United States v. Fish, 1st Cir. (2014)

7/26/2019 United States v. Fish, 1st Cir. (2014)

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United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

No. 12- 1791

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appel l ee,

v.

DAVI D FI SH,

Def endant , Appel l ant .

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[ Hon. Mi chael A. Ponsor , U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

Bef or e

Tor r uel l a, Dyk, * and Kayat t a,Ci r cui t J udges.

Thomas J . O' Connor , J r . , f or appel l ant .Al ex J . Gr ant , Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, wi t h whom

Car men M. Or t i z, Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, was on br i ef , f orappel l ee.

Febr uar y 26, 2014

*Of t he Feder al Ci r cui t , si t t i ng by desi gnat i on.



KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Feder al l aw makes i t a cr i me t o

possess body ar mor af t er havi ng been convi ct ed of a "cr i me of

vi ol ence" as def i ned i n 18 U. S. C. § 16 ( "sect i on 16" ) . See 18

U. S. C. § 931. Appel l ant Davi d Fi sh possessed body armor af t er

havi ng been convi ct ed of sever al cr i mes, and t he di st r i ct cour t

r ul ed t hat at l east one of t hose sever al of f enses qual i f i ed as a

cr i me of vi ol ence under sect i on 16. Fol l owi ng t hat r ul i ng, Fi sh

ent er ed a condi t i onal pl ea of gui l t y, r eser vi ng t he r i ght t o

chal l enge on t hi s t i mel y appeal t he det er mi nat i on t hat he had

pr evi ousl y been convi ct ed of a cr i me of vi ol ence.

I n def ense of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s det er mi nat i on, t he

gover nment poi nt s t o f our cr i mes under Massachuset t s l aw f or whi ch

Fi sh had pr evi ousl y been convi ct ed: br eaki ng and ent er i ng i n t he

dayt i me, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, §§ 17- 18, br eaki ng and

ent er i ng at ni ght , see i d. § 16, assaul t and bat t er y wi t h a

danger ous weapon, see i d. ch. 265, § 15A( b) , and possessi on of a

bur gl ar i ous i nst r ument , see i d. ch. 266, § 49. Not wi t hst andi ng

t hei r apt l y- st yl ed t i t l es, we f i nd t hat none of t hose cri mes, as

def i ned under Massachuset t s l aw, qual i f i es as a cr i me of vi ol ence

under sect i on 16. We t her ef or e r ever se Fi sh' s convi ct i on.

I. Facts

The f ol l owi ng f act s ar e t aken f r om t he prosecut i on' s

pr esent at i on at Fi sh' s pl ea col l oquy. At t he col l oquy, Fi sh

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admi t t ed t o al l f act s necessar y t o suppor t hi s gui l t y pl ea. The

f act s ar e uncont est ed on appeal .

On J une 18, 2009, Fi sh, who was worki ng as an aut o

mechani c at a repai r shop i n Pi t t sf i el d, Massachuset t s, r epor t ed t o

t he Pi t t sf i el d Pol i ce Depar t ment t hat someone had br oken i nt o a

pol i ce vehi cl e t hat had been l ef t at t he shop f or r epai r . Af t er

exami ni ng t he vehi cl e, pol i ce di scover ed t hat sever al bul l et pr oof

vest s wer e mi ssi ng. I n ear l y J ul y, t he depar t ment l ear ned t hr ough

a cooper at i ng wi t ness t hat Fi sh was of f er i ng t o sel l si x

bul l et pr oof vest s. An under cover of f i cer cont act ed Fi sh t hr ough

t he cooper at i ng wi t ness and pur chased f i ve vest s, whi ch t he

depar t ment af t er war ds i dent i f i ed as f i ve of t he vest s t hat had been

st ol en f r om i t s vehi cl e. The vest s, manuf act ur ed out si de

Massachuset t s, had t r avel ed i nt er st at e f or sal e i n t he

Commonweal t h.

A f eder al gr and j ur y event ual l y ret ur ned an i ndi ct ment

char gi ng Fi sh wi t h a si ngl e count of possessi ng body ar mor i n

vi ol at i on of 18 U. S. C. § 931( a) , t he f eder al body ar mor st at ut e,

whi ch pr ohi bi t s any per son who "has been convi ct ed of a f el ony t hat

i s . . . a cri me of vi ol ence ( as def i ned i n [ secti on 16] ) " f r om

possessi ng body ar mor t hat has been "sol d or of f er ed f or sal e[ ] i n

i nt er st at e or f or ei gn commer ce. " See al so 18 U. S. C. §§ 921( a) ( 35) .

Fi sh moved t o di smi ss t he i ndi ct ment , cl ai mi ng t hat none of hi s

pr i or convi ct i ons qual i f i ed as a "cr i me of vi ol ence" under

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sect i on 16, and t hat t he body ar mor st at ut e was unconst i t ut i onal .

I n r esponse, t he gover nment ar gued t hat Fi sh' s convi ct i ons f or

assaul t and bat t ery wi t h a danger ous weapon and breaki ng and

ent er i ng al l qual i f i ed as cr i mes of vi ol ence under sect i on 16, and

t hat t he body ar mor st at ut e was const i t ut i onal .

The di st r i ct cour t deni ed t he mot i on t o di smi ss, f i ndi ng

t hat " [ a] t a mi ni mum, t he convi ct i ons f or br eaki ng and ent er i ng

sat i sf y t he r equi r ement [ s of sect i on 16] . " The cour t al so r ej ect ed

Fi sh' s chal l enge t o t he const i t ut i onal i t y of t he body ar mor

st at ut e. Fi sh ent er ed a condi t i onal gui l t y pl ea under Rul e

11( a) ( 2) of t he Feder al Rul es of Cr i mi nal Pr ocedur e, pr eser vi ng hi s

r i ght t o chal l enge on appeal t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of hi s

mot i on t o di smi ss t he i ndi ct ment . On J une 7, 2012, t he di st r i ct

cour t ent er ed a f i nal j udgment , sent enci ng Fi sh t o f or t y- ei ght

mont hs' pr obat i on, wi t h t en mont hs t o be served i n a communi t y

cor r ecti ons f aci l i t y. Thi s appeal f ol l owed.

II. Standard of Review

Whet her a pr i or convi ct i on i s a qual i f yi ng of f ense under

sect i on 16 i s a quest i on of l aw t hat we r evi ew de novo. See Agui ar

v. Gonzal es, 438 F. 3d 86, 88 ( 1st Ci r . 2006) .

III. Analysis

The di f f i cul t y posed by t hi s and si mi l ar cases ar i ses

f r omt he f act t hat t her e i s no mast er l i st of of f enses t hat qual i f y

as cr i mes of vi ol ence. Rat her , sect i on 16 set s f or t h t wo

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qual i t at i ve def i ni t i ons of t he t er m"cri me of vi ol ence, " l eavi ng i t

t o t he cour t s t o measur e each cr i me agai nst t hese def i ni t i ons,

whi ch r ead as f ol l ows:

( a) an of f ense t hat has as an el ement t he use,at t empt ed use, or t hr eat ened use of physi cal f or ceagai nst t he per son or pr oper t y of anot her , or

( b) any ot her of f ense t hat i s a f el ony and t hat , byi t s nat ur e, i nvol ves a subst ant i al r i sk t hat physi calf orce agai nst t he per son or pr oper t y of another may beused i n t he cour se of commi t t i ng t he of f ense.

18 U. S. C. § 16.

The candi dat es f or sat i sf yi ng t hese def i ni t i ons ar e

l egi on and var i ed. Each st at e def i nes i t s own cr i mes, gener al l y

wi t hout r ef er ence t o ( and of t en, we pr esume, wi t hout knowl edge of )

t he sect i on 16 def i ni t i ons. Si mi l ar - soundi ng cr i mes may have

di f f er ent el ement s f r om st at e t o st at e. E. g. , Sykes v. Uni t ed

St at es, 131 S. Ct . 2267, 2295 ( 2011) ( Kagan, J . , di ssent i ng) . The

el ement s of each cr i me may be def i ned by st at ut e, e. g. , Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 266, § 16, or by case l aw, e. g. , Commonweal t h v. Bur no,

396 Mass 622, 625 ( 1986) ( di scussi ng t he el ement s of Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 265, § 15A) .

Compoundi ng the di f f i cul t y of wor ki ng wi t h sect i on 16' s

t wo qual i t at i ve def i ni t i ons i s t he f act t hat Congr ess has al so

adopt ed an ent i r el y separ at e, but qui t e si mi l ar , def i ni t i on of t he

t er m "vi ol ent f el ony" as used i n t he Ar med Car eer Cr i mi nal Act , 18

U. S. C. § 924( e) ( "ACCA") . ACCA def i nes "vi ol ent f el ony" as

f ol l ows:

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[ T] he t er m "vi ol ent f el ony" means any cr i mepuni shabl e by i mpr i sonment f or a t ermexceedi ng one year. . . t hat

( i ) has as an el ement t he use, at t empt ed use, ort hr eat ened use of physi cal f or ce agai nst t he per son of

another ; or

( i i ) i s bur gl ar y, ar son, or ext or t i on, i nvol ves use of expl osi ves, or ot her wi se i nvol ves conduct t hat pr esent sa ser i ous pot ent i al r i sk of physi cal i nj ur y t o anot her .

The par t i al l y over l appi ng, t wo- pronged def i ni t i ons of t he

t er ms "cr i me of vi ol ence" and "vi ol ent f el ony" have gi ven r i se t o

mul t i pl e l i nes of pr ecedent , each of f er i ng bot h t he advant ages and

t he l i mi t at i ons of cross- over appl i cat i on by anal ogy. E. g. , Uni t ed

St at es v. Leahy, 473 F. 3d 401, 412 ( 1st Ci r . 2007) ( not i ng t hat

al t hough we and t he Supr eme Cour t have t r eat ed t he "r i sk of

physi cal i nj ur y" provi si ons as r eachi ng conduct beyond t he scope of

sect i on 16( b) , nei t her our deci si ons nor t he Supr eme Cour t ' s " i n

any way suggest [ ] t hat t he r ever se i s t r ue" ) . Addi ng f ur t her

i nsi ght , but per haps f ur t her conf usi on as wel l , t he Uni t ed St at es

Sent enci ng Gui del i nes def i ne the t er m "cr i me of vi ol ence" usi ng

l anguage t hat i s al most , but not qui t e, t he same as t he l anguage

t hat ACCA uses to def i ne t he t er m "vi ol ent f el ony. " See U. S. S. G.

§ 4B1. 2 ( def i ni ng "cr i me of vi ol ence" under t he car eer of f ender

gui del i ne) ; compar e Uni t ed St at es v. Wi l l i ngs, 588 F. 3d 56, 58 n. 2

( 1st Ci r . 2009) ( " [ T] he t er ms ' cr i me of vi ol ence' under t he car eer

of f ender gui del i ne and ' vi ol ent f el ony' under t he ACCA ar e near l y

i dent i cal i n meani ng, so t hat deci si ons const r ui ng one t er m i nf or m

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t he const r uct i on of t he ot her . " ) wi t h Uni t ed St at es v. Gi ggey, 551

F. 3d 27, 36 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) ( en banc) ( poi nt i ng out di f f er ences) .

A t hi r d and gr eat er compl exi t y ar i ses f r om t he f act t hat

many cr i mes ar e def i ned i n a manner broad enough t o cover bot h

conduct t hat cl ear l y meet s one or bot h of t he sect i on 16

def i ni t i ons and conduct t hat cl ear l y does not . For exampl e, i n

Massachuset t s, t he br oad def i ni t i on of si mpl e assaul t and bat t er y

encompasses bot h a devast at i ng beat i ng and a t ap on t he shoul der .

See gener al l y Uni t ed St at es v. Hol l oway, 630 F. 3d 252 ( 1st Ci r .

2011) ( di scussi ng t he Massachuset t s s i mpl e assaul t and bat t er y

statute).

The Supreme Cour t has grappl ed r epeat edl y wi t h t hi s t hi r d

compl exi t y, est abl i shi ng and t hen r ef i ni ng a set of r ul es t o be

empl oyed i n cl assi f yi ng a def endant ' s pr i or of f enses of convi ct i on.

These r ul es der i ve i n great par t f r om t he need t o honor t he

r equi r ement s of t he Si xt h Amendment ' s ri ght t o j ur y t r i al . Thei r

pr i nci pal pur pose i s t o ensur e that bef or e we send a per son t o j ai l

f or doi ng "X, " ei t her t he per son must admi t t o "X" or a j ur y ( or

j ury- wai ved cour t ) must convi ct t he person of doi ng "X" f ol l owi ng

a f ai r t r i al . See Shepar d v. Uni t ed St at es, 544 U. S. 13, 24

( 2005) .

The f i r st set of r ul es t o be appl i ed f or ms what i s known

as t he "cat egor i cal " appr oach. Agui ar v. Gonzal es, 438 F. 3d 86, 88

( 1st Ci r . 2006) . The cat egor i cal appr oach r equi r es an assessment

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of "t he el ement s of t he st at ut e of convi ct i on, not . . . t he f act s

of each def endant ' s conduct . " Tayl or v. Uni t ed St at es, 495 U. S.

575, 601 ( 1990) . I n ot her wor ds, wi t hout r egar d t o t he speci f i c

f act s of each def endant ' s of f ense, we compare the el ement s of t he

cr i me f or whi ch t he def endant was pr evi ousl y convi ct ed wi t h

Congr ess' s def i ni t i on of t he t ype of cr i me t hat may ser ve as a

pr edi cat e of f ense. Under t hi s appr oach, we " l ook[ ] onl y t o t he

st at ut or y def i ni t i on of t he st at e cri me and t he f act of convi ct i on

t o det er mi ne whet her t he conduct cr i mi nal i zed by t he st atut e,

i ncl udi ng t he most i nnocent conduct , qual i f i es as a cr i me of

vi ol ence. " Kar i mi v. Hol der , 715 F. 3d 561, 567 ( 4t h Ci r . 2013)

( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ; see al so Agui ar , 438 F. 3d at

89. For exampl e, i f a st at e def i nes t he el ement s of bur gl ar y so as

not t o requi r e unl awf ul ent r y, such t hat i t s st at ut e encompasses

bot h shopl i f t i ng and a cl assi c mi dni ght br eak- i n of a bank, t hen

under t he cat egor i cal appr oach a convi ct i on under t hat l aw i s not

consi der ed t o be a convi ct i on f or so- cal l ed "gener i c" bur gl ar y.

Descamps v. Uni t ed St at es, 133 S. Ct . 2276, 2281, 2293 (2013)

( def i ni ng t he "gener i c" ver si on of a cr i me as " t he of f ense as

commonl y underst ood") ; Shepard, 544 U. S. at 16- 18. 1

1 I n t he cont ext of st at ut es ot her t han sect i on 16, cour t sar e occasi onal l y t asked wi t h def i ni ng an of f ense by t he f ul l r angeof conduct i t pr oscr i bes, i nqui r i ng not i nt o whet her t hat conducti s over br oad, but i nst ead i nt o whet her i t "t ypi cal l y" i nvol vescer t ai n char act er i st i cs. See Begay v. Uni t ed St at es, 553 U. S. 137( 2008) .

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A second set of r ul es r ecogni zes an except i on t o the

cat egor i cal appr oach. I f an of f ense' s el ement s ar e over br oad- - i f ,

t hat i s, t hey encompass conduct t hat does not r equi r e al l t he

el ement s necessary t o r ender t he of f ense a pr edi cate- - we are

somet i mes aut hor i zed to appl y t he "modi f i ed" cat egor i cal appr oach.

Under t hat appr oach, we f i r st det er mi ne whet her t he pr i or

convi ct i on t ook pl ace under a "di vi si bl e" st at ut e. Descamps, 133

S. Ct . at 2281- 82. A st at ut e i s di vi si bl e i f i t set s f or t h one or

mor e el ement s of a par t i cul ar of f ense i n t he al t er nat i ve. I d. ( "[ A

di vi si bl e] st at ut e set s out one or mor e el ement s of t he of f ense i n

t he al t er nat i ve- - f or exampl e, st at i ng t hat bur gl ar y i nvol ves ent r y

i nt o a bui l di ng or an aut omobi l e. " ) . When conf r ont ed wi t h such a

st at ut e, we are per mi t t ed t o " consul t a l i mi t ed cl ass of document s,

such as i ndi ct ment s and j ur y i nst r uct i ons, t o det er mi ne whi ch

al t er nat i ve f or med t he basi s of t he def endant ' s pr i or convi ct i on. "

I d. ; see al so Shepar d, 544 U. S. at 17, 26. We t hen anal yze t he

pr i or convi ct i on not i n r el at i on t o al l t he st at ut e' s el ement s, but

i nst ead i n r el at i on onl y t o the nar r ower subset of el ement s t hat

act ual l y gave r i se t o t he convi ct i on. E. g. , Descamps, 133 S. Ct .

at 2281- 82.

Thi r d, i n assess i ng whether t he el ements of t he candi dat e

pr oposed as a pr edi cat e cr i me ar e over br oad, we need not consi der

f anci f ul , hypot het i cal scenar i os. See Gonzal es v. Duenas- Al var ez,

549 U. S. 183, 193 ( 2007) ( " [ T] o f i nd t hat a st at e st at ut e cr eat es

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a cr i me out si de t he gener i c def i ni t i on of a l i st ed cr i me i n a

f eder al st at ut e r equi r es mor e t han t he appl i cat i on of l egal

i magi nat i on t o a st at e st at ut e' s l anguage. I t r equi r es a r eal i st i c

pr obabi l i t y, not a t heor et i cal possi bi l i t y, t hat t he St at e woul d

appl y i t s st at ut e . . . . ") ; see al so J ames v. Uni t ed St at es, 550

U. S. 192, 208 ( 2007) ( "We do not vi ew [ t he cat egor i cal appr oach] as

r equi r i ng t hat ever y concei vabl e f act ual of f ense cover ed by a

st at ut e must necessar i l y pr esent a ser i ous pot ent i al r i sk of i nj ur y

bef or e t he of f ense can be deemed a vi ol ent f el ony. " ) . But t he t wo

appr oaches r emai n st r i ngent : t hey ar e gover ned by t he basi c

pr i nci pl e t hat a st at e' s def i ni t i on of a cri me i s over br oad i f i t s

el ement s al l ow f or a convi ct i on wi t hout sat i sf yi ng t he el ement s

Congr ess has pr ovi ded t o def i ne t he r equi r ed pr edi cat e of f ense.

See gener al l y Descamps, 133 S. Ct . at 2283- 85 ( " [ I ] f t he st at ut e

sweeps more br oadl y t han t he gener i c cr i me, a convi ct i on under t hat

l aw cannot count as an ACCA pr edi cat e, even i f t he def endant

act ual l y commi t t ed t he of f ense i n i t s gener i c f or m. ") ; Tayl or , 495

U. S. at 599 ( "I f t he st at e st at ut e i s nar r ower t han t he gener i c

vi ew . . . t he convi ct i on necessar i l y i mpl i es t hat t he def endant

has been f ound gui l t y of al l t he el ement s of gener i c bur gl ar y. And

i f t he def endant was convi ct ed of bur gl ar y i n a St at e wher e t he

gener i c def i ni t i on has been adopt ed, wi t h mi nor var i at i ons i n

t er mi nol ogy, t hen t he t r i al cour t need f i nd onl y t hat t he st at e

st atut e cor r esponds i n subst ance t o t he gener i c meani ng of

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bur gl ar y. " ) . Wi t h t hese r ul es i n mi nd, we t ur n now t o anal yzi ng

whether any of t he f our cr i mes t o whi ch the government poi nt s

qual i f i es as a cr i me of vi ol ence under sect i on 16.

A. Daytime and Nighttime Breaking and Entering

Because t he di st r i ct cour t based i t s j udgment on Fi sh' s

pr i or convi ct i ons f or "B&E Dayt i me Fel ony" under an uni dent i f i ed

st at ut e and f or br eaki ng and ent er i ng a bui l di ng i n t he ni ght t i me

wi t h the i nt ent t o commi t a f el ony, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266,

§ 16, we begi n our anal ysi s by consi der i ng t he appl i cabi l i t y of

sect i on 16 t o t hese of f enses. The gover nment ' s br i ef on appeal

ar gues t hat even t hough t he recor ds of t he f or mer convi ct i on st at e

onl y t hat Fi sh was convi ct ed of a "B&E Dayt i me, " one coul d concl ude

f r om t hem t hat Fi sh had been convi ct ed under a st at ut e, Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 266, § 17, whi ch requi r es as an el ement t hat a per son

l awf ul l y i n t he st r uct ur e br oken i nt o have been put i n f ear .

Bef ore or al argument , however , t he government submi t t ed a Rul e

28( j ) l et t er i n whi ch i t wi t hdr ew t hat i nt er pr et at i on of t he

r ecor ds of convi ct i on. Then, at or al ar gument , t he gover nment sai d

i t had " t r oubl e maki ng sense of " t he r ecor ds of convi ct i on as t hey

r el at ed t o t he st at ut e, ul t i mat el y concedi ng t hat we shoul d anal yze

t he l east cul pabl e conduct t hat qual i f i es as dayt i me B&E, see

Agui ar v. Gonzal es, 438 F. 3d 86, 88 ( 1st Ci r . 2006) . Because t hat

conduct over l aps i n al l mat er i al r espect s wi t h ni ght t i me B&E, we

anal yze t he t wo of f enses t ogether .

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Bot h dayt i me and ni ght t i me B&E may be commi t t ed by

br eaki ng i nt o a "bui l di ng, shi p, vessel or vehi cl e. " I d. at § 16;

see al so i d. at § 18 ( " . . . bui l di ng, shi p or mot or vehi cl e or

vessel . . . " ) . Presumabl y because t he br eaki ng need not i nvol ve

t he use of f or ce, e. g. , Commonweal t h v. Bur ke, 392 Mass. 688, 688-

90 ( 1984) , but i nst ead may i nvol ve si mpl y wal ki ng t hr ough an

unl ocked door , see Commonweal t h v. Ti l l ey, 355 Mass. 507, 508

( 1969) , t he gover nment does not argue t hat ei t her of Fi sh’ s B&E

convi ct i ons qual i f i es as a cr i me of vi ol ence under sect i on 16( a) ,

whi ch i s l i mi t ed t o f el oni es havi ng "as an el ement , " t he "use,

at t empt ed use, or t hr eat ened use of physi cal f or ce. " We t her ef or e

l i mi t our anal ysi s t o sect i on 16( b) , whi ch appl i es t o al l f el oni es

t hat , by t hei r nat ur e, "i nvol ve[ ] a subst ant i al r i sk t hat physi cal

f orce agai nst t he per son or pr oper t y of another may be used. "

Though t he appl i cabi l i t y of sect i on 16( b) t o t he t wo

Massachuset t s B&E of f enses i s a quest i on of f i r st i mpr essi on i n

t hi s ci r cui t , our anal ysi s does not t ake pl ace on a bl ank sl at e. I n

Uni t ed St ates v. Br own, 631 F. 3d 573 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) , we anal yzed

t he ni ght t i me B&E st at ut e and hel d t hat , even as nar r owed under t he

modi f i ed appr oach t o i ncl ude onl y "ni ght - t i me bur gl ar y of a

bui l di ng, " ni ght t i me B&E di d not qual i f y as a "cr i me of vi ol ence"

under t he r esi dual cl ause of t he car eer of f ender pr ovi si on of t he

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sent enci ng gui del i nes, U. S. S. G. § 4B1. 2. 2 A year l at er , we hel d i n

Uni t ed St at es v. Far r el l , 672 F. 3d 27, 37 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) , t hat i n

l i ght of Br own, a di st r i ct cour t had commi t t ed pl ai n er r or by

hol di ng that Massachuset t s' sect i on 18, t he dayt i me B&E st at ut e,

was a "vi ol ent f el ony" under t he Ar med Career Cr i mi nal Act , 18

U. S. C. § 924( e) .

We based our hol di ng i n Br own al most ent i r el y on t he

br eadt h of t he "bui l di ng" el ement under Massachuset t s l aw.

Acknowl edgi ng t hat t he t er m "i ncl udes not j ust st or es and of f i ce

bui l di ngs but an ar r ay of st r uct ur es- - det ached gar ages and st or age

f aci l i t i es, f or exampl e- - t hat may i nvi t e t hef t of pr oper t y but

woul d onl y rar el y expose i ndi vi dual s t o vi ol ence, " we f ound t he

"t hr eat of vi ol ence" i n "so br oadl y def i ned a uni ver se" t o be

"f ai r l y specul at i ve. " 631 F. 3d at 79. Then, i n Far r el l , when we

consi der ed t he "bui l di ng" el ement al ongsi de the possi bi l i t y of

"shi p" and "vessel " br eak- i ns, we f ound t hat t he Br own r at i onal e

"appl i e[ d] wi t h even more f orce. " 672 F. 3d at 35. We noted t hat

"happeni ng upon a per son i s f ar l ess l i kel y t o t ake pl ace whi l e

br eaki ng and ent er i ng a vessel t han i t i s whi l e bur gl ar i zi ng a

bui l di ng. " I d. at 37.

2 The gui del i nes pr ovi si on cover s any of f ense t hat " i sbur gl ar y of a dwel l i ng, ar son, or ext or t i on, i nvol ves use of expl osi ves, or ot her wi se i nvol ves conduct t hat pr esent s a ser i ouspot ent i al r i sk of physi cal i nj ur y t o anot her . " I d.

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The gover nment concedes t he cor r ect ness of Br own and

Far r el l , but asks us t o l i mi t t hose hol di ngs on t he gr ound t hat ,

unl i ke sect i on 16( b) , nei t her ACCA nor t he gui del i nes pr ovi si on

t akes account of t he r i sk of t he use of f or ce agai nst pr oper t y.

Thi s i s a f ai r poi nt . The probl em, t hough, i s t hat t he

Massachuset t s of f ense pl ai nl y does not r equi r e any conduct t hat

i nvol ves or subst ant i al l y r i sks t he use of f or ce agai nst pr oper t y.

Rat her , i t r eaches such non- f or cef ul act s as wal ki ng t hr ough an

unl ocked door wi t hout per mi ssi on. See Ti l l ey, 355 Mass. at 508

( " I n thi s Commonweal t h t he openi ng of a cl osed but unl ocked door or

wi ndow i s a br eaki ng. " ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ) . And

si nce we ar e l i mi t ed t o our common sense- - t he gover nment has gi ven

us not hi ng el se on whi ch t o rel y- - we must vi ew i t as ent i r el y

pl ausi bl e t hat t he of f ense f r equent l y i nvol ves such conduct ( whi ch

i s presumabl y why pol i ce f r equent l y remi nd pr oper t y owner s t o l ock

door s and wi ndows) .

Thi s concl usi on l i kewi se dooms t he gover nment ' s f i nal

ar gument , t hat we shoul d wr i t e of f as not t he "ordi nar y case" any

appl i cat i on of t he Massachuset t s st at ut es t o conduct t hat does not

pose t he r el evant r i sks. Wi t hout an empi r i cal f oundat i on f or i t s

pr oposed appl i cat i on of t he "ordi nar y case" appr oach, t he

gover nment di r ect s our at t ent i on t o t he Supr eme Cour t ’ s suggest i on

i n Leocal v. Ashcrof t , 543 U. S. 1, 10 ( 2004) , t hat gener i c bur gl ar y

i s the pr ot ot ypi cal sect i on 16( b) of f ense. At or al ar gument , t he

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gover nment pr essed t he anal ogy t o Leocal , i mpl yi ng that Leocal ' s

di scussi on had t ur ned on t he r i sk of vi ol ence t o pr oper t y. But

t hat opi ni on, t hough i t di scussed sect i on 16( b) i n gr eat dept h, di d

no such t hi ng. Rather , t he Supr eme Cour t suggest ed t hat bur gl ary

of a bui l di ng i s a sect i on 16 of f ense because i t "i nvol ves a

subst ant i al r i sk t hat t he bur gl ar wi l l use f or ce agai nst a vi ct i m, "

not because i t r ai ses any concer n about har mt o pr oper t y. I d. And

si nce we al r eady hel d i n Br own and Far r el l t hat t he br eaki ng and

ent er i ng st at ut es at i ssue her e ar e br oader t han gener i c bur gl ar y

and do not pr esent a requi si t e r i sk of t he t ype wi t h whi ch Leocal

was i n f act concer ned- - t hat i s, t he r i sk of har m t o per sons- - we

f ai l t o see how Leocal suppor t s t he gover nment ’ s posi t i on.

Havi ng t wi ce determi ned t hat t he Massachuset t s breaki ng

and ent er i ng st at ut es, appl yi ng as t hey do to nonvi ol ent ent r i es of

r ar el y- occupi ed st r uct ur es t hr ough unl ocked door s or wi ndows, do

not necessari l y i nvol ve conduct t hat woul d pose a r i sk of physi cal

i nj ur y or of t he use of f or ce, we now hol d t hat Fi sh' s pr i or

convi ct i ons f or dayt i me B&E and ni ght t i me B&E ar e not cat egor i cal l y

cr i mes of vi ol ence under sect i on 16( b) .

B. Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon

The next of f ense t o whi ch t he gover nment poi nt s i s t he

Massachuset t s cr i me of assaul t and bat t ery wi t h a dangerous weapon

( "ABDW") , Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A( b) . The name of t hi s

of f ense mar ks i t as a st r ong candi dat e f or cl assi f i cat i on as a

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cr i me of vi ol ence. I ndeed, convi ct i ons f or ABDW of t en ar i se f r om

t he i nt ent i onal use of danger ous f or ce agai nst anot her , causi ng

ser i ous i nj ur y. E. g. , Commonweal t h v. Vi ck, 454 Mass. 418 ( 2009)

( shoot i ng wi t h i nt ent t o mur der and causi ng ser i ous bodi l y i nj ur y) .

The gover nment , wi t h good r eason, never t hel ess decl i nes

t o ar gue t hat ABDW qual i f i es under sect i on 16( a) . As we have

not ed, sect i on 16( a) r equi r es t hat a pr edi cat e of f ense have "as an

el ement t he use, at t empt ed use, or t hr eatened use of physi cal

f or ce. " The Supr eme Cour t r ecent l y hel d, i n t he cont ext of ACCA' s

f or ce cl ause, 18 U. S. C. § 924( e) ( 2) ( B) ( i ) , t hat "t he phr ase

' physi cal f or ce' means vi ol ent f or ce, " see J ohnson v. Uni t ed

St ates, 559 U. S. 133, 140 ( 2010) , and we see no reason to t hi nk t he

same woul d not appl y t o t he same phr ase i n sect i on 16( a) . And

si nce ABDW may be accompl i shed by a mere "t ouchi ng, however

sl i ght , " see Uni t ed St at es v. Har t , 674 F. 3d 33, 42 ( 1st Ci r .

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2012) , i t does not have "as an el ement t he use" of physi cal f or ce. 3

As a r esul t , i t i s over br oad.

The gover nment t heref or e f ocuses i t s ar gument on sect i on

16( b) , whi ch cont ai ns no r equi r ement t hat vi ol ent f or ce be

empl oyed. Sect i on 16( b) does, however , r equi r e a "subst ant i al

r i sk" t hat physi cal f or ce "may be used" i n t he cour se of commi t t i ng

an of f ense. I n t heor y, i t mi ght be possi bl e t o const r ue t he

r ef er ence t o t he "use[ ] " of f or ce so br oadl y as t o encompass

of f enses i nvol vi ng st r i ct l i abi l i t y, negl i gence, or r eckl essness,

so l ong as some adequate l evel of vi ol ent i mpact wer e i nvol ved.

J ust such a const r uct i on was urged on t he Supreme Cour t i n Leocal

v. Ashcrof t , 543 U. S. 1, 9 ( 2004) , a sect i on 16( b) case i nvol vi ng

a Fl or i da convi ct i on f or dr i vi ng under t he i nf l uence and causi ng

3 As we expl ai ned i n Har t ,

Massachuset t s ABDWmay be commi t t ed ( 1) i nt ent i onal l y or( 2) want onl y or r eckl essl y. The f or mer t heor y r equi r est he i nt ent i onal and unj ust i f i ed use of f or ce upon t heper son of anot her , however sl i ght . The l at t er cal l s f ort he i nt ent i onal commi ssi on of a want on or r eckl ess act( somethi ng more t han gr oss negl i gence) causi ng physi calor bodi l y i nj ur y t o anot her . I n t he case of r eckl ess orwant on ABDW, t he vi ct i m' s i nj ury must be more t hant r ansi ent or t r i f l i ng and sever e enough t o i nt er f er e wi t hheal t h or comf or t .

674 F. 3d at 43 n. 7 ( ci t at i ons and i nt er nal quot at i on mar ksomi t t ed) . Bot h t heor i es of ABDW r equi r e t hat t he of f ense i nvol vet he empl oyment of a dangerous weapon, but t he def i ni t i on of "dangerous weapon" i ncl udes bot h i t ems t hat are dangerous " per se"and ot her wi se i nnocuous i t ems t hat , as used, are "capabl e of pr oduci ng ser i ous bodi l y har m. " I d. at 42- 43 ( ci t at i on andi nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) .

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bodi l y i nj ur y. The Cour t , however , r ej ect ed t he gover nment ' s

argument t hat " t he ' use' of f orce does not i ncorporate any mens r ea

component . " I d. Rat her , i t r easoned, "' use' r equi r es act i ve

empl oyment , " because "[ w] hi l e one may, i n theory, act i vel y empl oy

somet hi ng i n an acci dent al manner , i t i s much l ess nat ur al t o say

t hat a per son act i vel y empl oys physi cal f or ce agai nst anot her

per son by acci dent . " I d. at 9- 10 ( emphasi s i n or i gi nal ) . Al t hough

t he Supr eme Cour t expl i ci t l y l i mi t ed i t s r easoni ng t o negl i gence-

or - l ess cr i mes, Leocal ' s r at i onal e woul d seem t o appl y equal l y t o

cr i mes encompassi ng r eckl ess conduct wher ei n f orce i s brought t o

bear acci dent al l y, r at her t han bei ng act i vel y empl oyed. I t i s

t her ef or e not sur pr i si ng t hat our si st er ci r cui t s have concl uded,

wi t h st r i ki ng uni f or mi t y, t hat sect i on 16( b) does not r each

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r eckl essness of f enses. 4 On t he f or ce of Leocal ' s l ogi c, we hol d

t he same.

So t he key quest i on i s whether Massachuset t s ABDWal l ows

convi ct i ons based on mer e r eckl essness. The answer i s cl ear l y yes,

as l ong as t he r eckl essness causes non- t r i vi al bodi l y har m. E. g. ,

Commonweal t h v. Bur no, 396 Mass. 622 ( 1986) . I ndeed, " [ i ] n

Massachuset t s, conduct t hat under l i es a convi ct i on f or oper at i ng

under t he i nf l uence and causi ng ser i ous bodi l y i nj ur y may al so be

4

See J obson v. Ashcr of t , 326 F. 3d 367, 373 ( 2d Ci r . 2003) ; Tr an v. Gonzal es, 414 F. 3d 464, 469- 70 ( 3d Ci r . 2005) ( " [ U] se of f or ce i s an i nt ent i onal act . ") ; Bej ar ano- Ur r ut i a v. Gonzal es, 413F. 3d 444, 447 ( 4t h Ci r . 2005) ( " [ T] he concl usi on of t he LeocalCour t t hat ' i n no or di nar y or nat ur al sense can i t be sai d t hat aper son r i sks have to use physi cal f or ce agai nst anot her per son i nt he cour se of oper at i ng a vehi cl e whi l e i nt oxi cat ed and causi ngi nj ur y' st r ongl y i ndi cat es t hat t he r esul t i n Leocal woul d havebeen t he same even had a vi ol at i on of t he st atut e t her e at i ssuer equi r ed reckl essness r at her t han mer e negl i gence. " ) ; Uni t ed St at esv. Chapa- Gar za, 243 F. 3d 921 ( 5t h Ci r . 2001) ( f el ony dr i vi ng whi l ei nt oxi cat ed does not qual i f y under sect i on 16 because i t does not

necessar i l y i nvol ve i nt ent i onal use of f or ce or r eckl essness as t ot he possi bi l i t y of i nt ent i onal use of f or ce) ; Uni t ed St at es v.Por t el a, 469 F. 3d 496 ( 6t h Ci r . 2006) ( " [ A] cr i me r equi r i ng onl yr eckl essness does not qual i f y as a ' cr i me of vi ol ence' under 18U. S. C. § 16. " ) ; J i menez- Gonzal ez v. Mukasey, 548 F. 3d 557, 560 ( 7t hCi r . 2008) ( "Today we j oi n our si st er ci r cui t s and hol d t hatr eckl ess cr i mes ar e not cr i mes of vi ol ence under Sect i on 16( b) " ) ;Uni t ed St at es v. Tor r es- Vi l l al obos, 487 F. 3d 607, 615 ( 8t h Ci r .2007) ( r eckl ess mansl aught er not a "cr i me of vi ol ence" af t erLeocal ) ; Fer nandez- Rui z v. Gonzal es, 466 F. 3d 1121, 1129- 30 ( 9t hCi r . 2006) ( ci t ed i n Covar r ubi as Tepost e v. Hol der , 632 F. 3d 1049( 9t h Ci r . 2010) ( i nt ent i onal l y di schar gi ng f i r ear m wi t h r eckl ess

di sr egar d as t o whet her i t wi l l hi t an i nhabi t ed dwel l i ng i s not acr i me of vi ol ence) ) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Zuni ga- Sot o, 527 F. 3d 1110,1124 ( 10t h Ci r . 2008) ( " [ R] eckl essness f al l s i nt o t he cat egor y of acci dent al conduct t hat t he Leocal Cour t descr i bed as f ai l i ng t osat i sf y t he use of physi cal f or ce r equi r ement under ei t her of § 16' s def i ni t i ons of ' cr i me of vi ol ence. ' ") ; Uni t ed St at es v.Pal omi no Garci a, 606 F. 3d 1317, 1335- 36 (11t h Ci r . 2010) .

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charged as ABDW. " Hart , 674 F. 3d at 43 n. 8 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) . The

gover nment does not chal l enge t he accur acy of t hi s descr i pt i on of

Massachuset t s ABDW. I nst ead, t he government argues t hat , i n f act ,

Massachuset t s ABDW i s t ypi cal l y appl i ed t o conduct i nvol vi ng t he

act i ve empl oyment of f orce agai nst another , so we shoul d si mpl y

i gnor e, as not t he "or di nar y case, " convi ct i ons i nvol vi ng mer e

r eckl essness.

I n suppor t of t hi s posi t i on, t he gover nment r el i es on

Uni t ed St at es v. Har t , 674 F. 3d 33, 41- 44 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) , i n whi ch

we det er mi ned that Massachuset t s ABDW qual i f i es as a "vi ol ent

f el ony" under ACCA' s r esi dual cl ause. I n anal yzi ng ACCA' s

appl i cabi l i t y t o t he ABDW of f ense, we f i r st f ound t hat ABDW posed

a "ser i ous r i sk of i nj ur y, compar abl e t o t he degr ee of r i sk posed

by [ ACCA' s] enumer at ed of f enses. " I d. Cl ear l y ABDW does, i n al l

of i t s appl i cat i ons ( and t hus i n t he "ordi nar y case, " see J ames v.

Uni t ed St at es, 550 U. S. 192, 208 ( 2007) ) , pose such a r i sk- - even i n

i t s r eckl ess f or m, whi ch expr essl y r equi r es i nj ur y t hat i s "mor e

t han t r ansi ent . " Bur no, 396 Mass. at 627; see al so Uni t ed St at es

v. Gl over , 558 F. 3d 71, 81 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) ( concl udi ng t hat because

ABDW r equi r es as an el ement t hat a def endant have ef f ect ed a

t ouchi ng wi t h a danger ous weapon, t he of f ense "i nel uct abl y poses a

ser i ous pot ent i al r i sk of physi cal i nj ur y") . Equal l y cl ear l y, and

cont r ar y to t he di ssent ' s suggest i on t hat sect i on 16( b) "does not

di f f er f r om t he ACCA' s r esi dual cl ause i n any r el evant r espect s, "

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see Di ssent i ng Op. at 43, t hi s i s not t he r i sk t hat must be

assessed i n a sect i on 16( b) anal ysi s. See Leocal , 543 U. S. at 10

n. 7 ( hol di ng t hat sect i on 16( b) "pl ai nl y does not encompass al l

of f enses whi ch creat e a ' subst ant i al r i sk' t hat i nj ur y wi l l r esul t

f r om a per son' s conduct" , because "[ t ] he ' subst ant i al r i sk' i n

§ 16( b) r el at es t o t he use of f or ce, not t o t he possi bl e ef f ect of

a per son' s conduct " ) ; Agui ar , 438 F. 3d at 88.

Havi ng det er mi ned t hat ABDW posed a suf f i ci ent r i sk of

i nj ur y t o qual i f y under ACCA' s r esi dual cl ause, we pr oceeded,

pur suant t o t he Supr eme Cour t ' s anal ysi s i n Begay v. Uni t ed St at es,

553 U. S. 137, 142 ( 2008) , t o i nqui r e i nt o whet her ABDWwas " r oughl y

si mi l ar i n ki nd t o t he [ of f enses enumer at ed i n ACCA' s r esi dual

cl ause] . " Har t , 674 F. 3d at 43- 44; see al so Begay, 553 U. S. at 143

( " [ T] o gi ve ef f ect t o ever y cl ause and wor d [ of 18 U. S. C.

§ 924( e) ( 2) ( B) ( i i ) ] , we shoul d r ead t he [ exampl e cr i mes i n sect i on

924( e) ( 2) ( B) ( i i ) ] as l i mi t i ng t he cri mes t hat cl ause ( i i ) cover s t o

cr i mes t hat ar e r oughl y si mi l ar , i n ki nd as wel l as i n degr ee of

r i sk posed, t o t he exampl es t hemsel ves. " ( i nt er nal ci t at i on and

quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ) . I n or der t o sat i sf y Begay' s test f or

"r ough[ ] " si mi l ar i t y t o bur gl ar y, ar son, ext or t i on, and cri mes

i nvol vi ng t he use of expl osi ves- - cr i mes t hat ar e l i st ed i n ACCA,

but not i n sect i on 16( b) - - an of f ense must "t ypi cal l y i nvol ve

pur posef ul , vi ol ent and aggr essi ve conduct . " Har t , 674 F. 3d at 43-

44 ( quot i ng Begay, 553 U. S. at 144- 45) ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks

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omi t t ed) . Over pr ot est f r om t he def endant t o t he ef f ect t hat ABDW

i s occasi onal l y appl i ed t o r eckl ess conduct- - and, i n par t i cul ar , t o

r eckl ess dr i vi ng causi ng i nj ur y- - we f ound t hat such a f act pat t er n

di d not " r epr esent t he vast maj or i t y of ABDW convi ct i ons, " 674

F. 3d at 44, and coul d t her ef or e not def eat t he concl usi on that ABDW

was "t ypi cal l y" pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve. I d.

We need not quest i on Har t ' s hol di ng as t o ABDW' s

si mi l ar i t y t o ACCA' s l i st ed of f enses. But t hat hol di ng, based as

i t i s on an i nqui r y i nt o whet her ABDW i s "t ypi cal l y pur posef ul ,

vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve, " cannot est abl i sh t hat ABDW sat i sf i es

sect i on 16( b) . To t he ext ent t hat t he "t ypi cal l y pur posef ul ,

vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve" t est r equi r es t hat an of f ense i nvol ve

pur posef ul ness at al l , 5 t he t est l ooks onl y to t he "usual

ci r cumst ances of t he cr i me. " See 674 F. 3d at 44 ( " ' Adj ect i ves l i ke

"pur posef ul " and "aggr essi ve" denot e qual i t i es t hat ar e i nel uct abl y

mani f est ed i n degr ee and appear i n di f f er ent combi nat i ons. ' "

( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Wi l l i ams, 529 F. 3d 1, 7 n. 7 ( 1st Ci r .

2008) ) . Sect i on 16( b) , by cont r ast , r equi r es t hat an of f ense, i n

5 Though t he phr ase "pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve"woul d seem, on i t s f ace, t o r equi r e pur posef ul ness, vi ol ence, andaggr essi on, i t i s by now wel l - est abl i shed t hat t he t est may besat i sf i ed by any of f ense t hat "cont empl at es pur posef ul ness, but not

necessar i l y conduct t hat i s del i ber at el y vi ol ent or aggr essi ve asa mat t er of cour se. " Hart , 674 F. 3d at 44 n. 9; see al so Uni t edSt at es v. Wi l l i ams, 529 F. 3d 1, 7 n. 7 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) ( not i ng t hateven ACCA' s exampl e cr i mes " sat i sf y [ t he ' pur posef ul , vi ol ent , andaggr essi ve' ] r equi r ement s onl y i n some measur e" and t hat dr ugt r af f i cki ng cr i mes, whi ch " i nvol ve pur posef ul conduct but ar e onl ysomet i mes vi ol ent or aggr essi ve, " may sat i sf y Begay) .

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ever y r eal i st i cal l y pr obabl e appl i cat i on, i nvol ve a subst ant i al

r i sk t hat physi cal f or ce wi l l be br ought t o bear i n a manner such

t hat i t can be sai d t o have been "used. " See Leocal , 543 U. S. at

8- 12; Gonzal es v. Duenas- Al var ez, 549 U. S. 183, 193 ( 2007) ( " [ To

f i nd t hat a st at e st at ut e i s over br oad] r equi r es a r eal i st i c

pr obabi l i t y, not a t heor et i cal possi bi l i t y, t hat t he St at e woul d

appl y i t s st at ut e t o conduct t hat f al l s out si de t he gener i c

def i ni t i on of a cri me. To show t hat r eal i st i c pr obabi l i t y, an

of f ender , of cour se, may show t hat t he st atut e was so

appl i ed . . . ") ; see al so J ames v. Uni t ed St at es, 550 U. S. 192,

208 (2007) ( ci t i ng Duenas- Al var ez wi t h appr oval and not i ng that

" [ o] ne can al ways hypot hesi ze unusual cases i n whi ch even a

pr ot ot ypi cal l y vi ol ent cr i me mi ght not pr esent a genui ne r i sk of

i nj ury- - f or exampl e, an at t empted murder wher e t he gun, unbeknownst

t o t he shoot er , had no bul l et s. ") .

Fi ndi ng no comf or t i n Har t ' s hol di ng, t he gover nment

poi nt s out t hat our opi ni on i n Hart empl oyed l anguage t hat can be

r ead t o go beyond what Begay r equi r ed. Speci f i cal l y, Hart ' s

anal ysi s of t he "pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve" t est cont ai ns

t he f ol l owi ng r ef er ences t o t he "or di nar y case" :

I t i s t r ue t hat an ABDW convi ct i on may r est on a

r eckl essness t heor y, and i t i s not i nsi gni f i cant t hatr eckl ess ABDWmay be commi t t ed wi t h a seemi ngl y i nnocentobj ect used i n a danger ous f ashi on, as i n t he case of r eckl ess, vehi cul ar ABDW. But t hi s f act pat t er n does notr epr esent t he vast maj or i t y of ABDWconvi ct i ons, and ouranal ysi s under t he r esi dual cl ause i s expl i ci t l y, and

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necessar i l y, l i mi t ed t o t he "ordi nar y case. " J ames v.Uni t ed St ates, 550 U. S. 192, 208 ( 2007) .. . .

. . . I n consi der i ng t he ' or di nar y case [ ] ' of ABDW, J ames, 550 U. S. at 208, we must concl ude t hat a composi t e

of pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve conduct i s t henor m. See Begay, 553 U. S. at 144- 45.

674 F. 3d at 43- 44 ( some ci t at i ons omi t t ed) . The government argues

t hat t hi s l anguage, i n combi nat i on wi t h Har t ' s ci t at i ons t o J ames,

shoul d be r ead as l i cense t o use t he "ordi nar y case" appr oach t o

i gnore r eckl ess ABDW i n determi ni ng whether Massachuset t s ABDW

sat i sf i es the sect i on 16( b) t est . For t he f ol l owi ng r easons, we

di sagr ee.

As an i ni t i al mat t er , t he l i cense t he gover nment woul d

dr aw f r om t hi s l anguage r est s on di ct um. As we have expl ai ned,

Begay' s t est f or s i mi l ar i t y t o ACCA' s enumer ated of f enses was never

i nt ended t o operat e as a r i gorous compar i son between t he conduct

necessari l y under l yi ng a pr i or convi ct i on and t he conduct descr i bed

i n a r eci di vi st st at ut e. See Sykes v. Uni t ed St at es, 131 S. Ct .

2267, 2275 ( 2011) ( "The phr ase ' pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and

aggr essi ve' has no pr eci se t ext ual l i nk t o t he r esi dual cl ause. ") .

Rat her , af t er f i r st empl oyi ng t he cat egor i cal appr oach t o def i ne

t he el ement s of an of f ense wi t hout r ef er ence t o t he act ual f act s of

a def endant ' s conduct , Begay t r ai ns i t s f ocus on whet her t hat

of f ense i s, i n addi t i on t o meet i ng ACCA' s t ext ual r equi r ement ,

"r oughl y si mi l ar " t o t he of f enses l i st ed i n ACCA, so as t o avoi d

t he absurd appl i cat i on of ACCA t o cr i mes t hat " t hough danger ous,

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ar e not t ypi cal l y commi t t ed by t hose whom one nor mal l y l abel s

' armed career cr i mi nal s. ' " Begay, 553 U. S. at 146. Because our

obser vat i on i n Har t t hat r eckl ess, vehi cul ar ABDW "does not

r epr esent t he vast maj or i t y of ABDW convi ct i ons" was enough t o

sat i sf y t hi s per mi ssi ve st andar d, i t was unnecessary t o f ur t her

i nqui r e i nt o whet her t he "or di nar y case" of ABDWi nvol ves a r i sk of

t he "use" of physi cal f or ce as requi r ed by Leocal . Any concl usi on

we dr ew as t o t hat quest i on woul d, as di ct um, t her ef ore not bi nd us

her e. See Kosei r i s v. Rhode I sl and, 331 F. 3d 207, 213 ( 1st Ci r .

2003) ( "Di ct a, of cour se, i s not bi ndi ng on f ut ur e panel s. ") ; see

al so Di az- Rodr i guez v. Pep Boys Cor p. , 410 F. 3d 56 ( 1st Ci r . 2005)

( " [ A] l t hough a newl y const i t ut ed panel or di nar i l y may not di sr egar d

t he deci si on of a pr evi ous panel , pr i nci pl es of st ar e deci si s do

not pr ecl ude us f r om di scl ai mi ng di cta i n a pr i or deci si on. ") ;

Pi er r e N. Leval , J udgi ng Under t he Const i t ut i on: Di ct a About Di ct a,

81 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1263 ( 2006) ( "Among t he most common

mani f est at i ons of di sgui sed di ct umoccur s wher e t he cour t vent ur es

beyond t he i ssue i n cont r over sy t o decl ar e t he sol ut i on t o a

f ur t her pr obl em- - one t hat wi l l ar i se i n anot her case, or i n a l at er

phase of t he same case. " ) .

The government concedes t hat Har t i s, " t o be

sur e, . . . not di sposi t i ve" of t hi s case, and we t ake t hat

concessi on at f ace val ue. The di ssent , however , over shoot s t he

gover nment , pr oposi ng t hat we t r ansf or mt he Begay test - - an i nqui r y

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desi gned t o nar r ow ACCA' s appl i cat i on even when a cr i me, i n al l i t s

act ual appl i cat i ons, poses t he r i sk t hat ACCA' s t ext r equi r es- - i nt o

one t hat br oadens sect i on 16( b) ' s appl i cat i on. For t hi s si mpl e

r eason, we cannot accede t o t he di ssent ' s suggest i on t hat Begay' s

f ocus on t he "usual ci r cumst ances" of an of f ense now bi nds us t o

concl ude t hat ever ythi ng out si de t hose "usual ci r cumst ances" i s, i n

J ames' s t er ms, "hypot hesi ze[ d] . " See J ames, 550 U. S. at 208. 6

Nei t her J ames nor Begay suggest s such an appr oach, and t o adopt i t

woul d be t o abandon sect i on 16( b) ' s r equi r ement s i n f avor of an

i l l - f i t t i ng and l ess demandi ng t est desi gned t o accommodat e t he

t ext , pur pose, and l egi sl at i ve hi st or y of a mat er i al l y di f f er ent

st atut e. Such a r esul t s i mpl y cannot be what Begay, whi ch

6 The di ssent suggest s t hat " t he exampl es of ' unusual ' casest hat J ames gave ar e not so f ar - f et ched. " See Di ssent i ng Op. at 46.But J ames gave no exampl es of merel y "unusual " cases. Rat her , J ames made cl ear t hat t he exampl es i t provi ded wer e of "hypothesi ze[ d] unusual " cases, see 550 U. S. at 208 ( emphasi sadded) , provi ded i n order t o demonst r at e onl y t hat "ACCA does notr equi r e met aphysi cal cer t ai nt y" t hat a def endant ' s under l yi ng

conduct woul d have met a f eder al r eci di vi st st at ut e' s r equi r ement s.I d. ( ci t i ng Duenas- Al var ez, 550 U. S. at 193) . Not wi t hst andi ng ourdi ssent i ng col l eague' s obj ect i on t o t he exampl es pr ovi ded i n J ames,t hat case' s war ni ng agai nst r el yi ng on i magi ned, hypot het i calscenar i os has no appl i cat i on her e, because the def endant poi nt s t ocases i n whi ch t he ABDWst atut e has i n f act been appl i ed t o conductf al l i ng out si de sect i on 16( b) ' s bounds.

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ment i oned t he " r i sk" i nqui r y onl y to demonst r at e t hat i t was not

t he i nqui r y at i ssue, had i n mi nd. 7

Our anal ysi s under sect i on 16( b) i s t her ef or e gover ned by

J ames, Duenas- Al var ez, and Leocal , not by Begay. And i n def i ni ng

t he "ordi nar y case" as i t appl i es t o t he "r i sk" i nqui r y, J ames

expl ai ns t hat sent enci ng cour t s may di sr egar d onl y "hypot het i ze[ d] "

f act ual scenar i os. 550 U. S. at 208. Duenas- Al var ez, whi ch J ames

ci t es i n t he cour se of i t s expl anat i on of t he "ordi nar y case, "

l i kewi se per mi t s excl usi on onl y of appl i cat i ons t hat exi st sol el y

i n " l egal i magi nat i on. " 549 U. S. at 193. Unl i ke Begay' s " r oughl y

si mi l ar " t est , t he anal ysi s descr i bed i n J ames and Duenas- Al var ez

gr ant s us no l i cense t o i gnor e act ual cases on t he gr ound t hat t hey

ar e not " t ypi cal " or do not r epr esent t he "maj or i t y" of

convi ct i ons. Thus, t hough we do not r ead our opi ni on i n Har t as

havi ng gone out of i t s way, i n cr ypt i c di ct um, t o vi ol at e J ames and

Duenas- Al var ez, we concl ude t hat we woul d be bound t o f ol l ow t hose

t wo Supr eme Cour t cases over any di ct um t he gover nment mi ght f i nd

t o the cont r ar y i n Har t ' s appl i cat i on of t he l ess- demandi ng

"t ypi cal l y pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve" t est . See

7 Mor eover , we ar e unabl e t o r econci l e t he di ssent ' s

suggest i on t hat sect i on 16( b) "does not di f f er f r om t he ACCA' sr esi dual cl ause i n any r el evant r espect s, " Di ssent i ng Op. at 43,wi t h the Supr eme Cour t ' s suggest i on i n Leocal t hat t he t wo st at ut esar e meani ngf ul l y di st i nct . See 543 U. S. at 10 n. 7; see gener al l y J ohn v. Uni t ed St at es, 524 U. S 236, 252- 53 ( 1998) ( Supreme Cour tdeci si ons " r emai n bi ndi ng pr ecedent " unt i l t hat Cour t "see[ s] f i tt o reconsi der t hem") .

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gener al l y Uni t ed St at es v. Dancy, 640 F. 3d 455, 470 ( 1st Ci r .

2011) . 8

I n so concl udi ng, we acknowl edge t hat at l east one cour t

has, i n an anal ogous si t uat i on, r el i ed on J ames t o f i nd l i cense

under t he "ordi nar y case" appr oach t o l ook onl y t o what i t i magi ned

mi ght be t he t ypi cal case of convi ct i on, i n t he pr ocess i gnor i ng a

st at e st at ut e' s over br eadt h even i n t he f ace of act ual appl i cat i ons

of t he st at ut e t o conduct t hat f ai l ed t o meet t he t ext ual

r equi r ement s of t he f eder al st at ut e at i ssue. See, e. g. , Uni t ed

8 I n agr eei ng wi t h t he gover nment t hat Hart i s notdi sposi t i ve of t he case bef or e us, we do not , as t he di ssentsuggest s, "appl y[ ] t he or di nar y case r ul e di f f er ent l y to Sect i on16( b) t han t he ACCA. " Di ssent i ng Op. at 45. To t he cont r ary, we

acknowl edge t hat t he ordi nar y case r ul e al l ows cour t s t o di sr egar di magi ned, hypothet i cal scenar i os when matchi ng an of f ense t o thet wo st at ut es' " r i sk" r equi r ement s. But what does not appl y t osect i on 16( b) ( par t i cul ar l y t o br oaden i t ) i s t he assessment , underBegay, of what an of f ense " t ypi cal l y" i nvol ves. That assessment ,whi ch per mi t s a cour t t o l ook onl y to the usual ci r cumst ances underwhi ch an of f ense i s commi t t ed, appl i es onl y t o ACCA.

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St ates v. Mayer , 560 F. 3d 948, 960- 63 ( 9t h Ci r . 2009) . 9 Such a

f r eewheel i ng i nt er pr et at i on of J ames woul d seem t o conf l i ct not

onl y wi t h J ames and Duenas- Al var ez, but al so wi t h t he Supr eme

Cour t ' s r ecent deci si on i n Descamps v. Uni t ed St at es, 133 S. Ct .

2276, 2285- 86 ( 2013) , whi ch agai n reaf f i r med that t he onl y way a

f aci al l y over br oad st at ut e can qual i f y as an ACCA pr edi cat e i s by

appl i cat i on of t he modi f i ed cat egor i cal appr oach. Though i t i s

t heor et i cal l y possi bl e to read Descamps as havi ng no appl i cat i on to

t he t heor y t he di ssent pr oposes, we t hi nk i t unl i kel y that t he

9 Though our di ssent i ng col l eague al so cl ai ms suppor t i nDel gado- Hernandez v. Hol der , 697 F. 3d 1125, 1129 ( 9t h Ci r . 2012) ,and Uni t ed St at es v. J ohnson, 616 F. 3d 85 ( 2d Ci r . 2010) , seeDi ssent i ng Op. at 47- 48 & nn. 15- 16, nei t her opi ni on even f ei nt st owar d an anal ysi s di f f er ent f r om t he one we empl oy. I n Del gado-Her nandez, t he Ni nt h Ci r cui t hel d t hat Cal i f or ni a' s ki dnappi ngst at ut e was a cr i me of vi ol ence onl y af t er scour i ng r epor t ed casest o ensur e t hat onl y by "adopt [ i ng] a Pol l yannai sh out l ook at t hemar gi ns of t he st at ut e" coul d i t " i magi ne" a scenar i o i n whi ch t heof f ense di d not i nvol ve at l east "a subst ant i al r i sk of f or ce. "

Del gado- Hernandez, 697 F. 3d at 1129. And i n J ohnson, t he SecondCi r cui t appl i ed J ames pr eci sel y as we under st and i t , concl udi ngt hat Connect i cut ' s pr i son r i ot i ng st at ut e appl i ed ( bot h i n t heor yand i n f act ) onl y t o conduct i nvol vi ng t he r equi si t e r i sk. See 616F. 3d at 94 ( "Ever y vi ol at i on of pr i son r ul es creat es a r i sk t hatf el l ow i nmat es wi l l j oi n i n t he di st ur bance, oppose i t wi t h f or ce,or si mpl y use i t s occur r ence t o engage i n ot her act s of vi ol ence. ") . I f t he l anguage our col l eague quot es f r om J ohnsonseems i nconsi st ent wi t h t hat under st andi ng of J ames, see Di ssent i ngOp. at 48 n. 16, t hat i s per haps because t he l anguage i s pl ucked notf r om t he sect i on of J ohnson ent i t l ed "Si mi l ar i n Degr ee of Ri skPosed, " but i nst ead f r om a separ at e sect i on of t he opi ni on- - one

ent i t l ed "Si mi l ar ' I n Ki nd. ' " See 616 F. 3d at 89- 93. The l at t ersect i on, whi ch makes not a si ngl e r ef er ence t o t he "or di nar y case, "demonst r at es l i t t l e mor e t han t hat l i ke us, t he Second Ci r cui tunder st ands t he Begay i nqui r y to per mi t a cour t t o l ook onl y to t heusual ci r cumst ances of an of f ense. See supr a not e 8. Nei t her casecont ai ns any i ndi cat i on what soever t hat t he same appl i es t o ei t herACCA' s or sect i on 16( b) ' s " r i sk" r equi r ement .

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Supreme Cour t t ook and deci ded the Descamps case, i n whi ch i t yet

agai n cl ar i f i ed t he or nat e r ul es t hat gover n t he cat egor i cal and

modi f i ed cat egor i cal appr oaches, al l i n t he ser vi ce of a pr ocedur e

t hat ends wi t h t he exci si on of r eal appl i cat i ons of br oad of f enses

based on non- empi r i cal det er mi nat i ons t hat t hey do not pr esent t he

or di nar y case.

We are gui ded here not merel y by t he t hrust of Descamps,

but by i t s l anguage, as wel l . Descamps cont ai ns myr i ad warni ngs t o

t he ef f ect t hat "[ w] het her t he st at ut e of convi ct i on has an

over br oad or mi ssi ng el ement , t he pr obl em i s t he same: Because of

t he mi smatch i n el ement s, a per son convi ct ed under t hat st atut e i s

never convi ct ed of t he gener i c cr i me. " I d. at 2292. I n t hi s case,

t he di ssent can avoi d t he appl i cat i on of t hat pr i nci pl e onl y by

suggest i ng that we not consi der whet her t he st at ut e i s over br oad

unt i l we have al r eady whi t ewashed i t s over br oad, actual

appl i cat i ons.

To adopt t hat appr oach woul d ensnar e us i nt o deci di ng how

bi g a "mi nor i t y" of act ual convi ct i ons f or unqual i f yi ng of f enses

under an over l y br oad def i ni t i on we may per mi ss i bl y i gnore. One

opt i on, i n t heor y, woul d be t o f i nd empi r i cal t ool s f or conf i dent l y

gaugi ng whet her act ual convi ct i ons met what ever def i ni t i on of

mi nor i t y we mi ght i nvent . See Mayer , 560 F. 3d at 952 ( Kozi nski ,

C. J . , di ssent i ng f r om deni al of r ehear i ng en banc) ( "Don' t even

t hi nk about how a cour t i s supposed t o f i gur e out whet her a st at ut e

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i s appl i ed i n a cer t ai n way ' most of t he t i me. ' ( A st at i st i cal

anal ysi s of t he st at e r epor t er ? A sur vey? Exper t evi dence?

Googl e? Gut i nst i nct ?) " ) . The onl y al t er nat i ve woul d be t o wi pe

out t he cat egor i cal appr oach and di r ect l y r ej ect Descamps. The

f i r st opt i on i s i mpossi bl e, t he second f or ecl osed.

I n vi ew of t he unavoi dabl e compl exi t y of t he f or egoi ng,

we al so consi der a si mpl e hypot het i cal . I magi ne t hat Massachuset t s

def i ned t he cur r ent el ement s of ABDWsol el y by st at ut e, r at her t han

i n i t s case l aw. Keepi ng t he el ement s t he same, t he st atut e woul d,

i n subst ance, r ead as f ol l ows:

Assaul t and Bat t ery wi t h a Danger ous Weapon i s:

( 1) The i nt ent i onal and unj ust i f i ed t ouchi ng of anot herby use of a dangerous weapon,

or ,

( 2) The i nt ent i onal commi ssi on of a want on or r eckl essact causi ng mor e t han t r ansi ent or t r i f l i ng i nj ur y t oanot her .

See Hart , 674 F. 3d at 42, 43 n. 7.

We do not under st and t he di ssent or t he gover nment t o go

so f ar as t o ar gue, count er t o t he l aw of t en ci r cui t s, t hat a

convi ct i on under par t ( 2) of our hypot het i cal st at ut e woul d ser ve

as a pr edi cat e of f ense under sect i on 16( b) . See, e. g. , Leocal , 543

U. S. at 9- 10. And i f a def endant ' s convi ct i on wer e si mpl y f or ABDW

( as i n t he pr esent case) , wi t h no i ndi cat i on as t o whet her t he

charge was under a part i cul ar subdi vi si on, one woul d have t o assume

t hat t he convi ct i on mi ght have t aken pl ace under par t ( 2) . Agui ar

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438 F. 3d at 89 ( " [ O] nl y t he mi ni mum cr i mi nal conduct necessary t o

sust ai n a convi ct i on under a gi ven st at ut e i s r el evant . " ( i nt er nal

ci t at i on omi t t ed) ) . So t he quest i on ar i ses: gi ven such a st at ut e,

and an act ual convi ct i on not speci f i ed as t o whet her i t ar ose

under par t ( 1) or par t ( 2) , woul d t he possi bi l i t y of a convi ct i on

under par t ( 2) be i gnor ed as out si de of t he "or di nar y case"?

Cl ear l y, t he answer must be no.

I f t hat i s t he case, t hen why woul d one r each a di f f er ent

r esul t her e? Tr ue, our hypot het i cal i s easy because t he el ement s

ar e pl ai nl y def i ned by st at ut e. But because t he pr ovenance of a

cr i me' s el ement s t el l s one not hi ng about how t he cr i me i s

commi t t ed, we see no reason why t hat f act shoul d be deci si ve.

Thi s hypot het i cal al so ser ves t o i l l ust r at e our r eadi ng

of Hart . Absent any Shepard- appr oved document s t el l i ng us whi ch

pr ovi si on of t he hypot het i cal st at ut e had gi ven r i se t o a

convi ct i on, our anal ysi s of t he st at ut e under ACCA woul d r epl i cat e

Har t ' s hol di ng t hat ABDWi s a vi ol ent f el ony under ACCA' s r esi dual

cl ause. Thus, we woul d f i r st ask whet her , i n al l but i magi ned,

hypot het i cal ci r cumst ances, t he st at ut e i nvol ved a "ser i ous

pot ent i al r i sk of physi cal i nj ur y. " We woul d have t o concl ude t hat

i t di d: sect i on ( 2) makes i nj ur y an expl i ci t t ext ual r equi r ement ,

and al t hough sect i on ( 1) does not expl i ci t l y r equi r e i nj ur y, i t

pl ai nl y r equi r es conduct t hat creat es a ser i ous pot ent i al r i sk

t her eof . Under ACCA ( unl i ke sect i on 16( b) ) , we woul d t hen appl y

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Begay' s s i mi l ar i t y t est t o see whet her ABDWshoul d never t hel ess be

di squal i f i ed. Because t hat i nqui r y, unl i ke t he "ordi nar y case"

anal ysi s, i s sat i sf i ed so l ong as t he "t ypi cal " vi ol at i on of t he

st at ut e i nvol ves pur posef ul ness, we woul d, j ust as i n Har t , f i nd

Begay sat i sf i ed. Cf . Uni t ed St at es v. J ohnson, 616 F. 3d 85, 91 n. 4

( 2d Ci r . 2010) ( f i ndi ng Begay' s "r oughl y si mi l ar " t est sat i sf i ed

even on t he assumpt i on t hat an "overwhel mi ng maj or i t y" of

convi ct i ons under a st at ut e, but not al l of t hem, "i nvol ve[ d]

vi ol ent and aggr essi ve behavi or " ) .

To summar i ze our anal ysi s of ABDW: t he el ements of

Massachuset t s ABDWare sat i sf i ed when the i nt ent i onal commi ssi on of

a r eckl ess act causes mor e t han t r i f l i ng i nj ur y; convi ct i ons f or

ABDW f or such r eckl ess conduct ar e not mer el y hypot het i cal

possi bi l i t i es, but i nst ead act ual l y occur ; we agr ee wi t h t en

Ci r cui t s t hat r eckl ess conduct ber ef t of an i nt ent t o empl oy f or ce

agai nst anot her f al l s shor t of t he mens r ea requi r ed under sect i on

16( b) as i nt er pr et ed i n Leocal ; no Shepard- appr oved document s t el l

us t hat Fi sh' s ABDWconvi ct i on was not such an of f ense; t her ef or e,

hi s ABDWconvi ct i on i s not a cr i me of vi ol ence under sect i on 16( b) .

And i n r esponse to our l ear ned col l eague' s consi der ed di ssent , we

agr ee wi t h both Fi sh and the gover nment t hat Hart does not di ct ate

a cont r ar y r esul t . To t he extent t hat Har t can be r ead as usi ng

t he "or di nar y case" not i on of J ames t o er ase f r omour consi der at i on

of ABDW i t s act ual appl i cat i ons t o reckl ess conduct , we f i nd such

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a const r uct i on of J ames t o be unnecessar y t o Har t ' s act ual hol di ng

t hat Massachuset t s ABDW survi ves exami nat i on under Begay' s

si mi l ar i t y t est . The si mi l ar i t y t est r equi r es onl y t hat an of f ense

"t ypi cal l y" i nvol ve a pur posef ul use of f or ce. 10

Fi nal l y, t he ver y compl exi t y of t he gover nment ' s at t empt

t o pr ove t hat ever y per son convi ct ed of ABDW i n Massachuset t s i s,

per se, a vi ol ent of f ender , wi t hout any adj udi cat i on or admi ssi on

necessi t at i ng t he concl usi on, shoul d i t sel f gi ve us pause. I f

someone wi t h Fi sh' s r ecor d had asked whether he coul d l awf ul l y buy

body ar mor , no one ( other t han f i ve Supr eme Cour t J ust i ces) coul d

have conf i dent l y answered t he quest i on. I n such a case, we cannot

si mpl y combi ne i nt r i cat e st at ut or y i nt er pr et at i ons wi t h j udi ci al

hunches about t he conduct under l yi ng pr i or convi ct i ons i n or der t o

i mpr i son as a vi ol ent f el on one whose conduct no j ur y has

necessar i l y f ound t o sat i sf y t he el ement s t hat make an of f ense a

10 Our di ssent i ng col l eague, pr oposi ng t hat we shoul d " t r eatBegay and J ames i nt er changeabl y, " poi nt s t o t wo cases t hat hesuggest s have so hel d. See Di ssent i ng Op. at 44 ( ci t i ng Uni t edSt at es v. Di smuke, 593 F. 3d 582 ( 7t h Ci r . 2010) ; Uni t ed St at es v.St i nson, 592 F. 3d 460, 466 ( 3d Ci r . 2010) ) . But nei t her of t hosecases suppor t s our col l eague' s concl usi on t hat t he J ames r ul eper mi t s us t o di sr egar d act ual appl i cat i ons of a st at ut e t o conductt hat f ai l s t o meet ACCA' s " r i sk" r equi r ement . Rat her , i n Di smuke,t he def endant conceded t hat t he " r i sk" r equi r ement was sat i sf i ed,t hus t aki ng i t of f t he t abl e compl et el y. See 593 F. 3d at 591 n. 3.

And i n St i nson, t he Thi r d Ci r cui t concl uded t hat al t hough t hel anguage of Pennsyl vani a' s r esi st i ng ar r est st at ut e suggest ed t hepossi bi l i t y of over br oad appl i cat i on, t he st at ut e had never been soappl i ed. See 592 F. 3d at 466 ( " [ W] e have f ound no deci si on underPennsyl vani a l aw t hat af f i r med a convi ct i on f or r esi st i ng ar r estbased on a def endant ' s i nact i on or si mpl y ' l yi ng down' or ' goi ngl i mp. ' " ) .

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cr i me of vi ol ence as def i ned by Congr ess. See Leocal , 543 U. S. at

11 n. 8 ( not i ng t hat because "§ 16 i s a cr i mi nal st at ut e", "t he r ul e

of l eni t y appl i es") ; cf . Al l eyne v. Uni t ed St at es, 133 S. Ct . 2151,

2156 ( 2013) ( "The Si xt h Amendment . . . , i n conj unct i on wi t h t he

Due Process Cl ause, r equi r es t hat each el ement of a cr i me be pr oved

t o t he j ur y beyond a r easonabl e doubt . " ) . We t her ef or e hol d t hat

because ABDW, as def i ned by Massachuset t s l aw, does not i n f orm or

appl i cat i on r equi r e a r i sk of t he use of f or ce, i t i s not a cri me

of vi ol ence as def i ned i n sect i on 16( b) .

C. Burglarious Tools

The gover nment poi nt s us l ast t o Fi sh' s pr i or convi ct i on

under t he Massachuset t s st at ut e pr ohi bi t i ng t he maki ng, possessi on,

and use of bur gl ar i ous i nst r ument s. That st at ut e r eads as f ol l ows:

Whoever makes or mends, or begi ns t o make or mend, orknowi ngl y has i n hi s possessi on, an engi ne, machi ne, t oolor i mpl ement adapt ed and desi gned f or cut t i ng t hr ough,

f or ci ng or br eaki ng open a bui l di ng, r oom, vaul t , saf e orot her deposi t or y, i n or der t o st eal t her ef r om money orother pr oper t y, or t o commi t any ot her cr i me, knowi ng t hesame t o be adapt ed and desi gned f or t he pur poseaf oresai d, wi t h i nt ent t o use or empl oy or al l ow t he samet o be used or empl oyed f or such purpose, or whoeverknowi ngl y has i n hi s possessi on a mast er key desi gned t of i t mor e t han one mot or vehi cl e, wi t h i nt ent t o use orempl oy t he same to st eal a mot or vehi cl e or ot herpr oper t y t her ef r om, shal l be puni shed by i mpr i sonment i nt he st at e pr i son f or not more t han t en year s or by a f i neof not more t han one t housand dol l ars and i mpr i sonment i n

j ai l f or not mor e t han t wo and one hal f year s.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 49. Fi sh argues t hat because t he

gover nment never r ai sed t he bur gl ar i ous i nst r ument s convi ct i on

unt i l t hi s appeal , we shoul d not consi der t he of f ense. Whi l e we

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not e t he pecul i ar i t y of pl aci ng an appel l at e cour t i n t he posi t i on

of f i ndi ng f act s t o sat i sf y an el ement of an of f ense, we need not

addr ess Fi sh' s cont ent i on: We ul t i mat el y concl ude, as per haps t he

government di d when i t determi ned not t o ar gue t he i ssue i n t he

di st r i ct cour t , t hat t he bur gl ar i ous t ool s st at ut e i s over br oad, as

wel l .

The probl em f or t he government i s t hat Massachuset t s

cour t s have made cl ear t hat a “t ool or i mpl ement . . . desi gned

f or . . . br eaki ng open a bui l di ng, r oom, vaul t , saf e or ot her

deposi t or y” as descr i bed i n t he f i r st cl ause of sect i on 49 can be

a mast er key, so l ong as t he mast er key i s not one f or an

aut omobi l e. Commonweal t h v. Ti l l ey, 306 Mass. 412, 417 ( 1940)

( “Keys expr essl y made t o f i t a par t i cul ar l ock f or t he pur pose of

wr ongf ul l y gai ni ng access t o a deposi t ory i n whi ch goods were kept ,

i n or der t o st eal t hem, ar e tool s and i mpl ement s of t he ki nd and

char act er descr i bed i n t he st at ut e. ”) . 11 Gi ven t he possi bi l i t y t hat

a def endant mi ght be convi ct ed of maki ng or possessi ng a mast er key

wi t hout any at t empt t o use i t - - a cr i me t hat st r i kes us as posi ng a

r el at i vel y l ow r i sk of t he ul t i mat e use of physi cal f or ce agai nst

per sons or pr oper t y–- we cannot concl ude t hat t he bur gl ar i ous t ool s

11 Though t he of f ense of possessi on of an aut omobi l e mast erkey may no l onger be charged under t he f i r st cl ause, seeCommonweal t h v. Col l ardo, 13 Mass. App. Ct . 1013, 1013- 14 ( Mass.App. Ct . 1982) , t he government pr ovi des us no r eason t o concl udet hat t he possessi on of a non- aut omobi l e mast er or dupl i cat e keycoul d not be char ged under t he f i r st cl ause.

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of f ense, even as l i mi t ed under t he modi f i ed appr oach, cat egor i cal l y

const i t ut es a cri me of vi ol ence.

IV. Conclusion

I t i s no secr et t hat t he st at ut es Congr ess chose t o enact

i n i t s under st andabl e ef f or t t o f ocus on vi ol ent conduct ar e

i mper f ect . See, e. g. , Descamps v. Uni t ed St at es, 133 S. Ct . 2276,

2293- 94 ( Kennedy, J . , concur r i ng) ( " I f Congr ess wi shes t o pur sue

i t s pol i cy i n a pr oper and ef f i ci ent way wi t hout mandat i ng

uni f or mi t y among t he St at es wi t h r espect t o thei r cr i mi nal st at ut es

f or scores of ser i ous of f enses, and wi t hout r equi r i ng t he amendment

of any number of f eder al cr i mi nal st at ut es as wel l , Congr ess shoul d

act at once. " ) ; Der by v. Uni t ed St at es, 131 S. Ct . 2858 ( 2011)

( Scal i a, J . , di ssent i ng f rom deni al of cer t i orar i and so

cri t i ci zi ng ACCA' s r esi dual pr ovi si on) ; Sykes v. Uni t ed St at es, 131

S. Ct . 2267, 2295 ( 2011) ( Kagan, J . , j oi ned by Gi nsbur g, J . ,

di ssent i ng and l ament i ng t he Supr eme Cour t ' s di f f i cul t i es i n

cr af t i ng a workabl e appr oach) ; Chamber s v. Uni t ed St ates, 555 U. S.

122, 131- 32 ( 2009) ( Al i t o, J . , j oi ned by Thomas, J . , concur r i ng i n

t he j udgment ) ( " [ O] nl y Congr ess can r escue t he f eder al cour t s f r om

t he mi r e i nt o whi ch ACCA' s dr af t smanshi p and Tayl or ' s ' cat egor i cal

appr oach' have pushed us. " ) . As has been poi nt ed out el sewhere,

see, e. g. , Sykes, 131 S. Ct . at 2284 ( Scal i a, J . , di ssent i ng) , t he

gr eat var i at i on bet ween t he di f f er ent st at es' cr i mi nal st at ut es has

f l ummoxed t he f ederal cour t s. Though t he dut y here undert aken

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seems a bet t er f i t f or Congr ess or an admi ni st r at i ve agency, we

have f or now no choi ce but t o do our best t o gi ve ef f ect t o

Congr ess' s expr essed i nt ent .

As a r esul t , our hol di ng may appear odd to t he reasonabl y

di scer ni ng ci t i zen, par t i cul ar l y f r om af ar . Convi cti ons under

st at utes wi t h names connot i ng vi ol ence ar e somet i mes deemed not t o

be cri mes of vi ol ence, even i f i t i s l i kel y t hat most such

convi ct i ons ar i se f r om vi ol ent conduct . Thi s appar ent anomal y

ar i ses l argel y because many st ates have st r et ched t hese vi ol ence-

connot i ng rubr i cs t o encompass conduct t hat Congr ess does not

def i ne as a cr i me of vi ol ence. Dr i vi ng under t he i nf l uence and

acci dent al l y causi ng ser i ous i nj ur y t hus get s gr ouped t oget her wi t h

pi st ol - whi ppi ng a bank t el l er , and pr osecut or s and cour t s ar e l ef t

t o choose bet ween t wo unpal at abl e opt i ons: ei t her we may deemnon-

vi ol ent i ndi vi dual s who l i kel y ar e i n f act vi ol ent , or we may

f al sel y assume t hat ever y per son convi ct ed under an over br oad

st at ut e i s i n f act a vi ol ent cri mi nal . Si nce t he const i t ut i on

pr ohi bi t s us f r om char t i ng t he l at t er cour se, we wi l l t ake t he

f ormer unl ess Congress changes t he l aw or t he Supreme Cour t

i nst r uct s ot her wi se.

Fi sh' s convi ct i on i s r ever sed, and t he case i s r emanded

f or di smi ssal . So or der ed.

-- Dissenting Opinion Follows --

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DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Li ke t he maj or i t y, I

f i nd pr obl emat i c t he government ’ s argument s her e t hat br eaki ng and

ent er i ng and possessi on of bur gl ar ’ s t ool s const i t ut e cr i mes of

vi ol ence under 18 U. S. C. § 16. I par t company wi t h t he maj or i t y

when i t hol ds t hat Massachuset t s ABDW i s not a cr i me of vi ol ence.

Thi s cour t has previ ousl y hel d i n Uni t ed St at es v. Har t ,

674 F. 3d 33, 40- 44 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) , and Uni t ed St at es v. Gl over ,

558 F. 3d 71, 79- 82 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) , t hat Massachuset t s ABDW i s a

“vi ol ent f el ony” under t he Ar med Career Cr i mi nal s Act ( ACCA) , 18

U. S. C. § 924( e) ( 2) ( B) and a “cr i me of vi ol ence” under t he Uni t ed

St at es Sent enci ng Gui del i nes, U. S. S. G. § 4B1. 2( a) . The quest i on i n

t hi s case i s whet her Massachuset t s ABDW- - assaul t and bat t er y wi t h

a danger ous weapon- - i s s i mi l ar l y a “cr i me of vi ol ence” under

Sect i on 16( b) . 12 The maj or i t y, deci di ng not t o f ol l ow Gl over and

Har t , hol ds t hat Massachuset t s ABDW i s not a “cr i me of vi ol ence”

f or pur poses of Sect i on 16( b) , and r ever ses Fi sh’ s convi ct i on.

Not hi ng i n t he l anguage of t he t hr ee pr ovi si ons suppor t s

such an i nconsi st ent r esul t , and i n my vi ew t he maj or i t y’ s deci si on

i s di r ectl y cont r ar y t o t he r easoni ng of t hi s cour t ’ s deci si on i n

Har t , r easoni ng whi ch t he maj or i t y di smi sses as “di ct um. ” Maj or i t y

12 Sect i on 16( b) def i nes “cr i me of vi ol ence” f or pur poses of t he body armor st at ut e under whi ch t hi s def endant was char ged aswel l as f or many ot her cr i mi nal st at ut es. E. g. , 8 U. S. C.§ 1227( a) ( 2) ( E) ( i ) ( al l owi ng depor t at i on of any al i en who commi t sa cr i me of vi ol ence agai nst a domest i c r el at i on) ; 18 U. S. C. § 25( doubl i ng t he st at ut or y maxi mum sent ence i f a def endanti nt ent i onal l y uses a mi nor t o commi t a cr i me of vi ol ence) .

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Op. at 24. I n my vi ew t he maj or i t y’ s deci si on i s al so i nconsi st ent

wi t h the Supr eme Cour t ’ s deci si on i n J ames v. Uni t ed St at es, 550

U. S. 192, 208 ( 2007) . I r espect f ul l y di ssent .

I .

When a f eder al st atut e makes r ef er ence t o cr i mes def i ned

by st at e l aw i n order t o det er mi ne what const i t ut es a cr i me of

vi ol ence or vi ol ent f el ony under f eder al l aw, cour t s appl y a

“cat egor i cal appr oach” t o det er mi ne whet her t he st ate l aw cr i me

meet s t he f eder al def i ni t i on. See, e. g. , Descamps v. Uni t ed

St ates, 133 S. Ct . 2276, 2281 ( 2013) ; J ames, 550 U. S. at 202;

Tayl or v. Uni t ed St at es, 495 U. S. 575, 588- 89, 600- 02 ( 1990) . The

cour t must consi der t he st at e l aw cr i me gener i cal l y, i . e. , wi t h “a

f ocus on t he el ement s, r at her t han t he f act s, of a cr i me, ”

Descamps, 133 S. Ct . at 2285, except t o t he ext ent t hat t he st atut e

of convi ct i on i s di vi si bl e and t he char gi ng and si mi l ar document s

r eveal under whi ch subdi vi si on of t he st at ut e t he convi ct i on was

obt ai ned. See i d. at 2281, 2285 n. 2. The gover nment does not r el y

on such documents here.

Sect i on 16( b) def i nes a cr i me of vi ol ence as an of f ense

t hat “i s a f el ony and t hat , by i t s nat ur e, i nvol ves a subst ant i al

r i sk t hat physi cal f or ce agai nst t he per son or pr oper t y of anot her

may be used i n t he cour se of commi t t i ng t he of f ense. ” Thi s

l anguage has been i nt er pr et ed t o requi r e a hi gher degr ee of i nt ent

t han i s pr esent i n “mer el y acci dent al or negl i gent ” appl i cat i ons of

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physi cal f or ce. Leocal v. Ashcrof t , 543 U. S. 1, 11 ( 2004) . The

maj or i t y hol ds t hat t he i ncl usi on of r eckl ess conduct , such as

r eckl ess dr i vi ng, wi t hi n Massachuset t s ABDWexcl udes ABDWf r omt he

def i ni t i on of Sect i on 16( b) . But t he cat egor i cal appr oach does not

r equi r e a cour t t o consi der “ever y concei vabl e f act ual of f ense”

cover ed by t he st ate st atut e. J ames, 550 U. S. at 208. When

appl yi ng a f eder al st at ut e t hat cont ai ns “i nher ent l y pr obabi l i st i c”

l anguage such as “pot ent i al r i sk of i nj ur y, ” under J ames cour t s

consi der onl y “t he conduct encompassed by t he el ement s of t he

[ st at ut e of convi ct i on] i n t he or di nar y case. ” I d. at 207, 208

( emphasi s added) .

I I .

Thi s cour t i n Gl over hel d t hat “t he or di nary ABDW

of f ense” i s a cr i me of vi ol ence under t he Sent enci ng Gui del i nes.

Gl over , 558 F. 3d at 82. Har t appl i ed Gl over ’ s hol di ng t o t he ACCA.

674 F. 3d at 41- 42. I n my vi ew, Har t di sposes of t hi s case by

hol di ng t hat r eckl ess dr i vi ng, whi l e wi t hi n t he scope of t he ABDW

st atut e, i s not t he ordi nary case under J ames and does not pr event

ADBW f r om bei ng a cr i me of vi ol ence under t he cat egor i cal

approach. 13

The pr eci se quest i on i n Har t was whet her ABDW i s a

vi ol ent f el ony under t he r esi dual cl ause of t he ACCA, whi ch

13 Gl over di d not expl i ci t l y addr ess t he r eckl ess dr i vi ngscenar i o. 558 F. 3d at 82.

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encompasses f el ony of f enses t hat “present [ ] a ser i ous pot ent i al

r i sk of physi cal i nj ur y t o anot her ” and ar e si mi l ar i n ki nd t o

cer t ai n l i st ed of f enses such as bur gl ar y, ar son, and ext or t i on. 18

U. S. C. § 924( e) ( 2) ( B) ( i i ) ; Har t , 674 F. 3d at 41. To be si mi l ar t o

t he enumer at ed of f enses, a cr i me must “‘ t ypi cal l y i nvol ve

pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve conduct . ’ ” I d. at 41 ( quot i ng

Begay v. Uni t ed St at es, 553 U. S. 137, 144- 45 ( 2008) ) . The

def endant i n Har t ar gued t hat Massachuset t s ABDW f ai l ed t hat

r equi r ement because a convi ct i on coul d r est on r eckl ess conduct

such as dr unk dr i vi ng. 674 F. 3d at 43. The cour t nonet hel ess

concl uded that “a composi t e of pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve

conduct i s t he nor m” under Massachuset t s ABDW. I d. at 44.

I n r eachi ng t hat concl usi on, t he Har t cour t speci f i cal l y

r ej ect ed t he gr ound on whi ch t oday’ s maj or i t y rest s:

I t i s t r ue t hat an ABDWconvi ct i on may r est ona r eckl essness t heor y, and i t i s noti nsi gni f i cant t hat r eckl ess ABDW may becommi t t ed wi t h a seemi ngl y i nnocent obj ectused i n a danger ous f ashi on, as i n t he case of r eckl ess, vehi cul ar ABDW. But t hi s f actpat t er n does not r epr esent t he vast maj or i t yof ABDW convi ct i ons, and our anal ysi s undert he r esi dual cl ause i s expl i ci t l y, andnecessar i l y, l i mi t ed t o t he “or di nar y case. ”

I d. at 43 ( f oot not es and ci t at i ons omi t t ed) ( quot i ng J ames, 550

U. S. at 208) . Thi s same poi nt was r ei t er ated on t he ver y next page

of t he opi ni on:

ACCA’ s enumer ated of f enses must onl y t ypi cal l yi nvol ve pur posef ul conduct , and so we mustl ook t o the usual ci r cumst ances of t he cr i me,

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not al l owi ng hypot het i cal f act pat t er ns t onegat e commonsense. I n consi der i ng t he“or di nar y case” of ABDW, we must concl ude t hata composi t e of pur posef ul , vi ol ent , andaggr essi ve conduct i s t he norm.

I d. at 44 ( quot i ng J ames, 550 U. S. at 208) ( ci t at i ons, al t er at i ons,

and i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) . Thus, Har t t wi ce concl uded

t hat r eckl ess ABDW i s not t he or di nar y case under J ames. Thi s

panel i s bound t o f ol l ow Har t . I n addr essi ng t he r esi dual cl ause

of Sect i on 16( b) , whi ch does not di f f er f r om t he ACCA’ s r esi dual

cl ause i n any rel evant r espect s, t he cour t need not concer n i t sel f

wi t h reckl ess ABDWbecause i t “does not r epr esent t he vast maj or i t y

of ABDW convi ct i ons. ” I d. at 43.

The maj or i t y suggest s t hat Har t ’ s di scussi on of t he

or di nar y case was “di ct um. ” Maj or i t y Op. at 24. I di sagr ee.

Begay speci f i cal l y hel d t hat dr unk dr i vi ng i s out si de t he scope of

t he pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve conduct r equi r ement of t he

ACCA, 553 U. S. at 144- 45, 14 and ot her cour t s of appeal s have agr eed

t hat t he ACCA def i ni t i on of “vi ol ent f el ony” does not i ncl ude

r eckl ess conduct , e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Smi t h, 544 F. 3d 781, 782

( 7t h Ci r . 2008) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Mor r i s, 527 F. 3d 1059, 1061 ( 10t h

14 Begay st at ed: “The l i st ed cr i mes [ i n t he ACCA] al l

t ypi cal l y i nvol ve pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi veconduct . . . . By way of cont r ast , st at ut es t hat f or bi d dr i vi ngunder t he i nf l uence, such as t he st at ut e bef or e us, t ypi cal l y donot . . . . [ U] nl i ke t he exampl e cr i mes, t he conduct f or whi ch t hedr unk dr i ver i s convi ct ed ( dr i vi ng under t he i nf l uence) need not bepur posef ul or del i ber at e. ” 553 U. S. at 144- 45 ( i nt er nal quot at i onmarks omi t t ed) .

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Ci r . 2008) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Her r i ck, 545 F. 3d 53, 59- 60

( 1st Ci r . 2008) ( concl udi ng t hat an of f ense r equi r i ng “cr i mi nal

negl i gence” di d not meet t he pur posef ul , vi ol ent , and aggr essi ve

conduct r equi r ement of Begay) . Hart coul d f i nd t hat Massachuset t s

ABDW was a “vi ol ent f el ony” under t he ACCA onl y by f i ndi ng t hat

r eckl ess dr i vi ng was not t he or di nar y case under J ames ( i t sel f a

case under t he ACCA r esi dual cl ause) , whi ch i s exact l y what Hart

di d. See 674 F. 3d at 43- 44. The J ames or di nar y case di scussi on i n

Har t was not di ct um.

The maj or i t y appear s t o suggest t hat Har t unnecessar i l y

appl i ed J ames’ s “ordi nar y case” st andar d because i t shoul d have

appl i ed Begay’ s “t ypi cal [ ] ” case st andar d, whi ch i s mor e

“per mi ssi ve. ” Maj or i t y Op. at 25- 25, 27, 28 n. 8. Of cour se, t hat

i s cont r ary t o Har t , whi ch vi ewed t he J ames and Begay st andards as

bei ng t he same. 674 F. 3d at 43- 44; see al so Uni t ed St ates v.

Dancy, 640 F. 3d 455, 470 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) . I t i s al so cont r ar y t o

t he vi ews of at l east t wo ot her ci r cui t s whi ch t r eat Begay and

J ames i nt er changeabl y. Uni t ed St at es v. Di smuke, 593 F. 3d 582, 594

( 7t h Ci r . 2010) ( under t he ACCA, cour t must ask whether t he cr i me,

“i n t he or di nar y or t ypi cal case, ” meet s both pr ongs of Begay) ;

Uni t ed St at es v. St i nson, 592 F. 3d 460, 466 ( 3r d Ci r . 2010) ( “[ W] e

must det er mi ne whet her t he ‘ or di nar y’ or ‘ t ypi cal ’ f act

scenar i o . . . i s suf f i ci ent l y ‘ purposef ul , vi ol ent , and

aggr essi ve’ t o qual i f y as a cr i me of vi ol ence af t er Begay. ” ( ci t i ng

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both Begay and J ames) ) . Cont r ary t o t he maj or i t y, Begay’ s

“t ypi cal [ ] ” case i s not di f f er ent f r om J ames’ s “or di nar y case. ”

Ther e i s al so no basi s f or appl yi ng t he or di nary case

r ul e di f f er ent l y t o Sect i on 16( b) t han t he ACCA. The ACCA def i nes

a “vi ol ent f el ony” as a cr i me t hat “i s bur gl ar y, ar son, or

ext or t i on, i nvol ves use of expl osi ves, or ot her wi se i nvol ves

conduct t hat pr esent s a ser i ous pot ent i al r i sk of physi cal i nj ur y

t o anot her . ” § 924( e) ( 2) ( B) ( i i ) . Sect i on 16( b) def i nes a “cri me

of vi ol ence” as an “of f ense t hat i s a f el ony and t hat , by i t s

nat ur e, i nvol ves a subst ant i al r i sk t hat physi cal f or ce agai nst t he

person or pr oper t y of anot her may be used i n t he cour se of

commi t t i ng t he of f ense. ” Bot h st at ut es requi r e pur posef ul act i on;

both st atut es excl ude negl i gent conduct . See Begay, 553 U. S. at

144- 45; Leocal , 543 U. S. at 11.

I do not t hi nk t he ACCA and Sect i on 16( b) ar e “mat er i al l y

di f f er ent st at ut e[ s] , ” as the maj or i t y suggest s. Maj or i t y Op. at

26. As I see i t , t her e ar e onl y t wo di f f er ences bet ween t he t wo

pr ovi si ons: one, t he ACCA enumer at es cer t ai n of f enses whi l e

Sect i on 16( b) does not , and t wo, t he ACCA r ef er s t o a “ser i ous

pot ent i al r i sk of physi cal i nj ur y” whi l e Sect i on 16( b) r ef er s t o a

“subst ant i al r i sk t hat physi cal f or ce agai nst t he per son or

pr oper t y of anot her may be used. ” Those di f f er ences ar e cer t ai nl y

i mpor t ant . See Leocal , 543 U. S. at 10 n. 7; Agui ar v. Gonzal es, 438

F. 3d 86, 88 ( 1st Ci r . 2006) . But nei t her di f f er ence suggest s that

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t he “or di nar y case” i nqui r y under J ames shoul d be di f f er ent under

t he t wo pr ovi si ons, or t hat Har t ’ s anal ysi s of t he or di nar y case of

ABDW as t o t he ACCA shoul d not appl y t o Sect i on 16( b) .

I I I .

The maj or i t y al so suggest s t hat Har t was wr ongl y deci ded

because i t s appl i cat i on of J ames was t oo br oad, and shoul d have

excl uded onl y “f anci f ul , hypot het i cal scenar i os. ” Maj or i t y Op. at

9; see al so i d. at 27. But J ames di d not def i ne t he i nqui r y so

nar r owl y. The Cour t def i ned “t he pr oper i nqui r y” as “whet her t he

conduct encompassed by t he el ement s of t he of f ense, i n the or di nary

case, pr esent s a ser i ous pot ent i al r i sk of i nj ur y t o anot her . ” 550

U. S. at 208. The Cour t caut i oned t hat one can al ways “hypothesi ze

unusual cases i n whi ch even a pr ot ot ypi cal l y vi ol ent cr i me mi ght

not present a genui ne r i sk of i nj ur y. ” I d. To be sur e, t hi s means

t hat cour t s appl yi ng t he cat egor i cal appr oach t o r esi dual cl auses

need not concer n t hemsel ves wi t h absurd hypothet i cal s. But t he

exampl es of “unusual ” cases t hat J ames gave are not so f ar - f et ched.

J ames expl ai ned:

One can al ways hypot hesi ze unusual cases i nwhi ch even a pr ot ot ypi cal l y vi ol ent cr i memi ght not pr esent a genui ne r i sk of i nj ur y- -f or exampl e, an at t empt ed murder wher e t hegun, unbeknownst t o t he shoot er , had no

bul l et s. Or , t o t ake an exampl e f r om t heof f enses speci f i cal l y enumer at ed i n [ t heACCA] , one coul d i magi ne an ext or t i on schemewher e an anonymous bl ackmai l er t hreat ens t or el ease embar r assi ng per sonal i nf or mat i onabout t he vi ct i m unl ess he i s mai l ed r egul arpayment s. I n bot h cases, t he r i sk of physi cal

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i nj ur y t o anot her appr oaches zero. But t hatdoes not mean that t he of f enses of at t empt edmur der or ext or t i on ar e cat egor i cal l ynonvi ol ent .

550 U. S. at 208. And, as descr i bed above, Begay ( f ol l owi ng J ames)

l ooked t o the “t ypi cal [ ] ” case of a cr i me, 553 U. S. at 144- 45, not

t o “f anci f ul , hypot het i cal scenar i os, ” Maj or i t y Op. at 9.

Ot her cour t s have not i nt erpr et ed J ames so narr owl y as

t he maj or i t y does t oday. Rel yi ng on J ames, t he Ni nt h Ci r cui t

concl uded t hat Or egon’ s bur gl ary l aw meet s t he ACCA’ s r esi dual

cl ause. Uni t ed St at es v. Mayer , 560 F. 3d 948, 963 ( 9t h Ci r . 2009) .

Even t hough t he st atut e had been appl i ed t o t he act of ent er i ng

publ i c phone boot hs t o st eal change, t he Ni nt h Ci r cui t f ound t hat

t hat was not t he or di nar y case. See i d. at 952- 53 ( Kozi nski , C. J . ,

di ssent i ng f r om t he deni al of r ehear i ng en banc) . 15 The Second

Ci r cui t concl uded t hat Connect i cut ’ s pr i son r i ot i ng st at ut e was a

vi ol ent f el ony under t he ACCA al t hough i n t wo cases i nmat es were

convi ct ed f or nonvi ol ent conduct . 16

15 See al so Del gado- Hernandez v. Hol der , 697 F. 3d 1125, 1129( 9t h Ci r . 2012) ( “[ W] e t oo may i magi ne a non- cust odi al parent whor ef uses t o r et ur n wi t h her chi l dr en f r oma vacat i on abr oad, t her ebyef f ect uat i ng a ki dnappi ng under § 207, wi t h mi ni mal r i sk of f or ce.However , we cannot adopt a Pol l yannai sh out l ook at t he margi ns of t he st at ut e; t he evi dence bef or e us i s t hat t he or di nar y case of ki dnappi ng i nvol ves a r i sk of vi ol ence. ” ( ci t at i on omi t t ed) ) .

16 Uni t ed St at es v. J ohnson, 616 F. 3d 85, 94 ( 2d Ci r . 2010)( quot i ng J ames, 550 U. S. at 208) . The cour t ’ s reasoni ng was qui t esi mi l ar t o Har t :

The f act t hat some ar guabl y nonvi ol ent conduct - - such asa hunger st r i ke–- mi ght vi ol at e t he st at ut e, or even t hat

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Fi nal l y, t he maj or i t y suggest s t hat J ames i s no l onger

good l aw af t er Descamps. See Maj or i t y Op. at 29- 30. But Descamps

onl y addr essed whet her cour t s may consul t chargi ng and si mi l ar

document s when a def endant was convi ct ed under an i ndi vi si bl e

st atut e. 133 S. Ct . at 2281. Descamps di d not di scuss J ames or

t he or di nary case rul e, and t he part i es i n Descamps never suggest ed

t hat J ames shoul d be over r ul ed. We are obl i gated t o f ol l ow Supr eme

Cour t pr ecedent unt i l i t i s expl i ci t l y over t ur ned. Hohn v. Uni t ed

St at es, 524 U. S. 236, 252- 53 ( 1998) ( “Our deci si ons r emai n bi ndi ng

pr ecedent unt i l we see f i t t o reconsi der t hem, r egar dl ess of

whet her subsequent cases have r ai sed doubt s about t hei r cont i nui ng

vi t al i t y. ”) . J ames i s st i l l good l aw.

some convi ct i ons under t he st at ut e have act ual l y i nvol vednonvi ol ent conduct , i s not di sposi t i ve. We r ecent l yhel d, i n Uni t ed St at es v. Thr ower , t hat “l ar ceny f r omt heper son” i s a vi ol ent f el ony under t he ACCA. 584 F. 3d 70,74 ( 2d Ci r . 2009) . We di d so not wi t hst andi ng t he f actt hat some conduct t hat i s nei t her vi ol ent nor aggr essi ve-- such as pi ckpocket i ng- - woul d sur el y be cover ed by t hest at ut e at i ssue i n t hat case. Si mi l ar l y, t he f act t hatt he sexual assaul t st at ut e at i ssue i n [ Uni t ed St at es v.

Daye, 571 F. 3d 225, 234 ( 2d Ci r . 2009) ] coul d have beenappl i ed t o t he conduct of consent i ng t eenager s di d notf or ecl ose a hol di ng t hat a ‘ t ypi cal i nst ance of t hi scr i me’ wi l l i ndeed i nvol ve vi ol ent and aggr essi veconduct .

I d. at 91 ( f oot not e omi t t ed) .

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I V.

I n my vi ew, t he maj or i t y’ s deci si on i s i nconsi st ent wi t h

Har t and J ames. I r espect f ul l y di ssent . 17

17 Fi sh al so ar gues t hat t he body ar mor st atut e exceedsCongr ess’ s power t o r egul ate i nt er st at e commer ce. As he appears t oconcede, t hat argument was al l but f orecl osed by Scarbor ough v.Uni t ed St at es, 431 U. S. 563 ( 1977) , whi ch appear ed t o assume theconst i t ut i onal i t y of a si mi l ar st at ut e banni ng f el on possessi on of f i r earms. Scarborough r emai ns good l aw, see Uni t ed St at es v.Car doza, 129 F. 3d 6, 11 ( 1st Ci r . 1997) , and I see no basi s f or

di st i ngui shi ng t he body ar mor s t at ut e. Ot her ci r cui t s have uphel dt he body armor st atut e on t he basi s of Scarborough. Uni t ed St atesv. Cook, 488 F. App’ x 643, 644- 46 ( 3d Ci r . 2012) ( unpubl i shed) ;Uni t ed St ates v. Al der man, 565 F. 3d 641, 645- 48 ( 9t h Ci r . 2009) ;Uni t ed St at es v. Scot t , 245 F. App’ x 391, 393 ( 5t h Ci r . 2007)( unpubl i shed) ; Uni t ed St at es v Pat t on 451 F 3d 615 634 36 ( 10t h

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