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University of Antwerp
The history of development cooperation
Hasselt University Interdisciplinary Course North-South
Crossing borders
16 February 2011
Robrecht Renard
University of Antwerp
• slide 2
Outline
1. The history of aid: the money 2. The history of aid: the ideas3. Too many aid deliverers4. Donor collective action problems5. Conclusion
University of Antwerp
• slide 3
ODA in value and as share of GNI
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
bil
lio
n U
S $
(20
08 c
on
stan
t p
rice
s)
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
as p
erce
nta
ge
of
do
no
r G
NI
value (left axis) share of GNI (right axis)
Post-colonial adjustment
Stalled promise yet steady increase in volumes
Aid fatigue
New found optimism?
University of Antwerp
• slide 6
2. The history of aid: the ideas
period preferred aid modality
major constraint addressed
donor attitude to partner government
1960-1980
projects - physical capital- human capital
bypass
1980-2000
policy based support
- macroeconomic policies
bully
2000- budget support
- ownership- governance- good donorship
engage
7
University of Antwerp
• slide 7
1. Ownership1. Ownership(Partner country)(Partner country)
mutual accountability
Results oriented management
Results oriented management
2. Alignment2. Alignment(Donor-Partner)(Donor-Partner) Aligning with
partner’s agenda
Partner sets the agenda
Using partner systems
Establishing common
arrangements
Simplifying procedures Sharing information
3. Harmonisation3. Harmonisation(Donor-Donor)(Donor-Donor)
The 2005 Paris declaration
University of Antwerp
• slide 9
taxes
ODA budget
bilateral aid multilateral aid
3. Too many aid deliverers
University of Antwerp
• slide 10
taxes private donations
ODA budget
bilateral aid
private aid
multilateral aid
3. Too many aid deliverers
University of Antwerp
• slide 11
taxes private donations
capital market
ODA budget
bilateral aid
private aid
multilateral aid
3. Too many aid deliverers
University of Antwerp
• slide 12
taxes private donations
capital market
ODA budget
bilateral aid
private aid
multilateral aid
3. Too many aid deliverers
Sources of aidSources of aid
Deliverers of aidDeliverers of aid
University of Antwerp
• slide 14
4. Donor collective action problems
• Excessive number of aid deliverers – signals a failure to collaborate– problem aggravated by what follows:
• Principal-agent relationship• Samaritan’s dilemma• Warm glow effects• Missing feedback loops• Donors in pursuit of too many goals
University of Antwerp
• slide 15
Me principal, you agent
• Recipient governments often are not pursuing development in their countries– this is not a question of individual morality– but a question of institutional incentives
• Aid is more and more being directed towards countries that are badly governed– well-governed countries manage well without aid
• Principal-agent theory– requires strong principal who can sanction the agent– but aid sanctions do not hurt the right people
University of Antwerp
• slide 16
The Samaritan’s Dilemma (J. Buchanan)
Recipient
High Effort Low Effort
Samaritan
No Help 2,2 1,1
Help 4,3 3,4
University of Antwerp
• slide 17
Samaritan dilemma
• If Samaritan is strongly motivated to help, recipient is in the more powerful position, and bad Nash equilibrium results– governments receiving food aid disregard agriculture– villagers do not maintain donor-funded infrastructure
• Through a credible strategy of withdrawal (conditionality), a tough Samaritan may avoid the bad equilibrium occurring
• Another effective strategy for the smart Samaritan may be to organize aid tournaments (selectivity)
University of Antwerp
• slide 18
Warm glow
• People feel good simply from the act of giving, irrespective of the results obtained– not to be confused with altruism
• Although warm glow is a powerful incentive for international solidarity, it can hamper collective action– donors prefer tangible (photographs) and ‘attributable’
results (projects), even if this contributes to donor fragmentation
– Northern citizens bypass intermediaries (NGOs) in order to increase the warm glow, even if this reduces effectiveness (transaction costs for delivery and supervision)
University of Antwerp
• slide 19
Missing feedback loop
• Makes public opinion easily manipulated• Gives undue importance to pressure groups
– NGOs– universities– private sector (aid tying)
• Suggests an increased role for Parliament– provided it is better informed than public opinion– provided it does not only listen to pressure groups
University of Antwerp
• slide 20
Donors in pursuit of too many goals
• Development– technocratic: econonomic growth, health, education,…– political: democracy
• Global public goods – climate change– distress migration– drug trafficking– contagious diseases
• Non-developmental selfish donor interests– commercial interests (aid tying)– geo-political interests– security interests
University of Antwerp
• slide 21
Direct effects
Donor managed project aid
• productivity of the project itself
Budget support
• general productivity of the public sector
University of Antwerp
• slide 22
Direct effects Indirect effects
Donor managed project aid
• productivity of the project itself
• know-how transfer• pilot function
• transaction costs• weakening of public sector (donor-driven priority setting, poaching of recurrent resources and staff)
Budget support
• general productivity of the public sector
• strengthening of the public sector (TA, policy dialogue, conditionalities)
University of Antwerp
• slide 23
Direct effects Indirect effects
Donor managed project aid
• productivity of the project itself
• know-how transfer• pilot function
• transaction costs• weakening of public sector (donor-driven priority setting, poaching of recurrent resources and staff)
Budget support
• general productivity of the public sector
• strengthening of the public sector (TA, policy dialogue, conditionalities)
University of Antwerp
• slide 24
Conclusions
• High hopes of the aid approach that is advocated in the 2005 Paris Declaration are not being fulfilled – good principles– but naïve about incentives of major actors
• But there is no brilliant new aid paradigm looming over the horizon– this is still the best game in town