Unpacking the Diaspora Channel in New Democracies:When Do Migrants Act Politically Back Home?

Katrina Burgess

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract Migrant influence on politics back home has arguably become broader anddeeper in the wake of a widespread convergence between out-migration and democra-tization. This article seeks to identify the structural conditions under which migrantsfrom post-1980 democracies are likely to activate the “diaspora channel” of politicalinfluence back home. Specifically, I identify, explain, and code two sets of incentiveslikely to induce migrants to engage in home-country politics from abroad: (1) socio-economic incentives generated by cross-border linkages and migrant characteristicslikely to predispose them toward broader forms of transnational engagement and (2)political incentives generated by diaspora politicization and formal access to thepolitical process in the home country. I score these incentives in 40 developingcountries and then generate hypotheses about the degree to which migrants from thesecountries are likely to activate the diaspora channel through participation in home-country elections, lobbying for policy changes by the home-country government, ortransnational coproduction.

Keywords Migration . Democracy . Diaspora . Transnationalism

The scholarly literature is only beginning to pay attention to the growing but complexinfluence that migrants from the developing world are having, intentionally or not, onpolitics in their countries of origin. Such influence is not new, but it has arguablybecome broader and deeper in the wake of a convergence between emigration anddemocratization in many developing countries. Migrants from new democracies asdiverse as Mexico, the Philippines, Lebanon, Cape Verde, and Senegal are influencingelectoral politics, non-electoral civic engagement, and patterns of governance backhome. In the process, they are having an impact on the quality of democracy, often inthe context of serious deficits in democratic governance.

Rather than examining whether this impact is positive or negative, I seek in thisarticle to identify the structural conditions under which migrants are likely to activate

St Comp Int DevDOI 10.1007/s12116-014-9151-5

K. Burgess (*)Fletcher School, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USAe-mail: katrina.burgess@tufts.edu

the “diaspora channel” of influence on their countries of origin (Kapur 2010;Introduction, this volume).1 Besides establishing a systematic basis on which to selectcountries for further research, this exercise enables us to unpack and disentangle thesocioeconomic and political incentives likely to inform migrant decisions about thenature and extent of engagement with their homeland. Using data from 40 developingcountries that have made democratic transitions since the 1980s, I construct a prelim-inary model for identifying which migrant groups are most likely to activate thediaspora channel, as well as the conditions under which different kinds of engagementare likely to emerge.

Before proceeding, it is worth introducing several caveats regarding the quality ofmy data. As any migration scholar knows, the available statistics on migration andremittances are notoriously incomplete and uneven. Not only do undocumented mi-grants and informal remittance flows often escape official detection, particularly indeveloping countries, but the comparability of cross-national data is often compromisedby different methodologies of data gathering and levels of reliability. Relatedly, wehave far more data on migrants in Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) countries than in developing countries, where nearly half ofall international migrants reside (Ratha and Shaw 2007). In addition, the level ofaggregation at which I am necessarily operating obscures important nuances regardingthe nature of the migrant community and the conditions in which migrants live. Thus,my findings should be treated as a very rough approximation of a much more complexreality. Nonetheless, as long as we keep our salt-shaker handy, I believe the exercise isworthwhile as a first step in mapping the landscape of diaspora engagement andgenerating hypotheses that can be tested further with in-depth qualitative research.

Migration and Democracy in the Global South

Between 1970 and 2010, the estimated number of international migrants more thandoubled from 81 million to 215 million (Castles and Miller 2009, p. 5; World Bank2011). While the share of people living outside their countries of origin has remainedremarkably stable at 3 % since 1960 (UNDP 2009, p. 2), the direction of these flowshas profoundly affected developing countries. Eighty percent of today’s migrants comefrom the global South (World Bank 2011), and nearly half of them live in OECDcountries, whose share of international migrants increased from 37 % in 1960 to 56 %in 2010 (UNDP 2009, p. 30).2 In 2009, remittances to developing countries totaled over$300 billion, dwarfing official development assistance ($120 billion) and portfolioinvestment ($85 billion) and nearly overtaking foreign direct investment ($359 billion)(World Bank 2011).

During the same period, many developing countries joined the “third wave” ofdemocratization (Huntington 1991), which began in southern Europe in the mid-1970sand spread to countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe in the 1980s

1 As explained in the Introduction to this volume, the diaspora channel consists of emigrants exercisinginfluence from abroad and is one of four channels of migrant influence proposed by Kapur.2 In the World Bank’s classification, “South” refers to low- and middle-income countries, including a fewlocated in northern latitudes, and “North” includes both OECD and non-OECD high-income countries,including a few located in southern latitudes.

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and 1990s. By 2010, over one third of developing countries had experienced transitionsfrom authoritarian to democratic rule (Marshall and Jaggers 2009; World Bank 2010).Although we find plenty of examples of diaspora activism in authoritarian regimes, thisconvergence between emigration and democratization generates new opportunities formigrant engagement in politics back home. First, ordinary citizens gain greater accessto the political process through competitive elections, political decentralization, lessopaque policymaking, and/or a reinvigorated civil society. While migrants do not haveas many political rights as local residents, they can exercise influence either indirectlyby shaping the political behavior of their friends and family or directly through issueadvocacy, party activism, expatriate voting, or coproduction of public goods (seeIntroduction, this volume).

Second, democratic governments have greater incentives to reach out to their emi-grants. In the last 20 years, developing countries have participated in a global shift inofficial discourse from vilifying emigrants as traitors to glorifying them as heroes of thenation (Castles 2007; Iskander 2010; Mohan 2008; Nieswand 2009; Smith and Bakker2008; Solomon 2009). This discursive turn has been accompanied by the creation of newinstitutions and policies designed to encourage migrants to maintain ties with theirhomeland (Gamlen et al. 2013; Rannveig Agunias 2009). While authoritarian regimessuch as China, Morocco, and Vietnam have also made this shift, diaspora outreach indemocracies is motivated by a more diverse set of concerns—including winning elec-tions—and is more likely to include political rights and representation for migrants.

Third, and relatedly, democratization alters the terms of engagement betweenmigrants and their home governments. Whereas engagement under authoritarian ruletends to be either non-existent, highly oppositional, or tightly controlled, regime changecan clear a path toward a more collaborative and negotiated relationship betweenmigrants and political authorities back home. This shift may take a long time in the wakeof repression or civil war, but the combination of shared interests and generational changeusually leads to some degree of dialogue while giving migrants more room to maintaintheir autonomy from the state. Even if the intensity of migrant engagement declines afterthe transition to democracy, its heterogeneity and scope is likely to increase.

In light of these changes, I propose a model for assessing the likelihood thatmigrants from “new democracies” in the global South will activate the diaspora channelin ways that have some impact on politics back home.3 My research sample includes 40countries that (1) democratized between 1975 and 2006; (2) remained democratic in2010; (3) were classified by the World Bank as low income, lower middle income, orupper middle income in 2010; and (4) had a population of at least 500,000 people in2009. I score a country as democratic if it had a regime score of 6 or higher in 2010 oran average regime score of 6 or higher since its democratic transition.4

3 This article is part of a larger project on the patterns and implications of cross-border engagement bymigrants in home-country politics.4 The regime scores are from the Polity IV Project, which calculates degrees of democratic and autocraticauthority along a 21-point scale ranging from −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy),with a score of +6 considered as the threshold for a democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). I have keptEcuador in the sample despite its 2010 score of +5 because I disagree that it has made a full transition back toauthoritarianism. Mali also remains in the sample despite its 2012 coup, which appears to have been a briefinterlude in a relatively long period of democratic rule. At the same time, I have excluded Comoros andGuinea-Bissau even though they meet the minimum polity threshold because they were classified as“authoritarian” by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2010.

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The remainder of the article develops a set of indicators likely to influence whethermigrants activate the diaspora channel for political purposes. Consistent with theIntroduction of this volume, I am defining “politics” broadly to encompass bothelectoral and non-electoral forms of engagement. Specifically, I am interested in threetypes of diaspora channel activation: (1) electoral participation in the form of expatriatevoting or campaign financing, (2) issue advocacy through individual or collectivelobbying of home governments, and (3) transnational coproduction by organizedmigrants.5 Although measuring these outcomes is beyond the scope of this article, Ilay the groundwork for a full empirical analysis by proposing and coding a set of likelydeterminants. My unit of analysis is the collectivity of migrants from a particularcountry, and I use a cross-section of the most recent data available. Whenever possible,I include data on all migrant destinations to capture South–South as well as South–North migration.

In the next two sections, I identify, explain, and code the factors I believe shouldmatter for activation of the diaspora channel.6 Initially, I treat my dependent variable asa single, aggregated outcome and develop hypotheses about its incidence based on allmy independent variables. I then disaggregate this outcome into the three typesmentioned above and identify a subset of independent variables most likely to matterfor each type. I conclude with a discussion of the contributions and the limits of myproposed model.

Incentives for Diaspora Channel Activation

In order to determine whether migrants are likely to become engaged in politics backhome, we need to understand—and then measure—the incentives that would motivatesuch engagement. I argue that we can divide these incentives into two broad categories.The first category is socioeconomic incentives (SEI), which includes the extent ofinteraction between migrants and their families back home and the degree to whichtheir status in the host country is likely to predispose them toward broader forms oftransnational engagement. The second category is political incentives (PLI), whichincludes the degree of diaspora politicization and the availability of formal channels ofaccess to the political process in the home country. Table 1 specifies the key dimensionsand sub-dimensions of each category based on an assessment of which incentives arelikely to be most relevant to activation of the diaspora channel. While leaving room formigrant agency, as well as the impact of unanticipated economic or political shocks, Iargue that these incentive structures should affect the likelihood of broad-based acti-vation of the diaspora channel by a country’s emigrants.

5 Coproduction refers to the provision of goods and services by private as well as public actors (Ostrom 1996;see, also, Duquette, this volume). Although it often implies collaboration, I am including any investmentsmade by both actors (e.g., in public goods) regardless of whether they engaged in explicit task-sharing.6 Unless otherwise indicated, I am using “activation of the diaspora channel” to refer to political activities,setting aside the other kinds of migrant engagement covered by the Kapur framework, such as investment,entrepreneurship, or cultural exchange. For a fascinating discussion of how diaspora investment might bemotivated by the desire to influence politics back home, thereby transforming my dependent variable into anindependent variable, see Riddle and Nielsen (2012).

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Socioeconomic Incentives

I argue that the socioeconomic incentives for diaspora channel activation are likely tobe the strongest among migrants who have (1) a sustained connection with theircommunities of origin, which I label cross-border linkages and (2) characteristics thatincline them to lead transnational lives, which I label transnationally oriented profile.To measure cross-border linkages, I combine four indicators: (1.1) the home country’semigration rate, (1.2) the weight of remittances as measured by the per-migrant value ofannual remittances as a share of GDP per capita, (1.3) the geographical distancebetween the home and host countries, and (1.4) the rate of telephone access in thehome and host countries. While the emigration rate provides a rough measure of theoverall importance of cross-border ties, the other three indicators are more specific tothe migrants themselves. The remittance indicator captures the level of migrants’financial commitment to non-migrants relative to the latter’s economic need. Thedistance and telephone indicators offer rough proxies of the ease with whichmigrants can stay in touch with their communities of origin, either throughreturn visits or by communicating by landline or cell phone. Highly connectedmigrants are likely not only to have a personal stake in living conditions backhome but also to care about politics and policies that affect their economic andsocial exchanges with friends and family (Levitt 2001). As shown in “Appendix 1,”the scores for cross-border linkages range from a high of 59.5 for Albania to a low of21.5 for Zambia.7

7 Unless otherwise indicated, the country scores for each variable are an unweighted average of its componentindicators.

Table 1 Unpacking the incentives for diaspora channel activation

A. Socioeconomic incentives (SEI) B. Political incentives (PLI)

1. Cross-border linkages 1. Politicization of diaspora

1.1. Emigration rate 1.1. Refugee legacy

1.2. Weight of remittances 1.2. Cleavage-based partisanship

1.3. Geographical proximity 1.3. Overseas party presence

1.4. Phone access 1.4. Overseas campaigning

2. Transnationally oriented profile 1.5. Blocked political rights

2.1. Gender (male) 1.6. Reliance on self-help

2.2. Post-primary education 2. Formal access

2.3. Partial integration 2.1. Diaspora outreach institutions

2.3.1. Education-based (EPI) 2.2. Migrant advisory council

2.3.2. Duration-based (DPI) 2.3. Expatriate voting

2.4. Migrant density 2.4. Legislative representation

2.4.1. Global

2.4.2. OECD

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Transnationalism is not just about the number or frequency of cross-border linkages,however. It also involves distinct ways of thinking and acting.8 I therefore include asecond set of socioeconomic incentives based on the profile of each country’s migrants.Drawing on Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002), I identify characteristics that reflect multiplemotivations for transnational engagement. On the one hand, migrants may engage intransnational practices because they offer refuge from negative experiences in the hostcountry, which Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) call “reactive transnationalism” (p. 771).On the other hand, they may become transnationally engaged only after they haveaccumulated sufficient resources to do so, which Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) call“resource-dependent transnationalism” (p. 772). Rather than treating these pathways asmutually exclusive, I hypothesize that their interaction creates the best conditions foractivation of the diaspora channel.

I identify four aspects of a migrant’s profile likely to induce these different kinds oftransnationalism: (2.1) gender, (2.2) education, (2.3) integration into the host society,and (2.4) migrant density in the host country. In general, I expect that higher shares ofmale migrants and partial integration into the host society will be associated withreactive transnationalism while higher levels of education and more migrant densitywill be associated with resource-dependent transnationalism. Unfortunately, the data formost of these indicators are limited to OECD countries, so I am unable to provide acomplete measure of this variable for a significant share of the migrants in my study.Nonetheless, given the heightened probability that migrants living in developed de-mocracies will engage in cross-border politics (see below), I believe this variableshould be included.9 As shown in “Appendix 1,” the profile scores range from a highof 55.9 for Nepal to a low of 37.0 for Lesotho.

With regard to gender, several studies of Latin American migrants in the USA findthat men are more likely to be politically active in their communities of origin(Goldring 2001; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Jones-Correa1998), whereas women tend to focus their energies on building a new life in the hostcountry (Kandel and Massey 2001; Levitt 2001; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Wampleret al. 2009). At first, these findings appear to contradict evidence that women spend ahigher share of their income on remittances and maintain closer ties with home thanmen (see, e.g., Chant and Radcliffe 1992; Tacoli 1999; Zontini 2010). But a clearerpicture emerges once we clearly distinguish between personal connections and broaderforms of transnational engagement, which are more likely to have a male gender bias.While women are by no means absent from the diaspora channel, they tend to reapfewer status gains through transnational engagement and to face greater obstacles toentering the public sphere back home.10 In addition, female migrants may be less likelyto work in niche markets than men (Bastia 2007), thereby reducing their opportunitiesto engage in collective action. Thus, my gender indicator is the share of male migrantsin OECD countries, which ranges from a high of 62.2 % for Mali to a low of 39.0 % forthe Philippines.11

8 For an excellent survey of the vast literature on migrant transnationalism, see Vertovec (2004).9 I therefore exclude Chile, Mexico, and Turkey from my OECD-based indicators.10 This is not to say that female migrants are any less susceptible to feeling excluded and marginalized in thehost countries, particularly if they are undocumented.11 The United Nations has global gender data (UNDP 2009), but it is so inconsistent with the OECD data that Ihave chosen not to use it.

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With regard to education, migrants who have attended high school or college arelikely to possess more intellectual and economic resources than their compatriots withonly a primary education, thereby facilitating political participation. If they findthemselves underemployed in the host country (e.g., engineers driving taxis) while stillbeing relatively privileged back home, they may be particularly inclined towardtransnational engagement. For my education indicator, I therefore use the share ofOECD-based migrants with a post-primary level of education, which ranges from ahigh of 90.6 % for Namibia to a low of 28.8 % for Cape Verde.

Relatedly, recent studies on integration suggest a non-linear relationshipbetween integration and transnational engagement, whereby first-generationmigrants who are well-established and/or upwardly mobile are the most inclinedto care about politics back home and participate in transnational migrantorganizations (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Portes et al.2007; Portes 2003). I therefore hypothesize that “partially integrated” migrantsare most likely to activate the diaspora channel. I construct two OECD-basedindicators to measure this phenomenon: (2.3.1) education-based partial integra-tion (EPI), which interacts non-naturalization rates with the share of migrantswith post-primary education and (2.3.2) duration-based partial integration (DPI),which interacts non-naturalization rates with the share of migrants who havelived in the host country for at least 10 years. As shown in “Appendix 1,” thescores for education-based partial integration range from a high of 68.6 forNepal to a low of 4.6 for Lesotho, and the scores for duration-based partialintegration range from a high of 46.6 for Mexico to a low of 5.5 for Lesotho.12

I include both indicators because they have different implications for transnationalengagement. In the case of education-based partial integration, well-educated migrantswithout host-country citizenship rights are likely to be relatively recent arrivals withstrong attachments to their country of origin who nonetheless possess the resources toactivate the diaspora channel. 13 In the case of duration-based partial integration,longtime residents who remain unnaturalized are more likely to be uneducated (andperhaps undocumented) and to feel caught between two worlds, having made only apartial transition from “transplanted” communities, which reproduce social networksand practices from back home, to “constructed” communities, which emerge whenmigrants develop new networks and practices in the host society (Wampler et al. 2009).14

While duration-of-stay and community orientation are obviously related, existingresearch suggests that the latter is shaped as much by expectations and host-countryconditions as by time.15 Thus, even migrants who have lived abroad for decades may

12 The low scores for Lesotho reflect a very high naturalization rate (93.1 %) in the OECD. It is worth noting,however, that fewer than 1 % of Lesotho’s emigrants live in OECD countries.13 In fact, my cases show a strong negative correlation between education-based partial integration and theshare of migrants with at least 10 years in the host country (R2=−0.84).14 My cases show a strong inverse correlation between duration-based partial integration and post-primaryeducation (R2=−0.69).15 Several scholars note the importance of “socially expected duration” whereby migrants internalize theexpectations of family and friends regarding the length of their stay (see, e.g., Guarnizo et al. 2003).Community orientation is also shaped by immigration policy in the host country. For example, Turkey’s highscore for partial integration is linked to the longstanding exclusion of Turkish immigrants from citizenship inGermany, where 70 % of them reside. Until reforming its nationality law in 1999, Germany adhered to theprinciple of jus sanguinis, whereby citizenship was restricted to people of German descent.

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entertain the notion of returning home and/or continue to feel excluded from the hostsociety, thereby increasing their incentives to activate the diaspora channel.

The last indicator of a transnationally oriented profile is migrant density—the degreeto which migrants live in close proximity to one another—which highlights the non-material side of resource-dependent transnationalism. Numerous studies find thatgeographically concentrated migrants have more opportunities for transnational identityformation and collective action, particularly if they live in “migrant enclaves” withcommunity leaders who were politically active before migrating (see, e.g., Guarnizoet al. 2003; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2010; Waldinger and Lim 2009). Since the USAis the only country that provides disaggregated data, I use a weighted average of theshare of migrants across the top five country-wide destinations, adjusted for the state-level concentration of US-based migrants. For reasons explained below, I include oneindicator for migrant density within the OECD (adjusted for the total number ofOECD-based migrants) and another indicator for migrant density across all destina-tions. “Appendix 1” shows that the OECD density scores range from a high of 75.2 forTurkey to a low of 18.0 for Lesotho, and the global density scores range from a high of87.4 in Lesotho to a low of 34.6 for Lebanon.

Political Incentives

While socioeconomic incentives are likely to have a significant influence on whethermigrants activate the diaspora channel, political incentives may be even more crucial. Iexpect these incentives to be the strongest among migrants who (1) are exposed tocatalysts for political mobilization, which I label politicization of the diaspora, and (2)have channels of communication and influence with policymakers back home, which Ilabel formal access. Unlike the socioeconomic indicators, which are based on quanti-tative data, my measures of political incentives are highly qualitative and thereforebased on categorical values.16

For politicization of the diaspora, I combine six indicators: (1.1) a past crisis thatproduced a significant outflow of political refugees, (1.2) identity-based loyalties in thediaspora (e.g., religion, ethnicity, language) that overlap significantly with partisandivisions back home, (1.3) overseas organization and outreach by home-countrypolitical parties, (1.4) overseas campaigning by home-country presidential or vice-presidential candidates, (1.5) blocked political rights for migrants back home, and (1.6)reliance on self-help in the migrants’ country of origin to fill gaps in public goodsprovision. While refugee legacies and cleavage-based partisanship focus on the polit-ical identities of the migrants themselves, party outreach and overseas campaigninginvolve diaspora mobilization by political actors from the country of origin. Finally,blocked political rights and reliance on self-help are shortcomings in the home countrythat are likely to motivate migrants either to demand change or to fill the gaps left byinadequate governance. As shown in “Appendix 2,” the scores for politicization rangefrom a high of 91.7 for Liberia to a low of 0 for Panama.

Starting with the identity-based indicators of politicization, I identify 15 countrieswith refugee legacies and 18 countries with cleavage-based partisanship. With regard torefugee legacies, I give a full score to Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Turkey,

16 See “Appendix 4” for specific coding strategies.

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where recent civil wars or local conflicts have resulted in more than 3 % of all migrantsstill being classified as refugees in 2010. I give a partial score to another 11 countriesthat experienced significant refugee outflows in the past but with intervening waves ofeconomically motivated migration. Among these countries, Lebanon had the mostrecent conflict but nonetheless falls below the three-percent threshold. Seven otherpartial-score countries are in the Western Hemisphere, reflecting the prevalence ofhighly repressive dictatorships and/or civil war prior to democratic transitions in theregion.17 Although decades have passed since those dark days, the refugee experienceleft a legacy that continues to affect migrants and their relationship with home-countrypolitics. The conflicts are even more distant in the cases of Latvia, Macedonia, andUkraine, but their refugee experiences have even greater resonance given the tensionsthat resurfaced after the collapse of the Soviet Union.18

I give six countries a full score for cleavage-based partisanship. Although the type ofcleavage varies, migrants from all these countries have strong ethnic, racial, religious,and/or linguistic loyalties clearly reflected in home-country partisan politics. The mostsalient partisan cleavages are ethnic in Guyana and Kenya, religious in Lebanon andTurkey (although Turkey also has a significant Kurdish minority with partisan repre-sentation), and ethnonationalist in Latvia and Ukraine, which have significant Russianminorities and a major pro-Russia party. In these cases, I would expect migrantengagement in home-country politics to be strongly influenced by these alignments.

I give partial scores for cleavage-based partisanship to another 12 countries, whereidentity-based loyalties among migrants are important but correspond to home-countrypartisan divisions in less explicit or encompassing ways. Most political parties inBenin, Ghana, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have historical ties with aparticular ethnic group, but there is also widespread evidence of cross-ethnic coalitionsand voting (Basedau and Stroh 2009; Glennerster et al. 2011; Lindberg and Morrison2008; Posner 2007; Sawyer 2008; Totemayer 2007). Identity also resonates politicallyin Bolivia, Peru, and South Africa, but the major parties or candidates do not self-identify explicitly or primarily along ethnic or racial lines despite divided electorates.19

By contrast, the Balkan states have minority ethnic parties (Turks in Bulgaria andAlbanians in Macedonia), but their likely impact on the diaspora channel is muted bythe prevalence of pan-national diasporas whose ethnic and national loyalties may notoverlap. Finally, Moldova has been wracked by ethnonationalist divisions, but ratherthan finding expression in national partisan politics, they sparked a civil war and led tothe creation of a quasi-independent region (Transnistria) with strong ties to Russia(Economist Intelligence Unit 2008). In these partial cases, I would expect identity-

17 There have been political refugees from nearly all of the 40 countries, but I am only giving positive scoresto those in which the political motivations for emigration clearly outweighed the economic ones, at least for asignificant subset of migrants. I am also excluding countries such as Nepal and Peru where most displacedpeople from the conflict zones moved elsewhere in the same country.18 The Macedonian case is complicated by the contested borders and pan-national ethnic identities in theregion. For example, the Greek Civil War produced many Macedonian refugees, but they were not fleeing thestate of Macedonia. In fact, while some fled to OECD countries, many crossed the border into what was thenYugoslavia and is now officially the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For an excellent analysis of theMacedonia Question, see Danforth (1997).19 Ecuador and Guatemala are also sharply divided along ethnic lines, but I have excluded them because of theweak links between identity and partisanship at the national level. Ecuador does have ethnic parties, but theytend to be highly personalistic and easily marginalized.

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based alignments to have an intermittent and issue-driven impact on migrant engage-ment in home-country politics.

Turning to the mobilization-based indicators of politicization, I identify 18 coun-tries with at least some degree of overseas party presence and 17 countries withoverseas campaigning. While all ten countries with a full score for party presencealso have overseas campaigning, Bolivia and Mexico are the only countries with apartial score for party presence whose presidential and/or vice-presidential candidateshave visited migrant communities during their campaigns.20 Finally, there are fourcountries with overseas campaigning but no discernible party presence (Benin,Ecuador, Mali, and Peru), reflecting the highly volatile and personalized nature oftheir party systems.

Finally, I identify 22 countries with blocked rights for migrants and 27 countriesthat rely on self-help to fill gaps in public goods provision back home. Althoughmigrant rights can also include national treatment, dual nationality, or legislativerepresentation, I focus on expatriate voting as the minimum threshold for having adirect impact on home-country political outcomes. Ten countries have no expatriatesuffrage, and five countries (Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, and Turkey)have reformed their laws but have not yet held an election in which OECD-basedmigrants have cast overseas ballots. 21 I also give a partial score to Bolivia,Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, and the Philippines,where overseas voting is allowed but only because of prior mobilization bymigrants.22 Although such mobilization constitutes activation of the diaspora chan-nel, which is my dependent variable, formation of a “migrant lobby” facilitatesactivation around new issues in the future, thereby exercising an independent effectacross time.23

Measuring reliance on self-help is more challenging. In most cases, we can extrap-olate from the level of public goods provision, since self-help mechanisms and mutualaid organizations are widespread in poor communities in the developing world, andmigrants can be expected to carry these traditions with them, especially if they still livein transplanted communities. Thus, I begin by creating a proxy for public goodsprovision based on two indicators: (1) household access to drinking water and

20 The legislation that established expatriate voting rights in Mexico included a prohibition against presidentialcampaigning outside the country. In practice, however, candidates find other reasons to distribute propagandaand visit the migrant community in the USA during campaign season. Following the coding strategy outlinedin “Appendix 4,” I therefore give Mexico a partial score of 0.5 on this indicator.21 The failure of implementation is most glaring in Ghana, where migrants remain disenfranchised despitepassage of favorable legislation in 2006, but it may also prove daunting in Lebanon and Sierra Leone. Bycontrast, the prospects for overseas voting appear relatively favorable for the next elections in Turkey, whichare currently scheduled to take place in August 2014.22 In the remaining countries with expatriate voting, the right to vote from abroad was granted in a top-downfashion, either during the country’s democratic transition or to consolidate a new governing coalition, withlittle to no migrant mobilization.23 For example, the campaign for expatriate voting rights in Mexico contributed to the emergence of newleaders, organizations, and networks (Lieber 2010; Smith and Bakker 2008). Even after achieving their initialgoal, many of these same actors have lobbied the Mexican government for other reforms, such as fewerrestrictions on voter registration and the creation of a cabinet position for migrant affairs.

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sanitation (WHO/UNICEF 2013) and (2) public expenditures on health.24 I recognize,however, that this indicator is likely to over-estimate reliance on self-help in countriesonce in the Soviet sphere of influence, where the demobilizing effect of totalitarianismcontinues to inhibit community solidarity and collective action (see, e.g., Howard 2003;Mondak and Gearing 1998). I therefore adjust the proxy indicator to account fortotalitarian legacies. 25 Thirteen countries receive full scores, of which only three(Bolivia, Indonesia, and Paraguay) are outside sub-Saharan Africa. Another 14 coun-tries, mostly in Latin America, receive partial scores. Migrants from these countries arelikely to have strong incentives to use their resources and influence to affect publicgoods provision back home, particularly if they have extensive cross-border linkages.

The second set of political incentives relevant to activation of the diaspora channelare channels of formal access to the political process back home. I identify four suchchannels: (2.1) state institutions dedicated to diaspora outreach, (2.2) quasi-governmental advisory councils with migrant representation, (2.3) expatriate votingrights, and (2.4) migrant seats in the national legislature. While outreach institutionscreate a target for migrant demands but do not usually provide them with any formalinfluence, the other three mechanisms create spaces for migrant input. As shown in“Appendix 2,” the scores for formal access range from a high of 100 for Mali to a lowof 0 for Guyana, Lesotho, and Nicaragua.

Over three quarters of the 40 new democracies have diaspora outreach institutions atthe national level (Gallina 2007; Gamlen et al. 2013; Ionescu 2006; Agunias Rannveigand Newland 2012). As indicated in “Appendix 4,” I give a full score to those countriesthat have either a cabinet-level ministry or multiple sub-ministerial or specializedoffices dedicated to diaspora outreach. While only Ecuador and Macedonia havecabinet-level ministries dedicated exclusively to the diaspora, five other countries(Benin, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mali, and Senegal) have “hybrid” ministries responsiblefor diaspora affairs along with other missions. 26 In addition, Chile, Mexico, thePhilippines, and Turkey combine diaspora outreach offices within the Ministry ofForeign Affairs with at least one other sub-ministry or specialized agency dedicatedto diaspora affairs.27 I give a partial score to another 20 countries that have either a sub-ministry or a specialized agency of diaspora outreach at the national level.

These institutions give migrants a degree of access to policymakers concerned withdiaspora-related issues, but they tend to be top-down initiatives aimed primarily atprotecting overseas workers and/or attracting migrant remittances, investment, or

24 To be consistent with the categorical coding used for the other political incentives, I score this indicator asfull, partial, and none based on terciles within the sample range. I recognize that drinking water and sanitationare not necessarily public goods, but coverage rates can still serve as a reasonable proxy for the government’scommitment to providing public services. Because of missing data for 2011, I am using 2000 figures forsanitation in Latvia and Lebanon and for drinking water and sanitation in Paraguay and Romania. Since Latviaand Romania have since gained access to resources linked to membership in the European Union, their figuresare likely to be inflated.25 The only post-communist countries affected by this adjustment are Albania, Moldova, and Romania, whosescores fall from partial to none.26 Senegal had a cabinet-level ministry dedicated exclusively to the diaspora until 2012, when a newadministration merged it into a hybrid Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese in the Diaspora (AfricaReview, 24 September 2013).27 In the Mexican case, I am counting the National Network of State Offices of Attention to Migrants(Conofam), which acts as an umbrella organization for state-level offices of diaspora outreach in 29 ofMexico’s 32 states.

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human capital for economic purposes (Agunias Rannveig and Newland 2012). Thus,the extent and type of migrant input is usually quite limited. A more inclusive form ofoutreach is to create quasi-governmental advisory councils composed of migrantrepresentatives to consult the government on diaspora-related issues. Such councilsexist in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mali, Mexico, Peru, Senegal, and Uruguay(Bouvier 2009; Diatta and Mbow 1999; Gonzalez Gutierrez 2009; Macalou 2009;Padilla 2011). I also give a partial score to Liberia because, despite lacking anypermanent advisory council, the government has periodically engaged migrants informal consultations.28 While these councils are vulnerable to political manipulation,they have the potential to create a more meaningful space for migrant engagementthrough the diaspora channel, particularly when the migrant representatives are electedrather than appointed.29

Another point of political access for migrants to exert influence through the diasporachannel is the right to vote from abroad. As shown in “Appendix 2,” migrants haveexercised this right in 26 of the 40 new democracies (Glickhouse and Keller 2012;Navarro Fierro et al. 2007).30 In contrast to countries without overseas voting, wheremigrants have incentives to demand reform by non-electoral means, these countriesgive migrants a direct mechanism of electoral influence. Even though most migrants donot participate in home-country elections, the migrant vote occasionally alters theoutcome of a national election, as happened in Cape Verde in 2006 and Romania in2009 (Baker 2006; Burean 2011). More importantly, the right to vote provides migrantswith a mechanism for activating the diaspora channel in the context of other incentivesto do so.

My final indicator of formal access is migrant representation in the national legis-lature. We find the most longstanding example in Cape Verde, where the 1992Constitution created three overseas regions with a total of six out of 72 seats (8.3 %)in the national parliament (Baker 2006, p. 496). Ecuador, Romania, the DominicanRepublic, and Macedonia have adopted similar reforms in the last 10 years (Burean2011; Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011; Vargas 2011).31 While these representatives aresubject to cooptation and can easily be outvoted, they at least enjoy a place at the tablein the formulation and passage of legislation, as well as privileged access to the media.If they take their role as transnational interlocutors seriously, they can encourage othermigrants to activate the diaspora channel as well.

28 The most notable examples are migrant representation on the Liberian Truth and ReconciliationCommission from 2006 to 2009 (Young and Park 2009) and the creation of a Diaspora Advisory Board bythe Liberian Embassy in Washington, DC in 2009 to consult the government on its Poverty Reduction Strategy(Moniba 2009).29 The only advisory councils with unelected representatives are the Consultative Committees to thePresidency of Dominicans Abroad (CCPDE), whose members are appointed by the president, and theSupreme Council of Senegalese Abroad (CSSE), which has a mix of elected and appointed members. Itshould be noted, however, that even the elected councils are often highly politicized and tend to be chosen by avery small minority of the migrant community.30 I give a partial score to Kenya because only migrants living in the East African Community were allowed tovote from abroad in the 2013 elections, thereby excluding the sizable communities of Kenyan migrants livingin OECD countries (“Kenyan Elections 2013: Only 960 Kenyans Register to Vote in Uganda” 2013).31 Senegal also reserved four seats for migrants in its newly created Senate in 2007, but they were directlynominated by the president rather than elected, and the Senate was disbanded entirely in 2012 (“Senegal GetsRid of Its Senate to Save Money” 2012; Whitaker 2011, p. 766).

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When we compare the scores for politicization and access, an interesting patternemerges whereby high (low) levels of politicization are accompanied by low (high)levels of access. Although this inverse relationship is partly a function of the mutualexclusivity of blocked rights and expatriate voting, it also suggests that identity-basedmobilization is perceived as a threat by political elites. At one extreme, all six countrieswith high scores for politicization (Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, andTurkey) have low levels of access, reflecting the greater reluctance of political elitesto create opportunities for migrant input in the context of refugee legacies and/orcleavage-based partisanship. At the other extreme, all six countries with high levelsof access (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Macedonia, Mali, Mexico, and Senegal) havelow to medium levels of politicization, most of which is attributable to campaigning byhome-country politicians rather than identity-based factors. Thus, a greater degree ofpolitical apathy among migrants makes it relatively “safe” for political elites in thesecountries to grant them formal access and then coopt or contain the small minority whoare politically active.

Matching Incentives to Outcomes

We are now ready to assess the likely impact of these incentives on activation of thediaspora channel. As mentioned above, I lack the necessary data to test relationships ormake causal claims, but the scores for my independent variables allow me to generatehypotheses about which countries are likely to witness activation of the diasporachannel by their migrants. Rather than combining the scores for SEI and PLI, I explorethe likely impact of their interaction by creating a matrix based on high, medium, andlow scores for each set of incentives. These scores are based on terciles within thesample range rather than ideal types and should therefore be viewed in relative ratherthan absolute terms.

I begin by treating diaspora channel activation as a single, aggregated outcome and plotthe countries based on an unweighted average of all the dimensions of SEI and PLI. Asshown in Table 2, the Dominican Republic and Mexico are the only countries to receivehigh scores on both dimensions, which suggests relatively widespread and multifacetedactivation of the diaspora channel. Migrants from El Salvador, Guyana, and Romania alsohave strong socioeconomic incentives for home-country engagement, but their moderatepolitical incentives are likely to limit the intensity and/or breadth of their participation inhome-country politics. By contrast, migrants from Ecuador, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, andTurkey combine high-PLI scores with moderate SEI scores, which suggests that cross-border political engagement may be intense but among a smaller share of migrants. Theminority nature of engagement is likely to be similar amongmigrant groupswithmoderatepolitical incentives, particularly in the low-SEI cases. Finally, a plurality of countries havelow political incentives, suggesting that their migrants will feel disconnected from thepublic arena back home regardless of their SEI scores. While activation of the diasporachannel may still occur, it is likely to be intermittent and event-driven.

Thus far, I have treated activation of the diaspora channel as an undifferentiatedoutcome with a common set of causes. As noted earlier, however, such activation cantake several forms, each of which is likely to be motivated by a different combination ofincentives. I therefore devote the next section to unpacking my dependent variable into

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three types of diaspora channel activation—electoral participation, issue advocacy, andtransnational coproduction—and matching them with specific configurations of SEIand PLI, which I then score and plot in a matrix for each type. As we will see, verydifferent patterns emerge depending on the type of activation.

Electoral Participation

One obvious way for migrants to activate the diaspora channel is through involvement inelectoral politics back home. Even if they do not have the right to vote from abroad, theymay support a home-country party or donate money to a home-country campaign. Incontrast to issue advocacy and transnational coproduction, electoral participation tends tooccur on an individual basis rather than through collective action. As result, migrants whoactivate the diaspora channel through elections face a different set of challenges than thosewho lobby their home governments or pool their resources to finance community projects.

Aside from cross-border linkages and gender, which I include as starting points forall three types of activation, I hypothesize that the most important socioeconomicincentives for electoral participation are education-based partial integration and globalmigrant density. 32 With regard to integration, well-educated migrants without host-country citizenship rights can be expected to combine strong home-country attachmentswith the economic and informational resources necessary to bear the high transaction

32 Several studies find a weak relationship between voting and gender in US and European elections whencontrolling for socioeconomic status (see, e.g., Schlozman et al. 1994). The same result is possible with regardto home-country elections, but I suspect that non-economic factors such as culture and status create a strongergender bias in overseas voting, largely because female migrants are likely to have fewer status-basedincentives to participate in electoral politics back home, particularly if they come from traditional societies.

Table 2 Socioeconomic and political incentives for diaspora channel activation

Political incentives Total

High Medium Low

Socioeconomicincentives

High Dominican Republic,Mexico

El Salvador, Guyana,Romania

Albania, Bulgaria,Guatemala, Honduras,Moldova, Nepal,Nicaragua

12

Medium Ecuador, Kenya,Mali, Senegal,Turkey

Benin, Bolivia,Indonesia, Liberia,Macedonia,Peru, Philippines,Sierra Leone,Uruguay

Latvia, Lesotho,Panama, Paraguay,Ukraine

19

Low Brazil, Cape Verde,Ghana, Lebanon

Argentina, Chile,Namibia,South Africa,Zambia

9

Total 7 16 17 40

Socioeconomic incentives: (1) cross-border linkages and (2) transnationally oriented profile. Political incen-tives: (1) politicization of diaspora and (2) formal access

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costs of overseas voting and campaign financing. I do not expect to find the same set ofconditions among migrants with duration-based partial integration, since they are lesslikely to possess these resources and more likely to be detached from a political systemthey left many years ago.

With regard to density, highly concentrated migrants should have easier access toinformation, polling places (if relevant), and outreach initiatives by overseas politiciansthan migrants who are more dispersed. I am using the global density indicator becauseelectoral statistics show that migrants living in other developing countries are as, if notmore, likely to vote from abroad than their OECD-based counterparts, particularly ifthey live in a nearby country. Thus, the regime type of the host country does not appearto matter as much to individual-level participation, and home-country parties andcandidates may have more opportunities to use clientelist appeals with concentratedmigrants who are poor and living in close proximity. I therefore find that it is importantto measure migrant density across all destinations.

Turning to the political incentives for electoral participation, I include three politi-cization variables (cleavage-based partisanship, overseas party presence, and overseascampaigning) and two access variables (expatriate voting rights and migrant seats in thenational legislature). While expatriate voting rights are a necessary condition foroverseas voting, the other incentives can be expected to affect rates of electoral turnoutamong those migrants who enjoy such rights. 33 In addition, the politicization variablesmay lead migrants to make campaign contributions, lobby for particular candidateswith their friends and family, or return home to vote even if they are unable to castoverseas ballots. In fact, political parties from Bulgaria, the Dominican Republic, andLebanon have been known to finance flights for migrants to return to their local pollingstations on election day (Gilbert 2009; Lieber 2010, pp. 114–115; Smilov et al. 2009,pp. 228–229).

Table 3 presents a matrix based on high, medium, and low scores for theseconfigurations of SEI and PLI. The absence of any cases with high scores on bothdimensions suggests that electoral participation is limited to a small minority ofmigrants regardless of politicization or access. We are most likely to find such activityin the 12 countries with high PLI, although with variations in scope. While migrantsfrom Bolivia, Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Kenya (in East Africa),Macedonia, Mali, Romania, and Senegal can vote from abroad, migrants fromGuyana, Lebanon, and Turkey, as well as OECD-based migrants from Kenya, arelimited to other kinds of electoral participation. Nonetheless, cleavage-based partisan-ship in these four countries may heighten the intensity and breadth of such participa-tion, with implications for electoral turnout if and when migrants gain suffrage. Bycontrast, electoral participation is likely to be quite limited in Ecuador and Mali, whichhave migrant seats in the national legislature but lack either cleavage-based partisanshipor overseas party structures to mobilize migrant voters.

A plurality of countries are at the other end of the political spectrum, with weakpolitical incentives likely to dampen electoral participation regardless of their SEIscores. Migrants from Albania and Nepal are socioeconomically positioned to play a

33 Another factor that is likely to have a major impact on voter turnout, but is beyond the scope of this article,is the extent to which the home country’s voting rules and infrastructure facilitate (or obstruct) electoralparticipation (see, e.g., Chelius 2003; Lafleur 2013; Lieber 2010).

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role in home-country elections, but they are weakly politicized and have no votingrights, so we can expect to see very little partisan activity despite their high-SEI scores.Another six low-PLI countries do not allow expatriate voting, although migrants fromChile, Guatemala, and Uruguay have carried out campaigns to demand this right.Finally, seven low-PLI countries allow overseas balloting but are weakly politicized,suggesting low rates of electoral participation even with the right to vote.

The remaining countries combine moderate PLI with varying levels of SEI. We aretherefore likely to find some degree of electoral participation but with less diversityand/or a lower rate of participation than in the high-PLI cases. Ghana and Liberia donot allow their migrants to vote overseas but receive medium-PLI scores due tooverseas party organization and campaigning. All of the other medium-PLI countriesallow expatriate voting but have lower levels of politicization, which is likely todampen electoral participation.34

Issue Advocacy

A second type of diaspora channel activation is issue advocacy, whereby migrantsdemand policy reforms by their home-country governments. Although advocacy canoccur on an individual basis, particularly if migrants have direct access topolicymakers, it often requires collective action. We also find variation in the typesof issues around which migrants mobilize. Most migrant organizations focus on issues

34 A notable exception that proves the rule is the high turnout among Latvian migrants to vote in a 2012referendum to determine whether Russian should become Latvia’s second official language. Actively encour-aged by Latvian diaspora organizations, nearly 40,000 Latvians cast ballots from abroad, an almost three-foldincrease over the number of overseas votes in the parliamentary elections just 1 year before (Corcoran 2013).These outcomes are consistent with Latvia’s combination of weak party outreach and cleavage-basedpartisanship.

Table 3 Socioeconomic and political incentives for electoral participation

Political incentives Total

High Medium Low

Socioeconomicincentives

High Moldova Albania, Nepal 3

Medium Bolivia, DominicanRepublic, Ecuador,Guyana, Macedonia,Mali, Romania,Senegal, Turkey

Benin, Bulgaria,El Salvador,Liberia,Mexico,Namibia,Ukraine

Guatemala, Honduras,Indonesia, Lesotho,Nicaragua, Paraguay,Sierra Leone,Uruguay

24

Low Cape Verde, Kenya,Lebanon

Brazil, Ghana,Latvia, Peru,South Africa

Argentina, Chile,Panama, Philippines,Zambia

13

Total 12 13 15 40

Socioeconomic incentives: (1) cross-border linkages, (2) male share in OECD, (3) education-based partialintegration in OECD, and (4) migrant density across top five destinations adjusted for state-level density inUSA. Political incentives: (1) cleavage-based partisanship, (2) overseas party presence, (3) overseascampaigning, (4) expatriate voting, and (5) migrant seats in national legislature

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that affect them directly, such as the right to vote from abroad or protection againstmigrant abuses, but they may also lobby for domestic reforms (e.g., anti-corruptionmeasures, language policy) or broader changes in foreign policy (e.g., contestedborders, bilateral relations).

Aside from cross-border linkages and gender, I hypothesize that the most importantsocioeconomic incentives for issue advocacy are post-primary education and migrantdensity in the OECD. As with electoral participation, well-educated migrants are morelikely to possess the economic and intellectual resources to bear the required transactioncosts, which may be even higher if collective action is required. I am using the share ofmigrants with post-primary education rather than education-based partial integrationbecause the acquisition of citizenship rights in the host country often coexists withcross-border activism on broader social or political issues, particularly among diasporascharacterized by social cleavages or refugee legacies. With regard to migrant density, Iam using the OECD figure rather than global density because of the more conduciveconditions for collective organizing and political expression in advanced democracies.Whereas the more individual and private activities of expatriate voting or overseasfinancing occur regularly in non-democratic settings, issue advocacy is more likely toemerge in host countries with democratic institutions and vibrant civil societies. Thus,migrants who are highly concentrated within the OECD are likely to have strongerincentives and opportunities to activate the diaspora channel through issue advocacy.35

Regarding the political incentives for issue advocacy, I include three politicizationindicators (refugee legacy, cleavage-based partisanship, and blocked political rights)and two access indicators (diaspora outreach and migrant advisory council). While allthree kinds of politicization can be expected to spur rights-based claims, a refugeelegacy and/or cleavage-based partisanship is likely to generate interest in broaderquestions of national identity, regime quality, or cultural politics. Among the accessvariables, diaspora outreach institutions create targets for migrant organizations seekingto influence home-country policymakers while migrant advisory councils providepotential interlocutors within the migrant community.

Table 4 plots the high, medium, and low scores for these configurations of SEI andPLI for issue advocacy. Once again, we do not find any cases with high scores alongboth dimensions. Migrants from Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Turkey, and Uruguayreceive high-PLI scores, but for different reasons and with varying levels of SEI. In thecase of Uruguay, which combines blocked political rights with diaspora outreach and amigrant advisory council, we can expect issue advocacy to focus on rights-based claimsand to occur through more technocratic channels. In the other high-PLI cases, migrantshave less formal access to policymaking but higher levels of politicization. Combinedwith either high rates of post-primary education (Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Liberia) orhigh migrant density in the OECD (Turkey), we can expect organized migrants fromthese countries to make broad-based claims on their home governments, including butnot limited to the right to vote from abroad.

The vast majority of countries are divided between low- and medium-PLI scores.Issue advocacy is likely to be quite rare at the low end of the political spectrum but may

35 As with all of my indicators, there are notable exceptions that reflect a more complicated reality. Forexample, migrant organizations are arguably stronger and more prevalent in Argentina and Hong Kong than inJapan (see, e.g., Grismon and Paz Soldán 2000; Pizarro 2009; Rother 2009; Yamanaka 2010).

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occur in response to specific events or crises (e.g., the 2009 coup in Honduras). It islikely to be somewhat more frequent and sustained in the medium-PLI countries, butwith important variations corresponding to the types of incentives. A good example isthe contrast between Albania and Kenya. Although they both combine medium PLIwith high SEI, only Kenya has cleavage-based partisanship and a high rate of post-primary education in the OECD. Thus, Kenyan migrants can be expected to engage inmore frequent and broader-based issue advocacy than their Albanian counterparts. Weare also likely to find parallels to the Uruguayan case among medium-PLI countrieswith high levels of formal access but a lack of cleavage-based partisanship (e.g., Brazil,Dominican Republic, Mali, Mexico, Peru, Senegal), where a vocal minority can beexpected to demand policy changes back home but on a narrower set of issues andthrough more technocratic channels.

Transnational Co-production

A third type of diaspora channel activation is transnational coproduction, wherebymigrants pool their resources to invest in public goods back home, sometimes incollaboration with the government.36 In contrast to the overtly “political” nature ofelectoral participation or issue advocacy, transnational coproduction can be seen as aform of sociocultural transnationalism, which Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) define as“the emergence of practices of sociability, mutual help, and public rituals rooted in thecultural understandings that pertain to the sense of belonging and social obligations ofimmigrants” (p. 768). Nonetheless, while not all such practices are political, they

Table 4 Socioeconomic and political incentives for issue advocacy

Political incentives Total

High Medium Low

Socioeconomicincentives

High Albania, Benin, Bolivia,Guyana, Kenya, Nepal,Nicaragua

Bulgaria, Moldova,Paraguay, Romania

11

Medium Lebanon, SierraLeone, Turkey,Uruguay

Dominican Republic,Ecuador, El Salvador,Ghana, Guatemala, Latvia,Mali, Mexico, Peru,Philippines, Senegal,Ukraine, Zambia

Argentina, Honduras,Indonesia, Panama,South Africa

22

Low Liberia Brazil, Chile, Macedonia,Namibia

Cape Verde, Lesotho 7

Total 5 24 11 40

Socioeconomic incentives: (1) cross-border linkages, (2) male share in OECD, (3) OECD share with post-primary education, and (4) migrant density across top five OECD destinations adjusted for state-level densityin USA and total number of OECD-based migrants. Political incentives: (1) refugee legacy, (2) cleavage-basedpartisanship, (3) blocked political rights, (4) diaspora outreach, and (5) migrant advisory council

36 Organized migrants are also increasingly involved in promoting business development and job creationback home. Although this form of engagement is important and may affect home-country politics, I am nottreating it as transnational coproduction because of its emphasis on private rather than public goods.

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become so once they bring migrants into the public sphere, particularly if they involvecollective action or coordination with government officials (Guarnizo et al. 2003,p. 1223).

Aside from cross-border linkages and gender, I hypothesize that the most importantsocioeconomic incentives for transnational coproduction are duration-based partialintegration and migrant density in the OECD. Migrants who have not fully integratedinto their host country despite many years of residence are most likely to reap statusgains from this type of activation, particularly if they continue to maintain cross-borderlinkages. At the same time, they need to be able to overcome the obstacles to collectiveaction and have sufficient resources to invest in public goods back home, both of whichare likely to be enhanced by migrant density in OECD countries.

Turning to the political incentives for transnational coproduction, I include onepoliticization indicator (reliance on self-help) and one access indicator (diaspora out-reach). The other politicization indicators are unlikely to have much impact on trans-national coproduction. While migrants are by no means immune to partisanship orsocial cleavages when making decisions about whether to invest in community pro-jects, these concerns are likely to be both more peripheral and more local than forelectoral participation or issue advocacy. 37 The one exception is reliance by theircommunities of origin on self-help mechanisms to correct for the government’s failureto meet basic needs, which creates incentives for migrants to take up the slack,particularly if they have extensive cross-border linkages. Meanwhile, diaspora outreachserves as a rough proxy for the state’s commitment to migrants, which is likely to createmore space for transnational coproduction. In a few cases, it has a direct impact throughprograms that provide financial or logistical support for migrant organizations orprojects.38

Table 5 creates a matrix with high, medium, and low scores for these configurationsof SEI and PLI. Mali, Mexico, and Senegal receive high scores on both dimensions as aresult of their male-dominated migration, high levels of duration-based partial integra-tion, OECD density, reliance on self-help, and diaspora outreach. We can thereforeexpect to see significant investment in public goods by their migrants, perhaps incollaboration with the state. Ten other countries combine a reliance on self-help withdiaspora outreach, but their migrants have weaker socioeconomic incentives, suggest-ing that such investment will occur but on a smaller scale and in a more piece-mealfashion.

Just over a third of the countries are at the other end of the political spectrum. Wecan still expect to find migrant-financed projects in the five countries that combine lowPLI with high SEI, particularly since they all have deficits in public goods provision.Nonetheless, such investment is likely to be quite sporadic as a result of eithertotalitarian legacies (Albania, Romania) or a lack of diaspora outreach (Guyana,Honduras, Nicaragua). The only other low-PLI countries with under-provided publicgoods are Moldova, Namibia, and South Africa, but Moldova’s totalitarian past is likelyto inhibit its migrants from acting collectively to fill the gap, and the two African

37 A notable exception is investment in churches, mosques, or other religious projects, but I am excludingthese from transnational coproduction because they are not publicly funded in most countries.38 The most prominent example is Mexico’s Three-for-One Program, which provides matching grants tomigrant organizations with qualifying local projects (Fernandez de Castro et al. 2006; Duquette, this volume).

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countries lack diaspora outreach and have weak socioeconomic incentives, includingvery low levels of duration-based partial integration in the OECD. We are least likely tosee transnational coproduction by migrants from the remaining low-PLI countries,which combine low levels of duration-based partial integration with adequate provisionof public goods.

A third group of countries has moderate political incentives to engage in transna-tional coproduction. We are most likely to find such activity in countries with high-SEIscores, particularly the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala, whichcombine high levels of duration-based partial integration with moderate reliance onself-help. Cape Verde and Peru have a similar profile but at a slightly lower level.Finally, transnational coproduction may also take place in the four low-SEI countriesbut on an even more sporadic basis, since migrants either have weaker incentives toprovide public goods (Chile, Lebanon) or less encouragement by the state (Lesotho,Liberia). In the African cases, migrants may help their families purchase water, build alatrine, or access healthcare, but they are less likely to invest collectively in publicgoods given the combination of weak diaspora outreach and a higher share of migrantsliving in poor, non-democratic countries where acting collectively and raising funds forcommunity projects tends to be more difficult.39

39 For example, OECD-based migrants from Liberia are quite well-organized and have invested in education,health, agriculture, and resettlement projects back home (Stephen Lubkemann 2008; Stevens 2007; Young andPark 2009), but they represent only 20 % of all Liberian migrants.

Table 5 Socioeconomic and political incentives for transnational coproduction

Political incentives Total

High Medium Low

Socioeconomicincentives

High Mali, Mexico, Senegal Dominican Republic,El Salvador,Guatemala,Turkey

Albania, Guyana,Honduras,Nicaragua,Romania

12

Medium Benin, Bolivia, Ecuador,Ghana, Indonesia,Kenya, Nepal,Philippines,Sierra Leone

Brazil, Cape Verde,Macedonia,Paraguay, Peru

Argentina, Bulgaria,Moldova, Ukraine,Uruguay

19

Low Zambia Chile, Lebanon,Lesotho, Liberia

Latvia, Namibia,Panama,South Africa

9

Total 13 13 14 40

Socioeconomic incentives: (1) cross-border linkages, (2) male share in OECD, (3) duration-based partialintegration in OECD, and (4) migrant density across top five OECD destinations adjusted for state-leveldensity in USA and total number of OECD-based migrants. Political incentives: (1) home-country reliance onself-help and (2) diaspora outreach

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Conclusion

In this article, I have constructed a comprehensive, if complex, model of theincentive structures likely to affect activation of the diaspora channel bymigrants from 40 new democracies. Specifically, I identify and code twoindependent variables: (1) SEI derived from cross-border linkages and migrantcharacteristics likely to encourage broader forms of transnationalism and (2)PLI derived from politicization of the diaspora and formal channels of access tothe political process back home. Based on an unweighted average of theaggregate scores for SEI and PLI, the Dominican Republic receives the highestscore of 61.2 while Panama receives the lowest score of 29.4. As my analysisillustrates, however, these aggregate scores obscure a significant degree ofvariation likely to shape not only the degree but also the nature of diasporachannel activation.

By incorporating a broad array of indicators and then disaggregating theminto sub-categories, I am better able to capture the nuance and complexity ofmigrant motivations. The case of the Philippines is instructive. Despite itsfamed reliance on labor exports and the high degree of involvement by boththe government and domestic civil society in managing and/or protectingmigrants (Solomon 2009), my analysis suggests that Filipinos may not be asengaged in home-country politics as we might expect from just looking at theemigration rate, volume of remittances, or government policies. 40 We couldreach a similar conclusion about Mexico, which is often considered a paradig-matic case of migrant transnationalism yet does not receive consistently highscores once we disaggregate diaspora channel activation. By relying on bothquantitative and qualitative indicators that include a broad cross-section ofmigrants, rather than just a vocal minority, I hope to provide a more balancedview of the degree to which they are likely to activate the diaspora channel andthereby influence politics back home.

Several caveats are nonetheless in order. First, as mentioned in the introduc-tion, I am relying on very broad, aggregated, and often incomplete data. Ofparticular concern is the lack of profile data for migrants outside the OECD,which undoubtedly skews the SEI scores, although it is not clear in whichdirection. In addition, my qualitative indicators gloss over important differencesthat are not captured by my categorical coding, even with the inclusion ofpartial values.41 For example, not all outreach institutions or migrant advisorycouncils have the same level of autonomy or influence, nor are all systems ofexpatriate voting equally accessible to migrants (Lafleur 2013; Lieber 2010).Returning to the Philippines, the government’s extensive outreach probablycompensates to some degree for weak politicization in providing migrants withincentives to engage in issue advocacy, particularly on outreach-related issues.Moreover, my scoring system applies the same weights to socioeconomic and

40 Given the prevalence of temporary labor migration, the return channel may be of greater importance thanthe diaspora channel to politics in the Philippines.41 It would be possible—and desirable—to construct a multi-point scale for these indicators, but such anendeavour requires additional research that is beyond the scope of this article.

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political incentives, even though they are likely to resonate unevenly and todifferent degrees depending on the type of diaspora channel activation. Finally,my reliance on data that can be relatively easily gathered and coded for all 40countries necessarily overlooks historical or sociological factors that are likely to beimportant in particular cases.

A second caveat is that the scoring levels are relative to my sample of 40new democracies rather than to some ideal-type of socioeconomic or politicalincentives to activate the diaspora channel. Thus, even when countries receivehigh scores on both dimensions, this does not mean that most of their migrantsare actively engaged in politics back home. In fact, most of them are probablynot, which brings us to a third caveat. While there is evidence that politicaltransnationalism is increasing, this activity remains at the margins of politicalprocesses in both the home and host countries. I still believe the diasporachannel is worth studying, not least of all because governments and politicalparties are taking migrants seriously enough to adopt strategies explicitlydesigned to gain their support. I also suspect that migrants are having a deeperimpact on homeland politics through their indirect influence on the politicalbehavior of non-migrants back home (see Introduction, this volume).Nonetheless, we need to be modest about our claims.

This article leaves two critical questions unanswered. First, to what extent dothe incentive structures I have identified match up with the actual behaviors ofmigrants from these 40 countries? Answering this question requires furtherresearch to determine the extent to which migrants have, in fact, engaged inelectoral politics, issue advocacy, and transnational coproduction. Once there aresufficient data to code these outcomes, it becomes possible to conduct empiricaltests of my hypothesized correlations. In the process, we may discover that notall of the incentives I have identified are necessary to explain activation of thediaspora channel.

The second unanswered question is whether long-distance involvement bymigrants in electoral politics, issue advocacy, or transnational coproduction isgood or bad for democracy. On the one hand, migrants may weaken democ-racy by crowding out domestic claims to representation, supporting leaders orpolicies that perpetuate corrupt and/or exclusionary practices, or exacerbat-ing ethnic, religious, or partisan cleavages. On the other hand, they maystrengthen democracy by encouraging electoral competition, expanding thepolitical franchise, empowering local residents to demand their rights, andholding politicians accountable in their communities of origin. Answers toboth of these questions require further research that enables us to trace themechanisms, outcomes, and implications of the diaspora channel in newdemocracies.

Acknowledgments The author would like to thank her research assistants for their invaluable help,as well as Joy Langston, Deepak Lamba-Nieves, Covadonga Meseguer, and the reviewers for theirdetailed comments on earlier drafts, which were presented at the Center for Research and Teachingin Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City and the Transnational Studies Initiative at Harvard Universityin Cambridge, MA.

St Comp Int Dev

Table6

Socioeconomicincentives

fordiaspora

channelactiv

ation

Country

Emigratio

nrate

Rem

/GDP

(per

cap,

log)

Phone

index

Proxim

ityindex

Linkages

OECD

%male

OECD

%post-primary

OECD

EPI

OECD

DPI

OECD

density

Global

density

Profile

Albania

45.4

50.1

48.4

94.2

59.5

54.4

45.3

41.3

31.5

73.4

81.3

54.5

Argentin

a2.4

34.0

51.5

42.9

32.7

49.4

74.2

43.3

22.8

57.8

50.7

49.7

Benin

5.8

65.3

12.4

81.0

41.1

55.8

75.1

30.1

24.0

50.2

66.5

50.3

Bolivia

6.8

68.7

34.4

65.7

43.9

44.2

69.6

53.1

22.1

65.3

71.1

54.2

Brazil

0.7

52.9

39.2

31.0

30.9

48.8

70.3

53.4

27.6

40.9

40.6

46.9

Bulgaria

16.0

48.3

50.3

71.7

46.6

46.3

77.5

59.8

20.0

46.9

62.6

52.2

CapeVerde

37.5

49.0

25.9

55.6

42.0

45.8

28.8

16.1

37.8

52.7

54.3

39.2

Chile

3.7

0.9

44.3

50.2

24.8

48.3

79.5

36.2

30.9

33.2

47.3

45.9

Dom

.Rep.

10.1

65.0

41.4

87.7

51.0

42.6

56.4

29.6

36.1

58.6

65.4

48.1

Ecuador

8.3

61.2

52.2

61.9

45.9

48.7

54.4

44.8

19.4

64.4

71.3

50.5

ElSalvador

20.5

69.3

58.3

85.9

58.5

52.9

46.3

31.0

44.4

50.4

56.1

46.9

Ghana

3.4

38.7

15.1

57.5

28.7

55.5

72.4

42.5

27.9

37.7

42.8

46.4

Guatemala

6.1

80.3

55.8

87.8

57.5

60.1

43.0

32.3

41.0

42.1

49.0

44.6

Guyana

56.8

49.3

39.2

75.5

55.2

45.9

76.3

20.2

20.7

61.9

72.2

49.5

Honduras

7.5

84.7

53.9

84.0

57.5

53.3

47.6

36.1

37.0

36.0

41.6

41.9

Indonesia

1.1

71.6

39.6

69.7

45.5

46.3

82.1

30.4

27.2

41.1

70.3

49.6

Kenya

1.1

96.8

21.3

58.7

44.5

49.7

78.5

25.7

22.4

48.6

57.1

47.0

Latvia

12.2

48.8

51.4

65.5

44.5

42.7

80.8

41.0

28.2

29.1

51.3

45.5

Lebanon

15.6

77.8

28.3

38.5

40.0

53.9

73.3

14.8

15.7

30.8

34.6

37.2

Lesotho

20.5

73.8

13.6

88.6

49.2

39.9

66.7

4.6

5.5

18.0

87.4

37.0

Liberia

10.5

58.3

7.1

80.3

39.1

50.3

77.9

51.4

27.5

22.4

63.8

48.9

App

endix1

St Comp Int Dev

Table6

(contin

ued)

Country

Emigratio

nrate

Rem

/GDP

(per

cap,

log)

Phone

index

Proxim

ityindex

Linkages

OECD

%male

OECD

%post-primary

OECD

EPI

OECD

DPI

OECD

density

Global

density

Profile

Macedonia

21.9

48.2

52.4

64.6

46.8

51.6

44.2

27.3

38.6

45.0

54.2

43.5

Mali

7.6

63.3

8.8

74.5

38.6

62.2

32.1

22.7

45.0

62.6

62.2

47.8

Mexico

10.7

48.8

42.8

98.9

50.3

55.9

40.3

30.4

46.6

61.6

61.3

49.4

Moldova

21.5

72.8

52.8

74.2

55.3

47.2

78.6

60.3

20.7

49.5

63.7

53.3

Nam

ibia

0.7

45.3

16.1

58.5

30.1

45.7

90.6

45.0

21.1

21.1

58.9

47.1

Nepal

3.3

100.0

8.2

78.6

47.5

61.5

82.5

68.6

17.0

31.2

74.6

55.9

Nicaragua

12.5

67.6

22.8

84.6

46.9

47.3

71.4

37.6

42.1

53.2

71.7

53.9

Panama

4.0

47.1

75.9

79.6

51.7

39.8

87.5

23.5

22.4

30.9

42.3

41.1

Paraguay

7.9

56.5

41.3

78.0

45.9

50.1

64.9

39.2

26.1

55.9

77.2

52.2

Peru

3.7

59.3

40.6

51.8

38.9

46.3

78.9

48.8

30.6

44.2

41.0

48.3

Philippines

9.3

85.3

31.9

36.5

40.7

39.0

86.3

33.4

26.4

47.5

42.8

45.9

Rom

ania

13.1

48.5

55.7

69.5

46.7

46.6

70.4

51.6

34.7

57.9

60.0

53.5

Senegal

4.9

81.6

20.3

65.8

43.1

56.5

44.3

28.9

31.7

57.5

52.7

45.2

Sierra

Leone

4.6

58.2

6.1

76.0

36.2

48.9

72.4

41.8

25.5

37.7

69.9

49.4

SouthAfrica

1.7

44.1

32.7

43.1

30.4

48.4

88.7

36.1

20.5

43.5

51.4

48.1

Turkey

5.6

18.2

51.0

73.8

37.1

52.4

33.6

17.9

42.6

75.2

74.2

49.3

Ukraine

14.4

52.2

63.6

71.2

50.4

41.7

74.0

29.5

20.1

42.1

63.8

45.2

Uruguay

10.5

19.8

63.3

61.0

38.7

46.6

66.6

38.0

23.6

52.3

61.8

48.1

Zam

bia

1.4

8.8

8.4

67.5

21.5

46.9

86.1

29.0

20.3

45.0

52.6

46.6

Average

11.3

56.8

37.0

68.5

43.4

49.2

66.7

36.2

28.1

46.9

59.3

47.8

Forcoding

strategies,d

ates,and

sources,see“A

ppendix3”

St Comp Int Dev

App

endix2

Table7

Politicalincentives

fordiaspora

channelactiv

ation

Country

Refugee

legacy

Cleavage-based

partisanship

Party

presence

Overseas

campaigning

Blocked

rights

Relianceon

self-help

Politicization

Diaspora

outreach

Migrant

advisory

council

Expatriate

votin

gLegislative

seats

Form

alaccess

Albania

00

0.5

01

025.0

0.5

00

012.5

Argentin

a0.5

00

00

08.3

0.5

01

037.5

Benin

00.5

01

01

41.7

10

10

50.0

Bolivia

00.5

0.5

10.5

158.3

0.5

01

037.5

Brazil

00

0.5

00

0.5

16.7

0.5

11

062.5

Bulgaria

00.5

0.5

00

016.7

0.5

01

037.5

CapeVerde

00

11

00.5

41.7

0.5

01

162.5

Chile

0.5

00

01

025.0

10

00

25.0

Dom

inican

Republic

0.5

01

10.5

0.5

58.3

0.5

11

187.5

Ecuador

00

01

0.5

0.5

33.3

10

11

75.0

ElSalvador

0.5

00.5

10.5

0.5

50.0

0.5

01

037.5

Ghana

00.5

11

11

75.0

0.5

00

012.5

Guatemala

0.5

00

01

0.5

33.3

0.5

00

012.5

Guyana

01

11

10.5

75.0

00

00

0.0

Honduras

00

00

00.5

8.3

00

10

25.0

Indonesia

00

00

01

16.7

10

10

50.0

Kenya

01

11

11

83.3

0.5

00.5

025.0

Latvia

0.5

10

00

025.0

0.5

01

037.5

Lebanon

0.5

11

11

075.0

10

00

25.0

Lesotho

00

00

11

33.3

00

00

0.0

Liberia

10.5

11

11

91.7

00.5

00

12.5

St Comp Int Dev

Table7

(contin

ued)

Country

Refugee

legacy

Cleavage-based

partisanship

Party

presence

Overseas

campaigning

Blocked

rights

Relianceon

self-help

Politicization

Diaspora

outreach

Migrant

advisory

council

Expatriate

votin

gLegislative

seats

Form

alaccess

Macedonia

0.5

0.5

0.5

00

025.0

10

11

75.0

Mali

00

01

01

33.3

11

11

100.0

Mexico

00

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

33.3

11

10

75.0

Moldova

00.5

00

00

8.3

0.5

01

037.5

Nam

ibia

10.5

00

00.5

33.3

00

10

25.0

Nepal

00

00

11

33.3

0.5

00

012.5

Nicaragua

0.5

00

01

0.5

33.3

00

00

0.0

Panama

00

00

00

0.0

00

10

25.0

Paraguay

00

00

0.5

125.0

00

10

25.0

Peru

00.5

01

00.5

33.3

0.5

11

062.5

Philippines

00

00

0.5

0.5

16.7

10

10

50.0

Rom

ania

00

11

00

33.3

0.5

01

162.5

Senegal

00

11

01

50.0

11

10

75.0

Sierra

Leone

10.5

00

11

58.3

0.5

00

012.5

SouthAfrica

00.5

00

00.5

16.7

00

10

25.0

Turkey

11

11

10

83.3

10

00

25.0

Ukraine

0.5

10

00

025.0

0.5

01

037.5

Uruguay

0.5

00.5

01

033.3

0.5

10

037.5

Zam

bia

00.5

00

11

41.7

0.5

00

012.5

Count/average

1518

1817

2227

37.7

318

266

37.5

Forcoding

strategies,d

ates,and

sources,see“A

ppendix4”

St Comp Int Dev

Appendix 3

Table 8 Indicators, coding strategies, and sources for socioeconomic incentives

Indicators Coding strategy Sources

Emigration rate Stock of emigrants as share of home-country population (2010)

World Bank (2011)

Remittances/migrant as shareof GDP percapita

Annual remittances divided by migrantstocks as share of GDP per capita (2010)

World Bank, Bilateral Migration andRemittances (http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0); World Bank, WorldDatabank (http://databank.worldbank.org)

Phone access Landlines and mobile phone subscriptionsper 100 people in home country and top5 destinations adjusted by share ofmigrant stocks in each destination(2010)

World Bank, Data Catalog (http://data.worldbank.org/country); World Bank,Bilateral Migration and Remittances(http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0)

Proximity to homecountry

Index of weighted average of distancebetween closest population centers(shared borders=0) multiplied by shareof migrant stocks in top 5 destinations(2010)

Google maps (https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en); World Bank, BilateralMigration and Remittances (http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0)

Gender Male share of OECD-based migrants(2005)

OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECDCountries (http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/dioc.htm)

Post-primaryeducation

Share of OECD-based migrants withsecondary or tertiary schooling (2005)

OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECDCountries (http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/dioc.htm)

Education-basedpartialintegration

Share of OECD-based migrants with sec-ondary or tertiary schooling multipliedby non-naturalized share (2005)

OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECDCountries (http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/dioc.htm); OECD.International Migration Database (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG)

Duration-basedpartialintegration

Share of OECD-based migrants with atleast 10 years in host country multipliedby non-naturalized share (2005)

OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECDCountries (http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/dioc.htm); OECD.International Migration Database(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG)

OECD migrantdensity

Weighted average of share of migrantsacross top 5 OECD destinations (2010),adjusted for state-level density in USA(2011), and natural log of total numberof OECD-based migrants (2010)

World Bank, Bilateral Migration andRemittances (http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0); US Census, AmericanCommunity Survey, Public UseMicrodata Sample (http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data_documentation/public_use_microdata_sample/)

Global migrantdensity

Weighted average of share of migrantsacross top 5 global destinations (2010),adjusted for state-level density in USA(2011)

World Bank, Bilateral Migration andRemittances (http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0); US Census, AmericanCommunity Survey, Public UseMicrodata Sample (http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data_documentation/public_use_microdata_sample/)

St Comp Int Dev

Appendix 4

Table 9 Indicators, coding strategies, and sources for political incentives

Indicators Coding strategy Sources

Refugee legacy 1=at least 3 % of all migrants classifiedas refugees in 2010; 0.5=major refugeeflows in past but with intervening wavesof economically motivated migration

UNHCR Statistical Yearbook,2010 (http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9cc9c9.html)

World Bank, Bilateral Migrationand Remittances (http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0)

Various secondary sources

Cleavage-basedpartisanship

1=social cleavages along ethnic, racial,religious, or linguistic lines thatcorrespond to divisions among both partiesand electorates; 0.5=social cleavageswith less explicit or encompassing overlapwith partisan divisions

Various secondary sources

Overseas partypresence

1=at least 2 major parties have permanentbranches in foreign countries; 0.5=overseasparty presence is limited to fewer than2 major parties and/or does not includepermanent branches

Various secondary sources

Overseascampaigning

1=overseas visits by presidential and/orvice-presidential candidates during campaignseason; 0.5=prohibition against overseascampaigning but informal visits by presidentialand/or vice-presidential candidates duringcampaign season

Various secondary sources

Blocked politicalrights

1=no expatriate voting rights in OECD;0.5=expatriate voting rights but only asresult of migrant mobilization

Various secondary sources

Reliance onself-help

Index of share of households without accessto water and/or sanitation (2011) andrescaled public health expenditures,PPP (2006) adjusted for totalitarian legacy

WHO/UNICEF 2013; UNDP 2009

Diaspora outreach 1=cabinet-level ministry or multiple sub-ministriesand/or specialized agencies dedicated todiaspora outreach beyond traditional consularservices; 0.5=single sub-ministry or specializedagency dedicated to diaspora outreach beyondtraditional consular services

Various secondary sources

Migrant advisorycouncil

1=formal body with permanent migrantrepresentation; 0.5=informal and/ortemporary forum with migrant input

Various secondary sources

Expatriate votingrights

1=expatriate voting rights for least50 % of all emigrants; 0.5=expatriatevoting rights for fewer than 50 %of all emigrants

Various secondary sources

Migrant legislativeseats

Overseas districts with migrant representationin national legislature

Various secondary sources

St Comp Int Dev

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Katrina Burgess is Associate Professor of Political Economy at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. She isauthor of Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy and co-editor with Abraham F. Lowenthal of TheCalifornia-Mexico Connection. She has also published numerous book chapters and articles, including piecesin World Politics, South European Politics and Society, Comparative Political Studies, Politica y gobierno,International Studies Review, Studies in Comparative International Development, and Latin American Politics& Society. Her current project addresses the impact of migration on politics in new democracies in thedeveloping world. Professor Burgess received a B.A. in political science from Swarthmore College, an M.A.in international relations from the University of Southern California, and a Ph.D. in politics from PrincetonUniversity. She has also served as Assistant Director of the US–Mexico Project at the Overseas DevelopmentCouncil in Washington, DC and Associate Director of the California–Mexico Project at USC in Los Angeles.

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