United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    1/22

    United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

    No. 14- 1186

    UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

    Appel l ee,

    v.

    CECI LI O MERCEDES- DE LA CRUZ,

    Def endant , Appel l ant .

    APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF PUERTO RI CO

    [ Hon. Franci sco A. Besosa, U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

    Bef or e

    Lynch, Chi ef J udge,Tor r uel l a and Sel ya, Ci r cui t J udges.

    Dani el N. Marx, wi t h whom Rober t E. Toone, Mi chel e L.Adel man, Shr ut i h Raml ochan- Tewar i e, and Fol ey Hoag LLP were onbr i ef , f or appel l ant .

    Susan Z. J or gensen, Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney,wi t h whomRosa Emi l i a Rodr guez- Vl ez, Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, andNel son Pr ez- Sosa, Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, Chi ef ,Appel l at e Di vi si on, wer e on br i ef , f or appel l ee.

    May 26, 2015

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    2/22

    LYNCH, Chief Judge. Thi s i s t he r ar e case i n whi ch we

    f i nd on di r ect appeal t hat t her e was i nef f ect i ve assi st ance of

    def ense counsel and so vacat e a convi ct i on and remand f or f ur t her

    pr oceedi ngs.

    Def endant Ceci l i o Mer cedes- De La Cr uz appeal s hi s

    convi ct i on and sent ence f or conspi r acy t o possess wi t h i nt ent t o

    di st r i but e cocai ne and possessi on wi t h i nt ent t o di st r i but e

    cocai ne. Mer cedes' pr i mary argument as t o hi s convi ct i on, made

    under t wo doct r i nes, i s t hat t he gover nment agent s who arr est ed hi m

    l acked pr obabl e cause t o do so. Fi r st , Mer cedes cont ends t hat t he

    f ai l ur e of t he di st r i ct cour t t o suppr ess i ncri mi nat i ng st at ement s

    t hat he made shor t l y af t er t he ar r est was pl ai n er r or . Second, he

    ar gues t hat , i n any event , t he f ai l ur e of hi s counsel t o f i l e a

    t i mel y mot i on t o suppr ess t hat evi dence was a bl atant di spl ay of

    i nef f ect i ve assi st ance of counsel . Mer cedes al so chal l enges hi s

    sent ence, ar gui ng t hat t he di st r i ct cour t ( 1) i mpr oper l y i ncreased

    hi s sent ence by maki ng an unsuppor t ed f i ndi ng t hat Mercedes was not

    t r ut hf ul at hi s sent enci ng hear i ng and ( 2) er r oneousl y f ai l ed t o

    appl y the saf et y val ve under 18 U. S. C. 3553( f ) .

    We agr ee wi t h Mer cedes' i nef f ect i ve assi st ance of counsel

    argument and need not r each t he pl ai n err or i ssue, and so we vacat e

    hi s convi ct i on and r emand f or f ur t her pr oceedi ngs. The r ecor d i s

    suf f i ci ent l y devel oped and t he f act s concer ni ng t he appar ent l y

    unj ust i f i ed ar r est and counsel ' s f ai l ur e t o move t o suppr ess ar e

    -2-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    3/22

    suf f i ci ent l y egr egi ous as t o war r ant r el i ef . We al so r each t he

    i ssue of whet her t her e was sent enci ng er r or , l est t he er r or r ecur

    or have some l i nger i ng ef f ect i n t he event of r et r i al .

    I .

    On t he eveni ng of Sept ember 16, 2012, f ederal agent s

    conduct ed sur vei l l ance of a remot e st r et ch of mi l es of coast l i ne i n

    t he sout heast r egi on of Puer t o Ri co suspect ed t o be an area of dr ug

    t r af f i cki ng act i vi t y. The r egi on was known t o be a common

    debar kat i on poi nt f or drug shi pment s. I t i s a mount ai nous r ur al

    r egi on wi t h a l ot of br ush.

    Cust oms and Border Pat r ol Agent Lui s Capest any was

    pat r ol l i ng Puer t o Ri co St at e Road 901, whi ch r uns near t he coast .

    He encount er ed a whi t e van " i n t hr ee di f f er ent l ocat i ons i n [ a]

    ver y smal l amount of dr i vi ng di st ance, " whi ch he f ound suspi ci ous.

    A vehi cl e regi st r y check r eveal ed t hat t he van was r egi st er ed t o

    J ose Mi guel Guzmn- De l os Sant os. 1

    Ar ound 3: 30 A. M. , Capest any l ear ned f r om hi s super i or s

    t hat t her e was a boat t r avel i ng t owar d t he coast wi t h i t s l i ght s

    out . A hel i copt er spi ed t he vessel near a poi nt on t he coast

    cal l ed Punt a Tor o. Capest any cont i nued pat r ol l i ng and encount er ed

    1Guzmn, a codefendant in this case, was convicted of

    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. Heappealed his conviction and sentence, see United States v. Guzmn-De los Santos, No. 14-1209, but we dismissed the appeal after thedistrict court issued an order stating that it would dismiss theindictment.

    -3-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    4/22

    a gol d Hyundai st at i on wagon wi t h 19- i nch ni ckel chr ome r i ms at a

    poi nt wher e Road 901 i nt er sect ed wi t h a r oad goi ng t o the coast .

    The vehi cl e t urned ont o Road 901 and began dr i vi ng nor t hbound.

    Capest any f ound t hi s suspi ci ous i n l i ght of t he t i me of ni ght and

    t he r emote natur e of t he area. He r an t he Hyundai ' s pl ates and

    di scover ed t hat t hey wer e regi st er ed t o a Mazda.

    Shor t l y af t er war d, Capest any saw t hr ee i ndi vi dual s r un

    f r omt he di r ect i on of t he beach and "spe[ e] d of f " al ong Road 901 i n

    a r ed t wo- door coupe. Capest any not i f i ed t he ot her agent s i n t he

    ar ea of t he suspi ci ous act i vi t y he had observed.

    By t hat t i me, t he vessel whi ch the agent s had been

    moni t or i ng had near ed t he coast l i ne near Punt a Toro. Ther e i s no

    evi dence t here had been pr evi ous dr ug encount ers on t he Punt a Toro

    beach. Capest any cal l ed f or backup, and he and seven ot her agent s

    event ual l y made t hei r way down a gr avel r oad toward Punt a Toro.

    They encount er ed appr oxi mat el y si x r esi dences al ong t hat r oad,

    whi ch wer e i nhabi t ed and "wel l kept . "

    Ar ound 4: 30 A. M. , t he agent s encountered an abandoned red

    For d Excur si on st uck at t he end of t he gr avel r oad. Ther e wer e

    sever al cont ai ner s of gasol i ne next t o t he vehi cl e, but t he agent s

    di d not f i nd any peopl e or cont r aband near by at t hat t i me.

    Capest any and f i ve of t he agent s cont i nued wal ki ng t oward t he shore

    al ong a gr ass t r ai l , whi l e t wo of t he agent s, Wi l f r edo Vega- Fl echa

    and a muni ci pal pol i ce of f i cer , who wer e armed, st ayed behi nd at

    -4-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    5/22

    t he end of t he gr avel r oad t o "mak[ e] sure t hat nobody woul d t r y t o

    t ake t hat vehi cl e out . "

    Appr oxi mat el y hal f an hour l at er , i n t he dar kness of t he

    ear l y mor ni ng i n an unl i t ar ea, t he t wo agent s next t o t he

    Excur si on hear d a noi se i n a near by wooded area. Vega had ni ght -

    vi si on goggl es and used t hem t o obser ve an i ndi vi dual - - l at er

    i dent i f i ed as Mer cedes - - wal ki ng out of t he woods t owar d t he

    Excursi on. He di d not obser ve any weapons wi t h t he man.

    Mer cedes coul d not see t he agent s because i t was st i l l

    dar k. Vega t est i f i ed t hat t he t wo agent s t ol d Mer cedes to st op,

    and " [ h] e r ai sed hi s hands, and we pl aced hi m under ar r est "

    ( emphasi s added) . The gover nment does not di sput e t hat Mercedes

    was ar r est ed i mmedi at el y af t er Vega st opped hi m. There was no

    Ter r y st op; t here was, r at her , an i mmedi at e ar r est .

    The ot her si x of f i cer s event ual l y di scover ed 33 bundl es

    cont ai ni ng near l y 1000 ki l ogr ams of cocai ne near a dr y creek bed

    about 100 f eet away f r om t he Excur si on. The boat t hat had

    apparent l y del i ver ed t he dr ugs was f ound abandoned i n t he sand wi t h

    i t s l i ght s on. However , Vega and hi s par t ner di d not know about

    t he di scover y of t he dr ugs or t he boat at t he t i me of Mer cedes'

    ar r est . At t r i al on di r ect exami nat i on, Vega sai d onl y t hat he saw

    Mer cedes comi ng t oward hi m, " t ol d hi m t o st op, " and arr est ed hi m.

    Vega di d not ment i on any concer n f or of f i cer saf et y. On cr oss-

    exami nat i on, when asked why he ar r est ed Mercedes, Vega repl i ed:

    -5-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    6/22

    Wel l , f i r st of al l , he i s i n a pl ace wher et her e i s a vehi cl e t hat i s pr esumed t o be i nt he dr ug t r af f i cki ng. He doesn' t know aboutt he pl ace because he seems t o be f r om anot herpl aces [ sic] . I don' t know hi m. For mysaf et y, I pl aced hi m under ar r est .

    Onl y af t er t he ar r est di d t he t wo of f i cer s sear ch Mer cedes; t hey

    f ound a wal l et wi t h i dent i f i cat i on and $20 cash. They f ound no

    weapons. They saw t hat Mercedes was wet f r omt he wai st down. Vega

    asked Mercedes, "How many ar e you?" Mercedes di d not r espond, and

    Vega asked hi m agai n. Mercedes sai d, " Four . " Vega t hen asked

    ( agai n t wi ce) how much Mercedes had been pai d " t o do t hi s j ob. "

    Mercedes r esponded, "$1, 000. "

    At t hat t i me, sever al ot her of f i cer s ar r i ved on t he

    scene, and Vega i nst r uct ed them t o t ake Mer cedes and "pl ace hi m i n

    a cel l at t he Maunabo st at i on house. " Mer cedes was l ater t aken

    f r omMaunabo t o t he Puer t o Ri co Pol i ce Mar i ne Uni t i n Humacao, and

    t hen t o the mai n of f i ce of Homel and Secur i t y I nvest i gat i ons i nMi r amar . Mer cedes was handcuf f ed whi l e i n t he vehi cl e.

    Upon Mer cedes' ar r i val i n Mi r amar , a Homel and Secur i t y

    i nvest i gat or , Angel Or t i z, l ed Mer cedes t o a det ent i on cel l ar ea.

    At t hat poi nt , Or t i z t est i f i ed, Mer cedes made "sever al spont aneous

    st at ement s" t hat he had "done t hi s f or $1, 000" and t hat "he r eal l y

    di dn' t know who t he owner s were of what ever i t was t hat he was

    doi ng. " Or t i z st opped Mer cedes f r omspeaki ng because Or t i z had not

    yet admi ni st er ed Mercedes hi s Mi r anda r i ght s, nor had anyone el se.

    -6-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    7/22

    Once t he gr oup r eached a pr ocessi ng cel l , Or t i z r ead

    Mer cedes hi s Mi r anda r i ght s and had hi m si gn f or ms i ndi cat i ng t hat

    Mer cedes under st ood hi s r i ght s and woul d wai ve t hem. Or t i z t hen

    i nt ervi ewed Mercedes. Mercedes r ecount ed t hat a person had

    appr oached hi m on t he pr evi ous day and asked hi m " i f he want ed t o

    make $1, 000" ; t hat he had t r avel ed t o t he coast i n a van and hel ped

    unl oad whi t e sacks f r om t he boat on t he coast ; and t hat al l of t he

    men unl oadi ng t he boat ' s car go had run away when t hey saw a

    hel i copt er appr oachi ng t he vessel . Mer cedes i ndi cat ed t hat , af t er

    he st ar t ed r unni ng, t he "next t hi ng he knew [ was] t hat t wo pol i ce

    of f i cer s had appr ehended hi m. "

    Mer cedes and co- def endant s Guzmn and Vi ct or Manuel

    Car el a2 were i ndi ct ed on September 27, 2012, on t wo char ges:

    conspi r acy t o possess wi t h i nt ent t o di st r i but e cocai ne and

    possessi on wi t h i nt ent t o di st r i but e cocai ne. The di st r i ct cour t

    i ssued a schedul i ng or der r equi r i ng al l mot i ons t o suppr ess t o be

    f i l ed by "November 2, 2012 or , i f t he case i s cont i nued, no l at er

    t han f our t een ( 14) days bef or e t he t r i al dat e. " Counsel f or Guzmn

    and Car el a bot h f i l ed mot i ons t o suppr ess st at ement s t hei r cl i ent s

    had made dur i ng and af t er t hei r ar r est s on t he gr ounds t hat t hei r

    ar r est s wer e i l l egal . The co- def endant s' mot i ons wer e based on

    ver y di f f er ent f act s f ar l ess f avor abl e t o t hose def endant s t han

    2 Car el a has al so appeal ed hi s convi ct i on and sent ence.See Uni t ed St ates v. Carel a, No. 14- 1194.

    -7-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    8/22

    t he f act s wer e as t o Mer cedes. The di st r i ct cour t deni ed bot h

    mot i ons. Mer cedes' counsel di d not f i l e a mot i on t o suppr ess.

    Ther e wer e t wo t r i al s i n t hi s case; t he f i r st began on

    Apr i l 15, 2013. On t he f i r st day of t hat t r i al , bef or e t he j ur y

    was brought i nt o t he cour t r oom, Mer cedes' counsel r ef er r ed t o t he

    gover nment ' s mot i on i n l i mi ne, whi ch had asked t he cour t t o

    "pr ecl ude t he def endant s f r ompr esent i ng, at t r i al , any ar gument as

    t o t he l egal i t y of t hei r quest i oni ng by l aw enf or cement of f i cer s. "

    I n t hat mot i on, t he gover nment had r epeat ed t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

    obser vat i on ( made i n i t s r ul i ng on t he co- def endant s' mot i ons t o

    suppr ess) t hat Mer cedes had wai ved hi s r i ght t o f i l e a mot i on t o

    suppr ess by f ai l i ng t o f i l e one by t he cour t - i mposed deadl i ne.

    Mercedes' counsel acknowl edged t hat he had not f i l ed a mot i on t o

    suppr ess, but st at ed t hat Mer cedes "ha[ d] wai ved no r i ght " and

    di r ect ed t he cour t ' s at t ent i on t o the Supr eme Cour t ' s deci si on i n

    Cr ane v. Kent ucky, 476 U. S. 683 ( 1986) . 3

    The di st r i ct cour t asked Mer cedes' counsel what t he Cr ane

    case "ha[d] t o do wi t h bei ng l ate and not compl yi ng wi t h t he

    Cour t ' s or der . " The cour t r emi nded counsel t hat , under t he

    pr et r i al or der , al l mot i ons t o suppr ess wer e r equi r ed t o be f i l ed

    14 days bef or e t r i al . Mer cedes' counsel r epl i ed t hat " [ t ] hi s i s

    3 Cr ane hel d t hat t he ci r cumst ances sur r oundi ng adef endant ' s conf essi on ar e r el evant t o t he conf essi on' scr edi bi l i t y, as wel l as i t s vol unt ar i ness, and t hat t he di str i ctcour t ' s excl usi on of t est i mony about t hose ci r cumst ances depr i vedt he def endant of hi s ri ght t o a f ai r t r i al . 476 U. S. at 687- 91.

    -8-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    9/22

    not a mot i on t o suppress" ( emphasi s added) ; he merel y wi shed t o

    cr oss- exami ne t he agent s r egardi ng t he ci r cumst ances sur r oundi ng

    Mer cedes' conf essi on. 4 The cour t st at ed t hat such quest i oni ng

    woul d be al l owed.

    The f i r st t r i al ended wi t h a hung j ury on Apr i l 22, 2013.

    The case was r et r i ed t hree weeks l at er , on May 13, 2013. At t he

    begi nni ng of t hat t r i al , t he cour t st at ed t hat "t he . . . r ul i ngs

    st and as t o [ t he par t i es' ] pr evi ous mot i ons. " Mer cedes' counsel

    t ol d t he cour t t hat "concer ni ng t he mot i on t o suppr ess, we wi l l

    r ei t er at e t he case l aw we quot ed t he l ast t i me. " At no poi nt ,

    however , di d counsel expl ai n hi s f ai l ur e t o compl y wi t h t he

    di st r i ct cour t ' s schedul i ng or der or even r equest l eave t o f i l e an

    unt i mel y mot i on t o suppr ess.

    The second j ur y convi ct ed Mer cedes on bot h count s i n t he

    i ndi ct ment . Thi s appeal f ol l owed.

    I I .

    Mer cedes, t hr ough di f f er ent counsel , argues on appeal

    t hat t her e was no pr obabl e cause f or hi s ar r est and hence t hat t he

    i ncul pat ory post - arr est st at ement s he made t o t he agent s must be

    suppr essed as f r ui t of t he poi sonous t r ee. He al so ar gues t hat hi s

    t r i al at t or ney' s f ai l ur e t o f i l e a mot i on t o suppr ess on t hose

    4 Nonet hel ess, Mer cedes' counsel chal l enged t he l awf ul nessof Mer cedes' ar r est i n Rul e 29 mot i ons f i l ed at t he cl ose of t hegover nment ' s case i n bot h t r i al s. The cour t deni ed both mot i onsf r om t he bench.

    -9-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    10/22

    gr ounds at any t i me const i t ut ed i nef f ect i ve assi st ance of counsel

    i n vi ol at i on of t he Si xt h Amendment .

    We very "r ar el y revi ew Si xt h Amendment cl ai ms agai nst

    t r i al counsel r ai sed i ni t i al l y on di r ect appeal . " Uni t ed St at es v.

    LaPl ant e, 714 F. 3d 641, 648 ( 1st Ci r . 2013) . That i s, i n par t ,

    because such cl ai ms usual l y pr esent f actbound quest i ons on whi ch

    t he r ecor d i s i nsuf f i ci ent l y devel oped - - quest i ons about whet her

    counsel ' s chal l enged deci si ons wer e mi st akes of a const i t ut i onal

    magni t ude or si mpl y reasonabl e st r at egi c choi ces t hat di d not pan

    out , and about whet her any def i ci ent per f ormance act ual l y made t he

    def endant wor se of f . See i d. ; Uni t ed St ates v. Downs- Moses, 329

    F. 3d 253, 264- 65 ( 1st Ci r . 2003) . However , t he usual r ul e does not

    appl y i f "t he key f act s ar e not i n di sput e" and t he r ecor d i s

    "' suf f i ci ent l y devel oped t o al l ow a r easoned consi der at i on' " of t he

    cl ai m. Downs- Moses, 329 F. 3d at 265 ( quot i ng Uni t ed St ates v.

    Nat anel , 938 F. 2d 302, 309 ( 1st Ci r . 1991) ) .

    Thi s i s such an except i onal case. We have no di f f i cul t y

    concl udi ng on t hi s r ecor d t hat Mer cedes' t r i al counsel ' s f ai l ur e t o

    f i l e a t i mel y mot i on t o suppr ess amount ed t o const i t ut i onal l y

    def i ci ent per f ormance and t hat Mer cedes was pr ej udi ced as a

    r esul t . 5

    5 Thi s case does not r equi r e us t o consi der t he wai ver -r el at ed consequences of a f ai l ur e t o f i l e a t i mel y suppr essi onmot i on under t he recent l y amended Federal Rul e of Cr i mi nalProcedur e 12. See Uni t ed St at es v. Anderson, 783 F. 3d 727, 740- 41( 8t h Ci r . 2015) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Sot o, 780 F. 3d 689, 700- 01 & n. 2

    -10-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    11/22

    A. Legal Fr amewor k

    "A convi ct ed def endant ' s cl ai mt hat counsel ' s assi st ance

    was so def ect i ve as t o r equi r e r ever sal of a convi ct i on . . . has

    t wo component s. " St r i ckl and v. Washi ngt on, 466 U. S. 668, 687

    ( 1984) . Fi r st , t he def endant must show t hat counsel ' s per f or mance

    was obj ect i vel y unr easonabl e "under pr evai l i ng pr of essi onal nor ms. "

    I d. at 688. I n maki ng t hi s assessment , cour t s must be "hi ghl y

    def er ent i al " and " i ndul ge a st r ong pr esumpt i on t hat . . . under t he

    ci r cumst ances, t he chal l enged act i on mi ght be consi der ed sound

    t r i al st r at egy. " I d. at 689 ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ;

    accor d Woods v. Donal d, 135 S. Ct . 1372, 1375 ( 2015) ( per cur i am) .

    Second, t he def endant must show t hat counsel ' s def i ci ent

    per f or mance r esul t ed i n pr ej udi ce - - t hat i s, "t hat t her e i s a

    r easonabl e pr obabi l i t y t hat , but f or counsel ' s unpr of essi onal

    er r or s, t he r esul t of t he pr oceedi ng woul d have been di f f er ent . "

    St r i ckl and, 466 U. S. at 694; accor d Woods, 135 S. Ct . at 1375. I n

    t hi s speci f i c cont ext , wher e t he al l eged i nef f ect i veness was t he

    f ai l ur e t o f i l e a mot i on t o suppr ess, i n or der t o show pr ej udi ce

    t he def endant must "pr ove t hat hi s Four t h Amendment cl ai m i s

    mer i t or i ous" and t hat t her e i s a r easonabl e pr obabi l i t y t hat t he

    ( 6t h Ci r . 2015) . Her e, Mer cedes has ar gued t hat hi s counsel ' sper f or mance was const i t ut i onal l y def i ci ent pr eci sel y because hef ai l ed t o f i l e such a mot i on. We can r esol ve t hat cl ai mr egar dl essof whet her t he suppr essi on cl ai m i t sel f was wai ved or f or f ei t ed.Cf . Ki mmel man v. Mor r i son, 477 U. S. 365, 374 n. 1 ( 1986) .

    -11-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    12/22

    ver di ct woul d have been di f f er ent had t he chal l enged evi dence been

    excl uded. Ki mmel man v. Mor r i son, 477 U. S. 365, 375 ( 1986) . 6

    B. Per f or mance

    Def ense counsel ' s f ai l ur e t o f i l e a t i mel y mot i on t o

    suppr ess Mer cedes' post - ar r est st at ement s was obj ect i vel y

    unr easonabl e under pr evai l i ng pr of essi onal norms. The adequacy of

    t he j ust i f i cat i on f or Mer cedes' ver y pr ompt ar r est was an i ssue i n

    t he case. Def ense counsel knew t hat : he had quest i oned a

    gover nment wi t ness at Mer cedes' pr el i mi nary det ent i on hear i ng about

    t he ci r cumst ances sur r oundi ng t he ar r est , aski ng i f Mer cedes had

    "done anyt hi ng wr ong besi des wal ki ng around cl ose t o a van. " Both

    of Mer cedes' co- def endant s, who had f ar l ess pr omi si ng f act ual

    gr ounds, f i l ed t i mel y mot i ons t o suppr ess. Yet counsel never f i l ed

    a mot i on t o suppr ess on behal f of Mercedes, much l ess a t i mel y one.

    The government ar gues t hat t hi s "may have been a

    st r ategi c choi ce, " r easoni ng t hat counsel may have want ed i nst ead

    t o cr oss- exami ne government wi t nesses about t he ci r cumst ances

    sur r oundi ng Mer cedes' ar r est . But Mer cedes' counsel coul d have

    6 I mpor t ant l y, t he pr ej udi ce i nqui r y does not r equi r e t hedef endant t o show t hat t he unl awf ul l y obt ai ned evi dence wasunr el i abl e, or t hat i t s admi ssi on creat ed a r i sk of convi ct i ng an

    i nnocent per son. "The ' pr ej udi ce' essent i al t o a vi ol at i on of t heSi xth Amendment r i ght t o t he ef f ect i ve assi st ance of counsel i s notbei ng convi ct ed t hough one i s i nnocent , al t hough t hat i s t he wor stki nd; i t i s bei ng convi ct ed when one woul d have been acqui t t ed, orat l east woul d have had a good shot at acqui t t al , had one beencompetent l y r epr esent ed. " Owens v. Uni t ed St at es, 387 F. 3d 607,610 ( 7t h Ci r . 2004) ( Posner , J . ) .

    -12-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    13/22

    f i l ed a t i mel y mot i on t o suppr ess Mer cedes' post - ar r est st at ement s

    and st i l l conduct ed such cr oss- exami nat i on i f t he mot i on wer e

    deni ed. The t wo cour ses of act i on wer e not mut ual l y excl usi ve. 7

    See J ohnson v. Uni t ed St ates, 604 F. 3d 1016, 1020- 21 ( 7t h Ci r .

    2010) ( suggest i ng t hat counsel ' s f ai l ur e t o f i l e a mot i on t o

    suppr ess evi dence f ound i n a car t he def endant had bor r owed may

    have been unr easonabl e, and rej ect i ng the ar gument t hat " i t was a

    bet t er def ense . . . f or [ t he def endant ] t o cl ai m a l ack of

    knowl edge that t he dr ugs were i n t he vehi cl e" because t here was "no

    i nher ent conf l i ct bet ween a t r i al def ense based on [ t he

    def endant ' s] l ack of knowl edge t hat t he dr ugs wer e i n t he car , and

    a mot i on t o suppr ess cont endi ng t hat t he sear ch vi ol at ed hi s

    r easonabl e expect at i on of pr i vacy i n t he vehi cl e" ) ; Owens v. Uni t ed

    St at es, 387 F. 3d 607, 608- 09 ( 7t h Ci r . 2004) ( f i ndi ng t hat

    counsel ' s deci si on t o f or f ei t hi s c l i ent ' s standi ng t o r ai se a

    Four t h Amendment chal l enge t o t he sear ch of a house wher e cr ack had

    been di scover ed by denyi ng t hat t he cl i ent owned t he house was

    unr easonabl e because, " i n t he unl i kel y event t hat t he mot i on

    f ai l ed, t he def ense coul d change cour se and t r y t o pr ove at t r i al

    t hat i t was not [ def endant ' s] house af t er al l ") .

    7

    Ironically, Crane, the case defense counsel cited at thebeginning of the first trial in attempting to explain his failureto file a motion to suppress, featured just such a strategy:defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the defendant'sconfession on the ground that it was involuntary, and then, afterthe motion was denied, tried to pursue lines of attack at trialsuggesting that the confession was unreliable and not credible,even if not coerced. 476 U.S. at 684-86.

    -13-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    14/22

    What i s more, a t i mel y mot i on t o suppress on the gr ound

    t hat t he agent s di d not have pr obabl e cause t o ar r est Mer cedes

    woul d qui t e l i kel y have been mer i t or i ous. As Vega' s t est i mony

    conf i r med, t he onl y f act t he agent s knew about Mercedes at t he t i me

    of hi s arr est whi ch i ndi cat ed t hat he mi ght be i nvol ved i n cr i mi nal

    act i vi t y was t hat he was i n t he same general area as a suspect ed

    dr ug- smuggl i ng vent ur e. 8

    I t i s bl ack- l et t er l aw t hat "[ a] n i ndi vi dual ' s pr esence

    i n an ar ea of expect ed cr i mi nal act i vi t y, st andi ng al one, i s not

    enough t o suppor t a r easonabl e, par t i cul ar i zed suspi ci on t hat t he

    per son i s commi t t i ng a cr i me, " I l l i noi s v. War dl ow, 528 U. S. 119,

    124 ( 2000) ( ci t i ng Br own v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 ( 1979) ) , much l ess

    a f i ndi ng of pr obabl e cause, see, e. g. , Ybar r a v. I l l i noi s, 444

    U. S. 85, 90- 91 ( 1979) ( f i ndi ng no pr obabl e cause when "t he agent s

    knew not hi ng i n par t i cul ar about [ t he def endant ] , except t hat he

    was present , al ong wi t h sever al ot her cust omer s, i n a publ i c t aver n

    at a t i me when t he pol i ce had r eason t o bel i eve t hat t he bart ender

    woul d have her oi n f or sal e" ) . Al t hough pr esence i n a " ' hi gh cr i me

    ar ea' " i s a "r el evant cont ext ual consi der at i on[ ] , " at l east i n a

    Ter r y anal ysi s, War dl ow, 528 U. S. at 124 ( quot i ng Adams v.

    Wi l l i ams, 407 U. S. 143, 144 ( 1972) ) , not even t hat f act or i s

    8 Vega t est i f i ed t hat Mer cedes was "i n a pl ace wher e t her ei s a vehi cl e t hat i s pr esumed t o be i n t he dr ug t r af f i cki ng" andt hat "he seem[ ed] t o be f r omanot her pl ace[ ] . " Vega al so sai d t hathe ar r est ed Mer cedes " [ f ] or [ Vega' s] saf et y" because he "d[ i dn' t ]know hi m. "

    -14-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    15/22

    appl i cabl e here. The l ocat i on where Mercedes was f ound was hardl y

    a "hi gh cr i me ar ea. " I t was a l ar ge wooded ar ea wi t h t r ai l s near

    a beach i n r ur al Puer t o Ri co, and t her e wer e f i ve or si x "wel l

    kept " houses nearby. The of f i cer s had no apparent basi s on whi ch

    t o concl ude t hat Mer cedes was not associ ated wi t h t hose houses.

    The government ' s ar gument t hat t here was no ot her

    r easonabl e out come t han a concl usi on t hat t here was pr obabl e cause

    f or t he ar r est i s wr ong, as wel l as bei ng conf used and

    unper suasi ve. I t i s conf used because t he gover nment i nvokes t he

    "r easonabl e suspi ci on" st andar d ut i l i zed f or a Ter r y stop, whi ch

    does not appl y her e. Thi s was not a Ter r y st op. An arr est must be

    suppor t ed by pr obabl e cause, see Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U. S. 626, 630

    ( 2003) ( per cur i am) , whi ch i s an "obvi ousl y" hi gher bur den t han

    r easonabl e suspi ci on, Navar et t e v. Cal i f or ni a, 134 S. Ct . 1683,

    1687 ( 2014) ( i nt er nal quotat i on marks omi t t ed) . The argument i s

    unper suasi ve because t he gover nment f ai l s t o i dent i f y any f act

    known t o t he agent s bef ore t he ar r est t hat woul d have cast

    suspi ci on on Mer cedes besi des t he f act t hat he was i n a "r emote

    area" t hat "had been t he si t e of dr ug smuggl i ng over t he past

    mont h. " The government mi st akenl y ar gues t he agent s knew mor e

    bef ore t he ar r est : Mer cedes " was f ound at t he cr i me scene, " "was

    wet and sandy, i ndi cat i ng he had been on the beach, " and was

    wal ki ng t owar d " t he get away vehi cl e" ear l y i n t he mor ni ng. But t he

    arr est i ng agent s di d not know t hat Mer cedes was wet unt i l t hey

    -15-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    16/22

    "checked hi m out " af t er t he ar r est , and t hey di d not know t hat t he

    area was a "cr i me scene" or t hat t he Excur si on was " t he getaway

    vehi cl e" unt i l t hey di scover ed t he dr ugs. At t he t i me of t he

    ar r est , t hey knew a vessel had been spot t ed comi ng t oward the

    coast , but t hey di d not know t her e was cocai ne i nsi de or t hat

    Mer cedes was connect ed wi t h t he boat . " [ A] sear ch unl awf ul at i t s

    i ncept i on may [ not ] be val i dated by what i t t ur ns up. " Wong Sun v.

    Uni t ed St at es, 371 U. S. 471, 484 ( 1963) . And i f of f i cer saf et y was

    t r ul y t he i ssue, a Ter r y st op woul d have suf f i ced.

    That a t i mel y mot i on t o suppr ess Mer cedes' st at ements

    woul d l i kel y have been mer i t or i ous and wi t hout r eper cussi on t o

    ot her def ense st r at egi es conf ut es any ar gument t hat counsel ' s

    f ai l ur e t o f i l e such a mot i on was pr of essi onal l y r easonabl e. See,

    e. g. , Gent r y v. Sevi er , 597 F. 3d 838, 851- 52 ( 7t h Ci r . 2010) ;

    Owens, 387 F. 3d at 608- 09; Stat e v. Rei chenbach, 101 P. 3d 80, 84,

    87 ( Wash. 2004) ; St ate v. Si l ver s, 587 N. W. 2d 325, 334 ( Neb. 1998) ;

    Commonweal t h v. Davi s, 743 A. 2d 946, 953 ( Pa. Super . Ct . 1999) .

    I n shor t , t he gover nment has not pr ovi ded - - and t he

    r ecor d does not di scl ose - - any pl ausi bl e st r at egi c expl anat i on f or

    counsel ' s f ai l ur e t o f i l e a t i mel y mot i on t o suppr ess, and so we

    concl ude t hat hi s per f or mance was const i t ut i onal l y def i ci ent . See

    Ki mmel man, 477 U. S. at 385- 86 ( f i ndi ng counsel ' s f ai l ur e t o f i l e

    mot i on t o suppr ess obj ect i vel y unr easonabl e because the r ecord

    suggest ed "no bet t er expl anat i on" f or hi s f ai l ur e t han "i gnor ance

    -16-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    17/22

    of t he l aw" and "a compl et e l ack of pr et r i al pr epar at i on") ; Ti ce v.

    J ohnson, 647 F. 3d 87, 106 ( 4t h Ci r . 2011) ( "Ther e i s si mpl y not hi ng

    we can di scern f r omt he record t hat woul d excuse t he def ense t eam' s

    f ai l ur e t o move t o suppr ess [ t he def endant ' s] conf essi on. ") . The

    mer e i nconveni ence t o def ense counsel of havi ng to meet a pr et r i al

    schedul e f or f i l i ng mot i ons i s sur el y not enough.

    C. Pr ej udi ce

    We ar e al so sat i sf i ed t hat t her e i s a r easonabl e

    pr obabi l i t y that , had Mer cedes' counsel f i l ed a mot i on t o suppr ess,

    t he out come of t he pr oceedi ng woul d have been di f f er ent . As sai d,

    had such a mot i on been f i l ed, i t l i kel y woul d have succeeded, and

    had i t succeeded, many (per haps al l ) of Mer cedes' i ncul pat or y

    st atement s woul d have been excl uded as " f r ui t of t he poi sonous

    t r ee. " See gener al l y Br own v. I l l i noi s, 422 U. S. 590, 602- 04

    ( 1975) ; Wong Sun, 371 U. S. at 487- 88; Uni t ed St ates v. St ark, 499

    F. 3d 72, 76- 77 ( 1st Ci r . 2007) .

    The gover nment ' s case agai nst Mer cedes was based al most

    excl usi vel y on t hose st at ement s. I ndeed, i n t he gover nment ' s

    cl osi ng ar gument , t he pr osecut or r epeat ed t hat Mer cedes had

    admi t t ed hi s i nvol vement i n t he t r ansact i on near l y ever y t i me she

    ment i oned hi m, and she r ef er r ed t o scant other evi dence of hi s

    par t i ci pat i on. Cf . Uni t ed St at es v. Mel vi n, 730 F. 3d 29, 40 ( 1st

    Ci r . 2013) ( r el yi ng on pr osecut or ' s cl osi ng ar gument t o det er mi ne

    whet her i mpr oper l y admi t t ed t est i mony was suf f i ci ent l y i mpor t ant t o

    -17-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    18/22

    t he gover nment ' s case so as t o requi r e vacat ur of t he def endant ' s

    convi ct i on) . Ther e was no asser t i on t hat any of t he ot her

    def endant s had i dent i f i ed Mer cedes as i nvol ved i n unl oadi ng t he

    cocai ne. Excl usi on of t he post - ar r est st at ement s woul d l i kel y have

    evi scer at ed t he gover nment ' s case. See, e. g. , Ti ce, 647 F. 3d at

    111; Rei chenbach, 101 P. 3d at 87.

    I I I .

    Our deci si on t o vacate Mer cedes' convi ct i on mi ght be

    t hought t o r ender i t unnecessar y t o r each hi s cl ai ms of sent enci ng

    er r or . Never t hel ess, t o pr event possi bl e r ecur r ence, we t hi nk i t

    appr opr i at e to add thi s coda regardi ng the sent ence i mposed by t he

    di s t r i ct court .

    At sent enci ng, t he def ense contended t hat Mercedes shoul d

    be consi der ed "a mi nor par t i ci pant " f or pur poses of hi s Sent enci ng

    Gui del i nes cal cul at i on because " t her e was no evi dence whatsoever

    t hat demonst r at ed t hat [ he] i n any way was a pr i nci pal i n t hi s

    case. " I nst ead, Mercedes argued, he was "merel y a workman. " The

    gover nment di sagr eed, st at i ng t hat Mer cedes was "an i nt egr al part "

    of "a $22 mi l l i on conver t [ sic] of f l oadi ng oper at i on whi ch r equi r ed

    i ndi vi dual s of t r ust . " As suppor t , t he pr osecut or poi nt ed t o

    Mer cedes' conf essi on t hat "he was pai d $1, 000 and t hat . . . he was

    i nvol ved i n t he of f l oadi ng of t he nar cot i cs, " and t o t he f act t hat

    he ran away when he saw t he hel i copt er , suggest i ng "t hat he knew

    what he was doi ng was wr ong. "

    -18-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    19/22

    Af t er counsel made t hese ar gument s, t he di st r i ct cour t

    gave Mer cedes an oppor t uni t y t o al l ocut e. The f ol l owi ng col l oquy

    ensued:

    THE DEFENDANT: Wel l , I woul d l i ke t osay to you t hat , as f ar as I know, I don' tbel i eve t here i s any evi dence t hat makes mer esponsi bl e f or t hat .

    THE COURT: For what ?

    THE DEFENDANT: For t he ci r cumst ancest hat t he Pr osecut or i s r ef er r i ng t o, becausehe di d not see me wi t h t hat . And i f he di dn' tsee me wi t h t hat and he doesn' t have anyf i nger pr i nt s of mi ne on t hat , he cannot makeme gui l t y of t hat .

    THE COURT: But you wer e t here.

    THE DEFENDANT: I was on t he r oad. Apol i ceman ar r est ed me, and he t ook me. Theyhad a red t r uck.

    THE COURT: That ' s not how I r emembert he case, Mr . Mer cedes. I f I r emember t hecase, you wer e ar r est ed r i ght t her e as you

    came out of t he bushes wi t h your hands up.THE DEFENDANT: Wel l , t hat ' s t he

    ver si on f r om t he pol i ceman t hat ar r est ed me.And he sai d thr ee ver si ons at t he same t i me,and none of t hem wer e j ust i f i ed. My at t or neyasked hi m at what moment he had ar r est ed me,and he sai d he ar r est ed me because he saw meas a suspect around t here.

    On that day, t he 17t h of September ,2012, t he sun came out ar ound 6: 13 i n t hemorni ng, and he sai d he had bi nocul ars, ni ght

    vi si on goggl es, and t hat he had ar r est ed me at6: 00 i n t he morni ng. And at 6: 30 i n t hemor ni ng, i f he has t hose ni ght vi si on goggl est hat he had arr est ed me at 6: 30 - - but at 6: 13i s when t he sun came out . What can he do wi t ht hat on hi s f ace at t hat t i me i n t he mor ni ng,at 6: 30?

    -19-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    20/22

    I t hi nk i t was ver i f i ed t hat he was notpr eci se cont i nuousl y as t o t hat . And as t oever yt hi ng el se, t hose ar e t hi ngs t hat I l eaveat your sound di scr et i on.

    Thank you.

    The di st r i ct cour t grant ed t he mi nor par t i ci pant

    r educt i on and cal cul at ed Mer cedes' gui del i nes sent enci ng range as

    121 t o 151 mont hs. The cour t t hen f ound t hat Mercedes had been

    unt r ut hf ul i n hi s al l ocut i on:

    Today Mr . Mer cedes has i ndi cat ed t hatt her e i s no evi dence of hi s i nvol vement i n t heoper at i on. He i ndi cat ed t hat he was ar r est edon t he r oad.

    Tr i al evi dence demonst r at ed, however ,t hat Mr . Mer cedes was ar r est ed shor t l y af t ert he agent s ar r i ved, when he came out of t hebushes cl ose t o wher e t he red [Excur si on] wasand cl ose t o wher e t he [ 33] bal es of cocai newere st ashed.

    He has not been t r ut hf ul t o the Cour tt oday, and t he sent ence wi l l r ef l ect i t .

    The cour t sentenced Mer cedes t o 136 mont hs i n pr i son. We

    concl ude t hat t her e i s a pr obabi l i t y t he di st r i ct cour tmi sunderst ood t he col l oquy and so commi t t ed sent enci ng err or .

    The di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on t o i ncr ease Mer cedes'

    sent ence r est ed on an ext r emel y doubt f ul f i ndi ng t hat Mer cedes was

    unt r ut hf ul i n hi s al l ocut i on. 9 As we r ead t he r ecor d, Mercedes was

    9 The gover nment says t he di st r i ct cour t di d not penal i ze

    Mer cedes because i t di d not i mpose an obst r uct i on of j ust i ceenhancement . That ar gument mi sses t he mar k. Mercedes has notcont est ed any enhancement under t he gui del i nes, nor has he ar guedhe shoul d have r ecei ved a r educt i on ( f or exampl e, f or accept ance ofr esponsi bi l i t y) . I nst ead, as we r ead Mer cedes' br i ef , he i scont est i ng t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on t o i mpose a mor e sever esent ence t han i t ot herwi se woul d have based on Mercedes' pur por t ed

    -20-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    21/22

    si mpl y di sput i ng ( 1) t he ver si on of event s t hat t he pr osecut or

    r el ayed at sent enci ng, whi ch suggest ed t hat Mercedes was a maj or

    pl ayer i n t he dr ug smuggl i ng ent er pr i se, and ( 2) par t s of t he

    ar r est i ng agent ' s test i mony. Mer cedes di d not cont est hi s gui l t at

    sent enci ng. The di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ng t hat Mer cedes deni ed "hi s

    i nvol vement i n t he oper at i on" i s t hus wi t hout suppor t i n t he

    r ecor d. Cf . Uni t ed St at es v. Al - Ri kabi , 606 F. 3d 11, 14- 16 ( 1st

    Ci r . 2010) . 10

    Mer cedes' l i mi t ed pr of i ci ency i n Engl i sh, whi ch i s

    appar ent f r om t he sent enci ng t r anscr i pt , but t r esses thi s

    concl usi on. Any per cei ved i naccur aci es i n Mer cedes' s al l ocut i on

    wer e l i kel y a r esul t of t he l anguage bar r i er , not di shonest y on

    Mer cedes' par t . Cf . Nadmi d v. Hol der , ___ F. 3d ___, 2015 WL

    1787066, at *3 (7t h Ci r . Apr . 21, 2015) ( r ej ect i ng an i mmi gr at i on

    j udge' s adver se cr edi bi l i t y f i ndi ng wi t h r espect t o an asyl um

    appl i cant whose "answer s suggest [ ed] t hat t r ansl at i on pr obl ems

    ha[ d] made i t di f f i cul t [ f or hi m] t o under st and t he quest i ons posed

    t o hi m") ; Ramsameachi r e v. Ashcrof t , 357 F. 3d 169, 180 ( 2d Ci r .

    2004) ( not i ng t hat st at ement s made by an al i en who may not

    under st and Engl i sh "shoul d be consi der ed l ess r el i abl e") .

    di shonest y dur i ng hi s al l ocut i on.

    10 We not e that t he cour t ' s deci si on not t o appl y t he saf et yval ve, whi ch Mercedes al so chal l enges on appeal , was dubi ous. Wel eave t he saf et y val ve i ssue f or t he di st r i ct cour t t o r esol ve i nt he f i r st i nst ance shoul d i t r ecur on r emand.

    -21-

  • 7/26/2019 United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz, 1st Cir. (2015)

    22/22

    Sent enci ng cour t s shoul d exer ci se gr eat caut i on bef or e penal i zi ng

    a def endant wi t h l i mi t ed pr of i ci ency i n Engl i sh based on ar guabl y

    ambi guous st at ement s.

    I V.

    We vacat e Mercedes' convi ct i on and sent ence and remand

    t hi s case f or f ur t her pr oceedi ngs.

    -22-