PF\daj\NI\insec urb\revised reportUKR.doc Strasbourg, 21 May 1999

ACTIVITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

(ADACS)

PROGRAMME FOR LEGAL CO-OPERATION

PROJECT ON URBAN INSECURITY AND ITS PREVENTION IN THE C.I.S.

ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE EXPERTS WORKING IN L’VIV, UKRAINE

URBAN INSECURITY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN UKRAINE

Report by Council of Europe team of experts:

Lars Alexandersson, National Council for Crime Prevention, SwedenTom P. Bersee, Amsterdam/Amstelland Police, The NetherlandsDr. Paul Ekblom, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, United KingdomFrans J.E. van Gelderen, Amsterdam/Amstelland Police, The NetherlandsAndreas Kohl, M.A., European Centre for Crime Prevention, Germany

1 Introduction

1.1 The Project “Urban insecurity and preventive measures in the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.)”

The Council of Europe launched the project ‘Urban insecurity and preventive measures in the C.I.S.’ in 1997. Its main aim is to assist those C.I.S. countries, which are member-states of the Organisation, or have special guest status with its Parliamentary Assembly, in their transition to democracy.

The major problems faced by these countries relate to the political, economic and social transition which has been taking place there in recent years and which has been accompanied by a number of negative trends, threatening to destabilise the emerging democratic societies and to undermine public confidence in them.

Appropriate policy responses are needed for the following social problems relating to transition:

Unemployment, the enforced idleness of large sections of the population and growing poverty, which often cause those affected to resort to illegal activities

A rise in ‘neighbourhood’ crime (especially involving young people) - theft and burglary, drug dealing, violence, vandalism, etc

A general increase in antisocial behaviour of all kinds - late-night disturbances of the peace, insulting behaviour, aggressive begging, disputes between neighbours, etc

Self-destructive behaviour - alcoholism, drug addiction, suicide, etc

The public's perception of these trends is greatly influenced by a feeling that existing policies are having little or no effect and that the responses by the police and courts are not suited to the situations described.

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This feeling is particularly widespread in urban areas, especially in larger cities. It has a major impact on the quality of people's lives and often leads to fears - which are sometimes exaggerated. Regardless of whether such fears are well founded or not, they can be harmful to the emerging democratic regimes and trigger problematic reactions. The re-emergence of xenophobia, reflected in acts of extreme violence, is of particular concern.

The question of security and the quality of life in urban areas and the adoption of measures designed to tackle the sense of insecurity and the problems that underlie it have thus become a key concern of social policy.

Somewhat similar concerns have been felt in Western European societies as well, which have already been working for a number of years to establish and manage partnerships between the different institutions at national and local level in the field of crime prevention and urban safety. Thus they have accumulated useful experience, which may be shared with the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe.

It was therefore agreed that the Council of Europe should assist the CIS states in fighting urban insecurity by launching a special project. This Urban Insecurity Project (UIP) was divided into three main strands:

Identification and analysis of the specific problems of urban insecurity in some major cities

Development of preventive policies suited to the specific problems of each individual city and directed at ameliorating the safety of everyday life in towns, and proposition of pilot projects to be implemented by the respective authorities

Assessment of the implementation of the pilot projects by the respective cities and assisting in spreading the experience achieved among other towns as well

In each of several different CIS countries a multidisciplinary group of Council of Europe experts from Western Europe (‘team of experts’) is involved in realising the UIP. This approach is complemented in the framework of the UIP by:

Visits to West European countries by specialists from the cities concerned to give them an opportunity to study new measures for combating urban insecurity

Visits by Western European experts to the cities concerned to help their authorities to develop

and implement the local pilot projects proposed

If appropriate, the organisation of training sessions for those responsible for crime prevention etc

The UIP in Ukraine is designed to give assistance and information to the project partners within Ukraine to develop local crime prevention institutions capable of planning and implementing tailor-made measures focusing on local problems - that is,. a ‘bottom-up’ approach.

The aim of the present report, drawn up by the team of experts working on Ukraine, and taking account of any comments by the authorities concerned, is to provide the basis for the development and implementation of pilot projects on urban insecurity and crime prevention in the city of L'viv in Western Ukraine. This is set out in more detail in Section 1.6 below. The team of experts also went beyond their original remit, in that they also tried to arrange for the support of the partners

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during the implementation process of the pilot project, primarily through recommending involvement of an expert coach.

The UIP-Ukraine also takes account of the specific political, economic and social prerequisites of a former socialist country in transition. It is not designed to give recommendations aimed towards a change of national laws in Ukraine, e.g. the penal code or the code of criminal procedure. These laws are only touched on in this report when they have implications for crime prevention measures.

1.2 Ukraine - recent political and economic developments

Ukraine lies in the eastern part of Europe and borders on Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Black Sea. With an area of 603.700 km2 Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe. It has a population of estimated 51.000.000 inhabitants (1998); this is decreasing slowly according to a 1998 demographic report of the Council of Europe. The population can be divided into the following ethnic groups: 73% Ukrainians, 22% Russians and 5% other groups. Until 1991 Ukraine was called ‘Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic’ and was of course a member of the Soviet Union. Ukraine became an independent state on December 1st 1991 and a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). Since 1994 the President of Ukraine is Leonid D. Kuchma. He enjoys a powerful constitutional position. The capital of Ukraine is Kyiv with 2.600.000 inhabitants. The country is divided into 24 administrative parts (oblasti), 1 autonomous republic (Autonomous Republic Krim (Crimea)) and 2 municipalities with oblast status (Kyiv and Sevastopol') and can be subdivided into 479 Rayons.

In 1990 the first constitutional commission was formed by the Ukrainian Parliament, the Supreme Council or Verkhovna Rada (450 seats, members are elected to serve four-year terms). After a three-year-phase this commission presented two draft constitutions in 1993. After the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1994 a new constitutional commission under the chairmanship of President Leonid D. Kuchma and the Parliamentary Leader Oleksandr Moroz continued to work on the draft constitution. In 1995 a ‘Constitutional Treaty between the Verkhovna Rada and the Ukrainian President’ defined the leading legislative and executive institutions and the outlines of a future Ukrainian constitution. In this treaty Ukraine was defined as a democratic and social state (Article 1) under the principle of separation of powers, with a pluralistic order (Articles 3 and 4) and a social market economy (Article 5). After further discussions and draft outlines the Ukrainian constitution was finally adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on June 28th, 1996. Since its independence Ukraine has entered various international organisations. In November 1995 it became a member of the Council of Europe.

Despite the formal rights the constitution bestows, the situation is different in practice. There is a low acceptance and knowledge of laws on the part of the public who also have little faith in the judicial system. This insecurity has contributed to the present situation in Ukraine, together with the less-than-anticipated economic development since 1991.

Ukraine, relative to other countries of the former Eastern bloc, still has major economic problems to solve, despite its fertile soils and large deposits of natural resources. Ukraine has struggled to implement effective economic reforms, e.g. privatisation and trade liberalisation, which began shortly after its independence in 1991. Despite formally coming into force, the reforms have been blocked by strong political and administrative influences within the country.

As a result of this difficult economic situation Ukraine has the lowest GDP of all middle and eastern European countries (1997 = $39; 1989 = $100), the lowest direct foreign investments (1989-1996: $1.270.000 and the highest shadow economy (estimated 50-60% of the GDP). The

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official registered unemployment rate in December 1996 was 1%, but there are a large number of unregistered or underemployed workers: hidden unemployment is estimated to be one third of all workers. The first currency reform (karbovanets, in circulation since 12 November 1992) failed, so on September 2nd, 1996, the hryvnia replaced the karbovanets and became the national currency of Ukraine. Since 1996 some indications have appeared - e.g. low inflation rates - that the Ukrainian economy is becoming more stable.

1.3 Methods used by the team of experts to assemble information - and the selection of L’viv

In gathering appropriate information on the situation in Ukraine, the team of experts focused on obtaining answers to the following main questions:

What is the social and crime situation in Ukraine at national, regional and local levels? What institutions or projects in crime prevention already exist? Which protagonists from government, police, economy, science or society are already active in

the field of crime prevention? What potential facilitators and what weak spots for future crime preventive action can be

identified? What are the political and legal conditions under which crime prevention measures can be

implemented in Ukraine?

The team of experts used a range of methods to answer these questions, principally through two fact-finding visits: to L’viv and Kyiv. During these visits the team had talks with different Ukrainian experts from various governmental and administrative institutions and levels, and with scientists, teachers and others. Furthermore lectures were arranged to inform the team about specific items linked to the UIP. The Council of Europe also supplied the team with official documents it had produced itself, plus others from Ukraine. To collect data on the situation in L’viv in particular a questionnaire was developed (Appendix 1) and supplied to different persons and institutions in L’viv. The answers to this questionnaire appear in Appendix 2. Despite these efforts there is still outstanding a need for more information especially focussing on the different responsibilities and pieces of legislation in the field of crime prevention and the issue of whether the national and local crime statistics in Ukraine are collected on a common basis.

The UIP in Ukraine started in December 1997 with the first visit of the team of experts to L’viv and Kyiv. This visit was designed to assemble basic information about the Ukrainian situation, especially the administrative system and economic and social conditions. For this purpose the team had talks with representatives from the local, regional and national level. Another important aim of the mission was to decide which city should be chosen to implement the project. In this first phase of the project the team had to decide whether the project should start in Kyiv or L’viv, or both.

From December 1st to 3rd, 1997, the experts visited the city of L’viv. They gave presentations on the different systems of crime prevention in Great Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. Also experts from L’viv held lectures on existing laws and practices in Ukraine, problems encountered in the course of the fight against economic crime, the problem of car thefts and transportation of stolen vehicles across the border. The team of experts also met the Mayor of L’viv, Mr. Vasyl Kuybida. From December 3rd to 6th the experts visited Kyiv. Here meetings were arranged with representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Family and Youth, the Ministry of Justice, the Kyiv Police Force and the Kyiv Regional State Administration. The experts also met Mr. Semyon Glusman, director of the Ukrainian-American Bureau for Protection of Human Rights, Kyiv, Mrs. Jo Lucas, project manager of the School of Social

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Work/National University of the ‘Kyiv-Mohyla-Academy’, Ms Fionna Gibb of the UK Know-How Fund, and Mrs. Galina Polyakova from the Research Centre for Social Policy, Kyiv.

From March 14th to 16th, 1998, the team of experts met in Stockholm to discuss the results of the first visit to Ukraine and further measures to be taken on the second visit. They also had a meeting with Steinar Langbankk and Alexander Pirogov from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities (SALA) who presented the ‘Ukrainian-Swedish Project of Local Self-Administration Development in the town of Irpin’ and advised the group to relocate the project in Irpin.

To digress briefly from this sequence of activities, in the light of the information received and experience undergone by this stage, the team decided to focus its efforts on L’viv, for reasons that follow. Both L’viv and Kyiv fitted within the framework of the UIP; moreover, representatives of SALA had, as said, offered their assistance to relocate the Project in the City of Irpin. On the basis of the documents and information accessible to the team, together with personal impressions, the decision was made to start the project in the city of L’viv. Irpin has less than 100.000 inhabitants and therefore does not fit very well into the Council of Europe’s project scheme to support major cities. It also has multiple local authorities, which would make collaboration difficult. On the other hand, Kyiv with its more than 2.600.000 inhabitants seemed to be too big and not very comprehensible. As state capital it was also a ‘special case’. L’viv therefore fitted best to the aims of the group. With its medium size and its social and economical problems typical for a city of a former socialist country we felt it had the best prospects for achieving positive results in crime prevention which can afterwards be adopted by other Ukrainian cities. Not least in our considerations were the energetic initiatives already taken in L’viv by the Mayor, the City Council and the Militia, together with the warm welcome we received on our visits.

From May 10th to 16th, 1998, the team of experts visited the city of L’viv a second time to gather more detailed information on the local situation and identify possible persons and institutions to co-operate within the project framework. The experts had discussions with different departments of the city administration, e.g. with the department of city construction, the housing department, the city engineering department and the labour department, and visited police stations, an orphanage, an elementary school and a private business school.

In the short term, a study visit was arranged for a party of key players in L’viv, to cover both Amsterdam and Stockholm. The aim of this visit was to help those who would be involved in planning and implementing pilot crime prevention schemes to gain a clearer vision of the kind of partnership collaboration, and the kind of activities, which modern crime prevention can achieve. Details of the visit schedules are in Appendix 3.

1.3.1 Project contacts in Ukraine - national level

The team of experts had significant contact with a number of national organisations, all of whom may be interested in the results of the UIP, and may be fruitful collaborators in implementing recommendations: Ministry of the Interior Ministry of Family and Youth Ministry of Education Ministry of Justice President’s Foundation for Local Self-Government Research Centre for Social Policy, Kyiv Ukrainian-American Bureau for Protection of Human Rights

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1.3.2 Initial contacts and information sources in L’viv

Mr. Vasyl Kuybida, Mayor of L’viv L’viv City Council (Rada) and Administration Co-ordination Council on Juvenile issues L'viv branch of National Militia L’viv Criminal Police - on Juvenile Issues Municipal Guard L'viv City Informational and Methodological Centre of Education L'viv State University Committee on Education, Sciences, Youth and Sports of L'viv Oblast Council

1.4 The crime situation in Ukraine

The political changes in eastern Europe since the mid-eighties were accompanied by substantial changes in the quality and the quantity of crime. Ukraine has not escaped this trend, the overall crime figure rising by 100% from 1989 to 1997. However, official statistics indicate that serious crimes at least seem to have started to decrease over the last year.

A problem suffered by all eastern European countries in transition is the rise of corruption and organised crime. Although the UIP does not focus on these crime phenomena and their dimensions in Ukraine are unclear, organised crime has become an important political and economic factor since the beginning of this decade. Extortion, contract killings, intimidation and harassment are offences that hinder economic regeneration and especially deter foreign investors from entering the Ukrainian market. Cases are also known where local government entities, sometimes linked to organised crime groups, have blocked foreign investors without any legal basis.

Street crimes like thefts and robberies, often targeted at foreigners, are becoming prevalent in big cities especially. Carjackings are on the increase. There are also property crimes like car theft and burglary.

Another big crime problem, which has also increased within recent years, is drug-related criminality. According to U.S. preliminary estimates, 35.000 criminal cases involving narcotics were brought to court in Ukraine in 1998, and additional 22.000 individuals were fined. The number of registered drug addicts has risen from 8.000 in 1992 to more than 55.000 in 1998, with an estimated almost 500.000 unregistered. More than 5.000 drug dealers were apprehended and 1.500 criminal groups involved in narcotics were broken up by the police. Within Ukraine, the opium poppy is cultivated in the Western and northern part, hemp in the eastern and southern part. There is also drug traffic from Turkey, Central Asia, the Balkans and other regions e.g. to Western Europe and Russia.

Youth crime in particular has become a problem within the last decade. Without the prospect of an acceptable standard of living, without enough money to realise consumer desires, often without work, sometimes homeless, crime and disorder has risen disproportionately in this group. Another factor that has strengthened this development is the decline of institutions like scouts or the Komsomol which during the socialist period offered leisure activities and support. Today only a small percentage of young people are active within youth organisations. There are few effective organisation which can take care of children in trouble. Another major problem is a lack of well-trained social workers for young people. One specific problem is the absence of a mechanism for

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the exchange of juvenile delinquents and homeless children between the different states of the former Soviet Union.

1.5 Crime prevention in Ukraine - focus on juveniles

The government has set up programmes to combat crime in Ukraine, especially a national, and various regional, crime fighting plans. We suspect, however, that concrete action has been constrained by lack of resources. Co-ordination committees with members of Parliament and representatives from different ministries have been built up. The Ministry of the Interior has - assigned by the President - focussed on such areas of priority as privatisation, financial and credit transactions.

To care for youth in particular a national comprehensive programme ‘Youth of Ukraine’ has been drawn up. This long-term programme defines central principles and guidelines up to the year 2005. Supervised by the Ministry of Family and Youth, the Ministries of Justice, Health, Education, Labour, Finance, Culture and Arts, Defence, Information and the Press, Interior, Transport, Emergencies, as well as various institutions, local state administrations, self-government bodies and private organisations are involved in different sub-projects. Part 3 of the programme: ‘Forming a Legal Culture and Juvenile Delinquency Prevention’ is especially relevant in the context of the UIP.

One major reason for the comparatively high rate of juvenile delinquents is most likely to be found in the economic situation and there is an obvious risk that this basic problem will ‘produce’ an increasing number of juveniles who will make their debut in criminality. In a draft project proposal (Nov 27, 1997) from the Netherlands Helsinki Committee the situation for juvenile delinquents in Ukraine is outlined, and the further point is made that during this period of economic and social instability ‘there is a grave danger that this vulnerable group does not receive the attention it deserves. This is partly due to the fact that the centralised system [of socialisation] has ceased to exist. Professionals who are working with juvenile delinquents are confronted with the situation that old ideas about functions, old structures and old visions on youth do not address the reality.’ Performance of current staff in post falls short of requirements, due to a lack of training. This brief description of the changed situation in society and the exacerbated consequences for youth also can be said to apply to the task of developing an effective crime prevention programme. Many different features from the Soviet period, specifically contributing to the up-bringing of youth, and the constructive occupation of their time, have ceased to exist, without being replaced by anything else. There is (as already said) a specific gap in the socialisation of young people now that the Komsomol and Pioneer organisations have lost their strong position amongst youth.

Parents (and schools) are unused to carrying out these functions in the way which we in the West take for granted. Furthermore, the economic situation has caused enormous strains on families, which also minimises the scope for discussions of norms and values ‘at the kitchen table’.

Adults more generally were, however, involved in socialisation in the daily life of children and youth during the Soviet era. Provision of a very broad-based set of constructive spare-time activities formerly played a significant role in what is often called primary prevention. Many adults occupied with organising and conducting spare-time activities for children in schools, during and after school time, are no longer present or welcome. A substantial decrease in such meetings and interactions between adults and children and youth results in a reduction of possibilities for youth to try, test and assimilate norms and values.

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The lack of adults forming a socialisation network for children must in one way or another be remedied. We noted with interest that, in the absence of financial resources, street games were organised in suburbs by officials from the municipality. We also noted that established sports organisations in the football premier league, such as Dynamo Kiev, have increased their activities towards children in the suburbs. It ought to be possible to disseminate these new features and the basic idea behind the commitment to carry on such broad-based activities and make a contribution to the socialisation of children and youth.

Our impression is that the co-operation between schools and other agencies has diminished and is today very limited. According to one headmaster in a particularly-deprived area, co-operation with the criminal police is restricted to the period after a specific individual crime has been committed. The police refused - said that it was not their role - to come to help intervene in a wave of damage/vandalism, petty theft or other accumulated problems in the school or the neighbourhood. Schools report a high increase in pupils playing truant. As far as we could notice the school management and the classroom teachers were left to cope alone with this problem and had no other professionals with whom to share and solve this problem together.

As in all countries and schools some pupils are from time to time in great need of specialist help from different professionals, such as special teachers, social welfare officers or psychologists. As far as we could see there is a tremendous shortage of such employees in Ukraine. These needs can of course not be replaced by any other competence. A Western expert group (like ours) will of course be able to identify a number of necessary functions that are missing in Ukrainian society. The possibility for responsible authorities to meet our suggestions based on analyses of what is needed will to a great extent depend on the general political and social-economic situation. While awaiting an improvement of the economic situation in Ukraine the challenge will be to find cost-effective and cheap solutions.

1.5.1 Local crime prevention

Local crime prevention in general seems to be the responsibility of local government (examples of activity are described in Section 1.5.2 below). The police do not seem to participate in general preventive activities beyond approaches quite tightly linked to the conventional Criminal Justice System. To take a very specific example, in one police station, sophisticated computer software was used to map the location of incidents of theft of vehicles. However, instead of using the patterns of vehicle crime revealed on the map, to guide preventive activity (for example increasing surveillance and altering the physical layout of the high-risk localities), they were merely used to plan reactive road-blocks and police pursuit after the event. More generally, the research and statistics capacity of local police departments is very limited and likely to depend on individual local initiatives. To take a proactive example, the police take responsibility for regular ‘prophylactic’ checking up on offenders in the community, after they have completed their sentence; but wider contacts with those at risk of offending are very limited.

Some pilot experiments are being initiated, which go beyond the scope of the formal Criminal Justice System. For example, in 1997 such a project began in one of the rayons of Kyiv, where volunteers assist the police in keeping public order. The volunteers work under the guidance of concierges in a living quarter comprising 20 dwellings. Results are not yet available, but evidently, and perhaps unusually, the experiment has managed to proceed in the absence of a formal basis in law.

Evidently, the social and economic situation differs significantly from that in Western Europe. This has not only a very important influence on the infra-structure of the country but also on the

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possibilities for developing new policies e.g. in the field of crime prevention. It is hoped that, despite the serious difficulties the Ukrainians face, the various important initiatives just described will make a real and lasting impact on crime and other social problems over the next few years. The great interest and eagerness that we observed on the part of the Ukrainian participants to learn and develop new strategies, give grounds for cautious optimism.

1.6 L’viv: background and crime patterns

1.6.1 Background

L’viv is the administrative centre of the L'vivska oblast and the cultural and industrial centre of the Western Ukraine. Compared with other large Ukrainian cities, L’viv is very well-furnished with cultural and educational institutions and relatively less involved in heavy industry. The number of citizens of L'viv amounts to 822.200, comprising 657.800 Ukrainians and 164.400 citizens from other nationalities. Officially 20.400 people (4%) are unemployed. It is administratively divided into five Rayons. It is also an academic centre with 8 institutes of the National Science Academy of Ukraine, more than 40 research institutes, 3 academies and 3 universities. There is a total number 118 schools, which can be divided into 95 general education schools (1-11 grades), 2 non-complete secondary schools (1-9 grades), 5 basic schools (1-3 grades), 9 residential schools for mentally and physically handicapped children, 3 High schools and 4 Colleges.

Several different forces in L’viv work in the field of law enforcement. The Militia is the state police force under the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior, subdivided into Oblast Departments and within these, divisions. The head of the Militia of the city of L'viv is at the same time a member of the Executive Committee of the Municipal Council. Once a year he reports to the session of the City Council on the work done. These forces are responsible for traffic, public security, economic crime and guarding prisons. The national Security Service of Ukraine is headed by a chairman who is appointed by the President. The local departments are responsible for the investigation of the most important criminal cases. The Municipal Guard was created by the L’viv City Council to protect public security in the city. It is an unarmed force with limited powers and jointly subordinate to the L’viv City Council and the L’viv Department of the Interior. In April, 1998, the L’viv City branch of the Militia had 1.862 police officers, working in five sectoral departments (one within each Rayon) each divided into six divisions. Another 257 persons were working in the L’viv Municipal Guard. The two bodies carry out joint patrolling.

The local system of education reflected nation-wide problems mentioned above. As a result of discussions with different representatives, we got the impression that there are have been quite a number of initiatives carried out (or claimed to have been carried out) which were not well-co-ordinated, and which enjoyed little feedback or exchange of information on their implementation and impact. Consequently the system is difficult to modify should any aspects of it prove ineffective.

1.6.2 Crime problems and preventive responses

The crime problems in L’viv are not completely comparable to the national pattern. For example, there is almost no organised crime centred on gangs; there are relatively few street crimes against foreigners; and there have been no contract killings over the last 3 years. The overall crime rate is lower than average. The main problems, described also in the speech of the Mayor of L’viv in Erfurt, are general juvenile delinquency/disorder, burglary and car theft. The high rate of first offenders amongst young people and the rising gravity of crimes committed by people under 16 years are subjects of especial concern. Youth unemployment rate is very high – 17.800 juveniles

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who have not graduated from secondary school are officially known to be unemployed - and many young people are homeless in L’viv. Juveniles who are addicted to drugs currently prefer alcohol and poppy-straw. Other drugs are not yet significant but they are anticipated.

To address these problems L’viv has adopted a ‘Complex programme to fight crime in L'viv until the year 2000’. More specifically, public and official concern in Ukraine currently centres on crime by young people. The official response to these crimes is divided between:

Traditional police/Criminal Justice approaches focussing on detecting, arresting and punishing individual offenders (and formally supervising them in the community after the sentence has been served) thereby deterring future crimes by the offender and others. Although there is a separate police unit with officers assigned to deal with juvenile delinquents, the requirement to assist in general criminal investigation means that they can only devote the minimum time to juveniles. Rather than developing and implementing broader crime prevention strategies, and making broader contact with children and young people, they can only focus on individual criminal cases involving delinquents. Special judges/tutors are to be provided for under the law to deal with juvenile delinquents who are serving or have completed their sentences - but as yet none are in place.

A Regional Programme for Crime Prevention on Juveniles exists but remains on paper due to lack of funding and absence of co-ordination. The Oblast, together with private organisations and bodies, fund an asylum centre for minors, where children from 3-18 years may stay for up to 30 days. Capacity is 50 beds. A range of other institutions are responsible for social work and rehabilitation amongst juveniles - there are boarding schools for difficult children aged 11-14, and vocational schools for those aged 14-18. There are also ‘colonies’ for juvenile delinquents and there used to be centres for medical and social rehabilitation for young drug addicts. This was in place for 3 years, but stopped due to lack of money.

Within the Municipality, there is a special Directorate for Juveniles (i.e. juvenile delinquents and children at risk), which employs 5 inspectors (one for each rayon), and aims to cover all aspects of work with difficult children in L’viv. More widely, it was estimated locally that some 50 staff would be needed across L’viv as a whole to deal with difficult children and young people, but in fact only 36 are currently in post.

Enthusiastic schemes, mainly by local government and other local ‘civilian’ organisations, aim to develop sporting and entertainment facilities for young people, on the assumption that it is the absence of these that is motivating crime. One such example which impressed us with its efforts was the organisation ‘Galitzkoe yunatztvo’ - whose staff are paid by the municipality but the programmes and projects are funded from other sources. Another was a planned programme of social training and prevention among the students of the many higher education institutions in L’viv, run by the Union of the Deputy Directors of Universities and Business Colleges. However, this was never actually implemented.

Without wishing to detract from what they have achieved, these local initiatives, we felt, have generally suffered from a lack of detailed analysis and careful interpretation of crime patterns so as to match action to problem; and a lack of hard evaluation.

In all this, L’viv resembles the ‘early days’ of prevention in Western countries (conditions which, we would be the first to admit, have proved difficult to change completely).

Sources:

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Central Intelligence Agency 1998: World Factbook 1997.Council of Europe (1998). Activities for the Development and Consolidation of Democratic Stability. Co-operation and Assistance to Western Eastern European Countries: Programme for 1998 (SG/INF(98)2).Elfers, Frank 1998: Verfassungsentwicklung und Rechtssicherheit in der Ukraine, In: Recht in Ost und West, Heft 2, S. 41-49.Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft 1998: idw-Bericht Nr. 9 vom 26.02.1998, S. 4/5.Stekal, Leonid 1996: Die organisierte Kriminalität in der Ukraine, In: Europäische Sicherheit, Heft 12, S. 53-55.U.S. Embassy, Kyiv 1998: 1998 Crime and Security Report Kyiv, Ukraine.Making standards work in the Ukrainian juvenile prison systemTraining, partnerships and other assistance to the Juvenile prison system ofUkraine, 27 November 1997, the Netherlands Helsinki Committee (M. Tijssen, NHC; H.Krooi, Child Protection Board)Speech by Mayor of L’viv at the CLRAE International Conference on “Crime and Urban Insecurity in Europe: The Role and Responsibilities of Local and Regional Authorities”, Erfurt, Germany, 26-28 February 1997

1.7 The purpose and structure of this Report

The purpose of this report is to:

Bring together the views of the Council of Europe team of experts and set these views in the context of the way the project was originally set up, how it developed and changed course in the light of experience, and how this might have implications for future Council of Europe strategy

Arrive at an agreed view of strategy with partners in L’viv

Provide a platform for the work of the Local Project Steering Group and Local Project Working Group (as described within the main text below).

Part 2 of the report makes the case for the kind of approach to local crime prevention that we, the experts, think Ukraine should aim to achieve. Part 3 identifies the key task of the UIP in Ukraine, as one of ‘transfer of know-how’. Part 4 sets out our views on how this should be done, and documents our recommendations for taking this forward through multi-level organisational arrangements centring on pilot projects. Before embarking on this sequence, though, we felt it worthwhile recording our overall impressions of working on the UIP.

1.8 Impressions of the process of conducting the Ukraine Urban Insecurity Project

From several points of view, working on the Ukraine UIP has been a special, sometimes intriguing process for the team of experts.

1.8.1 The organisation by the Council of Europe

In Autumn 1997, all experts were originally asked to participate in a three-day, initial visit to Kyiv to present the project of the Council of Europe. Also, they were informed that during a second visit, sometime in 1998, an assessment-mission would be undertaken and a report with recommendations would have to be written by them. In November 1997, it became clear to the

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experts that the initial visit would take 5 instead of 3 days and that the city of L'viv would also participate in the project.

During the initial visit, the experts came to the conclusion that the idea of simply writing a report, with highly-specific recommendations about crime prevention structures and activities, to be delivered to the local authorities, would be inadequate. We concluded that this approach would have severe limitations given the Soviet-era history of Ukraine and the complexity, and rapidity of development, of its institutions and legal framework, and would be unlikely to have much lasting influence on crime prevention in Ukraine. Instead, as will be described more fully in Part 4, the team suggested a more generic, practical and exploratory strategy in which co-operation between the local authorities, the Council of Europe and the group of experts would be developed, followed up by a coaching role for the authorities in Ukraine to be supplied by an additional expert from Western Europe. This realisation, combined with the need to prepare the fact finding mission in L'viv and to discuss the final version of the report, necessitated the organisation of two extra one-day meetings in March and October 1998. When one includes the substantial task of arranging the visits of Ukrainian experts to Amsterdam and Stockholm, for the Council of Europe team of experts it meant a far larger investment of time and energy than at first anticipated.

Although much of the additional activity was acknowledged as necessary - or even in fact suggested - by the team of experts themselves, it is put to the Council of Europe that they need to be more precise in advance about the necessary contribution to this kind of project when experts are first being asked to participate.

1.8.2 Working in Ukraine

Visiting and working in Ukraine has been an interesting, sometimes even exciting, experience. Most of the experts had never been in a former Soviet Union country before. Apart from professional curiosity, there was also a personal curiosity in the team about the situation in Ukraine.

There now follow a number of impressions, both practical and cultural, from the team about the situation in L'viv and Kyiv. Some of these, as well as shaping our experiences, contributed to our move towards the generic and exploratory approach of transferring ‘know-how’.

Both in L'viv and Kyiv, our hosts had organised well-structured visits. During the initial visit in December 1997, all meetings had a formal character and we met with groups of people which were rather too large. This meant that asking questions was difficult and the process was rather slow. (Lunch-breaks and minibus journeys gave a better opportunity to get into a more personal and open contact with individuals.) Because of the formal settings, most answers were formal. As a result, it took us quite some time to understand the local organisational structures and problems.

We had the impression that most of the representatives of the local government and law-enforcement of Ukraine have to do their work in a rather formal setting. Quite often it was emphasised that the requirement, or custom, to adhere strictly to rules and laws or simply to obey orders from people with higher rank or authority were inhibiting new developments. One of the representatives told us: ‘We all agree that we should do more about crime prevention. The main problem is that we do not have a law yet which tells us to do this’.

Most of the governmental bodies have strict guidelines for their activities. Quite often we were informed that the answer to a specific question about a certain problem had to be given by

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another organisation because that organisation was responsible for that part of the problem. We did not find a common felt responsibility by all agencies to solve problems together, by-passing the strict, bureaucratic rules. While this is of course a problem in all our countries, it seemed particularly severe in Ukraine.

During our initial visit in Kyiv, we had a strange experience with one of the host organisations. It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that its representative stated that the project could only succeed if the Council of Europe delivered a substantial amount of money to them personally.

Gathering concise statistical information was difficult. Although the team had created a list of questions about the situation in general but also about specific youth crime problems, much relevant information was not supplied and/or translated in time. This sometimes made it very difficult to make an adequate assessment of the situation.

We experienced a very warm and hospitable reception by our hosts, especially in L'viv. Although language barriers made it difficult to get into a really personal relationship, we had some very pleasant moments together during the Project, and a feeling of collective commitment to its aims.

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2 The vision of ‘modern’ crime prevention

Over the last 15 years there has been a revolution in the approach to reducing crime in many Western countries. The starting position was one in which:

Greatest emphasis was placed on the operation of the formal Criminal Justice System in focusing on the individual offender: intervening during criminal events, detecting and arresting criminals during and after crimes, and securing punishment through trial and sentence, with the aim of incapacitating or treating the offenders whilst in prison, and deterring those offenders from committing further crimes. By example, the aim was also to deter potential offenders, and to dramatise the message to all citizens that crime was wrong. There was little attempt to remove the underlying causes of crime.

Police action centred on uniformed patrolling to deter and intervene, and detection and arrest to feed into the Criminal Justice System. Together, traditional policing and the Criminal Justice System, relying on the state’s monopoly of force and constraint, have only a limited capacity to deal with crime. Only a small proportion of crimes are reported to the police, only a small proportion of these lead to detection and an arrest, only a proportion of these are prosecuted, and only a proportion of these result in a conviction. Most of the resources of the police and Criminal Justice System are used to control the effects of crimes already committed, after the damage has been done (see, for example, Our Collective Responsibility - a national programme for Crime Prevention, Sweden, 1997).

Other interventions were confined to very general (‘lock it or lose it’) publicity campaigns encouraging citizens, businesses etc to be vigilant and protect themselves, and well-intended ‘youth-club’-type activities aimed at occupying young people’s time constructively or changing their attitudes. With the last, there was a particular risk of a ‘drift of objectives’, where the original purpose of the intervention was forgotten, but the activities became ‘ends in themselves’. With the focus on psychopathology or personal responsibility for causing crime (offenders’ mental illness or ‘wickedness’), little attention was given to the role of the crime situation in generating opportunities for crime through the presence of tempting and vulnerable goods to steal or damage, or the absence of ‘guardians’ to protect it. There was thus little systematic consideration of ‘situational’ approaches to prevention, apart from the limited provision of advice on physical security (locks and bolts etc).

In general, action was delivered in a fairly rigid and generalised way which was driven by the methods immediately available to prevent crime and the general approach of the organisation (usually the police) that happened to take on a particular crime problem, rather than a careful analysis of specific crime problems, interpretation of their causes and selection of solutions to match the problem, delivered by the most appropriate organisation, or combination of organisations. Close consideration was not given as to how, exactly, the action itself was intended to work, and how its effects might be ‘triggered’ in specific situations. There was (and often still remains) a tendency to uncritically take crime prevention methods ‘off the shelf’ - especially methods associated with one or two prominent ‘success stories’ - and apply them without thorough analysis and matching to circumstances.

There was little collaboration between police and other agencies whose actions may contribute to reducing people’s criminal predisposition, factors in their current life circumstances motivating them to offend, or opportunities for committing crime. Insufficient attention was given to the realisation that crime is ultimately a result of general developments in society at large and thus affected by social circumstances, and social policies beyond crime policy itself.

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Action was informed by custom, common sense and sometimes the need to make popular gestures rather than by hard evaluation of what worked. The ‘Swedish experience’ is that most of the traditional preventive activities oriented towards young people at risk of offending in particular, have limited capacity to engage with the selected target group and their needs. There are too many examples when national authorities grant money to ‘reliable’ preventive means and not for preventive aims.

The finishing position (or more strictly, the goal to which many countries aspire, but which they have not yet fully reached) is one in which:

Crime prevention is far more deeply and widely embedded in society’s institutions. Its functions are recognisable within the judicial system, the socio-political area, child and youth development and crime opportunities. (Crime Prevention in the Nordic Context - the Nordic Model, 1998). The role of the judicial system, as said above, is primarily that of creating basic norms and delivering prevention through deterrence and incapacitation of offenders. Changes in the Criminal Justice System are considered to have only a marginal effect on the prevention of crime. Social policy is an end in itself, not an explicit means to prevent crime - to fight marginalisation, to support socially vulnerable people and to ensure that everyone has equal opportunities for education and for making a livelihood. The main socio-political goal with regard to children and young people is to ensure that they have as good conditions for growing up as possible and as good a life as possible. This type of social prevention may have a general aim and direction or contribute to identifying children and young people who are in danger of developing in an undesirable way and thus prevent criminality and other anti-social behaviour.

Crime prevention is focused on highly specific, often very local, problems, identified through systematic collection and analysis of data such as local recorded crime statistics and crime surveys. The nature of the action is carefully matched to addressing the causes of each problem (based on a good understanding of the remote, and the immediate, causes of criminal events) and the context in which the problem is set. This is the so-called ‘problem-oriented’ approach.

As far as possible the choice of preventive action is also guided by the accumulation of a body of knowledge of effective methods - ‘what works, in what circumstances’. In this, investment in evaluation research plays an important role. As appropriate, crime prevention can apply both offender-oriented methods (changing the predisposition and motivation of criminals to offend by intervening early in their lives or after they have reach adolescence and started to offend), and situational methods (changing the physical and social targets and environments of crime to make it more difficult, more risky and less rewarding for the offender to commit crime). Such methods can be applied through action focused at a number of levels - on individual people, homes, cars, places at risk, or local communities as a whole; they can also be implemented through wider regional and national policy (for example on social and economic regeneration, or on something as mundane as the regulation of spare vehicle components sold by local scrap dealers).

Where (as in many cases) there is no ‘what works’ evidence to guide the choice of preventive methods to apply to a new crime problem, development of solutions depends on thoughtful application of basic principles of prevention, and testing them out in pilot interventions before applying them widely.

Governments have sought to involve other agencies, voluntary groups and individual citizens in prevention to the extent that these are in a better position to intervene effectively, and/or they have a greater capacity to do so.

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Governments have also recognised that many crime problems cut across the artificial divisions of labour between society’s institutions. Solving a crime problem may require a combination of care, control, conflict resolution and collaboration, supplied by several institutions working in partnership. As part of this there has been a particular move towards empowering local communities to solve crime problems themselves (albeit in legal and acceptable ways).

Countries such as Sweden, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Canada in particular have followed this route through national initiatives, although others such as Germany are following at a more local level. Part 3 attempts to depict a common ‘evolutionary process’ that these countries have more, or less, closely undergone in passing from traditional to modern prevention. A number of influences have produced this revolution in crime prevention - but perhaps the most consistent pressure has been from the accumulation of hard evaluation evidence that the new approach is potentially far more cost-effective, and has fewer adverse side-effects, than the old. The next section briefly summarises this evidence.

2.1 The case for investing in ‘modern’ prevention rather than ‘traditional approaches’

2.1.1 What are the economic benefits from investment in crime prevention?

Traditionally, governments have lacked empirical evidence of crime prevention programmes’ impact on juvenile delinquency. However, in many Western countries today, a growing body of evaluation research supports the idea of crime prevention as both a practical and cost-effective way of reducing crime in general and youth misbehaviour in particular. Delinquency prevention efforts are mostly broad-based, and their impact is therefore often very difficult to measure. However, during recent years more and more research has indicated that juvenile crime and delinquency prevention programmes not only have a positive impact on troubled youth, but also are a good investment when compared with the costs associated with the behaviour of serious chronic juvenile offenders, and the costs of traditional ways of dealing with that behaviour. A recent US literature review (Crime prevention: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising) identified several prevention programmes that were proven effective through empirical evaluations and several that were potentially promising based on less rigorous research design Similarly, the UK Home Office has recently produced a review of the cost-effectiveness of the entire range of ways of reducing crime (Reducing Offending) which now forms the starting point of a national crime reduction programme for England & Wales.

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) in Montreal, Canada, has in its ‘Digest’ described several crime prevention schemes, or broader programmes, where researchers have aggregated ‘all the gains and losses’ in such a way that the net gain from one programme can be compared to that of alternatives. These show the value received by the public from the investment of one monetary unit spent on a crime prevention programme.

Economic costs to victims of crime account for a substantial portion of a country’s total cost of crime. Property loss, lost wages, increased insurance fees and lost quality of life are some of the many direct and indirect costs which crime victims incur. ICPC has tried to calculate the economic returns from different investments in crime prevention to victims, law enforcement and criminal justice, as well as other publicly-funded programmes. There follow below a few examples from the Digest of the costs of crime and criminal justice and the estimated benefits of prevention projects, when compared to traditional ways of responding to crime. These are drawn from 7 countries with relatively advanced crime prevention programmes (England, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Canada, USA):

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Every year the costs of delinquency and violent crime for the average citizen (in the 7 countries) are approximately $200 for police, courts and prisons, $400 for the shattered lives of victims, $100 for private security and $25 for lost property

The number of police officers has risen gradually over the last 30 years to approximately 1 per 400 citizens. The costs grow more rapidly. Where statistics are available, the number of private security guards has grown from half the number of police officers to nearly double - 1 per 250 persons

The number of persons incarcerated has risen gradually over the last 30 years to one prisoner for every 1000 persons - an increase of 10% since 1970. However, the USA already had 2 prisoners for every 1000 persons in 1960 and has more than 6 per 1000 today. The increase alone costs an extra $200 per citizen

Burglary prevention programmes in England have produced pay-offs as high as 200% on an evaluation of 240 schemes that looked at savings to victims and to state expenditure on crime control

In the USA, some extensive demonstration projects in preventing delinquency and violence have produced substantial economic benefits that exceed twice their costs. A 23 year follow-up of a small enriched pre-school programme for disadvantaged kids returned to the public $7,16 for each $1 invested through savings in reduced crime, less reliance on social assistance and greater productivity

It costs 8 times more in taxes per household to achieve a reduction in crime by 10% by increasing incarceration than by providing incentives for youth to complete high school

The ICPC Digest also gives an account of a study by the RAND Corporation (a not-for-profit organisation that helps improve public policy through research and analysis) showing that programmes aimed at helping juvenile offenders before they become repeat felons may be a more cost-effective approach to reducing crime than incarceration by the so called ‘3 Strikes Law’ - a third felony brings life imprisonment. RAND presented data for five strategies, showing the percentage of serious crime reduced, and the corresponding costs: 3 Strikes (21,4%, $5,5 billion); delinquent supervision (1,8%, $0,2 billion); parent training (6,6%, $0,4 billion); graduation incentives (15,5%, $0,6 billion) and home visits/day care (5,5%, $3,2 billion)

These figures were used to estimate the costs to achieve a 10% reduction in crime, as well as the percentage of the cohort treated - that is the proportion who would benefit from graduation incentives. Aggregate costs were then divided by the estimated total number of households in California (11,3 million) It was estimated that a 10% reduction in serious crime per year could be achieved by increasing taxes per household by $228 to pay for prison, $118 for delinquent supervision, $48 to pay for parent training or $32 for graduation incentives. By opting for the two social prevention schemes over incarceration, the public may get between a 5- and 7-fold return on their tax dollars, with no loss in crime reduction.

Sources

Ministry of Justice, Sweden. Our Collective Responsibility: A national programme for crime prevention. National Council for Crime Prevention, Sweden 1997.

P. Goldblatt and C. Lewis (eds.). Reducing Offending: An assessment of research evidence on ways of dealing with offending behaviour. Home Office Research Study 187. London: Home Office 1998.

ICPC Digest 1998. International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (at www.crime-prevention-intl.org)

Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising. Office of Justice Programs Research Report: US Department of Justice.

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3 The key task of the Council of Europe Urban Insecurity Project: transfer of know-how

As the Introduction indicated, the team’s strong overall impression was that a number of fundamental features of the situation in Ukraine make local, modern, crime prevention particularly challenging to organise and implement in a focused and sustainable manner. These included the diversity of the organisations with responsibility for crime and related social problems in L’viv, their unclear boundaries of responsibility and power, the equally unclear mix of national and local jurisdiction, and the changing nature of all these relationships and the legal system as Ukraine’s transition proceeds.

We came to the conclusion that the idea of simply writing a report, with highly-specific concrete recommendations about crime prevention structures and activities to be implemented, would be inadequate. We concluded that this approach would have severe limitations given the complexity and rapidity of development of Ukraine’s institutions and legal framework, and would be unlikely to have a lasting influence on crime prevention in Ukraine. Instead, the team suggested a more generic, practical and exploratory strategy in which co-operation between the local authorities, the Council of Europe and the experts would be developed.

This involved initiating the process of transferring know-how in ways which build on the Ukrainians’ existing capacities to prevent crime. The task became one of working with partners in Ukraine to reduce crime by transferring the experience of Western countries of crime prevention, taking account of the Ukrainian context of culture, economy, constitution, legal system, and central/local governance: seeking to fit in with this context as it evolves, but at the same time indicating how certain elements of the context itself may need to change to help crime prevention succeed.

3.1. What exactly do we transfer?

As was made clear in Part 2 on the vision of modern crime prevention, the nature of the ‘know-how’ to be transferred is not simply a list of successful ‘cookery recipes’ for specific crime prevention schemes. Even in Western countries with considerable experience of this kind of prevention, such lists can lead to superficial replication of the actions in question, or their application in inappropriate circumstances. The transferable elements of prevention are, it is suggested, an intelligent process of matching solutions to the specific crime problem, drawing on reliable knowledge of ‘what works, in what context, at what cost’, and theoretically-sound principles. This process is described more fully below. First, we consider some obstacles to the transfer and application of crime prevention know-how, both from our general knowledge of such problems in the West, and in summarising from our particular experiences in Ukraine.

3.2 What are the problems to be overcome in transferring crime prevention know-how?

3.2.1 Problems shared with the West

Some problems will be similar to those experienced in the West, as modern crime prevention evolved and struggled to find a place on the national policy agenda alongside traditional approaches. These include:

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A belief, in some circles, in the effectiveness of traditional crime reduction approaches (law enforcement, trial, punishment - especially incarceration) as ‘the only way’ to tackle crime

A belief in ‘quick fixes’ and superficial gestures uninformed by proper analysis of the crime problem and careful selection of the solution

A limited stock of reliable knowledge of ‘what works against crime’ Inadequate quality assurance of the action implemented, and a ‘drift of objectives’ in which

pursuit of the means becomes an end in itself Difficulties in effectively ‘acting at a distance’ - in other words, when crime prevention experts

try to get other, inexpert, people and institutions to implement the preventive action Institutional autonomy and poor communication as a barrier to partnership collaboration - this

seemed very strong in Ukraine, especially with the police

3.2.2 Problems peculiar to CIS states

Other problems are peculiar to the CIS countries and stem from the legal, economic and social structures inherited from the Soviet Union, plus the effects of ongoing transition to a democratic, mixed economy, society. Summarising and building on the observations noted in Part 1 above, the main problems seem to be:

The legal context (heavy dependence of agencies with a potential crime prevention role, on having the legal authority to act - this is especially challenging since Western experience suggests that crime prevention, with its problem-oriented focus, cuts across the formal responsibilities of individual agencies and may require that they work in ways that go beyond their formal remit)

The institutional context (unclear demarcation of responsibilities and powers of different institutions, operating at different geographical levels - national, oblast, local; the likely changes in these as Ukraine modernises. Mistrust between agencies, and between agencies and the media. Little tradition of partnership working)

The financial/resource context (public funds very limited, absence of autonomy of funding by local government means it cannot direct money to crime prevention activities at local level )

The information context (lack of awareness, on the part of the police and relevant policy-makers, of modern crime-prevention concepts; lack of specific knowledge of what works in the Ukrainian context; apart from reports on specific crimes, a lack of consistent data on local crime problems - their nature, the offenders, location, scale, causes; apparent absence of nationally-consistent data standards for recording crime, to promote good practice and inter-city comparison; absence of local inter-agency exchanges of data on local problems and their causes)

The social context (socialisation of youth, unemployment, poverty, desirable but unattainable Western lifestyle on TV)

The crime context, and the capacity to respond to crime (as described in Sections 1.4-1.5 above - juvenile courts not functioning, and juvenile police confined to conventional investigation of crime - limited by shortage of time, staff and funds)

The research context (local university resources may be available to conduct studies on the local crime problems, the causes of crime, possible solutions and evaluation of their impact, but we

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suspect that they are currently under-used; on the basis of Western experience, some time and effort may be required to convert sufficient staff from academic to practical orientation)

3.3 How do we overcome these problems - what is the strategy for transfer of know-how?

3.3.1 The Western experience - evolutionary phases in crime prevention

The Western experience suggests that making a dramatic, across-the-board change of attitudes and practices would be difficult. All countries seemed to have worked through several evolutionary phases in moving beyond the ‘traditional’ phase described earlier (of course not every country has had exactly the same experience, and some phases may occur in parallel):

An ‘elementary’ phase in which crime prevention was a low-priority activity involving fixed and narrow methods - often publicity campaigns and leaflets giving basic advice on locks and bolts. Crime prevention of this kind was very much subordinate to reliance on traditional policing, courts and punishment.

A ‘basic research’ phase in which the fundamental ideas were developed, by central government and academic researchers, covering both the limitations of the traditional crime reduction approach and the potential benefits and possibilities of the modern approach

An ‘experimental’ phase in which crime prevention was subject to intensive ‘greenhouse’ cultivation, with a great deal of input from academic/practical experts to special demonstration schemes or special types of crime, and in some ways ‘protected’ from excessive influence from the traditional approach

A ‘developmental’ phase in which attempts were made to propagate prevention schemes more widely in a range of contexts and build up evaluation findings, and to break down barriers to collaboration between different institutions. Crime prevention information booklets, published to aid self-protection, began to draw on the new research-based ideas.

A ‘general release’ phase in which the ideas were picked up piecemeal by a wide range of local institutions often working in partnership - but not always implemented well, or properly evaluated; national institutions started to become involved, e.g. in setting standards for construction of secure cars or houses, and for environmental design, in ways comparable to fire prevention and public health. In many Western countries, at about the same time as this phase, cheap crime preventers, drawn from the unemployed, appeared in the form of guards, wardens or fitters of security equipment in local and national initiatives. Neighbourhood Watch sprang up (at least in UK) as a popular community-level self-help movement at about this phase too. At the other extreme, private security guards played an increasingly significant role as public police resources became constrained

A ‘programme’ phase (perhaps in parallel with general release) in which national programmes such as Safer Cities in UK, or the Swedish/Dutch equivalents, are implemented, usually organised on a managerial or rational planning basis. As a response to the fact that the great majority of offences which affect individual citizens (as opposed to ‘economic’ crimes affecting the financial health of the state and commercial corporations), are committed in their local environment and often have their roots in this environment, national programmes (such as the Swedish National Crime Prevention Programme described in Our Collective Responsibility) generally focus on the local level to begin to tackle their crime problems. The decisive factor in local crime prevention work is that there is local involvement and a local willingness to act.

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In order to have an effect on crime at local level, various interested parties must be actively involved in partnerships. The possibilities for the police alone to achieve results are limited.

The final phase, perhaps, is one where modern prevention is mature enough to survive alongside traditional prevention and wider crime control, and to work in synergy with these. Increasingly, in the programme and maturity phases, there is emphasis on the importance of a systematic, evidence-based approach maximising cost-effectiveness of action against crime (as described under part 2 above). The need to develop prevention as a professional discipline becomes accepted, and to this end the establishment of national capacities for training, development of databases on ‘what works’ etc. There may be legislation to give local partnerships special responsibility for crime prevention (as for example with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in England and Wales). Crime prevention becomes considered on a corporate basis by all government institutions, as one of a number of economic and quality-of-life priorities alongside public health, environmental quality, economic regeneration etc.

We can see, therefore, that even in the Western countries where modern crime prevention originated its evolution was a slow and complex process over some 20 years. There is no sense in which ‘programme’ or ‘mature’ crime prevention can be transplanted, like a fully-grown tree, into new territory.

However, because Ukraine is able to draw on the lessons from success and failure in other countries, transfer can perhaps be more efficient and rather faster than this time-scale. Transfer should we think begin at the (developmental end of the) experimental stage.

Sources

Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (England & Wales). See www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cdact/index.htm. Ekblom, P. (1999, in press). The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity - a tool for clear, ‘joined-up’ thinking about community safety and crime reduction. UK Home Office

Pease, K., Ballintyne, S. and McLaren, V. (Eds.), Key Issues in Crime Prevention, Crime Reduction and Community Safety. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.

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4 Coping with change in Ukraine: a generic approach to transfer of know-how through the ‘preventive process’

4.1 A generic approach

To recapitulate from Part 3, problems, and potential solutions, to the transfer of crime prevention know-how are still rapidly evolving in the legal, institutional and financial contexts of Ukraine. This suggests that if the Council of Europe experts simply recommended a particular detailed structure for prevention, it would be unlikely to hit the target and even if it did, it would rapidly become out of date. A generic approach therefore seems best, which sets out the principles and processes of prevention and places the Ukrainian partners in a position to identify what arrangements they have to make in order to support local crime prevention activity, and what their legal, institutional and financial instruments have to provide to make these arrangements possible.

Many of the themes that follow were already anticipated in the letter the experts wrote to the Mayor of L’viv in March 1998 (Appendix 4). (That letter, it should be noted, was rather optimistic about what could be achieved in the time available.)

4.1.1 The preventive process

The generic approach we put forward has both operational and strategic aspects. At the operational level, it has been called the ‘preventive process’. This has the following steps:

• Focusing on specific local crime problems by collection of detailed data on the crime and its causes

• On the basis of this data, analysing and interpreting patterns in crime - identifying hot-spots, peak times, people at special risk etc

• Devising preventive action specifically to concentrate on the hot spots etc identified - to tackle the causes of crime revealed, using knowledge of cost-effective solutions and sound crime prevention principles, matched to the local circumstances

• Implementing the action - through insertion (getting the appropriate people or agencies to take responsibility and act), and intervention (the action that actually disrupts the causes of the criminal events)

• Monitoring the implementation, and fine-tuning this as necessary• Evaluation in terms of assessing its impact on the crime problem tackled (has the problem

become less frequent, or less serious?); and developing a clear picture of how it worked, and what aspects of the local context were necessary ‘hidden ingredients’ which would have to be present to make the intervention work in other locations

• Adjustment of the action, abandonment if not working, replication elsewhere if successful

A more detailed description of these steps is in Appendix 5. Ensuring that these steps have been taken can act as a checklist to help quality-assure any proposal for preventive action, before contracts are signed and funds and staff are committed.

The preventive process was developed at the ‘experimental’ phase in the West. More recently, during the programme and mature phases, the preventive process as a whole has been embedded in a more strategic framework. To give an example from the current guidance for the 1998 Crime & Disorder Act in England & Wales:

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The crime prevention partnership (between local government and police):

• Conducts a crime audit to identify major local crime problems• Consults the public over priorities • Publishes a strategic action plan and sets targets for crime reduction at city level or for

smaller districts individually• Implements the action plan• Monitors and evaluates at the strategic level, i.e. in relation to the achievement of targets

and the cost-effectiveness of the action implemented.

The process of know-how transfer involves working with the Ukrainian partners to systematically identify what needs to be done to make it practical and legally permissible to conduct each of the operational, and each of the strategic, steps:

What ingredients are needed in terms of:

data - e.g. permanently instituting the routine collection of good quality information on the nature and location of crimes

analytic/statistical tools for identifying patterns in the data which are reliable enough to act on

manpower skills - including project-management skills, which are especially important in a country

where many officials have been accustomed to working mainly in a routine way knowledge - both theoretical and practical legal powers

Who supplies these ingredients locally and nationally?

What local and national obstacles need to be tackled and how might they be overcome?

4.1.2 A ‘top-down’ or a ‘bottom-up’ approach?

The ‘organisational and administrative culture’ in Ukraine would, we believe, naturally favour a ‘top-down’ approach to the implementation of crime prevention, in which plans were developed centrally and then handed down to be implemented locally. We suggest, however, that the best place to begin the transfer is at the very local level - centring on neighbourhoods, schools, youth clubs etc. This kind of approach is known as ‘bottom-up’. One general reason for this, based firmly on Western experience, is that crime problems are far more immediate and tangible at the local level; and so are resources for (and difficulties of) implementation. ‘Ownership’ of the problem, and the solution, by local organisations and local residents who see the relevance of the preventive action to their own immediate needs, is an important ingredient of commitment and success. Often, people who have been close to a particular problem may have valuable ideas to contribute. Another specific reason is that we felt that there was the real possibility of achieving local-level change in L’viv and its rayons. During our visits, we were particularly impressed with the efforts of the local government, and local branches of national agencies, to collaborate there (for example in the establishment of the Municipal Police, the Juvenile Department, and the ‘Integral Approach’). The city-wide and neighbourhood-level action in L’viv could then become a model for replication elsewhere in Ukraine.

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The strategic framework described in 4.1.1 is a more top-down process - albeit with the ‘top’ at municipality level, rather than oblast or national level. The preventive process is mainly bottom-up. We suggest that, at the ‘experimental’ stage of development of crime prevention in L’viv, more emphasis be given to trying out the preventive process. There is no point in establishing a strategic framework until the operations which that framework organises have themselves been tested out. But it is worth emphasising here that both the preventive process and the strategic framework are intended to be applied in a way that is enabling and non-prescriptive in the sense that central governments in the West wish to see the principles properly followed, but do not dictate the precise methods to be used. Local problems require local solutions, albeit good quality ones appropriately targeted. It is unlikely that this capability could be delivered by relying solely on building up an elaborate framework of highly-specific laws. This would probably just create more problems than it solved. Having stated this, however, we do recognise that the Ukrainian context may currently require a more specific legal underwriting of crime prevention, and in particular of empowering very local action using locally-available funds, than some Western countries feel necessary. Unfortunately at the time of finalising this report, we have still not had sight of draft laws for crime prevention, so cannot comment.

4.1.3 Identification of obstacles to transfer - importance of action research

Many obstacles to the transfer of crime prevention know-how will not become apparent until there is an attempt to implement further preventive actions on the ground whose aim is to move beyond existing practices and established boundaries. It will be vitally important to identify these problems, and find ways of dealing with them, before moving fully into the developmental stage (which may be after the lifetime of the Council of Europe project). Therefore, it is important that the Council of Europe project proceeds through a series of experimental action-research demonstration schemes.

4.1.4 A two-level approach to action research

The schemes implemented, although operational, have to be exploited for the maximum amount of diagnostic information at all levels - not just for how to solve low-level practical problems at the operational level such as data analysis, but what the strategic constraints are at institutional, policy, legal and constitutional levels. And they must not come to a halt because of practical or personality problems, or a major opportunity would have been wasted. For these reasons, a two-level approach is necessary:

• A local working group, responsible at the operational level for the day-to-day planning and implementation of action-research schemes following the steps of the preventive process, including scheme-level evaluation.

• A steering group - in fact set up in March 1999 as the Co-ordination Council on Juvenile Matters of L’viv Municipal Executive Committee - responsible at the strategic level for:

Finding sources of funding Efficient allocation of existing funds Support and facilitation of the actions of the working group including finding ways

through procedural and practical problems Quality-assurance of preventive action implemented and of scheme-level evaluation Assessment of strategic implications (at city level)

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Developing and implementing a publicity policy once action is under way Maintaining contact with Council of Europe - sending reports and receiving advice

In both cases the groups should incorporate representatives from (or at least should liase with) all relevant Ukrainian institutions with authority over L’viv - whether these are L’viv-based (such as the City Council), oblast-based or national (such as the L’viv branch of the National Police).

4.1.5 Importance of prolonged involvement

The Council of Europe experts, as said, made contact with other organisations involved in ‘know-how transfer’ to Ukraine (principally SALA and the UK Know-How fund). Given the history of barriers to information and collaboration between institutions originating in the Soviet era, and given the changing context as modernisation has proceeded, the representatives of these organisations strongly suggested that to ‘champion’ crime prevention and facilitate the transfer, some sort of prolonged presence on the ground was necessary (or at the very least, much more frequent visits). Occasional visits from experts, ‘parachuting in’ for a few days a couple of times a year, would have little effect. (Diverse ‘hotel lobby’ contacts, such as representatives of an American water-supply contractor, gave the same message.) Since job commitments make it impractical for the Council of Europe experts themselves to make frequent visits or spend prolonged periods in L’viv, one solution suggested was for Council of Europe to fund an experienced advisor to take on this role.

4.1.6 Council of Europe Advisory Group

To provide continuing advice and support for the advisor, the original Council of Europe experts plus members of the Council of Europe project administration team could together make up a Council of Europe advisory group. This would communicate largely by fax/email. It would review key stages of implementation and provide an independent source of advice on evaluation at scheme and project levels.

4.1.7 Importance of establishing an explicit agreement for collaboration

If Council of Europe, its advisor and experts are to invest time and effort in further collaboration with the various organisations in L’viv, then there needs to be some guarantee from the latter that they will endeavour to maintain their commitment to the crime prevention action research strategy outlined here. Likewise, having helped start things moving in L’viv, Council of Europe needs to give some undertakings of its own that advice will continue to be supplied.

4.2 Demonstration schemes - crimes by young people

We agreed that the Working Group in L’viv should attempt to set up at least two pilot or demonstration schemes. For reasons made clear in the Introduction, these should centre on crime by young people. To maximise diagnostic benefit these schemes should be rather different in scope (e.g. local housing estate versus town centre, property crime versus violent crime and disorder), method of prevention employed (e.g. situational versus offender-oriented) and partners involved, although both are likely to include the police and local government. At an early stage the working group should identify a larger number of candidate schemes than those finally selected, so that explicit choices can be made about which to pursue, so that a wider range of obstacles can be

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identified, and so that if any of the selected schemes fail, little time is lost in starting up one of the ‘reserve’ schemes. If the selected schemes seem to be succeeding, then the reserve schemes can be implemented to maintain the momentum of crime prevention.

4.2.1 Following the preventive process

The demonstration schemes should of course seek to follow the preventive process (see checklist in Appendix 4) in preceding the planning and implementation of action by collection of data (crime reports, complaints to the police, observations and surveys) and identification of local crime patterns, causes and ‘risk factors’ for juvenile crime (conditions associated with offending by particular individuals, such as - in the West at least - harsh or inconsistent discipline by parents; and area-level risks such as degree of poverty).

4.2.2 Quality of intervention delivered by scheme

The preventive process continues by planning and implementing specific interventions. These should be matched to the crime problems revealed in the analysis of crime patterns just described. Western experience suggests that crime prevention schemes directed in a very general way at young people may deliver interventions that are poorly-formulated, and can have unclear objectives which may drift so that the scheme gradually changes into, for example, merely providing entertainment or club facilities without regard to whether they have any impact on crime. The schemes will, therefore, have to be very clearly specified in terms of how they are meant to act to reduce crime. Possible approaches to crime prevention are to:

• Reduce criminal predisposition of young people (e.g. by changing attitudes to offending)• Reduce criminal motivation (e.g. by satisfying young people’s needs for excitement and

challenge legitimately, tackling drug or alcohol problems, resolving conflicts between gangs or between groups of young versus older citizens)

• Supply young people with resources to avoid crime (e.g. social skills, time-keeping and self-management skills)

• Restrict resources which may be used in crime (e.g. weapons or tools and other items such as paint spray cans used for graffiti)

• Keep potential young offenders out of crime situations (exclusion from adult bars, attraction to ‘safe and harmless’ locations)

• Harden, remove or render less attractive, crime targets subject to damage or theft by young people

• Tighten perimeter or access control of target enclosures such as fences, building exteriors etc• Make environments such as city centre or housing estate less conducive to offending and more

favourable to prevention; focus particularly on any environmental sources of conflict such as noise or crowding

• Enhance the motivation and capabilities of crime preventers in providing surveillance and intervention (preventers can include police, security guards, employees, property owners or ‘good citizens’ with no personal or work-related interest)

• Discourage people who promote crime through carelessness (e.g. those who leave cars insecure or leave tempting targets on display), or through deliberate action (e.g. those who encourage young people to offend as part of a ‘criminal sub-culture’, or who buy stolen goods from them)

4.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation

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The preventive process ends with monitoring and evaluation of the implementation process and evaluation of impact on crime. These are vital aspects of the learning process. They are vital, too, for convincing local and national officials and politicians of the value of prevention. However good the demonstration schemes implemented, without such acceptance the Council of Europe Urban Insecurity Project will have little influence on the wider Ukrainian scene.

Levels of evaluation

Evaluation needs to be done at two levels. Scheme-level evaluation focuses on whether each individual demonstration scheme worked. This must be supplemented by Project-level evaluation, to assess whether the Project structure as a whole is delivering schemes which are capable of working successfully.

Types of evaluation

Different types of evaluation can be distinguished by the key questions they ask. The major distinction to make is between a focus on implementation of preventive action (i.e. 'what action was successfully put into place on the ground?'), and a focus on impact or effectiveness (i.e. 'what works'?).

On the implementation side, we have:

monitoring (was the preventive action targeted on the right people or properties? did the scheme deliver appropriate activity to the targets?)

and the more qualitative study of process (what were the practical difficulties and problematic issues raised in implementation?).

On the impact side, the key questions are:

'was there a real fall in crime?' as opposed to random fluctuation and the operation of background trends

and if there was, 'how much of the fall could be attributed to the preventive action? ' as opposed to the many other possible causes that are usually present

'were there any side-effects of the action?' (e.g. exacerbation of fear, displacement)

'what was the cost-effectiveness of the action?'

'can it be reproduced elsewhere?'

To answer these questions some sort of comparison area/s or groups should be available which do not receive the intervention. Before and after outcome measures should be available for both action and comparison - and these measures should be consistent over time.

Diagnostic information

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Sufficient of the right kind of information will have to be collected on both implementation and impact sides so that, in the case of failure of any of the schemes, the results are still useful. In particular we will want to distinguish between:

theory failure (the fundamental concept of the preventive method of intervention was wrong, or inappropriate for the circumstances in question)

implementation failure (the concept was sound and appropriate, but the scheme was poorly implemented)

measurement failure (the scheme was well-conceived, appropriate and well-implemented, but the evaluation method lacked the power to detect it conclusively).

4.2.4 Demonstration schemes - more strategic considerations‘Quick wins’ are very important if influential people are to be convinced of the benefits of modern prevention. For example, organising late-night public transport to get young people home from a weekly town-centre disco could rapidly reduce disorder. (This would involve getting the transport authorities to acknowledge that they had a wider role to play in society than merely providing buses or trams at normal working hours.) Schemes which only deliver in 5-10 years are not advisable in the present context. Likewise, schemes which are relatively straightforward to evaluate should be given preference. This means the crimes to be prevented should be localised, visible and reliably recorded; the intervention should not be too complex or subtle and should be clearly directed to particular groups of offenders; and the organisational responsibilities should be clear and beyond dispute between the parties concerned. On the legal framework, there should be a trade-off between implementing a scheme which is wholly ‘safe’ in that it has a clear legal basis, versus choosing something more risky, which breaks new ground and offers the scope for revealing new issues of implementation.

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5. Conclusion

We discovered, in L’viv, great enthusiasm and a sense of urgency for the prevention of crime. We also discovered some considerable strengths including public spiritedness, a willingness to be imaginative (for example in developing socially-acceptable street games for children), a history of public provision of recreational facilities and Soviet-era practices (such as the court, after passing judgement in a criminal case, making forceful recommendations for the prevention of similar crimes in the future) which could be brought back to life. We also discovered for ourselves the severe economic constraints under which those who were concerned to prevent crime had to operate. The approach we have recommended builds on the enthusiasm and commitment, and directs the existing strengths such that limited financial resources are focused to best effect, and key players are convinced of the merits of the approach. The challenge for cities such as L’viv will therefore be to find resources that could be used for activities that correspond to crime patterns identified by a detailed analysis and a careful interpretation of the local problems and circumstances. Hopefully this way of working will lead to a better-directed use of limited local resources aimed at selected targets - in this case, youth at risk of criminal and disorderly behaviour.

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APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO CONTACTS IN UKRAINE

Council of Europe

Project Group:Urban Insecurity and its Prevention: City of L’viv

The Council of Europe has put into force a Project Urban Insecurity and its Prevention to implement crime prevention measures and structures. To gather basic information on the problems related to crime in L’viv, the project group of international experts has created the following questionnaire. It consists of five chapters which cover different topics:

A) The organisation of law-enforcement, maintaining the public order and crime preventionB) Policy in crime-fighting, crime prevention in connection to law-enforcement organisationsC) Co-operation with relevant external organisations in order to solve (crime) problems or to

prevent crimeD) General information about the city of L’vivE) Additional questions: Juvenile Delinquency

If you answer the questions, you can help us to get a more detailed view on the situation in your city. This will help us to create better tailor-made preventive measures.

Lars Alexandersson (National Council for Crime Prevention/Sweden)Tom P. Bersee (Amsterdam/Amstelland Police/The Netherlands)Dr. Paul Ekblom (Home Office/United Kingdom)Frans J.E. van Gelderen (Amsterdam/Amstelland Police/The Netherlands)Andreas Kohl, M.A. (European Centre for Crime Prevention/Germany)

Thank you for your support!

.........................................................................

THE QUESTIONS:

A) The organisation of law-enforcement, maintaining the public order and crime prevention

1. Which organisation or organisations are responsible for law-enforcement, maintaining the public order and crime prevention (e.g. police, militia, etc.)in the territory of the city of L’viv? If more than one organisation is responsible, how do the organisations co-operate?

2. Are there any laws or decrees yet which regulate crime prevention activities/organisation or set standards? 3. How many officers, civil servants etc are being employed by this/these organisation(s)?

3. How is this organisation/are these organisations horizontally and vertically structured and geographically spread over the city?

4. How many police-stations are present in L’viv?5. Are police-officers personally connected to neighbourhoods and if so, what role do they play in

these neighbourhoods?6. Is crime prevention a topic of regular police training yet?7. Who can be held politically responsible for safety and security in L'viv?

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8. How is the power and (democratic) control over the police being organised?9. How are police-budgets being set?

B) Policy in crime-fighting, crime prevention in connection to law-enforcement organisations

11. To what extend are targets being set in the field of concrete crime problems (e.g. annually) and are these targets being evaluated?

12. What is the top 3 of crime problems in the city of L’viv? How is this top 3 being set and by who(m)?

13. Is it known or researched what percentage of actually happening crime s are being reported to the police?

14. To what extend are individual representatives from law-enforcement organisations or other organisations being made personally responsible or approachable for results in concrete types of crime or problems in the city?

15. Is there a policy or action-plan to tackle crime or to improve certain situations or crime problems in 1998 in the city of L’viv?

16. Are inhabitants of the city of L’viv being questioned at a regular basis about their opinion or feelings towards:

- safety in their neighbourhood - the types of crime they worry about most - solutions, proposed by them, to tackle certain crime problems17. If yes, were these results analysed and published and what has been d one with them? If not, is

there any other way by which the police communicate s with the citizens of L’viv, e.g. hearings on local crime problems, regular publications etc.?

18. To what extent are figures about important types of crime being gathered and analysed on a regular and structural basis, e.g. determining:

- days of the week in which they take place - hours of the day in which they take place - hot spots where they take place - type of actors involved (both suspects and victims) - specific information of the environment in which they take place - comparison with previous years? - modus operandi of certain types of crime or criminals - reasons from other origins (e.g. unemployment)19. Are these types of analyses being used operationally, e.g. in: - specific preventive actions or projects? - patrol instructions for police officers? - police personnel planning procedures? - allocating budgets?

C) Co-operation with relevant external organisations in order to solve (crime) problems or to prevent crime

20. Can you give a description of the governmental and non-governmental organisations which are active in the (neighbourhoods of the) city in the fields of:

- maintenance of buildings, houses, roads, parks and other public territory - social care for all kinds of groups in society (elderly persons, disabled persons, youth,

mentally ill or disturbed persons, schools, universities)21. To what extent and how are these organisations working together with local government and

law-enforcement organisations to tackle problems and fight or prevent crime?

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22. Can you give a description of activities, protagonists, procedures and projects that will, were or have been carried out and still take place in the field of crime prevention in the city of L’viv?

23. Can you mention any obstacle that can or will hinder or complicate co-operation between law-enforcement and other governmental or non-governmental organisations in the combined approach to tackle crime and to organise crime prevention activities?

24. What future developments or changes are being expected in the field o f law-enforcement and crime prevention. (e.g. the installation of a municipal police?)

25. What is your opinion about the willingness of the general public in L 'viv to co-operate with the police in the attack of crime problems and with crime prevention activities?

26. Do you think the local media (TV, radio, newspaper) is willing to pro mote or join crime prevention activities in order to reach more citizens?

D) General information about the city of L’viv

27. Composition of the population - male/female - ethnical background of the population/foreigners - age structure (% youth, senior citizens etc) - unemployment - level of education

E) Additional questions: Juvenile Delinquency

28. What is the age structure of the youth in L’viv?29. How is the unemployment rate of those young who have left school?30. School system in L’viv:

- How many schools are in L’viv? - What different school types? - Is there a compulsory school system? - How many children do not follow school ( in %)? - How many hours are spent at school per day?31. Generally spoken, what have been the most important changes for the young people in the last

seven years?32. What are the common leisure activities and organisations for the youth?33. Name organisations who are involved in:

- child care - social problems - schools

34. What kinds of crime problems concerning young people exist?35. Name the two most important crimes which young people commit. Please use the

specifications of Question no. 18 for each crime.36. What kind of crime prevention measures are already taking place in this field?37. Are the police and other agencies you mentioned before sharing information and working

together in the approach?38. What do courts, prosecutors and other agencies you mentioned before with frequent offenders?

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APPENDIX 2

REPLY TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE (APPENDIX 1)

The organisation of law-enforcement, maintaining of public order and crime prevention

1. The L’viv city police department (militia), the L’viv municipal guard. Joint patrolling is carried out by both structures

2. The Ukrainian law on “Local Self-government” and on the MilitiaProgramme for fight against crime until the year 2000Such programmes are adopted for Ukraine in general, for L’viv Region (Oblast) and for the town of L’viv.

3. 1862 persons are working at the police department and 257 are working at the municipal guard

4. The structure of the militia and of the and of the municipal guard is as follows:1.

2.

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L’viv City Council

Department of the municipal guard

Galitskii Department

Zaliznichni Department

Frankivski Department

Shevchenski Department

Lichevskii Department

Trafic Control Department

Ministry of the Interior

Regional Department of the Interior

City Department of the Interior

5. There are 5 sectorial departments of the militia in L’viv, which comprise 6 divisions of the militia.

6. Not always. Almost none.7. Yes, it is.8. The City Council, the City Chairman9. The head of the militia of the city of L’viv is at the same time a member of the Executive

Committee of the Municipal Council. Once a year he reports to the session of the City Council on the work done. The heads of the different militia departments give interviews before the TV, radio and in the newspapers.

10. The budget of the militia is approved downside up (according to the given above structure). Besides that out of the municipal budget are paid 228 staff members of the traffic police, 10 members of staff of the convoy detachment and 30 members of staff of the medical unit for treatment of drunk people. The department of the municipal guard is also financed by the municipal budget.

Policy in crime-fighting, crime-prevention in connection to law-enforcement organisations

11. The rise of criminality is constantly being analysed. Each year are approved plans for crime-fighting, divided according to the different types of crimes committed

12. The three top types of crimes are: juvenile delinquency, burglaries, and car thefts. The militia department defines these types according to the rise of number of crime committed.

13. The data concerning committed crimes are registered on the grounds of the complaints filed. That is why there is no data on the non-registered crimes.

14. The Head of the militia of L’viv, the heads of the sectorial militia departments and the heads of departments fighting different types of crimes are directly responsible for the results in concrete types of crime.

15. There is adopted a “Complex programme to fight crime in L’viv until the year 2000”16. No such inquiries are carried out on a regular basis.17. The heads of militia are interviewed by the TV, radio and the newspapers.18. All types of crimes are analysed searching for similar structures, although no separate

statistics are maintained according to the structure of crimes. 19. All enumerated types of statistics are used, but the budget funding is not regular.

Co-operation with relevant external organisations in order to solve (crime) problems or to prevent crime

20. – Premises and housing: The Department of Housing Planning and the sectorial administrations of the L’viv City Council;Enterprises and budget organisations, which own houses and other premises- Roads:Department on City Engineering and the sectorial administrations of the L’viv City Council- Parks and other public territories:Department of land and construction planning and the sectorial administrations of the L’viv City Council- Social protection of all groups of the populationDepartment of humanitarian and social policy and the sectorial administrations of the L’viv City CouncilThe regional divisions for social protection (pensions)- Social protection of mentally ill and mentally disturbed persons

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Department of humanitarian and social policy and the sectorial administrations of the L’viv City CouncilThe regional divisions for social protection - SchoolsDepartment of education and the sectorial administrations of the L’viv City CouncilSpecial educational institutions (vocational schools, technical colleges, institutes and universities) are subordinate to the corresponding Ukrainians ministries

21. There is practically no co-operation with the law enforcement bodies22. According to the types of crimes are held different activities named according to special

secret codes for crime prevention and fight against crime23. Basically the obstacles are lack of financing24. It is planned to amend the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code, the

Code of Penal Procedure. There is a draft law on Municipal Militia25. In general the population in L’viv has a number of economic problems and due to them is

not showing a marked willingness to co-operate with the law enforcement bodies26. The local mass media are willing to cover crime prevention activities, in case such an

information is provided to them.

General information about L’viv

27. The number of citizens of L’viv amounts to 822 200.Of them 397 900 are men; 424 300 are womenUkrainians – 657 800; other nationalities – 164 400The population divided into sectors:Below the age of employment – 166 100 (20.2%)At the age of employment – 510 200 (62.1%)Above the age of employment – 145 900 (17.7%)

Unemployed – 20 400 (4.0%)Level of education:Higher - 136 000Non-finished higher education – 30 000Vocational secondary education 137 700General secondary education – 211 400Non-finished secondary education – 87 800Basic education – 88 700

E. Additional questions: Juvenile Delinquency

28. Structure by age of the juveniles:10 – 14 years 54 30015 – 19 years 60 60020 – 24 years 63 10025 – 29 years 69 300

29. There are 17.800 unemployed juveniles who have not graduated from secondary school30. The school system in L’viv:

The total number of schools is 118this includesgeneral education schools (1-11 grades) 95non-complete secondary schools (1-9 grades) 2basic schools (1-3 grades) 5schools dormitories for mentally and

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physically handicapped children 9High schools 3Colleges 4

The school education is obligatory

54 children do not go to school (the data is incomplete)the children spend at school 5-7 hours per day

31. The changes that took place with the juveniles during the last seven years are the following:- unemployment- how to spend their free time- amoral behaviour- copying of idols- watching TV and cinema films (in most of the cases of bad quality)- children became more independent- the desire to become rich quickly and at any price- informed choice of their own future- children became more pragmatic

32. Basically they watch TV and video filmsThere are about 60 associations for juveniles and children in L’viv. The most powerful of them are: “Plast”, “Students Brotherhood”, “Spadshtina”, “The Christ’s Youth of Ukraine”.

33. - The child healthcare is within the responsibility of the departments for health care and the departments of education at the L’viv City Council- The social protection is within the responsibility of the department for humanitarian and social policy, the L’viv City Council and the five sectorial departments for social protection

- The schools are within the responsibility of the department of education of the L’viv City Council

34. Crimes committed by juveniles- thefts- burglaries- car thefts- racketing- drug addiction- rape- prostitution

35. The most spread crimes committed by juveniles are:- thefts- burglaries

No such specification is used

36. The crime prevention measures include:- activities by the law enforcement bodies to determine the juvenile offenders- delivery of speeches at schools, statements in the mass media by the law enforcement

bodies

37. The militia exchanges information with the official organisations and institutions of the L’viv City Council

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38. The offenders are handled by:

- the schools- the department for juveniles at the L’viv City Council- the criminal police for juveniles- the courts take decisions which are obligatory for all organisations and institutions- the prosecution performs the general supervision whether the legal norms are followed

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APPENDIX 3

PROGRAMMES OF THE STUDY VISITS TO STOCKHOLM AND AMSTERDAM

From September 28th to October 2nd, 1998, a delegation from L’viv visited Stockholm and Amsterdam to gather information on crime prevention in western Europe and the work of police and justice. The delegation consisted of the following members:

Mr. Bohdan Shkarada, Head of L’viv Police Department Mr. Mykhailo Bregin, Director of L’viv City Informational and Methodical Centre of Education Mr. Andriy Boiko, Docent (Assistant Professor) of the Chair of Criminal Law and Legal

Proceedings, L’viv State University Mr. Mykhailo Komarnytskyi, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Education, Sciences,

Youth and Sports of L’viv Oblast Council Mrs. Nataliya Simina, Deputy Head of the Criminal Police on Juvenile Issues (member of the

Co-ordination Council on Juvenile Issues) Igor Kyternoha, Interpreter

The group visited the following institutions and projects in Stockholm, September 28th to September 29th, 1998:

Visit of the National Police Board Visit to City Hall of Stockholm and meeting with Mr. Ingemar Ingevik, President of the

Stockholm City Council Visit to the Stockholm suburb Rinkeby School Meeting with representatives of the Rinkeby police district Meeting with representatives of the Skarpneck community police district Introduction to the project "Mediation in connection with juvenile delinquency" Visit to Skarpneck District Council Visit to Youth Emergency Duty at the social welfare service Visit to the Youth Custody

The group visited the following institutions and projects in Amsterdam, September 30th to October 2nd, 1998:

Visit to Headquarters of Amsterdam-Amstelland Police Department Visit to the office of the borough of Amsterdam-Noord Introduction to the project "Safe places of gathering" Visit to successful youth participation project, to safe place of gathering Visit to police station Waddenweg Visit to Security Station Mercatorplein Introduction to the school adaptation programme and school covenant Meeting with chair of the municipal co-ordination commission for Youth and Safety Meeting with representatives of the Municipal Welfare Department and introduction to the

project "New Perspectives" Visit to HALT-bureau, introduction about the role of the HALT-bureau in the repression of

youth crime and violations Visit to Balistraat Police Station Introduction to the youth surveillance team "PEP team" that operates under supervision of the

police in the borough of Zeeburg40

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APPENDIX 4

TEXT OF LETTER FROM Council of Europe TEAM OF EXPERTS TO MAYOR OF L’VIV

We organised a meeting for the team of experts in Stockholm on 16 March at which we reviewed what we had learned from our previous visit to Ukraine in December, and reflected on how best to take the project forward.

To develop a clear plan for the future, we decided that we needed some indication, from the authorities in L’viv, of specific crime prevention tasks for our experts to tackle. We think, on the basis of our first visit and the documents we have read, that youth-crime is a strong possibility. We would also like to look at some other specific crime problem, but we leave it to you to advise us on your priorities. We would only say that the COUNCIL OF EUROPE Urban Insecurity Project focuses on ‘ordinary’ crimes, that cause problems for all citizens, like theft or burglary. Organised crime and economic crime are beyond our remit.

As you know from my letter of 9 March we plan to return to L’viv for the week beginning 11 May. During this week we hope to move swiftly, with help from yourself and from local people with day-to-day knowledge (for example if we select the youth crime area we would want to consult a teacher, parents, social worker, school director, police, director of youth prison) to choose the specific crime problems and to start thinking about how to tackle them in some detail. To do this we envisage that we will use a multi - stage process along the following lines:

1) Collecting crime data, surveys and observations2) Conducting crime pattern analysis to identify the location of specific crime problems and

determine their causes3) Choosing a specific crime problem and/ or area to target4) Identifying resources (money, manpower, material, laws) available to tackle crime problems -

perhaps from different agencies (police, local government etc)5) Devising a detailed plan of preventive action6) Implementing the action and monitoring its implementation7) Evaluation and adjustment of action

This is the kind of approach that has been used with much success in Western Europe on a wide range of local crime problems. We realise that trying to apply it in Ukraine, where the circumstances are different, may present us with some new challenges. However, we believe that both yourselves, and the team of COUNCIL OF EUROPE experts, can learn much that will help focus on how to make the process of ‘doing crime prevention’ succeed in the Ukrainian context.

We think it might be helpful, once you select the crime problems for us to tackle, that you convene a small group of local experts to advise/help us to carry out the work, and facilitate collaboration with the local agencies who have an interest in the crime problems. Since we may need to meet quite a lot of local people, it will probably be necessary for the team of COUNCIL OF EUROPE experts to split into two at times during the week. This would imply double transport and translation facilities.

Please let us know, as soon as possible, if you think this is a sensible way to proceed. Then, on our arrival on 11 May, we can immediately begin to meet your experts and start with our work. In our experience, it would be best to have some quick initial meetings, and then have a very flexible

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programme for the rest of the week. We hope during the week to progress to about stage 5 of the preventive process above. Assuming that we are able to reach this stage, further timing could be as follows:

Produce report of conclusions from stages 1-5 - end of June 1998

Arrange visit of local Ukrainian experts, who will be involved in implementation of preventive action plans, to Western Europe - mid-June

Stage 6, implementation of plans - September-December - plus further visit? From COUNCIL OF EUROPE experts

Stage 7, evaluation, after mid-1999 As you can see, establishing the group of local Ukrainian experts who are willing to invest time and energy in this project is vital to making the whole process work. It will also be important in transferring experience on a more permanent basis. We would welcome confirmation from you that this is an acceptable way to proceed, which involves obligations on the part of COUNCIL OF EUROPE and the authorities in L’viv. When we have received your confirmation we will send you a questionnaire where we want to assemble background information, which will enable us to work more quickly when arriving in L´viv.

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APPENDIX 5: THE PREVENTIVE PROCESS: AN OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR ACTION TO TACKLE SPECIFIC LOCAL CRIME PROBLEMS

Following on from Section 4.1.1 of the main report, this table sets out in greater detail the steps that need to be taken to identify specific local crime problems, devise preventive solutions, implement these and evaluate.

STAGES STEPS

Stages of the preventive process Detailed actions in setting up and carrying out local crime prevention scheme

Selection of crime problem to investigate

Selection of particular local areas, crime problems, victims etc for further investigation, based on

initial indications of the existence of a serious crime problem

priorities identified in the strategic audit and crime prevention plan

Data collection Getting information on crime and disorder problems by collecting crime and incident data from police, surveys, and observations

Getting information on harmful consequences of crime and disorder by conducting surveys of fear, area perceptions, impact of crime and disorder on economic and social life, and vulnerability of individuals, institutions and communities to these consequences

Collecting information to interpret crime patterns and guide intervention - information from police and probation on:

patterns of offender residence travel to crime and other routine activities and lifestyle offender Modus Operandi offender motivation (including drugs) local market for stolen goods

Analysis Conducting crime pattern analysis to identify crime and disorder problems (including repeat victimisation/ repeat offending), in terms of their nature, location, timing, target, offenders and Modus Operandi

Linking the crime patterns with patterns of harmful consequences and vulnerability

Interpreting the likely causes of the crime patterns Identifying links with problems in other community safety areas (e.g. fire risk) or

wider social and economic policy fields (e.g. education, employment)

continued...

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STAGES STEPS

Stages of the preventive process Detailed actions in setting up and carrying out local crime prevention scheme

Objective setting Choosing a specific crime or disorder problem, victim category (e.g. vulnerable old people) or geographic area to tackle in the light of the results of the analysis. Setting specific crime reduction objectives for the local scheme, consistent with strategic priorities

Drawing up options - devising proposals for preventive methods to employ - And

Option evaluation and selection of the ‘winner’

Drawing on: generic principles of crime prevention careful use of exemplary schemes with reliable evidence on cost-

effectiveness match action to local circumstances - will the intervention work here?

Identifying plausible mechanisms by which the action could have its effect in the current context

Appraising proposals against a range of criteria covering : practical considerations of implementation (e.g. cost, appropriate time-

scale, available agencies or individuals willing and able to deliver, specifiability in terms of concrete action)

policy (e.g. equity, any side-effects e.g. on fire safety, privacy, and impact on other policies such as planning or education)

evaluability (will the proposed action be capable of evaluation sufficient to teach us how to do better in the future?)

Designing proposals to maximise desired effects and minimise undesired ones (such as increase of fear, or restriction of people’s mobility and privacy)

Filtering out those where cost and undesirable effects seem to outstrip benefits Shortlisting and final decision

Detailed planning of implementation

Clear specification of: inputs (funding and other resources), outputs (e.g. number of hours youth club is open) intermediate outcomes (e.g. number of young people attending, and

numbers showing ‘changed attitudes to offending’) ultimate outcome to be achieved (e.g. ‘reduced offending by young

people and/or reduced offending in area’) - refers to the objectives of the scheme

Setting quantified targets for the action input, output and outcome measures, with reference to:

strategic perspective - acceptable levels of crime and disorder cost effectiveness perspective - what impact desired, for what cost?

Implementation Implementing the action Insertion (getting other people or agencies motivated and empowered to

take preventive action) Intervention (the action which disrupts the causes of the criminal event)

monitoring and fine-tuning the insertion and interventionEvaluation Evaluating impact of intervention on objectives/ outcome targets

Feedback Adjustment, replication or abandonment of action as necessary

Strategic crime control context

If crime and disorder fail to decrease sufficiently: consider augmenting existing action, or adding/ substituting something

different consider balance between efforts at reduction and efforts at mitigation of

harmful consequences suffered by victims, and by whole community

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