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rban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon

U Guilain Denoeux

Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, 310 pages. ISBN 0-7914-1523-6 $54.50 hardcover. ISBN 0-7914-1524-4 $17.95 paperback.

Review by Joel Gordon, Ph.D. Franklin and Marshall College

ccording to the old model, urbanization destroys a web of informal A networks that traditionally bound individuals together and pro- vided protection from or recourse against the state. The demise ofthose networks in turn produced isolation, alienation, and ultimately fueled urban unrest. In this “contribution to an incipient revisionist perspec- tive on Third World urbanization” (p. 211), Guilain Denoeux reexam- ines the influences of urbanization (the self-generating growth of the megalopolis and the flood of rural migration to the city) in the Middle East on social and political discontent and its more dramatic eruptions into violence, revolution, and civil war.

Denoeux does not seek to trade one model in for another. He finds the counter-model equally dissatisfying. The new model argues that informal networks, far from vanishing, persist on many levels and are often strengthened by the process of urbanization and the consolida- tion of state hegemony. This part of the proposition he accepts. But the corollary, that informal networks, by providing a social foundation for the urban poor and facilitating the adjustment of rural migrants to the city, exert a stabilizing influence and temper unrest, he finds overly simplistic. Informal networks, he argues, whether rooted in patronage,

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occupation, residency, ethnicity, or religion, can “operate as ideal bases for the articulation of grievances in the political arena” (p. 21). Howev- er, while claiming at the outset that his primary goal is to demonstrate this, his argument really cuts deeper. Many informal networks, he contends, are “double- edged’’ in their relationship to social order. They may foster stability, but under certain conditions, even those with the most to gain from preserving a status quo will become swept up in the paroxysms ofwide-scale unrest. They may, indeed, become the leaders of violent opposition to the established order.

To support his proposition, Denoeux offers three case studies, each singular, but each, arguably, revealing fundamental aspects of the issues at hand. Egypt, with a strong central state authority rooted in the reforms of Muhammad Ali and his successors, is least threatened by civil disorder. Iran, its bazaar historically autonomous fiom central authority and linked to a powerfully independent ulama, produced a revolution in the 1970s. And Lebanon, characterized by a unique and destructive confessional politics, collapsed into vicious civil war. The common denominator in each of these cases is the breakdown, not of informal networks, but of conditions that had, until their breakdown, exerted a stabilizing influence.

Denoeux succeeds in taking the reader behind events by highlight- ing an important sociopolitical dynamic. Although there is little that is novel in his treatment of historical or current events, his synthesis is skillfully woven. The inevitable generalization creeps in-as does a tendency to reify“Is1am” as a system that stands above and outside the cultures and life histories of its practitionersbut he has assimilated much of the best that has been written about Middle Eastern cities, social movements, and the three countries highlighted. His revision- ism is to temper conflicting theories and is, therefore, most welcome.

Still, he is too theoretically inclined, perhaps too wary of losing his thesis (or audience?), to take the ultimate leap into the gray area of ambiguity. Informal networks, he rightly insists, can play either stabilizing or destabilizing roles at different points in time, depending on the circumstance. What his model does not seem to reckon with is that they may play both roles simultaneously. For example, religious networks have often proven-r are perceived to b-more efficient, lucrative, or morally correct than state offices in providing social services such as transportation, medical care, housing, or financial services for investment and banking. Islamisborganized relief efforts following the 1992 earthquake in Egypt are a striking example of informal networks that threatened to supplant the state in a moment of crisis. Denoeux recognizes the “double-edged” sword of such phe-

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nomenon: that while they often serve to defuse potential violent outbursts, at other times they may underscore for many the weak- ness of the establishment and even the viability of an alternative establishment. What his model does not seem to allow is that this double-edge may cut both ways at the same time. Both edges of the sword may be one and the same and cut a similar swath in a single stroke.

There are several other related issues I would urge Denoeux (or his readers) to reconsider when assessing his theory. First, is his focus on national capitals not limiting? For many Middle Eastern nations one city, usually (but not always) the capital, remains the sole or predominant magnet for rural migrants and therefore an appropriate focus for the study of urbanization and informal net- working. Yet one wonders how the equation might change when looking at less uni-centric nations. Even in Egypt, with Cairo so obviously bursting at the seams, the most troubling manifestations of urban unrest occur of late in southern provincial capitals and satellite university cities.

Second, does the emphasis on dramatic, cataclysmic eruptions of urban unrest-certainly the cases in Iran and Lebanon-not mask much more common manifestations of conflict and conflict resolution? Denoeux in the end recognizes that his focus has been confined to “rather dramatic outbursts,” and that a “fascinating” realm of “everyday forms of resistance” is left untouched (p. 201). While the cases he studies will undoubtedly interest those con- cerned with social upheaval and revolution, others may find this focus less insightful. Iran has not proven to be the harbinger of Islamic revolutions. Lebanon, warily on the road to reconciliation, was always an exception. Egypt, because it is proffered here as the least turbulent society, is accorded a look filled with more nuances (although the attention paid Egypt is far less than the other two cases). What Denoeux never does is explore these societies from the perspective of the insiders, the men and women who struggle daily to preserve order, to foment unrest, or simply to make ends meet.

This raises the final question: who is Denoeux’s intended audi- ence? His book should be of greatest service to students of compar- ative political systems who are unfamiliar with literature on the Middle East. Denoeux is not the first to bemoan the dearth of that literature in certain areas. This book, one hopes, will attract new readers unversed in the region, as well as prompt new students of the Middle East to explore the issues it has raised on the ground and in all their nuances and ambiguities.

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