Universities, Public Policy and Economic Development in Latin America - David E. Lorey

7/27/2019 Universities, Public Policy and Economic Development in Latin America - David E. Lorey

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Universities, Public Policy and Economic Development in Latin America: The Cases of Mexicoand VenezuelaAuthor(s): David E. LoreySource: Higher Education, Vol. 23, No. 1, Education and Development (Jan., 1992), pp. 65-78Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3447320 .

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HigherEducation23:65-78, 1992.0 1992KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printed n the Netherlands.

Universities,publicpolicyandeconomicdevelopmentn LatinAmerica:he casesof Mexicoand VenezuelaDAVID E. LOREYCoordinator,UCLAProgramonMexico,UCLALatinAmericanCenter,LosAngeles,California,U.S.A.Abstract.Since the establishment of national university systems in Mexico and Venezuela, threeprincipal demands have dominated the formulation of universitypolicy: the ideological demandimposedby governmentrhetoricand nationalaspirations(a demand reflected n federalexpenditure),the demand of the national economy for different areasand levels of professional expertise,and thebroad-basedpoliticaland social demandforupward mobility by wayof universityeducation. Tensionsbetween these three demands in both Mexico and Venezuela have stemmed from the historicallydecreasing ability of LatinAmerican economies to producesignificantlong-termsocial mobility intothe middle classes. Although in the 1940s and 1950s theuniversitysystemsplayedimportantroles inpromoting social mobility, by the 1960sthe number of professional jobs was much smaller than thenumber of university graduates.By the 1980s,the socialroleof the universitieswasseverely imitedbyeconomiccrisisbroughtonby a combinationof droppingoil prices,debt,andgovernmentdeficits.Themajor challenge currently facing Mexico and Venezuela in higher education policy is to restarteconomic growthto providejobs for universitygraduates.

The interactionof universityeducation,public policy, and economic developmentin Latin America has seldom been studied in its historical context. Yet it is thepattern of historical economic development that best explains the changingfunctionsof Latin Americanuniversities n the twentiethcentury.The evolutionofpublic policy for education has also been determined to a large extent by thehistoricaldevelopmentof Latin American economies.This article considers universities and economies in two of the most highlydevelopedcountries in the LatinAmericanregion:Mexico and Venezuela. In theearly 1980s, Mexico devoted 3.4 percent of its GNP to education, of which 27.5percentwent to highereducation,while Venezueladevoted 5.8 percentof GNP toeducation, of which 35.5 percentwas committedto the university evel. In 1987,Mexico had an enrollmentof 1,244,888at theuniversity evel and Venezuela hadanenrollment of 467,371 at the university level. Mexican universities graduated153,131 students in 1987 (15 percent from private institutions); Venezuelauniversitiesgraduated32,396 nthesameyear(16percentfromprivate nstitutions).In both countries 2.6 percentof the generalpopulation has had some universityeducation(Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa 1990).In both Mexico and Venezuela,the universitysystem has constituteda centralfactorin governmentplansfordevelopment.Further,statisticalagencies nthe twocountrieshave producedlong series of quantitativedata on universityeducationand economic change, facilitatinganalysisof historical nteraction.The many pressures that have shaped the university systems in Mexico andVenezuela over time can be synthesized into three principal demands: the

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66ideological demand imposed by governmentrhetoricand national aspirations(ademand shaped by objectiveconditions and reflectedin federalexpenditure),thedemand of the national economy for differentareas and levels of professionalexpertise,and the broad-basedpoliticaland social demandfor upwardmobility byway of universityeducation.Since early in the twentiethcentury,tension between these three demands hasexisted in both Mexico and Venezuela. In the main, such tension stems from thehistoricallydecreasingabilityof LatinAmerican economies to producesignificantlong-termsocial mobility into the middle classes: trends in universityeducationcannot be separated from trends in employment for universitygraduates. Thestruggle between these three demands and responses to them, which involveimportantpublic policydecisions,frequentlyhave beenexpressed hroughpoliticalconfrontationbetweenuniversitystudents and the state.The highereducation systems of Mexico and Venezuela are used here as casestudiesof particularssues.Thecaseof Mexicoisexaminedwithparticular eferenceto thecausal links between economicdemandforprofessionals,socialmobilityandsocial and political impacts of economic change. The evolution of universityeducation in Venezuela is used to show the reponsiveness of universities togovernment development strategies, particularlyto government expenditureingeneralareasof social and economic emphasis(see Lorey 1988, 1989, 1990).

Mexico:theuniversity nd economicdevelopment nder institutionalizedevolution',1929-1985In 1929 the Mexican Revolutionwas institutionalized, onsolidatedpoliticallywiththecreation of the first officialpartyof the Revolution- the PNR(PartidoNacionalRevolucionario).The partyunitedMexico'sdiverseregionaland sectoral interestsinto a manageablecoalition. Workers,peasants, and middle-sectorgroups werebrought under the government'swing. With the official party, the governmentinstitutionalized he Revolutionby creatingrelationshipsof directdependenceonthe machineryof government among the majorinterestgroups in nationallife.At the time of the politicalconsolidation of the Mexican Revolutionin 1929,theuniversity was incorporatedinto government plans for economic development.Mexican leaders saw the education of professionalsas necessaryto the two mainpaths of revolutionarydevelopment: rapid economic growth and government-sponsored social reform. The two essential aims of the government for theuniversity, intertwined since 1929 in public policy, have been to satisfy theeconomy'sneed forprofessionalexpertiseandto fulfillthe desire orsocialmobilityby way of professionalemployment.The incorporation of the university into government plans for economicdevelopmentproducedmanysignificantaccomplishments.Theuniversityachievedthe nationalizationof professional trainingin fields from economics to dentistry.And the university system expanded enrollment at an extremely rapid rate,especially n the yearsafter 1958.



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67Since the late-1950s,however,high hopes for what the universitycould achievehavebeen underminedby theview that the university s sufferinga profoundcrisis.

Concern over student activism and violence, apparentlydeclining standards ofquality, crowdedcampuses,and unemploymentof graduatesled critics to chargethe universitywith failureto achieve the economic and social goals set for it byMexicanleaders,particularlyafterthe universitycrisisof 1966-68. The universitycrisisin Mexico is perceivedas havingthreemain characteristics: )theuniversity sout of touch with thedevelopmentgoals of Mexicanleaders;3) theuniversitydoesnot fulfill the economy's needs for professionals;and 3) the universityno longermakes good on its revolutionarysocial commitment.The secondof these threecriticismshasbecomethemostfrequentlyvoiced.Manyobservers have accused the university system of being unable to educate theprofessionals that the Mexican economy needs - both in specific fields and atdifferent levels of expertise. The common perception has been that Mexicanuniversitiesproducetoo many graduatesof 'traditional' ields,particularlyawyers,andnot enoughengineersand scientists.Thisaspectof theperceiveduniversitycrisisbecameincreasinglytalkedof duringthe 1960s and the call for closercooperationbetween the universityand the economy has been stronglyvoiced by the privatesector.Contrary to popular and scholarly conceptions, Mexican universities haveresponded well to the specific needs for professionalsby industry,business, and

government since 1929. There is, for example, a close match of professionaleconomically active population (EAP) by field and professionals produced byuniversities.There is also a close matchbetweenpatterns n governmenthiringanduniversityproduction.Clearly,governmentexercisesa significant nfluenceon thecareer choices of university students through its employment practices. Theuniversity system has in general respondedto economic demandwithout a greatdeal of distortion - that is, without producing a great number of unneededprofessionalsin specificfields.As significantas the university'sresponseto demandforprofessionals n specificareas of expertisehas been its response to the historical shift in the economy'sdemand from professionalsto technicians. This shift constitutesa majortrendinMexico'stwentieth-centuryconomicdevelopmentandneedsto bebrieflyoutlined.Over time, the Mexican economy has come to need an increasingly greaterrelative number of technicians than professionals. The ability of the Mexicaneconomy to absorb university graduateshas not grown as fast as the numberofuniversitygraduatesproducedby the universities.The mismatchbetween demandand output and the differentially greater demand for technicians than forprofessionalswereparticularlymarkedafter the late-1950s.The historicaldifferentiationof demand forprofessionalsand technicians heds agreat deal of light on the history of Mexico's twentieth-centuryeconomicdevelopment.The historicalshiftprovidesa clue to key trendsin the abilityof theMexican economy to produce jobs for professionals. Until the late-1950s, theexpanding industrial and commercial sectors and the growing state apparatusabsorbedthe bulk of the universities'productionof professionalsrelativelyeasily.



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70spectrummeantthat thedrop-outratewouldalsogrowdramatically:hosestudentswho left after a yearor two weregenerally rom the lower socio-economic echelonsof enteringclasses.Publicuniversities ook overthe taskof providingsocialstatus tostudents of humble backgrounds,while privateuniversities came to focus on thereinforcementof middle-andupper-classstatusthroughtheprovisionof high-levelprofessionalsto both the public and the privatesector.The extremely mportant adaptationof providingsocial status in placeof socialmobility is central to the political historyof the Mexicanuniversity.The politicalactivity of Mexican universitystudents must be interpretedin the light of thehistorical imitationsfacingthemin theirprofessionalcareers, he same limitationsthat have forced the shift from emphasison social mobility to emphasison socialstatusat the universities.Studentsclearlybenefitfromthesystem n someimportantways: the universitiesprovide social status to an importantnumberof universitystudents in lieu of a ticket to professional employment;the reformistand radicalcreedspropagatedat the public universitiesrepresentan important psychologicalbenefit because they teach students to externalizeblame for limited employmentopportunities.But in thelongview,university tudents,unable to findprofessional-level work, are the victims of the historical pattern of Mexico's economicdevelopment.Theuniversitycannotchangethissituationevenwiththorough-goinginternal reforms: the determiningfactors are beyond the control of universityadministratorsor students.

The relationshipbetween economic developmentand social mobility outlinedabove lies at the root of post-1958 political debates involving the universityinMexico.Politicalconflicts nwhichuniversity tudentshaveplayedmajorroleshavehad their most profound roots in dissatisfactionwith scarce opportunitiesforprofessional employment. Public employment could hold off the student-ledmiddle-classexplosionof 1968for some time,but not indefinitely,giventhe natureof Mexico's economicdevelopment.Nor couldgreatly ncreasedgovernmenthiringof professionals n the 1970ssolve the basic mismatchbetweenjobs and graduates.The virtualorgyof public-sectorhiringof professionals hat followed thediscoveryof oil in the late-1970sbecame a bust after the economic crisis of 1982.Beneath the perceived'universitycrisis' in Mexico there lie deeperand longer-termproblems.If the notion of crisiscannotbe discarded, hentheuniversitycrisisshouldbe termeda 'permanent risis'within Mexico's'permanentRevolution.'Theuniversity's roubles do not, infact,constitutea crisis,becausetheyreflectaprocesswith a long history.And theprimary ocus of theproblemis not theuniversity tself.Rather,what has beendescribedas a universitycrisisis the reflection,at the level ofprofessional education, professional employment, and social mobility, of thehistoricaldevelopmentof Mexico'seconomy.It is theparticularpatternof Mexico'seconomic developmentthathas causedsuchproblemsas 'overcrowded'campusesand the differentiationof publicandprivateuniversity unctions.Because hesourceof the university's 'permanentcrisis' lies outside the university, reforming theuniversitywill not changeMexico. Onlya changedMexico,witha greatlymodifiedtrajectoryof economic development, can produce a universitysystem that is notplaguedby 'permanentcrisis'.



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71Venezuela:harnessingpetroleumwealthfor socialchange,1935-1980Theideal of 'sowingthepetroleum',turning he nationalpetroleumresources o thebuildingof a modernnation,has guidedgovernmentrhetoricand shapednationalaspirationsin Venezuelafrom early in the twentiethcentury.Venezuelanleadershave consciously attemptedto harness the rich oil resource and use it to producerapidand sustainedeconomic development.Since the late-1950s,democraticadministrationshave emphasizedthe need tomodernize social infrastructure angingfrom health care to educationapace withthe rapidly changingVenezuelaneconomy. R6mulo Betancourt(president1959-64) wrote that he and his partisanswanted to createan activist stateto modernizenot only the economic but also the social foundationsof Venezuelan ife:We wantedto lay the foundationsfor a moderncountry- electricallyequipped,traversedby meansofcommunications,and readyto take advantageof its own naturalresources. But this was not all. Thestate had to take greaterconcern for its people, bringingthem bettereducation, a betterdiet, decenthomes, land which they could work, and preventiveand curativemedicine for their chronic diseases(Betancourt1979:208).How was Venezuela'snatural resourcewealthsown in the professionaleducationsystem in line with the modernizing ideology of a succession of presidentialadministrationsafter 1935?Professionalsdirectlyrelated to petroleumand mininghave been key to national aims of making the petroleumand iron-ore industriesVenezuelan,as these industriescould not be trulynationaluntilVenezuelansmadeproduction decisions and oversaw operations. At the same time, the social-developmentaims of democraticgovernmentssince 1945encouraged he develop-ment of highly-trained specialists in a wide variety of professional fields -particularly n agricultural ngineeringand the healthprofessions.Has the university responded to government plans for change? Since theuniversity-ledreformmovementof 1928,the highereducationsystemhas been atthe forefrontof politicalchange nVenezuela Albornoz 1972;Levine1973).Has theuniversityalso been at theforefrontof social andeconomicchange?Thesequestionsare examined in the context of historical trends in federal expenditureand thedevelopmentof Venezuela'sprofessionaleducationsystem.

Historical backgroundand federalexpenditureRabe 1982; Aranda1984; Hansen1977)Duringthe 1940s,the three mainthemesof the Venezuelaneconomicdevelopmenteffort - social reform, regional development, economic diversification- firstemerged. Ironically, both dictatorial and democratic regimes held these threegeneral aims. The Medina Angarita administration(1941-44) focused on theeconomic developmentof the interiorprovinces,with particularemphasison thelivestockindustry n the llanos,or plains, regionof the country.The firstperiodof



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72AD (Acci6n Democratica) administration, 1945-48, emphasized economic di-versification,with a focus on agriculturaldevelopmentand attentionto irrigationworks to bringnew lands cultivation. Social developmentwas also given its firstmajor impulsein the 1945-48'trienio',withsuchprogramsas thehighly publicizedcampaignto eradicatemalariaand largegovernmentoutlaysfor publichealthandeducationinfrastructure.Government socialspending ncreased nthelate 1940s oan averageof 11.6percentof the total federalbudgetin the 1945-1949periodfromonly 4.9 percentin the 1936-1944period (Kornblithand Maing, 1985).After theoverthrowof thefirstAD government n 1948,andparticularly ftertheassumption of the presidency by military dictator Perez Jimenez in 1952,government spending shifted to constructionand the development of economicinfrastructuresuch as roads, railways, port facilities, and utilities. Governmentspending on social improvements fell to about 9.2 percent of all governmentspendingwhileexpenditureon economic outlay increasedto 65.5 percentover the49.5 percentof the 1945-49 period.TheAD-led coalitiongovernmentsof the 1960sreturned o the socialgoals of the1945-48period, emphasizing and reform to modernizethe agricultural ector andhealth careand basic education orall Venezuelans.Governmentspendingon socialinfrastructureumped to an average of 25.8 percent in the first AD governmentunderR6mulo Betancourt 1959-63) and 30.6percentunder Raul Leoni(1964-68).Rafael Caldera of the COPEI party kept social expenditureat 31.4 during hisadministration (1969-73). During the 1964-73 period, social and economicexpenditurewereevenlybalanced,with socialoutlayat 31.0and economicoutlayat32.2 percent.Due to slumpingoil pricesand a decliningshareof the UnitedStates marketdueto the imposition of a quota structure unfavorableto Venezuela, the income ofdemocratic governments 1958-73 rose slowly, limiting government goals andachievements.While thegovernmentreceiveda largershareof oil companyprofits,lower sales left the governmentat times with less income than Perez Jimenezhadenjoyed in the 1950s. Because of the dependenceof society and economy on thepetroleum ndustry, heslumpin oil exportscausedslumpsinothersectors,notablyin the constructionindustry,a key employerof skilledand unskilledlabor.At thesame time, the Venezuelan population grew at more than three percent a year,making difficult the achievement of Alliance for Progress goals for economicgrowtheven with millionsof dollars of United Statesaid (Rabe 1982).The doubling of oil pricesafter 1973 and the nationalizationof the oil industrymade it possible for Venezuela to realize more income from petroleum in the1976-80 period than it had in the 52 years between 1921 and 1973. This leap inincome set the stage for increased government spending under the democraticadministrationsof the 1970s and 1980s.Reversingthe emphasisof previous ADleaders,Carlos Andres Perez 1974-78) cutsocialspendingto 24.5percentof federalbudget, its lowest since the Perez Jimenezdictatorship,while boosting economicoutlay to 46.5 percent.With the downturnin oil pricesand debt crisis underLuisHerreraCampins(1979-83), social expenditureclimbedbackup to 31.4percentoffederalexpenditure(in the first two years of his administration),while economic



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73outlay settled at 23.3 percent.Data on governmentexpenditureby functional areaindicate that in 1984 the new government of Jaime Lusinchi increased socialexpenditureto 41.5 percent of the budget and increased economic expenditureslightlyover thatof hispredecessor, o 22.8percent.Gainsin bothareas were madepossiblyby keepingdefenseexpenditures o a low 6.1 percentof the budget.In summary,availabledatashow a steadilyincreasinggovernmentconcernwitheconomic growth through the late-1950s. Social spending received its firstsignificantboost in theearly-1960sandcomes to be roughlyequalinimportancetoeconomic expenditure n relativeterms. The two major fields of expenditurearebalancedat about 30percenteachfrom theearly-1960sto themid-1970s. Butonlyin the mid-1960s and the early 1970s does social expenditureriseabove economicexpenditure.Economic spending leapt upwards as social spending fell with theaccession of Carlos Andres Perez to the presidencyin 1973. After a large gapbetween social and economic expenditurein 1974, economic spending falls andsocial rises to produceanotherbriefbalancing period in the late 1970s.

Developmentof the Venezuelanuniversity ystemHistorically,thedevelopmentof professionalexpertise nVenezuelawastiedto theprofessionalneeds andemploymentpracticesof theforeignoil companies.Until the1950s, most engineers and managers were foreign-bornand trained outside ofVenezuela. The mainVenezuelanuniversity, he UniversidadCentralde Venezuela(UCV), was closed off and on afterthepoliticalagitationof 1928andproducedfewgraduates of the caliber needed by the dominant oil industry. Fields of studyimportantto public policyweredeveloped only slowly: agriculturewas introducedas an academic program only in 1937, economics in 1938. Graduate study intechnicalfieldsby Venezuelanshad to be pursuedabroad,generally n Germanyorthe United States.Europeanmigrationto Venezuela n the 1930sand 1940sfurtherdepressedthe UCV's production of professionalsbecause of the relativelyhighpercentageof professionalsand technicians n this migrantstream.Although some Venezuelan leaders counseled the nationalization of the oilindustryas earlyas the 1920s o freeVenezuela rom 'technicalsubservience', uch amove was hardly possible for Venezuela. Venezuela's economy was much lessdiverse than Mexico's, for example, which had nationalized its oil in 1938, andVenezuela was much more dependentthan Mexico had been on the revenuefromthe foreign-owned oil companies. Equally as important, Venezuela was moredependenton foreigntechnicalexpertisethan Mexico. During 1941 talks betweentheoil industriesand Venezuelan eadersaboutreforming axeson theindustry, orexample, Venezuelanrepresentativesconfessedthat they were unable to keep upwiththetechnicalknowledgeof theircounterpartsat thediscussion.Itwasacceptedboth by Venezuelans and foreigners that Venezuela lacked the professionalexpertise necessaryto develop its own resources.Venezuela's historical desire to realize larger profits from the dominant oilindustrywere tied to desires to provide professional and technical employment



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74positions for Venezuelans. The 1943 law providing that profits be equally splitbetweenoil companiesand thegovernment,whichmarked hebeginningof take-offingovernmentrevenues rom taxes on oil, also marked hebeginningof Venezuelaninsistence that the foreigncompaniesemploymore Venezuelannationalsin the oilfields,especiallyin technicaland managementpositions. DuringtheAD trienio of1945-48, this measure was much emphasizedas the party'smain constituentwasmade up of oil workers at all levels of the industry.Although it had been emphasized in the 1943 50/50 law and by the ADgovernmentin 1945-48, hiringof nationals had never assumedimportantlevels.Ironically,thehiringof Venezuelannationals nthe oil industryassumednoticeableproportionsonly in the 1950sunder PerezJimenez.In otheraspects,PerezJimenezcannot be said to have stimulated the development of Venezuelanprofessionalexpertise,as he closedtheUCV andrepressed tudentpressures or educationalandpoliticalreforms.With the beginningof the presentdemocraticperiodin 1958,emphasis n highereducation policy shifted to production in Venezuela of a professional base foreconomic development of social infrastructureand regional development. Theuniversitywas to play a major role in the economic development of Venezuela-envisionedby democraticleaders.The Universidadde Oriente was establishedin1958as anexperimentaluniversity o fomentdevelopmentof thebackwardseasternregion,withwidely-scatterednucleirather han a centralcampus.The Universidadde Oriente has achievedlong-termsuccessin finding employmentfor its graduatesin the two states of Anzoategui and Guayana, which together form an areaestablishedas a development 'pole' in the 1960s(El Nacional, July 12, 1988). In1959, the IVIC (InstitutoVenezolano de InvestigacionesCientificas)was formed.Technical studies weregiven a majorboost with the establishmentof Venezuela'sfirstpolytechnicinstitute in Barquisimeto n 1962.Butevenbythetime of thenationalization of the iron ore industry n 1975andofthe oil industryin 1976,Venezuelanleaders could not completelyseversuccessfulexploitation of natural resources from the influence of foreign companies forreasonsof technicalexpertise.After the nationalizationof both industries, oreignprofessionalexpertiseplayedan importantpartin the exploitationof the country'snaturalresources.Clauses nthenationalizationbillsforboth industriesestablishedcontinuing importantroles for the companies through technicalexchangeagree-ments (Petras,Morley,and Smith 1980).Two main goals have guided the developmentof the highereducationsystemsince 1958.Governmentofficialsanduniversityadministratorshave tried1)to moldhigher education output to the human-resourceneeds of the country;and 2) toprovide higher educational opportunities to Venezuelans less-favoredor disad-vantagedby pre-1958economic development.

Inpursuanceof thefirstgoal, thegovernment ook theinnovativestepof creatinga government-fundedelite university, the Universidad Sim6n Bolivar, to trainengineersin fields other than the traditional civil engineeringspecialization.Toadvancethe second goal, the governmenthas set up severaltypesof universities orelieve the pressureon the UCV and otherlargepublicuniversitiesn the provinces



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75and also to emphasize technical and short-career (technician-level) training.Attempts to achieve the two goals were combined in the establishment of acomputerized'national pre-inscription',or universityselection, process in 1980.This process weighs students' secondary-school grades, scores on standardizedaptitudetests,geographicalregionof origin,and socio-economic status andassignsthem to universities and faculties throughoutthe country, thus controllingbothoverall matriculationand career-fieldentrances.

Historicaldevelopment f professional xpertise or economicdevelopmentHow have Venezuelanuniversitiesrespondedto governmentplans for social andeconomicdevelopment?Historical shifts in thegraduationof students rom variousprofessional specialties provide clues to the impact of governmentideology andpolicy and to the patternof economic development.Data for the earliestdecades of the twentiethcenturyshow the dominance oftraditionalprofessions.Health and law togethermade up the majorityof degreesgranted by the UniversidadCentralde Venezuela(UCV) until the 1930-34period.In the earliest five-yearperiod for which there are data, these two professionsaccountedfor fully81.5percentof alldegreesgrantedbytheUCV. This dominanceof professional-careerareasby healthand legal professionalswas not significantlymodifieduntilthe 1930-34period,at whichpoint engineeringdegreescame to playan increasingly important role in the professional profile of the country.Engineeringdegreesclimbedfrom7.2percentof alldegrees nthe 1901-29periodtoalmost twice that percentage 14.0 percent)1930-1959.From the 1950s on, Venezuelaexperienceda dramatic overall growth in thenumber of universityegresados.From educating ess than 1000 Venezuelans o theuniversitylevel in 1950, the higher education system producedalmost 30,000 by1986.Therate of growthafter1970wasveryrapid.Although growingat agood clipof 31percenta yearbetween1950and 1969,the numberof professionalsgrewat41percenta year after 1970.During the 1960s, Venezuela's professional profile gradually became morediverse.Bythemid-1970s,thehealthprofessionshaddeclinedbya third and lawbymore than half. The importance of these traditional fields was eroded by thegrowingbusiness,engineering,and economicsfields.Furthermore, hroughoutthedecade,thefour or fivenumericallymost important ields saw theirtotal sharedropas new professions cut into their share. The late-1970s saw the engineeringfieldsexpandingveryrapidly.By the early-1980s, heirrelative mportancehad growntoanaverageof 28.5percentof alldegrees.Whilehealthand law heldsteady,therewasa slip in thepercentageshare held by business- from 15percent n thelate-1970stojust half that amount in the firsthalf of the 1980s.Oneverysignificantchangein the overallstructureof professionaleducationinVenezuela s thegrowth n shortcourseprofessions those that take feweryearsandlead to employment predominantly n technicianpositions such as mechanics andlegal assistants.Shortterm coursesservemuch the same function in Venezuelaas



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76the intermediateegresadoexit does in Mexico.The universitysystemthus servestoprovide training for technicians. Programs encouraging study for lower-levelprofessional positions were established in Venezuela in response to the rapidlyincreasingenrollmentafter the late-1960sandthepressureof overcrowdingat someuniversitycampuses.The vast majorityof short technicaldegreesare awardedinbusiness andengineering ields. The explosionof personsstudyingbusinessfieldsatthislower levelprobablyexplainsthefalteringof growthin businessconcentrationsat the university level after the late-1970s. By the early 1980s, short courses inbusiness accounted for more than half of all degrees awarded by Venezuelanuniversities n the business field.Available dataon graduatesof Venezuelanuniversities ndicatethatby the 1980sVenezuela'shighereducationsystemwasproducing argenumbersof professional-ly-skilledpersonsto fuel its economicdevelopmenteffort.Thetraditional pecialtiesof law and health remainedimportant,but newer fields such as engineeringandbusiness have become prominentareas of professional-levelstudy and expertise.The overall picture is one of increasing diversityof professionalfieldsproducinggraduates,and thus an overall diversityin professional-levelskills available foremployment. It is clear that there is very rapid growth in the late-1970s in theuniversityeducation of persons to fill employmentpositions as technicians ratherthan as upper-levelprofessionals.This factor indicatesa slowingrateof absorptionof the most highly-trainedprofessionalsby the Venezuelaneconomy.

To gauge the impact of governmentpolicy and governmentspending,we cancomparethesketchof historicalchangesin governmentexpenditureabovewith thedata on graduates of Venezuelan universities.The basic ideological shifts ofVenezuelan presidentialadministrations are reflected in budgetary outlays andparticularly n the balance betweenoutlays for social and economic ends. We canuse health and agriculturalengineeringto gauge the impact of governmentsocialexpenditureand social programs,business concentrations to gauge the impact ofplans for developmentof economic infrastructure.Afterthe early 1940s,there was a steadyincrease n the numberof professionalseducatedin Venezuelafor economicgrowthandparticularlyndustrialization.Thenumber of professionals in social fields increased gradually with no dramaticupswingduring socially-revolutionary'eriodssuchasthe late 1940sorearly1960s.In fact, the rate of increaseof social professionals evelsoff in the early 1960safterrisingslowlyfrom 1946 on. Inthe mid-1960s,the numberof professionalsbeginstogrow again- steadilyand without markedjumps.In economic professionsthe same generalupwardtrend is apparent n data forsamplesocialprofessions,but fortheeconomic area of businessfieldsthere s a largebulge in the late 1960s and early-1970s. Professionals useful to the economicdevelopmentof theVenezuelan conomyfirstjump oprominenceduring heyearsofthe Perez Jimenezdictatorship.But theycontinue to grow rapidlyduringthe early1960s, downturns coming only in 1963 and 1965. The impulse for economicdevelopment s seento have ncreaseddramatically nderdemocraticgovernmentsofthelate1960s, ailingoff someunder heCalderaadministration o showlessdramaticand less stablegrowththan socialprofessionsbytheoil-boomyearsof the late- 1970s.



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77In relativeterms, from the early 1950sthroughthe late-1970stherehas been aroughbalancein realpercentageshares claimedby social and economiccategories

of professions. There was a definite boost to social professions in the 1945-48trienio, another in the early 1960s, and another in the mid-1970s,all under ADadministrations.Therelative mportanceof economic fields climbedsharplyduringthe administrationof Perez Jimenez. The percentageshare of economic fieldsdeclined during 1960-63 and then shot up until 1969. After 1969, economicprofessionsdeclinedgradually,with a slight recovery1971-73.In summary, there is a strong correlation between government ideology asgauged by functional areas of spending and the education of professionals inVenezuela. The universitiesappearto respond positively to governmentrhetoricand to the employment environmentcreated in part by government plans andpolicies.At the same time,the stimulation of the educationof professionals or theeconomic developmentof social infrastructurehas tended to lag behind that forprofessionalsuseful to economic goals. While democraticgovernments,and ADgovernmentsin particular,have had a greaterimpact than others in stimulatingstudy for the social professions, all governmentswould appear to be primarilyconcerned with economic development.

ConclusionsThis article has brieflyexaminedthe historical nteractionof universityeducation,economic development,and public policy in the cases of Mexico and Venezuela.Governmentstrategiesfor economic developmenthave encouragedcertainformsof economic change;both governmentpolicyandeconomic evolutionhaveshapedthe functioningof Latin Americanuniversities.The cases of Mexico andVenezuelahaveserved o illuminateuniversity esponsesto threehistoricalchallenges: he demand of nationaleconomies for differentareasand levelsof professionalexpertise, hebroadsocial demandforupwardmobility byway of universityeducation,and the ideologicaldemandimposedby governmentrhetoric and nationalaspirations.Universities in both Mexico and Venezuela have shown themselvesresponsiveover time to changingeconomic and social circumstances.Contraryto commonconceptions of 'universitycrisis', the universitiesare not 'out of control.' Rathertrends in universityeducation of professionalsfollow closely trends in nationalpriorities, as expressed in government expenditure, employment trends in theeconomy, and a demandforsocialmobilitythatis not easilymetgiventherestraintsimposed by historical economic development.Theprincipalstressplacedon theuniversity ystems nboth countries s related othe economies' inabilityto produce obs at theprofessional evelat therateatwhichuniversitiesproduceprofessional-levelgraduates.Although in the 1940sand 1950sthe universitysystemsplayed importantrolesin promotingsocial mobility,by the1960s the number of professional jobs was much smaller than the number ofuniversity graduates.By the 1980s, the social role of the universitieswas severely



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78limitedbyeconomiccrisisbroughton bya combinationof droppingoilprices,debt,and governmentdeficits.

Clearly,the major challengefacing Mexico and Venezuela in highereducationpolicyis to restarteconomicgrowthto provide obs foruniversitygraduates.For themost important source of university problems such as crowded campuses and'politicized'studentbodies lies outside the universities hemselves, n the historicalpatternof economic developmentin the two countries.

ReferencesAlbornoz, Orlando(1972).Estudiantes DesarrolloPolitico. Caracas: Monte AvilaEditores.Aranda, Sergio (1984).La EconomiaVenezolana UnaInterpretaci6n e su Modo deFuncionamiento.Caracas: Editorial Pomaire.Betancourt,R6mulo (1979). Venezuela:Oil andPolitics.Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Fuentes Molinar, Olac (1981). 'Universidady democracia:la mirada hacia la izquierda',CuadernosPoliticos 53 (Enero/Abril).Hansen, J. and James, A. (1977). 'Cycles of economic growth and structuralchangesince 1950',inMartz, John D. and Meyer,David J., Venezuela:TheDemocraticExperience.New York:Praeger.Kornblith, Miriam and Maingon, Thais (1985). Estadoy Gasto Publico en Venezuela,1936-1980.Caracas: UCV.Levine, Daniel H. (1973). ConflictandPolitical Change n Venezuela.Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress.Lorey, David E. (1988). 'Sowingthe petroleum in highereducation:the trainingof professionalsforsocial modernization in Venezuela, 1936-86', in Wilkie, James, W. and Ochoa, EnriqueC., (eds.),Los Angeles: UCLA LatinAmerican Center Publications.Lorey, David E. (1989). 'The development of engineering expertise for social and economicmodernization in Mexico since 1929',in Society andEconomy n Mexico. Los Angeles:UCLA LatinAmerican Center Publications.Lorey,David E. (1990).'Theuniversityandeconomicdevelopment n Mexicosince 1929'.Dissertation,UCLA.Martz,John D. andMeyer,David J. (1977). Venezuela:TheDemocraticExperience.New York:Praeger.Petras,JamesF., Morley,MorrisandSmith, Steven(1980).TheNationalizationof Venezuela'sOil. NewYork:Praeger.Rabe,StephenG. (1982).TheRoadto OPEC:UnitedStatesRelationswithVenezuela, 919-1976.Austin:Universityof Texas Press.Wilkie,JamesW., Lorey,David E.andOchoa,EnriqueC. (1987).StatisticalAbstractofLatinAmerica.Vol. 28. Los Angeles: UCLA LatinAmerican Center Publications.

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Universities, Public Policy and Economic Development in Latin America - David E. Lorey