Submission No.48

Uranium Mining in Australia

AustralianConservationFoundation

Submissionto the Houseof RepresentativesStandingCommitteeon IndustryandResourcesInquiry into theStrategicImportanceofAustralia’s UraniumResources

2005

DavidNoonanand& Dave SweeneyJune2005

H

HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIV~S

STANDING COMMITTEE ON

1 3 JUP~ ZOOS

INDUSTRY AND RESOURCES

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AustralianConservationth13 June2005 FoundationINC. ABN 22 007 498 482

Floor 1, 60 Leicester StreetCanton VIC 3053Telephone: 03 9345 1111

Facsimile: 039345 1166

Email: acf@acfonline.org.au

www.acfonhine.org.a u

To the Secretary,Uranium Inquiry Committee

Introduction:

TheAustralianConservationFoundation(ACF) is a leadingnationalenvironmentorganisationwith activeprograms,membersandrepresentationin all AustralianstatesandTerritories.ACF hasbeenactivein promoting,defendingandcelebratingournaturalenvironmentfor nearlyforty years.

ACF haslong helddeepconcernsovertheoperationsandimpactsofuraniumminingandthewidernuclearindustryin Australiaandmaintainsthatthereis no netbenefittoourenvironmentor communityfrom theactivitiesofthis sector.

Therearestrongstrategic,environment,publichealthandpublicpolicy reasonsto windbackratherthanexpanduraniummining andexportsandnuclearpoweroverseas.

Nuclearwastemanagementremainsunresolved,risksofnuclearaccidentsareunacceptable,risksofnuclearterrorismincreaseand internationalsafeguardsregimesareseento havefailed. ExportanduseofAustralianuraniumcontributestoproliferationofdualusenuclearweaponstechnology,facilities and fissilematerials.

Australianeedssociallyand environmentallyresponsibleanswersto therealandpressingchallengesofclimatechange.Nuclearcanneverprovideanysuchanswer.

ACF considerin anumberofrespectsthaturaniumis theasbestosindustryofthe21stcentury.Australiashouldexerciseresponsibilityfor oururaniumreservesby leavingit in thegroundand engagecleanrenewableenergyandenergyefficiencymeasurestoaddressclimatechangeissues.

ACF welcomethisopportunityto presentwritten evidenceon this importantpublicissue.ACF alsorequesttheopportunityto presentfurthermaterialandspeakto thissubmissionin hearingsbeforetheCommittee.

Yourssincerely

DavidNoonanB.Sc.,M.Env.St.CampaignOfficerAustralianConservationFoundation

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ContentsIntroduction 2Contents 3

A. Globaldemandfor Australia’suraniumresourcesandassociatedsupplyissues

Globalnuclearindustryissues 4

Limited SourcesofSupplyofUraniumin Australia 6

B. StrategicimportanceofAustralia’suraniumresourcesand anyrelevantindustrydevelopment

PotentialIndustrydevelopmentofexistinguraniummines 7

Strategicissuesconsequentto Australia’suraniumreserves 9

C. Potentialimplicationsfor global greenhousegasemissionreductionsfrom thefurtherdevelopmentandexportofAustralia’suraniumresources

A backdoorcomeback:Nuclearenergyasa solutionfor climatechange? 13

NuclearReactorHazards,OngoingDangersof OperatingNuclearTechnologyin the21stCentury 15

D. Currentstructureandregulatoryenvironmentoftheuraniummining sector

OutdatedStandardsin ionisingradiationoccupationalhealthandsafety 16

NorthernTerritoryuraniummining operationsat RangerandJabiluka 17

ImpactsofUraniumMining in Kakaduandtheadequacy,effectivenessandperformanceofexistingmonitoringandreportingregimesandregulations 18

Summary 12

Commonwealthagencyadequacyandeffectivenessin Kakadu 22

InternationalConcerns 23

Rehabilitationissues 27

Commonwealthresponsibilitiesand mechanismsto realiseimprovedenvironmentalperformanceandtransparencyofreporting 28-29

Attachments: No.1RangerMine Incident RecordAn annotatedsummaryofenvironmentalincidents,accidents,breachesand divergencesatERA’s Rangeruraniummine.

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Term of Reference A.Global demandfor Australia’s uranium resourcesand associatedsupply issues

Global nuclear industry issues

ACF considerthatthereis no netbenefitfrom thenuclearindustry.Australia’sglobalresponsibilityandnationalinterestis bestservedby contributingto endthehazardsofnuclearpoweroverseas,andto endratherthanexpanduraniummining in Australia.

ACF fundamentallydisagreeswith thepositionofForeignMinisterAndrewDownerthat: “It is in Australia ‘s nationalinterest,sincewe exporturanium, that therebe aglobalexpansionofthenuclearindustry” (TheAustralian,

4th June2005).

Thereis no significantexpansionofglobal nuclearpoweroroftotaluraniumdemand,exceptin Chinaand India - bothseriouslyproblematicmarketsfor Australianuranium.Theuraniumsupplyshortfall(throughare-alignmentof supplysourcesacrossmineproduction,inventoriesandmilitary sources)presentsAustraliawith aseriouschallengegivenourresponsibilityfor some40%of worlduraniumreserves.

Riskofreactoraccidentsandthreatofnuclearterrorism,unresolvednuclearwastemanagementandincreasingconcernoverweaponsproliferationareall strongreasonsfor Australiato endratherthanexpanduraniummining and exports.Ratherthanlookingto profiteer,in selfinterest,off oururaniumreservesandexportoptions.

ACF requesttheCommitteeformally considertheattachedreport“TheWorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport2004” (Dec2004, by: TheGreens/ EuropeanFreeAllianceGroupin theEuropeanParliament)aspartofthis submission.Available at:http://www.greens-ET1 w85 383 m192 383 lSBTefa.org/pdf/documents/greensefa documents 106 en.pdf

In thecountriesof origin ofnuclearpower,theUS, EuropeandRussia,thereis nonuclearexpansionandanewnuclearpowerplant (NNP) is arareexception.ThenumberofNPPpeakedacrosstheUS andWesternEuropesome15 yearsagoandislikely to continueto declineoverthenext 15 years.

AcrosstheEU-iS countriesin the last25 yearsonly2 NPPhavebeenorderedandstartedconstruction,in Francein 1991 andin Finlandin 2004. In theexpandedEU-25groupofcountriesFinlandnowhastheonly NPPunderconstructionandthereis only1 otherNPPat aplanningstage,in France,whichmaystartconstructionin 2007.

Thenumberofreactorsin theEU-25will continueto declinewith legislativenuclearpowerphaseouts in Germanyandin Belgiumto see25 nuclearreactorscloseby2025.Germanyrecentlyclosedits secondNPP.Nuclearphaseoutpoliciesin Spain,theNetherlandsand Swedenwill seeafurther21 reactorscloseby 2030.

Thereareno newordersin Russia,wherethe3 NPPunderconstructionwereorderedprior to theChernobyldisasterin 1986andit is not clearif theywill everbe finished.

In theUK 9 NPParesetto closefrom 2007to 2020dueto agingofplantsthatareunsuitedandunsafefor anyextensionof licensingperiod.DisclosedUK IndustryDepartmentadviceon anyrenewalofnuclearpowerconfirmedthat anewNPPstill

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requiresa 10 yearleadtime from orderthroughinto operationandfaceskey hurdlesofunresolvednuclearwastemanagementalongwith alackofpublic acceptance.

In theUS therehasnotbeenasinglenuclearpowerplant orderedandsuccessfullybroughtthroughto operationsince1977,theyearthelastUS reactorcommencedconstruction.Evenwith PresidentBush’s offersof majorpublic subsidiesto nuclearpowerthereis still not asingle neworderandnoneunderconstruction.

With little prospectfor newnuclearordersathomethenuclearindustryin thewestisdependenton selling reactorsto Asiato try andstayin business.

Thelastpotentialexpansionof theglobal nuclearindustryis in Asia.HoweverindustrialisedAsiahasat mostonly aslow expansionwith a totalof5 NPPunderconstructionacrossJapan(2),Sth Korea(1)andTaiwan(2).It is to ChinaandIndia, theonly 2 countriesin theworldwith asignificantexpansionofnuclearpower,that theproposedexpansionofAustralianuraniummining is directedin the longterm.

Indiaprovides3%ofpresentelectricitycapacityfrom nuclearpowerandhas8 NPPunderconstructionand furthernuclearexpansionunderconsideration.India is alsoaroguenuclearweaponstateoutsideofinternationalconventionsandis nota signatoryto theNon ProliferationTreaty.ThereforeIndiais noteligible to receiveAustralianuraniumundercurrentfederalgovernmentpolicy.

Howeverthis policy is now underseriouspressuregiventhegovernment’sview onuranium,thatthenationalinterestequalstheeconomicinterestin increasedexportsales.MinisterMacfarlaneis ignoringproliferationconcernsto profiteeroff uranium.

“Both India and Chinawill increasetheir nucleargeneration,andit~ importantthatAustraliaexportsto thoseopportunities.”(FederalMinisterfor ResourcesIanMacfarlaneon ABC AM “FederalCabinettodiscussuraniumminingbans”Monday,6 June2005).

Chinahasby far thelargestpotentialnuclearexpansionunderconsiderationin theworld. With 1 NPPunderconstructionand4 NPPplannedandconsiderationof up toa 6 fold increaseon thecurrentinstallednuclearelectricitycapacityover thenext20yearswithin anominateddoublingoftotalChineseelectricitysupplyby 2025.

UnderthisplanthenuclearshareofChineseelectricitygenerationwill only increasefrom thepresent2%towardsome6-10%by 2025 (dependenton therangeofactualexpansionin nuclearcapacityandactualincreasein sizeofthetotal electricitysupply).While representingasignificantMw capacity,a figureof 10%astheupperend ofnuclearpower’sshareofelectricitygenerationshowsthat nuclearis notamajoranswerto electricitysupplyin Chinain theforeseeablefuture.

Seriousunresolvedproliferation,nuclearrisk andnuclearwasteissuespredicateagainstany furtherAustraliansupportfor nuclearpoweranywherein Asia.BothChinaandIndiaarenuclearweaponstatesstill developingnuclearweaponsprograms.Theseriousunresolvedhumanrights andlabourrightsissuesin Chinaparticularlyweighagainstcurrentnegotiationsfor proposedsaleof Australianuraniumto China.

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Nucleartrade,in uraniumandwhat follows from theuseof oururanium,is neversafeandwould compromiseourresponsibilitiesto ourneighboursincludingIndonesia,VietnamandThailand,countriestheForeignMinisterhasrecentlytargeted.

Thecatastrophichealthconsequencesthatcould resultfrom areactoraccidentor actofnuclearterrorismandtheclearrejectionofnuclearwastetransportanddumpingbycommunitiesacrossAustraliaprecludeagainstnuclearpowerAustralia.

Thisprohibitionis theclearwill ofParliamentsinNSW (1986)andVictoria (1983)with legislationpassedto prohibit bothnuclearpowerandnuclearwastestorageanddisposalon Stateland. And in SA (2000and2003),WA (1999and2004)andNT(2004)to prohibit the import, transport,storageanddisposalof reactorwastes.

Sowhy shouldweplacelessvalueon thesafety,healthand environmentofourneighboursin Asiathroughtheproposedexport andusageofoururanium?

Limited Sourcesof Supply ofUranium in Australia

Significantsocietalconcernoveruraniumhasleadto arangeofestablishedStateGovernmentpolicy against,andincreasinglegislationprohibiting,uraniummining.

Legislationhasbeenpassedin NSWandin Victoria andis pendingin WA followingPremierGallop’s commitmentsin the2004electionandapolicy prohibitionsince2002.TheQueenslandBeattieGovernmenthaspolicy againsturaniumminingandrecentlyreaffirmedthepolicy andtheirintentionnot to changeit.

SA hashadclearpolicy againstnewuraniumminessinceelectionoftheRannGovernmentin 2002 following electionpolicy commitmentssignedby Mike Rannandby JohnHill. Seethe SA ALP “No NuclearDumpsPolicy” (1 ~ Dec2001):

“Labor continuesto beopposedto theestablishmentofanynewuraniumminesandanyexpansionoftheenrichmentprocess.At: httD://www.sa.alD.orQ.au/Dolicy/environment/nonuclear dumDs.html

ACF areconfidentthattheSA Governmentwill continueto honourthis commitment.

TheproposedHoneymoonacidleachuraniumprojectlacksakey SA Governmentlicensingapproval,thecommercialuraniummining andmilling licenseundertheRadiationProtectionandControlAct. Theproponenthasneverappliedfor thelicense.Thepolicy commitmentby Mike Rannopposesestablishmentof anynewuraniummines.Any futureapplicationfor thiskeymissinglicenseapprovalwould becontraryto thispolicy andwould notbegrantedby theSA Government.

In additionthereareno operationsor potentialfacilities on theHoneymoonsitesinceclosureofthetrial minein 2000. Thetrial minecannotbeusedagainunderorderof hitheCommonwealthGovernment.TheproponentSouthernCrossResourcesof

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Canada,placedtheHoneymoonprojecton hold in late2004andhasfailed since2001to raisefundingto provide for constructionofa commercialplant.

ACF areconfidentthateffectivelocal, nationalandinternationaloppositionwillpreventanynewuraniumminesin Kakadu.TheJabilukauraniumprojectin Kakaduis now subjectto aright ofvetoby theMirrar traditionalownerswho soresolutelyandeffectivelyopposedJabilukain alliancewith nationalenvironmentgroups.

ACF areconfidenttheproposedKoongarrauraniumprojectwill notproceed.ACFnoterecentstatementsof oppositionto theprojectbytheNT Mines andEnergyMinisterKon Vatskalisandtheclearelectionpolicy commitmentofChiefMinister

thClareMartin againstanyKoongarramine (SundayTerritorian5 June2005).

Anynewuraniumminein Australiarequires2 completesetsof separateapprovalsinCommonwealthandin State/Territoryjurisdictions.TheCommonwealthcannotprevail or legislateto bring on uraniummining within a State.PolicyanddecisionatStateandTerritory level hasa separateandfinal sayin the issue.

Uraniumexplorationin Australiais at besta longtermspeculativeactivity in thefaceof StateGovernmentoppositionto newuraniummines.

B. Strategic importanceof Australia’s uranium resourcesand any relevantindustry development

Potential industry developmentof existinguranium mines

Therearestrongenvironmentalandpublic interestreasonsfor opposinganyexpansionofuraniummining in Australia,with theRoxby expansionplanto trebleuraniumproductiontoward15,000tonnesa yearfacingarangeofunresolvedissues.

Characteristicofuraniummining is the impositionoftoxic radioactive,heavymetalandacidic tailingswith seriouslongtermenvironmentalimpactsandno crediblemeansofcontainment.Followingprocessingofuraniumsome80%oftheradioactivityin theoreremainsin thetailings.UnderWMC’ s planstheradioactivetailingsareto be left asapermanenthazardon thesurfaceattheminesite.

Tailingsproductionfrom theproposedopenpit minewill massivelyincreasethescaleofthe currentproblemwithoutprovidingany credibleanswerto tailingscontainment.

Presently60 million tonnesoftailingscoveran areaof approximately4 km2 andaccumulateat some8 million tonnesa yearfrom theundergroundmine. Theopenpitexpansionplansto increasetailingsstoragetowardan areaofapproximately10 km2

coveredby radioactiveliquid pondsandtailings storagepiles30 metresin height.

Modemlegal process,standardsand effectivescrutinydon’t applyatRoxbyasWMCoperatesundera setof legal privilegesavailableto no othercompanyoperatingin SA.

Contraryto thepublic interesttheRoxbyDownsIndentureRatificationActoverridestheproperprocessandpowersoftheEnvironmentProtectionAct,the Water

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ResourcesAct,andtheAboriginalHeritageAct. ThoughtheConfidentialityClause,theIndenturealsooverridestheFreedomofInformationActin SouthAustralia.

Why hasWMC beenso unwilling to beboundby andcomply with thesamelegalrequirementsthat applyto everyotherbusinessoperatingin SouthAustralia?

As a conditionof anyconsiderationofan applicationfor expansionoftheRoxbyuraniummine theStateGovernmentshouldrepealtheseunacceptablelegalprivileges.

Mining demandson watersupplythreatentheGreatArtesianBasinandtheuniqueMoundSpringecosystemsdependenton naturalgroundwaterflows for theirsurvival.TheMoundSpringsarelisted ecologicalcommunitiesundertheCommonwealthEnvironmentProtectionandBiodiversityConservationActandmustbeprotected.

Alreadythebiggestindustrialuserofundergroundwaterin thesouthernhemisphere,WMC currentlytakesabout33 million litres aday andis licensedto take42 millionlitresa dayfreeofchargefrom alimited public waterresource- theGAB. This iseffectivelymining fossil water.WMC arenow askingfor an additional 70 millionlitresof wateraday formineralprocessingin theproposedopenpit Roxbyexpansion.

WMC s waterextractionreducesgroundwaterpressureandcausesaregionaldrawdowneffectin theGAB that hascausedtheextinctionofsomespringsandlessensandthreatensto cut off thenaturalflows that theMoundSpringgroupsdependon. TheGAB modellingin usehasa limited reliablepredictivecapacityandistaskedbeyondits meansin protectingthesefragile naturalsystems.BorefleldA wasbuilt whereit would do themostdamage,right in themiddleof thefragileMoundSpringarcaroundLakeEyre.Borefield B directlythreatenstheecologicallyandculturallysignificantHermitHill springgrouprelianton only a5 m headofwater.

TheCommonwealthEIS processunderEPBCAct mustprotectthe listedmoundspringsandtheStateGovernmentshouldnot allow mining atRoxbyto furthercompromisetheGreatArtesianBasin.WMC’s BorefieldA shouldbeclosedimmediatelyandBorefield B woundbackovertime andnot expandedto its licensedcapacity.Mine expansionplansfor anewlargerscaleBorefieldC shouldberejected.

WMC havebeengivennoticeofthe importanceofdemandson regionalwatersupply:

“In AMC~opinion themain environmentalissuesfor the longtermfutureofOlympicDam are theimpacton andaccessto regionalwaterresourcesandthepermittingofan openpit or cavingoperationwith respectto landaccessandheritage.”

In: “WMC ResourcesLimited - SpecialistTechnicalReport”by AMC ConsultantsPtyLtd, Dec2004,see2.6 EnvironmentalImpactandPermitting,p.27.

Electricity supplyto themine expansionis alsounresolvedwith WMC nominatingExxon’sproposedbutunconfirmedPapuaNew Guineato CapeYork pipelineassourceofgassupplyfor aproposedonsite250Mw powerplantadditionalto the120

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Mw presentdemandon theSA grid. WMC havenotciteda ‘plan B’ to explainsourcingofelectricityorgasoutsideofSA if theExxonprojectdoesnotproceed.

Impositionofadditional mineexpansionpowerrequirementsonto the limited SAelectricitygrid supply,or furthersourcingof gaswithin SA, would be controversial.

Therearean arrayofseriousconcernsconsequentto themining, exportanduseofAustralia’suranium.ACF considerWMC shouldhaveto presenteconomicandminingplansfor theexistingoperationandtheproposedRoxbyexpansionwithouturaniumprocessingandexportandsettingoutmanagementofuraniumin thetails.

Regardingotherexistingminespotentialfor expansionis limited with Rangerscheduledto finish miningwithin a few yearsandfinish milling soonafter. ApreviouslyconsideredoptionofminingunderneathMagellaCreekis obviouslynottenablewithin theenvironmentallysensitivewetlandsandWorld Heritagevaluesofthearea.RangershouldclosearoundthetimetheRoxby expansionmaygo online.

Beverleyis legallyrestrictedto depositswithin themine lease.Furtheruseofmineplantis dependentonotheruraniumdepositswithin proximity ofpotentialpipelinedistanceto acidleachwellfields subjectto approvalsfor mining outsideofthe lease.

Strategicissuesconsequentto Australia’s uranium reserves

Thenuclearindustryis fundamentally‘dual use’ acrossnuclearpowercapacityandnuclearweaponscapabilities.Nuclearpowerprogramsprovidetechnology,facilities,experience,skills, nuclearmaterialsandacoverfor manycountriesholdinganddevelopingthresholdnuclearweaponspotential.Australia’srole asuraniumfuelsupplierto theworld nuclearindustryis inseparablefrom this dualusereality.

Australianshavebeenmisleadovertimeby claimsthat JABA andAustralian(ASNO)nuclearsafeguardsregimescouldprovideassuranceagainstcivilian nuclearprogramscontributingto military nuclearcapabilitiesandprograms.TheIABA andAustralianapproachhasbeento facilitatethespreadofdualusetechnology,facilities andfissilematerialsandthenhopeto control onlythevery laststepsin nuclearproliferation.

It is now increasinglyrecognisedthatinternationalsafeguardsregimes,includingtheNon-ProliferationTreaty,havefailed to deliveron thekey strategicrequirementtopreventproliferationofnuclearweaponscapabilities.

A rangeofcurrentproblemsweresummarisedby IABA DirectorGeneralMohamedEl Baradeiattheopeningofthe2005NPT ReviewConference:

‘in fiveyears,theworld haschanged.Ourfearsofa deadlynucleardetonation—

whateverthecause— havebeenreawakened.Inpart, thesefears aredrivenby newrealities. Therise in terrorism. Thediscoveryofclandestinenuclearprogrammes.Theemergenceofa nuclearblackmarket.

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But theserealitieshavealso heightenedour awarenessofvulnerabilitiesin theNPTregime.Theacquisitionby moreandmorecountriesofsensitivenuclearknow-howandcapabilities.Theunevendegreeofphysicalprotectionofnuclearmaterialsfromcountryto country. The limitations in theIAEA i~ ver~ficationauthority —particularlyin countrieswithoutadditionalprotocolsin force.

Thecontinuingrelianceon nucleardeterrence.Theongoingperceptionofimbalancebetweenthenuclearhavesandhave-nots.Andthesenseofinsecuritythatpersists,unaddressed,in a numberofregions,mostworryingly in theMiddleEastandtheKoreanPeninsula.”

TheIABA DirectorGeneralMohamedEl Baradeihasstatedthat therecanbe noassurancefor countrieswhicharenot asignatoryto theIAEA Additional Protocols.After sevenyearsofIAEA requesttheAdditional Protocolshaveonly enteredintoforce in some65 countriesoutofover 180 NPTstates.JABA verificationprovidesnoassurancetodayin over onehundredcountriesandover timeprovidedno assuranceintoday’ssignatorycountriesprior to theirhavingsignedup to theAdditionalProtocols.

Australiais failing in our responsibilityto universalisetheJABA Additional Protocolsregimeby excludingnuclearweaponstatesfrom proposednewconditionsonexportofAustralianuranium.With only non-nuclearweaponsstatesto be requiredtoprovideentryinto forceoftheAdditional Protocolsasaconditionofuraniumsupply:

“Australia will taketheleadin makingtheAdditionalProtocolon strengthenednuclearsafeguardsapre-conditionfor thesupplyofuraniumto non-nuclearweaponstates.... Australiaaimsto bring thispolicy intoforceassoonaspossibleandwill beconsultingothers,both suppliersandcustomers,on timing.”

(“AustralianNuclearControlsto beStrengthened”DEFATMediaRelease,4 May05)

While theACF supportuniversalisationoftheIAEA Additional Protocolasaminimumrequiredinterim stepto tightennon-proliferationaims,this will not answerthefundamentalpremisethatnucleartechnologyandnucleartradeis neversafe.

ACF considerthat addressingAustralia’sinternationalnuclearresponsibilitiesrequirea cessationofuraniumsales.Howeverif theFederalGovernmentintendto properlyuseourpotentialinfluencein holdingsome40%ofworld uraniumreservesarangeofadditionalkey conditionsshouldbeplacingon anyremaininguraniumexportsales.

Failureto progressthekeyinternationalnon-proliferationinstrument,theNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT),attherecentconferencein New York wasin largepartdueto nuclearweaponstatesrefusalto complywith theirobligationsundertheNPT.Principally,to moveforthwith to bringtheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty(CTBT)into forceandfor progresstowardirreversibleandverifiablenucleardisarmament.

Australiashouldrequirecommitmentsfrom all outstandingrelevantstatesto bringtheCTBT into force andfor all nuclearweaponstatesincluding theUS to assoonaspossiblesignandratify theCTBT andto demonstrateverifiableclosureofnuclearweaponstestingfacilities asaconditionof any furtherremainingexportof uranium.

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Onprincipalweshouldnotbeexportinguraniumto nuclearweaponstatesfull stop.Iftheydo not acceptablyprogressnucleardisarmamentthenuraniumsalesshould cease.

Our FederalGovernmentis alsounderminingtheNPTby proposingto selluraniumtoIndia,aroguenuclearweaponstatewhich is notasignatorypartyto thetreatyandisoutsideof internationalnuclearconventions.In lookingto profiteeroffuraniumMinisterMacfarlaneis unacceptablyignoringourinternationalresponsibilities.

“Both India and Chinawill increasetheir nucleargeneration,andit’1s~ importantthatAustraliaexportsto thoseopportunities.”

(FederalMinisterfor ResourcesIanMacfarlaneonABC AM “FederalCabinettodiscussuraniumminingbans”Monday,6 June2005)

Theagendaofproposeduraniumsalesto India andthestatedpositionoftheResourcesMinisteraredirectly contraryto thestatedpositionof theForeignMinisterin theDFAT submission(paragraph36) to this Inquiry. WhichMinister will prevail?

AustraliapreviouslyunderminedtheNPT by arrangementsthroughtheUS for exportofoururaniumto Taiwan,neitheranationstatenorasignatorypartyto theNPT.

Australia’suraniumexportsdirectlycontributeto fissile materialsstockpilesaroundtheworld. Throughproductionofplutoniumin reactorsusingAustralianuranium,andby FederalGovernmentapprovalfor separationof Australianobligateplutoniumthroughreprocessingofspentnuclearfuelarisingfrom useofoururanium.

Over60 tonnesofAustralianobligateplutoniumexiststhroughuseofoururaniumexportsin nuclearpower.With anuclearweaponpowerfulenoughto destroya cityrequiringamere10 kg ofplutoniumthereis atheoreticalpotentialfor some6 000nuclearweaponsto bemadefrom existingAustralianobligateplutoniummaterials.

Reprocessingis an untenableproliferationtechnologythat Australiamustopposeifweareto haveanycredibility in furtheringour internationalnuclearresponsibilities.

Reprocessingis themostpolluting stageofthenuclearfuel cycle,all reprocessingplantsproduceand accumulateseparatedplutonium andunresolvedhigh levelnuclearwastesandarekey nuclearterrorismtargets.Reprocessingplantsat Sellafieldin theUK andLaHaguein Francearealsorespectivelythesinglegreatestsourcesofongoingmarineand ofaerialradiationreleasesin theworld.

Our FederalGovernmentis complicit in this direct andlongtermproliferationrisk bypreviousandcontinuedsupportfor reprocessingofAustralianobligatenuclearmaterials.In an Australianpaper“Approachesto thenuclearfuel cycle” (para.5,May2005)presentedto theNPT Conferencein New York theMinisterfor ForeignAffairsstatesan aim to maintainglobalreprocessingcapacity.

Thispolicy andpracticealsodirectlycompromisesany futurecrediblerole for theproposedFissileMaterialsCut-OffTreaty(FMCT).TheFMCT will haveto prohibitseparationofsocalled ‘civilian’ plutoniumthroughreprocessing— apotentif not

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optimal fissilematerial- aswell asprohibitingproductionofplutoniumfor directmilitary purposes.All separatedplutoniumshouldbesubjectto thesamecontrols.

Australiashouldrequirean endto reprocessingofexistingAustralianObligateNuclearMaterialsandprohibit reprocessingof futureAONM asaconditionofanyfurtheruraniumexportsales.

In strategictermsaccessto theexpandingnuclearmarketsofChinaandIndia areprimarycommercialinterestsfor theproposedexpansionofuraniummining inAustraliaincluding theRoxbyuraniumexpansion.Both areunacceptablemarkets.

ThatChinais not an opensocietypredicatesagainstrelianceon stateassurancesoverproliferationandmanagementofAONM. ApparentlytheChinaexportarrangementsareproposedto allow enrichmentofAustralianuraniumin China.Thiswould furthercompromiseanyclaimedcontroloverAONM within China.

Chinahasseriousunresolvedhumanrights, labourrights andcultural rights issuesincludingTibet. Will Australian’sconcernsovertheseleadissuesbeput asideinpursuitoftheuraniumdollarand corporatenuclearinterests?

Both ChinaandIndia arenuclearweaponstatesstill developingnuclearweaponsprograms.India is nota signatorypartyto theNPT andhasstatedits intentiontoretainits nuclearweaponsregardless.Will Australiarewardnuclearweaponsstatus?

Indirectly facilitatingnuclearweaponprogramsshouldbeequallyunacceptable.

Both ChinaandIndiahavelimited uraniumreservesoftheirown andrely in themediumtermon importinguraniumto fuel theirplannedexpansionofnuclearpower.

If Australiawereto sell eitherorbothcountriesasmuchuraniumastheymayrequestwearein effectthenfreeingthemup to usetheirown limited uraniumsuppliesintheirnuclearweaponprograms.An indirectAustralianfacilitationoftheseprograms.

In takingresponsibilityforAustralia’suraniumexportsarewe to only ‘look on onesideofthefence’,theclaimedsafeguardedcivilian nuclearpowerprogram,while ontheothersideof thefencetheirmilitary weaponsprogramcontinuesunabated?

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C. Potential implications for global greenhousegasemissionreductions from thefurther developmentand export ofAustralia’s uranium resources.

TheACF requestthis Inquiry Committeeformally considertwo recentinternationalreviewson thenuclearindustryandclimatechange,by theWorld InformationServiceonEnergy(Feb2005)andby GreenpeaceInternational(April 2005).

A back door comeback:Nuclear energyasa solutionfor climate change?

“A backdoorcomeback:Nuclearenergyasasolutionfor climatechange?”NUCLEARMONITOR. A PublicationofWorld InformationServiceonEnergy(WISE) andtheNuclearInformation& ResourceService(NIRS), incorporatingtheformerWISENewsCommuniqu~.(Feb2005).At: http://wwwlO.antenna.nl/wise

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SummaryClimatechangeis widelyacknowledgedasbeingoneofthemostpressingissuesforthe global community.Climatechangeaffectsmanyaspectsofthe environmentandsociety,includinghumanhealth,ecosystems,agricultureandwatersupplies,local andglobal economies,sealevelsandextremeweatherevents.Manyin thenuclearindustryhaveseenclimatechangeasa ‘lever’ by whichto revitalisethefortunesofnuclearpower.

However,in variousstagesofthenuclearprocesshugeamountsofenergyareneeded,muchmorethanfor lesscomplexformsofelectricityproduction.Mostof thisenergycomesin theform of fossil fuels,andthereforenuclearpowerindirectlyemitsarelativelyhigh amountofgreenhousegases.Theemissionsfrom thenuclearindustryarestronglydependenton thepercentageofuraniumin theoresusedto fuel thenuclearprocess,which is expectedto decreasedramatic.Recentstudyestimatesthatnuclearpowerproductioncausestheemissionofjust 3 times fewergreenhousegasesthanmodernnaturalgaspowerstations.

To reducethe emissionsofthepublic energysectoraccordingto thetargetsoftheKyoto Protocol,72 newmediumsizednuclearplantswouldbe requiredin theEU-iS.Thesewouldhaveto bebuilt beforethe endofthefirst commitmentperiod2008-2012. Leavingasidethehugecoststhiswould involve, it is unlikely thatit istechnicallyfeasibleto build so manynewplantsin sucha short time, giventhat only15 newreactorshavebeenbuilt in the last20 years.

If wewould decideto replaceall electricitygeneratedbyburningfossil fuel withelectricityfrom nuclearpowertoday,therewouldbe enougheconomicallyviableuraniumto fuel thereactorsfor between3 and4 years.With theuseoffastbreederreactorsa closedcycle couldbereachedthatwould endthedependencyon limiteduraniumresources.But despitehugeinvestmentsandresearchover the lastdecades,breederreactorshavebeenatechnologicalandeconomicfailure.

Switchingtheentireworld’s electricityproductionto nuclearwould still not solvetheproblem.This is becausetheproductionofelectricityis only oneofmanyhumanactivitiesthatreleasegreenhousegases.Othersincludetransportandheating,agriculture,theproductionofcementand deforestation.TheC02 releasedworldwide

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throughelectricityproductionaccountsfor 39%of total annualhumangreenhousegasemissions.

Numerousstudieshaveshownthat thesinglemosteffectivewayto reduceemissionsis to reduceenergydemand.Studiesoffuture energyscenariosshowno evidentcorrelationbetweenC02emissionsandnuclearpower.In fact thescenariowith thelowestemissionswasnot theonewith thegreatestuseofnuclearpower,but theonein which thegrowthin demandwasminimised.

Therearealsoa lot ofalternativeenergysources.Thecostsofrenewablesourcesarefalling rapidly: in the last 10 yearsthecostperkWh of electricityfrom wind turbinesfell by 50%,andthat from photovoltaiccellsfell by 30%. Thecostsofnuclearpowerarerising, despitethefactthatnuclearpowerhasbeenhugelysubsidisedoverthe lasthalfcentury.Someof thecostsofnuclearenergyhavebeenexcludedfrom theprice.Examplesincludecostsof decommissioningandliability costs.

In themediumtermit is possibleto supplyall of theworld’s energyneedsthroughrenewablesourcesbasedoncurrenttechnology.Renewableenergysourceshavemultiplebenefits.Theyarefreefrom greenhousegasemissionsandcanalsoincreasediversity in theenergymarket.Theycanprovidelong-termsustainabilityofourenergysupplyandcanbeusedin ruralareasof lessdevelopedcountriesthat arenotconnectedto gasandelectricitynetworks.

Therearemanyseriousproblemsassociatedwith nuclearpowerthathaveexistedsinceits introductionandarestill not resolved.For thestorageofhighradioactivenuclearwastetherearestill no final repositoriesin operation.In the lastdecadesresearchershavebeenworking on thetechnologyto reduceradioactivityandthedecaytime ofnuclearwaste,theso-calledtransmutationprocess.Thereis noguaranteethat thisexpensiveresearchwill be successful,andthesetechniquescanonly beappliedfor futurespentfuel andnot for thepresentamountofnuclearwaste.

Althoughmuchprogresshasbeenmadein increasingsafetystandardsreactorsarestill not inherentlysafeandproblemsarestill common.Apart from possibletechnicalfailures,therisk ofhumanerror canneverbe excluded.Thisrisk will grownow thattheonsetofprivatisationandliberalisationoftheelectricitymarkethasforcednuclearoperatorsto increasetheirefficiencyandreducecosts.Thereductionsin thesizeoftheworkforcehavein somecasesledto concernsover safety.

Oneoftheby-productsofmostnuclearreactorsis plutonium-239,whichcanbeusedin nuclearweapons.Nuclearinstallationscouldalsobecometargetsfor terroristattacksandradioactivematerialcouldbeusedby terroriststo make“dirty bombs”.In theeventofanucleardisasterthehealthconcernsareobvious.Exposuretoradioactivefallout would leadto anincreasedrisk ofgeneticdisorders,cancerandleukaemia.

Therearealso healthrisksassociatedwith theday-to-dayproductionofnuclearpower.Employeesworkingin powerplantsareexposedto low-level radioactivity.

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Nuclear Reactor Hazards, Ongoing Dangersof Operating Nuclear Technologyinthe 21stCentury

“Nuclear ReactorHazards,OngoingDangersofOperatingNuclearTechnologyinthe21stCentury.“ReportPreparedfor GreenpeaceInternationalby HelmutHirsch,OdaBecker,Mycle Schneider,AntonyFroggatt,April 2005.At:

http://www.greenpeace.or~/internationaI/press/reports/nuclearreactorhazards

Thisreportgivesacomprehensiveassessmentofthehazardsofoperationalreactors,new‘evolutionary’ designsandfuturereactorconcepts.It alsoaddressestherisksassociatedwith theunresolvedmanagementofspentnuclearfuel.

The first partofthereportdescribesthecharacteristicsandinherentflawsofthemainreactordesignsin operationtoday; thesecondpartassessestherisksassociatedto newdesigns;thethirdpartthe ‘ageing’ of operationalreactors;andthefourthparttheuntenableterroristthreatto nuclearpower.

The main conclusionsare:• All operationalreactorshaveveryseriousinherentsafetyflawswhichcannotbeeliminatedby safetyupgrading;

• A majoraccidentin a light-waterreactor— the largemajorityofthereactors— canleadto radioactivereleasesequivalentto severaltimes thereleaseat Chernobylandabout1000times thatreleasedby a fissionweapon.Relocationofthepopulationcanbecomenecessaryforlargeareas(up to 100.000km2). Thenumberofcancerdeathscouldexceed1 million;

• Newreactorlinesareenvisagedwhich areheraldedasfundamentallysafe.However,apartfrom havingtheirown specificsafetyproblems,thosenewreactorswould requireenormoussumsfor theirdevelopment,with uncertainoutcome;

• Theaverageageoftheworld’s reactorsis 21 yearsandmanycountriesareplanningto extendthelifetime oftheirreactorsbeyondtheoriginal designlifetime. This leadsto thedegradationofcritical componentsandtheincreaseofsevereincidents.Theagerelateddegradationmechanismsarenotwell understoodanddifficult to predict;

• De-regulation(liberalisation)ofelectricitymarketshaspushednuclearutilities todecreasesafety-relatedinvestmentsandlimit staff Utilities arealsoupgradingtheirreactorsby increasingreactorpressureand operationaltemperatureandtheburn-upofthefuel. This acceleratesageinganddecreasessafetymargins.Nuclearregulatorsarenot alwaysableto fully copewith this newregime;

• Highly radioactivespentfuel mostly is storedemployingactivecooling. If this fails,this could leadto amajorreleaseofradioactivity, far moreimportantthanthe 1986Chernobylaccident;

• Reactorscannotbesufficientlyprotectedagainstaterroristthreat.Thereareseveralscenario’s— asidefrom acrashofan airlineron thereactorbuilding— whichcouldleadto amajoraccident.

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D. Current structure and regulatory environment of the uranium mining sector

Outdated standards in ionising radiation occupational health and safety

TheAustralianConservationFoundationformally requestthis Inquiry Committeeconsiderthepresentbestindependentscientificadvicecontainedin thereport:

“RecommendationsoftheEuropeanCommitteeon RadiationRiskTheHealthEffectsofJonisingRadiationExposureatLowDosesfor RadiationProtectionPurposes.Regulators’Edition.“(ECRR, 2003).

SeeExecutiveSummaryat: httD://www.euradcom.org/2003/execsumm.htm

SeeECRRBackgroundat: http://www.euradcom.org/2003/ecrr2003.htm

SeeBasicandScopeto Reportat: http://www.euradcom.org12003/basisandscope.htm

“12. Thecommitteelists its recommendations.The total maximumpermissibledose Pto membersofthepublic arisingfrom all humanpracticesshouldnotbe more thanO.lmSv,with a valueof5mSvfor nuclearworkers.

Thiswouldseverelycurtail theoperationofnuclearpowerstationsandreprocessingplants, andthis reflectsthecommittee’isbeliefthatnuclearpoweris a costlywayofproducingenergywhenhumanhealthdeficitsareincludedin theoverall assessment.

All newpracticesmustbejust~fiedin sucha way thattherights ofall individualsareconsidered.Radiationexposuresmustbe keptaslow asreasonablyachievableusingbestavailabletechnology.

Finally, theenvironmentalconsequencesofradioactivedischargesmustbeassessedin relation to thetotal environment,includingboth directandindirecteffectson allliving systems.“(ExecutiveSummary,ECRR2003).

ACF considerthatit is unacceptablefor currentAustralianstandardsin occupationalandpublic ionisingradiationexposureto lag so farbehindthebestindependentscientificadvicein theEuropeanCommitteeon RadiationRisk’s Recommendations.

Workersin Australianuraniumminesarelegally subjectto ionisingradiationexposuresfour timeshigherthanthetotal maximumpermissibledoserecommendedby theEuropeanCommitteeon RadiationRisk for nuclearworkersincludingmining.

Thepublic canbelegally subjectto ionisingradiationexposurestentimeshigherthanthetotalmaximumpermissiblepublic doserecommendedby theECRRfrom allhumanpracticesincludinguraniummining.

ACF find thesedisparitiesunacceptableandcall on this Inquiry to recommenduraniummining standardsbebroughtinto line with theECRRRecommendations.

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Northern Territory uranium mining operations at Rangerand Jabiluka:

EnergyResourcesofAustralia(ERA) operatetheopen-cutRangeruraniummineinKakaduandhavebeenactivelytrying to developthenearbyundergroundJabilukaproject. Both operationsremainthefocusof deepcommunityconcernwith ERArecentlybeingfoundguilty ofbreachesoftheNT Mining ManagementAct overitsoperationsat RangerandJabilukacurrentlystalledby aof lackoftraditionalownerconsentfor ERA’s preferreddevelopmentplananda formalagreementwhichmakesanyfuturedevelopmentatthesitecontingenton theexplicit approvaloftheMirarrtraditionalowners.

The Londonbasedmining groupRio Tinto Ltd is themajority shareholder(68%) andparententityofERA.

ACF and Kakadu

ACF maintainsan activeengagementwith theKakaduregionandhasalonghistoryofinvolvementwith the issuessurroundinguraniummining in theKakaduregiondatingfrom involvementin theRangerUraniumEnvironmentalInquiry (theFox Report)andtheproclamationof KakaduNationalPark.

TheprotectionoftheWorld Heritagelisted Kakaduregionis akey concernfor ACFandremainsanimportantyardstickofsuccessiveGovernment’senvironmentalcommitmentand credibility.

Furtherdetailon ACF policiesandactivitiesin relationto theseareascanbe foundatwww.acfonline.org.au

Kakadu’s Importance

TheKakaduregionis oneofbreathtakingbio-diversityandis widely recognisedashavingoutstandingconservationvalues.It is hometo 21 of Australia’s29 mangrovespecies,over 900plant species,onethird ofAustralia’sbird species,onequarterofthenation’sfreshwaterfish, over 100 speciesof amphibiansandreptilesandanestimated10,000speciesofinsects.

Kakadu’sextensiveRamsar-listedwetlandscontaintheworld’s richesttropicalbreedinggroundfor waterbirds.Thedominantriver systemshavecreatedlargefloodplains,swamps,estuaries,mangrovesandmudflats.ThesandstoneescarpmentoftheArnhemLandplateautowersoverthefloodplains,andthe cumulativeeffect is awe-inspiring.

Kakaduis alsofar morethanaremarkablenaturalecosystem.Theregionis hometoindigenouspeopleregardedashavingthelongestcontinuouscultural traditionsonearth.Theareacontainsmorethan7,000rock artsiteswith over400,000individualpaintingswhich areofimportanceto local Aboriginalpeoplewho’s culturalpracticeremainsstrong.

It is becauseofthesefactorsthattheKakaduregionis World Heritagelistedfor both knaturalandculturalvaluesandproperties.Thereis acleardomesticandinternational

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expectationthatthis truly uniqueregiondeservesthehighestlevel ofprotectionandregard- sadlythis is not thecaseat present.

Impacts of Uranium Mining in Kakadu and the adequacy,effectivenessandperformance ofexisting monitoring and reporting regimesand regulations:

Recentyearshaveseenanescalationin thetrendaway from bestpractiseenvironmentalmonitoring,reportingandprotectionregimesin Kakadu.An increasingseriesofspills,leaks,incidentsandreportingfailuressince2000haveunderminedthe credibility ofbothminingcompanyEnergyResourcesofAustraliaandthe currentenvironmentalprotectionframeworkandhighlightedseriousregulatorydeficiencies.

2000Ranger Tailings PipeLeak

In April 2000ERA identifiedandrepairedaleakin atailingswaterreturnpipelocatedwithin theRangeruraniummineRestrictedReleaseZone(RRZ). Contaminantmaterialsin theRRZ arerequiredto bemaintainedandmanagedin this designatedareaandnotbereleasedto thewiderRangerProjectAreaor theKakaduenvironment.

BetweenDecember1999andApril 2000anestimatedtwo million litres ofmaterialcontaininghighlevelsofmanganesealongwith uranium,radiumandasuiteofothercontaminantsescapedfrom this brokenpipeandtheRRZ.

This severeoperationalfailurewascompoundedby thefactthatmorethantwentydayselapsedbeforeERA notified therelevantNorthernTerritory(NT) andCommonwealthauthoritiesoftheleakdespitetheclearreportingrequirementcontainedin section16 oftheRangerEnvironmentalRequirements(ERs)whichreads-

16.1 ThecompanymustdirectlyandimmediatelynotW~ theSupervisingAuthority, theSupervisingScientist,theMinisterandtheNorthernLandCouncilofall breachesofanyoftheseEnvironmentalRequirementsandany mine-relatedeventwhich:(a) results in significantrisk to ecosystemhealth; or(b) whichhasthepotentialto causeharm to peopleliving or working in thearea;or(c) which is ofor couldcauseconcernto Aboriginalsor thebroaderpublic.

Thissituationwasaclearandseveresystemandreportingfailureandwasidentifiedassuchin theSupervisingScientistssubsequentreport,Investigationoftailings waterleakat theRangeruraniummine(Report153, 2000).This foundthatERA hadfailed tocomply with theER’s by bothallowingRRZ materialinto theexternalenvironmentandfailing to properlyreportthis action.

ERA werenot prosecuteddespitethisbreachofthemostfundamentalformalregulationsgoverningminingoperationsin a controversialsectorwith complexstakeholderrelationships.ACF maintainsthat theCommonwealth’sfailure to takeurgentandeffectiveaction,including legal action,atthis time wasinconsistentwithcommunityexpectation,Commonwealthresponsibilityandbestregulatorypractise.

Manyoftherecommendationswhich arosefrom theSupervisingScientistsreportintothe2000leakhavestill notbeenimplementedby ERA. Indeedafull two yearsaftertheserecommendationsweremadean ERA internalreviewinto asubsequentleak

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reportedthat “full compliancewith therecommendationscannotbeachievedwithcurrentresources”(InvestigationReport- Catchmentmanagement,southernstockpilearea,RangerMine - March2002).

2002RangerStockpileFailure

FurtherseriousoperationalproblemswereexposedattheRangerwith theincorrectstockpileplacementofa largevolumeoflow gradeuraniumore.84,500tonnesofmaterialwasplacedin thewrongareabetweentheperiodofJanuary14 to February26,2002.Thiserror resultedin themovementof largevolumesof rainfall seepagethroughtheuncompactedstockpilewith thesubsequentmobilisationofhigh concentrationsofuranium.

Althoughtheincorrectdumpingof materialcommencedon January14 ERA failedtoreportboththisandtheresultantincreasesin uraniumcontaminationin watersamplesuntil February27, 2002.Further,duringthis periodERA staffprovidedincorrectinformationon the stockpilestatusto aninspectionteamcomprisedofCommonwealthandNT supervisingauthorities.

ERA’s handlingofthis issuewasdescribedin a SupervisingScientistreportas‘‘inconsistentwith theapprovalgivenby theNT Minister for ResourceDevelopment’’,(InvestigationoftheStockpilingandReportingIncidentsatRangerandJabiluka2002).Whilst thisreport failedto adequatelyaddressthefundamentalproblemsatRanger,excerptsshowsomedisturbingtrendsconcerningERA’s cultureandperformance:

“It is also evidentthattherewasno effectivecommunicationprocessbetweenthe ERAEnvironmentDepartmentand theRangerMine Department.In addition to beingsymptomaticofdeficienciesin internal reportingandcommunicationsystems,theaction ofMineDepartmentstaffalso indicatesa lackofappropriateenvironmentalawarenessamongstsomeERAemployees.”(p. 10)

‘further evidenceofsignificantroomfor improvementin ERA’~Sinspectionandmaintenancesystems”(p. 11)

“a delaywhich is notconsistentwithERA~ reportingrequirements...ERAdid not takeappropriateaction internally..,clear contraventionofERA~ reportingrequirements...(p. 12)

“There is no doubtthatthedumpingofadditionalmaterialon theGrade2 stockpilebyERAin JanuaryandFebruary2002was..contrary to theapprovalissuedby theMinister” (p. 15)

“ERA hasnot utilisedall theexpertiseavailableto it.. anddidnot haveall therequiredexpertiseon siteat Rangeror Jabiluka” (p. 19)

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2004Water and Vehiclecontamination eventsI 2005ERA prosecution

Thedeficienciesin infrastructureandcorporatecultureseenwith ERA’s tailingspipelineandstockpileissueswerefurtherhighlightedwith thehighprofile watercontaminationandvehicleclearanceissuesduring 2004.

EnergyResourcesofAustralia’sRangeruraniummine in Kakaduwasrecentlyfoundguilty andfined $A150,000and costsoverbreachesoftheNT MiningManagementActin relationto a contaminationincidentin March2004wherearound150 peoplewereexposedto drinkingwatercontaininguraniumlevels400 timesgreaterthanthemaximumAustraliansafetystandard.

Twenty-eightmineworkerssufferedadversehealtheffectsincludingvomiting andskin irritation asaresultof theexposure.

A furtherchargerelatedto contaminatedvehiclesleavingthemine site inbreachofde-contaminationandclearanceprocedures— causingaseriousandpreventableradiationexposureto a local mechanicandhis children.

Therecentcontaminationeventat Rangeris the latestin over 120 leaks,spillsandlicensebreachessincethemine openedin 1981.Aging infrastructureanda deficientsafety/managementcultureatthe Rangermine hasseenthefrequencyandseverityoftheseincidentsincreasein recentyears.

TheSupervisingScientist2003-2004Annual Reportraisessomeimportantissuesandobservationsin relationto theseeventsandtheSupervisingScientisthasadvisedthefederalMinisterfor Industry,TourismandResourcesthat heconsidersERA hasbreachedtheCommonwealthEnvironmentalRequirements(ER’s) - particularlyERic, 3.4, 5.1 and 12.1 atRanger.TheSupervisingScientistwasalsooftheview thatkey issuesconcerningupgradingthewatersystematRanger“shouldbemaderequirementsofthecompanyunderlegislation.”

In theSenateon 31 March 2004SenatorIan Macdonaldreada statementfrom theEnvironmentMinisteron the Rangercontaminationandstated“anyrecommendationsmadeby the SupervisingScientistwill be persuedby theGovernment,andanypossiblemeasureswill be takenwith theintentionof ensuringthat suchincidentsdo not happenagain”.

Given that manyof theSenateECITA Uranium Inquiry (2003)recommendationsdirectly dealwith enhancingtheregulatoryframeworkat Rangerthefailure of thefederalgovernmentto dateto implement,or evenformally respondto, theoutcomesof this Inquiry runscounterto the assurancesof bestpractiseregulation.

TheSupervisingScientistconcluded“that theCommonwealthGovernmentmaywishto besatisfiedthattheoccurrenceof this incidentcannotbeattributedto alackofvigilanceon thepartoftheNT Governmentin thedischargeof its responsibilitiesinthedayto day regulationof uraniummining atRanger”.ACF maintainsthatthefederalgovernmenthasakey oversightrole atRangerbut is failing to adequatelyaddressclearlicensebreachesandunsafepractises.

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History of leaks, spills, accidentsand incidents at Ranger Mine:

Theincidentsdetailedabovearepartofa litany ofoperationalerrorsandproceduralfailuresat ERA’s Rangeroperation.Whilst someofthesearenot ofgreatindividualimpact,othersare.Cumulativelytheydocumentapatternofsystemicunder-performanceandnon-complianceandhighlight thegrowingcredibility gap that existsbetweenERA’s selfpromotionandtherealityof it’s performance.Theseincidentsaredocumentedin Appendix1, RangerMineIncidentRecord. ACF commendsthispaperto theCommittee’sattentionandlooks forwardto atimewhenthereshallbeno furtheradditions.ACF believesthatevenacursoryexaminationofAppendix 1 andtherecentincidentsat Rangershowsthatthereis an urgentandrealneedfor effectiveactioninorderto protectthemagnificentKakaduregion.

Summary:

ACF maintainsthatthereareseriousdeficienciesin relationto theadequacy,effectivenessandperformanceofexistingmonitoringandreportingregimesandregulationscoveringERA’s uraniumoperationsin Kakadu.Thishascontributedto asignificantlyreducedenvironmentalprotectionframeworkandunacceptableandunnecessaryoperationalandproceduralfailures.

ThecurrentregulatoryregimeatRangerwasdescribedby theECITA 2003 SenateInquiry into UraniumRegulationas‘complex,confusingandinadequate’.Theregimedoesnotprovideadequatetransparency,ngour,recourseorconfidenceandis notconsistentwith communityexpectation,bestregulatorypractiseandAustralia’sdomesticandinternationalresponsibilityto protectthevaluesandpropertiesoftheWorldHeritagelisted KakaduNationalPark. Particularconcernsincludethe:

(i) failureof theCommonwealthto implementorrespondto therecommendationsofthe2003 SenateInquiry intoUraniumRegulation.This reportidentifiedaseriesofcurrentdeficienciesand aprudentsetofmeasuresto addressthese.

(ii) thepreparednessofbothCommonwealthandNT regulatoryagenciestofacilitateERA’s operationalneedsaboveotherconcerns.

(iii) thepotentialfor seriousagencybasedconflict of interestsdueto theconflictingrolesofindustrypromotionandindustryregulation.This wasclearlyidentifiedin thereportofa2004/5reviewofthestructureandoperationsoftheNTDepartmentofBusiness,IndustryandResourceDevelopment(DBIRD) andcanbeequallyappliedto therole ofCommonwealthagencies,especiallyDITR.

(iv) continuinglackofclarity, cleardemarcationand linesofaccountabilityandauthoritybetweenCommonwealth- NT agenciesandworkingarrangements.

(v) significantlyreducedCommonwealth“on-ground”role andan increasedrelianceon ERA provideddataandanalysis.

(vi) growingreluctanceofCommonwealthto persuelegal avenuesto deliverimprovedenvironmentaloutcomes,insteadrelyingon company/agencyagreementswhichhavefew benchmarks,little clarity andno formal standing.

(vii) lackofreportingandattentiongivento cultural andsocial impactsandthefailureto adequatelyorappropriatelyengageAboriginal TraditionalOwners.

(viii) increasedrelianceon companycommitments,self-assessmentmodelsandindustryprocesses,despiteERA’s underperformanceandnon-compliance.

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(ix) persistentandgrowingwatermanagementproblems,describedin theERAinternal2000Rangertailingspipeleakas “a longtermissuewith themanagementandultimatedisposalofwateron the leasehasnotbeenadequatelyaddressed.TheRangerstaiffacean increasinglyintractablewatermanagementproblemwhich is becomingtheprimary driver behindoperationaland environmentaldecisionmaking”.

(x) failure ofbothCommonwealthandNT regulatoryauthoritiesto give adequateregardand effectto minimising impactson theRangerProjectAreadespitethisbeingclearlyarticulatedin theER’s. This hasseenaconsistentpatternofapprovalsbeinggrantedthatincreaseERA’s contaminantfootprint andcomplicatefuture rehabilitationandfinal landformoptions.

Commonwealthagencyadequacyand effectivenessin Kakadu

Thetwo key Commonwealthagenciesinvolvedwith uraniummining in thisregionaretheOffice of theSupervisingScientist(OSS)andtheDepartmentofIndustry,TourismandResources(DITR).

Theprevioussectiondetailingdeficienciesin thecurrentregimecoveringuraniumoperationsin Kakaduhashighlightedarangeof therecentinadequacieson thepartoftheCommonwealthagencies.

ACF believesthatDITR’s roleis profoundlycompromisedasit is anagencywhichexiststo developandfacilitateindustry- apositioninconsistentwith therole of acredibleanddisinterestedregulator.

Thepartisanapproachtakenby DITR canbeseenin relationto therole playedbyformerResourcesMinisterParerin weakeningenvironmentalrecommendationsduringtheJabilukaEIS, thefailureofformerResourcesMinisterMinchin to prosecuteERAfor aclearbreachoftheER’s in 2000 andthegrantingofan extendeduraniumexportlicenseto ERA withoutan increasedsetofconditionsto improveenvironmentalperformance.

ThekeyCommonwealthagencythatexiststo ensurethattheenvironmentalprotectionregimeandregulatoryarrangementsareadequateto protectKakadufrom theimpactsofuraniummining is theOffice of theSupervisingScientist.

Whilst ACF acknowledgesthefocusgivento thewaterandvehiclecontaminationeventsin its 2003/4AnnualReportACF holdsseriousconcernsovertheperformanceoftheOSSincluding:

)‘ thereductionofa Commonwealth“on-ground”presencein Kakadu) therepeatedunwillingnessor inability of OSSto upholdtheintegrity oftheRanger

ER’s throughusingthefull suiteof options,includinglegal action) thedegreeofregulatorycaptureandtheorganisationalindependenceoftheOSS,

dramaticallyevidencedwith themovementoftheformerAssistantSecretaryto aseniormanagementpositionatERA duringthe2003 contaminationinvestigation

) theadequacyofOSSfunding andresources> theover-relianceoncompanyprovideddata,processesandanalysis~ theOSSprioritisingERA’s operationalneedsover otherconsiderations

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> thelackofadequatemonitoringof socialandcultural impacts> thefailureto adequatelyengageTraditionalOwnersorreflecttheirconcerns) theover-relianceon voluntaryandinformal agency-ERAunderstandings

International Concerns:

Kakadu’sWorld Heritagestatushasseenintenseinternationalattentiongiven to themanagementandprotectionofthenaturalandcultural valuesandpropertiesofthisregion.This hasparticularlybeenthecasein relationto theJabilukaprojectwhichcontinuesto be thefocusofscrutinyby UNESCO’sWorld HeritageCommittee(WHC).

TheAustralianGovernmenthasengagedin unprecedentedlobbyingoftheWHC inorderto avoidKakadubeinglisted on theregisterofWorldHeritageIn Danger.ItshouldberememberedthattheprimaryrecommendationoftheUNESCOWHC ExpertAssessmentMissionwhichvisited Kakaduin October26 -November1,1998stated:

Recommendation]:Themissionhasnotedsevereascertainedandpotentialdangerstothecultural andnationalvaluesofKakaduNationalParkposedprimarily by theproposalfor uraniumminingandmilling atJabiluka. The missionthereforerecommendsthattheproposalto mineandmill uraniumat Jabilukashouldnotproceed.

Theimpactsofuraniumoperationson thenaturaland culturalvaluesofKakaduhavealso attractedconcernandattentionoftheEuropeanParliamentwhichhascalled“ontheAustralianGovernmentnot to proceedwith the[Jabiluka]project”(EuropeanParliamentUrgencyResolution,15-1-98).

Therearenumerousexamplesof internationalagencies,NGO’s andprofessionalbodieswho havecalledfor ahalt to theJabilukaproject,an endto uraniummining in theKakaduregionor asignificantlyupgradedprotectionregime.

It is increasinglyclearthatAustralia’sperformancein relationto theprotectionofKakaduis failing thetestof internationalanddomesticexpectationandbestpractise.Thecontinuingfailure ofthecurrentregulatoryandenvironmentalprotectionframeworksin Kakaduservesonly to heightentheseconcernsanddoesnothingtoadvanceourinternationalreputationor stature.

Koongarra: TheKoongarrauraniumdepositformspartofthemid-headwatersofNourlangieCreekwhich is amajortributaryofthecentralcatchmentofKakadu,theSouthAlligator River.Thedepositabutstheescarpmentabout30 km southof ERA’sexistingRangeruraniummineandaround3 km eastofNourlangieRock in avalleyboundedby theMount BrockmanoutlierandtheArnhemLandplateau.

NourlangieRockis awell-knowntouristattractionin Kakaduseenby an estimated90%ofthetouristswho visit Kakaduannually.Themining leaseis visible fromNourlangieRockwhich wouldbe compromisedasbothasiteoftraditionalAboriginalimportanceandasatouristdestinationby theimpactsofmining. Asrecognisedin thefederalgovernment’srecentsharedvisionfor tourismin KakaduNationalPark,tourismis amajorrevenueearnerandthenumberoneemployerof

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Territorians.In 2002/2003,tourismdirectlycontributed$1080million into theNTeconomy.Whenindirecteffectsaretakeninto accountthisnumberincreasesto over$2 billion andanestimated1 in 7 Territorianswork in thetourismindustry.

If mining atKoongarrrawasto go aheadit couldbeexpectedthat theseverevisualencroachmenton thispristineareaofnationalandcultural importancewould seeadownturnin bothtouristnumbersanddollars.Thenoiseandthedustthatwouldbegeneratedby mining would severelyimpacton NourlangieRockandpreventpeoplefrom beingableto enjoyoneof thechiefattractionsof Kakadu— apoint notedinwelcomerecentstatementsagainsttheproposedKoongarramineby theNT MinesMinisterKon Vatskalis.

Theimpactsofmining includenotjust thevisual scarringofKakadu’sexquisitenaturallandscape,butalsotheveryrealthreatofecologicaldamageto theSouthAlligator RiverandtheWoolwongawetlands.TheKoongarraareais oneofthemostecologicallysensitiveareasofKakadu.This sensitivityis due inpart to its positionupstreamoftheWoolwongawetlands,oneofthewetlandssystemslisted in theConventiononWetlandsof InternationalImportance(theRamsarconvention). The1977RangerUraniumEnvironmentalInquiry SecondReport(theFox Report)explicitly stated:“If uraniummining proceeds,it shouldbe restricted,westoftheArnhemLandReserve,to onedrainagebasin,so that environmentaldamagefrommining canbegeographicallycontained...WerecognisethatNoranda,thecompanyconcernedwill haveexpectationsto minetheKoongarradeposit.HowevertheWoolwongaareais sovaluableecologicallythat weopposein principleanyminingdevelopmentupstreamof it.”

TheFoxreportwent on to say, .... . anypollutionfrom operationsat Koongarrawouldbeapotentialthreatto theveryvaluablewildlife oftheWoolwongaReserve.”Theseconcernsledto aview thatmining operationsatKoongarrashouldnotproceed.Thesubsequentexperienceoftheuraniummining industryin KakadushowsthatFox’scautionwaswell founded.SinceERA’s Rangermineopenedin 1981,therehavebeenmorethan 120 documentedincidents,spills andleaks.

A detailedinvestigationoftheimpactsof uraniumminingby theAustralianSenatein2003foundclearevidenceof”a patternofunderperformanceandnon-compliance”andconcludedthat significantchangeswereneededto avoid“seriousor irreversibledamage”.ACF maintainsthattheoperationalreality showsthat claimsby miningcompaniesthaturaniummining canbe donesafely,withoutpollution oradverseimpacts,do nothold up to scrutiny.

Following extensivelobbyingfrom Aboriginal traditionalownersandenvironmentorganisationsahighlevel WorldHeritageCommitteeassessmentteamvisitedKakaduin October1998 to assesstheimpactofpossiblemining at Jabiluka.TheAssessmentcommitteerecommendedthatKakadube listed as“In Danger”dueto thethreatsposedby uraniumminingoperationsin Kakadu. TheAustralianGovernmentwasvery concernednot to haveKakadulisted asIn Dangerand washighly critical oftheassessmentteamsreporton Jabiluka.Howevertheyendorsedtherecommendationsmadeby theCommitteein relationto Koongarra. TheWorld HeritageCommitteeRecommendation,Section7.15 is asfollows:

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7.15 The Koongarra Mineral LeaseThe missionnotedthat the KoongarraMineral Lease(seeMap I) is locatednearthehighly culturally significantandhighly visitedNourlangieoutlierwithits outstandinggalleriesof rock art. TheAustralianGovernmentarticulatedaview to the mission that this Mineral Leaseexcisedfrom KakaduNationalParkshouldneverbe developed. It washoweveracknowledgedthatthe legalrights of traditional ownersunderAustralianlaw includethe opportunitytoopposethisview.Recommendation 13: The mission is of the opinion that the AustralianGovernmentshould discussrescindingthe 1981 KoongarraProjectAreaAct(which proposesamendmentof the boundariesof KakaduNational Parktoaccommodateamine at Koongarra)with thetraditionalownersandseektheirconsentto include the KoongarraMineral Leasein the Park and thereforeprecludemining.

In Australia’sResponse,Section6.13 Recommendation13: TheKoongarraMineralLease,the FederalGovernmentwrote:

“This Recommendationis supportedin principle.TheGovernmenthasraisedthe scopeofthisrecommendationwith theAboriginalpartiesconcerned.Thisrecommendationis basedonamisunderstandingabouttheprocessthatthecompanymustundergobeforeit cancontemplatemining in thearea.UnderAustralianlaw,asthis is Aboriginal Land,thecompanymustfirst negotiateasatisfactorylegal agreementwith thetraditionalownersoftheareaconcerned,throughthestatutoryAboriginal body, theNorthernLandCouncil. TheAustralianGovernmentmustalsoendorsesuchanAgreement.Thepreviousandcurrentownershavenotbeenableto concludethis process,particularlyfor theareaspecifiedunderthe 1981 KoongarraProjectAreaAct (referFigure9). Shouldthe currentownersfinaliseasatisfactoryAgreementsometimeinthefuture and/orif thecompanystill contemplatedmining in the areaoftheoriginal lease,theprojectcouldnot commencewithoutarigorousandtransparentenvironmentalassessmentunderbothAustralianandNorthernTerritory environmentallaw. TheAustralianGovernmentwill not approveaminethatwoulddamageWorld Heritagevalues.”

With thisresponsetheAustralianGovernmenthasmadeavaluablesteptowardsendingthethreatofmining atKoongarra.Theopeningandconcludingsentencesareparticularlypowerful: “This Recommendationis supportedin principle” and“TheAustralianGovernmentwill notapproveamine thatwould damageWorld Heritagevalues.”Thispublic statementby theAustralianGovernmentto a leadinginternationalbodyis afirm commitmentto theprotectionofWorld HeritagevaluesandpropertiesandACF looks forwardto actionthat givespracticaleffect to this.

The formalstatusof theKoongarraprojecthaslong beenregardedascomplexanduncertainasthereareno currenttenementsor titles thatexistin relationto Koongarra.TheKoongarraareais wholly enclosedwithin KakaduNationalPark,thoughthearea5ML69 wasexciseduponproclamationof Kakadu.TherearenineMineral Leaseapplicationsandtwo ExplorationLicenceapplicationsin this areahoweveronly theapplicationfor explorationlicenceEL 10082is still beingconsidered.Thisapplicationhasbeenthe subjectof amoratoriumby TraditionalOwners.Thecurrent

25

explorationlicenceapplicationwasvetoedon the26th ofApril 2000.Explorationlicense10082coversan areaofforty-five squarekilometresin theSouthAlligatorregionincludingbothuraniumorebody’sat theKoongarrasite.This applicationisalmostdoublethesizeofEL 3479,whichwasinitially appliedfor in 1981 inaccordancewith the(neverproclaimed)KoongarraProjectAreaAct 1981 andDenison’srevisedProjectProposal.EL 10082,thecurrentapplicationfor anexplorationlicenceat Koongarracoversboththeareaof SML 69 andthatof EL3479.If theKoongarraProjectAreaAct wereproclaimed,EL 3479wouldbeexcisedfromKakaduNationalPark,howevertheWorld Heritageboundarieswould not change.

FollowingtheTraditionalOwners2000decisionto vetominingat Koongarra,CogemaclosedtheirDarwinoffice in August2000. Sincetheexpiryofthemoratoriumon activity on EL 10082onApril 26 2005, theapplicationprocesshasbeenagaininitiatedby Cogema.Thisprocessofrepeatedapplicationsfor explorationdespitepreviousveto’sby traditionalAboriginal ownerscancontinueindefinitely andthis persistentpressureto approveunwantedprojectsis unacceptable.

TheAustralianGovernmenthasa numberofoptionsthatit canbring into playtoresolvetheKoongarraissueandprecludemining andits impactson theWorldHeritagelistedKakaduNationalParkincluding rescindingtheKoongarraProjectAreaAct (1981).RescindingtheKPA would show a greatdealofsupportfor theWorld HeritageCommitteerecommendationregardingthefutureofKoongarraandenhanceAustralia’sreputationfor environmentalprotectionbothhereandabroad.Suchactionwould alsodemonstratetheGovernmentsactivecommitmentto theprotectionofAboriginal cultureandtheintegrityof KakaduNationalPark.

RescindingtheneverproclaimedKPA Act would alsobe consistentwith theprovisionsof theEnvironmentProtectionandBiodiversityConservationAct (1999)that explicitly banmining operationsin KakaduNationalPark.

TheAustralianGovernmentshouldagainseekto follow up Recommendation13 oftheWorld HeritageCommittee’sreporton Kakadu.It is understoodthattheGovernmentmadeeffortsto do so in 1999anddid notreceivearesponse.It ispossiblethatno responsewasforthcominggivenuncertaintyandconfusionoverthesuccessionprocessanddebateovertheownershipof theKoongarraestate.Thematterofownershiphasnow beenresolvedandthis increasedclarity sincetherecommendationsoftheWorld HeritagemissionweremadenowrequiresactiononthepartoftheFederalGovernment.TheAustralianGovernmentshouldreiteratetotheNorthernLandCouncil its desireto ascertaintheviewsof TraditionalOwnerswith regardsto Recommendation13 ofthereportof theUNESCOWorld HeritageMissionto KakaduNationalPark.

TheAustraliangovernmentnow hastheveryrealopportunityto complywith thisrecommendationandto precludemining atKoongarraand in so doingactto protectamostuniqueandimportantplace.

26

Rehabilitation issues:

Thereareseriousandcontinuingconcernsin relationto theimpactsof formeruraniumminingoperationsin theKakadu/WestAruhem!Alligator RiversRegionincludingattheNabarleksiteandin theSouthAlligator Valley.

Nabarlek: In 1959QueenslandMines Ltd was formedasa uraniumexplorationcompany.In May 1970 it discoveredNabarlek,a small high-gradedepositjust insideArnhemLand, 15 kilometreseastof Qenpelliandin theEastAlligator River regionoftheNorthernTerritory.

QueenslandMines openedNabarlekin 1979.The NabarlekI orebodywasminedout in just over4 monthsof thedryseasonand 600,000tonnesof average2%gradeore stockpiledfor treatmentfrom 1980.Around 10,800 tonnesof uraniumoxide(U308)wasproducedandabout2.3 million tonnesof wastegeneratedduring thisoperation.

PioneerInternationalLtd astheparentcompanyof QueenslandMines, which isvirtually defunct,wrote off Nabarlekexceptfor a liability in its balancesheetto allowfor rehabilitationof thesite. In August2003theoperatorsof the now closedNabarlekuraniummine in western Arnhem Landreceived95% of themoneypreviouslyheldin a trust funddedicatedto payfor the mine’scleanup and rehabilitation.PioneerInternationalgota paymentof $A9.5 million — leavingonly $A500,000to coverallremainingcosts.Thedecisionto grantthis moneywasmadeby officers in the NTDepartmentof Business,IndustryandResourceDevelopment(DBIRD).

This action occurredwithout theknowledgeor consentof theareastraditionalAboriginal owners,theNorthern LandCouncil or theSupervisingScientistsDivision(SSD)— theCommonwealthagencychargedwith oversightof uraniumminingoperationsin the Alligator Riversregion.

Theformalrecordof ameetingoftheNabarlekMinesiteTechnicalCommittee—

which includesrepresentativesoftheNLC, SSDandDBIRD — heldin thesameweekasthereturnofthemoneystatesthemeetingsfocuswas“to commenceaprocessforthedevelopmentoffinal closeoutplan (sic) for Nabarlek” (ouremphasis).Thuswehavetheunacceptablesituationwheretheactionto returnthebondmoneywasmadedespitetherebeingno final agreedandapprovedmine closureplan.

Thismostirregularactionbodesverypoorly for futurecleanupworks,especiallyontheRangermineralleaseaswell asunderminingthesitespecific cleanup optionsandprocessesatNabarlek.

Continuing unresolved environmental and radiological issues at Nabarlek

An expertgroupfrom theAlligator RiversRegionTechnicalCommittee(ARRTC)visitedtheNabarleksitein September2003.A laterARRTC discussionofthe sitevisit paintsaclearpictureofan operationthatis nowherenear95%rehabilitatedandconfirmedseriousconcernsincluding:

• adversesocialandcultural impacts:“oneTraditionalOwnerhadindicatednodesireto havebushtuckergrow ontheNabarleksite; heindicatedthathewould noteatbushtucker..from thesite.This would suggestpossibleconcernsin relationto radiologicalcontamination”.

27

• Dr ArthurJohnston— the SupervisingScientist— describedtherehabilitationatNabarlekas“far from ideal” and “that a lot morework wasrequiredat thesite”.Hewasnot awarethat DBIRD hadalreadyhandedoverthemoney.

• manyweedspecieswerenow so wide-spreadthatminesitecontrol“was likelyto beuseless”andweedshadspreadto thewiderenvironment

• “verybasicissuesofsafetyand stabilitystill hadnotbeenmet”• obviousareasofdisturbanceon thesite— includingasbestosbuildingwastes• “therewasa longwayto go if thesitewasto berehabilitatedto thestandards

that appliedwhendecommissioningoccurredin the 1990’s”• concernswereexpressedaboutthebadlands(thenamegivento areaadjacent

to theformerminepit wherenothinggrows). Commentsincluded:“thereasonsfor thefeaturebeingso desolateremainamystery”,“notedthebadlandsasanareaofconcern~~,‘‘noted thebadlandsasaproblem..and amajorsourceofradiologicalcontamination”

Former uranium operations in the South Alligator valley:

Throughoutthe 1950/60’s13 uraniummines,2 uraniummills andaseriesofexplorationsitesoperatedin the SouthAlligator region.ThelegacywasteissuesfromtheseoperationsremainunresolvedandthefocusofarehabilitationprojectheadedbyParksAustralia.Parkshasa legal obligationto rehabilitatethesesitesby thecloseof2015andincreasedresearchandresourcesarerequiredto facilitatethis.

ACF urgesthefederalgovernmentto moveto addressthebaselineresearch,operationalaspectsandon-goingmonitoringregimeneededto minimisetheradiologicalimpactof thesesitesandbelievesthereis aclearlegal andethicalimperativeto do so.

TherehabilitationsituationatNabarlekandthroughouttheSouthAlligator valleyremainsunresolvedandthisunderminesstakeholderconfidencein thecredibility andcapacityofpastandpresentoperatorsandregulatorsto deliver on rehabilitationcommitments.

This is aparticularconcernin thecontextofthefar largerRangerminemovingintoits final operationalstageswith theresultingrehabilitationand final landformchallengesthatthis will entail.Themanagementofradioactiveuraniumminetailingswasdescribedby the 1997SenateSelectCommitteeon UraniumMining andMillingasoneof“themostseriouschallengesfacingmining companies,thewider nuclearindustry..andwill alsocontinueto beamajorpre-occupationfor regulatorsandscientists”.ACF maintainsthatthis challengeis notbeingeffectivelyaddressedin thecurrentoperationsoftheuraniumindustryortheexistingregulatoryregimeandurgesurgentfederalattentionto this.

Commonwealthresponsibilitiesand mechanismsto realise improvedenvironmentalperformance and transparencyof reporting:

Thereis aclearandurgentneedfor actionfrom theCommonwealthto adequatelygiveeffectto its domesticandinternationalresponsibilitiesandobligationsfortheprotectionoftheWorld Heritagelisted Kakaduregion.Suchactionis alsoneededin orderto meet

28

communityexpectationson this issueandto realisebestpractiseframeworksforenvironmentalprotection.

AppropriateCommonwealthinitiatives to addressthecurrentdeficienciesin theexistingregulatoryregimeinclude:

(i) implementingtherecommendationsofthe2003 ECITA SenateInquiryRegulatingtheRanger,Jabiluka,BeverleyandHoneymoonUraniumMines

(ii) independentreviewofthe statusofcommitmentsmadeby theAustralianGovernment/ agenciesandERA to theWorldHeritageCommitteeandtheimplementationofall outstandingcommitments

(iii) an increased“on-ground”role in Kakadufor theOSSandthereductioninrelianceon ERA derivedprimarydataandanalysis

(iv) areviewoftheregulatoryregimein orderto addresstheexistingcomplexityanduncertainty,clarify linesof authorityandaccountabilityandensureperformanceexpectationsareexplicit andimplemented— to addressacurrentsituationwhereregulationsare‘complex, confusingandinadequate’.

(v) ensureERA’s full compliancewith theRangerEnvironmentalRequirements(vi) advancetheincorporationoftheKoongarraMineral Leaseinto KakaduNational

Park(KNP). Suchapositionwouldbe consistentwith communityexpectation,bestenvironmentalprotectionandtheexistingCommonwealthin principlesupportfor theWorldHeritageCommitteerecommendationto includetheKoongarraMineral Leaseinto KNP

(vii) independentreviewoftheadequacyof currentplansandfinancialprovisionfortheforthcomingRangermine-siterehabilitationprogram

(viii) provideadequatefundingandresourcesto progresstheeffectiverehabilitationofformeruraniummine sitesin theSouthAlligator Valley andatNabarlek.

(ix) amorecomprehensiveandactivemonitoringanddatacollectionprocessthatincludesagreaternumberofmonitoringstationsand an increasedfrequencyofmonitoringwith anenhancedeventbasedmonitoringapproach.

(x) enhancedreportingprocessesandpublic accessto dataanddocumentation(xi) independentreviewofthestatusof therecommendationsmadein the Senate

reportJabiluka: The UnderminingofProcess(ECITA Committee,June1999)with the implementationofanyoutstandingrecommendations

(xii) supporttheMirarr traditionalownersin the identificationanddevelopmentofapostmining regionaleconomicframework

(xiii) independentreviewofstatusof implementationofGovernmentandERAundertakingsandconditionsmadeduringJabilukaassessmentandapprovalprocessandimplementationofoutstandingcommitmentsandrequirements

(xiv) facilitateanenhancedrole for traditional ownersin thedevelopmentandimplementationofappropriateenvironmental,socialandculturalheritagemonitoring,reportingandprotectionregimes

Attachments:

#1 RangerMine Incident Record- an annotated summary of environmental incidents, accidents, breaches anddivergences at ERA’s Ranger uranium mine.

29

Environmental Incidents at Ran~jer

Environmental Incidents at Ranger - update May 2005

Compiledfrom:• AnnualReportsby theOffice ofthe SupervisingScientist.• OSSSix-MonthlyReportsto the Alligator Rivers RegionAdvisoryCommittee(ARRAC).• Appendix2.9, SenateSelectCommitteeon UraniumMining & Milling (1997).• Appendix 6, ECITA Senate Committee on Regulating the Ranger, Jabiluka, Beverley and

HoneymoonUraniumMines (2003)• OSS, 2000, Investigation of Tailings Water Leak at the Ranger Uranium Mine. Office of the

SupervisingScientist,SupervisingScientistReport153,June2000,168 p.• SKM, 2000, ERA Ranger Tailings Corridor Review. Report to the Office of the Supervising

Scientist,SupervisingScientistReport154,June2000,27 p.• ERARangerMine - AnnualEnvironmentalManagementReports.• Kinhill, 1996,AppendixE: Draft EnvironmentalImpactStatement- TheJabilukaPro]ect. Prepared

by Kinhill EngineersPty Ltd, in associationwith ERA EnvironmentalServicesLtd, for EnergyResourcesof AustraliaLtd (ERA), October1996,775 p.

• Borton,R, 1989,A History ofRangerUranium Mine 1979-83.Unpublishedmanuscript.

Compiled by Friends of theEarth, Australian ConservationFoundation and theSustainableEnergy & Anti-Uranium Service Inc.

Page 1

Environmental Incidents at Ranger

2005• May 6— ERA pleadsguilty to threechargesof breachingtheNT Mining ManagementAct

following the2004waterandvehiclecontaminationevents.

2004• October Compressedairlinesin theRangermill areacontaminated.Oneworkerexposedto

uraniumoxideandothercontaminants• October— Around200 kilogramsof sulphurspilt on highwaytraversingKakaduNationalPark

en-routeto theRangermill• August— Leakfrom tailingspipeline• July— Contractfitter suffersabrokenleg andseriousheadinjuries andis airlifted to Darwin

hospitalfollowing anaccidentat theRangermill• March 23/24— Contaminationof potablewaterlineswith processwatercontaininguranium

levels400 timesgreaterthanthemaximumAustraliansafetystandard.ContaminationaffectedRangermineandmill areaandwatersuppliesatJabiruEast.Rangermineshutdownfollowingthis eventthat saw28 workerspresentwith adversehealthsymptomsincluding vomiting,gastricupsets,headachesandskin rashes.

• February— ConcemsovercontaminatedvehiclesleavingtheRangerminesite• January— Largevolume oftailingsspilt froma brokentailspipeline

2003• June— 2 furtherspills ofprocesswater• May — Repeatedspills of processwateroutsideof designatedbundedareasinboththe Ranger

mill andtailings corridor

2002• September— Processwater sprays from a restricted area in breachof ERA’s Environmental

Requirements• April - It wasdiscoveredthat furtherrunofffrom the Low GradeOrestockpile - which wassupposed

to havebeenredirected- haduraniumat 13,785 Lig/L andwasenteringthe headwatersof CorridorCreek. Despitebeing a considerablyhigherandmore significant concentration,ERA (andregulators)do notinvestigateto find the source.

• Feb. 26 - It was discoveredthat Low Grade Ore had been dumped in the wrong area, withcontaminatedrunoffcontaininguraniumin excessof 2,000U gIL enteringthe headwatersof CorridorCreek. Subsequentinvestigationsrevealedthat the incorrectdumpinghadbeenoccurringfor somesixweeksfrom January14. Thetotalquantity involved 80,900t of ‘Grade2’ material(0.02-0.08%U308)plus 3,600 t of ‘Grade3’ material (0.08-0.12%U305). It wasalso discoveredthat runoff from anadjacentmediumgradestockpile(‘Grade 4’) was failing to reportto RP2 as intendedandwasmixingwith the contaminatedrunoff from the incorrectstockpiling andenteringCorridor Creek. Remedialworkswereundertakenimmediately.

• Feb.(early) - Fourth yearin a row of highuraniumconcentrationsin waterdischarginguncontrolledfrom PP1 to CoonjimbaandMagelaCreeks.This year the concentrationshave increasedbackto ashigh as the first episodein 1998/99(about70 LIIgIL). In response,ERA promiseto ‘completelyre-engineer’theRP 1 catchment(thoughthis is four wetseasonstoo late).

2000

• Sep.9 - About 20,000litres of tailings leakedfollowing the failure of a pressuregaugetappingpointadjacentto oneof thetailingspumpsin themill area.Thefailure resultedin tailings sprayingoverthebundssurroundingthepipeandassociatedinfrastructureinto anareawhichdrainsto RP2.No tailingsleft the mill area.

• May 15 - Weepingwasdetectedbetweentwo pipe joints in the TailingsWaterReturnPipeline.Theline wasshutdownandjoints disassembled,checked,reassembledandthecompleteline waspressuretested.Estimatedvolumelosswas5 litres.

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Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• May 12 - A leakwas discoveredin the ‘B’ tails line betweentheprocessingplant andPit #1. Thecontentsof thespill wereretainedby secondarycontainmentsystems.

• April 28 - A major leak of about2,000,000 litres was announcedfrom the tailings water returnpipeline,betweenPit #1 andGeorgetownCreek.ERA first detectedtheproblemonApril 4, but failedto notify theauthoritiesuntil April 28.Theleak, fromlateDecember1999to April 5, 2000,originatedfrom 2 flangeson the tailings waterreturnpipeline (whichpumpswater from the tailingsdam in Pit#1 to the mill for processuse).The burial of the flangejoints in silt andmoistconditionsfor up to 6monthsof the year allowed threebolts to rust and allow the joint to developa slow leak. Afterbreachingthe bund surroundingthe pipeline, about85,000 litres of tailings water wasestimatedtohave reached the adjacent wetlands in Corridor Creek, from where water dischargesthroughGeorgetownand into MagelaCreek. The exact way the leak wasdiscoveredremainsunclear,butappearsto beby visual inspection.Follow-up investigationby OSSdiscoveredevidenceof a similarleak during the 1998/99wet season.Tailings waterhasconcentrationsof Mn around1,000,000Dg/LandNil4 at 530 mg/L. ERA’s monitoringwasnotrequiredto analysefor thesespeciesin samplingintheCorridorCreekarea.

• Feb.2 - Re-occurrenceof high uraniumin waterdischarginguncontrolledfrom PP1 to CoonjimbaandMagelaCreeks.Althoughconcentrationswere notas high asthe previouswet season,thesourceof theuraniumremaineduncertainandquestionsthe remedialworks undertakenby ERA in the 1999dryseasonto preventthis problemagain.

1999• General- Theuraniumcontaminationof PP1 during the 1998/99Wet Seasonis the closestERA has

yet cometo exceedingtheir operatingrequirements.Althoughthe total massofuraniumdischargedisbelow (high) legalhints,the low flows in MagelaCreekduring theearlydischargesfrom PP1 almostled to ERA increasingthe U concentrationin theMagelagreaterthan the 3.8 Lig/L allowed. The Uand SO4 levels in the Magelaat the KakaduNationalParkborderare higher thanbackground.ERAstatethat: “Analysis ofwaterqualityandsedimentsin surroundingbillabongsandcreeksindicatethepresenceof the mine is apparent,as wasexpectedby the RangerUranium EnvironmentalInquiiy.Whilst the levels are detectablechemically, theyare not ecologicallysignificant andno deleteriouseffectson downstreamflora andfaunaor downstreamusersofthe creekand its resourceshavebeendetected.“This is in contrastto theevidenceandearlierOSScommentson suchincreases.

• Oct. 7 - 4 new, unuseddrums usedto transporturaniumwere lost whilst in transit from Perth toDarwin.

• Aug. 5 - About 5,000litres of PP2waterwasusedoutsidetheRRZ for fire fighting. The fire damageda smalljoint in the tailings pipeline, leading to a small spill of tailings into the tailings pipelinecorridor.

• June24 - A pumpandback-up systemfailed at the Brockinanborefield,which led to the exhaustionof thepotablewatersupplyon site. As a consequence,7 employeeswereunableto showerat the endof their shift aspart of the decontaminationroutine.

• Feb.17 - ERA attemptto minimisethedischargefrom PP1 by sandbaggingthe spiliway - in ordertoavoidtheMagelaexceedingits allowableuraniumconcentration.

• Feb.4 - Dischargeandrunofffrom thelow gradestockpileson the northernwall of the(old) tailingsdamwaspumpedto PP2.

• Jan.30 - Daily monitoringcommencedof PP1 discharge- 3 daysafterhigh uraniumconcentrationswerefirst observed.

• Jan.27 - The concentrationof uraniumin water discharginguncontrolledfrom PP1 to CoonjimbaCreekandon to the MagelaCreekwasfoundto be approximately70 U gIL - up to 100 timeshigherthannormal.ThePP1 sedimentcontrolbund,with uraniumat 600 []g/L, was identifiedas the likelysource

1998

• Dec.13 (1998/99Wet) - Possibleleakof tailingswaterdiscoveredduring investigationof the tailingswaterreturnpipelinediscoveredon April 28, 2000.

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Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• Dec. 10 - The sulphurdioxide (SO2)monitorlocatedin thenewly expandedacidplant was foundtobemalfunctioning.

• Nov. 16 - An estimated16,000to 27,000litres of waterbetweenSump98 andPP2escapedthroughabypassingvalveinto a borrowpit adjacentto thePP2WetlandFilter.

• Nov. 13 - A smallquantityof tailings wasreportedat thetailings corridordrain. Thisoccurredat thetop of the tailings dam ramp whena syphon-breakvalve on the dredge tailings line allowed thetailingsto drain.Neithertailingsnor processwaterleft thedrain.

• Oct. (late) to Nov. (early) - The PP2 Wetlandfilter had beenallowed to dry out during the DrySeason.The first rainsof the Wet led to acidificationof the wetlandwaters,with pH around2.6 anduraniumas highas4 to 6 mg/L.

• Oct. 31 - A small quantity of tailings was reportedat the tailings corridor drain in two locationsduring theclearingof thetailingslines, which hadbecomebogged.

• Sep.24 - About 200 litres of tailings materialescapedfrom a small truck involved in cartingsometailings-contaminatedearthfromthemill to Pit #3 for disposal’.

• Sep.- Thestacksamplerfailedandsostackemissionscouldnotbemonitoredor reported.• July 27-28 - The B-centrifugeconveyorwasdecontaminatedfor returnto Alfa Laval in Sydneyfor

repair.The conveyorwasdispatchedfrom ERA on July 28,anduponinspectionby Alfa Laval, they“flaky yellow material” coated the inside of the bearingsbeing replaced. It was estimatedto beapproximately10 gramsof ammoniadiurinate.

• June (mid) - Difficulties experiencedin analysing water samples at the external analyticallaboratoriesfor 210Pb, 2t0Poand 230Th meant that they were not included in the Non-RRZ Water PReleaseReportfor 1997/98.

• March 16 - To removerainwaterwhich hadcollectedon the haul road,an ERA employeebroke abundwhichresultedin about100,000litres of waterescapingfromtheRRZ.

1997• General - Powerhousestack emissions had not been reported since 1981, contravening the

Authorisationwhich requiresdatasummaryreportsto besubmittedquarterly.• General- Grossalphaactivity in freshwatermusselshasnotbeenmonitoredandreportedsince1990.• Dec. 19 - About 2,000litres of tailings slurry escapedfrom the RRZ due to a leak in the tailings

pipeline.• June 30 - During the EnvironmentPerformanceReview (EPR) held in June 1997, two other

infringementswereidentified.• June29 - A monitor installedin the powerstationstackto continuouslyrecordthe levelof SO2 and

CO2emissionsfailed on29 June1997.• Feb.24 - 50,000litres of Very Low Grade/LowGrade(VLG/LG) ore spilled outsidethe RRZ zone

into thePP1 catchment.

1996• Dec. 10 - ERA reportedanotherminor failure of the stockpiledrainagebund resulting in a small

quantity of RRZ runoff enteringthe PP1 catchmentduring a severerainfall event.Further,a drainblocked by sedimentat a VLG dump also causedRRZ rainfall runoff to entera non-RRZ draindischargingto PP1 at that time.

• I)cc. 10 - ERA reportedanotherfailure of thestockpiledrainagebundresulting in a smallquantityofRRZ runoffenteringthe PP1 catchmentduring a severerainfall event.Further,a drain blockedbysedimentat a VLG dumpalso causedRRZ rainfall runoff to entera non-RRZ drain dischargingtoPPlat thattime.

• Nov. 19 - A segmentof theperimeterdrain aroundnew extensionsto the VLG/LG stockpilewashedoutduring a heavystorm.About 100,00litres ofRRZ waterandsomesedimentwasreleasedinto PP1catchment.

1 It is unsure why tailings-contaminated soil would be disposed of in the operational Pit #3, presumably Pit

#1 was intended and Pit #3 is an error (pp 245, OSS-AR, 1999; in EA, 1999a).

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Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• Nov. 6 - Fatal work accidentinvolving a contractor.The worker died whenthe excavatorhe wasoperatingcollapsedinto the excavation.

• Sep. 27 - Preliminary works on the mill expansioncommencedbefore ministerial approvalwasgranted.

• Sep.21 - A bushfire on themine siteplacedsignificant demandon accessiblenon-RRZwaterfor firefighting. To speedup the turnaroundtimesfor watertankers,a decisionwasmadeto useRRZ waterto createa wet perimeterandto dampenfacilities underthreat.Approximately585,000,000litres wasappliedto areasoutsidetheRRZ.

• Feb. 18 - 2,000 litres of tailings sprayedfrom a leak in the pipeline running along the top of thetailingsdamembankment.Approximately250 litres fell outsidethe RRZ ontheouterwall of thedam.Thisareawasscrapedup andreturnedto the tailingsdam.

• Jan.23 - 2,000to 3,000litres of tailings spilledfrom the tailings line andwentoutsidetheRRZ, theresultof a valvefailure. Theareaaffectedextendedoverabout60 to 80 in

2.

1995

• General- Biological monitoringalong theMagelaCreekfollowing the releaseswas limited due tootherERA commitments.

• Dec. 13 - An administrativeerrorresultedin a repeatof the incidentof 6 Dec. when8,000litres of theresidualdiesel/watermixture was spilledbackto PP2.Therewere no furtherbird deathsassociatedwith this incident.

• Dec. 6 - 12,000litres of dieselspilledfrom tanksat the powerstationandran into PP2.Althoughthespill wasclearedup thespill wasresponsiblefor thedeathof forty water birds

• (36 Little BlackCormorants,3 AustralasianGrebeand 1 AustralianDarter). The OSSrej~arded thisincident as the first exampleof an unacceptableenvironmental impactatRatuier sinceoperationsbej~tan

.

• Aug. to Dec.- Wetlandfiltration optioncommencedfor disposalof excesswaterfrom PP2.Previoustrials indicatedthat thefilters would haveacapacityto absorb98%of uraniumandthat it appearsthatthere is no remobilisationof the uranium later. The actualperformanceindicatedthat uraniumremovalfromthePP2filter decreasedfrom 95%to 45%.

• Aug. 1 - About 120,000litres of PP2 water wasaccidentallydischargedoutsidethe RRZ due to afailure in a pipelinecarryingwaterto theconstructedwetlandfilter adjacentto PP1.

• July 31 - An asbestoscementpipe failed and about120,000litres of water from PP2was released.Thewaterwaspumpedoverthe spillwayintoDjalkmaraCreek.

• July 20 - About 10,000litres of PP2waterwasusedin pre-productiondrilling at orebody#3 outsidetheRRZ.

• Feb.21 - ERA soughtapprovalto releasewaterwith elevatedlevels of uranium,sulfatesandheavymetals from PP2 demonstratingagain the difficulties of operatinga mine in monsoontropicalclimates.Aboriginal LandOwnerstook legalactionto halt therelease.

• Jan.19 to April 13 - 500,000,000litres of waterfrom PP4 wasreleasedthroughwetlandfilter intoDjalkmaraBillabong andtheninto MagelaCreek.Uraniumconcentrationsin PP4areincreasing.

1994

• General - The OSS questionedthe capacityof the Land Application Area to receivewater withoutdeleteriousenvironmentalimpactsin the longerterm - due to the appearanceof saltefflorescence.OSS-AR (1994)expressesconcernat the appearanceof saltsin the Land Application Area, statingthat the “... appearancethis year of salt efflorescenceon soil surfacesin the LAA raisesthe questionof the capacityof the areato receivewater without deleteriousenvironmentalimpacts in the longterm” (pp36).

• May 10 - About 50,000litres of PP2waterwasaccidentallydischargedoutsidetheRRZ during theinstallationof anewsectionofpipe atthePP2pumpingstation.Thepipewas partof thenetworkthatservestheMagelairrigation area.

• April 13 - About 60,000 litres of combinedrainfall-runoff and seepagefrom the high-gradeorestockpile dischargedoutsidethe RRZ following a pipejoint failure. The pipe ran alongsidethe draindownstreamof the RRZ boundaryat the bund in the high-gradeore stockpiledrain. Samplestaken

Page 5

Environmental Incidents at Ranger

along the flow path showedanincreasein U concentrationin GeorgetownCreekbut no changein Uconcentrationcouldbe detectedin GeorgetownBillabong.Thepipe hassincebeenrelocatedwhollyinsidetheRRZ.

• Feb. - Rangerappliedto changethemonitoringprogramsuchthatduringa waterreleasefrom PP4orPP1 monitoringofMagelaCreekwaterquality is requiredweeklyratherthan daily.

1993

• Oct. 21 - Failure of a componentin the tailings dam sprinkler system, used to minimise dustgenerationresultedin wind blown spraydrifting overthedabembankmentoutsidetheRRZ boundary.This resultedfrom coincidentalhighwinds from theNNW at thetime of the failure. The quantityofwaterwassmallandtheareawascleanedup within two days.

• Feb.21 to March - 43,000,000litres of water containingU, Mg and SO4 wasreleasedfrom PP4during this time.TheOSSreportedthatERA andtheNTDME alteredauthorisationsandweretardyinproviding full informationin regardto thetoxicity andmonitoringof thesereleases.Mg, Mn and SO4concentrationsinMagelaCreekarehigherthanbackgroundlevels.

• Jan.25 - During heavyrainfall a blockeddrain causeda small volume (lessthan 100,000litres) ofwaterto escapefrom the RRZ. The OSSassessedthis eventas being an infringementof the RangerAuthorisationanda breachof ER27.

1992• Sep.27 - About 430,000litres of PP2water wastransportedby mine trucks to locationsoutsidethe

RRZ for useby the Rangeremergencyfire crewin containingandcontrolling a bushfireburning inand nearthe MagelaLAA. The fire, fannedby strong windsandburning on a numberof fronts,threatenedinfrastructureincluding monitoring installations andpowerlinesclose to PP2 and alsothreatenedto movetowardsthe light industrialareaandtheJabiruEastsite. Therewereno alternativesourcesof water in sufficient quantityavailableto fight the fire. The OSS assessedthe transferofwaterfrom the RRZ as constitutingan infringementof theRangerAuthorisationanda breachof theERs.

• Feb.26 to 27 - During a highrainfall event,waterfrom the highgradeore stockpile,which containedsignificantU concentrations,escapedfrom its containmentsumpandflowed into GeorgetownCreek,theninto MagelaCreek.As a resultincreasedconcentrationsofU were detectedin GeorgetownCreekandin MagelaCreek.The availableinformation did not enableanaccurateassessmentto be madeoftheeffect of thisuncontrolledrelease.TheOSSestimatedthatabout25 kg of U wasreleased.

1991• Geaeral- “At Ranger,the expectedenvironmentaleffects of a large operatinguranium mine are

beginningto be discernibleoutsidethe immediateenvironsof the mine site ... The water quality ofMagelaCreekcloseto the boundaryof the ProjectareaandKakaduNationalParkdeterioratedin the1991 Wet seasonto the extent that uranium and sulphate reachedconcentrationshigher thanbackgroundvalues... this isthe first recordedinstancesinceRangercommencedmining that thewaterquality in MagelaCreekhas deterioratedto the point whereit hasthe potentialto causeobservableeffectsonaquaticorganisms.Rangeris now a maturemine;lossesof contaminantsto theenvironmentareincreasingand their presenceis measurablein local waterbodiesandstreams.The companyhasintroduceda numberof practiceswhich result in the deliberatereleaseof water whosequality,willmodify the chemistryof nearbynatural waterbodies.While eachof thesesourcescontributesonlyminorquantitiesof contaminants,the resultanteffecton waterquality is readilymeasurableandmoreimportantly, the evidenceshows it to be increasing.The environmentalimplications of this trendshould be assessedand water managementpractices re-evaluatedto ensure that all sourcescontributingto lossesto theenvironmenthavebeenminimisedasrequiredunderthedefinitionof BestPracticableTechnology(ER44).” (pp 14-15,OSS-AR,1991).

• General- The OSSpredictedthat watermanagementat Rangerwas inadequateto copewith ‘belowaveragerain’ let alonethatapproachingthe 1 in 10 rainfall.

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Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• General - High U concentrationswere found in the MagelaCreek. “Following the observationofintermittentincreasesin uraniumconcentrationsin MagelaCreekduring the1990-91 Wetseason,theCommitteerequestedRanger,NTDME and OSS to collaboratein a samplingprogramduring the1991-92 Wet seasonto monitor and investigatethe origin of any anomalouslyhigh concentrations.”The escapeof uraniumbearingwaterfrom the crusherfeed ore stockpilewas identifiedas the majorcontributorto higheruraniumlevels.

• Aug. 24 to 25 - Approximately 1,300,000litres of RRZ water (from PP2)wasinadvertentlyusedontheperimeterroadofthe tailingsdamto suppressdust.

• March 27 - About 320,000 litres of additional water were applied to the land application areafollowing equipmentmalfunction, leading to a 9% increasein irrigation rate. The water fullyinfiltrated andtherewasno runoff.

• Feb. 26 to 27 - Uranium enrichedwater draining from the Rangerhigh grade ore stockpile wasaccidentallyreleasedto GeorgetownCreekand subsequentlyMagela Creek. The event was notclassifiedas aninfringementby NTDME. The055estimatedthatabout25 kg of U wasdischargedtoMagelaCreekduring this eventand, basedupon the flow conditionsat the time, assessedthat theconcentrationof uraniumcouldhavebeencomparableto thereceivingwaterlimit for a shortperiod.

• Feb.19 to April 8 - 75,000,000litres from PP4containing40 [Jg/LU.

1990

• Genetal - “The SupervisingScientist hasadvisedthat the 1989 Wet seasonenvironmentaltoxicitytestshave shownthat waters from PP4 when mixed with MagelaCreekwater can producetoxicresponsesin certainaquaticorganisms”.The toxicityof PP4is of concernbecauseit is not in theRRZandtherelativelylargecatchmentandthelimited capacityof thepondrequiresthereleaseof waterinmostWetseasons.

• June22 - Approximately2,500to 3,000litres of tailings leakedfrom a split pipe; all material wascontainedwith theRRZ.

• April 25 - A small quantityof tailingssprayedfrom a pumpwhenthe casingfailed. No materiallefttheRRZ anda thoroughcleanup wascompleted.

1989

• Aug. 13 to 14 - About 315,000litres of PP2 water was used for fire fighting when a bushfirethreatenedboththeRangerandAlligator RiversRegionResearchInstitutelaboratories.

• April 9 - The daily approvedapplicationrate of water to the land applicationareawas exceeded.Theremayhavebeena smallamountof runoff.

• March - Approval wasgivenby theNT supervisingauthorityto shutdowntemporarily(forup to twoyears)the seepagecollectorsystemin theRangertailings dam in contraventionof ERlO. Thepurposewasto obtaininformationonthe migrationof seepageawayfrom the tailingsdamso as to calibrateatheoreticalmodelof groundwatercontamination.

• March - Approvalwasgivenby theNT supervisingauthority for releaseof water from PP4via thespillway. This providedless assuredcontrol of theenvironmentalimpactof the releasedwater thandirect dischargeto MagelaCreekvia the installedpipeline.

• March 20 - PP2water level was allowedto reacha level almost 1 m abovetheagreedwet seasonlimit desirableto preventovertoppingas a resultof a 1-in-i 00 yearstormevent.

• Jan.- The NTDME gavepermissionto releasewaterinto KakaduNationalPark from PP4 next to apile of radioactiverockthat wasdumpedin error andeventhoughhigher thannormal U levels hadbeendetectedin the pond on two occasions.ERA released10,000,000litres of contaminatedwaterover a spillwayto Djalkmarabillabong,which flows into theMagelaCreeksystem,despiteongoingadvice from the OSS that any releaseshouldbe via the pipeline ratherthan the spillway. The OSScriticisedthis methodof releasesayingwaterreleaseat Rangerwas‘out of control’.

1988

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Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• Genei~al - Following an abnormally low rainfall wet seasonmore than a third of the tailings in thedam wereexposedto the atmosphere.Attemptsby Rangerto dampenthetailings left a dry portioninthe centreof the dam not within the rangeof the water spraysystem,causingpotentialhazardstoworkers, tourists and the nearby town of Jabimfrom the releaseof wind-carried radioactivedustparticles.

• Nov. - Following a malfunctionof ore discriminatorsmaterialcontaininglow gradesof uraniumwasbeingdumpedincorrectly on the wasterockdump; up to 500,000tonnesof materialmay havebeeninvolved, possiblyfor as long as six months.The areaof thewasterock dumpwasredesignatedasRRZ. Criticising Ranger’s attitude to the incident,Dr Glen Riley, OSS Director at Jabirn wrote “Iregardthis situationas themostseriousdeficiencyshownby Rangerin a long seriesof malfunctionsand operationalshortcomingssince the mine opened... rather than achievebetter (or more sure)environmentalcontrol as they gain moreexperience,Rangerare moving the operationinto a morehazardoussituation”.

• Oct. 22 - A small quantityof tailingssprayed,mostly into thetailingsdamitself, from a burstgasketin thetailings dam.

• Oct. - OSSsamplesshowedthatunusuallyhighlevelsof U andRnin RP4.• Aug. 31 - Minor RRZ infringementwhena contractorinadvertentlyuseda small quantityof RRZ

waterfor dustsuppressionoutsidetheRRZ.• Feb. 1 to 2 - An overflow occurredof mill processfroth from a tailings neutralisationtank; about

13,000litres of liquid raninto RP2 butno liquid left theRRZ.

1987

• March - 500,000litres of RP4 water was inadvertentlyreleasedvia the pipeline to MagelaCreekfollowing a valve malfunctionandwhenthecreek’sflow ratewasbelow theminimum approvedrate.

• March - NTDME determinedthat RUM were 6 months overdue in submitting a report onrevegetationof wasterock as requiredby ER 26. Also water from RP3 had beenused for dustsuppressionoutsidetheRRZ ona wasterockdumphaul road.

• Feb.3 to 27 - 175,000,000litres of RP4 waterreleasedinto MagelaCreek.• Feb.2 - Between20,000and100,000litres of treatmentwaterin theRangermill with elevatedlevels

of uraniumandcalciumcarbonatesoverflowedinto theRRZ.

1986• General- The trial dry tailings plot wasobservedto be unfencedandwith animal footprintsin the

tailings.• Dec. 5 - RUM reportedthe unlawful removalfrom site of an emptybut radiologicallycontaminated

water tank (truckmounted;after negotiatingwith the ownerthe tank wasreturnedto site andRUMcontrol).

• July31 - A tailingspipelinefailure ledto ? kgof tailingsbeingsprayedoutsidetheRRZ.• June3 - About 5,000litres of waterfroma tailingspipelinewasspilledoutsidetheRRZ.• March 21 - Small quantityof tailings dam water sprayedandranoff the tailings dam wall; water

mostly returnedthroughthe seepagecollectorsystemin all probability. TheOSS expressedconcernoverdelaysin takingpositiveactionto stopthe leakage.

• March 6 to 7 - An islandoftailingsdevelopedin thetailings dam.• March 4 - The sulphuric acid plant was startedup at the wrong rate leading to an increasein

emissionsof sulphur dioxide. Exact monitoring did not take place becauseRanger’s monitoringequipmenthadbeenout of ordersinceNov. 1985.

• Jan.to March - Approval grantedto Rangerto release84,500,000litres of water from RP4 via apipeline to MagelaCreek. An expectedprogramof biological monitoring wasnotundertakeneventhoughbiological testsundertakenthe year beforeindicatedadverseeffects on someaquaticspeciesafterreleaseof waterfrom RP4.

1985

Page 8

Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• Nov. 26 - 200 litres of water leakedfrom a pipeline betweenthe centralseepagecollectorsumpandthenorthwall ofthe tailingsdam.

• Oct. 3-7 - Valve failure in the tailings line resultedin 500,000litres of tailings andprocesswaterbeinginadvertentlyappliedto landapplicationplotswithin theRRZ.

• Oct. - Rangerwasrequestedby theNT SupervisingAuthorities and theCo-ordinatingCommitteefortheAlligators River Regionto canyouta comparativeevaluationof optionsfor watermanagementatthemine.

• Sep.24 - 25,000litres of tailings wassprayedovera 1,250m2 areaoutsidethe RRZ after a tailingsline failure, coveringthearea2 cmthick in tailings.

• Sep. 18 - Another tailings pipeline failure resultedin about 25,000 litres of tailings water beingreleasedfrom theRRZ.

• Sep.17 - Tailingspipelinefailure resultedin about25,000litres of tailings waterbeing releasedfromtheRRZ.

• Sep.3-A smallislandwasdetectedin thetailingsdam,about25 m2 and5cmhigh.• Sep. 2 - Accidental releaseof about 50,000 litres of water from RP2 adjacentto the trial land

applicationarea.• Sep.- Scaffoldingstainedwithammoniumdiuranatewasshippedoff siteto Darwinfor re-use.• Aug. 9 - Yet anotherfailure in thetailings pipeline - againresultedin about2 kg of tailings being

sprayedoutsidetheRRZ.• Aug. 1 - A further failure in the tailings pipeline resultedin about2 kg of tailings being Sprayed

outsidetheRRZ.• July31 - A failure in the tailingspipelineresultedin about2 kg of tailingsbeingsprayedoutsidethe

RRZ.• June28 - RUM detecteda level of acid mist abovethe authorisedlimit; remedialwork alleviatedthe

problemandpreventedrecurrence.• March - A pipeline failure resulted in tailings dam water leaving the RRZ. The OSS expressed

concernto Rangeroverthedelaysin taking actionto stopthe leakage.• March - Rangerdischargedabout160,000,000litres of waterfrom RP4 to theMagelaCreek.Water

held in RP4 is regularlyreleasedandis only supposedto holdrainfall runoff. The OSSreportedsomemusselsin thecreekabortedtheir larvae.It also appearedthat the migrationroutesof somefish werealteredduring the release.

• Feb. 28 - Monthly samplingat productpackingstackshoweduraniumlevels closeto the allowablelimit; remedialwork undertakenby RUM to repairscrubbersystem.

• Feb.14 to 16 - Fishkill in RP2was reportedafterwaterwaspumpedfrom RP4.• Feb. - Pipelinefrom RP2 to MagelaCreekinstalled.ERA soughtpermissionto releasecontaminated

waterinto theMagelaCreek.Approvalfor releasenotgranted.

1984• Oct. 30 - 600 litres of waterleakedoutsidetheRRZ fromthetailingsdamseepagecollectorline.• July 11 - 200,000litres of water from within the RRZ leakedoutsidethe RRZ from ajoint in a pipe

carryingtailingsdamseepagebackto thedam.• April 9 - Estimated200 litres spilledfroma tankatbore77/13whenit was tippedover.• Jan. 25 - 100,000litres of RP2 waterescapedfrom apipeline within theRRZ; all watercontained.

1983• Nov. 16 - 100 litres of dieselfuel spilledfrom split fuel line atborehole77/2 overanareaof 25 in

2.

• Oct. 20 - Non-routine maintenanceoperationswere undertakenin the productpacking areawithradioactivedustabovelevelsrequiredthoserequiredto bereported.

• Sep.20 - 40 tonnesof low gradedumpedoutsidetheRRZ.Cleanup wascarriedandmaterialreturnedto RRZ.

• Sep. - Workersat Rangerwent out on strike for 7 days over healthandsafetystandards.The strikewasdescribedasthe final strawin a seriesof incidentsat themine thathaveendangeredthe healthofworkersandhaverepercussionson theKakaduNationalPark.

• Aug. 15 - Minor tailingsleak; containedwithin RRZ.

Page 9

Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• Aug. - Plannedmaintenanceoperationswereundertakenin the calcinerandproductpacking areaswith radioactivedustabovelevelsrequiredthoserequiredto bereported.

• July 13 - A contractor,without authorisation,pumpeda smallamountof RP2 wateroutsidetheRRZto usein tailings damconstruction.

• July - Drinking waterat themine wascontaminatedby radioactivewaterusedin theprocessingof theplant.The processingwater anddrinking waterwereconnectedaccidentally.It is uncertainhow longthis situation went undetected.Whenthe contaminationwaseventuallydiscoveredthe systemwasflushedoutandworkerswereexaminedfor radioactivecontamination.Testson the workersandin thecontaminatedareaindicated‘no danger’;howeversubsequentlya plumberfoundresiduein thepipeswhich wasrevealedto havebeentheradioactivesubstanceammoniumdiuranate.

• May - High groundwaterpressuresandseepagediscoveredat RP2.• April 22 - Lessthan50 litres of dieselescapedto GulungulCreekfrom a spill at aboreholesite 74/1.• i~’1arch 9 - Labourerexposedto radioactivedustconcentrationabovederivedlimits.• March - Small volume of sewageescapedfrom Jabirn East following entry of stormwaterinto

system;leadingto pumpfailure.• Feb.23 - 7 personnelexposedto abovepermittedlevels of airborneradioactivecontaminationduring

modificationsto yellowcakescrubbers.• Feb.9 -200 litres of dieselspiltat a borefield 800 m southofpit #1.• Feb.1 - 1 tonneof low gradeore(0.02-0.05%U308)washedoutsideRRZ with 150,000litres of RRZ

waterfollowing drainblockagein heavyrainfall.

1982-83 Wet Season• 1982-83- Rangerimported 1,000,000,000litres of water during a drought.The mine hadrecruited

managementpersonnelfrom arid climates who were unfamiliar with the variations of tropicalmonsoonalclimates.

1982• Dec. 9 - Tailings spillagewithin themill atNo. 2 pachuca.• Nov. 5 - Blockagein thetailingspipelinewith spillagecovering40 m2 ofthebundon thedarnwall.• Sep.- The first reportsappearon theproblemswith leakageof thedam.Thetailingsdamcontinuesto

leakwith greaterseepagethandesignassumptions.• Aug. 13 - Releaseof tailings from an air releasevalve. Apparentlynot discovereduntil 7 am on

August14. CleanupeffectedonAugust16.• July 5 - Significant incident following a major spill of product, 1 tonne of yellowcake,with two

workersingestingyellowcake,radiationsafetymeasureswereinvestigated.• June/July- SO

2emissionsfrom acid plant stackover allowable limits (2 kg per tonne of acid

produced).Plantshutdownandmodifiedto preventfurtherproblems.• Juiie22 - Filter cakefrom sulphurmeterselfignitedandwasnot fully extinguishedbeforedumping

in tailings dam; subsequentlyre-ignitedandhadto bedowsedwith earth.• June 16 - Discoveredthat emissionsfrom scrubber in the product packing areaexceededthe

allowablerate on May 24; unit wasshutdown andoverhauled;systemmodified to preventblockagein waterfilter. Revisedcalculationsalso showedabreachon March 12.

• June7 - Minor leakagefrom a perforationin thetailingspipeline.• May - High groundwaterpressuresnotedat thetailingsdam.• April 20 - 30,000 litres pregnantorganic liquor solution overflowedfrom an overflow sump into

stounwatersystemthenceto RP2.Operationwas stopped;sumpmodified.• March 25 - Bleedervalve on tailingspipelineleakedabout30,000litres of tailings onto insidetop of

embankment;tailings werehosedinto dam.• March 16 - SO2analyseron acidplantdamagedby acid.• March 4 - 1 in

2 islandof tailings appearedabovewaterin tailingsdamovernightwhenpipe was notshiftedon time.

• Feb. 25 - Acid mist eliminators in acid plant floodeddue to blockeddrain andmist level exceededpermittedlimits; plantshutdownandfault rectified(by March3).

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Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• Feb.18 - Accordingto OSS-AR(1982),a smallleakfrom thetailingspipelinewasdetected.Thelinewas shut down and a repair effected within 1 hour including clean up, all tailings stayed in the‘supervisedarea’.Basedon theMine Inspectors’entryin theMill RecordBook, however,thespill wasactuallydiscoveredby a Mines Inspector(andNOTOSS or ERA) andwasapparently2 m deepand0.5 km long.

• Jan.22 to Feb.2 - Acid plant stack emissionsmeasuredto be in excessof allowable limit of 2kg/tonneof acid produced;problemdue to incorrectfitting in plant since commissioning(July 17,1981); partreplacedandlevel fell to about1.3 kg/tonne.

• Jan.22 to 23 - About 40 deadfish were found in CoonjimbaBillabong,consideredpart of naturalprocesses(no abnormalwaterquality indicatorswere found).

• Jan.5 - Smallquantityof yellowcakespilt from two drumsin transportoutsidepackingarea.• Jan.2 - Breakin tailingsline insidetailings damwall; someerosion,wall repairedwith wasterock.• Jan.- At least3 additional failuresin the tailingspipelinesnotreportedby OSS-AR(1982).Onewas

atthe damwall while anotherwasalong thepipelinecorridor.

1981

• General - At the official opening ceremonyin 1981 therewere exposedtailings in the dam. TheRangerUraniumEnvironmentalInquiry recommendedthat tailings at Rangerbe coveredby 2 m ofwater to reducethe releaseof radongas and to preventdry seasonwinds from carryingradioactivedust particlesover theregion. Regulationswerequickly changedto enable tailings to be kept dampinstead(ie. no minimumwaterdepth).

• Dec. 28 - Operatorsprayedwithammoniumdiuranate.• Dec.22 - #3 sewageretentionpondoverflowed,Contractorfailedto beon siteasrequired.• Dec. 14 - Small tailings spill from breathervalvein tailings pipeline on insideperimeteron tailings

dam embankment.Breathervalvesdeclaredredundantandremoved.• Dec. 11 - Small amountof tailings leakedfrom a pipelineto the tailings dam floor abovethewater

level, materialwascoveredin soil.• Nov. 26 - Operatorfound in bare feetwhilst working in the tailings dam; operatorandsupervisor

advisedof the importanceof following safetyprocedures.• Nov. 25 - Two observedemissionsof concentratedustfrom the scrubberstack,estimatedat 2 to 4 kg

U. Thisexceededthedaily dischargelimit of 1.5 kg U.• Nov. 23 - Spillageof concentratefrom a drumoutsidethestoreduringunloading.• Nov. 3 to 23 - Two islandsof tailingsappearedin thetailings dam,areaabout20 in

2; mine closedfor

4 days while authorisationand requirementfor 2 m water cover were reviewed. Authorisationamendedto showwatercoverratherthanspecific depth.

• Aug. 13 - Sewagemanholeat CoonjimbaCampdischargedat 3-4 litres/minuteand effluent wasflowing on the track to the billabong; leak was due to a faulty automaticpump control whichpreventedpumpstarting.

• Aug. 5 - Clarifiedpregnantliquortankandassociatedclarifier tankoverflowedinto anadjacentbunddueto operatorerror. Liquor waspumpedback; further overflow stoppedby adjustmentof processflow rate;slight increasein radioactivityin bundduring incident.

• Aug. - During commissioningof the mill processstreamwasterock wasused.The groundwasteaccumulatedat onepoint in thetailingsdamandsomewasexposedto air.

• July31 - Fugitive slakedlime dust from a lime transferoperationblew into thesurfaceofDjalkmaraBillabongandwasnotedthrougha pH readingof 9.3 during routine monitoring.

• July 29 - Recycletank overflowedspilling processwater from RP3 into the neutral thickenerarea.Someof the water anda minoramountof tailings solids werepumpedinto the stormwatercollectionpond which dischargesto RP2 during the wet season.The estimatedvolume pumpedwas40,000litres.

• April 9 - Small volume of water and silt flowed from RUM’s organicdump tank to GeorgetownCreek.(Rangerreportedtheincidentto the OSSonApril 29).

1980-81Wet Season

Page 11

Environmental Incidents at Ranger

• General - Sewerat old mess site becamesurchargedat times and sewageenteredCoonjimba

Billabong; necessitatingremedialworks.

1980• Nov. 9 OneantilopinekangaroofoundshotatGulungulCreekborefield.• Aug. 11 - OneseaeaglefoundshotnearjunctionofMagelaandGeorgetownCreeks.• July - Large-scalesandmining was found to be occurring at Mudginberri Billabong by Pioneer

Concretefor cementandconstructionworksat Rangerandthe townshipof Jabiru.Mining orderedtobe stoppedby the OSS.

• June 27 - Dry drilling in BorrowPit A; wet drilling wasto be usedunderOccupationalHealthandSafetyrequirements.

• June 6 - Releaseof 1,000,000litres of silty waterdischargedfromBorrowD to GeorgetownCreek.• March 29 - RangerUraniumMine (RUM) pumpedwater from Borrow areasA andB to RP2 and

RP3 beforethepondsweredeclaredofficially to betheRRZ.• Feb. 23 - Eucalypttreeknockedoverby a contractor.• Feb. - Thetailings damfloor andwalls wereidentifiedby theRangerUraniumEnvironmentalInquiry

as majorpathwaysby which contaminantscouldentertheMagelaCreek.245 mmof rain fell on theRangermine site in five hours.A rapid rise in water level occurredin both RIP1 and the partiallycompletetailings dam.The companywasforcedto makea four metrebreachin the tailingsdamwallandabout9,000,000litres wasdischargedinto DjalkmaraCreek. [Note - calculationsin Section4.3.3suggestthata totalof upto 64,000,000litres was actuallydischarged,includingtheoutletpipe.]

• General (Feb. ?) - Concreteusedin theconstructionof the tailingsdamwasfaulty.

1979• Dec. 7 - Small amountofoil-tar spilledat a sedimentcontrolpondatJabiruPolice Station.• Nov. 22 - 20 litres of dieselspilledinto a drainin Jabiru.• Nov. 9 - Contractor’splant encroachedon fencedoff vegetation;areawasre-fencedandvegetation

restored.• Feb. 28 - Spillageof diesel into CoonjimbaBillabong.

Page 12