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SHARPENING THE FOCUS ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS ANDORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY1

ByBob Travica

I.H. Asper School of BusinessUniversity of Manitoba

This article reports on an investigation of information culture in two companies. Information cultures with distinct characteristics have been discovered in each company, each exhibiting internal divisions. The article contributes to research on the relationship between information systems and organizational culture. It also advances an information culture approach that may assist in defining more clearly the relationship between IS research and the cultural view within organization theory.

Introduction

The relationship between organizational culture and information and information technology (IT) artifacts has recently received attention of researchers (e.g., Bressand & Distler,1995; Davenport & Prusak, 1997; Huang et al., 2003; Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999; Kappos & Rivard, 2008; Leidner & Kayworth, 2006, 2008; Orlikowski, 1996). Inquiry would usually follow the premise that culture affects adoption and use of IT and information systems (IS, systems). For example, Kappos and Rivard (2008) provided a recent, exhaustive review of the literature investigating the relationship between organizational culture and systems’ development and use. IS researchers taking the cultural perspective have mostly relied on organization theory (e.g., Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Martin, 1992; Schein, 1991, 1992; Smircich, 1983). The resulting literature provides insights valuable for theory and management of IS. However, due to its novelty, the lens for examining this important relationship is still in the process of calibration, thus necessitating improvements in the analytical apparatus. In other words, there is a focus issue in IS research.

Another way of stating the focus issue is that culture-based IS research needs to anchor itself more decidedly in information and IT artifacts rather than drawing exclusively on broad concepts, constructs, measures and models of organizational culture borrowed from reference disciplines. For example, a cornerstone of organizational culture is the definition of organizational identity, or what Schein (1992) calls the shared assumptions addressing the problems of external and internal adaptation. Rather than merely following the broad avenue of organizational culture study, IS inquiry may adjust this lens

________________Acknowledgement: This study was supported in part by the university of Manitoba URGP grant #31532.

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by concentrating on the identity of an organization’s groups in relation to its IT/IS, whose coping with IT/IS constitutes an aspect of the adaptation and integration processes. This can be called a WHO-question of IS-specific cultural inquiry. This lens adjustment would not deny the need for understanding the broader organizational culture in IS research, while it would enrich research by introducing an IS-specific focus. Similarly, instead of examining the beliefs on organization’s purpose that is usually manifested in core values, vision/mission statements, and stories (Morgan, 1986; Schein, 1991), one can investigate directly the purpose of organizational IT/IS as conceived of by organizational members. This can be called a WHAT-question of IS-specific cultural inquiry.

Another standard theme in organizational culture research refers to the character of relationships among organization members (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Handy, 1982; Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 1992). These are eminently management phenomena and they include beliefs and practices of competition, cooperation, hierarchy, meritocracy, power allocation, reward, and punishment. IS research could supplement the people’s management focus by zeroing in on beliefs and actual practices pertaining to managing information, IT and IS. Thus, rather than inquiring about competitiveness among employees and extrapolating from this finding the likelihood of adopting certain IT or IS, one could investigate directly the level of competition evolving around the relevant data and IT. This can be called a HOW-question of IS-specific cultural inquiry. Moreover, assumptions about change (progress vs. status quo) and related understanding of time (e.g., past-present-future focus, time measurement, speed of time) have also been addressed in organizational culture research (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 1992; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). If the IS researcher remains focused just on general orientations that organization members maintain about change and time, the resulting picture is not as sharp as it could be. A slight adjustment in the approach would sharpen the IS lens so that one concentrates on conservatism/progressiveness and time aspects as these apply to IS. This can be called a WHY or WHEN-question of IS-specific cultural inquiry (why/when should IS be changed).

There are two goals behind the present study. One is to contribute to studying the relationship between IS and organizational culture. The other goal is to advance study of information culture that may assist in defining more clearly the relationship between IS research and organization theory and particularly the cultural view of organization. This goal, therefore, has to do with the above outlined focus issue in IS research or with the IS field’s self-identity (deemed by many as a core challenge). Two premises inspire this effort: (1) bridges between the IS field and so called reference disciplines are to be maintained, and (2) a perspective specific to the IS field needs to be carved.

The concept of Infoculture

The concept of information culture (infoculture for short) used in this article has been defined in terms of organization members’ stable beliefs (deep-set assumptions, values, norms) and patterns of behaviour that are related to information and IT (Travica 2003, 2005). Infoculture is a part of organizational culture. The notion of information used in the definition above is broad, and it implies knowledge, meaning, and data. The term “IT” implies electronic and pre-electronic technology. The causal relationship between cultural beliefs/behaviours and information/IT is assumed to be mutual. In other words, IT and information can be influenced by organizational culture and these can also influence it. This concept of infoculture draws on both IS theory and organization theory, thus filling a need for cross-pollination between related fields (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). However, infoculture pinpoints to a particular segment of organizational culture that is relevant for IS research. The infoculture concept also differentiates between IT and other technologies. This is rarely done in organization theory that has traditionally treated technology as a transformation function consisted of various tools, procedures, knowledge, and management.

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The concept of infoculture draws on several premises. It endorses a deeper theorizing of the IT artefact (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001) by assuming that one should differentiate between different types of IT/IS. An implication of this differentiation is that infoculture should be studied in the context of particular IS and organizational tasks/processes (e.g., business communication, customer support, tasks in human resource management, and knowledge creation and sharing). Furthermore, IT and IS create a part-whole relationship, as it is assumed in the area of systems analysis and design (IS includes IT, along with data, procedures, and other artifacts). This distinction has cultural implications. For example, in cultural valuing of a system that introduces major changes in a particular domain of an organization users could praise the system’s data for contributions to decision making. However, the same users could criticize a difficult user interface for defying efficiency assumptions ascribed to IT. Generalist inquiry into systems adoption may compel users to average their evaluations across data/meaning inferred and IT (user interface) and to appear undecided and, consequently, culturally conservative.

Another assumption in the infoculture approach concerns an analytical concept of information. The word “information” is an umbrella term that stands for data, meaning, and knowledge. It is assumed that data can reside in IS while knowledge and meaning belong to the domain of human cognition and systems can only facilitate (support) them. The essential purpose of IS (and of IT involved in systems) is to facilitate meaning creation and knowledge activities rather than to merely organize data. A consequence of this assumption is that the systems and practices of managing and interpreting constitute cultural artifacts of interest. For example, employee performance may be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively in two organizations. In one of these, management habitually may look just at select quantitative indicators automatically delivered by a system, while in the other management may take a more comprehensive approach in understanding what employee performance is. In effect, these organizations represent different infocultures.

The literature relevant to studying infoculture includes reports on the construction of the concept and on its initial testing. The construction process relied on the literature that will be outlined in this section and on this author’s empirical study (cf. Travica, 2003, 2005, 2005a, 2008). Bressand and Distler (1995) used the term “infoculture” in their analytical framework of social networks, and defined it in terms of shared objectives and mutual expectations pertaining to mobilizing network resources, rules that govern changes of rules, background knowledge taken for granted and enacted in daily use of the network. According to the authors, infoculture sets the basis to sense making, information, learning, knowledge, and shared understanding of specific situations. Orlikowski and Gash’s work (1994) also helps in modeling the content of the infoculture concept by pointing to assumptions about instrumentality of IT and information in accomplishing performance goals and the influences these assumptions exerted in the organization under investigation. Cultural beliefs and stories pertaining to knowledge preservation also contribute to understanding infoculture (Orlikowski, 1996). Thus, both the technological and “soft” part (knowledge) partakes in infoculture.

Many researchers of organizational culture posit that the cultural core consists of values (usually conceptualized in terms of stable and deep-set beliefs, either conscious or unconscious). This line of thinking can be traced back to anthropology. For example, Hofstede (1980) started his long-term study of culture, which has influenced study of organizational culture, by building on the work of anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn. In particular, Hofstede (1980) drew on Kluckhohn’s definition that was based on agreed anthropological definitions of the time:

Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values. (p. 25)

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Hofstede (1980) simplified the definition by focusing on the values aspect. Culture thus became a system of values, where value was defined as “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (p. 19). Value has been the central construct for explaining culture throughout Hofstede’s work. For him, culture is “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another” (Hofstede, 1980: p. 25), and values are the “invisible software of the mind” (Hofstede et al., 2010). Since it is values that “program” mind, other aspects of culture termed “practices” are ephemeral. Practices refer to rituals, stories, and heroes (Hofstede & Hofstede., 2005; Hofstede et al., 2010). It is also important to note Hofstede’s warning that his study of culture has just a limited value for study of organizational culture since organization is a particular social system (Hofstede et al., 2010: 47). In organizations, learning of practices is more salient than learning of values. The value focus has influenced much of IS research to date. Some authors have attempted to adjust the values approach to the IS perspective. For example, Leidner and Kayworth (2006) proposed a distinction between the IT-related values held by a group and the values embedded in a specific IT.

The concept of infoculture used in this article draws on the values approach (the generic term “beliefs” is used to refer to values as well as assumptions and norms), while allocating an equally important role to behaviours that belong to broadly conceived information domain. These include communication aspects, information seeking, meaning construction, mental models and other patterns of cognition, information management (e.g., methods of collecting, organizing and maintaining data; patterns of sharing data, documents, ideas and results of intellectual work), technological preferences, methods of managing systems’ life cycle, and habitual practices of using IT/IS. This approach is consistent with attention to patterns of thinking the values approach endorses. However, no a priori assumption with regard to the relative importance or explanatory power of beliefs as opposed to behaviours is posited. Consistently with previous research, organizations are viewed as particular social systems in which practices play a salient role (Hofstede et al., 2010). It is assumed that the domain of information (knowledge, meaning, data) and support technologies is increasingly dynamic and that it evades linear causality. Therefore, beliefs can come first and so can behaviours, and their congruence is a matter of scale. While less present in the mainstream literature, investigation of information behaviours has some support among followers of the cultural perspective in IS research. For example, Davenport and Prusak (1997) argued that organizations could be characterized by the choice of communication channels, methods of information sharing, and preferences for facts vs. rumours. These refer to information management methods and technological preferences. Similarly, a tension between the paper and electronic data formats (a technological preference) has been identified as an important phenomenon in organizations making advances in process automation (Sarker and Lee, 2000; Travica, 2005a, 2008).

Since infoculture is part of organizational culture, divisions within the latter can be reflected in the former. Professionals or occupational subcultures are the case in point. Schein (1992) identified subcultures of upper management versus IS professionals, which had evolved around differing conceptions of business information (more precisely, around desirable levels of processing data). Travica (2008) found that different levels of management define the purpose of IT in different ways (more details are provided in the following discussion). Furthermore, IS professionals’ can maintain beliefs of continuous acquisition of technical knowledge and a longer time orientation (Chase, 2008)—potentially aspects of the respective sub-infoculture. Martin’s (1992) framework on cultural integration-fragmentation-differentiation is relevant when it is applied to IS topics, such as system adoption and use (Huang at al., 2003; Kappos & Rivard, 2008). This perspective can help in achieving the depth infoculture research.

Research on typology of organizational cultures can further enrich the concept of infoculture and assist in understanding its relationship with organizational culture. One such typology is provided by Handy (1993) who uses an idea of culture source as the defining criterion. His types are: role culture

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(source: formalized role; example organizations: government agency, vertically integrated corporation), matrix (project-based work; engineering, civil construction), person (individual; academia, artistic organization), and power (dominant leader or group; small entrepreneurship, trade union). Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) provided a similar typology, but mapped it against the two dimensions of national culture he invented – uncertainty avoidance (the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous of unknown situations), and power distance (the extent to which less powerful members of a culture expect and accept that power is distributed unequally). His types are: machine bureaucracy (rules and regulations are emphasized), full bureaucracy (analogue to Handy’s role culture), family, and market. Since both bureaucracy types reject uncertainty/ambiguity, they stand opposed to family and market, whose members take uncertainty/ambiguity as a normal condition.

Boisot’s (1987) typology is similar to Handy’s (1993) and that of Hofstede & Hofstede (2005). However, Boisot proposed two knowledge dimensions as the basis for typifying, which brings his work closer to the infoculture perspective. His defining dimensions are codification (the extent of organizing knowledge representations or of making it communicable) and diffusion (the percentage of a population that knowledge reaches). These frame four types of organizational culture: market, bureaucracy, clan, and fiefdom. While the first two are apparently similar to the previously discussed market and bureaucracy types, it can be shown that clan is similar to Handy’s power type, and fiefdom to Handy’s person type. Both bureaucracy and market are high on codification as opposed to the other two types. However, bureaucracy diffuses knowledge according to rules and hierarchy criteria (e.g., patents, knowledge pertinent to the office one holds), while market tends to break limits to diffusion (e.g., the knowledge communicated via the publishing industry or the Internet). Furthermore, knowledge is less diffused in a fiefdom (e.g., tacit knowledge individual experts own) than in a clan (e.g., knowledge shared in a small entrepreneurship or in a professional group).

Finally, typologies focused on the relationship between the IS function and business functions can also inform research on infoculture. Kaarst-Brown and Robey (1999) provided such a typology inspired by evolution of IT in two companies. The authors distinguished between five “archetypes” of IT culture: revered, controlled, demystified, integrated, and fearful. Drawing on metaphors of wizard (IS professionals), dragon (IT/IS), and magic (capabilities of IT/IS), each IT culture establishes a different relationship between the IS department and the business (user) segment of an organization. For example, in the revered culture, the wizard is trusted by the users, and he has all the power stemming from his superb capability to control the dragon and to do magic. In contrast, in the fearful IT culture, the wizard is mistrusted and the dragon is confronted and can even be slain.

In the present study, the infoculture approach is advanced by framing the investigation upon meta-codes that follow the W+H logic discussed above: what is the purpose of IT/IS; who we are in relation to IT/IS; why/when should IS change; and how information and IT/IS should be and are practically managed. As already discussed, these questions have references in research on organizational culture. It can also be argued that the questions reflect some core existential issues pertinent to a cultural perspective. The what-question points to ontology of the cultural object. The who-question refers to self-ontology of the human agency defined in relation to the cultural object. The when/why-question addresses the agency’s orientation toward IS change and teleology of change. The how-question invites understanding broader management norms and the actual management of the cultural object, where the subject is conceived of broadly and beyond the management occupation.

Methodology

Here reported research addresses infocultures in two companies that will be called Utilities and Telco. The research problem addressed refers to identifying and describing infocultures in the two

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companies. The four aggregate W&H codes mentioned above have provided a backdrop to the following research questions:

What is the purpose of IT/IS? Who are we in relation to IT/IS? When/Why should IS change? How should information and IT/IS be and are managed?

Research reported here was a part of a larger study executed between 2005-2007, which was focused on adoption, use, and management of enterprise systems in the two companies – Utilities’ human resources management system (HRMS), and Telco’s customer relationship management system (CRMS). As part of that larger study, organizational cultures and infocultures were investigated as well. The present study advances this research through (1) new evidence (findings on Telco’s infoculture have never been publicized), (2) applying additional coding along the W&H-categories, and (3) applying a comparative analysis across and within the organizations studied.

A combination of qualitative and quantitative case study methods was deployed. The former included an interpretivist epistemology and a mix of qualitative methods (Charmaz, 2006; Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Lee, 1989; Suchman, 1987; Tedlock, 2000; Yin, 2003). Quantitative data were also collected via two surveys. Qualitative data collection consisted of intensive interviewing, observation of systems use, and document analysis. The interviews were taped, and notes were taken during each interview. The interviews varied in design from semi-structured to structured ones (applied to executives). The start point in interviewing was focusing on the enterprise system under investigation and then branch out to broader issues surrounding information, IS, and IT in the particular firm. Specifically, a semi-structured interview would start by asking a respondent to describe his/her main tasks and the role of relevant systems used. Then, probes would be used in order to learn about details of information and IT aspects involved in the tasks, advantages and disadvantages of the focal system, and user support provided.

At opportune moments, the interviewing would expand to broader information, technological and cultural issues. For example, were the cited weaknesses exclusive to the particular system or they were more generic in character? What the situation was of IS planning and IS implementation in general? What kind of support was management usually providing in adoption and use of IS in general? In the manner of grounded theory, interview notes and transcripts were coded iteratively in the data collection process, and the researcher’s learning about research issues was advancing over time. Once coding categories acquired initial contours, the interviewing became more focused. The goal from that point on was to drill down into details of the emerging constructs and of their relationships. Coding continued after completing data collection. The broad coding category of organizational culture (and others not reported here) was constructed by the end of the coding process, which led to the next step – constructing the infoculture code and the sub-categories that represented the content of infoculture (beliefs and practices). Finally, the W&H meta-codes were applied.

The interviewee sample at Utilities numbered 33 employees (managers, clerks, and professionals – listed in decreasing numerical order). Since the larger study cited above was focused on adoption and management of a HRMS (Travica, 2008), the HR staff made nearly a half of the sample studied. The reminder involved several organizational functions, including the IS department. At Telco, there were 32 interviewees (clerks, professionals, and managers). With the exception of CIO, all these resided in two departments – Marketing and Sales. This selection was determined by the CRMS under investigation (Travica, 2009). The final method deployed was surveying. Its purpose was to facilitate validation of the emerging coding categories and their relationships. A different survey was developed for each of the

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organizations and tested for semantic clarity on smaller employee samples. Then, surveyed were 85 respondents at Telco and 195 at Utilities – both yielding response rates over 50%.

The case organizations are comparable on several counts. Utilities Company is a large, over a century old government-owned monopoly that generates and distributes electrical power in several North American markets. The company has a number of departments and an elaborate management structure. Utilities is organized as bureaucracy, with an exception of the IS department that has a matrix organization. As a result of recent re-organization, the Utilities HR function was centralized. Most of the HR clerks and professionals were gathered at a single location and assigned to serve different departments remotely. The other case organization, Telco, is also a large and old company. It also has an extensive horizontal and vertical differentiation and competes in several geographical markets in North America. However, it was privatized in the mid-1990s. Telco has four lines of business – landline telephone, mobile telephone, cable TV, and the Internet connectivity. Telco’s sales department studied is organized as bureaucracy, with four units serving individual, small business, and partly corporate market (most of corporate sales are carried by a separate sales department). The staffs consist of sales representatives that are trained on the job to respond via the phone or email to customers’ ordering requests or billing inquiries. In contrast, the marketing department (also studied) resembles a professional organization, with multiple units organized around products and marketing channels. Most of the staff has a college degree.

Infoculture at Utilities

Following sections discuss findings from the comparative case study, starting with Utilities and then moving to Telco. At the point of departure, it should be reiterated that infoculture in any organization is related to its broader organizational culture. Understanding the fundamental characteristics of the latter, therefore, is a good start in exploring the former. The typologies of organizational cultures discussed above provide a parsimonious stance for this discussion. At Utilities, the dominant organizational culture resembles Handy’s (1993) role culture or Hofstede & Hofstede’s (2005) full bureaucracy. Formalized roles (job descriptions) and extensive procedures exist at Utilities. Roles and procedures are reinforced by external regulations and responsibilities imposed on a public corporation. Organization members tend to fill the roles and play by rules, rather then imparting individuality on their work and organizational existence. This facelessness is partly balanced by the practice of long-term, secure employment that provides opportunities for learning more about others. What infoculture does complement this organizational culture?

The general finding is that the infocultural aspects discovered at Utilities do not create a coherent whole. Rather, differences and tensions between beliefs/practices pertaining to different groups and departments are salient. At the level of over-arching infoculture artefacts the study identified one noteworthy aspect – unpolished/unfinished system development. This aspect refers to the quality of application software that is released to users. A seasoned trainer for enterprise systems argued that applications typically were not finalized into a polished product. He cited many examples demonstrating that the functionality or user interface of system modules have not been up to a desirable level of quality even though they did the job. This opinion was, then, further investigated. Respondents commonly confirmed that ERP applications as well as some others typically lacked a finishing touch. For some, this caused a minor problem they were able to overcome through learning and self-adjustment. Others experienced frustration in various degrees and a feeling of disappointment for being neglected. Extreme opinions had a significant following, often being linked to an assumption of a “too fast systems development.” As one respondent put it, “I think we’d all say that we all feel that we’re starting to get crippled by the computer.” The unpolished/unfinished system development belongs to the HOW rubric of infoculture: nobody really believes that systems should be developed this way, but practically they are.

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Reasons for the unpolished systems development could be sought in the inter-departmental power distribution. A strategy of implementing ERP applications over the entire enterprise moved large annual budgets under authority of the IS department. In addition, the largest group within the IS department developed expertise to cope with the large scope and complexity of the ERP product and client-server architecture. This exclusive knowledge became the source of expert power – a capability of influencing behaviour of people in business departments. The two types of power enabled the IS department to seek shortcuts while trying to overcome some unexpected systems development challenges and to meet deadlines. Compromising some quality standards, an emergency practice, turned into a habit.

Business vs. Technologist Infocultures

Role culture is resistant to change (Handy, 1993). Indeed, many interviewees at Utilities mentioned a habit of resisting and criticizing novelties. As one HR professional put it, “the people here like to criticize and complain a lot.” This trait of the company’s organization culture influences its infoculture, making it inert or conservative. The company’s CEO commented: “I think that is true for sure that people like to criticize. A lot of it came about when we first introduced the enterprise system because then there was a difficult process. There was a lot of resistance to change.” An IS executive agreed: “We don’t seem to have the clout to say, ‘well listen, we’re going to put this system in. I know it’s going to create some problems, but you know this is where we’re going, and just accept it and get on with life’.” The infocultural conservatism erupts when a new IS demands a change in work practices. People continue behaving in accustomed ways and decline in accountability as the following statement of an HR professional illustrates:

“For a number of folks who have now become time entry people it’s a very different process [managing data on work hours with a new system module]. We have seen some low accountability, and we had to make sure you do your time [data entry]; make sure you are checking [the system].”

The IS department is culturally contrasted to the rest of the Utilities organization. Its organizational culture can be described in terms of Handy’s (1993) matrix. System development teams possess material resources and problem solving capabilities and they enjoy a high degree of control over their work. Task culture embraces change and adaptation (Handy, 1993). The Utilities IS department employing about 250 members is organized along several lines of business, combining the system, user group and operation type criteria. The IS department’s culture is complemented by a particular infoculture. In fact, the study identified two starkly contrasted infocultures existing in a dynamic tension, thus confirming previous research (Huang et al., 2003; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). There is a technologist and a business infoculture in Utilities. Each responds differently to the infocultural question.

In the technologist infoculture, the purpose of IT/IS is assumed in terms of organization driver. The head of the enterprise systems unit within the IS department explained that the enterprise software deployed could be used for turning the entire organization of the company around a process-based model. The head argued that it was natural to change organization with technological progress: “You have to really question people who insist that you have to do it [tasks, processes] the old way.” This assumption frames IT/IS as a building block in designing an organization, while business is to follow from the organization, and information plays a tacit role at the end of the cue. In contrast, business departments assumed a different order of priorities: business—information—IT/IS. For them, the purpose of IT/IS was to deliver business information quickly, effortlessly and with minimal cost. A supervisor commented: “When we want the information, we usually want it right now; we don’t want to make a phone call to find where they [systems professionals] have hid it now.” Similarly, the head of the HR department expressed frustration with a lack of information relevant for decision making in spite of significant IS investments.

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He wondered in despair how was it possible that the Internet could deliver some relevant business information, and so even free of charge and without demanding special knowledge of operating computer or information search.

A split between the technologist and the business perspective characterized other infoculture dimensions as well. In defining their relationship toward IT/IS, the technologists side felt as being in a driver’s seat. An IS manager explained how prioritizing of applications was done: “We have picked the applications and those areas that we thought were the most important for the organization at this time.” Technologists have also enjoyed freedom in designing the functionality and characteristics of user interface. They could also turn down requests for system customization, usually using financial arguments for the justification. Some system professionals described “battles” they fought with divisional management and the wins achieved by imposing their own design solutions. In contrast, the business segment felt as if it was pushed to use new technology, while not being asked much about their needs and preferences. Their position can be labelled as reluctant passenger. One manager commented that “new and improved is not always better because there is a learning curve that goes into each application.” Managers exercised particularly remarkable resistance to doing approval tasks by using the system; previously, they would simply sign certain documents and clerks would do the systems work. Another instance of resistance coincided with a confusion and ignorance introduced by new, system-supported processes. A supervisor explained that he had to bypass a system when he was felt unsure about the source and validity of data pushed to him. This supervisor cited the case of approving employee reports on the completion of professional development courses.

When or why should IS change? The two infocultures again provided differing beliefs. Technologists presumed that systems should change with IT innovations. They believed that IT was following an infinite line of progress and argued about inevitability of moving forward. Technologists are aware that technology may not be perfect at the time of release, but for them this fact amounts just to “hiccups” that the next release will certainly remove. Some technologists criticized the users for being slow to adapt to the progress. An enterprise system expert uttered: “There is always going to be people who are going to resist […]; if you can get 90% of them, you are doing great.” The technologists’ assumptions on change could be explained by the character of the IS profession, which involves constant changes in technology and a need for continual learning and adjusting (Chase, 2008). In contrast, the business side exhibited a belief that systems should change only when this was really beneficial from the business perspective. A supervisor asserted: “If I can’t do it faster than I can do manually, then there is no advantage to the technology to take over.” A manager argued that the depth of system changes was something always open to a debate rather than an issue that should be resolved by technological trends. Another argued for taking time for solving first problems of the existing systems’ rather than “jumping ahead too far all the time.” Overall, a conservative character painted the business infoculture. As opposed to the technologists’ long and forward leaping time, the users’ time is reduced to the present dimension (cf. Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).

The how question of infoculture can possibly include many aspects. The study specifically found that Utilities’ technologist infoculture has been firmly rooted in electronic information. Computers have driven out paper wherever possible. This infocultural trait was remarkably manifested in office spaces (walled offices and cubicles) that feature little of paper if any. The epitome was the office of the IS department head. The head’s computer and a digital clock with a timer were the only items on a sizeable desk. But for a few binders, bare shelves walled one side of the office, inviting the question: why were there in the first place?

The business infoculture appeared very different. It was stretched between paper and electronic information management. Such a tension has been evidenced in previous research (Sarker and Lee, 2000; Travica, 2005a). The reluctant passenger kept mixing the paper and electronic trail in spite of a long-

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standing strategic initiative of transitioning to “paperless administration.” For example, the HR function was still printing pay check notifications even though the transfer of pay was electronic. Whereas government regulations could be partly responsible for retaining paper, accustomed behaviours played a big role. Clerks had commonly asserted that their bosses “still like to see it all on paper.” A secretary remarked: “I still print off the paper copy, and my manager still looks at that. When time comes for him to approve it in the system, he has already seen it on paper, and then it saves him time. I keep that signed copy for a long time.”

The office space complemented the picture of a tension between paper and electronic information management. In an executive’s office, there were several smaller desks covered with binders and loose documents, and a separate computer desk. In the office of another executive, there were two large desks. One was entirely covered with paper documents stacked in several layers, while the other had many paper documents opened or stacked on it, allowing just enough space to insert a monitor of the executive’s computer. During the interview, this executive referred to a certain document and offered to provide a copy of it. Then, the executive moved to the desk that was buried in documents. He moved around it, fetching document by document, only to quickly discard each. Unable to find the desired one, the executive eventually gave up the search, mumbling in frustration, “talking about paperless office…”

Table 1. Infoculture at UtilitiesInfoculture Question EnterpriseHow information and IT/IS are managed

- Unpolished systems development

Business Segment IS DepartmentWhat is role of IT/IS Information tool Organizational forceWho we are in relation to IT/IS Reluctant passenger DriverWhen/Why change IS When necessary, novelty must

save users’ effort; conservatismWhen IT changes, to follow progress

How information and IT/IS should be/are managed

- Electronic vs. paper formats- By white collars; digital divide

Electronic standard

Another aspect of the infoculture in business departments refers to blue collars access to electronic data. This access is severely limited to nil. Indeed, there is an open digital divide between white collar and blue collar employees. Electronic data is supposed to be managed primarily by white collar workers. The majority of blue collar employees (crewmembers, various trades) can even be without access to the company’s intranet. Those that have access privileges usually have no time for visiting offices in order to use computers. In addition, blue collar workers miss computer literacy. Perpetuating an old tradition, clerks perform information work for blue collars. These practices have had a complement in the norms sanctioning this state of affairs as normal.

The infocultural split at Utilities resembles IT-bound cultural archetypes proposed by Kaarst-Brown and Robey (1999). A general orientation of the driver infoculture resembles the revered IT culture: the IS department is privy of specialist knowledge of ERP technology, commands significant budgets, and makes crucial decisions in systems development. However, due to the infocultural split, the “wizard” and the “dragon” that the wizard controls are not revered, as it would follow from free reign of this archetype and perhaps wanted by the IS professionals. The user side strives for different archetypes. In engineering departments, IT had been demystified, giving a rise to autonomous system development practices with no reliance on the IS department, except for larger scale database applications. Other users may fit less the demystified and controlled archetypes, although traits of IT demystification are clearly present and reinforced even in private domains (note the remark of the HR executive on the business

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value of the free and easy Internet information). These departments appear more tuned to an integrated IT culture, in which business goals and customer service are seen as driving the technology and determining who benefits or loses (Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999). But the gap between business users and IS professionals mutes this urge. In reaction, the business infoculture comes close to the fearful archetype. This is manifested in the users’ frustration with and criticism of systems’ aspects and with information, users’ fear of systems’ evolution pace, the preservation of paper trail, and in the deprivation of blue-collar employees from access to systems.

In summary, Utilities’ infoculture exhibits a habit of unpolished systems development (see Table 1). Its even more salient characteristic is the internal division between the IS function and the business segment of the company. IS professionals believe that IT is a force for shaping organization. They assume that their calling is to drive this force. IS should keep evolving with IT progress and the company should follow through this progress with no hesitation, because the new is assumed to be a priori better. In their information practices technologists follow standards of electronic information management. In contrast, the infoculture of the business departments subordinates IT to business and information purposes. Organization members are aware that they cannot influence much the direction and pace of systems evolution. They are being in a passenger seat even though they actively resist and question rather than succumb. In their information practices they are stretched between the paper and electronic trail, in spite of long-standing initiatives favoring the latter. The world of electronic information is closed to blue-collar employees. Both this aspect and managers’ preference for paper have reinforced a distinguished infocultural position of the clerical staff. The gap between the two sub-infocultures at Utilities resembles differences between the fearful IT culture and an aspiring revered IT culture (Kaarst-Brown and Robey, 1999).

Infoculture at Telco

If Utilities operates in an environment of lower competitive pressures, Telco is in a very different situation. The company partakes in an industry that fuels the development of new economy characterized by global markets of capital, supplies, products, and labour. Much like the rest of the industry in North America, Telco had to undergo a process of deregulation and privatization, facing ever increasing competition in the local and remote markets across different lines of business. Telco entered the new millennium by competing in four service markets and several geographical markets. The study discovered several aspects of the company’s organizational culture, which may be linked to the turbulent industry dynamics. Specifically, there is a shared understanding of volatile markets among Telco’s employees and uncertainty is assumed to be part of the business as usual. Connected to this is a perception of time as being forward leaping and fast paced (cf. Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). The unpredictability of competitors’ moves, new entrants and substitute products shrinks the future horizon down to a two-three year period. This fact corresponds to Deal and Kennedy’s (1999) concept of “short-termism” – shorter term goals become the main guide, and a direction of the company is continually adjusted according to current financial results.

Telco’s culture of uncertainty, rapid time and short-termism reflects on the company’s infoculture. In particular, there is short-termism in IS strategy as well. Planning of the IS development and maintenance is limited to the annual basis. This puts severe constraints to advent of new systems and reduces systems maintenance down to a necessary minimum allowed by conservative budgeting. Further consequences are that new systems are usually not fully developed, while old systems are kept in operation, thus increasing the scope of systems’ maintenance. In the final result, strategic management of IS appears directionless. A point in case is its customer relationship management system (CRMS). Its planning started in the early 2000s, motivated by a vision of arriving at an integrated picture of customers in a local market. System design was refined several times, and each version specified a broad

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functionality to be added in a multi-stage development process (e.g., product catalogue, order entry, and order management with Web-based front-end). However, after acquiring a company that possessed a different brand of CRMS, the ambitious roadmap shrunk down. The marketing department ended up with an application for creating marketing campaigns, while the sales department was given applications for storing customer master data and for a summary tracking of the customer spend across the lines of business. Halting the further development of CRMS coincided with the leave of two top executives. After “there was no clout to radically switch to CRMS,” said an executive. One line of business even rejected it entirely – without repercussion. The CIO (who was about to leave the company at the time of interviewing) characterized the IS strategy of short-termism as follows:

“We tend to simply layer problems on top of other problems. You’re fixing the in-year problem but you’re creating a bigger longer-term problem… Tactical decisions are made with no strategic value… There has not been an appetite to step back and say, ‘we have to clean up the mess that we’ve made’.“

Another important trait of Telco’s infoculture is a silo-based information management. The study uncovered several aspects of this phenomenon. First, the issue of customer data ownership and maintenance has not been resolved for years. There is uncertainty in both departments as to who is supposed to update customer addresses. Finger pointing supplants a sound information policy. The end-result is inaccurate data and plausibly a loss of business. The second indication of silo-based information management is that data flows between the sales and the marketing department are at a low bandwidth. Although a system-supported pipeline is provided for disseminating marketing campaigns, the sales department is actually reached via electronic bulletins stored on the company’s intranet. Comparatively, this is rather a lower-tech channel, an electronic substitute for a printed bulletin. The third indication of a silo infoculture refers to a missing market feedback that should flow from the sales to the marketing department. In the consumer markets, sales staff operates as a call centre that does not inquire about responses to marketing campaigns. This information practice diminishes the capability of establishing the causal relationship between marketing campaigns and sales.

The final discovered aspect of the silo infoculture applies to customer complaints. Collected in the sales department, the transfer of these complaints to the marketing department is perplexed by a channel limited in data organization capabilities. However, more capable alternatives are available. This practice disables a more systematic tracking of customer calls and instantaneous sharing of these data between the departments. In effect, predictive capabilities of the company’s marketing are severely limited. Instead of being able to predict who could become unhappy customer that may leave Telco, marketing must cope with fire-fighting—trying to stop the customer who already decided to leave. These findings on constrained inter-departmental data flows correspond to conceptualizations of cultural identity in connection with the choice of communication channels (Davenport & Prusak, 1997).

Sales vs. Marketing Infoculture

The marketing department most closely resembles person organization culture (Handy, 1993). Individual professional interests and preferences are at the nexus of person culture, making the organization resemble a galaxy of individual stars. Self-sufficient individuals are resilient to control and management. Indeed, most of the members in Telco’s marketing department have enjoyed significant freedom in designing the tasks aiming at the development and promotion of company’s services. They could also choose the methods for performing the tasks, including technology solutions (e.g., the tools for market segmentation). Marketing professionals and managers enjoy individual offices and shared spaces with spacious cubicles.

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The sales department represents a starkly different organizational culture that emanates from its machine-like organization. It resembles role culture (Handy, 1993) or machine bureaucracy (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Job positions of sales representative, supervisor, and manager, are clearly defined in content, responsibility, authority, and technology. The task-IS relationship is for the most part defined in clear terms and systems’ use is mandated. The call centre is located in a new, large hall housing about 250 representatives and supervisors. An image of a ship struggling with a rough sea might be an appropriate metaphor for this facility. The ship is served by sales representatives residing in desk-sized cubicles. They resemble a busy sailor. Large white screens cover the walls positioned so to be in everyone’s line of sight. They display figures on the ongoing productivity, such as the number of calls received, responded to and still waiting in the cue, and the average time per call.

Since it is information work that constitutes the core of jobs in both departments, infoculture aspects are likely to fill much of the departments’ cultural space. The W+H lense reveals that each department has a distinctive infoculture. In the sales department, IS are embedded in everyday job of sales representatives. Their job revolves around a dozen of systems that use different brands and generations of IT. This variety is a consequence of the missing long range systems planning discussed above. In answering to a customer’s call, a representative would start from the CRMS to check basic customer data, and then move down to ordering and billing systems within a particular line of business. Some of the representatives perform this with an impressive proficiency and speed. While talking with a customer on the soft phone, a representative would move around windows displayed on the computer screen, each accessing a different system. To collate data from these different sources, the representative would take mental and sometimes paper notes, and may need to run some calculations in the process.

Representatives’ efficiency is continually and closely monitored. In fact, pressure to uphold a planned productivity is high. The continually tracked statistics mentioned above are used by supervisors, who intervene if the productivity drops below a norm. (Many incumbents of the supervisor role are the former representatives.) Managers have access to a special facility for monitoring the work of representatives, which can track individual stations. In addition, productivity improvement investigations are conducted by consultants on an annual basis by independent consultants. Resulting measures for boosting representatives’ productivity are enforced by management. Being preoccupied with monitoring and reinforcing efficiency of the call centre, supervisory and middle management also fit the metaphor of busy sailor.

These efficiency pressures directed toward representatives were not discovered in interviews with representatives but rather with management and through observation. On their part, the representatives were forthcoming but reserved. Perhaps they assumed that the study was yet another investigation on efficiency improvement. However, the representatives were more direct in their comments regarding IS. They commonly aired a preference for simpler technological support. Ideally, just one or two systems should be regularly used. Promises of such a future have been floated several times in the department but these never materialized. Instead, new systems and functionality would simply add to the plate without bringing a real benefit to the representatives. As a supervisor explained, any innovation “is just another system that makes their job harder to learn.” A manager confirmed this statement by ascertaining with a dire frankness that nothing was ever done to make the representatives’ lives easier. Instead, just new complexity was being added. One supervisor explained a part of this complexity (system names are coded):

“Representatives can’t cancel an order in system A, they have to go to system B. In system A they can’t move a customer from one address to another, but they have to go to system B. If they’re updating a customer’s address or updating comments in the call coding information in system B, they have to re-enter that information in other systems.”

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These findings can be used for completing the above sketched metaphor of ship. Various IS make the ship’s engine – a necessary part without which the ship cannot move. As opposed to the new and modern desk of the ship, this indispensable engine is rather a patchwork of disparate IS. The engine combines newer and older parts, is overly complex and hard to operate, and it needs tuning. These characteristics explain additionally why the sailor is so busy.

If the sales department members can be identified as a busy sailor operating the cumbersome indispensable engine of their ship, members of the marketing department provide an entirely different picture. From interviews with professionals and management has emerged a belief that IT and IS represent a business tools that changes with time and personal preferences. Marketing professionals have freedom to choose systems they wish to use. Both interviews and the survey uncovered a weak management enforcement and control of systems’ use. Even licensed users enjoy freedom to choose whether they would like to use the paid system solution or some alternative (if available). The exception applies just to some clerical staff that have little choice, if any.

Marketing professionals tend to overtly criticize quality of data in certain systems. For some, an unsatisfactory data quality was the alleged reason for abandoning respective systems. The selected system alternatives have not necessarily been superior in functionality but rather more trusted, easier to use, or “good enough” (an example refers to various Excel applications that substitute the functionality of database systems). At other times, system migrants have been able to gain better information and knowledge, but only after a costly learning process. Calling himself “John the Baptist in the wilderness,” a seasoned market analyst explained how he decided to abandon one system after many users had already left. Realizing that the system was no longer beneficial for him either, he taught himself how to run a data cubing program against the company’s data warehouse. This transition enlarged his information horizons and helped him to advance professionally.

What drives marketing professionals in selecting among different system alternatives is essentially personal professional benefit. To be selected, a system must be beneficial from the perspective of information, effort required in using it, and/or economic gain (advancement, bonus, salary increase, etc.). These professionals are selective and pragmatic in their relationship with IT/IS. The term selective pragmatist may label well their position. Supported by the department management, these professionals have elevated themselves beyond mandatory choices. Freedom they enjoy is additionally indicated in noted instances of a daring criticism some respondents applied to corporate IS planning and management. A young, recently graduated market analyst portrayed one system in terms of “bad data, brutal user interface, multimillion dollar mistake, and waste of time.” Another professional characterized a system as a vehicle with all four wheels coming off and blamed corporate and department management for ignoring such a situation. Boisot’s (1987) concept of fiefdom lends itself as an appropriate finishing touch on the portrait of selective pragmatist. Evolving around the individual, person culture confines knowledge to the individual space: knowledge is personal, or low on codification and diffusion, in Boisot’s terminology. Compare this with the sales department, where the busy sailor for the most part follows through prescribed systems and procedures learned through training (high codification), while this knowledge is specialized to particular systems and customer support tasks and not shared across even with a colleague in an adjacent cubicle (low diffusion).

The selective pragmatist and the busy sailor have disparate assumptions regarding the timing or reasons for changing systems. For the former, the reasons are individual, even if this leads to economically irrational choices, such as paying for the use license of an unused system. However, for the sales representative systems change when this is mandated. Such a conviction is exemplified in shared ignorance regarding system development plans and the destiny of the systems in operation. Commenting on the CRMS, a manager said: “We’re not sure where it’s going. Like it’s almost dead in the water. This is what you’ve got and there will be a little minor tweaking. We’re just not sure what’s happened.”

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Another manager provided a more general remark on the situation of systems affecting the sales department: “Who has the vision? Why would you stop funding?... Is it cheaper to do things manually versus automatically? And it just might be… I don’t know!”

The two differing infocultures provide also disparate answers to the how-question of infoculture (how information and IT/IS should be/are managed)? The response pertaining to the sales department is – close to the book. As a machine bureaucracy, the sales department typically plays by rule, including the rules that prescribe which systems must be used for which purpose. Still, there are lee-ways. For instance, some information management procedures are not clearly defined. The CIO has claimed that the representatives “fabricated” descriptions of customer calls, even though there was a technical capability for capturing the content automatically. In reality, call coding has usually been reduced to a representative’s selecting a call description from a drop-down list. Some representatives opt for writing brief notes in spaces within systems, which are reserved for this purpose. Still, other representatives record the notes on paper. Each variation of the call coding procedure creates its own problems. Supervisors are aware of this situation. But instead of reinforcing a certain procedure, supervisors are used to ignoring deliberately the whole issue. They are also responsible for not exercising systematic supervision over updates of customer address data, which representatives are formally required to do in every call. This accustomed relaxation of management control of information tasks represents an interesting infocultural aspect. In a way, the infoculture ‘softens’ the rigidity inherent to machine bureaucracy, warranting the qualification of information management as “close to the book.” Many supervisors ascended from the representative role to their current rank. This fact may explain in part why they can be understanding of the efficiency and technological burdens thrown on representatives. This possibility is clearly indicated in the interview data. Some programmatic reasons may also play a role. For example, supervisors may strive to keep absenteeism down and to ward off tacit obstruction of productivity quotas. Making representatives cooperative rather than adversarial can be the means these to these ends. The following statement of a sales manager is indicative in this respect:

“If I’m a service representative, I’d revert to doing a lot of my work in a legacy system I was trained for and I know that it works well. Even though I could do this function or part of the function in another system, I go with what I can do the quickest way because I’m under time constraints.”

The marketing department does not care much about playing by rules. In any case, rules are not elaborate. There is no rule book for either managers or professionals. Systems are considered to be optional business tools. Constraints on the selective pragmatist are not managerial but technical and partly economic. The head of the marketing department explained his reasoning behind budget allocations between two systems, both taking inputs outside the marketing department. One reason was that a system on the losing side was becoming less popular among the department members; in addition, the winning system provided better data for market research. Overall, this infocultural aspect of the marketing department can be characterized as laissez faire.

Table 2. Infoculture at TelcoInfoculture Question EnterpriseHow information and IT/IS are managed

- Short-termism in IS strategy- Silo-bound information managementMarketing Department Sales Department

What is role of IT/IS Optional business tool Indispensable engineWho we are in relation to IT/IS Selective pragmatist Busy sailorWhen/Why change IS When individually beneficial When mandated

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How information and IT/IS should be/are managed

Laissez faire Close to the book

In summary, Telco’s infoculture is characterized by short-termism in IS strategy and a silo-bound information management (see Table 2). Being related, these aspects have aggravating effects on operations and strategies. Equally remarkable is a split within this infoculture identified in the two departments investigated. The split is influenced and, in turn, influences the contrasting organizational cultures the two departments represent – person culture (Marketing) and machine bureaucracy (Sales). The marketing department nurtures the professional that stands to IT/IS as a selective pragmatist, treating different IT and IS as optional business tools. He is supported by laissez faire management of information and IT/IS, which allows personal freedom of choice even this is against certain financial objectives. This infoculture allows that individual professional interests dictate changes in systems use and otherwise. Members of the sales department live a dramatically different infoculture. At its nexus sits a busy sailor that takes prescribed IT and IS as indispensable means for performing daily job. System changes are out of the busy sailor’s reach, dictated from outside and from the top. Information and IT/IS are managed close to the book, based on elaborate rules and procedures, with some leeway in details.

Discussion and Conclusion

The study has confirmed that the concept of infoculture provides a distinctive insight into the relationship between organizational culture and IS. The implication is that the literature on the construction of the infoculture concept and on its initial testing has been confirmed (Boisot, 1987; Bressand & Distler, 1995; Davenport & Prusak, 1997; Leidner & Kayworth, 2006; Orlikowski, 1996; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994; Sarker & Lee, 2000; Travica, 2003, 2005, 2005a, 2008). In addition, the W+H inquiry applied proved capable of describing the content of infocultures in a parsimonious and potentially useful manner. In the case of Utilities, the who-question led to a sharp distinction between information technologists, identified metaphorically as a driver, and the members of business departments, identified as a reluctant passenger. These two infocultures define themselves on the department and occupation bases and in contrast to each other. This line of division can be explained in terms of cultural differentiation (Kappos & Rivard, 2008; Martin, 1992). At Telco, the who question led to identifying marketers as selective pragmatists and the sales staff as busy sailor. These metaphors indicate disparate rather than dichotomous alternatives, which can be explained in terms of fragmentation (Kappos & Rivard, 2008; Martin, 1992). Fragmentation presumes multiple differences and a less general or stable sharing of beliefs/behaviors within a group. Also, multiple smaller groups can form in a fragmented cultural setting. If infocultural differentiation engenders communication gaps in an organization, fragmentation impels a cosmic space dividing alien worlds.

The metaphors of infoculture subsume numerous differences between the infocultures in the two companies. A key difference in each is framed with help of the what-question of infoculture. The driver believes that IT and IS come first because these constitute an organizational force, and that the company should dutifully comply with the evolution of this force. However, for the reluctant passenger the role of IT/IS is subjugated to business and business information. The implications of these distinctions are both theoretical and practical. The underlying different orientations toward IT/IS can influence differently design, adoption, evaluation and use of IS. When metaphors are opposed, as in the case of Utilities, theory of systems adoption needs to account for possibly moderating effects of infoculture. When metaphors are disparate, as in the case of Telco, theory of systems design applied to cross-departmental information management needs to account for possibly intervening effects of infoculture. Similarly, practicing managers need to be aware of infocultural capabilities and limitations that are likely to be triggered in a system adoption situation. The case of Telco demonstrates that the two departments with

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disparate infocultures were unable to resolve elementary questions of common interest, such as ownership over customer address data. The case of Utilities demonstrates that, in the time of the study, the infocultural differentiation precluded communication between the two sides – technologists could not soften conservatism on the business side that, in turn, could not convey its needs to the former side.

The change versus status quo focus was illuminated by answering the infocultural when/why-question. Postulating past standards for information management and appreciating a slower pace of social time (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998), the business infoculture at Utilities has leaned toward a status-quo. Fear of the unknown (Hofstede, 1980) may be one of the causes at work in the broader business organizational culture. As new enterprise systems tend to centralize information management, a power loss may be a consequence at the level of department management. The old tension between centralization and decentralization pulls (Mintzberg, 1979) thus is triggered. While managers on the losing side may anticipate this consequence, they are less likely to know what its magnitude can be. This can grow fear of the unknown. At Telco, both infocultures are open to systems change, although for different reasons. Understanding their specifics is important since a general acceptance of systems change may be deceiving when subjective reasons are in the background (Telco’s marketing staff). It follows from both cases that study of the beliefs on social time and reasons for systems change can enrich IS research and contribute to sharpening its focus on relevant facilitating/hindering factors. Similarly, the practical management of systems’ evolution can benefit from understanding relevant infocultural engines and blockages.

The how-question has also served a useful role in this research. This question uncovers how information, IT and IS are supposed to be managed by users and how they really are managed. Thus, a contrast between normative and descriptive is part of investigation. This direction in analysis yielded several infocultural aspects – silo information management, blue collar/white collar digital divide, unpolished systems development, paper and electronic preferences, laissez-faire management, short termism in IS strategizing, and close to the book management. Theory of organizational culture has contributed significantly to understanding the part of culture focused on beliefs (assumptions, values, norms). The practice side is less studied and sometimes undervalued as being less important. In theory of IS, however, tangible, ongoing practices often constitute reality rather than assumptions and values that are professed in company documents and narratives. At Utilities, nobody really believes that systems should be rolled out to users in an unpolished state. Still, such practice has long been in place due to the circumstances previously discussed. At Telco, the “official” cultural norm still is to achieve an integrated picture of the customer. However, the real information and systems management significantly deviate from this norm. Therefore, a tension between infocultural (i.e., cultural) beliefs and behaviours is uncovered. Rather than being merely an epiphenomenon, infocultural practices may influence the normative side. For example, after trying to use new systems, users at Utilities may experience a transition from the fear of the unknown to a fear of the known. They may realize what expenses the unpolished systems carry in terms of learning effort and opportunity cost. This new fear of calculable risks becomes new aspect of infoculture, which complements the tendency toward status quo. From a broader theoretical perspective, dynamics created through the dialectics of the belief and behavioural segments of infoculture may be instrumental in explaining cultural change beyond the known causes (e.g., leadership change).

One of the present study’s limitations is that the W+H-questions did not drive data collection but rather were applied as the W+H meta-codes to the data collected via a grounded theory approach. This limitation may have constrained the intake of potentially more topic-corresponding data. Another limitation refers to the fact that the present study resulted from a broader investigation in which infoculture was not the topic of primary interest. This characteristic could have constrained the scope of data and, consequently, of the infocultural artifacts. Nevertheless, detecting and describing distinct

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infocultures between and within the two companies adds to the relevant literature on IS and organizational cultures and advances recently initiated studying of infoculture.

Future research should reach beyond the above limitations. It should deploy directly the W+H- questions in data collection in order to investigate infocultures in different kinds of organizations. Metaphors developed in the present study can be used as the sketches of the constructs’ content, with the intent of applying the constructs to different organizational and systems contexts, and expanding the constructs’ content (Barki, 2008). Enriching the content of the HOW-construct and then organizing it in parsimonious dimensions may pose a particular challenge, given its potentially broad scope discussed in the beginning of this article. This research process can lead to creating more complete coding categories for qualitative research and, potentially, variables for quantitative research. As for the latter, some ideas can be found in the present study. For example, the metaphors spawned by the who-question can be mapped into an agency continuum (i.e., one whose poles can be marked with terms “subject” and “object”). Similarly, the why-question can be mapped into a continuum showing intensity of force (as opposed to a passive instrument).

Infocultural research should also link infoculture to standard topics of system planning, design, evaluation, adoption, and use. Equally interesting would be to investigate this relationship in the opposite direction: how these systems issues reflect on infoculture? If systems dramatically change, can this change influence responses to the who and what questions of infoculture, as it may follow from analysis of Kaarst-Brown and Robey (1999)? If systems introduce significant changes in diffusion and codification of knowledge (Boisot, 1987), can this change infoculture? Another venue of research can investigate the relationship between infoculture and organizational culture. All this research can help further in sharpening the focus of culture-inspired research to a more distinct IS perspective.

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