18 percent

of its total armored vehicle force ofrse of the campaign. Russians casu-gh perhaps constituting as muchtheir total entering force in Chech- 1995 6 months before the sec-

zny where Russian casualties werean losses were also high. Then Rus-urity Advisor, Alexander Lebed,

fighting in Chechnya and another 240,000 woundedthrough September 1996.

Lesson 6

When Russian security operations began achievingresults, the Chechens started attacking targets withinRussia. By May 1995, Russian security forces con-trolled major Chechen cities and operations werespreading into rural villages. A 100-man Chechenraiding party seized hostages in the Russian town ofBudyonnovsk in June 1995. After Russian securityforces botched a hostage rescue attempt, the Chechensescaped with a major propaganda victory. The Budy-onnovsk operation was repeated in January 1996 whenChechen President Dudaevs son-in-law seized a hos-pital and maternity home in the town of Kizlar. Eventsin Kizlar played out as they had in 7 months prior inBudyonnovsk: an unsuccessful rescue attempt by Rus-sian security forces, large numbers of Russian civiliancasualties, escaping terrorists, and a major Chechenpropaganda victory.

Lesson 7

It was difficult to unite police and military unitsinto a single, cohesive force. Efforts to combinedisparate Ministry of Interior internal troops withregular Army units were problematic at several lev-els. First, Ministry of Interior troops were notdesigned, equipped, or organized for large-scalecombat operations nor did they regularly train withunits from the armed forces. Considerable antago-nism existed between the army and Ministry of Inte-rior forces, with the military regarding Ministry ofInterior troops as incompetent and unreliable.7

Lesson 8

Distinct advantagecern for the safety

security forces incivilian casualtiesadvantage of this struck convoys, punset vehicles on firwithout reprisal frononlethal, crowd-cconfused by inappsian troops stood bmanders even depapartment buildingattacks. This wasChechen commandalready fled the ccountryside; the re

Lesson 9

Concern about destruction declinforces rose.

Over harming civilians as troops grew frufighters from simi

their own losses mounted. Reports of rampaging

accrues to the side with less con- of the civilian population. Russianitially obeyed orders to minimize. Chechen fighters took militaryituation. Chechen civilians stoppedctured fuel tanks and tires, and evene in the early days of the conflictm Russian security forces. Lackingontrol equipment and apparently

ropriate rules of engagement, Rus-y and took no action. Chechen com-loyed guns close to schools or in courtyards to discourage Russian

a relatively painless exercise forers since most ethnic Chechens hadities to stay with relatives in thesidue was mostly ethnic Russians.

civilian casualties and propertyed as casualties among security

time, early Russian concerns aboutand destroying property declined

strated trying to distinguish enemylarly attired noncombatants and as

Russian soldiers engaged in looting, arson, indis-criminate arrests, torture, and summary executions ofcivilians increased. Initially, Russian use of heavyweapons in cities was restrained; eventually, how-ever, restraint dissolved. At one point, 4,000 artillerydetonations per hour were counted in Grozny. (Incomparison, Serbian shelling of Sarajevo reachedonly 3,500 artillery detonations per day.) Lesson 10Chechen forces received extensive outside assistance.The Russians claimed that the Chechens received up to5,000 volunteers from 14 different countries somewho had combat experience elsewhere in the Caucasusor Afghanistan. In the 2 years prior to the Russian incur-sion, Chechen forces amassed a significant inventory,including 35 tanks; 40 armored infantry vehicles; 1098

artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars;200 air defense wearms and man-portthe Russian militarwere unintentionalselves when the Ctected military wamilitary bases in mented these seizuRussian military oinvasion, Russian sply Chechen forcegreed or carelessnesian troops sold a tto Chechen separatRussian troops unammunition from room for looted hou

Operational Les

Lesson 11

Having well-develwarfare is not eno

itary had consideroperating in citiesPrague (1968), antary also inheritedwarfare doctrine frthis sound theoretColonel General AChief of Soviet Aone ever taught anblunders in Chec

Lesson 12

Situation-orientedRussian military e

ing standards for mandates 151 hour5 or 6 hours are overall reductions most troops ever retion. Nor were thethe city or individumilitary doctrine a

tice. Instead, Russian troops had to rely on sources like

apons; and vast quantities of smallable antitank weapons. According toy, up to 80 percent of those weaponsly provided by the Russians them-hechens seized them from unpro-rehouses and abandoned Russianthe region. The Chechens supple-res through purchases from corruptfficers and arms dealers. After theoldiers remarkably continued to sup-s with consumables either out ofss. On one occasion, drunken Rus-ank and an armored combat vehicleists for $6,000. On another occasion,loaded and left behind boxes ofarmored infantry vehicles to makesehold articles.

sons

oped military doctrine for urbanugh in and of itself. The Soviet mil-able post-World War II experience: Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956),d Kabul (1979). The Russian mili- an extensive body of formal urbanom its Soviet predecessor. Despiteical grounding in urban doctrine,chalov (the former Commander-in-irborne Troops), claimed that noyone anything when assessing thehnya.

training would have improvedffectiveness. Russian tactical train-squads, platoons, and companiess of total instruction, of which onlydedicated to urban warfare. Givenin Russian training, it is unlikelyceived those 5 or 6 hours of instruc-re any mock-up training ranges ofal blocks, as prescribed by Russiannd World War II Soviet army prac-

the instructional pamphlet prepared by the Main Com-bat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces forthose fighting in Chechnya. Because the lack of fundslimited the number of copies printed, soldiers had toshare them and pass them along on an ad hoc, individ-ual-to-individual basis. The situation was probablybest summed up by Colonel A. Kostyuchenko of theGround Troops Main Combat Training Directorate:[I]t so happened that, for our part, the tactics andmethods of conducting combat operations in a cityfound no place in combat training programs.

Lesson 13

Inadequate training in even the most basic maneuverand combat skills inhibited Russian operations. PoorRussian combat performance can be traced to an over-all lack of training in fundamental military skills. Thearmy conducted no division-level exercises in the 29

years prior to the Chechnya conflict. In that sameperiod, regimentalwere reduced overheld between Minisian army. Even inconsequently, somor their commande

ciencies due to traiground force units.ations in Chechnypsychologically prtheir skills in emproblems flying in peacetime training11 Russian generRussian forces wer

Lesson 14

Urban combat is eproduces significaamong the attacke

5:1 manpower advtry) was sometimguard every buildboth men and matRussian military losses, admitted t800 were woundedthe second battle casualty figures westimates that Ruthe 31 December dead and 300 prisalso extreme; e.g

Motorized Rifle Bcles in just 1 day oace during the firs

Lesson 15

Overwhelming firetional and tacticalis willing to disre

else failed, the Rinventive option Grozny. Heavy-handelivered ordnancegain control of Gro

Lesson 16

, battalion, and company exercises 75 percent. No joint exercises werestry of Interior troops and the Rus-dividual skill training was reduced;e half-trained units refused combatrs held them out. Operational defi-ning shortfalls were not confined to Russian accounts of air force oper-a also revealed that pilots were notepared for combat; had squanderedploying their weapons; and hadadverse weather because of reduced. Such readiness concerns also ledals to tell the Russian Duma thate not prepared for such operations.

xtremely manpower-intensive andnt attrition of men and materielrs. The Russians discovered that aantage (consisting mostly of infan-es not enough since they had toing they took. Attrition rates foreriel were also high. For example,officials, known for understatinghat 200 soldiers died and another in about 3 days of fighting during

for Grozny in August 1996. Theseere in line with earlier Ukrainianssian security force losses during1994 attack on Grozny were 600oners of war. Materiel losses were., an element of the 131 Maikoprigade lost 17 of 20 armored vehi-f fighting near the presidential pal-

t battle of Grozny.

power can make up for organiza- deficiencies in the short-run if onegard collateral damage. When allussians fell back upon their least overwhelming firepower to takeded use of massed artillery and air- allowed Russian security forces tozny after 2 months of fighting.

The sudden requirement to deploy to Chechnya, cou-pled with the unique supply problems posed by theChechen operating environment, overwhelmed thealready fragile Russian military logistics system. TheRussian Office of the Inspector General concluded thatthe Ministry of Defenses efforts to carry out a partialmobilization of the transportation system to supportRussian security forces in Chechnya was an outrightfailure. This was hardly a surprising finding sinceColonel-General V. Semenov of the military council ofthe ground forces had sought to have the entire cam-paign postponed before it commenced on the groundsthat military equipment was in a sorry state, more thana third of the armys helicopters could not fly, andemergency supplies had already been partially con-sumed. Those deficiencies in the logistics systemtranslated into some soldiers entering Grozny withoutweapons or ammunition for machineguns on armoredvehicles. Russian army supply officers were also10

unprepared for the abnormally high demands for handand smoke grenadable, one-shot ant-in cities. Similarlywith only 50 perceammunition, sparetics system also fatroops going into thand burial system bmon that parents ato identify their lstacked like cordsometimes forced military regions larequired by regulattations of the Rusexacerbated by thenya. Poor roads limsupply convoys wecrowds of unarmedPoor weather also

Lesson 17

A lack of high-qumore difficult andforces.

During the Russian officers we1:100,000 scale ma1:25,000 or 1:12,50lite intelligence wabeen turned off to ssance missions hadmanders fared even(1984) maps and parmys cartographimaps from aerial pof the fighting. Thedifficult for Russianto surround and ful

Pre-invasion intellitary capabilities weand troop-level comand intensity of Chinitial assault on Grdid not know theirtell me who is fi

es; demolition charges; and dispos-tank weapons generated by fighting, air force units entered the conflictnt of the prescribed norms for fuel, parts, and food. The military logis-iled to supply enough clothing fore field. Even the graves registrationroke down. Mistakes were so com-

nd wives had to travel to Chechnyaoved ones from a pile of bodieswood. Parents or wives were alsoto pay for the burials, since manycked the money to do the job asion. These inherent, structural limi-sian military logistics system were difficulties of operating in Chech-ited ground transport and military

re subject to ambush and delays by Chechen civilians blocking roads.

restricted shipments by air.

ality intelligence made operations dangerous for Russian securitypre-invasion planning phase, seniorre forced to rely upon 1:50,000 andps because they lacked better-suited0 scale maps. Current aerial or satel-s limited because the satellites hadave money and few aerial reconnais- been conducted. Lower-level com- worse many had no or outdatedhotographs. Eventually, the Russianc service had to prepare a new set ofhotographs taken during the course lack of adequate maps made it more forces to coordinate their actions or

ly cut off Grozny.

gence assessments of Chechen mili-re severely inaccurate as both seniormanders were shocked by the degreeechen resistance in Grozny. After theozny, some Russian prisoners of war location; others asked reporters toghting whom? Despite these early

intelligence failures, little was done to rectify the situa-tion beyond initiating more aerial surveillance. As late asMarch 1996, the Russian Minister of the Interior wasstill complaining that poor reconnaissance and intelli-gence had allowed Chechen military forces to enterGrozny again without warning. Interior MinisterKulikov went on to say that the outrageous negligenceof local authorities had resulted in heavy fighting andlosses. Kulikovs blistering attack produced few resultssince Chechen military forces recaptured Grozny inAugust 1996, again with no intelligence warning.

Lesson 18

The spatial qualities and perspective of urban andconventional warfare are very different. Urban warfareis more vertical in that operations routinely reach upinto buildings and down into sewers. The verticalcharacter of fighting in an urban setting worked both forand against Russian troops. On the positive side, Rus-sian troops were able to attack buildings from the topdownward, thereby achieving surprise and allowingthem to bypass strong, ground-level defenses. On thenegative side, the whole city [was] armed with a gre-nade launcher in every third floor window. Also, snip-ers operated regularly from roof-tops, deep withinupper-floor apartments, and from basements, makingthem difficult to spot. Chechens operating in this man-ner posed a serious problem since the guns on manyRussian armored vehicles lacked sufficient elevationand/or depression to deal with these threats. Also, dis-cussed in later lessons, few Russian armored vehicleswere capable of resisting top attacks.11

Lesson 19

Composite units

the start of campaunits like the

Kant

sions) were up to aoften manned at quently, many unminute additional ing to one report, armored vehicle crtial offensive. SimiGuards Artillery Rions only receivedcrews necessary tominute additions Artillery Regimentheir trade on the even know the lasentering battle. Somcreating ad hoc regthem to Chechnya.districts, for examwith conscripts inthem to Chechnyaregiments generallwere difficult to essential equipmenter of Defense Coof Afghanistan), mustered piecemeato collaborate with

Lesson 20

were generally unsatisfactory. Atign, few Russian units (even eliteemirovskaya and Tamanskaya divi-uthorized strength. Battalions wereonly 55 percent or less. Conse-its were fleshed out with lastpersonnel and equipment. Accord-up to 60 percent of the tanks andews were formed enroute to the ini-larly, the Chief of Staff of the 805thegiment complained that his battal- a small percentage of the trained fire its weapons. Many of the last-to the ranks of the 805th Guardst, including officers, had to learnfly. In some cases, soldiers did nott names of their comrades beforee military districts also resorted to

iments of volunteers and sending The Volga and Transbaikal militaryple, packaged genuine volunteers

to new, ad hoc regiments and sent under armed guard. These ad hocy exhibited poor unit cohesiveness,command, and sometimes lackedt. In the opinion of Deputy Minis-lonel-General Boris Gromov (herothe considerable forces that werel across Russia were simply unableout training.

Fratricide was a serious and continuing problemthroughout the campaign in Chechnya because itwas difficult to tell friend from foe, especially in cit-ies. Fratricide occurred frequently among Russianforces in Chechnya because, in the words of one Rus-sian commander, it is unbelievably difficult to dif-ferentiate friend from foe. In one particularlyegregious case, and Ministry of Interior regimentfought a 6-hour battle with an army regiment. Part ofthe problem stemmed from both sides using equip-ment (tanks, APCs, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs),etc.) of the same origin. Chechen forces, for exam-ple, wore Russian pattern camouflage coveralls andother items of military dress obtained from formerSoviet army stores in Chechnya. Usually this was nota deliberate attempt to disguise Chechen fighters asRussians, although Chechens used this ruse to carryout operations to discredit Russian soldiers with thelocal populous. Wide-scale use of nonstandard uni-forms within Russian forces made combat identifica-tion even tougher, especially with elite troops whoaffected a Rambo look. Russian troops were alsoallowed to wear civilian clothing to make up for theinability of the supply system to provide standardissue or to overcome poor military quality controlstandards. Fratricide was also caused by poor coordi-nation between different branches of the securityforces. Although the ground forces made up themajority of the troops at the beginning of the cam-paign, federal forces also included Ministry of Inte-rior troops, Naval Infantry, and Spetsnazreconnaissance troops under the control of the mili-tary intelligence branch. Miscommunicationsbetween ground forces and tactical air support crewsalso led to numerous cases of fratricide.

Lesson 21

Standard Russian military unit configurations wereinappropriate for urban combat. The nature ofurban warfare led the Russians to employ a novelconfiguration of assault detachments consisting ofinfantry reinforced with heavier fire support andcombat engineer assets than found in standard forma-tions. The recommended configuration for such agroup was: three motorized rifle platoons; one tank12

company; one flame-thrower (Shmel) platoon withnine launcher teadefense guns; obreaching vehiclemedical team; and

Lesson 22

Foregoing peacetiomy.

The Russian sequences of poor vehicles and automarch into Groznytanks fell out of flems. In another cfind one regimenvehicles from an en

Lesson 23

The potential of swas never realize

Russian military oproperly used, woGrozny. Units likenever sent, despitecapturing the Afgwith little blooddeployed, would sance and covert ospearheading the aYears Eve; this tional force commerly exploit SpeSpetsnaz were comnaissance role, sewere frequently inextract them, usuacooperation with hradios and other es

Lesson 24

The nature of cititions along narrow

conditions in Grofields of view, limitnues of approach,

ms; two Shilka or Tunguska airne UR-77 line-charge minefield; one combat engineer squad; one one technical support squad.

me maintenance is a false econ-army in Chechnya suffered the con-peacetime maintenance of armoredmotive equipment. On the road, for instance, two out of every tenormation due to mechanical prob-ase, the Russians were only able tots worth of functioning armoredtire divisions inventory.

pecial forces for urban operationsd in Chechnya. Both foreign andbservers agree that special forces,uld have been of great value in

the Alpha and Vympel teams were Alpha teams previous success ofhan presidential palace in Kabul. Spetsnaz troops, which were

have been excellent in reconnais-perations, but instead were wastedssault column into Grozny on Newaction occurred because conven-anders did not know how to prop-tsnaz capabilities. Even whenmitted in their traditional recon-

rious problems developed. Teamsserted without adequate means tolly due to poor coordination of orelicopter units. Teams also lackedsential equipment.

es tends to channel combat opera- lanes of activity. Because combat

zny were characterized by narrowed fields of fire, and constricted ave-operations tended to be channeled

along certain pre-ordained lines of march well-known and heavily defended by Chechen fighters.

Lesson 25

Psychological operations, especially disinformation,were central to both Chechen and Russian strategies.From the onset, both groups realized that domestic andforeign perceptions of the war were almost as impor-tant as the actual ground situation. Thus, both sidestried to shape the news medias coverage of the war.For the Russians, this meant a well-orchestrated cam-paign of withholding information and spreading delib-erate disinformation. This campaign ran from militaryofficers in the field, through government-controllednews services, up to senior government officials. TheRussians: spread false information about the timingand nature of military operations; used black opera-tions to mask Russian involvement; lied about the typeof weaponry used against targets in civilian areas; andunder-reported the extent of their own military losses.The Russians also sought to shape perceptions by hin-dering the activity of news correspondents in the warzone. Other Russian psychological operations included13

dropping leaflets from aircraft and appealing to Groznycitizens over loudsnot provoke Russibroadcasts and desand conducting usedate the Chechensdisinformation. Thganda events like Budyonnovsk and rity forces. Theredressed in Russiancredit Russian forc

Lesson 26

Strategic bombingto shape the battlphases.

The RussiSu-27 (Flanker), SSu-24 (Fencer) shChechen targets, ities, ammunition areas, military equand control facilitsians also employbombers to close the cities of Guder

Lesson 27

The Russian Air Dspace even beforeThe commander-inForce claimed thatprior to Russian shis command was oto ensure that furthnition were not aithat opposition foequipment if the ai

Tactical Lesson

Lesson 28

Rigorous communagainst relatively

much Russian tac

the clear. This allowed the Chechens to enter the Rus-

peakers to lay down their arms andan forces; jamming Chechen radiotroying the local television station;less talks to gain time and to intimi-

. Likewise, the Chechens, too, usedey also staged major news/propa-the raids on the Russian towns ofKizlar to embarrass Russian secu- were also reports of Chechens, uniforms, carrying out acts to dis-es with the civil population.

can be used in urban operationsefield, especially during the earlyans employed MiG-31 (Foxhound),u-25 (Frogfoot), Su-17 (Fitter), andort-range bombers to strike 873

ncluding bridges, petroleum facili-dumps, road networks, fortifiedipment repair facilities, command

ies, and enemy airfields. The Rus-ed Tu-22M3 (Backfire) long-rangeapproach and escape routes aroundmes, Shali, and Argun.

efense Force closed Chechen air- Russian troops entered Chechnya.-chief of the Russian Air Defense

, as early as August 1994 (5 monthsecurity forces entering Chechnya),rdered to close Chechen airspaceer mercenaries, weapons or ammu-rlifted into Chechnya. This meantrces would be limited to on-handr blockaded remained effective.

s

ications security is essential, even primitive enemies. Apparently,tical radio traffic was broadcast in

sian tactical air control radio net in order to redirectRussian air assets against their own troops. At othertimes, Russian forward air controllers broadcast theirown coordinates in the clear only to have Chechenartillery fire directed against them shortly thereafter.

Lesson 29

According to Russian after-action assessments, nightfighting was the single most difficult operation inChechnya for infantry forces. This assessment wasbased on a shortage of night vision equipment andinadequate training. As a result, some units used vehi-cle headlights and other visible light sources to con-duct night operations a tactic explicitly forbidden inarmy directives. Such use of headlights and search-lights was initially rationalized as a means to shockChechen forces. Instead, it made Russian forces morevulnerable to Chechen counterfire.

Lesson 30

Tanks and APCs cannot operate in cities withoutextensive dismounted infantry support. The Chechensfielded antitank hunter-killer teams, equipped withmassive amounts of antitank weapons, which keyedupon the engine noise from Russian armored vehicles.Once these hunter-killer teams converged upon Russianarmor, they would volley-fire RPG-7 and RPG-18 anti-tank missiles from above, behind, and the sides. Rus-sian armed vehicles had trouble dealing with theseforces for a variety of reasons; e.g., poor visibility fromthe vehicles and insufficient elevation/depression of on-board armament. Armor columns not accompanied by14

dismounted infantry experienced staggering losses (inthe initial assault orate). As one Russthe battle, [W]itholess to bring tanks i

Lesson 31

Forces operating iusually found in Requipment.

The Runeeded a rope wbuildings. Additiofound invaluable fo

Lesson 32

Firing tracer ammtarget for snipers.using tracer ammdirected enemy snLater, army policytracer ammunitionseverity of the snip

Lesson 33

Trained snipers wThe Russian armyfor fighting a snunready for the quof sniper operatiowere both under econditions they factional technique ofused unexpected tafor example, theybuildings, not frocountersniper teamsniper operations w

Lesson 34

Obscurants are espies. Russian forceswhite phosphorus during city fightinglery or mortar rounphorus. (The Russhad the added ben

Chechen protective masks, and was not banned by

n Grozny, up to 70 percent tank lossian airborne commander noted afterut infantry cover, it was really sense-nto the city.

n cities need special equipment notussian tables of organization andssians came to believe each soldier

ith a grappling hook for enteringnally, lightweight ladders werer assaulting infantry.

unition in cities makes the user a Russian forces eventually stoppedunition in night fighting since itipers back to the source of the fire. in Chechnya totally banned using night and day because of theer problem.

ere essential, but in short supply., although well prepared on paperiper engagement, proved totallyantitative and qualitative demandsns in Chechnya. Russian snipersquipped and poorly trained for theed in Chechnya. Besides the tradi- firing from rooftops, the Chechensctics in their own sniper operations; fired from deep within rooms ofm the window ledges as Russians expected. Consequently, Russianere less effective than anticipated.

ecially useful when fighting in cit- made extensive use of smoke andto screen the movement of forces. Every fourth or fifth Russian artil-d was either smoke or white phos-

ians claimed that white phosphorusefits of toxicity, readily penetrated

treaty.) They also found tear gas very useful in Grozny.

Lesson 35

Armored combat engineering vehicles can performimportant, specialized urban combat missions. TheRussians found that armored combat engineering vehi-cles were indispensable for removing obstacles (a seri-ous impediment to urban movement) and formineclearing. The Russians employed the IMR, a mul-tirole engineer vehicle fitted to a tank chassis. TheIMR has a bulldozer plow on the front and a traversingcrane in place of the turret. The crane has a bucket orcargo boom at the end depending upon the job. (Thereare two versions of this vehicle: the IMR built upon aT-55 chassis, and the IMR-2 based on the T-72 chas-sis.) The Russians also extensively used the UR-77, aminefield breaching vehicle based on a modified 2S1self-propelled howitzer chassis. This vehicle has arocket-propelled line charge launcher mounted on thehull rear for explosive breaching of minefields. TheRussian army recommended every assault groupinclude two IMRs and one UR-77.

Lesson 36

Recovering damaged armored vehicles is especiallydifficult in cities. The Russians discovered that rubble/debris, narrow streets, sniper fire, and the shortcom-ings of recovery vehicles themselves made armoredvehicle recovery extremely difficult and perilous.

Lesson 37

Hit-and-run ambush attacks by small groups werethe favorite tactic of the Chechens. The Chechensnormally operated in groups of 15 to 20 fighters;these groups would further subdivide into smallergroups of 3 to 4 for combat missions. Each smallgroup would generally include a sniper, a grenadelauncher operator, and at least one machinegunoperator. These units, employing antitank weaponsand Molotov cocktails, then lay in wait to ambushRussian forces. Ambushes sometimes involvedheavier weapons like artillery. In this case, theChechens would use one or two artillery pieces, firea few rounds, then flee. The Chechens used ambushtactics against helicopters as well.15

Lesson 38

Direct-fire artilleurban combat, prmajor concern. sians found it diindirect mode becfire-direction specnical deficiencies armored vehicleswith entrenched sgrenade launchersof buildings. Thusmultiple rocket laautomatic mortar ranges of 150 to 2

Lesson 39

A failure of smathe NCO level, wtactical failures iognized that urbactions of small tional Russian lacoupled with a shon the eve of theits small unit oper

Lesson 40

Tracked armorewheeled armoredRussians discoveamounts of rubblhad trouble travetrast, could readil

Technical Less

Lesson 41When operating imore protection anuted differently thations. Russian armoarc for NATO centrquate protection inProblems with the ry can be a valuable tool inovided collateral damage is not aUpon entering Grozny, the Rus-fficult to employ artillery in anause of the buildings and lack ofialists. They also found that tech-in the main guns of most Russian

made them incapable of dealingnipers and shoulder-fired antitank (RPG) teams on the upper floors, the Russians employed artillery,unchers, and the 82-mm Vasilekas direct fire weapons, usually at00 meters.

ll unit leadership, especially atas a primary cause of Russian

n Grozny. The Russians have rec-an warfare often devolves intogroups. Unfortunately, the tradi-ck of a professional NCO corps,ortfall of 12,000 platoon leaders

campaign in Chechnya, crippledations.

d vehicles are preferable to vehicles in urban warfare. Thered urban combat generated vaste debris that wheeled vehiclesrsing. Tracked vehicles, by con-y negotiate urban rubble.

ons

n cities, armored vehicles required that protection needs to be distrib-n for conventional battlefield opera-r arrays, optimized across the frontal

al front engagements, provided inade- the urban conditions of Chechnya.T-72 in Grozny centered upon cata-

strophic ammunition fires and inadequate protectionagainst top attacks from shaped charges. Survivability ofthe T-80 was also criticized by the Russian Minister ofDefense, especially its vulnerability to top attacks fromshaped charges. Diagrams of Russian armored vehiclesin public Russian assessments showed the majority oflethal hits against tanks and infantry fighting vehiclesoccurred on their upper surfaces, especially through theturret roofs and engine decks, as well as from the rear.Colonel General Sergei Mayev, Deputy Commander ofthe Ground Forces for Armaments, estimated that 98 per-cent of tanks destroyed in urban operations were hit inplaces where the design did not permit installation ofreactive armor. These same Russian assessments alsoemphasized that armored vehicles in Grozny were sub-jected to extensive, multiple attacks. Every armored vehi-cle had to deal with six or seven attacks by antitanksystems, mostly RPGs. These vulnerabilities should nothave surprised senior Ministry of Defense officials sinceRussian tank designers say they consciously shifted thebulk of armor protection to the frontal arc to deal with the16

anticipated threat to tanks NATO tanks and antitankweapons firing agaumns. Severe weighof Defense, forced d

Lesson 42RPGs can be useleast one recordedRPG to down a Ru

Lesson 43Air defense gunground targets. Th4 Shilka and the 2very useful againsguns had sufficientstories. Air defensground suppressiontually recommendetinely include Shilk

Lesson 44Heavy machineguclose air attack, evised Chechen tatruck-mounted 23-machineguns mouaged about 30 helicreports indicate destroyed at least ground-attack fight

Lesson 45Both sides employnologies for milittioned, Russian socivilian clothing fsome military cousince it made idencult. Chechen expconstructed ad hoc23-4 23-mm air detrucks and by placiToyota Land CruisUAZ-469. Similarcivilian-type truckand lessen their vinst advancing Russian armor col- limitations, imposed by the Ministryesigners to make this trade-off.

d against helicopters. There is at instance of the Chechens using anssian helicopter.

s are valuable for suppressinge Russians found that the ZSU-23-

S6 Tunguska air defense guns weret multistory buildings because their elevation to hit targets in the uppere weapons worked so well in this role that Russian authorities even-d that urban assault formations rou-as and Tunguskas.

ns still offer good defense againstspecially from helicopters. Impro-ctical air defenses, consisting ofmm cannons and 12.7-mm heavy

nted on 4 x 4 utility vehicles dam-opters and destroyed 1 other. Otherthat Chechen ZSU-23-4s alsoone, possibly two Russian SU-25ers.

ed commercial off-the-shelf tech-ary purposes. As previously men-ldiers were allowed to substitute

or inadequate, missing or cumber-nterparts. This proved a problemtifying friend from foe more diffi-erience was more positive. They air defense systems by mating Zu-fense cannons on civilian KAMAZng 12.7-mm heavy machineguns oners, Jeeps, and the Russian civilianly, the Chechens put mortars ons to improve their tactical mobilityulnerability to Russian counterbat-

tery fire. Chechen forces also employed Western-made, civilian radios for tactical communication dur-ing the second battle of Grozny. Finally, the Chechensturned industrial chemicals into home-made chemicalweapons. [Refer to Lesson 48 for details.]

Lesson 46

Non-lethal technologies were seldom used. There areno reports of Russian forces using nonlethal technolo-gies, except tear gas. It is not clear whether theabsence of nonlethal technologies was the result ofconscious Russian tactical decisions or because theirinventory did not offer them this option. Regardless,the lack of nonlethal systems put Russian convoycrews at a disadvantage when confronted by unarmedcivilians blocking roads.

Lesson 47

Tactical communication proved very difficult inGrozny. Part of the problem stemmed from designpractices that incorporated Russian army preference tofight from within armored infantry vehicles that led toinfantry tactical communications located inside ordependent upon the BMP or BTR infantry fightingvehicles. Once the infantry dismounted their vehicles,radios became hard to reach and communication wascumbersome. City buildings also disrupted the signalsof Russian military radios. Their short-term, tacticalsolution to this problem was to establish ground-basedand aircraft-based relay stations. Russian commenta-tors, however, noted that ultimately the military willhave to acquire radio equipment better suited for urban17

operations, like mobile cellular telephone networks.Ministry of Interioforces, tended to htactical radios, incoperate in cities. Hnicating from the sters or with the mil

Lesson 48Indigenous forceweapons. Becausemilitary chemical wby using on-handUsing chlorine gawere remotely deto

Lesson 49The cabs of suppAfghanistan, the Rcovered that it wtrucks, even thoseumns proved espeand roving bandstrucks were very vantitank landminesvehicles were destpaign. Numerous cof mine protectioAlthough the Russions of the standaAfghanistan, nonedeployed in the Chnow looking at a vtics vehicles for co

Lesson 50Bunker bustingwarfare. The highwas the RPO Shmthat 512 Shmel guservice in Chechnflame-thrower, it launcher in Westepocket artillery gle-shot, disposablor AT-4 rocket equipped with a th

can also be described as a fuel air explosive. It is

r units, equipped more like police

ave a much wider selection of smallluding individual radios, that couldowever, they had difficulty commu-mall unit level to higher headquar-itary services.

s can improvise crude chemical Chechen forces had no access toeapons, they improvised their own

supplies of industrial chemicals.s, they built chemical mines thatnated by radio signal.

ly trucks must be armored. As inussian army in Chechnya soon dis-as essential to armor the cabs of convoyed. Unarmored supply col-cially lucrative targets for snipers of Chechen fighters. In addition,ulnerable to both antipersonnel and; about 600 trucks and unarmoredroyed over the course of the cam-asualties resulted from the absencen on standard support vehicles.

sian army developed armored ver-rd Ural 5-ton truck for convoys in

were manufactured in quantity norechen theater. The Russian army isariety of armor packages for logis-ntingency operations.

weapons are invaluable for urbanest acclaimed weapon in Chechnyael. (A measure of its importance isnners received decorations for theirya.) Although officially called amore closely resembles a rocketrn armies. Unofficially, it is calledby Russian troops. Shmel is a sin-e weapon resembling a large LAWlauncher. The rocket grenade isermobaric incendiary mixture that

intended primarily to attack enemy troops in confinedspaces such as bunkers or interior rooms. It also has asecondary use against lightly armored vehicles. InGrozny, it was widely used against Chechensentrenched in buildings, especially snipers.

Lesson 51

Some Russian equipment was modified while in thefield to counter enemy tactics and equipment. TheRussians resurrected the Afghanistan concept of add-on armor to address problems that surfaced in Grozny.This led to the development of reshetka armor thatresembled a set of venetian blinds fabricated out ofsteel bars. It works on the principle that the majority ofRPGs striking the reshetka screens become trappedbetween the bars or disintegrate without the fuses det-onating their shaped charge warheads. Reshetkascreens were first displayed at the Kubinka armoredtest range trials during a hastily called conference inJanuary-February 1995 to examine the Chechen cam-paign lessons to date. These reshetka screens werethen deployed to Chechnya in February 1995. Addi-tionally, some tanks and APCs were outfitted withcages made from wire mesh that stood about 25 to 30centimeters away from the hull armor. These wiremesh cages were intended to defeat both RPGs andMolotov cocktails. The Russians also mounted 240-mm rockets on helicopters for the first time in Chech-nya as a field expedient to gain sufficient standoffrange as protection against tactical air defenses. [Referto Lesson 52.]18

Lesson 52

Helicopters needChechen use of 23machineguns encoto employ their wemore. HelicopterAfghanistan, foun(ATGMs) were vetargets with preciradio-command glonger ranged ATGcopter crew sufficiair defense guns. (Adeveloped a highmobaric principlesthere were no repoChechnya.) Smalle57-mm S-5 series aeffective, lacked sthe reach of Chequently, Russian cmm S-24 rocket fodefenses. This appthe Russians had with helicopters fothe engine when th

Lesson 53

Helicopters are nverdict deliverArmy Aviation, Cwas surprising sinfies the preferred from the top-downtion. That part of Colonel General Pspecifies that helicsnipers and ambus

Lesson 54

The Russian air fsion-guided weapweather. The Russguided bombs anThese weapons decations facilities w

possible. Russian use of precision-guide munitions, standoff weapons. Widespread-mm cannons and 12.7-mm heavy

uraged Russian helicopter gunshipsapons at ranges of 3,000 meters or

crews, repeating tactics fromd that antitank guided missilesry effective for attacking hardenedsion. The preferred type was theuided Shtrum (AT-6 Spiral). TheMs, such as Shtrum, gave the heli-ent standoff range to foil Chechenfter Afghanistan, the Russians also

explosive warhead using ther- for helicopter-fired ATGMs, butrts of such weapons being used inr caliber rockets, such as like thend the 80-mm S-8 series), although

ufficient range to put them outsidechen tactical air defenses. Conse-rews experimented with the 240-r attacking targets protected by aireared to be a field expedient sincenever attempted to integrate S-24sr fear the rocket plume might stalle helicopter moved forward.

ot suited for urban combat. Thised by the Commander of Russianolonel General Vitaliy Pavlov ce Russian military doctrine speci-method of capturing a building is, with troops helicoptered into posi-Russian doctrine notwithstanding,avlov claims Russian doctrine alsoopters are too vulnerable to rooftophes in urban setting.

orce made extensive use of preci-ons when not hampered by badians made large-scale use of laser-d missiles fired from the Su-24.stroyed key bridges and communi-ith greater precision than previously

however, was severely limited by the frequent appear-ance of rain and fog over the battlefield, especiallyduring the initial march to Grozny when weather con-ditions were appalling and the use of precision weap-onry was impossible.

Lesson 55

Inadequate on-board navigation systems and poorradar limited the use of helicopters in adverse weatherand at night. Technical shortcomings of on-board radarand navigation forced the Russians to employ Mi-24 heli-copters mostly during the day and fair weather when vis-ibility exceeded 1.5 kilometers and pilots could clearlysee their targets. According to Colonel General Pavlov,Commander of Russian Army Aviation, these rulesmeant that 95 percent of the days in February 1995 werelisted as non-flying days. 19

Lesson 56

The Russians did not use precision-guided, artillery-fired munitions despite having such rounds in theirinventory. The Russians had the necessary equipmentto carry out precise artillery strikes with weaponssuch as the laser-guided Krasnapol, Santimetr artil-lery rounds, and the guided Smelchak mortar rounds.However, none of these were used in Chechnya. Inter-national Defense Digest, quoting unnamed sources inthe Russian higher command, claimed that seniorcommanders considered highly advanced munitionstoo expensive to be wasted in Chechnya. Thesemunitions may also have been considered unneces-sary by tactical commanders who received the bulk oftheir fire support from direct fire artillery workingclose (150 to 200 meters) to the targets. At such closerange, accuracy could be achieved without resortingto expensive precision-guided artillery munitions.

Lesson 57

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were used exten-sively in Chechnya. Russia used UAVs in combat forthe first time in CSterkh, which has

naissance package with a daylight, stabilized TVcamera with a real-time transmission system; and anelectronic warfare jamming package. The Sterkhschief shortfall is its limited durability between 5and 10 landings. The Russians also used the sensor-carrying Shmel remotely piloted vehicle (RPV),which could operate up to 2 hours out to a range of60 kilometers. Apparently, the UAVs were used pri-marily by Russian airborne forces who judged themhechen. One such vehicle was the two modular payloads: a recon-

extremely successful, particularly as a way of savingthe lives of reconnaissance team members.20

Israels interventioresponse to a serieswhich Lebanon disingly under the infleration Organizatio(IDF) prepared thre1. A shallow penePLO camps near th

2. A deeper operatto the outskirts of Bin Tyre and Sidon,ans or entry into PL

3. The Big Pinestion with Syria an

MediterraneanSeaeirut to eliminate PLO strongholds but avoiding a clash with the Syri-O dominated Beirut; and

Plan that envisioned a confronta-d intervention into Beirut with theSection 3Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE: Israels Intervention into Lebanon

n into Lebanon in 1982 was in of events over the previous decade inintegrated politically and fell increas-uence of Syria and the Palestine Lib-n (PLO). The Israeli Defense Forcee options for the Israeli response:tration into Lebanon to clear oute border;

ion to the Alawi (Auwali) River or

objective of breaking Syrian influence in Lebanon anddriving the PLO completely out of the country.

The Israeli Government rejected the Big Pines Planand approved the second, more limited option that wasexpected to drive 40 kilometers into Lebanon and becompleted within 3 days. Instead, the Defense Minis-ter deliberately manipulated events to ensure that theBig Pines Plan was carried out. As a result, the IDFwas entangled in a situation where it planned to carryout a relatively limited, short-term operation. Instead,the IDF fought a much longer campaign that eventu-ally lasted 3 months plus an additional years occupa-tion of Lebanon due to senior Ministry of Defensecontravention of government authorization.

The fighting began on 5 June 1982 when the Israeli AirForce began a bombing campaign after an assassina-tion attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London. Fol-lowing this, the IDF crossed the border on 6 June tocommence Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE. Thisoperation consisted of a three-pronged assault with theWestern Force advancing towards Beirut along theMediterranean coast, a Central Force advancingthrough the Lebanese mountains to seize the westernheights over the Bekaa Valley, and the Bekaa Forces

BEIRUT

DAMASCUS

JERUSALEM

SYRIA

ISRAEL

LEBANON21

group whose aim was to destroy Syrian forces in theBekaa Valley in nurban warfare, onextensive fighting case study.

Strategic Lesso

Lesson 1Military action didunderlay Israels Operation PEACE June 1982 when IsrLebanon, was publto drive the PLO awsecure a 40-kilomDefense Minister snate the terrorist tdestroying the PLOinfrastructure, and Defense Minister ain southern Lebanened the political (without the apparegovernment) and into a war both agnon. The Israeli mobjectives, but Israbattle. Operation PLebanon more hossubstitution of oneinfluence substantiinternational standi

Lesson 2It was difficult forwell-defined policwork steadily andAriel Sharons hineed to conceal thIsraeli cabinet, detheir ability to plaSecrecy, in turn, bment among lowebetween stated podictably led to m

Israels key thrusts against the Syrians and Beirut

ortheastern Lebanon. In terms ofly the Western Force experiencedin cities and it is the focus of this

ns

not solve the political problems thatdifficulties in Southern Lebanon.FOR GALILEE, which began on 6aeli military forces invaded southernicly portrayed as a limited operationay from Israels northern border and

eter buffer zone. Privately, Israelsaw this as an opportunity to elimi-hreat from Lebanon completely bys military strength, eliminate theirdriving them out of Lebanon. The

lso hoped to reduce Syrias influenceon. These private objectives broad-and strategic objectives of the warnt knowledge or concurrence of the

gradually transformed its characterainst Syria and for control of Leba-ilitary achieved its tactical militaryel ultimately lost the wider politicalEACE FOR GALILEE ended withtile to Israel than when it began, the set of terrorists for another, Syrianally greater than before, and Israelsng sullied.

Israeli military commanders to gety objectives to which they could logically. Israeli Defense Ministerdden agenda, and his consequente true purpose of the war from theprived his military commanders ofn and execute decisive operations.red confusion and lack of commit-r levels of the IDF. The mismatchlitical and military objectives pre-

ajor operational errors because

never received the overt priority needed for success.Thus, operations against Syrian forces came late andindecisively with the consequence that the IDF facedprepared, well dug-in Syrian forces. The IDFs slowadvance to Beirut and the consequent difficulty in tak-ing the city after pausing on the outskirts were due toconfusion about operational objectives in the minds offield commanders.

Lesson 3

Overall Israeli command throughout the campaignsuffered from a lack of continuity. Deployment of IDFforces during the overall campaign was marked by a fre-quent shifting of units from the operational control ofone command to another; moving field commanders inand out of positions of command; and by the formationof small, task-oriented operations. Brigades wouldbegin under the command of one officer only to end upunder the command of someone else after havingpassed through one or two interim commands along theway. In one case, a command switched at least fourtimes in less than 30 kilometers. Operational confusionalso resulted when chains of command were disruptedby the practice of continuously forming and disbandingspecial military task forces.

Lesson 4

Problems with disjointed command structures wereexacerbated by too much senior leadership at theoperational level. Many Israeli officers complainedthat there were too many commanders runningaround the battlefield often with nothing to do or com-manding piecemeal operations for short periods oftime. This situation was a natural consequence ofIDFs practice of forming special task forces for lim-ited operations and shifting command responsibility asunits moved from one area to another.

Lesson 5

Contrary to initial government expectations, Opera-tion PEACE FOR GALILEE was neither of shortduration nor low cost. The Israeli cabinet authorized alimited incursion into Lebanon that was supposed tolast just 3 days and produce few casualties; instead, 3months of fighting and a long-running, large-scale22

occupation resulted. During the 3 months of fightingand the following y3,316 casualties. Wthese losses were Israel that was ino[In adjusting theseequivalent to the equated to the U.Sthe same period.] Acame from urban othe siege of Beiruttaken against the PIndeed, losses in b24 percent of its dfor the entire war.

Lesson 6

Distinct advantagecern for the safety that the IDF wishepolitical reasons, tcence during the located many of itsand ammunition duwithin the denselycamps and Fakahanons firing positionstures (e.g., hospiimmune to Israeli atics had mixed resuing parts of Beirutwere less cautious acamps where Pales

Lesson 7

ear of occupation, the IDF sufferedhile not large in absolute terms,

staggering for a small country likerdinately sensitive to casualty rates. casualty figures demographicallyUnited States, they would have. sustaining 195,840 casualties for large portion of the Israeli losses

perations; e.g., Israeli casualties for equaled or were greater than thoseLO in the entire war in the south.

esieging Beirut cost the IDF almostead and 32 percent of its wounded

accrues to the side with less con-of the civilian population. Realizingd to minimize civilian casualties forhe PLO sought to exploit that reti-battle for Beirut. Thus, the PLO military resources, such as artillerymps, inside civilian areas especially

populated districts like the refugeei. The PLO also chose to site weap- near or within noncombatant struc-tals, schools, embassies) believedttack for political reasons. These tac-lts. The IDF was restrained in attack- that contained few Palestinians, butbout sections of the city and refugee

tinian civilians predominated.

Wishful thinking and intellectual predispositionsprevented leaders and commanders from believingaccurate intelligence assessments. Senior PLO lead-ers had an excellent understanding of Israeli intentionsbefore the incursion, even to the point of Arafat havinga copy of an attack plan that was remarkably close tothe actual Israeli plan for Operation PEACE IN GALI-LEE. For at least 5 months before the invasion, Arafatwas both publicly and privately warning that Israelwas preparing a major attack, possibly even extendingto Beirut itself. Timely and accurate intelligence warn-ing of Israel intentions went unheeded by the PLOcommand system, partly because PLO commanderscould no longer distinguish real warnings from politi-cal gestures, particularly when numerous false warn-ings were issued in the past.

Operational Lessons

Lesson 8

The IDF had a well-developed military doctrine forurban warfare that influenced its tactics, but not itsoverall force structure. The IDF began developingdoctrine for military operations in urban terrain in1973 as a result of its experiences in fighting for Jerus-alem in 1967, as well as in Suez City and Qantara in1973. This doctrine envisioned two types of urbanoffensive one in which armor leads, and the other inwhich armor supports infantry as it opens and securesan area. Traditional IDF reliance on armor usuallyfavored using the former technique until an areaproved too difficult to take with armor. Israels relativelack of significant urban warfare experience to date,plus a decided bias toward armored warfare, meantthat Israeli doctrine for urban warfare had little impacton its overall force structure. Thus, the IDF lacked suf-ficient quantities of infantry necessary for urban oper-ations in Lebanon.

Lesson 9

Training in urban operations greatly benefited thoseIsraeli soldiers who received it. Unfortunately, not allsoldiers were afforded that opportunity. Israeli combattraining in military operations in urban terrain was23

extensive prior to judged very valuabBeirut. Units with hazards of fightingdent than units wcoordination of coas exercised in preafterwards judged sion training. Part otraining exercises inHeights and villageenvironment of thefrom the situation Beirut, the trainingonly the regular arwarfare. This wasmaintains only a smnumbers of reserviquate training in urannual training timquently, reservists more casualties in u

Lesson 10

Israeli rules of entionalize. The IDrules of engagemstressed the need collateral damage

mandated that Israeli commanders minimize their ownthe invasion of Lebanon and wasle in the aftermath of the battle forsuch training better understood the in a city and appeared more confi-ithout such training. Additionally,

mbat and combat support elements,-invasion Israeli urban training, wasmore effective because of pre-inva-f that training included small tactical captured Syrian towns in the Golans in southern Lebanon. Although these small towns differed significantlylater encountered in heavily built-up served the IDF well. Unfortunately,my units received training in urban a serious problem since the IDF

all cadre force fleshed out by largests none of whom received ade-ban operations because of the limited

e available to reservists. Conse-performed poorly and experiencedrban fighting.

gagement were difficult to opera-F was given clear but conflictingent. Initial rules of engagement

to minimize civilian casualties and in cities. These same rules also

casualties and adhere to a fast-paced operational time-table. The Israelis soon learned in the slow house-to-house fighting in the battle of Tyre that it was impossi-ble to accommodate these conflicting instructions.

Lesson 11Rules of engagement are sometimes difficult toenforce. Every effort was made in the initial phase ofthe campaign to enforce the rules about limiting inju-ries among noncombatants. Nevertheless, groundforce personnel often sought ways around such restric-tions upon the use of heavy weapons and target selec-tion in cities. One method was to call for an air strikewhen the ground forces met stiff resistance. That way,responsibility for civilian casualties and collateraldamage could be displaced to an anonymous platform the airplane and to the difficulties of carryingout precision bombing in urban environments. There-fore, the ground forces strictly observed the letter ofthe restrictions against firing into civilian areas whilesuccessfully evading the spirit of those rules.

Lesson 12Concern about civilian casualties and property dam-age declined as IDF casualties rose. The Israelis soonrealized that heavy firepower was the only way to min-imize their own casualties and maintain an adequateoperational tempo. Consequently, the Israelis began tobring artillery fire to bear on Palestinian strongpointswith the consequence that collateral damage rosesharply. They also increasingly employed close air sup-port, even in refugee camps. By the battle of Beirut, theIDF was engaging in intensive bombardment of Syr-ian and PLO targets in Palestinian sections of the city.24

Lesson 13

Overwhelming firtional and tacticaone is willing to din the campaign, tbers of infantry wareas; something tional emphasis oncient infantry, theFirepower over in(and preordained) had earlier increasto suppress enemown infantry forcfrom the 1973 war

Lesson 14

The tempo of urbsoldiers tend to ments of IDF perpoint out IDFs diations because of individual soldiersIsraeli casualty fisoldiers serving incal problems as aCompared with a 3.5 to 5 percent intle shock casualti

times more serious. The number of soldiers able toreturn to their units after treatment was also muchepower can make up for organiza-l deficiencies in the short-run ifisregard collateral damage. Earlyhe Israelis realized that large num-ould be necessary to clear built-upIDF lacked because of its tradi- maneuver warfare. Lacking suffi- IDF resorted to heavy weapons.fantry was probably the preferredsolution in Lebanon since the IDFed its reliance on mobile artilleryy infantry rather than expand itses in the wake of lessons learned.

an operations is so intense thatburn out. After-action assess-formance during urban operationsfficulty in sustaining combat oper-the high stress level it imposed on. This observation is borne out by

gures: 10 to 24 percent of Israeli Lebanon experienced psychologi- result of their battle experience.

psychological casualty rate of only the 1973 war, this means that bat-es in Lebanon were two to five

lower than expected.

Lesson 15

Non-combatants do not behave sensibly. ManyIsraeli military planners presumed civilians in urbancombat zones would practice common sense andabandon areas where fighting was taking place. Inmany cases, this did not occur. For many reasons some based on experiences in the earlier Lebanesecivil war civilians instead tried to stay in theirhomes. For example, some families were convincedby PLO propaganda that if they left their homesduring an IDF truce, they would be killed by theIsraelis. Others probably underestimated the likelyduration and intensity of the fighting and felt theycould withstand the effects of Israeli/PLO/Syriancombat. Still others simply feared that soldierswould loot their unprotected possessions a rea-sonable fear given the prevalence of looting duringthe Lebanese civil war.25

Lesson 16

The large-scale mcan significantly urging of Israeli 30,000 noncombaheaded for the beain the midst of the the city.) The madelayed IDF attacthe need to impocivilians to escapeoperations in the c

Lesson 17

Psychological opeIsraeli strategy. Prole in the Israeli sduring the siege ofthe IDF widely eloudspeakers to gchological operaachieving tactical bers of civilians tocombat operationsful at the campaiPLO fighters to laing the Lebanese sure the PLO into

Lesson 18

Urban operations itics system becauabnormally high cnumber of modest, standard equipmenthem in cities. Hanlaunchers, light arounds for mortarslarger numbers thantactical radios, espincreased beyond th

Lesson 19

Standard Israeli inappropriate for uovement of urban noncombatantsaffect military operations. At thepsychological warfare units, overtants fled the city of Tyre andches southwest of the city. (Later,fighting, half the people returned tossive exodus clogged roads and

ks on PLO strongpoints. Similarly,se cease-fires and open lanes for the fighting in Beirut slowed IDFity.

rations were a major element ofsychological warfare played a vitaleizure of Tyre and Sidon as well as Beirut. Throughout the campaign,mployed leaflets, pamphlets, andet its message across. Israeli psy-tions were often successful ingoals like encouraging large num- abandon urban areas to facilitate. However, they were not success-gn nor strategic levels in gettingy down their arms, nor in convinc-Sunni Muslim population to pres-leaving.

n Lebanon stressed the IDFs logis-se of unusual requirements andonsumption rates. The IDF took abut important steps to supplement thet suites of units prior to deployingd grenades, rocket-propelled grenadentitank weapons, and illumination were issued to infantry platoons in normal. The number of short-rangeecially hand-held radios, was alsoe usual unit allotments.

military unit configurations wererban combat. During the battle for

Beirut, the IDF adopted a task-oriented form of tacticalorganization that cross-attached tanks and self-pro-pelled artillery to infantry units. In such cases, thearmor and artillery generally remained under the infan-trys command for the duration of the tactical action.

Lesson 20Failure to understand the importance of civilaffairs cost Israeli commanders a high price. LocalIDF commanders did not understand the vital impor-tance of civil affairs for ongoing urban combat oper-ations. Thus, civil affairs efforts were ineffectual.Commanders failed to grasp the immediate combatimplications or the larger political implications ofpoor population management. Israeli psychologicaloperations convinced 30,000 noncombatants to fleeTyre and head for beaches outside the city. The sub-sequent inability of the IDF to provide food, water,clothing, shelter, and sanitation for these people pro-duced predictable consequences. Many tried toreturn to the city; a process that complicated thenorthward movement of Israeli troops and the deliv-ery of ordnance on selected targets in Tyre. IDFcommanders compounded these oversights by inter-fering with the efforts of outside relief agencies toaid the displaced population of Tyre lest the PLObenefit in some way. This second civil affairs failurecreated an adverse situation that was quicklyexploited by PLO psychological warfare specialists.The IDF also failed to educate its troops in dealingwith Lebanese civilians. Although the Shia Muslimpopulation of southern Lebanon either initially wel-comed or was neutral to Israeli presence, it soonbecame hostile because of the behavior of IDF per-sonnel and other factors.26

Lesson 21Aircraft played soperations, especiIsraeli air force carattack on Sidon:

1. Provided air cov

2. Prior to the IDtargets both to takeically demoralize Poutside the city.

3. Provided close athe city.

4. Provided air cofrom Syrian fighter

5. Transported troaround bottlenecks t

6. Removed wound

7. Dropped psycho

Lesson 22Amphibious operafare. Israel conducsmall one in supplarger one (about paign to capture Si

Lesson 23Special forces playIsraeli operations.initial landings d

north of Sidon and secured the beachhead for follow-on landing forces. This was the first major amphibiousoperation carried out