University of Groningen The social impacts of large

University of Groningen

The social impacts of large projects on Indigenous PeoplesHanna de Almeida Oliveira, Philippe

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CHAPTER 2Humanrights,Indigenouspeoples and the concept

ofFree,PriorandInformedConsent

Philippe Hanna

FrankVanclay

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Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of free, prior and informed consent

ABSTRACT

Thehumanrighttoself-determinationisenactedinvariousinternationaltreatiesandconventions.

In order to facilitate self-determination, it is necessary to provide Indigenous peoples with

opportunities to participate in decision-making and project development. The obligation for

governments and companies to engage impacted communities is recognized in international

law, especially with the principle of ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’, which is outlined

in the United NationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoplesandintheInternational

LabourOrganizationConvention169.Theencounterbetweenhumanrights,Indigenouspeoples

andminingandotherextractiveindustriesisdiscussed,especiallyasitishasplayedoutinBrazil.

Werecommendthatcompaniesshouldfullyendorseandrespecttheseinternationallyrecognized

human rights, including self-determination, even where not required by national or local

legislation. We also discuss the relationship between Free, Prior and Informed Consent and

ImpactsandBenefitsAgreements.

KEYWORDS

Social impact assessment; Right to have rights; Social licence to operate; Corporate social

responsibility;Human rightsimpactassessment

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2.1. INTRODUCTION

Thispaperdiscussesvariouscontemporary issues surroundinghumanrights, Indigenouspeoples

andtheirrelationshipwiththeextractiveindustries,focusingontheBraziliancontext.Inparticular,

theconceptof‘Free,Prior andInformedConsent’(FPIC)isdetailed.AmajordemandofIndigenous

peoplesfacingdevelopmentprojectslikelytoimpacttheirlivelihoods(e.g.mines, dams)istobeable

tohaveasayaboutwhetherandhow theprojectshouldproceed.Ineffect,thisdemandhasbeen

providedforwiththeprovisionofFPIC.However,thepracticalimplementationofFPICisoftenvery

far short of theideal.

FPIC “recognizes indigenouspeoples’ inherent and prior rights to their lands and resources and

respectstheirlegitimateauthoritytorequirethatthirdpartiesenterintoanequalandrespectful

relationshipwiththembasedon theprincipleof informedconsent.Procedurally, free,prior and

informed consent requires processes that allow and supportmeaningful choices by indigenous

peoplesabout theirdevelopmentpath”(UNSub-CommissiononthePromotionandProtectionof

HumanRights2004,p.5). FPICis intrinsicallyconnectedtotheideaofself-determination,which

basicallyarguesthat‘humanbeings, individuallyandasgroups,areequallyentitledtobein control

oftheirowndestinies,andtolivewithingoverning institutionalordersthataredevisedaccordingly’

(Anaya 2009,p.187).As stated in theCharterof theUnited Nations (UnitedNations1945)and

in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNGeneral

Assembly1966),self-determinationistobeprovidedto‘allpeoples’.

The history of the relationship between the human rights discourse and Indigenous peoples is

described, includingadiscussionoftheanthropologicalcontribution tothistopic,particularlyinthe

contextofhowithasplayedoutinBrazil.Inthefirstsectionofthispaper,theprocessofrecognizing

humanrights for Indigenous peoplesascollectiverights isdescribed.Theactivitiesof companies

anddevelopmentagenciesinrelationtothis issuearepresentedinthesecondsection.Inthethird

section,theconceptofFPICanditsoriginsaredescribed. Recommendationsforcompanieswishing

torespecthumanrights,particularlytowardsIndigenouspeoples, areprovidedintheconclusion.

2.2. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ STRUGGLE FOR THE ‘RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS’

‘Human rights are commonly understood as inalienable fundamentalrightstowhichaperson

isinherentlyentitled simplybecausesheorhe isahumanbeing’ (Sepúlvedaetal.2004,p.3).

Theserights,whichareconsideredtobe indivisible (apply equally to everyone) and inalienable

(always apply and cannot be voided or extinguished), include the right to life, property,

health, education, free association,amongothers (Sepúlvedaetal.2004).Human rights are

intendedtobeuniversal,‘withoutdistinctionof any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,

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Table 2.1. | SelectionofthekeyinternationalagreementsthataddressIndigenousrights

Charter of the United Nations (1945)–Article1,

Clause2articulates‘theprincipleofequalrights

andself-determinationofpeoples’,whichis

stilloneofthemajordemandsofIndigenous

peoples(UnitedNations1945).

Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)

–Thisdeclarationaddressesseveraluniversal

rights,whichalsoapplytoIndigenouspeoples,

suchastherighttolife,property,health,edu-

cationandfreeassociation,amongothers(UN

GeneralAssembly1948a).

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide (1948) –Article

2definesgenocideas‘actscommittedwith

intenttodestroy,inwholeorinpart,anational,

ethnical,racialorreligiousgroup’.Indigenous

peopleshistoricallywereandstillaretargets

ofgenocide,perpetratedindifferentwaysby

variousnationalgovernmentsandracistgroups

(UNGeneralAssembly1948b).

UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination (1965) –Thisconvention

promotestheeliminationofracialdiscrimina-

tionagainstethnicgroups,includingIndigenous

peoples(UNGeneralAssembly1965).

International Covenant on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights (1966, entered into force in 1976)

– Article1ofthisUNcovenantstatesthat‘all

peopleshavetherighttoself-determination’,and

thusto‘freelydeterminetheirpoliticalstatusand

freely pursue their economic, social and cultural

development’(UNGeneralAssembly1966).

Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention – Inter-

national Labour Organization C169 (1989) – This

conventionisarevisionofthe1957Indigenous

andTribalPopulationsConvention(ILOC107).

AlthoughC169hasbeenratifiedbyonly20

countriestodate,itisthemostimportant,legally

bindinginternationaldocumentaboutIndige-

nousrights.Itpromotesrightsindifferentareas

religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’

(UNGeneralAssembly 1948a,Article2).However,Indigenouspeoplesstillexperienceunequal

accesstohumanrightsandsystematicethnicdiscrimination(Cobo1986;Stavenhagen2009;ILO

2012).Theyfacehigherlevelsofinfantmortalityandfareworseonmosthealthindicatorswhen

compared with non-Indigenous groups (Stavenhagen 2003; Montenegro & Stephens 2006;

Gracey&King2009),asituationoften describedasthe‘fourthworld’(Dyck1985;Wright1988;

Watkins 2005). Anaya (2004) classifies it as a dual discrimination – there is denial of access

to land,basic resourcesandservices,leadingtodifficultiesinsustainingtraditional ways of life;

in addition, there is systematic discrimination that arises especiallywhen Indigenous peoples

attempttoparticipateinthedominantsociety.

TheIndigenouspeoples’struggletoensurerespectfortheirhumanrightsstartedwiththedemand

forthe‘righttohaverights’(Stavenhagen2003,linkingtoArendt1951),and has culminated in

thedrafting andendorsementofseveralinternationalconventionsandagreementsthatwere

conceived to guarantee the access of Indigenouspeoplestohumanrights.Alistofthevarious

international documentsthatdirectlyorindirectlyaddresstherightsof Indigenouspeoplesis

providedinTable2.1.

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(e.g.education,healthandland).Itrequiresgov-

ernmentstoconsultIndigenouspeoplesregard-

inganyadministrativeorlegislativemeasures

thataffectthemdirectly,andtoguaranteethat

Indigenouspeoplescanparticipateinthepro-

cessofdecision-making(ILO1989,Article6).

World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 (1991)

–ThisOperationalDirectiveregulateshow

borrowersfromtheWorldBankshouldproceed

whentheirprojectsaffectIndigenouspeoples

(WorldBank1991).

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging

to National or Ethnic Religious and Linguistic

Minorities (1992) – Themainprovisionofthis

UNDeclarationisstatedinArticle4,which

require states to take measures to ensure that

‘minoritiesmayexercisefullyandeffectively

theirhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms

withoutanydiscriminationandinfullequality

beforethelaw’(UNGeneralAssembly1992a).

Rio Declaration on Environment and

Development (1992) – ThisDeclarationisa

productoftheUnitedNationsConference

onEnvironmentandDevelopment(orEarth

Summit)heldinRiodeJaneiroin1992.

Principle22establishesthecrucialrole

ofIndigenouspeoplesinenvironmental

managementbecauseoftheirtraditional

knowledge(UNGeneralAssembly1992b).

Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) –

LiketheRioDeclaration,thisConventionwas

signedattheEarthSummit.Itrecognizes

theroleofIndigenouspeoplesinpromoting

biodiversitythroughtheirtraditional

knowledge(UNEP1992).

Vienna Declaration and Programme of

Action (1993) –Article1.20outlinedsome

basicprinciples,whileArticle1.28called

fortheestablishmentofaWorkingGroup

toprepareaDeclarationontheRightsof

IndigenousPeoples(whichwasnotfinalized

until2007).Article1.2statesthat‘TheWorld

ConferenceonHumanRightsconsidersthe

denialoftherightofself-determinationasa

violationofhumanrightsandunderlinesthe

importanceoftheeffectiverealizationofthis

right’(UNGeneralAssembly1993).

UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural

Diversity (2001) – ‘The defence of cultural

diversityisanethicalimperative,inseparable

fromrespectforhumandignity.Itimplies

acommitmenttohumanrightsand

fundamentalfreedoms,inparticularthe

rightsofpersonsbelongingtominoritiesand

thoseofindigenouspeoples’(UNESCO2001,

Article4).

Equator Principles (2003) – Avoluntarysetof

standardsdevelopedbyseveralmajorbanks

forassessingandmanagingrisksrelatedto

developmentprojects.Indigenouspeoples

areconsideredtobeastakeholderneeding

tobefullyconsidered(EquatorPrinciples

Association2003).

World Bank Operational Policy (OP) and Bank

Procedure (BP) 4.10 (2005) –TheOP/BP4.10

replacesOD4.20forinvestmentprojects

financedbytheWorldBankthataffect

Indigenouspeoples(WorldBank2005).

International Finance Corporation (IFC)

Performance Standard 7 (2006, updated in

2012) – IFCPerformanceStandards(PS)are

similartoWorldBanksafeguardpolicies,

butareadaptedtobeapplicabletoIFC

borrowers.PS7isrelatedtoIndigenous

peoplesandarticulatesspecificprocedures

forprojectsthataffectthem(IFC2006,

2012).

UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

Peoples (UNDRIP) (2007) – This

Declarationaddressesalargerangeof

rightsofIndigenouspeoples.Itaffirmsthat

governmentsshouldobtain‘free,priorand

informedconsent’fromIndigenouspeoples

aboutanyprojectthatmayaffecttheir

livelihoods(UNGeneralAssembly2007a,

Articles10,19,29and32).

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It is important to clarify that these documents do not provide Indigenous peoples with any

‘extra’humanrightsthatarenotalsoaccordedtonon-Indigenouspersons;neverthelessthese

documents are intended to guarantee that Indigenous peoples have equal access to human

rights(Anaya2009).However,aspresentlyunderstoodinalegalsense,FPICiscurrentlyprovided

exclusively for Indigenousandother ‘traditionalpeoples’, suchas thedescendantsofescaped

slaves(quilombolasinBrazil)andtribalpeoplesinAfrica,althoughthereisapushtowidenthe

applicationofFPIC(Goodland2004;Hilletal.2010;Vanclay&Esteves2011).FPICisnota‘right’

perse,butamechanismtoensureprogresstowardstherightofself-determinationforIndigenous

Peoples(Anaya2009).EventhoughFPICitselfmaynotbearight,Indigenouspeoplesdohavethe

righttobeconsultedonissuesthataffecttheirlives,whichwewillrefertoastherighttoFPIC.

The process of establishing this international body of law (Table 2.1.) has been controversial

from thebeginning.Anthropologists in general – as reflected in anAmericanAnthropological

Association (AAA) statement of 1947 (AAA, The Executive Board 1947) –were critical of the

conceptofuniversalhumanrights,whichtheyconsideredtobeaWesternethnocentricconcept

(Messer1993;Preis 1996;Riles2006). Themajor argumentsof theAAA statementwere that

rights are culturally relative and thatWestern notions of progress should not be imposed on

othercultures.Anotherreasonthat ledtoanthropologistsboycottingthe internationalhuman

rightsagendawasthepredominantlylegalapproachthatprevailed,alliedtoanexclusivefocuson

individualsratherthancollectivegroups.However,withtheIndigenousstruggleforrightsinthe

1980s,anthropologistswereaddressinghumanrightsthroughasocioculturalandpoliticalrather

thanlegalframework(Messer1993).Theyadvocatedforcollectiverights.Thisledtoachangein

theperspectiveofbothsides,astheinternationaldiscourseonhumanrightshasnowaccepted

theideaofcollectiverightsandhasevenaccepted‘someformofweakculturalrelativism;thatis,

onafundamentaluniversalityofbasichumanrights,temperedbyarecognitionofthepossible

needforlimitedculturalvariations.Basichumanrightsare,touseanappropriatelyparadoxical

phrase,relativelyuniversal’(Donelly1984,p.419).

The anthropological perspective has also broadened, particularly around the formulations of

socialtransformationandtheanthropologyofdevelopment(Messer1993).Inits1999Statement

about Human Rights, the AAA embraced the human rights discourse; however, it pointed

to theneed foradvocating for collectiveandcultural rightsand for toleranceacrossdifferent

cultures(Messer1993;AAA1999;Engle2001;Riles2006).Wright(1988)discussedthedilemmas

anthropologyfounditselfinduringthosedecades,asthenativepeoplesitstudiedwerefacinga

rangeofproblems,asdescribedabove,andoftentheirverysurvivalwasinquestion.Although

Indigenouspeoplesplayedamajor role themselves (Miranda2010),Wright identifiedways in

whichanthropologistswereengagedinadvocacyforIndigenouspeoples.Onewaywasthrough

influence international organizations and international law; and some positive results have

occurred,suchastheapprovaloftheUNDRIPbyalargenumberofcountries,somethingthatcan

beconsideredtobeamajorvictoryforIndigenouspeoples,evenifitwasalongtimecoming.

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The debate around collective and cultural rights was very important in the lead-up to and

thedraftingof theUNDRIP,astheserightsclashedwiththeWesternconceptofindividualrights

(Clinton1990;Anaya2004).AsexplainedbyWiessner(2011,p.124):

one of the major objections to the novel rights of indigenouspeopleshasbeen

thattheyarelargelyrightsofcollectivities, not individuals. Thus, they appear to

situneasilywith the traditional human rights regime,whichintheeyesofmanyis

constructedaroundtheinterestsandconcernsofindividualhumanbeings.

The human right to self-determination is provided for in several international instruments.

Many countries were reluctant to recognize the collective right of Indigenous peoples to

self-determinationbecausetheyfeared itcould threaten state sovereignty and lead to an

escalation in claims for independence by Indigenous peoples (Engle 2011). A complicating

factor is that there is a difference betweeninternalandexternalself-determination.External

self-determination refers to the aspiration of an ethnicgrouptoclaimstatehood,sovereignty

or secession, while internal self-determination provides some level of autonomy to

operate within the existing state (Sterio 2009). The UNDRIP provides only for internal self-

determination, which is comprehended by Engle (2011,p.148)asa‘collectivehumanrights

demandratherthanaclaimforstatehood’.

Another important argument towards collectivehuman rights is that an individual cannot

exercise their culturealone(Anaya2004).Thisleadsustothequestion ofculturalrights,which

alsobecameanimportantclaimandoneofthemajorstrategiesofIndigenousrightsadvocates

sincethe1990s(Engle2011).Culturalrights,that is, the rightof a particular ethnicgroupto

maintain its ownculture,arebroad.Forexample,forIndigenouspeoples,access to landand

natural resources are fundamental to exerciseandreproducetheirculture.Thus,thehuman

right toculturenecessarily includesrightstolandandits resources(Wiessner2011).

The UNDRIP does not establish any new rights for Indigenouspeoplesthatarenotalready

providedbyotherinternational human rights instruments; however, it synthesizeshowthese

rightsneed tobeappliedas amapof action for human rights policies towards Indigenous

peoples (Stavenhagen 2009). Several authors (e.g. Royo 2009;Stavenhagen2009;Wiessner

2011),aswellmostof the states voting in favour of the UNDRIP, clearly comprehend the

Declaration as a non-binding legal instrument, or ‘soft-law’, which does not require

ratification and for which non-compliance by its signatories would not result in any

sanctions. Burger (2009) argued that theDeclarationbroughtno substantial change towhat

already existed, unless states would make changes to their own legislation and, above all,

have the political will to do so. However, various authors (e.g. Anaya &Williams 2001;

Royo2009;Stavenhagen2009) expect that,withtime, full compliancewith theUNDRIP and

relatedinstrumentsislikelyasitwillbecomepartof customary international law(cf. Bradley

& Goldsmith1997),andthusbefullyapplied.

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2.3. THE ROLE OF CORPORATIONS

Most transnational corporations in the extractives sector have adopted Corporate Social

Responsibility standards for regulating their activities, sometimes including specific policies

relatingtohumanrightsand/orIndigenouspeoples.DespitetheUNDRIPandCorporateSocial

Responsibilitystandards,humanrightsviolationstowards Indigenous peoples keep occurring,

and the direct and indirectconsequencesof resourcesextractionbycompaniesinornearby

Indigenouslandsremainoneofthemajorproblems that Indigenous peoples continue to face

(Stavenhagen2003;ILO2012;Verdum2012).

Professor JohnRuggie, theSpecialRepresentativeof the UN Secretary-General on Human

Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises between 2005 and

2011,determined that companies should respect internationally recognized human rights,

even if it was not required by host governments. In the GuidingPrinciples,Ruggie (2011)

specified theminimum standards that companies should follow,specifically those expressed

in the InternationalBill ofHumanRights and theprinciplesconcerningfundamentalrightsset

outinthe International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and

RightsatWork.The right to self determination is thus included in the minimum standards.

The lack of regulation or enforcement in national legislation to ensure that transnational

companies comply with these standards is what Ruggie called a ‘governance gap’ (B&HRI

2010), which provides opportunities for companies to perform ‘wrongful acts’withoutany

legalconsequences.Asimilarphenomenonis described by Stavenhagen (2009, p. 367) as

the ‘implementationgapbetween lawsandpractical reality’. Thissituationcanbeworsened

inhybridstate–corporateenterpriseswhereconfluencesofinterestleadtoconflictsofinterest

androleconfusion,ashighlightedbyMiranda (2007,p.139):

Arguably,themostsignificantviolationsofindigenouspeoples’landrightsoccurinthe

contextofahybridstate– corporateenterprise,wherethroughacollaborativelegal

arrangement,astateeffectivelydelegatesmanyof itshumanrightsresponsibilities

towardindigenouspeoplestoajointcorporateactor.

Thegovernancegapisthat,inthesecircumstances,thestatefailsinitsdutytoprotect,partlybecause

there frequently is nomechanism to verify compliancewith human rights responsibilities. Also,

thereisnoentityorlegalinstrumentattheinternationalleveltoenforcecompaniestocomply.As

mentionedearlier,theUNDRIPisnotlegallybinding.Manyauthorshaveexposedavastnumberof

caseswhereIndigenousrightsarethreatenedbyindustryactivities(e.g.Colchester2010;Haalboom

2012;Coumans2012).Miranda(2007)warnsoftheneedtocreateaccountabilitymechanismsto

ensurethatcompaniesrespecttheinternationallyrecognizedrightsofIndigenouspeoples.

A solution that has been proposed to address and prevent human rights violations in the

development of large projects is to conduct a human rights impact assessment (HRIA)

prior to project implementation. MacNaughton and Hunt (2011, p. 362) define HRIA as ‘a

process ofpredicting thepotential consequencesof aproposedpolicy,programorprojecton

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theenjoymentofhumanrights’.Maassaranietal.(2007)seethepotentialofHRIAtocontribute

totheprogressiverealizationofhumanrights,ifitisintegratedintotheearlystagesofcompany

decision-makingprocesses.TheUNGlobalCompact(2011)createdaGuidanceToolforcompanies,

basedonRuggie’sGuidingPrinciples(Ruggie2011).Thefirststepoftheirapproachistoidentify

potentialviolationsofhumanrightsthroughoutthecompanyproductionchain,includingtaking

intoaccountindirectviolations,suchasfromsuppliersorcontractors.Thiscanbeachievedusing

thetechniquestypicallyusedinHRIAandsocialimpactassessment(SIA)(Esteves&Vanclay2009;

Estevesetal.2012).Afterassessingtheimpacts,theGlobalCompactGuidanceToolemphasizes

theneedtoinvolvethetopmanagementofthecompanyinordertohavearealcommitmentto

respectinghumanrights. Inadditiontomanagementsupport,training isneededforemployees

andcontractors.Grievancemechanismsforaffectedcommunitiesandperformanceindicatorsare

necessarytomonitorifhumanrightsarebeingrespected,andtocheckwhetherimprovements

arebeingmade(B&HRI2010).ThisapproachiswellalignedwithMesser’s(1993)proposal,where

anthropologistswereseenashavinga role inpreventing, rather thansimply reporting,human

rightsabusesincontextsofinter-ethnicconflict.

HumanrightsviolationstowardsIndigenouspeoplesinBraziloftenoccur in thedevelopmentof

largeprojects,particularlyminesanddamssponsoredbyBrazilianstate–corporateenterprises.

These situations canbe characterizedascontextsofinter-ethnicconflict,oraformof ‘internal

colonialism’(CardosodeOliveira1978).Thisarises partly because of the perception ofmany

LatinAmericanelitesthatIndigenousculturesare‘backwards’,andthelackofrespecttheyhave

forIndigenouspeoples, often believing that greater attention to Indigenous peoples’rights

wouldslowdownthedevelopmentofthenation.Thiscontextofclassstruggleor‘inter-ethnic

friction’ (Cardoso de Oliveira 1978) has led to several conflicts, including deaths, violence

and protracted legal battles (Coelho dos Santos 1981; Miranda 2007; Jampolsky 2012).

The ‘national interest’ is often advocated as a reason to ‘legitimately’ violate Indigenous

rights, especially in largedevelopmentprojects. This reasonwasevenstated inarecentand

controversial government act, Ordinance 303 (Portaria 303 da AGU), which was enacted on

16 July2012andstates: ‘the enjoymentof the richesof thesoil, riversand lakes existing in

indigenous lands (art. 231, §2 of the Constitution) can be relativizedwhenever, as in art.

231, 68, of the Constitution, there is relevant public interest of the Union, in the form of

a supplementary law’ (Brasil 2012,Article 1.1). Followingprotests, thisOrdinancehas been

suspended,butnotrevoked(Mongabay2012).

Another example,which has also been the subject of muchcontroversy, is theplannedBelo

Monte dam in the State of Para,Brazil. Ifbuilt,BeloMontewouldbe thethird largest dam in

theworld, would displace between20,000and40,000people,andwouldimpact,directlyor

indirectly, on some 10 different Indigenous groups (Jampolsky 2012). The major argument

against the construction of the BeloMonte dam (and other large projects) is the lack of

genuine commitment to the principle of FPIC by the developers, and consequently a denial

oftherighttoself-determination,arguablythemost violated Indigenous right in the Brazilian

development context(ILO2012).

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2.4. FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT

Itishardtodeterminewhentheterm‘Free,PriorandInformedConsent’firstappeared,butthe

literaturesuggeststhattheFPICideaaroseinthemid1980saspartoftheIndigenouspeoples’

struggle for self-determination (Colchester& Ferrari 2007).Goodland (2004) concurs that FPIC

appeared in the1980s, particularly related to casesof involuntarydisplacementof Indigenous

peoples.Theterm‘FreeandInformedConsent’,aprecursortothecurrentconceptofFPIC,first

appeared in the International LabourOrganization (ILO)Convention Concerning Indigenous and

Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,C169/1989.Theconcepthasdevelopedovertime,with

VanclayandEsteves(2011,pp.6–7)describingitasfollows:

In both the formal and more general utilization of FPIC, each word contributes

meaningtotheconcept.Free,meaningthattheremustbenocoercion,intimidation

ormanipulation by companies or governments, and that should a community say

‘no’theremustbenoretaliation.Prior,meaningthatconsentshouldbesoughtand

received before any activity on community land is commenced and that sufficient

timeisprovidedforadequateconsiderationbyanyaffectedcommunities.Informed,

meaning that there is full disclosure by project developers of their plans in the

language acceptable to the affected communities, and that each community has

enoughinformationtohaveareasonableunderstandingofwhatthoseplanswilllikely

meanforthem,includingofthesocialimpactstheywillexperience.Consent,meaning

thatcommunitieshavearealchoice,thattheycansayyesifthereisagoodflowof

benefitsanddevelopmentopportunitiestothem,ortheycansaynoiftheyarenot

satisfied with the deal, and that there is a workable mechanism for determining

whether there is widespread consent in the community as a whole and not just a small

elitegroupwithinthecommunity.

TherighttoFPICis intrinsicallylinkedtotherighttoself-determination,whichisarticulatedin

the945Charterof theUnitedNations: ‘Todevelop friendly relationsamongnationsbasedon

respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determinationof peoples, and to take other

appropriatemeasurestostrengthenuniversalpeace’(UnitedNations1945,Article1).Later,the

UNDRIPwould refer specifically to the rightsof Indigenouspeoples to self-determination (UN

GeneralAssembly2007a).Thisrightisabouthavingtheabilitytochoosetoliveaccordinglytoa

group’sinstitutionsandtraditionalorganization,andaboveall,byitsownwill.Therighttoself-

determinationmaybeseenasthebasisorinspirationbywhichtherighttoFPICwaselaborated

andclaimedbyIndigenouspeoples,scholarsandactivists(Page2004).

FPICisalsorelatedtotheconceptofethnodevelopment,whichwaselaboratedbyStavenhagen

(1985) around the same time as FPIC emerged, and was adopted into Brazilian law in 2004

(ResoluçãoCONDRAFno.44,Brasil2004).Ethnodevelopmentproposesthatdevelopmentshould

bedefinedaccordingtoeachculturalcontext,givingtherighttocommunitiestodecideovertheir

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ownfutureandtheuseoftheirresources,asguidedbytheirowncultural frameworks,which

maydifferfromtheWesternnotionofeconomicdevelopment(Stavenhagen1985).Ofcourse,

insidethesamecommunitytheremaybepoliticalandinter-generationalconflicts,withdifferent

perspectives for development. Even despite these possible divergences, ethnodevelopment is

definedbythecommunityitself,byitsownculturalframework.

The terms self-determination, ethnodevelopment and FPIC are now embedded into

internationalandnationallaws and have been incorporated into the discourse ofIndigenous

peopleswhenclaimingtheirrights(e.g.Brasil 2004;Tauli-Corpuzetal.2010;Hilletal.2010).As

previouslymentioned, the ILO addresses it in its Convention169,whichstatesinArticle6(1):

Governments shall: (a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate

procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever

consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measureswhich may

affect them directly; (b) establish means by which these peoples can freely

participate,toatleastthesameextentasothersectorsofthepopulation,atalllevels

of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies

responsible for policiesandprogrammeswhichconcernthem.(ILO1989,p.4)

AccordingtoMacKay(2004),theILOConvention169doesnotrequire‘consent’,althoughArticle

6obliges governments to ‘consult’ Indigenouspeoples.Article7(1) states that: ‘Thepeoples

concernedshallhavetherighttodecidetheirownprioritiesfortheprocessofdevelopment as

it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritualwell-beingandthelandstheyoccupyor

otherwiseuse,and toexercisecontrol,totheextentpossible,overtheirowneconomic,social

andculturaldevelopment’.Thiscouldbe regardedasbeingarighttoFPIC.

Tugendhatetal.(2009)considerthattheILO169istheonlylegallybindingdocumentregarding

therightsofIndigenous peoples. Besides this Convention, the UNDRIPisthemostreferred

to international document regarding the Indigenous right to FPIC, despite the fact thataUN

Declarationdoesnothave thesame legal status as an ILO Convention. The Declaration is

not legally binding,whiletheConventionprovisionscanbeenforced incourt.Thismaybeone

ofthereasonswhythereareonly 20 signatories to ILO Convention 169, but theUNDRIP was

endorsedin2007byavoteof143countriesinfavour, 11 abstaining (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,

Bhutan,Burundi, Colombia,Georgia,Kenya,Nigeria,RussianFederation, SamoaandUkraine),

andfouragainst(Australia,Canada, New Zealand and the United States). The four countries

thatvotedagainstthedeclarationarguedthat ‘theycould notsupportitbecauseofconcerns

overprovisionsonself-determination, land and resources rights and, amongothers,language

giving indigenouspeoples a right of veto over national legislation and State management

of resources’(UNGeneralAssembly2007b,p.1).Between 2009and2010,thefouropposing

countrieschangedtheirpositionandarenowsignatoriestotheDeclaration,alongwith two of

theabstainingcountries,ColombiaandSamoa.Nevertheless,attheirrespectiveannouncements

ofendorsement, Australia, Canada, the United States andNewZealand all emphasized that

34


theydidnotconsiderUNDRIPtobealegallybindingdocument,butratheranaspirationalgoal

(Engle2011;Wiessner2011).

FPICisaddressedinseveralplacesintheUNDRIP.AccordingtotheDeclaration,governmentsneed

toconsultIndigenouspeoplesinordertoobtaintheirconsentaboutthefollowingtopics:relocation

(Article10),administrativemeasuresthataffectthem(Article19),thestorageofhazardousmaterials

insideIndigenousland(Article29)andutilizationoftheirresources,asstatedinArticle32:

States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples

concernedthroughtheirown representative institutionsinorder toobtain their

free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their

lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the

development, utilizationorexploitationofmineral,waterorotherresources.(UN

GeneralAssembly2007a,p.12)

SomeinternationalentitiesthatrecognizetherighttoFPICaretheInter-AmericanCommission

onHuman Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Linde 2009). The World

Bank’s position on FPIC, however, isverycontroversial.Despite recommendations from the

World Commission on Dams and the World Bank’s own Extractive Industry Review, after

avery long debate and an arguably inadequate consultation with Indigenous organizations

(Linde 2009; Cariño & Colchester 2010), the World Bank adopted a lower standard – that

of ‘free, prior, and informed consultation resulting in broad community support’ – in their

Operational Policyon IndigenousPeoples,OP4.10 (WorldBank2005).OP4.10iscriticizedby

Indigenousorganizations,nongovernmental organizations, academics and activists because it

doesnotclearlyrecognizeFPIC,butinsteadproposesthis dubious concept of ‘FPICon’ (free,

prior and informed consultation)(Carusoetal.2003;MacKay2005;Griffiths 2005).Goodland

(2004),however,arguesthat‘meaningful participation’,asrequiredbytheWorldBank,canlead

to FPICifappliedingoodfaith.

The World Bank’s adoption of FPICon gave a mandate to other agencies to adopt similar

requirements, including the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in its Performance

Standard7(PS7),whichprovidesguidelines for engagementbetween Indigenous peoples and

the companies/projectsitfinances(IFC2006).However,the 2012 revision of PS7 recognized

the right to FPIC inspecial circumstances, such as ‘Impacts on Lands andNaturalResources

Subject to Traditional Ownership or UnderCustomaryUse’,‘RelocationofIndigenousPeoples

fromLandsandNaturalResourcesSubjecttoTraditional OwnershiporUnderCustomaryUse’

andforprojectsthat impact‘CriticalCulturalHeritage’(IFC2012).

Anotherinstitutionthathasadoptedaconceptsimilar to FPICon is the International Council

on Mining and Metals (ICMM), with its ‘Community Development Toolkit’ containing

guidelines for mining companies to engagewithcommunities.RegardingIndigenouspeoples,

itproposedthat ‘alldevelopmentprogramsshouldbe basedonengagingandconsultingwith

IndigenousPeoples inafair,timelyandculturallyappropriatewaythroughout theprojectcycle’

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(ICMM 2012, p. 22). In an earlier document focused exclusively on Indigenous peoples and

mining,theICMMstatedthatitagreedwiththe‘free,prior andinformed’elementsofFPIC,but

notwiththe ‘consent’ component. ICMM members are expected to engage in FPIC only

where it is required by national legislation. Their argument is that the right of FPIC is not

feasibleat present owing to the difficulties in implementation and definition (ICMM 2010).

The position ICMM is taking could leadtobreachesof internationalhumanrights standards,

as companies might only do the minimum necessary to meet the requirements of local

legislation (Haalboom2012),potentiallyfailingtorecognizetherighttoFPIC,andthusinfringing

theIndigenousrighttoself-determination.

Arguably, the Philippines and Australia (somewhat ironicallygiventhatAustraliawasoneof

fourobjectorstoUNDRIP)werethefirstcountriestorequireFPICorconsent in local legislation

(MacKay 2004). In thePhilippines, the right to FPIC is provided by the IndigenousPeoples’

Rights Act of 1997 and is effected throughthemediationofagovernmentagencyresponsible

forIndigenouspeoplesinthecountry(NationalCommissiononIndigenousPeoples,NCIP).The

ActdefinesFPICas:

FreeandPrior InformedConsent – asused in thisActshallmeantheconsensusof

allmembersoftheICCs/IPs[IndigenousCulturalCommunities/IndigenousPeoples]to

be determined in accordance with their respective customarylawsandpractices,

free from any external manipulation, interference and coercion, and obtained

afterfullydisclosingtheintentandscopeoftheactivity, ina languageandprocess

understandabletothecommunity.(IndigenousPeoples’RightsActof1997,section3)

MacKay(2004)suggeststhatFPIChasbeenrequired(albeitimplicitly)intheNorthernTerritory

ofAustralia formorethan30yearsthroughtheAboriginalLandRights (Northern Territory) Act

1976. Since then, New SouthWales,Queenslandandsomeotherstateshave adopted similar

regulations. However, while FPICmaybeinferredtoapply(andconsentisspecifimentioned),

noneofthislegislationspecificallymentions FPICperse,butrequiresaminingentrepreneurto

formalize‘consent’ inanagreementwiththeAboriginal ‘traditionalowners’,usuallymediated

byaLandCouncil orsimilarbody.

Carino and Colchester (2010) note that Bolivia,Venezuela, Colombia and Guyana adopted

national laws recognizing the Indigenous right to FPIC and that New Zealand requires it for

mining activities. InVenezuela,FPICisimpliedinalawonbiologicaldiversitythatalsoprotects

culturaldiversity(Gupta2002).In2012theInterAmerican Court of Human Rights decided on

a decadelongjudicialbattle,Sarayaku v. Ecuador,whichwasabout rights over oil exploration

in the Kichwa Sarayaku territory. With the Ecuadorian Government losing, this casecanbe

consideredanimportantlegalprecedentasitestablishesalegalmeaningonhowandwhenFPIC

should beapplied(AmnestyInternational2012).

Despite the fact that local law inmany places requires FPIC, experience in the Philippines

demonstrates that a regulatoryprocessonitsownisnotenoughtoensurethatit is applied

36


properly, as community consent has been manipulated through bribery or other coercion

methods,asCarino(2005,p.39)informs:

The experience of indigenous communities in the Philippines stands as a

vehement reminder that surface level [i.e. superficial] change is not sufficient;

despiteprogressive law that promises to involve indigenouscommunities in the

future of their ancestral lands, theindigenousvoicecontinuestobemanipulated

andignoredinthefaceofforeignownedminingfirms.Whenindustryinterestsclash

withlocalinterests,theformercontinuestoprevail.

ThereisalsotheriskofFPICbecomingabox-ticking proceduremadejusttocomplywithlocal

legislation,butwithnorealcommitmenttogetaclearstatementofconsentfromtheimpacted

party. Cariño and Colchester(2010) call this kind of process the ‘engineering of consent’. As

shownincaseofthePhilippines,achievingFPICmightbedonejusttocomplywithgovernment

requirements, sometimes including the bribery of community leaders and government

employees, in order to ‘tick the box’ of FPIC in the list of project requirements (Colchester

&MacKay2004;Carino&Colchester2010).AccordingtoColchesterandMacKay(2004,p.26),

‘extractive industries have consciously manipulated communities, introducingfactionalism,

dividing communities and promoting individuals, who may have no traditional authority as

leaders, to represent the communities. The illusion of free, prior and informed consent is

thus achieved by the exclusion of the majority of community members from effective

participation in decision-making’.

DespitebeingasignatorytotheILOConvention169andtheUNDRIP,theonlylegislationinBrazil

that impliesFPIC toanydegree is theBrazilianConstitutionof1988, specificallyArticle231§3

(Brasil1988).Even thoughnot specifically referring to ‘consent’, it states that theuseofwater

resources,potentialforhydropowerormineralrichesinIndigenouslandsmayonlybeexploited

‘after hearing the communities involved’.However, there areno guidelines regardinghowand

whenanyconsultationprocessmustbeapplied.Forthatreason,inJanuary2012aworkinggroup

wasformedbythegovernmenttodevelopandpresentaproposalforregulation(Verdum2012),

whichatthetimeoffinalizingourpaperinearly2013wasyettoreport.

InBrazil,miningcantakeplacenearIndigenouslands,butnotinsidetheirlandsowingtoregulatory

restrictions.Becauseofthis,variousquestionsarise.Forexample,despiteIndigenouspeoplesbeing

directlyaffectedbyoperations,where theyarenot the landownersof theactualmining lease,

should their consentbe required?Should thecommunityhaveavetopowerover theproject?

Whatdefinesconsent,especiallyiftheprojectisopposedbyonlyafewcommunitymembers?

Inordertoanswerthesequestions,andnotwithstandingourviewthatFPICisnotinitselfaright

butisineffect‘therighttobeconsulted’,webelieve,consistentwithmanyothers(e.g.Vanclay&

Esteves2011),thatFPICshouldbecomprehendedasaphilosophyratherthanalegalprocedure.

IfoperationsaffectIndigenouspeoples’ lives,theyshouldhavetherightfortheirviewstobe

considered and respected, regardless of the national legislation requirements. Cariño and

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Colchester(2010,p.434)proposethat“thespiritofFPIC isthatdevelopmentshouldbecome

accountabletopeoples’distinctivecultures,priorities,anduniquepathstoself-determination,

notendangertheirverysurvival”.However,speakingaboutthepracticaloperationalizationof

FPIC,Goodland(2004)suggests thatconsentshouldberegardedas thesupport from51%or

moreofcommunitymembers.However,thismajorityvoteisaWesternconceptionofdemocratic

decision-making,and isnot likely tobeendorsedbymany Indigenouspoliticalorganizations,

who,forexample,dependingontheethnicgroup,maypreferthatdecisionsbebasedonthe

elders’opinionsorby reaching consensusbetweenmembers (Bauman&Williams2004; van

Dam2008).

Despite being recognized by international treaties, as atthetimeofwritinginlate2012,only

asmallnumberofcompanieshavemadepublicstatementsofcommitmentto FPIC, including:

Inmet, Newmont, Rio Tinto, Talisman and Xstrata (Voss & Greenspan 2012). Despite the

expressed support of Talisman Oil for FPIC, Amazon Watch is criticizing them for their

operations close to the Achuar Indigenousgroupon theborderbetweenPeruand Ecuador.

Talismanallegesthattheyhavecommunityconsent,althoughaccordingtothenongovernmental

organization,theAchuaropposetheproject(AmazonWatch2012).

This low level of corporate commitment to FPIC to datemaybebecause companiesmight

considerthattheirinterestsarethreatenedbyrecognitionofanIndigenouscommunity’sright

toFPIC.Theargumentprovidedisthe same espoused by ICMM (2010), asmentioned earlier,

for whom the consent part of FPIC was unclear and/or not feasible to be implemented in

practice. Besides this argument, giving the power of veto to communities is seen as a

menace that could tip the power balance infavourofcommunitiesandrestrainpossibilities

for new ventures. Relations between companies and Indigenous communities are usually

difficult, but that should not become a barrier to companies in adopting best practices and

respecting internationally recognized human rights suchasFPIC.Inanycase,we arguethat

when undertaken, FPIC can provide benefits to both sides. Companies that apply FPIC are

likely to benefit from an improved social licence to operate and are likely to have abetter

publicimagethanthosewhodonotrecognizethe righttoFPIC.Communitiesthatenjoytheir

rightofbeing informed, consulted andheardby the project proponents are able to provide

positive feedbackonprojectdesign, for example, that could contribute to cost savings. The

enjoyment of this right also raises a community’s confidence, as it becomes an important

stakeholder during the whole project development process and puts it into a position that

enablesittohavearealopinionabouttheproject’s impactsandpossiblemeasurestoavoidor

mitigate these impacts. This could lead to simpler and cheaper solutions, as social impacts

are identified at an earlierstage.ApplyingFPICcanalsoavoidconflictswith communities(De

Echave2010)andreducecostsand risksforcompanies(Davis&Franks2011;Vanclay2012).

VariousauthorssuggestthattheconceptofFPIC shouldnotbelimitedtoIndigenouspeoples,

recommending itsadoption toprojects affectingall local communities (Goodland 2004; Hill

et al. 2010; Vanclay & Esteves 2011; Langbroek & Vanclay 2012). According to Goodland

38


(2004),we cannot advocate democracy only for some,leavingautocracytotheothers.Thus,

everyaffected community should have the right to be informed and to haveitsopinionon

thedevelopmentsthataffecttheirlives fullyconsidered.UsefultoolsformakingtheFPICprocess

moreeffectiveareSIAandHRIA,whichcanbeperceived asthe‘informed’componentofFPIC,

allowing both companies and communities to comprehend what the expected impacts are

and, if they are acceptable to the community, the possible ways of avoiding or mitigating

them.VanclayandEsteves(2011)perceivethattheFPICandSIAprocessesaresimilarandthat

the basic steps for accomplishing them are fundamentally the same. Additionally, where

there are unavoidable impacts, SIA canhelpascertainwhatwouldbefaircompensationtothe

community,andtoformalizethisinanImpactsandBenefitsAgreement.

2.5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FPIC AND IMPACTS AND BENEFITS AGREEMENTS

ImpactsandBenefitsAgreements(IBAs)areaformofcommunitydevelopmentagreementthat

communities negotiate with developers, usually without the mediation of government. They

emerged inCanadaandAustraliaasawayof formalizing thenegotiationsbetweenextractives

companies and Indigenous peoples. Earlier forms of arrangements failed to guarantee respect

for Indigenous rightsand/or theiradequateparticipation in theprocess (O’Faircheallaigh1999;

O’Faircheallaigh&Corbett2005).BeforetheIBAmodel,thesocialandenvironmentalimpactsof

developmentprojectsoncommunitiesusedtobeaddressedonlythroughenvironmentalimpact

assessmentprocedures, regulatedby thegovernment (Galbraithetal.2007).Prnoetal. (2010)

considerthatIBAsemergedasacommunityresponsetothe‘businessasusual’modusoperandithat

existedinCanadaduringtheenvironmentalimpactassessmentregime.IBAshavenowbecomethe

standardmodelofnegotiationbetweenextractivecompaniesandIndigenouspeoplesinCanada

andAustralia,andarebeingimplementedinmanyothercountriesandcontexts(O’Faircheallaigh

2010).InBrazil,althoughcurrentlawsforbidmineralextractionwithinIndigenouslands,aconcept

similar to IBA exists forwhere Indigenous peoplesmay be affected by developments close to

theirlands.BecauseofthecontextspecificityandchangingnatureofIBAs,weendorseCaineand

Krogman’s (2010,p.80)definitionthat IBAsare ‘agreementsthatestablish formal relationships

betweensignatories,mitigatenegativedevelopmentimpacts,andenhancepositivedevelopment

outcomesforAboriginalcommunities’.

Intheliteratureonthetopic,IBAsaregenerallyseenaspositivetoolsformitigatingimpacts,but

somestudiesdemonstratethatimportantissues,suchasgovernanceandimplementationofthe

provisions,areoftenleftout(Siebenmorgen2009;O’Faircheallaigh2010).Hitch(2006)alsoconsiders

IBAstobeaninnovativetoolforpromotingmoreequitableandsustainabledevelopmentforall

stakeholders,butsuggeststhat,forIBAstobesuccessfulinachievingtheirgoals,itiscrucialthat

companieshavehighlevelsofculturalsensitivity,applyparticipativeandtransparentapproaches

39

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to decisionmaking andwork in collaborationwith the communities. Similarly,O’Faircheallaigh

(2010,p.70) suggests thatagreements canprovide substantialbenefits,butmany issuesneed

tobeaddressed,‘includingconfidentiality,Aboriginalsupportforprojects,andAboriginalaccess

to judicialand regulatory systems.Alsovital is theneed tobreakdown thebarriers thatoften

existbetweenprocessesfornegotiatingprojectagreementsandbroaderprocessesforcommunity

planninganddecisionmaking’.

TheexistenceofasignedIBAbetweenacompanyandacommunitydoesnotnecessarilyconfirm

thattheconditionsofFPICwereapplied.Forexample,asignedagreementcouldbetheresultof

coercionofvariouskinds(i.e.notfree).Companiesmaynothaveactedingoodfaithbynotrevealing

allrelevantinformationand/orcommunitiesmightnothaveunderstoodtheimplicationsofwhat

wasgoingtohappen(i.e.notinformed).Andquiteoften,agreementsmayhavebeenfinalized,and

insomecasesnotevenstarted,untilafterprojectactivitieshadcommenced(i.e.notprior).Thus

thedevelopmentofanIBAneedstobeconsistentwiththephilosophyofFPIC.Becauseofpotential

futurelitigation(refertotheexamplesofhumanrightsabuseinKemp&Vanclay2013),anissuefor

companieswillbetoensurethattheycanestablishintothefuturethatFPICwasobservedandfully

applied.AlthoughthemereexistenceofanIBAisnotproofofFPIC(asdiscussedabove),whereIBAs

arecarefullywrittenanddocumentalltherelevantdetails,itislikelythatanIBAcanestablishthat

FPICwasobserved.AnIBAisanappropriateconclusiontoanFPICprocess.

2.6. CONCLUSION

Theconceptof‘Free,PriorandInformedConsent’isafundamentalcomponentoftheIndigenous

right to self-determination.Unfortunately, neither FPIC nor the right to self-determination are

beingrespectedinBrazilandmanyothercountries.Violationsoftheserightsareoverlookedby

governments,especiallyinthecaseof‘projectsofnationalinterest’,andparticularlyinrelationto

Brazil’shybridstate–corporateenterprises.Violationscanalsohappenwhencompanies,asabox-

tickingprocedure,onlydotheabsoluteminimumrequiredbyenvironmentallicensingprocesses

andignoreinternationalhumanrightsstandards.

FPICshouldbetakenseriouslybycompaniesthatinterfacewithIndigenouspeoples.Inorderto

achievealegitimatesociallicencetooperateandtorefrainfromviolatinghumanrights,companies

need to respect FPIC, arguably with non-Indigenous as well as Indigenous communities. The

righttoself-determinationisconceivedasbeingapplicabletoallpeoples(UnitedNations1945),

thusrespectingFPIC in relationtoall localcommunitieswouldbecomplyingwith international

humanrightsstandards.ComplyingwithFPICshouldnotbeseenasbeingavoluntarymeasure

thatcompaniescanchoosetofollowornot–itisnecessarytoensuretheself-determinationof

Indigenouspeoples.

40


Ifcompaniesarecommittedtofullyrespectinghuman rights, recognizing the right to FPIC,

and actually implementing it, are important steps. The alleged difficulties in applying

FPIC result from a lack of experience,withfewinitiativessofar.Withgoodfaithand qualified

professionals,anycompanythatchoosestoadheretoFPIC,orisforcedtobylegislation,should

be abletoimplementit.Also,therearenowmanyhandbooks availableonhow to implement

FPIC, describing the successes and difficulties in different situations (e.g. Colchester and

Ferrari 2007; Colchester 2008;Hill et al. 2010;LehrandSmith2010;Weitzner2011;Persoon

and Minter 2011). Therefore, although it can be considered as being difficult, as company–

communityrelationsusually are,it isnotinfeasible.Infact,relationships between companies

andcommunitiesmaybecomeeasierifFPICis applied,astheywillprobablybebasedontrust

insteadofconflict. However, companies need to be ready to listen and to accept ‘no’ as an

answer sometimes, as not every community will be agreeable to accept all development

projects affecting them, despite the potential benefits they might receive. Organizations

(corporateandgovernment) should not try to coerce communities into accepting aproject.

SIA and HRIA can be useful tools for ensuringthat human rights are being respected in a

company’sprojectsandoperations,ifperformedatanearlystageandinaparticipatorymanner.

Companies thatadopt theFPIC philosophy and fully implement it in practice, in addition to

respecting the right of communities to participate in decisions that affect their lives,will

probablybenefitfrom reduced conflict, reduced likelihood of reputational damage,aswell

reducedrisksandcosts.

41

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