United States The Biswell Symposium: Agriculture Forest ... · and in the urban interface include social barriers, fire safety, fuel management, legal barriers, multiple jurisdictions,

The Biswell Symposium:Fire Issues and Solutionsin Urban Interface andWildland Ecosystems

February 15-17, 1994 Walnut Creek, California

United StatesDepartment ofAgriculture

Forest Service

Pacific SouthwestResearch Stationhttp://www.psw.fs.fed.us

General TechnicalReport PSW-GTR-158

Weise, David R.; Martin, Robert E., technical coordinators. 1995. The Biswell symposium: fire issues and solutions in urbaninterface and wildland ecosystems; February 15-17, 1994; Walnut Creek, California. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158.Albany, CA: Pacific Southwest Research Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 199 p.

These proceedings summarize the results of a symposium designed to address current issues about wildfire and prescribedfire in both the wildland-urban interface and in wildlands. Thirty-eight invited oral papers and 23 poster papers describing theissues and state-of-the-art solutions to technical, biological, and social challenges currently facing land and fire managers werepresented at The Biswell Symposium held February 15-17, 1994, in Walnut Creek, California.

Retrieval Terms: community response, ecosystem management, fire ecology, fire management, fuel management,prescribed burning

Technical Coordinators:

David R. Weise is Project Leader—Prescribed Fire Research at the Station’s Forest Fire Laboratory,4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507. Robert E. Martin is Professor Emeritus, Departmentof Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, 145 Mulford Hall,Berkeley, CA 94720.

Publisher:

Pacific Southwest Research StationAlbany, California(Mailing address: P.O. Box 245, Berkeley, CA 94701-0245Telephone: 510-559-6300http://www.pswfs.gov/

August 1995

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues andSolutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystemsFebruary 15–17, 1994 Walnut Creek, California

David R. Weise Robert E. Martin Technical Coordinators

Contents

In Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Memorial Dedication to Dr. Harold H. Biswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1James K. Agee

Acknowledgments

PLENARY SESSION—I SSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Oakland-Berkeley Hills Fire of 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7P. Lamont Ewell

Dr. Biswell’s Influence on the Development of Prescribed Burning in California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Jan W. van Wagtendonk

“What Do We Do Now, Ollie?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Robert L. Irwin

Fire History of the Local Wildland-Urban Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Neil R. Honeycutt

PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Fire: Why Aren’t We Doing More? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Local, State, and National PerspectivesDonald A. Pierpont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Ken Nehoda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Jerry T. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Institutionalizing Fire Safety in Making Land Use and Development Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Marie-Annette Johnson and Marc Mullenix

A Synopsis of Large or Disastrous Wildland Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Robert E. Martin and David B. Sapsis

Cooperative Efforts in Fuels Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Gerald L. Adams

ii USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

PANEL DISCUSSION: Barriers to Fuel Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Organizational Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Kenneth S. Blonski

Legal Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Anita E. Ruud

Federal Disaster Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45William J. Patterson

CONCURRENT SESSION I—Wildland Ecosystem Topics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Fire in Wildland Ecosystems—Opening Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Tom Nichols

Interagency Wilderness Fire Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Jim Desmond

FARSITE: A Fire Area Simulator for Fire Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Mark A. Finney

Funding Fuels Management in the National Park Service: Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Stephen J. Botti

Ecosystem Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Jim Boynton

PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Jerry Hurley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Ishmael Messer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70Stephen J. Botti. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70Jay Perkins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71L. Dean Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

CONCURRENT SESSION II— Urban Interface Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Use of Class A Foams on Structures and Wildlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Paul Schlobohm

Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Jack D. Cohen

Strategies for and Barriers to Public Adoption of Fire Safe Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Ronald W. Hodgson

Neighborhood Organization Activities: Evacuation Drills, Clusters, and Fire Safety Awareness . . . . 99Dick White

Conflicts Between Natural Resources and Structural Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Stephen Bakken

PANEL DISCUSSION: Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Moderator’s Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Neil R. Honeycutt

Contents

USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995. iii

The East Bay Vegetation Management Consortium:A Subregional Approach to Resource Management and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Tony Acosta

East Bay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Michael Bradley

The Bay Area Wildfire Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Todd E. Bruce

Social and Environmental Issues in Developing Vegetation and Fire Management Plans . . . . . . . . . 117Leonard Charles

PLENARY SESSION—Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Working to Make the Clean Air Act and Prescribed Burning Compatible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125Trent Procter

Comprehensive Fire Prevention Legislation Enacted by the California Legislaturein 1992 After the East Bay Firestorm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Rachel Richman

Florida’s Solution to Liability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131Dale Wade and James Brenner

The Role of Fire in Ecosystem Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139Jerry T. Williams

Structural Wildland Intermix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141Ronny J. Coleman

A Balanced Approach: Dr. Biswell’s Solution to Fire Issuesin Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147Carol Rice

POSTER SESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Use of Aerial Photography for Fire Planning and Suppression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151Alan H. Ambacher

Characteristics of Coastal Sage Scrub in Relation to Fire History and Use byCalifornia Gnatcatchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Jan L. Beyers and Ginger C. Peña

The Quest for All-Purpose Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Susan L. Frommer and David R. Weise

A High-Resolution Weather Model for Fire Behavior Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Francis M. Fujioka, John O. Roads, Kyozo Ueyoshi, and Shyh-Chin Chen

Using a Geographic Information System (GIS) to Assess Fire Hazard and Monitor NaturalResources Protection on the Mount Tamalpais Watershed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Thomas H. Gaman and Philip Langley

Homeowner Intervention in Malibu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161Tom Gardner

Contents

iv USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Legacy of Harold Biswell in Southern California: His Teaching Influenceon the Use of Prescribed Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Walter L. Graves and Gary Reece

Helping Wildland-Urban Interface Residents Reduce Wildfire Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Warren E. Heilman, Jeremy S. Fried, William A. Main, and Donna M. Paananen

Mt. Diablo Park: The Role of Fire in a Controversy About Cattle Grazing at the Urban Fringe . . . . 167Lynn Huntsinger, Jeremy Fried, and Lita Buttolph

Fire in a Tropical Savanna—a Double-Edged Sword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Andrea L. Koonce, Timothy E. Paysen, and Bonni M. Corcoran

People—Fire Managers Must Talk With Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Arthur W. Magill

The Effects of Forest Fire Smoke on Firefighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Richard J. Mangan

Burning in Arizona’s Giant Cactus Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175Marcia G. Narog, Andrea L. Koonce, Ruth C. Wilson, and Bonni M. Corcoran

A Computer Program for Evaluating Prescribed Fire Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177Philip N. Omi, Douglas B. Rideout, and Stephen J. Botti

Potential Nitrogen Losses due to Fire from Pinus halepensis Stands in the Alicante Province(Southeastern Spain): Mineralomass Variability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Antonio Pastor-Lopez and Joaquin Martin-Martin

Susceptibility to Potential Erosion After Fire in Mediterranean Ecosystemsin the Alicante Province (Southeastern Spain) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Antonio Pastor-Lopez and Joaquin Martin-Martin

Operational Fire/GIS Dilemmas—The Fire Report Form Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185Lucy Anne Salazar and Martha Shea Flattley

Progression of the Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187David B. Sapsis, Donald V. Pearman, and Robert E. Martin

Comparison of Fuel Load, Structural Characteristics and InfrastructureBefore and After the Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Scott L. Stephens, Domingo M. Molina, Ron Carter, and Robert E. Martin

FireNet—A Forum for International Curriculum Developmentin Fire Science and Management? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

A. Chris F. Trevitt, David G. Green, and David B. Sapsis

Lightning Strikes and Natural Fire Regimes in San Diego County, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193Michael L. Wells and David E. McKinsey

Modern Fire Test Methodologies for Building Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195Robert H. White and Mark A. Dietenberger

Brush Fire Hazard: An Analysis of the Topanga Fire Storm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197James A. Woods

Contents

USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995. v

In Brief…

Weise, David R.; Martin, Robert E., technicalcoordinators. 1995. The Biswell symposium: fire issuesand solutions in urban interface and wildlandecosystems; February 15-17, 1994; Walnut Creek,California. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. Albany,CA: Pacific Southwest Research Station, Forest Service,U.S. Department of Agriculture; 199 p.

Retrieval Terms: community response, ecosystem manage-ment, fire ecology, fire management, fuel management,prescribed burning

Fire has been and continues to be both a threat and benefitto humans and ecosystems. Recent large or costly fires

have occurred in both the wildland-urban interface and inthe wildlands. These phenomena are not new events butmerely recurrences of long-standing challenges. The valuesat risk include, but are not limited to, human life and property,rare or unique cultural and natural resources, and ecosystemhealth. Much progress has been made during the past severaldecades regarding fire’s role in wildland systems, but manyissues still remain to be resolved.

This volume presents the proceedings of the symposium,“Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems” held February 15-17, 1994 in Walnut Creek,California. The primary objective of the symposium was todescribe fire issues and problems currently facing landmanagers and to present state of the art solutions that arecurrently being implemented by local, State, and Federalorganizations concerned with fire management. The focalpoint of the symposium was the 1991 Oakland/BerkeleyHills “Tunnel Fire”; however, the issues and solutionsdescribed are certainly regional and national in scope.

Several key issues regarding the role of fire in wildlandsand in the urban interface include social barriers, fire safety,fuel management, legal barriers, multiple jurisdictions,

program cost and benefits, wildland health, conflicts betweenwildland resources and residential structures, air quality,and liability. Social barriers include lack of general knowledgeof fire’s role, as well as recognition of its hazards andbenefits. Legal barriers include laws, ordinances, andregulations that either restrict fire use or do not provideincentives for fire use. Implementing fire use on an ecosystemlevel requires cooperation between neighbors. The safety ofstructures built in urban interface settings or adjacent towildland boundaries is an issue the owner faces; the liabilityassociated with destruction by wildland fire is an issue thatland managers face.

Because of the complexity of the issues regarding fireand its use, many different solutions have been developed.Researchers have identified social barriers and concerns thathinder adoption of fire safe practices by the general public.Educational efforts to prevent the public from forgetting thelosses associated with catastrophic wildfires have beendeveloped. Legal solutions to fuel management and firehazard reduction have been developed in California andFlorida to address liability issues. Community andneighborhood-based associations have developed to promotefire-safe wildland-urban interfaces. Interagency agreementswere developed to apply prescribed fire at ecosystem levelsto mutual benefit. Environmentally safe fire suppressiontechniques have also been developed.

Many proactive approaches to solving these and otherfire issues were presented at the symposium. It is our hopethat the symposium attendees as well as readers of theseproceedings benefit from the array of topics discussed, andthat the information gained from the technical sessions andthis proceedings provides a starting point to solving localfire issues. This symposium presents a snapshot of thecontinually evolving dialogue about fire and its role as ashaper of ecosystems.

vi USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995. vii

Preface

Fire has been and continues to be both a threat and benefitto humans and ecosystems. Recent large or costly fires

have occurred in both the wildland-urban interface and in thewildlands. These phenomena are not new events but merelyrecurrences of long-standing challenges. The values at riskinclude, but are not limited to, human life and property, rareor unique cultural and natural resources, and ecosystem health.Much progress has been made during the past several decadesregarding the recognition of fire’s role in wildland systems,but many issues still remain to be resolved.

Dr. Harold “Doc” Biswell was a pioneering advocatefor the study of the ecological role of fire, for the use ofprescribed fire in land management, and for fuels management.He worked to reduce fire hazard in urban-wildland interfaceareas and lived to see one of his most dire predictions cometrue in the Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire” of October1991. A conference to honor Dr. Harold H. Biswell wasproposed shortly after his death in January 1992. Thissymposium was organized to honor Dr. Biswell by addressingwildland and urban-wildland fire issues and solutions—subjects dear to his heart. We dedicate this symposium andproceedings to the memory of Dr. Harold Biswell.

Approximately 350 managers, researchers, planners,former students of Dr. Biswell and other individuals attendedthe symposium in Walnut Creek, California. Because thewildland and structural fire communities were equallyrepresented in attendance, the goal to bring both groupstogether in a common forum was accomplished. Thesymposium consisted of two and one-half days of technicalpresentations, a one-half day field trip touring the 1991Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire,” a poster session, andan evening session dedicated to Dr. Biswell’s life and legaciesled by Dr. James K. Agee. The technical presentations werestructured around issues/problems and solutions in bothwildland and urban interface ecosystems. The major topicswere developed by a Steering Committee representing Federal,State, and local agencies, and university and non-governmentalorganizations. Speakers were selected to address the majortopics. Each technical session was chaired by a moderatorand included the following topics:

• History, safety, and legal and social barriers to prescribedfire (moderator—Sue Husari, USDA Forest Service)

• Wildland topics including funding of fire programs,ecosystem management, and prescribed fire (moderator—Tom Nichols, USDI National Park Service)

• Urban-wildland interface topics including use of foams,neighborhood action groups, and fire safety (moder-ator—Steve Bakken, California Department of Parksand Recreation)

• Legislation and ecosystem management solutions(moderators—Bruce Kilgore, USDI National Park Service;Carol Rice, Wildland Resource Management, Inc.).

The technical sessions included expert panel discussions.In addition to the session moderators, the panel moderatorsincluded Dr. Ron Wakimoto, University of Montana; ChiefNeil Honeycutt, California Office of Emergency Services;and Chief Rich Aronsen (retired), California Office ofEmergency Services.

In addition to the technical sessions, the conferencefeatured a keynote speech by Chief Lamont Ewell, OaklandFire Department, describing the 1991 Oakland/Berkeley Hills“Tunnel Fire” and a banquet with a memorial dedication toDr. Biswell by Dr. James Agee, University of Washington.The symposium concluded with a summary of the eventsand issues by Robert Mutch, USDA Forest Service (retired).

AcknowledgmentsA conference and proceedings of this size require a

great deal of effort from many individuals. We thank themembers of the Symposium Steering Committee—RichAronsen, Steve Bakken, Todd Bruce, Neil Honeycutt, SueHusari, Ken Nehoda, Tom Nichols, Carol Rice, Joe Rubini—for putting together a dynamic and interesting symposiumagenda. The Steering Committee was organized using theIncident Command System as the basic organizationalframework. Robert Martin initiated the idea for the conference,organized the Steering Committee and served as IncidentCommander (Symposium Chair); Carol Rice (Operations)was assisted by Ken Nehoda; Joe Rubini (Logistics) wasassisted by Neil Honeycutt and Todd Bruce; Sue Husari(Finance) was assisted by Tom Nichols and Steve Bakken;and David Weise (Planning) was assisted by Rich Aronsen.The efforts of Sandy Cooper and Bruce Winner, UniversityExtension - University of California, Davis, were key toproviding the logistical support of program materials,registration, hotel negotiations, bus negotiations, and otheractivities too numerous to mention. Joe Rubini and NeilHoneycutt with the assistance of University of California,Berkeley graduate students David Sapsis, Scott Stephens,Robert Schroeder, and Maria Gutierrez developed aninformative tour of the 1991 “Tunnel Fire” and fuelmanagement activities in the Oakland/Berkeley Hills.

We further acknowledge the efforts of Eugene Hansonand Bonnie Corcoran, Prescribed Fire Research Unit locatedat the Forest Fire Laboratory in Riverside, California inassembling the proceedings, and the editorial and graphicsassistance of Sandy Young, Laurie Dunn, Kathy Stewart,and Robert Robinson of the Station’s Research InformationServices. Thanks to all the authors during the long process ofmanuscript preparation, editing, and production. Lastly, weacknowledge the support provided by the following sponsors:University of California at Berkeley; Bay Area WildfireForum; City of Oakland; East Bay Regional Parks; CaliforniaDepartments of Forestry and Fire Protection, Parks andRecreation, Emergency Services, and the Fire Marshall’sOffice; USDI National Park Service; USDA Forest Service,Region 5; USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest ResearchStation; and the Society of American Foresters.

1USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Memorial Dedication to Dr. Harold H. Biswell 1

James K. Agee 2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Professor of Forest Resources, University of Washington, Seattle,WA 98195.

This conference has been named the Biswell Symposiumin honor of Professor Harold H. Biswell, pioneer fire

ecologist. To represent all that Harold stood for to all thosewho were touched by this great man is a humbling experience.The profession of fire management underwent a paradigmshift in the 1960’s, and the man who, more than any other,actually shifted the focus of the fire culture was Harold Biswell.I first met Professor Biswell in the early 1960’s as anundergraduate forestry student at the University of California,Berkeley. The idea of underburning forests to prevent moredestructive wildfires was a revolutionary idea in California atthe time, although fire was routinely used in some shrublands.Despite Dr. Biswell’s contributions to our profession, he waswidely criticized for the same ideas, presented in the sameway, for which he received so much favorable response laterin his career. Because some of his monikers, like “Harry theTorch” or “Dr. Burnwell,” were acquired during the earlydays of controversy, I never felt comfortable with them,although “Doc” seemed acceptable to him.

Early ControversiesTwo particular examples of the controversies of the

early days come to mind. The first was associated with apublic hearing and post-fire analysis after a human-causedwildfire near Hoberg’s Resort in the early 1960’s. This wasthe area where Doc had done some of his early prescribedburning, with Mr. Hoberg’s blessings. The wildfire came upto the edge of the resort as a crowning fire, and dropped tothe ground at the edge of Doc’s burn unit, where it wascontrolled. I found the transcripts of the hearing whilebrowsing through the unindexed stacks in the Forestry Library,University of California, Berkeley. At the hearing, ProfessorBiswell noted that in his opinion the fire had stopped becausethe fuels had been reduced in the prescribed burn area overseveral short-interval burns. Yet personnel from the firesuppression agency involved testified that the wind stoppedexactly at the edge of the prescribed burn unit, so that achange in weather was responsible for the change in firebehavior. They were probably right that the wind slowed,but it slowed because the prescribed burned area had adampening effect on the wildfire behavior. I was able to visitthe site years later and found all the trees dead in the wildfire

area and a healthy forest in the prescribed fire area. Anobjective analysis was sorely lacking, continuing a patternthat had persisted since the 1920’s in a religious zeal tocombat all fires.

At roughly the same time, the University of Californiaissued a press release concerning Harold’s research, in whichhe was quoted as saying the kinds of things he was to repeatfor the next three decades. The press release was a narrativewith quotes from Doc sprinkled throughout the text, portionsof which are presented here: “The pine forests in the SierraNevada were open and parklike, and the most importantagent in maintaining these conditions was frequent lightfires. This forest was truly a product of nature—natural manand natural environment. Since the white man has suppressedfires, Biswell pointed out, the forest vegetation and landscapehave undergone profound changes. To reverse these trends,Biswell recommends adopting a trick from nature andreturning to controlled fire as a tool in forest management.”All those who knew Doc have heard one or more of hisvariations on this theme, but in those days it elicited responsessuch as this one from a statewide fire prevention organization:“We reproduce it here verbatim (the press release) to showwhat is being said by opponents of fire prevention. This isthe type of opinionated misinformation being spread bysome people with quotable positions.” Those who knewHarold also knew he was very much an advocate of fireprevention, but that he felt that a balance between firesuppression, prevention, and use was critical. Smokey Bearjust could not say it all in one sentence anymore.

A continual barrage of attacks and accusations followedHarold Biswell around the State during this period of the late1950’s and early 1960’s. His colleague Harold Weaver, whoworked for the USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs and had beenspreading a similar message since the mid-1940’s, publishedarticles that were footnoted with a disclaimer from the agency.One had to be very courageous in those days, and it is easyfor us to forget those early days. A lesser man might haveretreated, but Harold strode on, focusing on spreading themessage that has been repeated many times, and taking thehigh road in terms of his professional demeanor. The logicof that message attracted many of us, including me, to becomeinterested in fire science as a career.

The Teacher and His ResearchHarold Biswell was a great teacher. I mentioned the

Biswell Symposium to a professional forest consultant, nowworking in southern Oregon, who was once a student at theUniversity of California at Davis, and one evening attended

2 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

a talk by Dr. Biswell on fire and forest management. He toldme it was the best lecture he had ever heard in 4 years ofcollege, and it profoundly altered his career path. And he isnot alone. Doc was a great wildlife ecologist, a range ecologist,and a forest ecologist—just a wonderful teacher. He wouldinterpret the landscape during driving trips throughoutCalifornia, with a fantastic ability to recall when a field hadbeen fertilized, or a forest underburned—and an uncannyability to identify plants at a distance that I could not evensee, much less identify. At Altamont Pass, southeast ofWalnut Creek, California, a common practice of farmerswas to fertilize fields using a template of letters, and theresulting letters, paid for by advertisers, would show up invisible “words” of different species composition andproductivity of grasses and forbs. He would predict thespecies composition from a quarter mile away, and when wewalked over from the highway, he was always right. Hisability to integrate management into multiple facets of forest,shrubland, and grassland ecosystems gave all of his studentsa well-rounded education.

Harold was a true renaissance man. His first emphasiswas in range management, and his work from the 1930’s inroot dynamics of grasses from Nebraska is still widely cited.Although the picture of Harold on the symposium packetshows him holding a clump of giant sequoia needles, Ithought at first he was holding a perennial grass and inspectingits roots, because he was never far from his range “roots.”By the time he came to California, he had been introduced tofire in the southeast United States, and began to look at firein the ecotones between forest and grassland. Fire wascommonly used in the early 1950’s in the foothills to expandgrazing capacity, and Harold investigated shrub and grassresponse. He also worked in wildlife management, on severaldeer range problems, particularly in the Tehama and LakeCounty regions. This experience enabled him to shift emphasisto the forest zone, and in particular Hoberg’s Resort in LakeCounty, California, where he successfully reduced shrubinvasion and fuel buildups in the pine forests of the resort.This was one of the first successful wildland-urban interfacefire projects, and was evidence of both his innovative outlookand practical approach. Later, as he focused on mixed-coniferforests, he and his colleagues and students investigated soils,hydrology, fuels, and air quality effects of fire. Harold wasalways reminding us of the interactions between all thesecomponents of the ecosystem. When new issues arose, hewas always learning more, teaching those around him, andalways with an enthusiasm and energy that amazed us students.

In 1967, I was one of his research assistants workingwith him at Whitaker’s Forest. What energy! He could outwalkmost of us, and at times outrun us. I will never forget thatduring one of our “little burns,” as he would call them,which we conducted with the help of inmate crews, weburned across a yellowjacket nest. Harold, an inmate, and Iwere kneeling around the vicinity of the nest at the time.Harold yelled and took off sprinting like Carl Lewis, leavingthe inmate and I to greet the bees! I still remember the

inmate and I looking at each other, astounded, as Doc safelybounded away as if shot from a cannon. The two of uslaggards, of course, provided great sport for the yellowjackets.In addition, many of the short courses and tours he led in the1970’s and 1980’s left the attendees gasping for breath asDoc finished talking at one site, and then would proceed atan incredible pace to the next stop.

One of the strengths of Harold’s approach was a secular,rather than a revivalist, approach to prescribed fire. Duringthe 1950’s and 1960’s, the only place where fire wascommonly used in forests was in the South. At the TallTimbers Research Center in Tallahassee, Florida, a series ofconferences were held, beginning in 1962, and the “word”about fire was disseminated to a wider audience. Harold hadseveral articles in the early issues of the conferenceproceedings, which have become classics since they wereinitially published 15 years ago. In 1967, he helped organizethe first western Tall Timbers conference, held appropriatelyat Hoberg’s Resort, the site of some of Harold’s earlyprescribed burning experiments. Many of the Tall Timbersstaff attended, and the concluding discussions were muchlike a fundamentalist revival meeting, with audience membersrising and “testifying” to the benefits of fire in the forest. Iwas shocked—I wanted to go into fire ecology, not theology!I later realized this represented part of the ongoing institutionalchange in the South, and was to some extent a reaction to theearlier fire prevention “Dixie Crusaders.” Harold’s moresecular western approach, focusing on the practicality offire integration into forest management, was better receivedin California (and relieved me greatly!).

Turning PointHis innovative ideas remained controversial during the

late 1960’s, but his tireless extension efforts attracted agrowing crowd of converts, including the National ParksAdvisory Board, which met at Whitaker’s Forest soonthereafter. He began to hold occasional extension tours,which soon grew in frequency and attendance. This periodwas a turning point in the profession’s views on fire, butturning that corner was not easy. Few of us will ever experiencethe professional hurdles faced by Harold and hiscontemporaries.

I also used to think of him as the Arthur Murray offire—he taught many agency people to dance, as they wouldvisibly fidget while Doc provided his frank analyses of siteconditions and fire hazards, and asked probing questions,usually in front of a class or tour group. Those of usaccompanying Doc were able to watch these dance lessonswith amusement and often learned a few dance stepsourselves—an essential part of our education. To be put onthe spot helped us think on our feet.

Publication was an important part of Harold’scontributions to our profession. He understood the need forpublication in basic science outlets like Ecology, ForestEcology and Management, or other scientific journals, and

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Memorial Dedication to Dr. Biswell


in more extension-oriented publications, too—those thatwould reach the public. His book, Prescribed Burning inCalifornia Wildland Vegetation Management, published in1989, was a classic integration of science and interpretation.Harold took a complex problem and presented a complexanswer, but in a way that most people could understand. Hisemphasis on publication has carried over to many of hisstudents and colleagues.

By examining the profession’s current status, and thesuccess of Professor Biswell’s students—all of those hetouched—we can conclude that Harold Biswell has left agreat legacy. Dr. Harold Biswell will always be rememberedas a naturalist, ecologist, scientist, artist, author, innovator,friend, and teacher. The investment he made in his studentswill be repaid for the remainder of our lives. The disciplineof wildland fire will never be the same. Thank you, ProfessorHarold Biswell!

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Memorial Dedication to Dr. Biswell

PLENARY SESSION—ISSUES



The Oakland-Berkeley Hills Fire of 1991 1

P. Lamont Ewell 2


2Fire Chief, Oakland Fire Department, 1605 Martin Luther King Jr. Way,Oakland, CA 94612.

night. Fire crews had returned that morning to check for anyhot spots and to pick up equipment, and were on the scenefor 2 hours before the fire suddenly escaped the area oforigin because of high winds.

Eyewitness accounts testify that a sole ember blew intoa tree just outside the burn area, and the tree exploded intoflames. The resulting fire was quickly out of control—ragingaround and over firefighters who were suddenly fighting fortheir lives. Over the course of the next several days, the firewould leave 25 dead, 150 injured, and a total of 3,810dwelling units destroyed. The fire, which burned over 1,500acres within an area of 5.25 square miles, would result inover $1 billion in damages (OFD 1992, FEMA 1992).

Rescue and evacuation efforts were made as firefighterswere forced to fall back to defensible space.

Immediately, calls were placed to request additional fireunits and air drops. Soon, streets were clogged with residentstrying to get out and sightseers and emergency personneltrying to get in.

The fire quickly established four fronts: west downhilltoward California Highway 24 and the Rockridge district,north toward the Claremont Hotel, south toward BroadwayTerrace, and east toward Contra Costa County.

The Oakland Fire DepartmentThe Oakland Fire Department is composed of three

geographic districts, known as battalions, that are commandedby district chiefs 24 hours a day. As the fire progressed, theon-duty chiefs assumed new roles. Assistant Chief DonaldMatthews was the Incident Commander, Battalion Chief JamesRiley was assigned as Division “A” Commander, and BattalionChief Ronald Campos responded to Oakland Fire DispatchCenter to coordinate logistics, recall, and dispatch functions.

Later, Assistant Chief John K. Baker responded fromhome and was assigned the role of Incident Commanderwhen Assistant Chief Matthews became Operations Chief.At approximately 11:45 a.m. Fire Chief P. Lamont Ewellarrived on the scene at the Command Post and officiallyassumed command.

The Oakland Fire Department uses the Incident CommandSystem (ICS) to manage all emergency incidents, as was thecase with the Tunnel Fire. The system consists of an IncidentCommander who directly supervises four functional groups:operations, planning, logistics, and finance.

The operations and planning functions were conductedat the scene from the Department’s Mobile Command Post,while logistics and finance functions were conducted fromthe Dispatch Center.

Sunday, October 20, 1991, will be remembered as thedate of America’s most costly urban-wildland fire (FEMA

1992) and one of the worst fires involving loss of life andproperty since the Great San Francisco Earthquake and Fireof 1906 (OFD 1992).

The magnitude and range of what is simply referred toas the “Tunnel Fire” is far beyond the experience of anyliving American firefighter. Only those who fought theChicago Fire last century and those who battled the GreatFire in San Francisco would be able to identify with thisconflagration and firestorm.

A firestorm is defined as a fire which creates its ownweather. This was certainly the case in Oakland, California—the fire itself contributed to its own spread by supplyingwind to an already very windy day. A conflagration has beendescribed as a fire which exceeds the boundaries of the cityblock of origin. The Tunnel Fire did much more than this byburning neighborhood after neighborhood. Both firestormand conflagration are accurate terms when applied to theTunnel Fire; neither, however, comes close to adequatelydescribing what actually transpired.

The origin of the fire was on a steep hillside in whatsome refer to as a box canyon, above California State Highway24, near the entrance to the Caldecott Tunnel. This is awooded area with heavy underbrush, narrow streets, andsteep terrain, densely populated with expensive houses. Theunusual weather conditions of that day resulted in:

a foehn wind that, at speeds in excess of 65miles per hour, raced down from the crest of theOakland-Berkeley Hills. Coupled with recordhigh temperatures well into the nineties, the hotdry winds gusted and swirled through five yearsof drought-dry brush and groves of freeze-damaged Monterey Pines and Eucalyptus groves.All the conditions for a major fire disaster werepresent that morning of October 20, 1991.(FEMA 1992)

Firefighters were on the scene overhauling hot spotsfrom a fire the previous day. It is important to note thatSaturday’s fire had been completely doused, hose lines hadbeen left in place surrounding the burn area, and the fire areahad been checked by an Oakland Fire company during the

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues


The Dispatch Center was the basic structure of initialmanagement of the Tunnel Fire. This structure remainedintact until late in the evening on October 20 when theCalifornia Department of Forestry and Fire Prevention (CDF)provided an overhead management team to assist with theenormous task of managing such a large fire.

At this point a Joint Command was established thatconsisted of Oakland, Berkeley, and Piedmont FireDepartments and the CDF. Oakland firefighters were assistingwith evacuation efforts as they were forced to retreat fromthe advancing inferno. Division “A” Battalion Chief JamesRiley and Oakland Police Officer John Grubensky werekilled while trying to help citizens escape the fire. BothBattalion Chief Riley and Officer Grubensky were foundwith the remains of those people they were trying to help.These courageous men were very aware of their risky positionsand had ample opportunities to save themselves, but refusedto leave before the evacuation of residents was complete.

The rapid spread of the fire in four different directionspresented both line firefighters and chief officers withnumerous strategic challenges.

EvacuationEven though evacuation of residents is a responsibility

assigned to the Oakland Police Department, fire units wereheavily involved with this effort while trying to stop theadvancing flames. It has been estimated that more than10,000 people were evacuated from the burn area, some byway of very narrow streets, through blinding smoke andblowing debris.

The WindThe wind played a most crucial part in the scenario

which manifested once the fire was established. The windblew into the Oakland Hills from the east and over and downridge tops. It forced flames to swirl in many different directionscausing the fire to burn downhill as quickly as, and in somecases more quickly than, uphill.

The strength and speed of the wind prevented firefighterson the scene from falling back to defensible space becausethere was no place to hide. Fire crews were trapped andforced to protect themselves under umbrellas of water as theflames roared over and around them. One veteran firefighterobserved the fire progress 100 yards in 15 seconds.

This Santa Ana-type wind pushed the fire along widefronts, bypassed firefighters who were making a stand, andthen left them in isolated pockets of unburned areas. Thewind whipped the fire into the Hiller Highlands Developmentand consumed all combustibles (homes, vegetation, andvehicles) in 16 minutes. The wind caused the fire to pre-heateverything in its path which resulted in structures and contentsexploding into flame almost instantly (OFD 1992).

Pilots flying California Department of Forestryhelicopters complained that their bucket drops were not

effective because the water vaporized as the strong windsdispersed it over the intensely hot fire.

Communications

The Oakland Fire Department used two operational radiofrequencies to communicate between the Dispatch Centerand the 30 fire companies in the City. Communication withother jurisdictions is usually accomplished on the state-widemutual aid frequency which is referred to as the “WhiteFire” channel.

The effectiveness of these frequencies was soon reducedbecause of the overwhelming load placed upon them by fireunits requesting assistance, commanders trying to placeresources, and the Dispatch Center’s attempts to send firecompanies into the burn area.

These problems were compounded by additional fireunits from surrounding cities as they began to arrive to assistwith the fire. The steep hilly terrain in the Oakland Hills alsointerfered with radio signals, in some cases creating “deadspots” which drastically reduced radio effectiveness.

Mutual AidRequests for mutual aid in the form of air support and fire

suppression units were made during the initial stages of thefire, and additional requests continued throughout the day.

Mutual aid requests are processed through the CaliforniaOffice of Emergency Services (OES). Requests werechanneled through Alameda County OES which is dividedinto north and south zones, and then from the county level tothe state.

By late afternoon, 370 fire engines from as far away asthe Oregon-California state line in the north, from Bakersfieldin the south, and from Nevada to the east, were in, or on theirway to, Oakland.

Aircraft in the form of helicopters and large air tankersfrom hundreds of miles away made hundreds of water dropson the fire.

This was the largest mutual aid effort ever undertaken,at that time, in the State of California (OFD 1992).

Water SupplyFire units lost water at the height of the fire, forcing

them to retreat because the supply tanks and reservoirs whichprovide water to the hill area were emptied. Reasons for theloss of water were :

• Extraordinary fire suppression efforts used atremendous amount of water (an estimated 20million gallons).

• Residents were hosing down their roofs andvegetation, and many sprinklers were left runningafter evacuation.

• As homes were consumed by the fire, the waterservice supplying those homes began to flow freely.



technology, such as Forward Looking Infrared Radar to findsubterranean hot spots, and testing new products such asClass “A” foam.

Weather MonitoringTwo “Remote Automated Weather Stations” (RAWS)

have been installed in strategic locations in the Oakland Hills.These weather stations continuously provide the FireDepartment with updates in weather conditions. The FireDepartment increases its level of response accordingly, as thewind speed and the temperature rise and the humidity drops.

Initial response to the report of fire varies with theseverity of weather conditions. For example, low hazarddispatch requires three fire engines and two patrols. Responseon high hazard days requires six fire engines, four patrols,and a helicopter, as well as the predeployment of enginecompanies to locations in and around high fire hazard areas.

Communications ImprovementsThe Oakland Fire Department has recently converted to

an 800 megahertz radio system which provides a virtuallyunlimited number of radio talk groups. It is expected thatthis will mitigate much of the overload of tactical channelsthat was experienced during the initial stages of the fire.

In addition, proposals have been made to fire departmentssurrounding the City of Oakland to permit those jurisdictionsto participate in the 800 megahertz radio system.

Water SupplyAdapters have been purchased and installed on all fire

hydrants within the City of Oakland. These adapters willchange the coupling size on the hydrants to 2.5 inches. Thiswill standardize Oakland’s hydrants, thus allowing mutualaid fire departments to hook up to Oakland’s water supply.

Vegetation ManagementApproximately 16,000 Oakland Hills area parcels have

been inspected by Oakland Fire Department units. Fireinspectors are requiring brush to be cleared 30 to 100 feetaway from structures, and at least 10 feet away from propertylines and the street. All chimneys are required to have anapproved spark arrestor with no trees or bushes within 10feet. Compliance has been for the most part good, and violatorshave been cited and forced to abate their hazardous conditions.

Mutual AidOakland has negotiated agreements with the cities of

Berkeley, San Leandro, Alameda, Piedmont, and with theEast Bay Regional Parks District to establish Mutual ResponseArea (MRA) Agreements. These agreements provide for anautomatic response when a fire is reported within the MRA.

Hiller Highlands alone accounted for over 400water services.

• Water supplying the tanks and reservoirs is pumpedfrom lower parts of Oakland to the higherelevations. The electrically powered supply pumpscould not replenish depleted tanks once the firedestroyed power lines to the pumps.

• Some areas, such as the Rockridge district (whichwas developed in the 1920’s), were supplied by4-inch mains that are considered to be insufficientby today’s standards. They could not supplyenough water to fight a fire of this magnitude.

Many mutual aid fire engine companies could not hookup to Oakland fire hydrants because their 2.5-inch hosecouplings were not compatible with Oakland’s 3-inch couplings.

AftermathThe Tunnel Fire will long be remembered for the

magnitude of its destruction. The fire was viewed on primetime television around the world; it has been documented byprofessionals and laymen alike. The origin of the fire hasbeen and continues to be the focus of investigation.

The Fire Investigation Unit of the Oakland FireDepartment Fire Prevention Bureau has ultimate responsibilityfor finding the cause of the fire. Inspectors from the FireInvestigation Unit have worked with the Governor’s TaskForce which is represented by the California State FireMarshal’s Office and the Alameda County Fire InvestigationTeam. The Alameda County Fire Investigation Team iscomposed of representatives from the District Attorney’sOffice and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire Arms,along with investigators from the surrounding fire districts.

Fifteen hundred man-hours were spent in the first weekfollowing the fire, most of that time conducting interviewswith survivors and performing overhaul operations by siftingthrough debris, searching for evidence.

The origin of the Tunnel Fire is located next to 7151Buckingham Road. The cause of the fire, however, is stillunder investigation.

The Oakland Fire Department, as well as every other firedepartment in the state, has learned much about wildland/urban intermix fires. Much has been accomplished in the past3 years since the fire. The Oakland Fire Department iscommitted to doing everything possible to prevent a repeat ofthe 1991 Firestorm. The following is a partial account ofactions taken by the Oakland Fire Department since theconflagration.

Firefighting Training and TacticsOFD personnel have received intensive wildland training

from the California Department of Forestry and FirePrevention as well as other agencies with wildland expertise.New tactics include cold trailing (scraping the perimeter ofthe burn area to reveal unburned soil), utilizing new



will have a one-hour rating. Additionally, the citizens ofOakland have passed a $51 million bond to prepare the Cityor future disasters.

ReferencesFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 1992. Hazard mitigation

report for the East Bay Fire in the Oakland-Berkeley Hills in responseto the October 22, 1991 Federal disaster declaration covering AlamedaCounty, California. FEMA-919-DR-CA.

Oakland Fire Department. 1992. The Oakland Tunnel Fire, October 20,1991. A comprehensive report. Available from the Oakland FireDepartment, 1605 Martin Luther King Jr. Way, Oakland, CA 94612.

Borderline residents who report a fire will have a responsefrom both sides of the City limits, and in many cases theywill receive a faster response.

The Oakland Fire Department is committed to providingthe highest quality of fire protection to the residents of Oakland.

Codes and OrdinancesThe City has adopted an ordinance which requires Class

“A” roofs on new structures and replacement roofs withinthe high fire hazard area. Further, all siding on new structures



suppression on fuel accumulations. A program to improveforage for livestock by burning ranch lands was active in the1940’s and 1950’s, but gradually declined as concern aboutthe liability for escapes increased. Understory burning,particularly in ponderosa pine, did not become common untilthe late 1950’s and continues today.

Burning by Native AmericansNative Americans have resided in the Sierra Nevada for

at least 3,000 years (Reily 1987). Evidence of their use offire has been found in some of the oldest deposits of culturalmaterial. Fire was used to clear undergrowth, ease foodgathering and hunting, and favor vegetation used for specificpurposes (Reynolds 1959, Wickstrom 1987). Ethnographicstudies have shown that the primary use of fire by NativeAmericans in the Sierra Nevada was to manage plants forbasketry materials (Anderson 1993). In addition to fires setby humans, lightning ignitions ensured that fire was pervasiveon the landscape when European Americans arrived inCalifornia.

Light BurningEuropean settlers used fire indiscriminately to clear areas

for farming, ranching, and mining. The impacts of suchburning was not a concern because vegetation was thought ofas a nuisance rather than a resource. By the beginning of thecentury, timber became more important and attempts weremade to suppress fires (Clar 1959). Some landowners feltthat excluding all fires from the land was not beneficial in thelong run and that light burning could be used to reduce fuelhazards (Hoxie 1910). Forestry professionals claimed thatany fire in the forest was bad and that public and privatelands should be managed under a policy of systematic fireprotection (DuBois 1914). White (1920) countered with acritique of the fire protectionist policy. The controversy didnot subside until USDA Forest Service researchers concludedthat light burning was ineffective, impractical, andeconomically indefensible (Show and Kotok 1924). Fireprotection became institutionalized in California in 1924when the State Board of Forestry adopted the policy of fireexclusion (Pyne 1982).

Ranch and Game Range BurningIn the early 1940’s, ranchers and hunters became

concerned that rangelands used by livestock and wildlife haddeclined in value because of increasing brush density (Biswell

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban and Wildland Ecosystems,February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Research Scientist, Yosemite Field Station, National Biological Service,U.S. Department of the Interior, P.O. Box 700, El Portal, CA 95318.

Abstract: Prescribed burning in California has evolved from theoriginal practices of the Native Americans, through years of ex-perimentation and controversy, to finally become an acceptedecosystem management activity. When Dr. Harold Biswell arrivedin California, he began research on improving game range byusing prescribed fires and on understory burning in ponderosapine (Pinus ponderosa Dougl. ex Laws.) stands. Through a seriesof field days that included demonstration burns, Dr. Biswell wasable to educate and inform both the public and professional forest-ers about the benefits of prescribed fires. These field days becamethe basis for several university extension courses and were influ-ential in changing the prescribed fire policies of numerous agen-cies. As the problem of urban encroachment into wildlands contin-ues, the need for safe and effective prescribed burns will increase.Dr. Biswell’s sound research, presentation of the facts, and pa-tience with people and fire should guide us in the application offire in wildland ecosystems.

A lthough many people have contributed to thedevelopment of prescribed burning in California, Dr.

Harold H. Biswell was a major influence on the acceptanceand application of fire in wildland ecosystems. Acceptancedid not come easily. A history of abuse of fire and theperception that California’s climate and topography precludedthe use of fire galvanized objections to prescribed burning.By using his thorough research, enthusiastic teaching, andfield demonstrations, Dr. Biswell was able to gain the respectof public and professional audiences alike. As a result of hisuntiring efforts, agencies began to change their policies toinclude the use of fires. His ideas became even more relevantas urban development thrust its way into wildland ecosystems.

History of Prescribed Burningin California

Native Americans were the first practitioners ofprescribed burning for managing vegetation. When EuropeanAmericans settled the coastal and foothill areas of California,indiscriminate burning occurred. In response to the destructionperceived to be a result of burning, some attempted toexclude all fires from the landscape. A few land ownersbegan to use light burning to counter the effects of fire

Dr. Biswell’s Influence on the Development of PrescribedBurning in California 1

Jan W. van Wagtendonk 2



1989). In addition to reduced grazing capacities, theaccumulation of brush posed a hazard, especially for arsonfires. The California Division of Forestry (which later becamethe Department of Forestry and Fire Protection) recognizedthese problems and in 1945 began to issue burning permitsto landowners. For the first time in two decades, the use offire was officially sanctioned by a government agency.

When Dr. Biswell arrived in California in 1947, hebegan working with ranchers on their burning operations,and he conducted research on improving game range byusing prescribed fires in chaparral. His first efforts were atTeaford Forest in the Sierra Nevada foothills in MaderaCounty. There he worked with ranchers and farm advisors todevelop techniques for using fire to kill some of the woodyvegetation and then replace it with grasses to increase thegrazing capacity for livestock (Biswell 1963, 1967). Rangeimprovement burning reached its peak in 1955 when over200,000 acres were burned (Biswell 1989). As more homeswere built on adjacent wildlands, range improvement burningdeclined primarily because landowners were held liable forany damage from escaped fires.

Ranchers and public agencies tried to improve wildlifehabitat using type conversion burns. Extensive areas on theMendocino National Forest and on lands administered bythe Bureau of Land Management were burned (Burma 1967,Doman 1967). Dr. Biswell’s research was conducted inchamise (Adenostoma fasciculatum H.& A.) chaparral inLake County in conjunction with the California Departmentof Fish and Game (Biswell 1954, 1961). Prescribed burnswere used to create openings in the brush for deer, to encouragesprouting, and to favor herbaceous species. This resulted ina three- to four-fold increase in deer populations in theburned areas. Like range improvement, burning for wildlifehabitat declined because of the economic costs and the liabilityfor escapes.

Understory Burning inPonderosa Pine

Although light burning in the forest had been practicedfor many years before 1924, State and Federal policies requiredstrict suppression and precluded using fire for forestmanagement purposes. Prescribed fires were acceptable forgrass and brush lands but not in the pine forests (Biswell1989). Based on his experience in the southeast, Dr. Biswellfelt that prescribed burns could reduce fuel hazards in pinestands so that wildfires would be less destructive and easierto control.

In 1951, Dr. Biswell started research on understoryburning in ponderosa pine stands at Teaford Forest and atHoberg’s Resort in Lake County. The purpose of this burningwas to improve timber production by controlling brush inthe understory, reducing fire hazards, and thinning. Burnplots at Hoberg’s showed that the number of manzanita(Arctostaphylos viscida Parry) seedlings in second–growthponderosa pine stands can be substantially reduced and that

pine seedlings may appear in abundance (Biswell and Schultz1958). Additional studies showed that prescribed fire couldbe used to reduce fuel hazards (Biswell 1959, 1960; Biswelland Schultz 1956; Sweeney and Biswell 1961).

One of the most dramatic results of Dr. Biswell’s researchat Hoberg’s occurred when a wildfire burned into an areapreviously prescribe burned and was easily controlled (Biswell1963). In the treated area scarcely any needles on the treeswere scorched, while outside of it a majority of the treeswere killed. Thinning stands of ponderosa pine diminisheddebris accumulation for at least 20 years, and whenaccompanied with fertilization, increased growth by 134percent (Agee and Biswell 1970a, b).

Burning in Giant Sequoia and MixedConifer Forests

In 1965, Dr. Biswell started his research on fuel reductionand stand modification in giant sequoia (Sequoiadendrongiganteum [Lindl.] Buchholz) and mixed conifer stands atWhitaker’s Forest near Sequoia and Kings Canyon NationalParks. There, he and his students started a series of studiesthat would contribute greatly to the refinement of the scienceof prescribed burning. Litter production studies set the stagefor recognizing that different species had varying fuelcharacteristics that would affect fire behavior (Agee andothers 1978, Biswell and others 1966). Costs for cutting,piling, and broadcast burning giant sequoia stands to reducefire hazards ranged from $115 to $146 per acre (Biswell andothers 1968). Giant sequoia seedling survival was studied onburned and unburned areas that had been manipulated byAgee and Biswell (1969). They found 100 percent mortalityof giant sequoia seedlings on the unburned plot, while 96 outof 1,253 survived on the burned plot.

Adjacent to Whitaker’s Forest, in the Redwood MountainGrove of Kings Canyon National Park, Hartesvelt and Harvey(1967) started another study on giant sequoia regenerationafter fire. Harvey and others (1980) synthesized what wasknown about giant sequoia ecology in a single volume.

Graduate students took the opportunity to learn fromDr. Biswell’s experience and wisdom. Bruce Kilgore (1968),a student of Dr. Starker Leopold, studied the breeding birdpopulations in managed and unmanaged stands of giantsequoia at Whitaker’s Forest. Jim Agee (1968, 1973) did hismasters degree work on fuel conditions at Whitaker’s andhis doctorate on the effects of prescribed fires on forest floorproperties. My work (van Wagtendonk 1972, 1974) on fireand fuel relationships was conducted in Yosemite NationalPark because of insufficient ponderosa pine stands atWhitaker’s and because the Forest Service was not amenableto burning on its land.



managed as complete ecosystems that include fire (Leopoldand others 1963). The close association with Dr. Biswelland attendance at his field days undoubtedly influenced Dr.Leopold. The report was incorporated into National ParkService policy in 1968.

Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks started a firemanagement program in 1968 that included environmentalrestoration burns, prescribed natural fires, and research(Kilgore 1971, Kilgore and Briggs 1972, Parsons 1976).Yosemite’s prescribed burning program followed in 1970and its prescribed natural fire program in 1972 (vanWagtendonk 1978). Dr. Biswell and his former studentsplayed pivotal roles in these programs in both parks.

Similar to the conditions at Hoberg’s Resort, wildfireshave burned into park areas that have been previously burnedby prescribed fires. When the Pierce fire crowned uphill intothe Redwood Mountain Grove in Kings Canyon, it droppedto the ground in an area that had been burned five yearsbefore (Stephenson and others 1991). The eventual controlof the A-Rock fire in Yosemite in 1990 was attributed, inpart, to the prescribed burns in the area that had greatlyreduced fuels in the understory (Clark 1990).

California Department of Parks and Recreation

Many California State Park rangers and managers haveattended Dr. Biswell’s classes and field days. Their experienceformed the basis for programs to restore fire to the StateParks. In 1975, fire was carefully applied in Calaveras BigTrees State Park to allow the ecosystems to operate as naturallyas possible (Biswell 1989). By 1982, prescribed burningprograms were started in several other parks including Mt.Diablo, Cuyamaca Rancho, Big Basin Redwoods, andMontana de Oro.

Rangers are required to take intensive courses in fireecology and have supervised field experience before theyare certified to burn. Dr. Biswell and some of his formerstudents have taught in these classes.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection(CDF)

The CDF was involved in the range burning program inthe 1950’s, but soon emphasized the protection function offire management. Over the intervening years, many personnelfrom the agency have attended field days and special “showme” trips conducted by Dr. Biswell. At one of these fielddays, he recalled a CDF ranger stating, “In the fifties wewere all making fun of Harold and fighting him. Now, 30years later, we are all working for him” (Biswell 1989).

The single biggest impediment to burning on privatelands was removed when Senate Bill 1704 was enacted in1981. This bill authorized a vegetation management programfor brush-covered lands and the CDF to contract with privatelandowners to burn on their properties. The liability issuewas dealt with by requiring insurance and escrow accountsas well as state assumption of responsibility for the operation.

Field Days and Extension CoursesBeginning with the work at Hoberg’s, Dr. Biswell

conducted field days to discuss prescribed burning and todemonstrate its use with a small fire. These earlydemonstrations were controversial because many people werestill uncomfortable with the idea of burning (Biswell 1989).The field days were very educational, however, and numerousresource professionals and members of the public wereenlightened about the use of fire.

My first exposure to prescribed fire was at a field daysponsored by Dr. Biswell at Whitaker’s Forest. In attendancewere Dr. Leopold, other prominent scientists, severalrepresentatives from the USDI National Park Service andthe USDA Forest Service, and other interested people. Livelydiscussions occurred that planted the seed for policy changesthat were yet to come. On the last field day at Whitaker’sForest in 1973, 175 people attended. If the field days hadcontinued, Dr. Biswell felt that the attendance might havesoared to over 250 people (Biswell 1989).

After Dr. Biswell retired in 1973, he taught a class on fireecology at the University of California at Davis for 2 years.For the next 8 years he taught four university extension classes.Fire ecology of forests was the subject at Yosemite NationalPark, while the course at Mt. Diablo State Park covered chaparralfire ecology. Classes were held on giant sequoia fire ecologyat Calaveras State Park and fire ecology basics in San DiegoCounty. These courses attracted many students, agency workers,and the general public. The mix of participants ensured thatthere was a good exchange of information and a healthyreexamination of attitudes about fire. Although retired, Dr.Biswell was requested by students to be on their dissertationcommittees as an emeritus professor. Under his guidance, RonWakimoto (1978) completed his doctorate on the effects offires in chaparral in San Diego County.

Prescribed Burning PoliciesDr. Biswell’s influence on agency policies and attitudes

about prescribed fire have been both subtle and profound.The National Park Service and the California Department ofParks and Recreation have sought his advice and counseland have altered their policies as a result. Less direct, butjust as important, has been his influence on the Forest Serviceand the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

National Park Service

Although experimental burning had started in EvergladesNational Park in 1951 (Robinson 1962), National Park Servicepolicy did not include the use of fire at that time. Impetusfor a change came from university researchers in California.In 1962, the Secretary of the Interior asked Dr. Leopold tohead a committee to examine wildlife management concernsin the National Parks. The committee did not confine itsreport to wildlife, but rather recommended that parks be



Forest Service

From its inception in 1905, the Forest Service had astrict policy of fire exclusion. In 1943, an exception to thepolicy was allowed on National Forest lands in the longleafpine (Pinus palustris Mill. ) and slash pine (Pinus elliottiiEngelm) types, where private owners had burned for decadesand Forest Service research had shown beneficial effects(Schiff 1962). Dr. Biswell conducted some of the early researchwhile employed by the Forest Service at the SoutheasternForest Experiment Station. In 1941, he started his work onthe integration of prescribed burning, timber production, andlivestock grazing (Biswell 1958).

The Forest Service began to examine its fire exclusionpolicy in the early 1970’s. A retreat for regional fire controlofficers in 1974 brought together experts from outside theService to share their expertise. Interestingly, Dr. Biswellwas not invited to attend, but several of his former studentsgave presentations. It was not until 1978 that the nationalpolicy changed to encompass total fire management includingprevention, suppression, and use. Some of the people whowere instrumental in these changes had first been exposed tothe idea of prescribed burning through Dr. Biswell’s writingsor by attendance at one of his field days.

The FutureIn the years to come, Dr. Biswell’s influence will continue

to be felt throughout the fire community. In particular, as theproblem of urban encroachment into wildlands continues,the need for safe and effective prescribed burns will increase.His intuitive knowledge of wildland fuels led him to recognizethe real threat of the recent fires in Oakland and Berkeley.Research into the weather conditions leading up to theconflagration that destroyed 625 homes in Berkeley in 1923convinced him that, if fuels were not treated, such an eventcould recur (Biswell 1989). And in 1970 it did, when 37homes were destroyed in the Berkeley and Oakland hills.Research on fuel hazards guided by him showed that thepotential for even more destructive fires was present (Ageeand others 1973). The 1991 Tunnel fire in Oakland andBerkeley underscored his alarm.

When Dr. Biswell first started his research on fire inCalifornia, Dean Walter Mulford of the University ofCalifornia at Berkeley’s School of Forestry advised him to“develop sound research, let the chips fall where they may,and not argue with people but rather listen to them andpresent the facts” (Biswell 1989). We would do well tofollow that same advice. His research and, in particular, hispatience with people and fire should guide us in the futureapplication of fire in wildland ecosystems.

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plant communities. Berkeley: University of California; 55 p. M.S. thesis.Agee, J. K. 1973. Prescribed fire effects on physical and hydrologic properties

of mixed conifer forest floor and soil. Berkeley: University of California;57 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

Agee, J. K.; Biswell, H. H. 1969. Seedling survival in a giant sequoia forest.California Agriculture 23(4): 18-19.

Agee, J. K.; Biswell, H. H. 1970a. Debris accumulation in a ponderosa pineforest. California Agriculture 24(6): 6-7.

Agee, J. K.; Biswell, H. H. 1970b. Some effects of thinning and fertilizationon ponderosa pine understory vegetation. Journal of Forestry 68(11):709-711.

Agee, J. K.; Wakimoto, R. H.; Darley, E. F.; Biswell, H. H. 1973. Eucalyptusfuel dynamics and fire hazard in the Oakland hills. CaliforniaAgriculture 24(9): 13-15.

Agee, J. K.; Wakimoto, R. H.; Biswell H. H. 1978. Fire and fuel dynamics ofSierra Nevada conifers. Forest Ecology and Management 1: 255-265.

Anderson, M. K. 1993. Indian fire-based management in the sequoia-mixed conifer forests of the central and southern Sierra Nevada.Berkeley, CA: University of California; 441 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

Biswell, H. H. 1954. The brush control problem in California . Journalof Range Management 7(2): 57-62.

Biswell, H. H. 1958. Prescribed burning in Georgia and Californiacompared. Journal of Range Management 11(6): 293-298.

Biswell, H. H. 1959. Reduction of wildfire hazard. California Agriculture13(6): 5.

Biswell, H. H. 1960. Danger of wildfires reduced in ponderosa pine.California Agriculture 4(10): 5-6.

Biswell, H. H. 1961. Manipulation of chamise brush for deer rangeimprovement. California Fish and Game 47(2): 125-144.

Biswell, H. H. 1963. Research in wildland fire ecology in California. In:Proceedings 1st Tall Timbers fire ecology conference; 1962 March 1-2; Tallahassee, FL. Tallahassee: Tall Timbers Research Station; 63-97.

Biswell, H. H. 1967. Forest fire in perspective. In: Proceedings 7th TallTimbers fire ecology conference; 1967 November 9-10; Hoberg, CA.Tallahassee, FL: Tall Timbers Research Station; 43-63.

Biswell, H. H. 1989. Prescribed burning in California wildlands vegetationmanagement. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; 255 p.

Biswell, H. H.; Gibbens, R. P.; Buchanan, H. 1966. Litter production bybigtrees and associated species. California Agriculture 20(9): 5-7.

Biswell, H. H.; Gibbens, R. P.; Buchanan, H. 1968. Fuel conditions andfire hazard reduction costs in a giant sequoia forest. National ParksMagazine 42(262): 16-19.

Biswell, H. H.; Schultz, A. M. 1956. Reduction of wildfire hazard.California Agriculture 10(11): 4-5.

Biswell, H. H.; Schultz, A. M. 1958. Manzanita control in ponderosa.California Agriculture 12(2): 12.

Burma, G. D. 1967. Controlled burning on the public domain inCalifornia . In: Proceedings 7th Tall Timbers fire ecology conference;1967 November 9-10; Hoberg, CA. Tallahassee, FL: Tall TimbersResearch Station; 235-243.

Clar, C. R. 1959. California government and forestry. Sacramento, CA:California Division of Forestry; 623 p.

Clark, W. 1990. Report on the fire behavior of the A-Rock fire;Unpublished report on file in the Fire Management Office, YosemiteNational Park, CA. 4 p.

Doman, E. R. 1967. Prescribed burning and brush type conversion inCalifornia national forests. In: Proceedings 7th Tall Timbers fireecology conference; 1967 November 9-10; Hoberg, CA. Tallahassee,FL: Tall Timbers Research Station; 225-233.

DuBois, C. 1914. Systematic fire protection in the California forests.Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; 35 p.



Hartesvelt, R. J.; Harvey, H. T. 1967. The fire ecology of sequoiaregeneration. In: Proceedings 7th Tall Timbers fire ecology conference;1967 November 9-10; Hoberg, CA. Tallahassee, FL: Tall TimbersResearch Station; 65-77.

Harvey, H. T.; Shellhammer, H. S.; Stecker, R. E. 1980. Giant sequoiaecology. Scientific Monograph 12. Washington, DC: U.S. Departmentof the Interior; National Park Service; 182 p.

Hoxie, G. L. 1910. How fire helps forestry. Sunset 25(7): 145-151.Kilgore, B. M. 1968. Breeding bird populations in managed and

unmanaged stands of Sequoia gigantea. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia; 196 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

Kilgore, B. M. 1971. The role of fire in managing red fir forests. In:Transactions 36th North American wildlife and natural resourcesconference; 1971 May 7-10; Washington, DC. Washington, DC:Wildlife Management Institute; 405-416.

Kilgore, B. M.; Briggs, G. S. 1972. Restoring fire to high elevationforests in California. Journal of Forestry 70(5): 266-271.

Leopold, A. S.; Cain, S. A.; Cottam, C. M.; Gabrielson, I. N.; Kimball, T.L. 1963. Wildlife management in the national parks. In: Transactions28th North American wildlife and natural resources conference; 1963[date unknown]; Washington, DC. Washington, DC: WildlifeManagement Institute; 1-18.

Parsons, D. J. 1976. The role of fire in natural communities: anexample from the southern Sierra Nevada, California. Enviro-nmental Conservation 3(2): 91-99.

Pyne, S. J. 1982. Fire in America: a cultural history of wildland andrural fire . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 654 p.

Reily, L. M. 1987. Archeological investigations in the Merced Rivercanyon: report of the 1983 El Portal Archeological Project.Publications in Anthropology 3. El Portal, CA: U.S.Department ofthe Interior, National Park Service, Yosemite National Park; 287 p.

Reynolds, R. D. 1959. Effects upon the forest of natural fires andaboriginal burning in the Sierra Nevada. Berkeley, CA: Universityof California; 262 p. M. S. thesis.

Robinson, W. B. 1962. Fire and vegetation in the Everglades. In:Proceedings 1st Tall Timbers fire ecology conference; 1962 March 1-2; Tallahassee, FL. Tallahassee, FL: Tall Timbers Research Station;67-80.

Schiff, A. L. 1962. Fire and water: scientific heresy in the ForestService. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 225 p.

Show, S. B.; Kotok, E. I. 1924. The role of fire in the California pineforests. Agriculture Bulletin 1294. Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofAgriculture; 80 p.

Stephenson, N. L.; Parsons, D. J.; Swetnam, T. W. 1991. Restoringnatural fire to the sequoia-mixed conifer forest: should intensefire play a role? In: Proceedings 17th Tall Timbers fire ecologyconference; 1989 May 18-21; Tallahassee, FL. Tallahassee, FL: TallTimbers Research Station; 321-337.

Sweeney, J. R.; Biswell, H. H. 1961. Quantitative studies on the removalof litter and duff by fire under controlled conditions. Ecology42(3): 572-575.

van Wagtendonk, J. W. 1972. Fire and fuel relationships in YosemiteNational Park. Berkeley, CA: University of California; 163 p.Ph.D. dissertation.

van Wagtendonk, J. W. 1974. Refined burning prescriptions for YosemiteNational Park. Occasional Paper 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Departmentof the Interior, National Park Service; 21 p.

van Wagtendonk, J. W. 1978. Wilderness fire management in YosemiteNational Park. In: Schofield, E. A., ed. EARTHCARE: Globalprotection of natural areas: Proceedings of the 14th biennial wildernessconference; 1975 June 5-8; New York. Boulder, CO: Westview Press;324-335.

Wakimoto, R. H. 1978. Responses of southern California brushlandvegetation to fuel modification. Berkeley, CA: University of California;278 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

White, S. E. 1920. Woodsmen, spare those trees. Sunset 44(3): 115.Wickstrom, C. K. R. 1987. Issues concerning Native American use of

fire: a literature review . Publications in Anthropology 6. El Portal,CA: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, YosemiteNational Park; 68 p.




“What Do We Do Now, Ollie?” 1

Robert L. Irwin 2

Abstract: A personal overview of why California is sufferingbillion-dollar-per-year costs and losses from wildland fire is pre-sented. Two primary and ten supplemental factors contribute to thehuge losses. The primary factors are lack of planning effectivenessand lack of adequate fuels management on a sustained basis.Supplemental factors target organizational and political weak-nesses that contribute to the destructive consequences of the pri-mary factors. Correction or elimination of the dozen factors cansignificantly reduce costs and losses in the future. Actions to makethe needed corrections are suggested.

“W hat do we do now, Ollie?” is an expression thatmeans “something has gone wrong”—i.e., plans

have gone awry, a procedure has failed, expected outcomesare not happening. A classic example is about two pianomovers who are trying to get a heavy piano up to a second–story apartment on a flight of exterior stairs. They push, pull,strain, sweat, and get the piano to the top with great difficulty.As they rest and congratulate each other on a job well done,the piano begins to slip away. It bumps down the stairs androlls into the street where it is struck by a passing truck andtotally destroyed. That is when one mover says to the other,“What do we do now, Ollie?”

California fire agencies, planners, and others need toask that question of themselves in relation to the State’swildland-structural fire problems.

Hard WorkCalifornia fire agencies have struggled for more than 40

years to develop the best wildland fire suppression capabilitiesin the world. When needed, they can activate more aircraftthan many nations have in their military arsenals. The combinedagencies can mobilize 20,000 firefighters with equipmentand support in 72 hours or less. The agencies have a superiororganizational structure in the Incident Command System,sophisticated communications, and effective multiagencycoordination. And, they have consistently used thesecapabilities to achieve a 97 percent success ratio: only about3 percent of all fires do excessive damage.

California land-use planning law and planning procedureshave also matured over time. Slowly, but surely, the State’s

planning process has gotten more thorough and sophisticated.In 1971, the State upgraded standards for local governments’General Plans to improve future growth and developmentdecisions. Also in the early 1970’s, passage of the SubdivisionMap Act and the California Environmental Quality Act(CEQA) offered increased opportunities for local controlover project design. In 1980, General Plan Safety Elementswere required to include wildland fire concerns. Since about1987, a number of counties and some cities have refined

their wildland fire safety requirements to some degree.

Hard QuestionsWhy then has the State continued to suffer billion dollar

costs and losses annually from wildfire since 1985? Why,before the Northridge earthquake event of January 17, 1994,had the total costs and losses from wildland fire exceededthose of all the earthquakes in the State since 1934? Why hasthe problem gotten worse instead of better since 1950? Whyhas each fire season since 1987 been declared “the worst” inCalifornia’s history?

Most people’s answers to these questions would focuson factors such as “weather,” “population growth,”“development,” or “politics”—which are all valid reasons,but they are also the easy answers. They only summarizecategories of real causes, they do not define them.

Hard AnswersThe hard answers involve fundamental cause-and-effect

relationships and can be divided into two major categories:(1) lack of effective wildland land-use planning, and (2) lackof adequate fuels management on a sustained basis. Landand fire managers, planning experts, and others may arguethat they deserve credit rather than criticism in these endeavors,especially because of all their positive efforts. The magnitudeand pervasive nature of wildland fire losses, however, clearlyindicate that efforts to date have been inadequate. The landand the people still suffer beyond acceptable limits. Why?

Lack of Effective PlanningCalifornia planning law has not been thoroughly

understood and has never been assertively pursued by fireagencies. No wonder they are frequently frustrated by localgovernment approvals of unsafe developments. Local plannershave not assimilated nor institutionalized the fundamentalsof fire behavior and suppression requirements. No wonder


2Retired Fire Management Specialist and former Planning Commis-sioner, 13771 Mark Trail, Sonora, CA 95370.



Because comprehensive, area-wide, strategic fire inputthat addresses overall fire potential has not been developed,planning has always been done on a case-by-case basis. Aproject is approved here, another there. Fire concerns andmitigation requirements have been limited to the projectareas. External factors (e.g., fuels, slope, aspect, fire behavior)have not been considered. Because of 50 years of suchpractice, California’s wildlands have become a mix offlammable vegetation and structures. This case-by-caseprocess has often been called “ad hoc planning,” meaningthat no coherent overall plan exists, resulting in the failure toconsider a project’s relationship to its whole environment.

Wildland planning has also been negatively influencedby the urban bias that is ingrained in planners and the planningprocess. Although the wildland-structural fire problem beganto surface more than 40 years ago, only recently hasprofessional curriculum included the wildland issues thatconcern California. As late as 1990, no college or universityin the nation offered a degree in wildland planning. Thus,the planning process has been overseen for decades by peoplewhose basic training and process orientation was urban-oriented. Compounding this situation is the fact that legislatorswho pass laws, judges who interpret those laws, and electedofficials who administer them have also traditionally beeninfluenced by urban rather than wildland concerns.

The urban bias has resulted in thousands of subdivisionsand major developments with roads on the inside and structureson the outside of the project (if planning had been morecognizant of wildland fire, roads would have been placedaround developments to serve as fuel-breaks). The bias hasbrought perhaps 50,000 cul-de-sacs in wildland subdivisions,with only a handful suitable for helicopter operations. Powerand telephone lines have been routinely planned over oralongside cul-de-sacs, preventing their possible use asemergency landing sites. Water supply facilities have notbeen included in their construction. One half-million milesof roads may not be capable of carrying emergency responseand evacuation traffic at the same time. And, to add to thatproblem, fire hydrants (where feasible) have been placed atcurbside just as they have been since Boston and New Yorkbegan installing them in the 1830’s. This requires enginesand water tenders to block the very roads suppression forcesand evacuees need to keep clear.

Retrofitting all of these consequences of urban bias maynot be possible. However, California will continue toexperience significant growth in the wildlands, and it isimperative that future wildland fire safety needs areemphasized so that they outrank urban traditions in planning.

Lack of Effective Fuels ManagementThe current wildland-structural fire situation has been

negatively influenced by the lack of effective fuelsmanagement activities. The most destructive fires in Californiahistory are those characterized by the presence of structures

they have supported project after project in high-risk areaswithout adequate mitigation. Although the fire and planningcultures have increased their interactions over the past decade,they still have not communicated with each other about thefundamental requirements of their professions. There has notbeen much trading of skills and knowledge in the areas thatcould significantly improve fire safety.

Fire WeaknessesIn the past, fire agencies consistently set forth their

requirements for mitigating fires at the end of the planningprocess, rather than at the beginning. The power of theGeneral Plan and its requirements has remained relativelyunknown and drastically underutilized by the fire community.Thus, instead of promulgating one set of comprehensivestandards in the General Plan that would henceforth be appliedto all projects, the agencies have placed themselves in theposition of trying to achieve mitigation on one project afteranother—much work for low rewards.

Perhaps the most damaging omission, and the largestcontributor to ineffective planning on the part of fire agencies,has been the failure to plan on a strategic basis. Every entry-level firefighter knows that fire does not distinguish betweenproject or jurisdictional boundaries, yet that is where protectionplanning has stopped. Detailed protection planning has notbeen done on a total fire environment basis covering anentire watershed or jurisdiction. Thus, even relatively well-mitigated developments in high-risk areas have remainedvulnerable. On major fires in the wildland-structural fireenvironment, Incident Commanders are constrained by thepast planning failures and omissions of others. Suppressionforces have little, if any, strategic initiatives in developedareas. The vegetated areas between developments are “secondpriority” for force assignments, and the fire moves on, onlyto threaten another development. Firefighting is characterizedby one tactical move after another, some of which work, andsome of which do not.

The wildland-structural fire situation that California hasexperienced during the past decades will continue to worsenunless fire agencies regain suppression initiative throughimplementation of strategic fire planning.

Planning WeaknessesLocal and State land-use planning in the United States

has always been powerfully influenced by our political system.Elected officials, not planners, make final decisions aboutdevelopment. If professional planners had been “masters oftheir fate” during the past 40 years, things might be bettertoday in the wildland-structural fire situation. But plannersonly recommend, they only propose, and every action issubject to approval of at least one elected body. Given thatcaveat, the professional planning culture has still shownweaknesses in wildland fire safety.



Diffusion of Responsibility

Who is responsible for fuel reduction for fireprotection? The answer varies around the State. CDF isprimarily responsible for about 33 million acres of privatelyowned land in 56 of the State’s 58 counties. These areclassified as “State Responsibility Area” lands (SRA). SRAlands are dotted with more than a thousand rural fire districts,incorporated areas, and other land classifications describedas “Local Responsibility Area” (LRA). CDF contracts witha few counties to protect SRA lands within their jurisdictions.They also contract to manage various levels of dispatch andsupervision of local fire districts in other counties. TheUSDA Forest Service contracts with CDF to protect privatelands within National Forests, in return for CDF protectionof more than a million acres of National Forest land in otherareas. (The term “protect” in this context means suppression,not management.) Most counties assume that their compliancewith Public Resources Code 4290 (the “Defensible Space”law) fulfills their responsibility for fuel modification. Toomany local fire districts feel that their fire protectionresponsibilities are limited to the structural component ofwildland fire, the “protection of life and property,” and thatthe vegetative component is CDF’s problem. CDF acceptancefor the responsibility varies, depending largely upon theorientation of the ranger in charge of the area involved. Atbest, the state-wide diffusion of responsibility for fuelmodification has led to confusion in budgets, program actions,and serious gaps in performance. At worst, it escalates damagesfrom the conflagrations that are becoming commonplace.

Liability

Liability has hampered attempts at fuel modification forfire protection. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, CDF had activeprescribed burning programs for range improvement andbrushland conversion. Landowners were an important partof the programs, providing equipment and work that materiallyreduced CDF costs. In the 1970’s several of the burns escapedand caused minor to moderate damage on adjacent lands.Lawyers and insurance companies found new careeropportunities. Insurance for the burns became prohibitivefor landowners, and lawsuits became serious burdens to bothCDF and their private cooperators. To a lesser but stillsignificant level, USDA Forest Service activities werehampered by the same forces.

Environmental Requirements

The implementation of the California EnvironmentalQuality Act (CEQA) brought new analytic and administrativeworkloads to fuel managers at the State and local levels. Inits first decade of application (1971-81) there were few CEQAguidelines for fuel modification projects. Preparation ofenvironmental documents went forward on a trial-and- errorbasis. The error rate was high. Lawyers found more careeropportunities, and environmental groups found new crusades.Fuel managers found no increase in budgets, but much higheradministrative costs and time requirements. In some cases it

intermixed with high volumes of vegetative fuels. From asimplistic view, it can be argued that “if the fuels were notthere, the fire would not be there.” From a more realisticview, vegetation exacerbates the problem even in caseswhere structures serve as their own fuel supply. With firejumping from roof to roof and from house to house,vegetative combustion creates smoke, radiated heat,firebrands, and safety hazards that hamper suppression.Why are the fuels there?

Project Funding

The management of vegetative fuels to achieve fireprotection, wildlife habitat, water production, and estheticvalues has been a “step-child” in Federal, State, and localagencies for decades.

At all government levels budget allowances for fuelsprograms tend to be allocated after supression needs aresatisfied. Sources of funding are fragmented. Some dollarscome from one pocket, some from another. At the locallevel, bond issues, ordinances, or other special efforts maybe required to authorize and fund fuel reduction programs.Many times only the initial projects are funded. Maintenancefinancing frequently diminishes over time, and once-effectivefuels modification areas return to high hazard status.

Both the USDA Forest Service and the CaliforniaDepartment of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) havemissed opportunities to improve this situation. Since themid-1970’s, it has been possible to utilize General Planrequirements, the Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA to requiredevelopers to fund fuel treatments. These legal tools couldhave, and should have, been used to zone hazardous parts ofprivate lands for permanent fuel breaks, greenbelts, fuelreduction, and other mitigation requirements. Some criticalNational Forest lands could have been included.

Landowners and developers could have been fundingconstruction and maintenance of these improvements for thepast 20 years. But that did not happen. Failure to use theseopportunities may have been caused by lack of knowledge,lack of organizational purpose, or other factors. Whateverthe causes, California now has thousands of developmentsthat are more vulnerable than they need be. Natural resourceson thousands of acres of National Forest land adjacent todeveloped areas are at high risk because the Forest Servicemissed opportunities to have fuels reduced by privateenterprise.These conditions can be reversed to a significantdegree if the wildland fire agencies begin to assertivelypursue all the legal options available for fuels management.

Contributing InfluencesLow levels of fuels management funding and missed

opportunities are not the only reasons that California isvulnerable. A more intensive review of fuels managementhistory shows that other forces were also at work.



cost more in time and money to justify a project than it wouldto implement it. Frustrations mounted, motivation dropped,and production declined. Implementation of air quality controlsacted to further reduce production and raise costs.

Easy Money

While it became more difficult to efficiently conductfuel treatments, the availability of “emergency funds” didnot diminish. The USDA Forest Service, the CDF, and somelocal fire departments had almost unlimited suppression funds.“You light them, we will fight them” became a popularfirefighter slogan in the 1970’s. Occasionally the UnitedStates Congress or the State legislature would complainabout excessive suppression funds and require the agenciesto repay part of the costs from other programs. But this didnot happen often, it did not hurt very much, and it did not lastvery long. Following years usually saw even more emergencyexpenditures. Intelligent fire managers began to contrast thegrief of modifying fuels with the glories and recognition ofvaliant suppression efforts. Fuels management lost.

Other Dynamics

The State’s wildland-structural fire problem is analogousto rivers that gather volume and force from tributaries asthey flow: over time, more contributory events added strengthand destructive power to wildland fire. Some of the mostimportant dynamics that supplemented the increases indestruction can be identified.

Hands-Off Local Decisions

For at least 40 years, the CDF and Forest Service madeconscious (albeit unwritten) organizational efforts to avoidinfluence on local matters. However well intended thesepolicies were, the result has been the profusion of less-than-safe developments in wildlands. Since about 1980 the agencycomment process has improved, and a level of review ondevelopment proposals is now more routine. This improve-ment, however, has more to do with CEQA compliance thanwith agency commitment to assure fire safety. Federal andState fire inputs to local governments are still weak. With thepossible exception of Public Resources Code 4290, inputshave been of a “comment” or “advisory” nature.

Failure to Pursue Legal Avenues for Better Protection

No local decision to allow less-than-safe developmenthas been legally protested, appealed, or contested in court byfire agencies. Other Federal and State agencies have usedthe courts and the legislature to achieve specific safetystandards at the local government level. The State SeismicSafety Commission had precise earthquake safety standardsenacted into law. The State Water Resources Board and theFederal Emergency Management Agency did the same forflood plain planning and zoning. The State Department ofFish and Game has taken local governments to court to forcecompliance with wildlife habitat needs. Beyond the recenteffort to pass the “defensible space” law, neither CDF nor

the USDA Forest Service has used these avenues to improvefire protection.

Modified Mandates

The original organizational purpose for the wildlandfire agencies was the protection of watershed lands andnatural resources. Pressures from development, population,politics, and the honorable humanitarian desires to savelives and property have forced departures from the originalpurpose. The predominately tactical response (priority onstructure protection) that is now commonplace in firefightingis inefficient. It may actually be contributing to higher lossesin the long run.

Consider Nevada County’s “49’er” fire of 1988. Totalacres burned were 35,300. More than 500 structures weredestroyed. CDF estimates indicate that the fire could havebeen controlled at about 7,000 acres (20 percent of the finaltotal) if structures had not taken suppression priority. Manyof the lost structures would have been saved if historicalwildland suppression strategies had been used. Study of the“Stanislaus Complex” fires (Tuolumne County, 1987) andthe “Fountain” fire (Shasta County, 1992) support thisconclusion. In those cases, more than 100 million dollars innatural resources and long-term public revenues were lostbecause suppression resources were assigned to protect less

than 1,000 structures.

Real Costs Not Documented

When elected officials approve developments their primaryfocus is on economic growth, tax revenues, and maximizingprofit in the development and construction industries.

When fire agencies add up costs and losses they tend toamount to “negative growth.”

A significant differential exists between hoped-forrevenues, calculated costs, and real costs. Calculated costsshow up in official records and media reports. Citizens andofficials tend to accept that information. The real costs arenot shown, and that leads to invalid assumptions on the partof all concerned.

A multitude of real costs has been ignored for decades.Whole towns have been shut down for days, and job holdershave been delayed or prevented from getting to work.Vacationers have been diverted from their destinations.Motels, restaurants, and gas stations have lost income. Schoolshave been unable to conduct classes. State and localgovernments have spent months or years simply trying toreturn operations to the point they were at before conflagrationstruck. They have lost efficiency and public serviceopportunities during recovery. The “Cleveland” fire (ElDorado County, 1992) shut down the interstate highwayfrom central California to Reno, Nevada. After several daysof highway closure the Governor of Nevada complained toCalifornia’s Governor that Nevada gambling enterprises werelosing 8 million dollars per day because of travel restrictions.Commercial timber losses are calculated on stumpage value,not actual net return possible to local government, primary,



define and publicize the real costs of fire. Theeffort should also refine cost-benefit ratios forfuel management programs.

• The Governor’s Office of Emergency Servicesshould analyze the relative costs and losses oftactical versus strategic suppression efforts afterall major fires. Objectives would be to definesocial and economic outcomes of current structureprotection practices compared to fuel modificationand strategic alternatives. Results should beincluded in all State Hazard Mitigation Reports.

• Finally, the USDA Forest Service, CaliforniaDepartment of Forestry, State Office of EmergencyServices, and the State Fire Marshall shouldsponsor a cooperative initiative for a Statewide“Strategic Fuel Modification Program” with theprimary objective to reduce hazardous fuelvolumes and future fire intensities on critical lands,regardless of ownership or jurisdictionalboundaries. The secondary objective should be toprovide opportunities for productive work forcurrently nonproductive human resources, suchas inmates from overcrowded prisons, homeless,welfare recipients, and “displaced” timber industryworkers.

New Thinking for a New CenturyThis paper has shown many of the ways in which old

habits and old thinking have led the State into its presentsituation. Policies and practices that continue old thinkingwill result only in more of the same. That does not have tobe the case. California does not have to continue sufferingexorbitant costs and losses from wildland fire.

As the year 2000 approaches, fire agencies, planners,educators and decision-makers at all government levels mustdedicate themselves to making positive change in thewildland-structural fire situation. Some of that change canhappen by taking corrective action on the weaknessesaddressed in this analysis. Recommendations made here canbe implemented before the turn of the century.

and secondary industry. Soil and erosion costs are estimated,not validated after the fact; fire’s costs for flood prevention,control, and recovery are rarely, if ever, fully documented.

These real costs (and others) were not significant 40years ago. They are today. Full documentation of total lossescould change public and governmental perspectives aboutfire safety. It would certainly improve cost-benefit ratios forfuel modification projects. Local officials would find it harderto justify reduced mitigation requirements on newdevelopment in the name of “growth.”

The Next QuestionsThe next questions should be: What is the worth of the

best suppression organization in the world if costs and lossescontinue to increase? What is the worth of planning if itdoes not reduce billion-dollar-per-year losses? MustCalifornia continue to suffer such unnecessary costs?

We thus return to our original question: “What do we donow, Ollie?”

Recommendations• The Governor’s Office of Planning and Research

should arrange a series of “Summit Meetings”between top-level fire, fuel management, andplanning professionals. Primary goals should beto increase effective communication between thedisciplines, design safer planning and firemitigation procedures, and achieve higherstandards of development in vegetated areas.

• The University of California and State universitiesshould cooperate to increase the wildland fireeducation requirements in all land-use planningdegree programs. Every extension and continuingeducation course for planners should include awildland fire safety and fuel managementcomponent.

• The University of California should cooperatewith Federal, State, and local fire agencies to




Fire History of the Local Wildland-Urban Interface 1

Neil R. Honeycutt 2

Fire activity in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties hasbeen recorded in historical documents. In pre-European

times the Native Americans in the hills above the easternshore of San Francisco Bay used fire to remove unwantedunderbrush to improve the wildlife habitat. This type of“prescribed” burning may have been the earliest fire

management in this region—the characteristic low levels oflightning activity in northern California resulted in fewnaturally occurring fires. In the 20th century, patterns of firein this wildland and urban interface have caused muchdestruction. The history of fire in the area provides clues tothese patterns.


2Chief, Fire and Rescue Branch, State of California Office of EmergencyServices, 2800 Meadowview Road, Sacramento, CA 95832


Prescribed fire has been recognized as a potential tool forland managers for many years. The gradual recognition ofthe important role of fire in wildlands has been documentedmany times. In the United States, this recognition probablyfirst occurred in the longleaf pine region of the southernUnited States. Various agencies that once focussed on fireexclusion gradually adopted the use of prescribed fire as aland management tool. By the late 1970’s, many Federal,State, and local wildland agencies were actively implementingprescribed burning programs for purposes such as fuel hazardreduction and wildlife habitat management.

Even though the use of prescribed burning has increasedduring the past 60 years, present use of this tool falls farshort of its potential use given the millions of acres of land in

PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Fire:Why Aren’t We Doing More?

Local, State, and National Perspectives

fire-adapted or fire-dependent ecosystems in the United States.This observation begs the question “Why aren’t we doingmore prescribed burning?” In order to provide several differentperspectives on this question, a panel of experts was convenedto discuss the issue from the perspectives of local, State, andFederal wildland agencies. Battalion Chief Donald Pierpontof the Los Angeles County Fire Department, Mr. Ken Nehodaof the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection,and Mr. Jerry Williams of the USDA Forest Service eachprovided their views on the topic. Many common factorsaffect the prescribed burning programs of each of theseagencies. The following three papers present a summary ofthis panel discussion.



Abstract: The ability of local agencies to mitigate wildfire hazardsthrough prescribed burning is limited by many internal and externalfactors. Environmental regulations, public support, and internal de-partmental problems continue to limit the effectiveness of pre-scribed burn programs. These elements are discussed to provide abetter understanding of why we are not doing more at the local level.

The factors that limit prescribed fire programs on thenational and State level naturally affect local agencies

as well. Federal and State environmental, air quality, andmanagement decisions are implemented at the local level.The public’s perception of these decisions affects our abilityto produce modified acreage and mitigate the wildfire problem.

The cooperation of all agencies impacted by prescribedfires is essential to maximizing acreage production. Over theyears we have developed excellent relationships with mostof the agencies involved, and conflicts are rare. When conflictsdo occur, they are usually because of a lack of understandingof the mutual benefits of prescribed fire.

The objective of prescribed fire managers is to improvewildland fire protection; environmental issues are addressed,as necessary, to achieve this objective. When prescribedfires conflict with environmental laws, we rely on enforcingagencies to assist us by identifying ways to mitigate theimpact. This assistance is not always available, and developingmitigation methods is very time consuming and certainlyaffects prescribed fire.

The implementation of the prescribed burn program hasrequired continual public education regarding the benefitsand limitations of the program. With 12 years of experienceand public education behind us, we have developed a highlevel of public support. The public’s concern about thepotential impact of our projects has not diminished, butoutright opposition is extremely rare.

While developing a project in Los Angeles County, weidentified one property owner who did not want to cooperate.I met with the property owner in an effort to educate himand gain his cooperation. He stated that he was planning tosell his home and did not want to spoil the view. Wesubsequently attempted to continue with the project andwork around his property.

Prescribed Fire: “Why Aren’t We Doing More?”A Local Perspective 1

Donald A. Pierpont 2

The property owner then took his opposition to everypublic forum he could think of. He contacted County Supervisors,the City Council, the Town Council, Resource ConservationDistrict, and the media. The public, the politicians, and themedia supported the project at each of these meetings. Ourlong-term efforts in public education had proven successful.

His final effort was litigation. He filed suit, questioningour environmental documentation. Our response required thefiling of a negative declaration addressing the environmentalissues. The process of public meetings and litigation proved tobe very time consuming.

Contracts with cooperating property owners, for prescribedburning, are valid for only 3 years. In this case it took morethan 2 years to exhaust this property owner’s avenues ofopposition, and there was not sufficient time left to completethe project before the 3 year time limit expired. This time limithas impacted other projects as well.

The climate of Los Angeles County is diverse, rangingfrom the desert to coastal plains. Wildfire season starts as thevegetation dries in the inland valleys, long before the coastalareas are dry enough to burn. The need for resources tocombat these inland fires limits our ability to conduct burnsalong the coast.

The advent of the Paramedic program in 1970, followedby Emergency Medical Technician, Hazardous Materials, andUrban Search and Rescue programs, has dramatically changedfire departments nationwide. Today, only 7 percent of ourresponses are fire related and less than 1 percent are brush orgrass fires. Training is naturally directed toward the areas ofgreatest demand, and the number of wildland fire experts hasdeclined proportionately. Chief officers are drawn from thisdiverse background and, of course, reflect their experiences.These changes are also reflected in management and its responseto the prescribed burn program.

Today fire chiefs support prescribed burn programs butare extremely conservative in their approach. Prescribed firemanagers reflect this conservatism in their selection ofprojects, the size of burn units, and the conditions underwhich they are burned.

Every time prescribed fire managers light a match, weare placing our careers on the line.

ConclusionThe public’s understanding and demand for prescribed

fire continue to grow. The ongoing education of the public,other agencies, and chief officers—combined with thecontinued success of prescribed burning—will allow prescribedfire programs to be more productive.


2Battalion Chief, Los Angeles Fire Department, 1320 N. Eastern Ave.,Los Angeles, CA 90063.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire



Prescribed Fire: Why Aren’t We Doing More?A State Perspective 1

Ken Nehoda 2

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Program Manager, Vegetation Management Program, California De-partment of Forestry and Fire Protection, 1416 9th Street, Sacramento, CA95814.

Before I try to answer the question “Why aren’t we doingmore?” I will provide some basic information on the

Vegetation Management Program (VMP) of the CaliforniaDepartment of Forestry and Fire Protection and what wehave done with it.

Although the title might indicate a broader based function,the majority of the program’s efforts have been and arecurrently focused on the prescribed burning of brush-coveredlands classified as State Responsibility Area. The Handbookand Field Guide to the Vegetation Management Programsays, “The goal of the Vegetation Management Program isto reduce the chance of large, damaging wildfires by reducingfire hazards on wildlands in California. Realizing the bestmix of natural resource benefits from these lands, consistentwith environmental protection and landowner/stewardobjectives, is the Department’s intent.”

VMP has been functional since 1981. Here are somestatewide statistics:

• The highest amount of acreage burned in a year isabout 68,000 acres.

• The lowest amount of acreage burned in a year isabout 17,000 acres.

• Average annual acreage burned is about 42,000acres.

• This year, about 14,000 acres have been burned in27 projects.

• There are about 100 approved projects waiting to beburned, with a total project area of approximately106,000 acres.

Over the years, most of the projects burned under thisprogram have been located in fairly rural areas. Prescribedburns have been aimed primarily at fire hazard reduction,wildlife habitat improvement, and range improvement. As aresult of this general configuration, many of the burns havebeen of significant size. More recently, there is a shift awayfrom this type of project toward the urban interface. Withthis shift to more congested, built-up, populated areas, newissues are showing up. Among these issues are:

• Increased sensitivity toward smoke incidents.• Significantly higher values at risk in the event of

an escape.

• Smaller urban setting projects require as much, ifnot more planning, resources, and operational effortto conduct.

• Increasing public concern about the risk andpotential adverse impacts of prescribed fire.

However, this type of project has the potential to make adifference in saving or losing structures in built-up areas.That, by itself, is enough to merit facing the associatedchallenges. Fuels management, as a significant componentof a professional fire protection program in the wildlandsand at the urban interface, is at least a part of the solution tothese major fires with significant structure losses.

The ProcessThe process is normally initiated by one of the following

actions. Either the California Department of Forestry (CDF),or its representative, such as a Contract County, contacts alandowner or group of landowners in an area where theywould like to develop a project, or a landowner contacts us.Regardless of how it begins, the process must meet all of theadministrative requirements. The completed package willinclude the following information:

1. Prescribed Burning Project Standard Agreement—Thisis the agreement between CDF and the landowner. Ifone of the participants in the project is an agency of theUnited States Government, a “Federal Land Manage-ment Agency Prescribed Burning Project StandardAgreement” must be included.

2. The Burn Plan—This is the primary planning documentfor the project and includes:

a. General project information, i.e.: landowners’names, parcel numbers, etc.

b. Burn area description, legal and narrativedescription of property, zoning, land use, estimateof area to be burned, etc.

3. Environmental Setting and Impacts—This includesgeneral information about the following:

a. Description of project objectives and methods.b. Project area topography, elevation range, slope

steepness and aspect.c. Soils description and sensitivity to project

activities.d. Vegetation community and dominant species.e. Wildlife/fisheries habitat and sensitivity to project

activities.f. Cultural resources and sensitivity to project activities.g. Smoke and potential impacts to communities.h. Project maps.



The political issues–and I include “interagency coop-eration” as part of this–are also a factor. These issues includeworking cooperatively with many agencies to address impactsof prescribed fire upon archaeological and cultural resources,fisheries and wildlife habitats, air quality, vegetationcommunities, and, last but certainly not least, impacts on rareand endangered species of both plants and animals. I havebeen told by some that agencies with responsibility for managingor protecting these items are not receptive to prescribed fire.That may well be true, but a methodical, educational processthat focuses on the benefits that can be provided might changeopinions and is preferable to one that is by natureconfrontational. As a result of this type of controversy duringthe southern California fires late last fall, many people arelooking at the use of prescribed fire as well as how to improvethe political climate and interagency cooperation.

What I perceive to be social issues are those that are notusually founded on the physical impacts of prescribed fire,but are based upon some individual’s desire to participate in,and thus influence, the decision-making process. In most ofthe cases I have dealt with, the people had their own ideasabout what they wanted done, and more often than not, theywanted the project stopped. This can complicate the processand that is what I choose to deal with here. Examples include:neighbors who do not really believe that there is a significantrisk associated with unmanaged fuels around homes anddevelopments, people who believe that all fuel treatmentwill result in significantly accelerated erosion, and probablythe most common view that wildfires happen “somewhereelse” so we do not really need this here. I see this as a need toeducate people who live adjacent to project areas. In thosecases where individuals cannot be convinced the project isvalid, there are mechanisms to go around them. Unfortunately,this means more work, not less. Furthermore, we will notwin all of our battles. In most cases, however, the time spenton developing a project will not be wasted.

It appears to me that the answer to the question “Whyaren’t we doing more?” depends entirely on the experienceof the person who provides the answer. In an effort toaddress the issues, the California Department of Forestryand Fire Protection is exploring ways to simplify the paperflow, increase program flexibility, and improve our workingrelationships with other agencies. The product of this effortshould provide a strong foundation for a dynamic, stable,and functional Vegetation Management Program.

i. Copies of all letters to other agencies asking forinformation or concerns they might have with theproject and any responses.

4. Burn Prescription—This is the synthesis of all the infor-mation gathered about dead and live fuels, anticipatedweather, desired effects of the project, and smoke man-agement into a few model inputs so that you may specifyconditions which will achieve project objectives.

5. Project Cost Summary—Vegetation Management Pro-gram projects are partially funded by participating land-owners. This cost sharing formula is defined in Section1564, Title 14, California Code of Regulations. Insummary, it says, “The State’s share of such costs shallbear the same ratio to the total costs of the operation asthe public benefits bear to all public and private ben-efits from the operation as estimated by the Director.”Subsequent legislation was passed that allows the De-partment to pay all of the project costs if there are noprivate benefits accrued to the landowner.

6. Environmental Checklist—This document functions asthe initial study for the project. Its completion, accord-ing to the California Environmental Quality Act Guide-lines and the VMP Handbook, is mandatory.

Why Aren’t We Doing More?This is a deceptively simple question which requires a

complicated answer. The complications arise not only fromthe extremely diverse biological, environmental, and physicalconditions that exist in California, but also from administrative,political, and social differences.

Most of the administrative complications arise fromprogram staff within the Department and are differences ofopinion about how program requirements are interpreted.From the viewpoint of a program manager, whose dutiesinclude trying to ensure that projects meet the requirementsand intent of both law and policy, I offer the followingcomments. Frequently those of us who work in the programat Sacramento Headquarters are perceived to be much toodetail oriented. This description is most frequently appliedsoon after additional information or clarification of issues isrequested. I have heard on several occasions that programstaff should be inventing ways to approve projects, not tostop them. Since I cannot arbitrarily choose to ignore ormodify either the law or CDF policy, I must requirecompliance which can sometimes result in delayed imple-mentation: therefore, I am part of the problem.



USDA Forest Service and fire and aviation managementdecisions are commonly made in a context of biological,

technological, social, legal, and economic considerations.These considerations ultimately define the latitude in whichwe operate to achieve multiple-use objectives, and they helpus answer the question, “Why aren’t we doing more?”

These factors are also important in the context ofprescribed fire (fig.1). We use prescribed fire to meet specificresource objectives—despite that, prescribed fire problemshave traditionally focused on prescribed fire practices andpolicies, but rarely on the primary objectives.

A good example of means becoming confused withends is illustrated by the prescribed natural fire situationexperienced in 1988. After fire problems surfaced, virtuallyall of the focus centered on the application of prescribednatural fire policy. Few scrutinized the objectives on whichthe prescribed fire activity was predicated. We did not examinethe larger issues attached to the overarching objectives forwilderness and the meaning of those objectives in terms ofexpected benefits, risks, and consequences.

Underlying the question of “why aren’t we doing more”is the larger question of “to what purpose?” Fundamentally,whatever we do must be viewed as worthwhile. The benefitsmust be worth the risks. This notion becomes especiallyimportant to the resource manager because potential benefitsmay not be clear to the affected public. The risks that inherentlysurround prescribed fire and the consequences that can resultmake it imperative that the public have a full understandingof our objectives. If our objective is to sustain short intervalfire-adapted ecosystems, why aren’t we doing more?

DiscussionBiologically, prescribed fire must be included as a

management tool in sustaining fire-adapted ecosystems; fireregulates the biotic productivity and stability of fire-adaptedecosystems that cannot be fully emulated by mechanical orchemical means. Prescribed fire is especially important inshort interval fire-adapted systems in which the absence ofperiodic, low-intensity burning causes stands to undergorelatively rapid changes in species composition and structure,which in turn often results in predisposing factors to epidemic

Prescribed Fire: Why Aren’t We Doing More?A National Perspective 1

Jerry T. Williams 2

insect and disease outbreak and severe stand replacementwildfire. Among conifers, the long-needle pines are a commonexample of short interval fire-adapted species. Notably, thesespecies account for nearly 30 percent of the suitable timberbase on National Forest lands.

Technologically, in most short interval fire-adaptedecosystems, and particularly in the long-needle pine types,the opportunities to use prescribed fire on meaningful scalesis limited by narrow prescription windows. Risk and smokeare commonly cited as factors that inhibit more prescribedburning. However, in short interval fire-adapted ecosystems,in the prolonged absence of fire, high fuel loadings, unnaturalvolumes of biomass, and multi-storied canopies are thefundamental reasons more burning does not take place. Theseunderlying causal factors significantly impede the ability offield practitioners to conduct prescribed burns within acceptablelimits of risk. Not to be overlooked, these factors also precludeburning within ecologically appropriate ranges of fire intensity.Before we do more prescribed burning in these situations, weneed to give serious consideration to managing understoryvegetation and mechanically reducing fuels.

In the social arena, the public does not always understandthe rationale for prescribed burning. In fact, much of thecountry is culturally averse to fire. An exception, of course,is the south and southeastern United States. There, perhapsbecause long-needle pine forests have the shortest fire returnintervals anywhere, cause–and–effect relationships aremanifest most rapidly and, therefore, are most obvious. Inthat part of the country, in the absence of fire, undesirableeffects develop quickly. In only a few years, flammabilitycan increase significantly and the habitat for many gameanimals can diminish rapidly.

Figure 1– A variety of considerations surround fire management decisions.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interfaced and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Assistant Director—Fire Operations, Fire and Aviation ManagementStaff, USDA Forest Service, Washington DC 20250.



Misperceptions about fire and culturally imbedded fearsabout fire have a significant effect on the prescribed burningprogram. People who do not understand the long-termecological benefits of fire or are unable to see or somehowbenefit from the positive cause–and–effect relationships thatresult from fire are not likely to tolerate the short-termconsequences that invariably accompany prescribed burning.A compounding obstacle is the very nature of prescribedburning. We usually do not notice the ones that go well. Wealmost always notice the ones that do not. In the planningstages, proposed prescribed burn projects are typically affectedby the social impacts that may have resulted from rememberedsmoke incursions and escapes. Risk is a part of prescribedburning. Because failures command scrutiny while successesgo unrewarded, most decision-makers, most managers, andmost practitioners are cautious and conservative with the useof fire. Prescribed burning on the scales and over thetimeframes that are currently under discussion in some circleswill be exceedingly difficult in this social and cultural climate.

The legal arena, however, is perhaps the most contentious.The Forest Service mission is, in large measure, based on theMultiple-Use Sustained Yield Act (1960). Although a greatdeal of focus has historically centered on the multiple-useaspects of this legislation, sustainability is becoming thegrowing concern. Nowhere is the issue more acute than inshort interval fire-adapted ecosystems. Biologically, we knowthat a successful management strategy aimed at sustainingthese ecosystems must rely on prescribed fire. However,whether concern centers on air quality for a community,cover for large game, critical habitat for endangered species,or the desire for seclusion among people living in a wildlandsubdivision, the growing trend toward single-resourceemphasis will preclude the use of prescribed fire. As long aswe are legally mandated to manage for discrete componentsof the ecosystem, we will be unable to manage for the largerwhole ecosystem.

Last but certainly not least, economics will also play asignificant role in our ability to sustain fire-adaptedecosystems, particularly when we consider the cost ofrestoration that now confronts us. We should not think thatdollars will become available to fund these treatments unlessa compelling argument can be made that the cost of restorationand maintenance is worthwhile. The competition for dollarsis intense and it is getting more intense. Entitlements, health

care, education, and urban infrastructure needs are amongthe few that will compete for the dollars available to treatfire-adapted ecosystems. In the final analysis, restorationtreatments will need to demonstrate a savings, in terms ofthe costs that are likely to result in attempting to manageunder existing forest conditions and the losses that are likelyto accrue in the absence of treatment.

SummaryPerhaps the important question is not so much “why

aren’t we doing more,” but rather “what is the reason forneeding to do more?” Before we do more prescribed burning,we need to develop a better basis from which to operate. If ourobjective is to sustain short interval fire-adapted ecosystems,prescribed fire will be a part of that and so will smoke andescapes and expense. We can mitigate potential adverse effectsby mechanically pre-treating stands to reduce emissions andescapes. In some areas, before we use prescribed fire, we mustmake preceding mechanical entries in order to burn withinappropriate ecological amplitudes. Treating stands is one thing,but treating landscapes will be difficult and costly.

Nobody likes the idea of the smoke or the escapes or theexpense that is a part of sustaining fire-adapted ecosystemswith prescribed fire. But, as fire management professionals,we have realized that our suppression capabilities are limitedand, although consequences come with using fire, opting toavoid the use of fire carries serious consequences also. In thepast decade, under the influence of drought, catastrophicwildfires have consumed what prescribed burning was unableto treat, protect, and sustain.

We are at a crossroads in our ability to sustain fire-adapted ecosystems. This may be the single most importantresource issue facing the Forest Service. We are stalled in ourefforts to do more prescribed burning. I believe, at this point—because we do not have an adequate anchor, a basis fromwhich to operate—it is less important for our fire managersto advocate the use of prescribed fire than it is for them toknow and display the biological, technological, social, legal,and economic tradeoffs and limitations that are involvedfrom among our alternatives. Ultimately, the public willdetermine what latitudes we are allowed in using prescribedfire. We need to put our energies in providing them with theknowledge they will need to make informed decisions.



Institutionalizing Fire Safety in Making Land Use andDevelopment Decisions 1

Marie-Annette Johnson 2 and Marc Mullenix 2


2Long Range Planner, Boulder County Land Use Department, P.O.Box471, Boulder, CO 80306, and Wildland Fire Mitigation Coordinator, City ofBoulder Fire Department, Boulder, CO 80306

Because of three major wildland fires in the past 5 yearsalong the Front Range of the Boulder County area in

Colorado, current and potential residents should be told ofsteps that can reduce the risks of these fire hazards. TheWildfire Hazard Identification and Mitigation System(WHIMS) is used by the county and city to assist in theidentification and mitigation of wildfire hazards in theirwildland and urban interface areas. This system combinesavailable expertise in forestry, wildfire behavior, hazardassessment, and fire suppression with a geographicinformation system (GIS). The county uses WHIMS tocombine all the components of wildfire mitigation (i.e.,information, education, cooperation, community involvement,planning, and preparedness), and provides motivation forhomeowners and residents to actively participate. Thedevelopment of this system depends entirely on the excellentinteragency and cross-jurisdictional cooperation, experience,and knowledge of individuals and various agencies. Firesafety is institutionalized into land use and developmentdecisions in several ways. They include attempts atstrengthening local zoning and building codes (as well asstate legislation); creating a Natural Hazards Element for the

county’s comprehensive plan; requesting a WildfireMitigation Plan (which operates on a point system) underthe county’s Site Plan Review (which is required for all newdevelopment in the mountains); linking design with thedegree of wildfire hazards for new subdivisions in the city;examining alternatives to fuel management from a solidwaste perspective; providing information for open spaceplanners and land managers as more land is acquired; anddistributing brochures and videos to new residents as well asthe builders and designers of new construction in themountains. Much has been learned about institutionalizingfire safety and ensuring that it is an integral part of theplanning process. This includes the critical importance ofinteragency cooperation (as well as the involvement ofcitizens’ groups and homeowners’ associations), the necessityof public education and awareness; the importance of usingall available resources, personnel and funding; and the valueof sharing information from other areas. All managers shouldbe prepared to act immediately after a disaster during therelatively short “window” of heightened citizen awarenessthat is present in the aftermath.




Abstract: Wildland fires have occurred for centuries in NorthAmerica and other selected countries and can be segregated intothree periods: prehistoric (presuppression) fires, suppression pe-riod fires, and fire management period fires. Prehistoric fires var-ied in size and damage but were probably viewed fatalistically.Suppression period fires were based on policy that excluded firefrom many ecosystems where it played an important role; the viewof fire as an undesirable wildland disturbance was fostered duringthis period. Recognition of fire’s roles led to a managed use of fire;however, large and disastrous fires still occur because of large fuelaccumulations during the fire suppression period.

Fires burning in vegetation have been termed “forest” fires,or, more recently, “wildland” fires. If these fires also

involve structures, they have been termed “urban,” “interface,”or “intermix;” i.e., “urban/wildland” fires. Although thesetypes of fires are not new, in the past 30 years we have begunto consider these fires as a separate and very important groupof fires—fires that require a great deal of energy to suppress,and from which property and human lives have been lost.

Despite these disastrous fires, we must consider that innatural systems fire is generally neither good nor bad; it justoccurs. We might consider that the extinction of a speciescaused by fire would be a bad or disastrous event. However, isit a disastrous event or merely part of the natural progression ofsystems? The decision to term an event “good,” “bad,” or“disastrous” means that human values have been attached to it.

Our concepts of wildfires as bad or disastrous probablyresult from both our association with the loss of structuresto fire, and the Northern European education of the leadersof the conservation movement in North America. Ourassociation with urban fires was always that of loss ofvalues and life. When the conservation movement began inNorth America in the late 1800’s, fire was considered thenumber-one enemy, and more than 90 percent of the earlyforestry practices in the early 1900’s excluded fire fromwildland systems. This approach completely ignored therole of fire in these systems and the use of fire by NativeAmericans to manipulate their environment.

This paper summarizes the history of large and disastrousfires, in the United States and other nations—from theprehistoric fire regimes, to the suppression period (1910-1960)to the fire management period (1960 to the present).

Prehistoric Period

Fires were started primarily by humans and lightning inthe prehistoric period, although other sources such as volcanismwere temporally and spatially important. Friction, sparks, orrefraction were also possible as fire sources. The first firesprobably began shortly after plants first produced terrestrialbiomass, or when aquatic biomass dried and was susceptibleto burning. Ignitions by humans or our predecessors arerelatively recent in geologic time, and especially recent inlocations such as North America.

Ignitions caused by our early predecessors would normallyresult in a fire regime modified to a shorter period between,and reduce the variability of, a fire season and its severity, asthe fires set for any given purpose would better accomplishthis if set for a predetermined prescription. When fires wereignited by non-human sources, the conditions for spread couldhave varied widely.

For California, it has been estimated that prehistoric firescovered an average of 5.5 to more than 13 percent of the Stateevery year (Martin and Sapsis 1992). Fires also have coveredsubstantial areas of other parts of North America, Australia,and Africa ignited by both lightning and humans.

Settlement FiresFires during the settlement period were the largest and

often involved the largest loss of lives of any recorded fires(table 1). During this period attitudes about wildland fireswere complacent or even fatalistic. Logging created largeareas of undecayed slash, and fires were started indiscreetlyto burn slash or make land attractive to homesteading. Withoutany means to control fires, settlers were at the mercy of theweather once fires began to spread.

Suppression Period FiresThe disastrous fires of the late 1800’s and early 1900’s

led to the feeling of a need to control the fires. Thus, when the1910 fires of northern Idaho, western Montana, and easternWashington occurred, a skeleton force of firefighters attemptedto control them. Tools and equipment were simple, andknowledge of fire behavior primitive. Nevertheless, this wasthe beginning of the fire suppression period that lasted about50 years (table 2).

Along with the suppression effort was a strong fireprevention effort. Fire was labeled as evil, and the campaignagainst fire often took on the aspects of a religious crusade.Although some spoke in favor of a moderate policy, and eventhe use of fire as a tool in wildland management, they were

A Synopsis of Large or Disastrous Wildland Fires 1

Robert E. Martin 2 David B. Sapsis 3


2Professor Emeritus, Department of Environmental Science and PolicyManagement, 145 Mulford Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

3Graduate Student, Department of Environmental Science and Policy Man-agement, 145 Mulford Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.



Table 2—Suppression-period fires, 1910 to 1960.

Fire Name Location Date Size and Losses1 Comments2

Great Idaho northern Idaho, 1910 1.2 MM Ha; 85 killed Hot, dry, windy; spring andwestern Montana, summereastern Washington

Cloquet Minnesota 1918 551 killed Hot, dry, windy

Victoria Australia 1919 3 killed Fires burned for 6 weeks.

Berkeley Berkeley, California 1923 584 structures destroyed East winds

New South Wales Australia 1926 31 killed, 2,000 homeless and Victoria

Mill Valley N. California 1929 117 homes lost

Tillamook Oregon 1933 126 M Ha Dry, hot summer, east winds

New South Wales Australia 1939 1.37 MM Ha, 71 killed, and Victoria over 1,000 homes

destroyed

Marshfield Massachusetts 1941 450 homes lost

Southern California southern California 1943 200 homes lost (series)

Maine Forest Fire Maine 1947 1200 homes; 16 lives lost Disaster (series)

New South Wales Australia 1951 3.5 MM Ha; 6 killed

Manchuria China 1956 400 M Ha

1M = 1,000; MM = 1,000,000 2Sources: Brown and Davis 1973; Trevitt and Cheney 1973.

Table 1—Major-settlement period fires, before 1910.

Fire Name Location Date Size and Losses1 Comments2

Miramichi Maine 1825 1.2 MM Ha; Lives Many fires, undetermined drought; wind

Black Thursday Victoria, Australia 1851 10 killed

Peshtigo/Michigan northeast Wisconsin 1871 1.6 MM Ha; Many fires, drought,windUpper Michigan 1,200 to 1,500 killed

Michigan primarily northeast 1881 400 M Ha; 169 killed Many fires, drought, hot(“thumb”) area ofsouthern Michigan

Hinckley Minnesota 1894 418 killed Many fires, drought, hot

Far West Yacoult, Washington 1902 >500 M Ha; 38 killed Dry summer; hot, windy,low relative humidity

Adirondack New York 1903 258 M Ha; none killed Dry winter, strong winds

1M = 1,000; MM = 1,000,0002 Haines and others (1986) present evidence that many of these fires occurred without drought or severe weather preceding the fire, based on

historical weather records. (Brown and Davis 1973, Forest Fire: Control and Use; Australia, C. Trevitt and P. Cheney 1973).



overruled by those in favor of fire exclusion (Pyne 1984).Although scientific evidence supported the use of fire, thepolitical accidents of gaining control in Washington, DC, ledto a policy of fire exclusion.

Urban Interface andFire Management Period

During the urban interface and fire management period,wildland fires began to involve structures again, and the idea

of fire management began to evolve. Wildland fires had notbeen involved with structure losses in the United States sincethe 1923 Berkeley fire. Suddenly, because of the Harlow andBel Air Fires of 1961, wildland fire threats to urban areaswere again a reality. Although many in the fire service andthose in the academic community such as Harold Biswellrecognized the potential threat of wildland fires to urbanareas, many years passed before a broader awareness of theproblem evolved.

Table 3—Fires of the urban interface and fire management period, 1961 to the present.1

Fire Name Location Date Size and Losses2

Harlow central California 1961 106 homes; 2 lives lost

Bel Air southern California 1961 505 homes lost

Dwellingup western Australia 1961 146M Ha; 140 bldgs lost

New Jersey Fires (series) New Jersey 1963 458 homes; 7 lives lost

Staten Island New York 1963 100 homes lost

Parana Brazil 1963 2 MM Ha; 5000 homes;110 lives lost

Hanley, Nuns Canyon Fires northern California 1964 295 homes lost

Coyote southern California 1964 106 homes lost; 2 liveslost

Tasmania Australia 1967 263 M Ha; 1246buildings; 62 lives lost

Wright, Los Angeles southern California 1970 103 homes lost

Laguna, San Diego southern California 1970 382 homes; 5 lives lost

Sycamore, Santa Barbara southern California 1977 234 homes lost

Kanan, Los Angeles southern California 1978 224 homes; 1 life lost

Panorama, San Bernardino southern California 1980 325 homes; 4 lives lost

Ash Wednesday Fires Victoria and South Australia 1983 392M Ha; 2545 bldgs;75 lives lost

Black Dragon northern China 1988 >2 MM Ha

49er northern California 1988 148 homes lost

Paint, Santa Barbara southern California 1990 479 homes; 1 life lost

Tunnel, Oakland/Berkeley northern California 1991 2103 structures, (2475living units); 25(26) liveslost

Fountain, Redding northern California 1992 450 homes lost

Altadena, Los Angeles southern California 1993 118 homes lost

Laguna, Orange County southern California 1993 366 homes lost

Malibu, Los Angeles southern California 1993 350 homes; 3 lives lost

New South Wales Australia 1994 1.2 MM Ha; 185 homesplus other bldgs; 3 liveslost

1Sources: California, Reports of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection; Australian, P.Cheney, andC.Trevitt ; Brazil, R.Soares. United States fires from Brown and Davis, 1973, Forest Fire: Control and Use; Australia, C.Trevitt and P. Cheney. Eleven Fires from United States are from Brown and Davis, 1973, Forest Fire: Control and Use;Australian, C. Trevitt and P. Cheney; California, Reports of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

2 M = 1,000; MM = 1,000,000



management period itself, which advocates fuels management,is not responsible for the increase in acreage and homes lost.Rather, it is the long-term fuel accumulation from thesuppression period that has contributed to the fire problem.Today, even with the recognition of the need for fuelsmanagement in both vegetation and structures, the mostecologically sound tool for managing fuels—prescribedburning—is severely underused because of human inertiaand air quality constraints. Some local programs are vigorouslyattacking vegetation and fuels management, but we cancontinue to expect large fires and large losses of structuresbecause of the immensity of the urban/wildland fire problem.

ReferencesBrown, A. A.; Davis, K. P. 1973. Forest fire: control and use. New

York: McGraw-Hill; 686 p.Haines, D.A.; Johnson, V. J.; Main, W.A. 1976. An assessment of three

measures of long-term moisture deficiency before critical fire periods.Res. Paper NC-131. St. Paul, MN: North Central Forest ExperimentStation, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 13 p.

Martin, R. E.; Sapsis, D. B. 1992. Fires as agents of biodiversity:pyrodiversity promotes biodiversity. Proceedings of the conferenceon biodiversity of northwest California ecosystems. CooperativeExtension, University of California, Berkeley.

Pyne, S. J. 1984. Fire in America. New York: Wiley and Sons; 520 p.Schiff. A. L. 1962. Fire and water: scientific heresy in the Forest

Service. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press; 225 p.

Although the list of fires for this period (table 3) is notcomplete, it illustrates that large and disastrous wildland orurban/wildland fires have not diminished; if anything, theyhave continued to increase in frequency. Numbers of structureslost has increased. In California, as many as 3,500 homeswere lost to urban/wildland fires in the 7 decades from 1920to 1989. In the early 1990’s, about 4,200 homes were lost.Although the numbers of human lives lost to wildland fireshas decreased since the settlement period, during the last 70years, loss of life continues because of wildland fires.

SummaryFire has been part of many terrestrial vegetation

communities, and the use of fire as a powerful tool by manynative peoples around the world was an important factor intheir survival or extinction. Fire was foreign to the landmanagement philosophy during expansion of the conservationmovement. This fact, in addition to the large fires that hadoccurred, led to a policy of fire suppression and exclusion.

Large wildland fires usually are described as “disastrous”when large losses of human life or property occur, as withthe “disastrous” 1988 Yellowstone fires. Yet in terms ofeffects on natural systems, the fires were not disastrous.

Losses of homes or structures increased during the firemanagement period. This is probably because of more peopleliving near vegetation without the advantage of livestock orother means to manage fuels near structures. The fire



Our fire problem is multidimensional, including thecomponents of responsibility, accountability, economics, andthe environmental consequences of doing something, or inmost cases, nothing. There are major problems in attemptingto deal with the primary issues of reducing the fire risk.These are the very issues that I believe we must work on thehardest, to bring about a solution to “our fuel problems.” Itwill take a cooperative effort from many agencies andorganizations to finally provide solutions that are drasticallyneeded, in our wildland urban intermix communities.

We as fire suppression agencies have learned to developexcellent “Mutual Aid” pacts. We can gather virtual armiesand air forces to attack these notable wildland urban intermixfires, which we have been dealing with since the early 1970’s,and so which aptly have been called “the Fires of the Future.”

The question must be asked: “Why have we not beenable to develop a financial commitment to fuels management,similar to that we have in fire suppression?”

Thomas Watson, the founder of IBM, said, “The way tosucceed is to double the failure rate.” Have we doubled thefailure rate on our wildland urban intermix fires in the pastdecade? Must we experience more failures before we beginto manage our fuels to a level that will allow us to effectivelydeal with the wildfire issue? What will it ultimately take toget us on track?

The Beginnings of a Cooperative EffortWhen our fire district began recognizing the reality of

the fuels problem our community faced, my office began amulti-year project of bringing about a fuels reduction program,or “risk reduction on the ground” program, called DefensibleSpace. No one within my fire agency had the benefit of aneducation or background in forestry, biology, or ecology.We did have a “firefighter’s” knowledge that our communitywas at serious risk from any uncontrolled wildfire, and thatour daily resources to deal with the problem would beextremely limited.

For many decades we had successfully combated allfires within our community, and had begun to recognize thatour many successes would some day cause our mostdevastating failures. We had been excluding the forest’snatural management process, fire, and had not taken theresponsibility of managing the fuels any other way, such asreduction or removal.

Our “cooperative effort in fuels management” was basedon the following premise. On a daily basis my fire preventionoffice operates in the area of “responsibility”: individual

Cooperative Efforts in Fuels Management 1

Gerald L. Adams 2

Abstract: Our forests have been neglected or protected to death,creating an extreme wildfire risk in wildland urban intermix com-munities. We as agencies and organizations are just now beginningto understand that the fuel problems we have across the westernstates are not a single agency problem, but “our problem.” Wild-fires do not respect boundaries, be they political, jurisdictional, orprivate. Our fuels problem must be dealt with from a cooperativeeffort by all individuals who reside and work in the wildland urbanintermix communities.

Forests in Nevada have suffered the same decline in healththat many forests in the western states are now

experiencing. According to Fire Ecologist Professor BobSweeney: “we have built structures and now live in theforest. Additionally, we have not allowed nature to manageitself, primarily through normal fire cycles.”

If we as Europeans had not intervened, would naturalevents have produced a healthier forest than we now residein? Have we mismanaged or “overprotected” our naturalresources, and, in doing so, placed our communities at extremefire risk? I believe so.

Through decades of aggressive fire suppression, thenormal fire regime has been altered, stands of trees andunderstories have become overgrown, drought has stressedthe current stands, and now epidemic levels of insects anddiseases have come together to produce extensive forestmortality. To the wildland urban intermix, or interfacecommunities, this poses an extreme fire risk.

Because wildfires do not respect political, jurisdictional,or private boundaries, the fire issue becomes “our problem.”No one agency or organization can effectively deal with themagnitude of the problem, pre- or post-fire.

For this reason, we in the North Lake Tahoe FireProtection District, at the beginning of the 7-year drought,began laying the groundwork for an intensive DefensibleSpace vegetation management project.

In the major fires in recent history, we as incidentcommanders were waiting for either the weather to change, orthe fire to run out of fuel. How successful are we at suppressingfires in these unmanaged fuel accumulations? If recent historyis an indication, we are failing miserably, in lives lost, propertydamaged, and extreme natural resource losses.


2Fire Marshall, North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District, P.O. Box 385,Crystal Bay, NV 89402.



property owners have an obligation to maintain their propertyat a reasonably safe level.

We make sure that when you as the general public meet ina building, and an emergency occurs, your expectation to “getout alive” is met. When your next-door neighbor exposes yourhome to an unreasonable risk, there is an expectation that wecan reduce that risk through some action on the fire preventionoffice’s part. That’s the premise of “individual responsibility.”

When we looked at the fuels problem, we addressed itfrom the same standpoint. Each individual property ownerhad a shared responsibility to the community as a whole.

We looked at the problem from a worst-case fire behaviorstandpoint and recognized that even if all 12,000+ (parcels)property owners bought into the Defensible Space program,they would still be at serious risk from larger property ownerslike the USDA Forest Service and the Incline Village GeneralImprovement District (I.V.G.I.D.). The General ImprovementDistrict owned the most hazardous drainages that intersectedour community, and the Forest Service owned steep sensitivelands (Burton Santini lots) within and surrounding the community.

We additionally have an environmental regulatory agencycalled the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (T.R.P.A.) that,when we began our program, had a reputation for “nottouching anything green.”

As we began to meet with all the political and regulatoryagencies and the regional fire and forestry agencies, we allfound a common ground of concern, which was wildfire.

It was observed by all concerned that uncontrolledwildfires could, and most likely would, impact all of thediffering agencies and organizations in some way. Forexample, T.R.P.A.’s main concern would be the possibleimpact to “water quality” following a high intensity wildfire,and the associated erosion potential from damage to theforest floor.

From my fire district’s standpoint, the potential losses tolives and property within the community are the main concern.

The individual property owners are concerned about thelosses of homes and the long-term impact on today’s scenicbeauty, which would not return within their lifetime.

To say that all the agencies and organizations immediatelyjumped into a cooperative effort in fuels management wouldbe an overstatement. We had disagreements, we struggled,we built bridges and relationships over a long period of time.We worked through “turf” battles, funding problems, generalapathy, and denial that we did not even have a fuels problem.Eventually we developed a respect and trust for each other’spoints of view.

What got us to the present was the belief that the fuelsproblem was “our problem” and that one agency could noteffectively deal with it alone. Other factors were my personalcommitment and determination to provide a better level offire protection to my community. I have been accused ofusing a “bull dog approach” to reach that objective.

The cooperative effort began with my office joiningtogether with the University of Nevada, Reno CooperativeExtension, in Incline Village. Ed Smith and I recognized a

need for a multi-agency approach. With fuels reduction as agoal, one concern was how or why could or would theagencies and organizations keep us from “reducing the firerisk to our community?”

We had to inform, sell, and educate each agency andorganization that the common fire problem would affect usall. We eventually were able to accomplish that objective.

CooperatorsWho were the key agencies, organizations, groups,

and individuals that have made our community-basedprogram a success?

Organizations and Agencies

• University of Nevada, Reno, Cooperative Extension.• Sierra Front Wildfire Cooperators, Fire Prevention

Committee.• Lake Tahoe Regional Fire Chiefs’ Association.• Nevada Division of Forestry.• USDA Forest Service Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit.• Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (T.R.P.A.).• Incline Village General Improvement District.

Groups

• Neighbors for Defensible Space, Our Grass RootsCommunity Group.

• Incline Village, Crystal Bay Chamber of Commerce.• Incline Village Board of Realtors.• Nevada Forest Stewardship Program.• South Lake Tahoe Kiwanis (Dick Thomas).

Individuals

• Doug Clifford, and the Neighbors for a DefensibleSpace Executive Board.

• Ann Johnson, Executive Director, Chamber ofCommerce, Incline Village.

• Nevada State Legislative Representatives.• Nevada U.S. Congressional Representatives.• Many Concerned and Involved Private Property Owners

in the Community.• And many others, too numerous to mention.

Legal IssuesCooperative efforts have resulted in adoption of two

important legislative acts that will allow the State of Nevadato move forward in the area of fuels management. Thesesubmittals were generated by my office, but would not havebeen adopted without the cooperation and support of manyindividuals and different agencies.

In the 1991 legislative session, the adoption of a “HazardReduction” statute, N.R.S. 474.160, allowed my office torequire private property owners to remove hazards in a



timely manner, or we could remove the hazards and lien theproperty. My primary problem was that under currentlyadopted fire codes, I could not issue citations across statelines. The major problem was that our community has manyout-of-state, absentee property owners.

In the 1993 legislative session, we were successful ingetting “Prescribed Burning” legislation passed. Prior to thislegislation, prescribed burning was not even mentioned inthe State of Nevada fire and forestry laws.

SummaryCooperative efforts are what have made our community’s

Defensible Space program a regional role model. We wouldnot have accomplished what we have, to date (and we are notfinished yet), without cooperation from many agencies,organizations, and individuals.

We at this conference all know and understand thedangers that we face in the future for having tinkered withthe ecological system that poses the wildfire risk to ourforests and communities.

Each of the guest speakers and all of us at this conferenceseem to be like the “preacher, preaching to the choir.” Themain goal of these conferences is to share ideas and methodsin fuels management and the latest technology to managethem, but in order to do so, we all need to accomplish moreresults in the fuels problem area. Each year improvementsare made in the fuels management area in our agencies andorganizations, but they seem very slow when contrastedwith the accumulating losses in lives, property, and naturalresources each heavy fire season.

We as organizations need to make use of all thetremendous amount of individual knowledge and brilliantpeople that I meet at these conferences each year and joinforces to “educate the budgetary, policy and decision makers”that fuels management is the more cost- efficient way to dealwith the mounting wildfire problem.

Let me close with an example of “recorded total losses”in the Cleveland Fire, Eldorado National Forest, September1992. High winds, low humidity, steep terrain, and heavyconcentrations of forest fuels with extremely low fuel moisturecontent, contributed to problems with long-range spotting.The fire’s final size was 24,500 acres.

In 1992, the Cleveland fire caused the nation’s largestwildland fire loss (Sullivan 1993).The recorded loss totaledat $245,325,000, which does not include the $16.5 million insuppression costs and the loss of two lives (air tanker pilots).

The breakdown is as follows:

41 homes and structures $3,500,000

Private/timber stand losses 230,000,000

Marketable bio-mass 1,000,000

Revegetation/slope stabilization 2,000,000

Pacific Gas & Electric, utilities 7,000,000

Sacramento Municipal Utilities Dist. (SMUD) 175,000

Caltrans, roads, signs, infrastructure 250,000

D.C. Air Tanker 1,000,000

(missing item) 400,000

Total: $245,325,000

Additionally there were 72 injuries with no recordedcosts associated to them. These losses plus the suppressioncosts average out to approximately $10,683 per acre.

In these days of cutbacks, budget reductions, and doingmore for less, can we afford these “fires of the future”?Should we not be reviewing the past to learn and betterdefine a strategy for the future, looking for the best approachfor the protection of lives, reducing the escalating costs inproperty damage, and attempting to reduce the wildfire impactsto our natural resources?

ReferencesSullivan, Michael J. 1993. Large loss wildland fires in 1992 by listed $

loss: wildland fires. In: The National Fire Protection Association(N.F.P.A.) Journal, Nov./Dec. 1993: 88.


PANEL DISCUSSION: Barriers to Fuel Management

One of the traditional roles that prescribed fire has played inthe fire management arena is reduction of hazardous fuelbuildups under controlled, well-defined environmentalconditions. However, our ability to use this tool effectivelyis blocked by many barriers. The preceding panel discussionabout the causes of limited success in implementingprescribed burning programs addressed some of the barriersencountered by various types of governmental agencies.This panel discussion focussed on three specific barriers toimplementing fuel management programs incorporatingprescribed burning.

Mr. Kenneth Blonski of the USDA Forest Servicedescribed organizational barriers to implementation. Althoughthe specific examples are linked to the Forest Service, manyof the same barriers exist in other organizations. Ms. AnitaRuud of the U.S. Office of the General Counsel describedlegal barriers, particularly those related to liability issues.Federal disaster assistance programs are viewed by some asdisincentives to proactive hazard reduction programs. Mr.William Patterson addressed this issue and described newFederal assistance programs. The following three paperssummarize the comments of the panel.


Organizational Barriers to Fuel Management 1

Kenneth S. Blonski 2

may develop an economic basis for that strategy. Developinga sustained management strategy that embraces and enhancesthe fire-prone wildlands requires protection from the erratic,political winds of change. The rhetoric of politically correctenvironmental policy must be tempered with a realisticview of the traditional fire suppression mission. Successfulfuture fuel management strategies must complementprotection needs and provide a smooth transition to sustainedecosystem management.

Numerous obstacles to fuels management, such as limitedfunding and inadequate staffing, result from

programmatic conflict within the fire management missionof the USDA Forest Service. Traditional focus on firesuppression and the political realities of an extremelycompetitive climate for available public funds underlie thissituation. As the Forest Service shifts its focus to the holisticconcept of ecosystem management that includes fire andfuels management, agency leaders and resource managers


2Director of Fuels Management, Pacific Southwest Region, USDAForest Service, 630 Sansome St., San Francisco, CA 94111

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Barriers to Fuel Management


Legal Barriers to Fuel Management 1

Anita E. Ruud 2

The law is a strict master regarding any kind of deliberatelyset fires. The value of natural resources and resource

management is low on the list of priorities for this state’slawmakers. BEWARE is the key word for those who dare tochallenge the traditional notion that all fires must beextinguished immediately, except those within the safe

confines of your fireplace or backyard barbecue. In order forfuel management with fire to be more easily utilized, thelaws regarding fire management and resource protectionwill need to be amended to include the value of fuelmanagement as a resource protection tool.

Federal Disaster Assistance Programs 1

William J. Patterson 2

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and EmergencyAssistance Act—Public Law 93-288, as amended—is

designed to provide support and assistance to citizens, state,and local government from catastrophic disasters andemergencies. The law provides support in three distinctphases, including preparedness in avoiding or minimizingthe effect of a disaster, response support during the disaster,and recovery from the emergency. This law has severalinteresting and unique features relating to fire disasters.Although most disaster assistance requires a presidentialdeclaration, fire is recognized as a special type of disaster. If

fire threatens to become a disaster, assistance can be providedto prevent such a disaster. Special rules relate to thesepredisaster fire emergencies. Some provisions of the lawhave led to questions regarding its effectiveness in mitigatingfire problems. The hazard mitigation provision of the lawprovides the opportunity to raise critical issues and fundingsupport to address many important areas. Whether themitigation provisions of the law are being used mosteffectively in meeting the continuing threat of wildfire inCalifornia and the nation as a whole needs to be studied.


2Deputy Attorney General in the Office of the Regional Attorney General,455 Golden Gate Ave., Rm. 6200, California Department of Justice, SanFrancisco, CA 94102.


2Fire and Hazardous Materials Program Manager, Region 9, FederalEmergency Management Agency, San Francisco, CA 94129.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Barriers to Fuel Management

CONCURRENT SESSION I—Wildland Ecosystem Topics



Tom Nichols 2

More than 25 years ago, the pioneering work in fireecology by Harold Biswell and others encouraged the

incorporation of prescribed fire into fire management policies.However, the use in California of prescribed fire in fuelstreatment, wilderness management, or ecosystem maintenanceprograms has not been particularly extensive. Only a fractionof wilderness areas, for example, have a prescribed naturalfire program. In forests and brushlands around the State,natural and activity fuels continue to accumulate, and wildfiresare becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible in


2Prescribed Fire Specialist, Western Region, USDI National Park Ser-vice, 600 Harrison, Suite 600, San Francisco, CA 94107.

some situations, to suppress. Reasons for the gap betweenland management objectives and results with regard toprescribed fire include lack of interagency planning andcommunication, internal agency differences in resourcemanagement objectives, limitations on funding availability,and estimating the behavior of long-term prescribed fires,particularly those occurring in wilderness areas. Prescribedfire remains an important land management tool. The activity,however, of prescribed fire programs will depend on thesolution of many issues that constrain its application. Theideas of the various speakers and the discussion that isstimulated should provide much food for thought.

Fire in Wildland Ecosystems—Opening Comments 1

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I



that encompasses more than one million continuous acres inthe Sierra Nevada.

In the Central Sierra Nevada, National Forest wildernessareas and National Parks adjoin along common boundaries.These boundaries were established for a variety ofadministrative reasons and may or may not make sensewhen managing a prescribed natural fire. In this area, theNational Park Service currently operates with approved FireManagement Plans allowing for PNF in wilderness areas.The Forest Service is in the plan development stage. In thiscurrent situation, park fire managers have to manage naturalignitions according to current agency procedures andrestrictions if the natural ignition is close to the park/forestboundary. Generally, this includes taking full control actionsbefore the PNF threatens the boundary.

Once the Forest Service Wilderness Fire Plan isimplemented and the Park Service’s Fire Management Plansare amended, the ability to manage PNF across administrativeboundaries will be greatly enhanced. Management ofprescribed natural fire across the entire Sierra Nevadawilderness ecosystem will become a reality.

Principles for Successful InteragencyPlanning

There are several important elements in planning for asuccessful wilderness prescribed natural fire program thattranscends agency and administrative boundaries. These keysto success are common to any successful relationship, whetherinteragency, interdepartmental, or interpersonal. They workin a variety of situations, at any level, where people cooperateto achieve a common goal.

To develop a successful, unified PNF program, aconsiderable personal time commitment by the fire manageris required. This personal commitment requires regular visitsbetween line officers, staff officers, and fire managers inboth agencies. Successful personal interaction should bemore than just an occasional telephone call or messages sentvia electronic mail. This interaction must be face to face.Personal visits must be made with consistency, with the goalof getting to know and understand each other and eachother’s agency policies and procedures. This commitment istime well spent, with rewards and dividends in successfulinteragency coordination in the wilderness fire program.

After establishing a strong professional relationship withthe adjoining agency’s fire staff, the fire manager must makea concerted effort to learn and understand land managementand fire policies, procedures, and goals of the neighboring

Abstract: Wilderness fire managers are often confronted withnatural fire ignitions that start and/or burn near an adjoining agency’swilderness area boundary. Management strategies for prescribednatural fires (PNF) are often developed using the adjoining agency’swilderness boundary as the maximum allowable perimeter (controlline) for the PNF. When this occurs, fire’s natural role in thewilderness ecosystem may be restricted. The difficulty of burningnear another agency’s jurisdictional boundary can be overcome bystrong planning, close communications, and timely coordinationbetween the two affected agencies. Communications and coordi-nation can be achieved only through developing and maintaining astrong working relationship with the fire manager of the adjoiningagency. Keys to good interagency coordination are (1) investingtime, (2) understanding the policies and procedures of the adjoin-ing agency, (3) developing and maintaining open communications,and (4) having a commitment to see it succeed.

I nteragency management of prescribed natural fire (PNF)in federally managed wilderness areas is not new. It has

occurred on a limited basis in several areas of the countrybetween adjoining agencies for many years, often with verysuccessful results. But there are many areas where PNF hasnot been attempted because of the complexities of planningand managing a PNF that may cross interagency boundaries.One of the recommendations of the 1988 Fire Policy reviewwas that the federal agencies needed to do a much better jobof planning and coordinating their efforts during actual firemanagement activities, including prescribed natural fire. Thispaper is meant to share some observations on the subject ofinteragency cooperation and coordination in the managementof prescribed fire in federally managed wilderness areas. Iacquired experience while serving as team leader fordeveloping a complex Wilderness Fire Plan, in which a PNFmay be allowed to burn adjacent to administrative boundaries,and/or in which a PNF may be allowed to cross anadministrative boundary from one agency’s lands to another.

In this paper, I will be addressing my experiences inplanning for PNFs that may occur close to the administrativeboundaries that exist between the USDA Forest Service(Sierra, Inyo, and Sequoia National Forests) and the USDINational Park Service (Sequoia-Kings Canyon and YosemiteNational Parks). This is a federally managed wilderness area

Interagency Wilderness Fire Management 1

Jim Desmond 2

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17,1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Fire Management Officer, USDI National Park Service, Ozarks NationalScenic Riverways, P.O. Box 490, Van Buren, MO 63965.



agency. Not only must fire managers understand writtenpolicy and procedures, they must seek to understand themanagement style and philosophy of the adjoining line officers(i.e., Park Superintendent or Forest Supervisor) and theirfire staff. All line officers and fire managers bring a certainamount of their own philosophy, values, and ideas intomanaging the wilderness resource, and it is very importantto identify these early. Knowing and understanding thepolicies, procedures, and personalities of the adjoining agencyis very important to successful interagency coordination.

Another key to success is to establish and maintain strongcommunications with the adjoining land management agency.“Communications” is defined as more than just talking; it isexpressing oneself effectively. Communications must be open,truthful, and unselfish. An effective communicator is notonly a good speaker, but also a good listener.

Probably the most important key to success in developinginteragency cooperation in PNF is making the personalcommitment to see it succeed. The fire manager has toeliminate the “us versus them” attitude and establish a“teamwork” philosophy. The fire manager must be selflessin his concerns for the success of the overall wildernessPNF program. The fire manager must give 100 percenteffort. Personal and agency pride and even “agencyarrogance” must be set aside in order for interagencycooperation to succeed. The fire manager must believefrom the outset that the interagency wilderness fire programwill succeed.

These four keys to success can be easily used in planninga cooperative interagency PNF program. Planning requiresa time investment, an understanding of each other’s policies,open communications, and a commitment to success.

Implementing Principlesinto PNF Planning

Early on in the development of the Wilderness FirePlan for the John Muir, Ansel Adams, Dinkey Lakes, andMonarch Wilderness areas, it was recognized that adjoiningNational Parks (Yosemite and Sequoia-Kings Canyon) hada vested interest in what the Forest Service was planning intheir wilderness fire plan. A representative from the USDINational Park Service was invited to become an activeparticipant and adviser to the USDA Forest ServiceWilderness Fire Planning Team. This Park Servicerepresentative attended all planning sessions and had theopportunity to review and comment on all proposals to theplan. This interagency coordination effort was able to spotpotential problems in the plan early in the draft process.Other small procedural problems, terminology changes, and/or policy conflicts were addressed during this planningphase. As a result of this interagency planning team, manyof the following procedures were developed to manage thecomplexities of PNF’s that occurred adjacent to or acrossadministrative boundaries.

During the development of the Forest Wilderness Plan,it was determined that each central Sierra Nevada forest(Inyo, Sierra, and Sequoia) and each park (Yosemite andSequoia-Kings Canyon) will appoint one person to serve asa Unit/Agency PNF coordinator. This group of five forest/park liaison representatives will form the Unit/Agency PNFcoordinators group. These PNF coordinators will be theprimary interagency/intra-agency contacts in all mattersrelating to PNFs once the John Muir, Dinkey Lakes, AnselAdams, and Monarch Fire Plan has been approved. (Note:Both parks currently have approved Fire Management Plansallowing PNF in their Wilderness Fire Zones). Once the planis operational, the PNF coordinator will serve as liaisonbetween ranger units, forests, and parks.

The Unit/Agency PNF coordinators group’s duties andresponsibilities will include attending pre-season planningand post-evaluation of the area-wide PNF program. Theforest PNF coordinator will coordinate funding needs andrequests before placing natural ignitions in PNF status. Thecoordinators may assist individual ranger units in orderingequipment, crews, and qualified personnel to manage PNF’s.They will monitor forest-wide PNF activity and may serveas advisers to the district fire managers. The Unit/AgencyPNF coordinator will serve as the interagency/intra-agencycontact on any boundary fire between either two rangerunits, two forests, or between a forest and a park. The Unit/Agency PNF coordinator will be the chief adviser to theappropriate line officer and forest management team.

Interagency coordination is of critical importance innatural ignitions or fires that are close to administrativeboundaries. Any natural ignition or fire that is within 2 milesof the administrative boundary will be called a “boundaryfire.” The agency on which the fire is burning is called the“lead agency.” The agency across the boundary will beknown as the “adjoining agency.” Any potential PNF withinthe boundary zone will require the following: (1) “leadagency” notifies “adjoining agency” of situation, (2) “leadagency” provides copy of PNF assessment and Burn Planincluding map of maximum allowable perimeter (MAP) to“adjoining agency,” (3) allows the “adjoining agency” toprovide input to management and strategy of the boundaryPNF. This initial coordination should take place within 24-36 hours.

A second classification for a “boundary fire” is one inwhich the ignition or PNF is of “immediate threat” to theadministrative boundary. This is generally considered within0.25 mile of the boundary line. When an ignition is withinthis zone, both agency coordinators will perform the aboveprocedures, plus set up the framework for a unifiedmanagement team for the PNF, if it crosses the boundary.

At this point, we anticipated that there would beexceptions to the above policy and procedures. Examples ofthese exceptions are: when the ignition or fire is a “singletree in the rocks,” or when the PNF has little potential tocross the boundary because of significant natural barriers.Unit/Agency PNF coordinators are required to come to a



mutual agreement on the strategy and tactics on any ignitionsor fires within the boundary zone. Again, the key is timelycoordination and good communications between the Unit/Agency PNF coordinators.

Several other procedures concerning “boundary fires”were adopted by the planning team and incorporated into theForest Service Wilderness Fire Plan. The following areexamples of a few.

If any circumstance (i.e., political concerns, lack offunding, shortage of qualified personnel, etc.) occurs inwhich the “adjoining agency” feels uncomfortable in allowingthe PNF to burn within the boundary zone, the “boundaryfire” will be managed in appropriate suppression response(confine, contain, or control). Both agencies must be unifiedin their willingness to proceed in allowing a “boundary fire”to burn naturally within the confines of the plan.

Boundary PNF’s that burn on both agencies’ landssimultaneously may require separate documentation and record-keeping systems. Each unit will maintain its own PNF file.This file will contain documents that are specific to agencyneeds and requirements. Agencies are encouraged to sharemaps, observations, and other forms of intelligence gathered.

Daily revalidation of “boundary fires” will require lineofficer signatures. If the PNF is burning on both agencies’lands at once, line officers of both agencies will be requiredto sign off each day as agency policy requires. Each agencywill use its own forms and procedures for this daily requirement.

The utilization and coordinated use of aircraft, organizedcrews, and miscellaneous resources for monitoring and/orholding may be negotiated during the preliminary decisionanalysis of the PNF. Unit/Agency PNF coordinators willshare in formulating these agreements.

ConclusionThe time investment, an understanding of others’ policies

and procedures, strong communications, and a commitmentto see interagency coordination succeed do not end when theFire Management Plan is approved. Planning is a processthat makes land management decisions and outlines howthose decisions are to be implemented. Good planning canbe rendered useless by poor execution.

The wilderness fire manager must maintain a closerelationship with neighbors by continuing a strong commitmentto interagency cooperation and coordination. As stewards ofthe wilderness resource we should strive for no less.




FARSITE: A Fire Area Simulator for Fire Managers 1

Mark A. Finney 2

Abstract: A fire growth model (FARSITE) has been developedfor use on personal computers (PC’s). Because PC’s are com-monly used by land and fire managers, this portable platformwould be an accustomed means to bring fire growth modelingtechnology to management applications. The FARSITE model isintended for use in projecting the growth of prescribed natural firesfor wilderness areas. The PC model requires the support of ageographic information system (GIS) to manage and provide land-scape data. FARSITE currently uses a stream of weather and windchanges along with landscape data downloaded from the GIS tomodel fire growth.

Computerized fire growth models have been the subjectof research for about 20 years. Despite numerous

management applications (Andrews 1989), these models stillremain largely in the realm of research. Some obstacles toimplementing a fire growth model for management purposeshave been technological; different approaches to developinga realistic model for simulating wildland fire spread andbehavior have different technical problems to overcome.Practical limitations have also created obstacles, mainly withthe availability of computer hardware and software as wellas landscape data. Until recently, computers and geographicinformation systems (GIS) with adequate spatial coverage ofthe themes necessary for running a fire growth model havenot been widely available to potential users.

Many of these difficulties are no longer limiting. Advancesin computer technology and increasing prevalence of GIS nolonger impede the transfer of fire growth modeling technologyto user applications. Personal computers are now commonplaceand a familiar tool for most managers. These computers arethus a logical platform for a fire growth model that can beeasily accepted in an accustomed environment.

This paper briefly describes an implementation of theFARSITE Fire Area Simulator designed for fire managementuses on a personal computer.

Fire Growth ModelsThe FARSITE model uses Huygens’ principle of wave

propagation (Richards 1990) to expand fire fronts. Thismethod, named for the 17th century Dutch mathematicianwho studied light waves, treats fire as a wave that spreads

using points on its edge as independent sources of newwavelets. The approach was first used by Sanderlin andSunderson (1975) and Sanderlin and Van Gelder (1977) tomodel fire growth (other methods using Huygens’ principlein fire modeling were described by Anderson and others1982, Beer 1990, French and others 1990, Richards 1990,Knight and Coleman 1993, Wallace 1993). The Huygens’approach differs from models based on “cellular automata”that spread fire as a contagion process between cells of aregular grid (Green 1983, Green and others 1983, Kourtzand O’Reagan 1971, Kourtz and others 1977). The cellularautomata approach has been pursued by many researchers,too numerous to mention here. Models based on Huygens’principle are well suited to the relatively limited resourcesof personal computers. Huygens’ principle requiresinformation only from points on the fire edge. This makesefficient use of computer time and memory compared tocellular models. In cellular models, distortions to the fireshape resulting from the grid must be minimized bycalculating fire spread to unburned cells within a wide radiusof each active cell (French 1992).

The applicability of Huygens’ principle to fire growthmodeling has been demonstrated by a number of studies.Although they have not been comprehensively validated,fire spread patterns predicted by models using Huygen’sprinciple have generally agreed with those observed(Anderson 1982, Finney 1994, French 1992, Sanderlin andSunderson 1975). Many validations will eventually be neededfor defining the strengths and weaknesses of these models.

Features of FARSITEIn general, Huygens’ principle enables a logical

implementation of existing fire behavior models. Each pointon the fire front contains information on the time, direction,and rate of fire spread. These are essential components ofexisting models of surface fire spread, fire acceleration,crown fire and transition to crown fire, as well as spotting.FARSITE incorporates models for surface fire spread(Andrews 1986, Rothermel 1972) as well as transition tocrown fire and crown fire spread (Rothermel 1991, VanWagner 1977, 1993 ) and spotting distances.

A user interface for the FARSITE model has beendeveloped for the Microsoft WINDOWS operatingenvironment. This graphical interface allows considerabledevice independence among the widely varying hardwarecapabilities of personal computers. The FARSITE modelrequires the user to identify the data files (containinglandscape, weather, and wind data). The mouse control


2Research Scientist, Systems for Environmental Management, P.O. Box8868, Missoula, MT 59807.



ReferencesAnderson, D.H.; Catchpole, E.A.; DeMestre, N.J.; Parkes, T. 1982.

Modeling the spread of grass fires. J. Austal. Math. Soc. (Ser. B.) 23:451-466.

Andrews, P.L. 1986. BEHAVE: fire behavior prediction and fuelmodeling system-BURN subsystem, Part 1. USDA For. Serv. Gen.Tech. Rep. INT-194.

Andrews, P.L. 1989. Application of fire growth simulation models infire management. Proc. 10th Conf. Fire and Forest Meteorology,Ottawa Canada; 317-321.

Beer, T. 1990. The Australian National Bushfire Model Project.Mathematical and Computer Modelling 13(12): 49-56.

Finney, M.A. 1994. Modeling the spread and behavior of prescribednatural fires . In: Proc. 12th Conf. Fire and Forest Meteorology, JekyllIsland GA. In press.

French, I.A.; Anderson, D.H.; Catchpole, E.A. 1990. Graphical simulation ofbushfire spread. Mathematical and Computer Modelling 13(12): 67-71.

French, I.A. 1992. Visualisation techniques for the computer simulationof bushfires in two dimensions. University of New South Wales,Australian Defence Force Academy. M.S. Thesis.

Green, D.G. 1983. Shapes of simulated fires in discrete fuels. EcologicalModelling 20: 21-32.

Green, D.G.; Gill, A.M.; Noble, I. R. 1983. Fire shapes and the adequacyof fire-spread models. Ecological Modelling 20: 33-45.

Knight, I.; Coleman, J. 1993. A fire perimeter expansion algorithmbased on Huygen’s wavelet propagation. International Journal ofWildland Fire 3(2): 73-84.

Kourtz, P.; O’Reagan, W.G. 1971. A model for a small forest fire tosimulate burned and burning areas for use in a detection model.Forest Science 17(2): 163-169.

Kourtz, P.; Nozaki, P; O’Regan, W. 1977. Forest fires in the computer–A model to predict the perimeter location of a forest fire. Fisheriesand Environment Canada. Inf. Rep. FF-X-65.

Richards, G.D. 1990. An elliptical growth model of forest fire frontsand its numerical solution. Int. J. Numer. Meth. Eng. 30: 1163-1179.

Rothermel, R.C. 1972. A mathematical model for predicting fire spreadin wildland fuels. USDA For. Serv. Res. Pap. INT-115.

Rothermel, R.C. 1991. Predicting behavior and size of crown fires in thenorthern Rocky Mountains. USDA For. Serv. Res. Pap. INT-438.

Sanderlin, J.C.; Sunderson, J.M. 1975. A simulation for wildland firemanagement planning support (FIREMAN): Volume II. Prototypemodels for FIREMAN (PART II): Campaign Fire Evaluation .Mission Research Corp. Contract No. 231-343, Spec. 222. 249 p.

Sanderlin, J.C.; Van Gelder, R.J. 1977. A simulation of fire behaviorand suppression effectiveness for operation support in wildlandfire management. In: Proc. 1st Int. Conv. on mathematical modeling,St. Louis, MO; 619-630.

Van Wagner, C.E. 1977. Conditions for the start and spread of crownfire.Canadian Journal of Forest Research 7: 23-24.

Van Wagner, C.E. 1993. Prediction of crown fire behavior in two standsof jack pine. Canadian Journal of Forest Research 23: 442-449.

Wallace, G. 1993. A numerical fire simulation model. InternationalJournal of Wildland Fire 3(2): 111-116.

mechanism is then used to input ignitions on the displayedlandscape. These ignitions can be points, lines, or existingfire shapes (drawn as a series of line segments). In a similarfashion, users can make minor modifications to the landscapeincluding control lines or fuel type changes. The duration ofthe simulation is determined by the desired ending date andtime. Fire maps and area and perimeter data and graphs canbe output to files or printed. Current plans are to test thepreliminary version of FARSITE written for 32-bitWINDOWS (WIN32s) during the 1994 fire season atYosemite and Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks inCalifornia. The primary purpose of the test phase will be toincorporate management suggestions for interface features.The first general release of FARSITE for the personalcomputer is scheduled for 1995.

Although fire growth models will likely make someaspects of fire management easier, the true limitations ofthese models will probably soon become apparent. Weatherforecasts along with the absence of 3-dimensional windfields in complex terrain are likely to be a major source oferror for a long time.

ConclusionsThe transfer of fire growth modeling to user-applications

has recently been encouraged by new demands for managingand researching ecosystem processes across landscapes. ThePC version of the FARSITE model should be helpful inmanaging fire as a landscape process. When implementedon other platforms, it may also be useful for simulating fireas an ecosystem process over larger time and space scales.

AcknowledgmentsThis research has been funded by the National Interagency

Fire Center of the USDI National Park Service (NPS), througha cooperative agreement with the USDA Forest Service,Intermountain Research Station’s Fire Behavior ResearchWork Unit, and the Global Change Program, USDI NationalPark Service.



Abstract: Despite a quarter of a century of prescribed burning bythe National Park Service (NPS) in California, there is reason tobelieve that the fuels situation is getting worse rather than better.The area burned in the past 10 years has declined by 42 percentcompared to the previous 10 years. The total area burned per yearfrom wildfire and prescribed fire is substantially less than thathypothesized in pre-European settlement times. Fuels within thesefire adapted vegetation types are increasing and creating condi-tions conducive to more high-intensity wildfires. The NPS is fail-ing to meet its ecosystem management and hazardous fuel reduc-tion goals and objectives. Obtaining the funding to treat these fuelswith prescribed fire has proven difficult. The NPS has developed aproject cost analysis system to ensure the effective use of existingfuels management funding and is developing a comprehensivecost/benefit analysis to help demonstrate the wisdom of investinggreater resources in prescribed burning and fuels management.

The National Park Service (NPS) has utilized management-ignited prescribed fire (MIPF) in California for 25 years.

During the past 20 years, the NPS has prescribed burned23,187 hectares (57,271 acres) in California parks, or 2.8percent of the burnable area in those parks (fig. 1). For themost part, these fires are ignited either to restore and maintainnatural ecosystems or to reduce hazardous fuels. Hazardousfuels are defined as:

those which, if ignited, threaten public safety,structures, facilities, cultural and natural resources,natural processes, or permit wildfires to spreadacross administrative boundaries (USDI NationalPark Service 1990).

In reference to ecosystem management burns, NPSpolicies state:

where fire is an essential component of theecosystem but cannot be allowed to burn as anatural process because of management constraints,fire is used as a tool to accomplish resourcemanagement objectives. These objectives include,but are not limited to, replacing natural fire,maintaining historic scenes, reducing hazardousfuels, eliminating exotic/alien species, andpreserving endangered species (USDI NationalPark Service 1990).

Funding Fuels Management in the National Park Service:Costs and Benefits 1

Stephen J. Botti 2

Figure 1– Management-Ignited Prescribed Fire, National Parks inCalifornia, 1974-1993.


2Fire Program Planning Manager, USDI National Park Service, NationalInteragency Fire Center, Branch of Fire and Aviation Management, 3833Development Ave., Boise, ID 83705.

Many of these burns are multi-purpose. A burn to reducehazardous fuels may also produce ecosystem benefits invegetative communities adapted to natural fire regimes.Conversely, a burn to maintain the natural fire process willprevent unnatural fuels from accumulating and thus avoidthe necessity of a burn to reduce hazardous fuels under moredifficult burning conditions. For this reason, the NPS fundsboth types of burns with fire management funds, as part ofan integrated land management program. In an era of decliningbudgets, different components of fire management competewith each other for scarce funds. For this reason, it hasbecome increasingly important to quantify the relative costsand benefits of the three components of NPS wildland firemanagement: wildfire suppression, prescribed natural fire(PNF) management, and management-ignited prescribed fire(MIPF).

Liabilities and Handicaps in FuelsManagement Investments

Most people believe that wildfires should be suppressedregardless of the cost, and this view has been reflected inCongressional funding authorizations for many years. Sincesociety believes that the benefits of protecting lives, property,and resources from wildfires almost always outweigh thecosts, Congress has placed no theoretical limit on expendituresfor “emergency” wildfire suppression. Even though theappropriation for Department of Interior and related Federal



agencies contains an amount for emergency wildfiresuppression, additional funds can be transferred from otherappropriations as needed by the Secretary of the Interior. Onthe other hand, prescribed burning, whether used for ecosystemrestoration or as a tool for reducing hazardous fuels, hasbeen faced with a more uncertain funding reality, caused tosome degree by ambivalent feelings toward its risks, costs,and benefits. Although prescribed burning has broad supportamong certain segments of the general population and parkvisitors, it has rarely been viewed as equally essential towildfire suppression. The ecosystem benefits are somewhatesoteric to most people and the long-term reduction in wildfirethreat may not be immediately apparent to the public or parkmanagers. Some people oppose the program because smokecan affect neighboring communities and park visitors, orbecause of fear that prescribed fires will escape.

The prescribed fire program is complicated by inherentrisk of fire escape and associated liability issues. Even ifwildfire suppression efforts fail to save resources and property,there is a general reluctance among the public and the firemanagement community to criticize suppression organizationsand personnel who risk their lives fighting wildfire. Thehuge government expenditures for wildfire suppression alsorarely receive close scrutiny or critical analysis. This samegenerosity is seldom extended to prescribed burning efforts,however. If prescribed burns escape or smoke impacts becomeintolerable, reputations can be tarnished quickly, and careersadversely affected. This is one reason that evaluations of thecosts and benefits of wildfire suppression and fuelsmanagement are not conducted on a level playing field.Prescribed burning and fuels management are plannedinvestments that may not yield rewards for many years.They are not emergency actions. Like most investments inthe future, investing in prescribed burning requires discipline,a willingness to take risks, and a long-term perspective.

Status of Current NPS FuelsManagement

The Department of the Interior and the National ParkService have invested far more in suppressing destructivewildfires than in managing the fuels that produce destructivewildfires. In fiscal year 1994, the Department budgeted $221.5million for suppression and suppression preparednesscompared to only $12 million for prescribed fire and fuelsmanagement. In California last year, the NPS spent $3 millionto suppress wildfires on 329 hectares (813 acres) comparedto $237,000 to prescribe burn 2,040 hectares (5,039 acres).The relative costs for wildland fire management are $9,115per hectare ($3,690 per acre) for wildfire suppressioncompared to $116 per hectare ($47 per acre) for prescribedburning. The total suppression cost was actually considerablyhigher than NPS finance records indicate because the NPSdoes not track the costs of firefighting resources contributedby other federal agencies to suppress wildfires on NPS lands.Although the investment in suppression response may look

out-of-proportion to that in prescribed fire, a true evaluationof these numbers is not straightforward. It is to be expectedthat the cost of mobilizing large numbers of suppressionresources for an unscheduled incident would be much greaterthan the cost of staffing a planned and controlled prescribedburn. What is not clear is whether an increased investment inprescribed burning and fuels management would produce amuch greater corresponding reduction in suppression costs.Other, more subtle benefits of prescribed burning, such asthe decreased probability of catastrophic wildfire threateningresources at risk, remain to be quantified. Managers intuitivelybelieve that these benefits must exist or they would not takethe risks, but the lack of data or effective cost/benefit modelsfor prescribed burning diminishes our ability to present aconvincing case for increased support.

Are we achieving our fuels and ecosystem managementgoals with the present level of program funding andaccomplishment? The same question can be asked anotherway. What are the costs of not burning or of not burningenough? To answer this question we must document both theincreased costs of wildfire suppression and real propertylosses, which can be quantified economically, and theintangible costs of natural and cultural resource losses. Asstewards of taxpayer dollars, we must also ask, “Is the currentprescribed burning program cost effective, or would a greaterinvestment in prescribed burning be more cost effective?”

Before answering these questions, it may be helpful toevaluate the total influence of wildland fire within tworepresentative California National Parks. Wildfires,management-ignited prescribed fires, and prescribed naturalfires all contribute to the fuels balance and vegetativecommunity structure in Yosemite, Sequoia and Kings CanyonNational Parks. These Parks provide good examples to studybecause of their long history of prescribed fire management.

The past 20 years of combined wildfire, PNF, and MIPFdata from Yosemite reveal that the total area burned is only36 percent of that hypothesized under natural fire regimes,while at Sequoia and Kings Canyon it is only 22 percent(figs. 2 and 3). The hypothesized pristine average annual fireoccurrence target is extrapolated from current knowledge offire return intervals within the vegetative communities inboth parks (Caprio and Swetman, in press, Kilgore 1973,Kilgore 1981, Kilgore and Taylor 1979, Parsons 1976, Showand Kotok 1924, Swetnam 1993, USDI National Park Service1987, Wagener 1961). The continued existence of this gapbetween pristine and modern fire regimes in vegetativecommunities adapted to or even dependent upon recurringfires is causing the NPS to drift farther away from its twingoals of protecting people and property and preserving naturalecosystems. As a result of this gap, hazardous fuels arecontinuing to increase, increasing the costs and difficulty offuture prescribed burning projects, along with the cost anddestructive power of future wildfires. Analyzing the cost ofthis gap should be a major focus of future research. The NPSneeds to know whether closing that gap would be a cost-effective fire management strategy. At present, parks are



NPS developed three project analysis programs. In the first,parks define projects through an on-line computer program.Projects from all parks are compiled in a central databaseand assigned priority points by the computer on the basis offuel type, fire behavior, values at risk, and legislative andadministrative mandates and complexity. This program alsocontains a cost spreadsheet that displays costs stratified byfour cost categories and four phases of project developmentand execution (figs.4 and 5). This program produces reportsthat list all fuels and ecosystem maintenance prescribedburning projects in priority order along with the requestedbudget for each project. Using these reports, the nationalfire program manager can easily allocate funds to thehighest priority projects according to the funds available ineach year.

Under the second program, parks can group projectsinto multi-project and multi-year plans. This planning toolallows fire managers at the park to define, and those at theregional and national levels to understand, a park’s long-term strategy for fuels management and ecosystemmanagement prescribed burning. Multi-year plans that areapproved at the regional and national levels receive priorityfor funding in future years. This planning strategy encouragesparks to develop comprehensive fuels management plansand to receive assurance of year-to-year funding continuityfor well-designed programs. It also helps fire budget managersto allocate scarce funds to those programs which will achievethe most effective long-term results.

While these programs allow managers in the regionaland national fire offices to allocate funds to the highestpriority projects, they fail to address the issue of whether thefunding requests for high-priority projects are reasonable.Funding itself is not a priority ranking factor and thus mustbe considered separately. Projects of equal size in similarfuel types with equal values at risk and equal complexitysometimes vary dramatically in cost per hectare. Projectsvary from $1.20 to $42,000 per hectare, making it difficultto decide what is reasonable without more detailed knowledgeof the factors causing the variation. Some cost variationbetween projects is to be expected because of size, fuelmodel, complexity, and other factors, but managers need toquantify how much variation is acceptable for various typesof projects.

In order to solve this problem, the NPS contracted withthe Department of Forest Sciences at Colorado StateUniversity for the development of a cost analysis system(Omi and others 1992). They evaluated all project criteriathrough a regression analysis to determine which onescontributed most to cost variability, and used the results todevelop cost target zones for projects. The regression equationcaptured 91 percent of the cost variation for hazard fuelreduction projects and 82 percent of the variation forecosystem maintenance burns. The variables include criteriasuch as project size, NPS region, fuel model, type of treatment,natural resource values at risk, and the risk of fire escape.The findings were incorporated into a PC-based computer

Figure 3– Wildland Fire Occurrence, 1974-1993, YosemiteNational Park

Figure 2– Wildland Fire Occurrence, 1974-1993, Sequoia-KingsCanyon National Parks


proposing to burn less area than is required to close the gap,the NPS is funding less than the parks are proposing, andthe parks are carrying out only about half of the projectsthat are funded.

Fuels Management Analysis ProgramsThe NPS has never been able to fund all of the fuels

management work requested by parks each year. In 1994 theNPS was able to fund only 41 percent of hazard fuel reductionprojects requested by parks. In order to allocate scarce fundsto the highest priority and most cost-effective projects, the


just inside the upper end of the range or allowing costs for anotherwise inexpensive project to escalate to the upper end ofa range.

Although these three analysis programs provide usefultools for screening and ranking fuels management projects,they do not provide a quantitative evaluation of programmaticfuels management costs and benefits. A fourth analysis toolis being developed to model the effectiveness of incrementalincreases in prescribed burn funding in protecting resourcesat risk, reducing suppression costs, and restoring naturalecosystems. The model will identify the value of resourcesprotected, the long-term costs of the various alternative fuelstreatment programs, and the cost of projected suppressionresponse under various treatment scenarios.

By simulating wildfire suppression scenarios under avariety of fuels treatment strategies, managers will be able

program used to screen all NPS fuels management andecosystem maintenance projects.

This screening program is just one tool for decidingwhether to fund a project. Projects falling within the 95percent confidence range for costs of similar projects areconsidered to be reasonable from a cost standpoint, but maystill be rejected on the basis of ranking score, regional officerecommendation, a park’s track record for projectaccomplishment, or for other reasons. Projects rejected bythe screening program can still be funded if a park canjustify why the costs are unusually high.

The existence of the screening program has forced parksto improve their estimates of project costs and to becomemore cost efficient in order to stay within the target ranges.Since the target ranges are unknown to parks, they cannotmanipulate the system by either reducing their estimates to

Figure 5– National Park Service Hazard Fuel Project Cost Estimate Program

Figure 4– National Park Service Hazard Fuel Project Ranking Program



provide managers with powerful tools for identifyingoptimum program funding needs, formulating and defendinga fire management budget request that reflects those needs,and allocating scarce funds to the highest priority needs.Although there is ample scientific work identifying thebenefits of prescribed burning within fire adapted ecosystems,further work is needed to monitor fire effects and modelhow well the current and projected burning programs willachieve goals and objectives. The comprehensive fuelsmanagement analysis system being developed by the NPSwill help quantify the relative costs and benefits of wildfiresuppression and prescribed fire management programs. Thiswill help define true prescribed fire program needs, andensure the most efficient use of scarce taxpayer dollars.

ReferencesCaprio, A.C.; Swetman, Thomas W. Historic fire regimes along an

elevational gradient on the west slope of the Sierra Nevada,California . In: Proceedings of the symposium on fire in wildernessand park management: past lessons and future opportunities; 1993March 30-April 1; The University of Montana, Missoula, Montana.USDA Forest Service, GTR 000, Intermountain Experiment Station,Ogden, Utah [In press].

Kilgore, B.M. 1973. The ecological role of fire in Sierran coniferforests: its application to national park management. QuaternaryResearch 3(3): 496-513.

Kilgore, B.M. 1981. Fire in ecosystem distribution and structure:western forests and scrublands. In: Proceedings of the conference:Fire regimes and ecosystem properties: 1978 December 11-15;Honolulu, HI. Gen. Tech. Rep. WO-26. Washington, DC: ForestService, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 55-89.

Kilgore, B.M.; Taylor, Dan. 1979. Fire history of a sequoia mixedconifer forest. Ecology 60: 129-142.

Omi, P.N.; Rideout, Douglas B.; Stone, Jenna S. 1992. Final report:cost controls in NPS prescribed fire management. Prepared for theU.S. National Park Service, Branch of Fire and Aviation Management,Boise, ID.

Parsons, D.J. 1976. The role of fire in natural communities: an examplefrom the southern Sierra Nevada. California EnvironmentalConservation 3 (2): 91-99.

Show, S.B.; Kotok, E.I. 1924. The role of fire in California pine forests.USDA Bulletin 1295; 80 p.

Swetnam, T.W. 1993. Fire history and climate change in giant sequoiagroves. Science 262: 813-960.

U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service. 1987. Firemanagement plan. Yosemite National Park, National Park Service,U.S. Department of the Interior; 131 p.

U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service. 1990. Wildlandfire management guideline: NPS-18. Washington, DC: NationalPark Service; U.S. Department of the Interior.

Wagener, W.W. 1961. Past fire incidence in Sierra Nevada forests.Journal of Forestry 59 (9): 739-747.

to determine which strategy will be most effective in achievingthe desired reduction in risk to resources and real property.First managers will establish wildfire risk reduction andecosystem protection targets. For example, managers maybe willing to accept a 5 percent probability that wildfireswill destroy a value at risk. By modeling fire spread andsuppression response under alternative fuels treatmentmethods, managers will be able to determine which methodwill produce a fuels complex in which there is only a 5percent probability that a wildfire will exceed suppressioncapabilities and destroy resources at risk. The prescribedburning projects necessary to achieve the target fuel complexwill be defined under a preferred alternative for the firemanagement program. Subsequently, budget targets for park,regional, and national hazard fuels treatment can bedetermined by aggregating the projects identified in thepreferred alternatives for all programs. The simulation willalso display probable net savings in fire management costsby comparing wildfire suppression expenditures to hazardfuels treatment costs under various treatment alternatives.

Although the simulation and cost analysis have yet to bedesigned, some of the possible tools they will utilize mayinclude:

• Data that monitor fire effects, indicating the changesin the fuels complex and vegetative community structurefrom prescribed burns under varying prescriptions. Thesedata can be used to identify the prescription needed to achieveecosystem management objectives and to provide fuel inputsfor a large fire growth model.

• Existing data in the current NPS fire program analysissoftware that assess the degree of wildfire risk to naturaland cultural resources and real property in hazard fuelreduction units.

• Data on wildfires originating inside and adjacent toNational Parks that could burn through hazardous fuels anddestroy values at risk inside a park.

• Programs to simulate the spread of wildfires under avariety of hazard fuel treatments utilizing geographic informationsystems and large fire growth models. These programs willdisplay the likelihood that such fires can be successfullysuppressed with the current levels of suppression resources.

• Databases on resources outside parks at risk fromwildfires originating inside parks. The decreased risk tothese resources from fuels management programs will needto be considered in the comparison of total benefits to costs.

ConclusionThe completion of all four phases of the NPS

management-ignited prescribed fire analysis system will




Although recognized as an important tool for ecosystemmaintenance, fuels management, and a variety of other

purposes, the prescribed fire program in the Pacific SouthwestRegion of the USDA Forest Service has been constrained byseveral factors. These range from funding availability, todebates on the effect of fire on the habitat of sensitivespecies, to competition for resources with fire suppressionactivities, to the lack of awareness at various levels in theorganization of the need for prescribed fire as a landmanagement tool. The Advisory Group for Fire in EcosystemManagement (AGFEM) was established in 1992 to facilitatethe use of prescribed fire in the Region. Members of thegroup were selected from a variety of backgrounds, such aswildlife, fuels management, timber, fire management, airquality, soils, and hydrology. The group has also workedclosely with the California Fuels Committee. The

interdisciplinary approach allows a fuller discussion of thevarious concerns about the use of fire. These concerns havebeen expanded into a list of action items that have also beendeveloped into an annual program of work. The work items areexpected to break down barriers to implementing a prescribedfire program. For 1994, these included the development of afire awareness presentation to the Regional Management Team.If supported by the Team, similar presentations will be made atline officers’ and specialists’ workshops. Each member on theAGFEM is a key contact for such presentations within his orher own professional community. Other topics recommendedby the AGFEM include Minimum Impact SuppressionGuidelines for wilderness, a guide for developing wildernessfire programs, review of proposed standards for prescribed firequalifications and training, and development of an annotatedfire effects bibliography.

Ecosystem Management Issues 1

Jim Boynton 2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17,1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Forest Supervisor, Sierra National Forest, USDA Forest Service, 1600Tollhouse Rd., Clovis, CA 93612.


PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century

Even though many legal, social, and organizationalconstraints affect prescribed fire programs, the ecologicaland social benefits of such programs encourage their continuedexistence (with or without modification). The form of theseprograms in the next 10 to 50 years is pure speculation; butwe must speculate and project the programs, as well asassociated benefits and costs, since the ecosystems we managerespond to fire on several time scales.

A panel chaired by Dr. Ron Wakimoto of the Universityof Montana was convened to discuss projections about the

role and form of prescribed burning in the next century. Thefive panelists were Mr. Jerry Hurley, Plumas National Forest,Mr. Ishmael Messer, Santa Monica Mountains NationalRecreation Area, Mr. Stephen Botti, National InteragencyFire Center, Mr. Jay Perkins, Klamath National Forest, andMr. L. Dean Clark, Chiricahua National Monument. Severalcurrent problems associated with prescribed fire as well asfuture opportunities were presented, such as prescribed fireas a landscape phenomenon involving multiple jurisdictions.The following five papers present a summary of this panel discussion.



Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century 1

Jerry Hurley 2

more difficult. With more fuel for constructing fireline, higherfire intensities keeping firefighters further back, and morefires to contain or control, acres burned will only increase.Fire modeling projections for areas with the mortality problemshow resistance to suppression will become 3 times greater,acres per hour burned will increase 25 times, and spottingdistances will be 1.2 times greater (Page and others 1991).This has been validated with two fires on the Forest in 1989and 1990 in which both fires burned from 500 to 1,000 acresper hour during peak periods with extensive crowning andspotting. Demand for suppression resources is furthercompounded by urban-rural interfaces in which suppressionstrategies have changed from perimeter control that minimizesacres burned, to exposure protection focusing on structures.

A Partial SolutionBecause of the mortality rates, capturing the merchantable

timber value and reduction potential for catastrophic firebecame the objectives for the Plumas National Forest. TheUSDA Forest Service began aggressive salvage actions toremove the rapidly accumulating fuels and capture amerchantable product. However, salvage operations alonewould not reduce the potential for catastrophic fire becausenot all the dead and dying material would be removed. Inmany cases it was less than 30 percent of the boles removedwith salvage. Areas and trees without merchantable sawlogsalvage did not require removal. Complete removal of deadtrees would not occur for reasons of economic viability,access, equipment limitations, resource constraints, lowvolumes per acre, large acre involvement, and rapiddeterioration of wood value. In fact, based on our projections,fire potential was not reduced when salvage logging was theonly fuel treatment (Page and others 1991).

To treat more of the fuel problem and to reintroduce fireinto ecosystems, we proposed underburning as the preferredtreatment following salvage. Underburning also treats themost acres for the dollar. We currently have about 80,000acres covered by environmental documentation, includingsurveys for archaeology and wildlife, authorizing salvagelogging and underburning. Of this, we currently have about20,000 acres with approved burn plans.

In 1991 we began our fire reintroduction program. Wehave since burned more than 2,000 acres, getting nearly1,000 acres per year and working towards a target of 3,000to 5,000 acres per year. We have burned from the road toridgetop on a southwest-facing slope for 7.5 miles along aroad that parallels a major recreational lake. We begin ignition

Abstract: Past experiences in prescribed burning are described, aswell as important factors for the continuation and expansion ofprescribed burning in California. These factors include: a) gainingpublic acceptance by better identifying, managing, and communi-cating risks, especially the risk of attempting to exclude fire fromall ecosystems and the increasing risks associated with fires thatescape initial attack and affect air and water quality, forest healthand sustainability, habitats, costs, and firefighter safety; b) makingoperational improvements by learning from past mistakes andshowing that we have learned to recognize and understand factorsthat are common to escapes; c) better prioritizing of areas in whichto burn and broadening our views on project scale and focusing onlandscape; and d) more communication, education, training, pri-oritizing, and burning.

Natural fire is an ecosystem component, and prescribedfire, often emulating natural fire, is a management tool

to meet resource objectives. However, in the current state ofsome ecosystems, prescribed fire may be the worst tool tosolve resource problems. Tools used in combination arebest, especially thinning with underburning. Once agreementsare reached on desired future conditions, tool selectionbecomes easier. In addition, fire suppression will also becomeeasier if fire is considered part of the ecosystem, to reducethe damage from eventual wildfires, thereby allowing betteruse of resources.

The Fuel ProblemIn 1989, on the east side of the Plumas National Forest,

the cumulative effects of past timber management practicesand fire exclusion policies became apparent, with consecutivewater deficit years, resulting in large areas of insect-createdmortality. Thousands of acres of dense, overstocked, dead,and dying white fir stands now exist where open pine standsexisted at the turn of the century. Stand examinations showedmortality varying from 50 to 80 percent in an area that is theepicenter for lightning caused fires in California (Court 1960).

These dense and dying stands are now highly flammable,prone to torching and crowning, and the creation and receptionof embers generate more spotfires, making fire suppression


2Zone Fire Management Officer, Quincy Ranger District, Plumas NationalForest, USDA Forest Service, 39696 Highway 70, Quincy, CA 95971-9607.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland EcosystemsPanel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century


in the spring, as the snow melts off the south slopes, workingfrom the ridges down slope. On one occasion we were ableto carry 1.5 miles of fire down the hill by using the workforceof only six people.

Burning Into the Next Century—Gaining Public Acceptance

So how do we continue to expand prescribed fire programsinto the next century, especially as our society becomesmore pyrophobic and the struggle to clean up California’sair becomes more difficult? Most importantly we must gainpublic acceptance and support. To accomplish this we needto learn from our mistakes, and initiate a number of concurrentactions, such as improving operations to reduce risk ofadverse events, working on a larger scale, and betterprioritizing projects for overall fire management effectiveness.

Gaining social acceptance of intensive fuels managementwith large scale burning as an alternative is crucial to reducingthe number of catastrophic wildfires. Public perceptionsultimately drive public land management. This should beextremely clear to us in forest management after thecontroversial clearcutting issue. To help facilitate publicacceptance we need to better identify, manage, andcommunicate risks to homeowners, air quality regulators,and legislators. In particular, we should emphasize the riskof attempting to exclude all fire from all ecosystems. Theincreasing risks associated with fires escaping initial attackand their effects on air and water quality, forest health andsustainability, habitats, costs, and firefighter safety must beemphasized. We can only expect fires to continue escapinginitial attack, burning more acres and causing more damage.The reasons are clear: higher fuel loads create increased fireintensities causing more damage and lessening suppressioneffectiveness. We need to change the public’s thinking fromacres burned to damage incurred. Are 10 acres of non-renewable eastside forests equal to 10 acres of fast-growing,easily-regenerated westside forest, or 10 acres of great basingrass and sage? Do we care how many acres are burned, orare we more concerned about how many acres are damaged?

When we overcome the air quality hurdle, majoropportunities will open up. I believe we can affect publicperceptions through information and education. I think thepublic is smart enough to accept the differences betweensmoke management and smoke prevention. Not only hassmoke been part of the ecosystem, but the volume and durationcan be managed with prescribed fire. Wildfires, on the otherhand, create more unplanned smoke because they burn muchmore area and fuel. Toxic pollutants are also generated andcarried into convection columns when structures and theircontents are involved. The public needs to know that wildfiresmoke can be managed through fuels management.

Similarly we need to educate the public about wildfireeffects on water quality, forest health and sustainability,and wildlife habitats. The public should not have to see

these effects for themselves to make logical choices aboutforest health.

The public must understand the total costs of wildfiresand alternatives to suppression and their costs. In 1989, theLayman Fire, on the Plumas National Forest, burned over5,800 acres, most of which burned in the first 5 hours. Itcost about $8 million for suppression, emergencyrehabilitation, and reforestation, and about 30 percent of thetimbered land became incapable of regeneration because ofsite degradation. For $8 million we could have easily burnedall the high- priority ground on the Beckwourth RangerDistrict at least once.

The public should be aware of increased threats tofirefighters. As our forests generate more dead trees andsnags, the potential for loss of life from these silent killerswill only rise. Today there is a higher threat for loss of lifeby firefighters from snags than from the threat of burnovers.Contrary to what we sometimes hear on television, we canpredict fire spread direction and behavior. We can see buildupsand changes in the weather and fire. We cannot predictwhere or when a snag will fall. At night we cannot even seethem. In these forests, if you construct line, eat lunch, or takea drink of water, you may not even see, much less be safefrom a falling snag. There is no black, or safety, zone asthere is in a fire. How many acres will be burned if we ceaseto suppress fires at night (usually the most effective time),because of potential for firefighter fatalities from snags?

Thus, fire suppression—as represented in the figure ofSmokey the Bear—and a driptorch are not mutually exclusive.They are both fire management tools to reduce loss anddamage of property and forest resources to catastrophicwildfire. Just as we need Smokey the Bear for the fireprevention program to reduce ignitions, we need prescribedfire for the fuel management program to reduce damagecaused by ignitions that escape initial attack and that wecannot eliminate. I think the public is capable of understanding“good fire versus bad fire.” We have a responsibility to helpeducate them about the options, costs, and effects; and theyshould participate in risk decisions, because we cannot forgetthat public land managers work for the public.

Operational ImprovementsWe will have to make operational improvements that

demonstrate we have learned from the past and from ourmistakes. Some indicators common to prescribed burnescapes include:

• Planning Breakdowns—burn bosses shouldparticipate in burn plan participation and inplanning firelines.

• Target Fixation—the pressure to blacken acres, toget trees in the ground, or to light because thecrews are anxious, are reasons that burns havebeen ignited and have contributed to escapes. Wemust develop good resource and burn objectives



occurrence, and potential for catastrophic fire by watershedsso that the the dollars we are allocated protect the highestrisk ground. My experience in fire management has shownme that pouring millions of dollars into small timber saleunits for fuel treatment, or building non-strategically placedfuelbreaks to keep suppression forces funded has done littleto affect large-scale fire. These small units did not alter thewildfire behavior or reduce fire intensities, and stands stillsuffered extensive damage. We need to develop projects thatare cost competitive, allowing us to treat the most acres andthe highest priority land.

SummaryThe commemorative video took an important step with

its message for Smokey’s 50th anniversary by mentioning“that the absence of fire is (sometimes) bad; that fire needsto be part of the ecosystem.” Smokey and prescribed burningare not mutually exclusive. Fire and fuel management wereonce the street sweeper in the timber volume parade, buthave become the grand marshal of the forest ecosystemparade, because land management agencies and society arebeginning to accept that fire and its related effects arecomponents of the ecosystem.

We must better display the alternatives and effects.Although some air degradation may not be desirable, at leastwhen it is over we still have a forest or a home. If we do notuse all the fire management tools available to us, can wecontinue to accept the increases in costs, damage, and losses—including loss of firefighters—associated with wildfires?Can we ignore the dynamics of ecosystems by trying tomanage them as if they were static; or by attempting tomanage for a single species to the extinction of their habitator the extinction of other species?

We have the information and the experienced personnelto learn from our past mistakes. If we are going to affectlarge-scale fires, we have to implement large-scale projectsin the right places. Numerous case examples show thatstands have survived loss to catastrophic fire when thinnedand underburned before the wildfire. We must begincommunicating, educating, training, prioritizing and burning.We have a tool—prescribed fire—that is economically andecologically sound, and in some areas the public is demandingwe use it. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “the only limit toour realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today.”

ReferencesCourt, Arnold. 1960. Lightning fire incidence in northeastern California, 1945-1956. Technical paper No. 47 - May 1960. Berkeley, CA: Pacific

Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station, USDA Forest Service,U.S. Department of Agriculture; 21 p.

Page, James; Harrell, Dick; Hurley, Jerry; Deeming, John. 1991. Droughtmortality-measuring effects. A 1990 study of drought mortality onthe Plumas National Forest. Unpublished.

USDA Forest Service Smokey’s 50th Commemorative video. 1994.

and good prescriptions and follow them. Just“black” is not an objective.

• Lack of Weather Information and Knowledge—We need to maximize use of remote weatherstations and provide that information to ourforecasting services. Burning has been performedwithout on-site weather from general forecastsand no consultation with fire weather forecasters,or worse, decisions were made by a person withlittle fire behavior or weather training.

• Lack of Planning for Wind Events—Althoughlong-range weather forecasting is still an inexactscience, we know that during certain times of theyear we are prone to undesirable wind events,including frontal and foehn winds. With someexperience and knowledge, we can generallypredict when and where these events will occur.We can use that information in planning ignitionsand follow-up actions.

• Complacency—This has been a factor in theplanning, ignition, patrol, and monitoring phases.When we fail to follow the basics with test burns,or blacklines, or are complacent about patrollingor weather monitoring, the potential for escapesincreases. Escapes, like fire fatalities, are notonly the result of one breakdown, but acombination of events.

The application of prescribed fire is both art and science.The decision to burn is inherently risky. Agencies mustprovide the training, direction, and demonstrated support fortheir personnel who have followed that direction, followedapproved burn plans, and made the decision with the bestinformation they had, even when the undesirable occurs. Ihave never met a prescribed fire manager or burn boss whowants an escape, or undesirable event. Similarly, agencymanagers need to give equal emphasis to training and resourceallocations for prescribed burning.

The value of tenure can be very important to lessenrisks—not only tenure on the part of program managers, butalso with agency managers. High turnover is often associatedwith a lack of skill, knowledge, or trust. Tenured managerscan provide program continuity. Tenure can provide betterlocal knowledge of weather and fire problems. Productivitycan increase and costs decrease as personnel become morecomfortable with prescriptions, ecosystems, and weatherpatterns. Agency managers may also require fewer constraintsas their comfort and understanding increase with programpersonnel. Escapes, undesirable events, and consequentiallitigation can be reduced and risks lessened throughinformation sharing, training, mentoring, and tenure.

ScaleWe need to broaden our views on project scale and to

better prioritize areas in which to burn through strategicplanning. We should set priorities based on fire regimes, fire



Multijurisdictional prescribed burning programs are thefuture of fuels management for numerous areas. Many

agencies or departments have different mandates and policies.Burn programs are carried out according to these policies.These policies are often outdated and do not consider thecurrent urban/interface mix issues. Without a completeunderstanding of the mission of our cooperators and assistingagencies, fire managers will never be able to burn the acresthat need burning, including both the number of acres andstrategic locations of the burn sites. Why is a particular burnproject important? Will it truly protect natural resources ordownstream values? Will the project make a significantdifference in our protection program? Building resource

data bases, specifically accurate field-based vegetation mapsusing satellite imagery, aerial photography, groundtruthing,and other sources of data should be a priority for anyinteragency ecosystem management plan. By combiningresource data, resource management programs, land-useplanning, development practices, and public education,opportunities exist to promote environmentally sensitive landuse, while protecting resource values. For example, vegetationinformation combined with fire history data can be used todevelop a more effective fire management and prescribedburning program to better meet ecological and propertyprotection needs.


2 Fire Program Planning Manager, USDI National Park Service, NationalInteragency Fire Center, Branch of Fire and Aviation Management, 3833Development Ave., Boise, ID 83705.


Stephen J. Botti 2


Ishmael Messer 2

Prescribed burning programs are likely to experiencechanges in the next 20 years as revolutionary as those

experienced in the past 20 years. During the initial phase ofdeveloping prescribed burning programs for forested areas,researchers and managers generally believed that prescribedburning should be restricted to low-intensity surface fires,and that such fires could reestablish natural conditions whilealso reducing hazardous fuels to acceptable levels. It wasonly after managers started implementing long-durationprescribed burns covering several thousand hectares thatthey started to understand the degree of variability in firebehavior and effects that were both inevitable and desirablein trying to reestablish natural fire regimes. That variabilityincreased the risks and potential liability of burning, and hasproduced a growing conflict between hazard fuel reduction

goals and ecological prescribed burning goals. How thisconflict is resolved will strongly influence the future courseof prescribed burning programs. It could become increasinglypopular to minimize risks by implementing hazard fuelreduction programs that do not promote a natural role forfire in Parks, and may produce permanent, unnaturalecosystem changes. This can be done by concentrating onthe fuel complex without regard for the ecologicalconsequences of the treatment. Constraints on prescribedburning, imposed to minimize smoke impacts, impacts tocultural resources, impacts to visitor use in wildlands, andimpacts to wildfire suppression readiness, are likely tocontinue to increase, especially as the population continuesto move into the wildland-urban interface and parks becomeincreasingly isolated ecosystem remnants.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban and Wildland Ecosystems,February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area, USDI National ParkService, 30401 Agoura Road, Suite 100, Agoura Hills, CA 91301.



Abstract: Planning is an essential step in the process of getting fire“back into the ecosystem.” The public needs to understand that fireis necessary for a healthy ecosystem and an essential ingredient inecosystem management. The hazard of high fuel accumulationscoupled with risk of fire starts must be portrayed so that the publicunderstands what will happen when the next wildfire burns in ourbackyard. Decisions will need to be made so that the hazards willbe mitigated and areas prioritized for treatment, despite limitedbudgets. All professionals, and the public, too, who are working tofind the answers to healthy forests must work together to under-stand the role of the disturbance processes at work. Fire is a keydisturbance that must be considered in practically every landscape.

The future is now. We must plan to obtain funding toimplement the ecosystem management projects.

Conceptually, we have made tremendous progress. Beforeecosystem management became the current managementoperating norm for the USDA Forest Service, pioneers inthe use and importance of fire blazed the trail. Those of uswho will carry the ecosystem management torch must givethanks to the pioneers, such as Dr. Harold Biswell for hiswork in the California Sierras and Bob Mutch for his workon prescribed natural fire in the White Cap Wilderness in theBitterroot mountains of Idaho and Montana.

Recently, the Klamath National Forest committed itself todetermining the meaning of ecosystem management andpreparing the Forest for the 21st century. Landscape Analysisand Design is the process that was developed because fireanalysis fits comfortably within it. The key to fire’s futuresuccess is the incorporation of fire planning processes withinthe context of ecosystem management—not as a separate process.

Predicting or projecting the future is a tremendouschallenge. The technology age is expanding rapidly. Currentresearch in modeling stand dynamics in conjunction withdifferent fire scenarios will strengthen our ability to understandcomplex systems. The fire analysis used by the Klamath ispart of the Landscape Analysis and Design process. TheKlamath is confident that this approach will be useful in thefuture and can adapt to changing science.

This paper will discuss the use of the Landscape Analysisand Design process used on the Klamath National Forest.

Landscape Analysis and DesignThe purpose of the Landscape Analysis and Design

(LAD) process is to provide a means by which forestlandscapes can be understood as ecological systems, and touse this knowledge to help shape the landscape patternscreated through National Forest land management activities.Fire is recognized as an essential component of the Klamath;hence, fire is a primary element in the planning process.

The process is intended as a vehicle for implementationof forest planning direction while ensuring the ecologicalhealth of the resources. It provides the link between theNational Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act (NEPA), by providing a methodfor defining the desired condition of a landscape andidentifying opportunities to achieve and perpetuate the desiredlandscape character as portrayed in the Land ManagementPlanning (LMP) document.

Summary of the LAD Process Steps

The first two steps in the process are designed so thatthe landscape is described in the context of ecologicalstructures and functions. In the first step, the landscapeelements are described in terms of the vegetative matrix,patches, corridors, and patterns. In the second step, theecological phenomena (referred to as flows) that move across,or interact with, landscapes are identified. Fire, wildlife,humans, and water are some examples of flow phenomenathat operate at a landscape scale.

Step three provides a sense of the complexity of thelandscape by describing the interactions of the flows withthe individual landscape elements, as well as the landscapepatterns. Individual flow phenomena have a specific way ofinteracting with the landscape elements, and the landscapepattern in aggregate. This interaction provides insight intohow the landscape functions as an ecological system.

Step four provides a framework for defining sustain-ability. Landscapes are not static; disturbance processes arean integral factor in ecosystem sustainability. Characterizingpast conditions, processes that have created the presentconditions, and processes likely to affect future conditionsprovides a sense of the range of variability.

In step five the desired condition is defined by firstestablishing the landscape patterns and objectives found inthe Forest Plan. The applicable standards and guidelines areevaluated in the context of the historic range of variabilitydefined in the previous step. The resulting desired conditionencompasses understanding of ecological processes at work,as well as management direction.


2Fire Planning Specialist, Klamath National Forest, USDA Forest Ser-vice, 1312 Fairlane Road, Yreka, CA 96097.

Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century:The Role of Fire Planning 1

Jay Perkins 2



Finally, step six identifies possible managementopportunities, by contrasting the existing condition to thedesired condition. Potential opportunities that achieve desiredcondition objectives are delineated. The outcome of theprocess provides a purpose and need for implementation ofindividual projects designed to achieve, or maintain, thedesired condition of the landscape. This process can serve asa catalyst to identify a full range of resource opportunities;by reducing functionalism, planning efforts are betterintegrated to provide a balance of resource outputs.

Scale of the Landscape AnalysisBecause the analysis process encompasses areas roughly

between 10,000 and 100,000 acres, the level of detail will begeneral in nature but considerably more detailed than the analysisthat led up to the Land Management Planning document. Thisassessment of the landscape conditions serves to refine thedesired condition from the LMP, while defining managementconcerns and issues before initiating the NEPA process.

The analysis record serves as a source document forgeneral characterization of landscape conditions andinteractions. It can be used during the NEPA process to providea framework for the generation of alternatives, and may makerecommendations where additional information and data areneeded to assess environmental consequences. Although amore detailed analysis may be necessary for NEPA sufficiency,that analysis can be focused on project- specific issues andpotential effects in subsequent NEPA documents.

Basic Information NeedsFor every landscape, baseline information is necessary

to perform the analysis. Additional information that is neededwill depend on the flows, uses, and functions characteristicof each individual landscape. The baseline informationincludes:

• Land Management Plan map—Defines spatiallythe management area allocations in each landscape.General knowledge of land allocations for adjacentlandscapes is also necessary.

• Topographic map with transportation system—Serves as a point of reference for unique featuresor areas of concern, as well as general orientationof the landscape.

• Aerial photos—Serve as useful aids that show thelatest flight lines as well as earliest photos; alsoshow obliques, orthophotos, SPOT images, andflight lines taken just before and after major events.

• Vegetation map—(may be derived from timbertype or ecological type data).

• Fuel Model map—(forest crosswalk based ontimber strata characteristics).

• Fire Risk/Occurrence map—Based on Forest orDistrict information from fire history atlas.

• Fire Hazard/Fire Behavior map—Developed from

the fuel model map after initial field review;combines fuel model with topographic featuresof slope and aspect to show hazard potential.

Additional maps that will be of use throughout theprocess include:

• Geohazard map—An LMP product or districtproduct in areas where additional field review hasbeen accomplished.

• Order 2 Soils—Particularly helpful if regen-erability or productivity is a concern; LMPinformation could be useful in a gross scale foridentifying unsuitable or incapable grounds.

• Plantation map—In landscapes with higherproportions of managed plantations, silviculturebackground information is a useful tool.

The initial planning meeting should identify resourceconcerns specific to a landscape; including wildlife use, uniquefeatures or habitats, human use patterns, or sensitive resources(i.e., sensitive plants, soils, or cultural resources). Additionalneeded map layers will be determined from this initial meeting.This meeting should be scheduled well in advance of theanalysis process to provide sufficient lead time for data andmap preparation. This meeting is crucial also so that the firststeps in validation of map outputs can occur.

Team Composition and FunctionThe Forest has identified the need to provide consistency

to the process; hence, the formation of a core group. The coregroup is composed of five people: a team leader, a writer/editor, and three writers/specialists. This team goes to all ofthe meetings irrespective of the Ranger District/landscape.

Key to the process is the Districts’ involvement. Inbrief, they are the owners of the process and need to beintimately involved in the process. Much of their projectfunding will hinge on the outcomes of this process. TheDistricts provide the ground specialization and “resource”area familiarization. They also provide a key District liaisonto ensure the Districts’ needs are being met from the initiationof NEPA through project implementation.

Fire AnalysisThe fundamental information that is needed to analyze

wildfire susceptibility is an understanding of the fireoccurrence and the fuels (vegetation) situation on thelandscape. With these two elements, plus a sense of thehistoric role of fire in pre-fire suppression, we can gainan understanding of the susceptibility of the landscape tofire and the likelihood of the severity of a wildfire when itdoes occur.

The elements of this fire analysis within the LandscapeAnalysis and Design process will center around the Klamath’smost recent project, the Humbug landscape.

The Humbug landscape is situated due west of Yreka,California and is administered by the Oak Knoll Ranger District.



Fuel ModelingThe very first step is to characterize the fuels on the

landscape. As mentioned previously, one of the very firstLAD products is the preliminary fuel modeling map. This isbuilt from the timber strata map from the LMP databasethrough a geographic information system (GIS). A firstapproximation fuel map is created relating timber strata tofire behavior fuel models. Ground verification is the firsttask by the LAD team because the resolution of the timberstrata is not always sufficient for the analysis. The firebehavior fuel models characterize surface fires. If the firesreach the forest canopy, then the understory needs to beanalyzed so that surface fires that reach the forest canopyare better understood.

The dominant fuel models in Humbug include:• Fuel Model 1 (grass)—Globally changed to fuel

model 2, this model is still one of grass fuel butwith a tree or brush overstory. It mostly occursalong the ridges of the landscape boundary. Firestypically burn quickly in late summer.

• Fuel Model 5 (brush)—Globally changed to fuelmodel 6, these fuel models are difficult to discernfrom the timber strata information. It becomesimperative to field verify as these two fuel modelsburn differently. Overall decadence in the brushtypes indicate model 6 would be the best descriptor.The brush patches would require more detailedassessment before implementation of a prescribedburning project. Fire can be fast and intense.

• NCF (non commercial forest)—Without beinggiven a fuel model from the crosswalk, fuel model6 best characterizes the NCF lands in this landscape.

• Fuel Model 11 (slash)—Attributed to olderplantations (>30 years), this fuel model has fuelon the ground—probably from managementactivities. These had to be attributed on a polygonby polygon basis through use of the stand recordcard system or field verification.

General assumptions are:

• Thinned stands—Remained as fuel model 11because thinning slash in untreated stands createsa slash fuel model.

• Poorly stocked stands—Combined with fuel model6 because the assumption is the brush componentis the fire carrier. For the most part these standsare >30 years old, presumed brush with decadence.

• Adequately stocked stands—Combined with fuelmodel 9 because we assumed the litter accumul-ation is the fire carrier. Stands went into fuelmodel 9 rather than 8 because the majority of areahad a high component of ponderosa pine.

• Timber fuel models (models 8, 9, and 10)—Thesewere left unchanged because they are highlyvariable and no consistent assumption could be

applied to make changes. Stands will requirefurther refinement to develop burning prescriptionsthat will successfully achieve objectives of cleaningup ground fuels or understory regeneration withoutexceeding acceptable levels of mortality in theoverstory component.

Other Fuels CharacteristicsA factor not tracked in Humbug is development of

understory. Presence of an understory component in sufficientquantities would create ladder fuels that contribute to crownfire potential. This would place moderate hazard fuels (suchas 8 and 9) into higher hazard classes. This is an essentialpiece of information that needs collecting. Many currentsystems do not adequately portray the understory situation.This item must be improved in the future. Crown fires arethe most destructive and have a serious impact on manywildlife species that are currently protected by the Threatenedand Endangered Species Act.

Fire Hazard/Fire BehaviorFire hazard/fire behavior is a derived GIS layer that uses

a slope map, fuel model map, and fuel model to crosswalk afire hazard. The crosswalk is a way of entering a look-uptable for the GIS database. This crosswalk and subsequentcrosswalks will be used for building GIS layers.

Three slope classes are used, consistent with the slopeclasses used in the LMP geologic hazard classification (0 to34 percent, 35 to 65 percent, and >65 percent). The DigitalElevation Model (DEM ) information could be used to makedifferent slope breaks if necessary.

Each fuel model/slope combination found on thelandscape is run through the BEHAVE fire behavior program.This is a modeling program that uses fuel model, slope, andweather parameters to predict fire behavior and resistance tocontrol for suppression purposes. The 90th percentile weatherfrom district records are used to model late summer afternoonstypical of late August and early September. These late summerparameters are used because they are the ones that cause themost intense problems, burn the most acres, and have themost significant consequences to firefighting capability anddramatic fire effects to other resources.

The final product is another crosswalk created withinthe GIS database in which flame lengths and rate of spreadare evaluated to determine resistance to control. BEHAVE isused to build this crosswalk outside of the GIS systembecause this capability is not yet available. The output is arating of low, moderate, or high fire hazard/fire behavior:

• Low—Flame lengths less than 4 feet and capable ofdirect attack fire suppression with hand crews.

• Moderate—Flame lengths of 4 to 8 feet and capable ofdirect-attack suppression efforts with equipment, dozers orengines. Hand crews are not effective for direct attacksuppression efforts. Rates of spread greater than those thatthe handcrews can contain in the low category.



• High—Flame lengths greater than 8 feet and requireair support or an indirect attack method of fire suppression.

Although flame lengths are generally used to definehazard, some fuel models will have low flame lengths butextremely rapid rates of spread, which will place them into ahigher hazard class. For example, in Humbug, fuel model 2is a grass/low brush fuel model that never exceeds 4 feetflame lengths, but the rate of spread is 114 chains per hour.This exceeds the ability of hand crews, or equipment, fordirect attack without air support.

The derived layer incorporates the information into aspatial display of hazard assessment for the landscapeproviding the link to risk and the resource values.

Fire Risk/OccurrenceThis map is based on Ranger District and National

Forest fire atlas information. We are still working on gettingthis fire history process totally automated. The map displayslocation of starts over a 60 year period for the Humbuglandscape.

Fire risk is based on the number of fire starts per 1,000acres. Included in the calculation are the number of firestarts, number of years of historical information, and numberof acres involved. The value derived corresponds to alikelihood of fire starts per 1,000 acres. The risk ratings andrange of values used in the assessment include:

• Low Risk = 0 to 0.49—at least one fire expected every20 or more years per thousand acres.

• Moderate Risk = 0.5 to 0.99—at least one fire expectedin 11to 20 years per thousand acres.

• High Risk = >1.0—at least one fire expected in 0 to 10years per thousand acres.

Potential Wildfire SusceptibilityThis is the end product of the assessment. By

incorporating hazard and risk, a matrix is developed thatdisplays the likelihood an area will be affected by wildfire.The output is a tabular report identifying the number of acresin each category, and a spatial display generated by a GIS:

Potential Wildfire Susceptibility Matrix

Hazard | Risk |

| Low | Moderate | High

Low | 1 | 1 | 2

Moderate | 1 | 2 | 3

High | 2 | 3 | 4

What Is Next

Evaluation of the various resource values and objectivesalong with the wildfire susceptibility matrix can be used todevelop a fuels management plan that can best achieve thedesired condition for the landscape. Because all areas cannotbe treated at once, efforts may be focused on areas of greatestrisk to wildfire. The fire maps can also be overlaid withother resource concern areas for the line officer to evaluatepriority areas.

Other uses of these resources include:• Budgeting and identifying needs for priority work,

especially those that can meet several objectives in one treatment.• Using the products of the system for educational

purposes to display the importance of incorporating fireinto the ecosystem.

• Demonstrating that more firefighting resources willnot provide the desired output. Fire needs to be an ally in themanagement of ecosystems.

SummaryIn addition to the fire planning process, we need to

address other issues as well. For instance, budgeting processesmust align themselves with the task of implementingecosystem management. If Forest Service budgets remainresource-oriented, our publics may not be convinced that weintend to change our way of doing business.

In addition, dynamic fuel modeling will need to beintegrated with temporal vegetation modeling. Traditionalfuel modeling will have to change concurrently because ofthe greater need to study fuels vertically as well as horizontally.

Planning processes must follow the intent of NEPA andbe implemented in an interdisciplinary fashion. Fire plannersmust share their knowledge of fire effects and fire dynamicsso that we can have a better understanding of all of theinterrelations that occur on a landscape. The search forknowledge must continue and that knowledge must be shared.

ReferencesDiaz, Nancy; Apostol, Dean. 1992. Forest landscape analysis and design:

a process for developing and implementing land managementobjectives for landscape patterns. USDA Forest Service: PacificNorthwest Region; R6 ECO-TP-043-92; 94 p.

USDA Forest Service. 1992. Our approach to sustaining ecologicalsystems. USDA Forest Service: Northern Region; R1-92-23; 26 p.



on control of the timing and rate of progressive ignitions, orfiring. Fire as a tool is used only as a last resort.

Our transformation of this landscape compels aredefinition of our prescribed fire strategies. Suppressionalone is a defensive strategy. For fire suppression we mustconfine, contain, and control them (NPS 1991a). Forprescribed burning we depend on either management ornatural ignition. If tactics derive from strategy, then how dowe reconcile our actions to our policies?

Fire suppression works most of the time, but does notwork all of the time, particularly during the dry and windyextremes of a site’s environmental range of conditions. Duringthese times fire is the enemy; it can become the fire demon.We often must abandon exterior attacks upon fire flanks andmust defend positions of developed properties. We are duty-bound to do so. The reassignment of firefighting resourcesto the protection of human life and property furthercomplicates the control problems by an ever-wideningperimeter of uncontrolled fire. The command and operationaldifficulties in these tactics are a recurring problem (Phillips1971, USDA-USDI Task Force 1989).

We lack unified strategies to focus our uses of fire inother than suppression modes. General Helmut Von Moltkedefined strategy as “the practical adaptation of the meansplaced at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the objectin view.” Our lack is coordinated prescribed fire action onthe offensive end. We can take the initiative and use time toour advantage. The firefighting tools and equipment we canbuy are stronger, and more powerful than ever before. Ourtools, and therefore our tactics, are evolving. But even withlimited resources we can at least apply a limited aim strategy:for example, fuels management on key geographic positionswhen the weather elements align to our favor. The principleis to change weak fire defensive positions into strong (oranchor) points at times of advantage to a site’s fire potential,such as doing “off-season” controlled burning. As GeneralPatton used to say, “A good plan in time is better than aperfect plan that is too late.”

The integrated STRATEGY I propose is a simplesynthesis of three common strategies for prescribed firemanagement application. The use of these three strategicprofiles can provide priority and essential flexibility forany jurisdiction to integrate with the suppression andprevention programs for more effective wildland firemanagement. The strategies serve equally well forsuppression or for prescribed fires.


L. Dean Clark 2


2 Chief Ranger, Chiricahua National Monument, USDI National ParkService, Dos Cabezas Rt., Box 6500, Wilcox, AZ 85643.

Abstract: General Helmut Von Moltke defined strategy as “thepractical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal tothe attainment of the object in view.” Three strategies are neededfor a proactive posture of fire management in the 21st century. Thefirst is to improve positional defenses of human values at directrisk of fire loss. This strategy addresses primarily fuels manage-ment at the interface. A second strategy is to improve safety andcost effectiveness of fire management activities on the exteriorlines where rural and resources economics are the human values atrisk. The third strategy involves the dilemna of cost effectivewilderness fire management programs faced by land managers toimprove command, planning, logistics, and financing of interiorline prescribed fires (within administrative boundaries of publiclands).

I met Professor Biswell at Pinnacles National Monumentafter he had written a USDI National Park Service (NPS)

prescribed fire plan for that unit (Biswell 1976). My job wasto implement that plan. Professor Biswell gave me a littleadvice at the Pinnacles before doing the controlled burningthere: “Talk with the local ranchers—listen to what theyhave to say.” My attention was turned to the winds (Schroeder1961).

I presume to speak for those whose tongues are still. ForI have followed their paths and the ancient paths beforethem. These words you may regard as an echo. An echo ofwhat the winds have whispered to me. Because to understandthe essential nature of fire, you must feel the winds. For it isby such means that fire will return to where you stand andlisten. The “Cat-faced” trees are also a clue in my woods(Swetnam and others 1989).

Our cultural focus with fields and fire is that we willstop the fire if we do not want it or prescribe it as a treatment.We prescribe a fire. An interesting story is the one that theancients of this land held, that Fire is in the Wood (Clark1953). At the right time, by and by, it was let out. It went onand on that way for a long time. The fires started one way oranother. The fact is fire was here, is here, and so are we.

What should be the form of these fires? Currently, wehave two choices. Our direct defensive strategy (Clar andChatten 1966) is to keep to a minimum the number of acresburned and the extent of property and human losses. Thechances of success for our indirect offensive strategy depend



Positional DefensesThis strategy directly protects life and property from

fire. Tactics for this strategy are the most varied, and by thetopography of most human developments, machine-accessible. The objective is to reduce fire hazards nearproperties that are at risk to fire loss. The California PublicResources Code 4291 specifies a vegetation clearance aroundstructures in the wildlands. The rule is 30 feet or more and ifuniformly enforced, it would work to reduce wildfire losses.This tactic can be done by anyone or by any public entity onowned lands, not just in California.

Many common problems of wildland fire protectionoccur on a small scale that can be solved before a wildfire(Moore 1981). The image of a design of concentric circles,or ellipses, can be applied to fuel reduction areas aroundstructures, or developments, as fire protection buffer strips.This protection concept can apply to timber plantations,recreation sites, historic, natural or cultural resources aswell. The widest, or deepest, strips of modified vegetationwould be in the upwind, or to the downslope sides of thevalues at risk to fire.

The limited aim of this strategy is to turn the mostvulnerable flanks of wildland exposures into positions ofdefensible space under the worst case conditions expectedfor a site. Use of public labor crews may be an option forsome areas.

Exterior LinesPerimeter fire control is the basic tenet for effective

wildland fire suppression (Brown and Davis 1973). It is alawful assumption for controlled burns. The basic principleto this direct strategy on the exterior line is to contain a fire.Wildfire losses will be held to the minimum through timelyand effective suppression action consistent with values atrisk (USDI 1990). This strategy generally protects life andproperty indirectly by stopping the spread of a fire.

The defined perimeter of each prescribed burn is theline of “control” beyond which the fire is no longer controlled.Currently, therefore, each controlled burn is an exterior lineaction with all of the associated expenses.

Cooperation between neighboring agencies to agree uponjoint project areas on mutual boundaries can serve to “dissolve”administrative boundary lines. An example of this planningconcept is the joint NPS-USDA Forest Service Lassen Park-Caribou Wilderness Fire Management Plan recently re-approved by Lassen National Forest and Lassen NationalPark. Others are in development throughout the west.

Convergence of planning for wildfires and prescribedfires can use existing escaped fire situation analysis (EFSA)format as a basis for safer, more cost-effective resourcesdecisions. For multi-jurisdictional situations, the documentsmust reflect the unified command structure of the plannedincident, and thereby provide strategic agreement in advanceof the inevitable need. These are “pre-attack” fire

presuppression plans and can be prepared as contingencyfor planned or even on-going prescribed fires of concern tomanagers. Powerful new tools using remote sensingtechnology can help managers identify realistic firemanagement planning units based on fuels and projectedfire behavior.

The concept of fuelbreaks as a pre-attack measure forarea fire protection can be beneficial (Green 1977).Fuelbreaks emplaced upon geographic features such as ridges,particularly along administrative unit boundaries, serve dualpurposes. The access to fires is at least safer for firefighters,as well as being a clearly defined edge of a management unitor a jurisdiction such as at Whiskeytown National RecreationArea, and on the Stanislaus, Sequoia, and Sierra NationalForests. A successful example of this principle working inpractice was on the “Powerhouse” fire on the Sierra NationalForest in 1989. A flank of that fire was contained when itburned into Jose Basin, a part of of the “Sugarloaf” type-conversion project from the 1960’s.

Area conflagration control and wildfire reduction on anarea could be improved by treating the areas containedwithin the fuelbreak perimeters with controlled burning suchas on the “Grindstone” project on the Mendocino NationalForest. There are a multitude of resource benefits from suchprograms on public lands in addition to fire hazard reduction.

Interior LinesInterior lines as a strategic concept applies primarily to

large blocks of public lands. Areas that have few high-valueeconomic elements, and have high ecological significance,such as wildernesses, parks, and monuments, are logical forapplications of large-scale prescribed fires. Indeed, bothSequoia-Kings Canyon and Yosemite National Parks havebeen at the vanguard of the use of fire as a tool in ecosystemrestoration and maintenance. Several Forest Servicewildernesses such as the Selway-Bitterroot, and the WhiteCap in Montana are active with prescribed natural fire (PNF).

Wilderness should permit the role of natural processesto the fullest extent possible without interference from man.Yet each wilderness fire must be guided by a plan! Weshould plan the fires to our capacities, for instance, schedulingthe ignitions in certain areas, at certain times where naturalignitions and suppression activities have resulted inunprecedented fuel accumulations. The strategy of the interiorline has a broad scope of application in the medium sizedand smaller units of the public lands. The use of an interiorline strategy will work, but some objectives and proceduresneed to be refined. On the interior lines of remote areas, theecological processes may be served within the span-of-control of modest-sized forces, by using moderate burningconditions, with some time allowed to do the job patientlyand carefully.

Formation of mobile tactical teams of specialized firemanagement resources able to move from job to job asreinforcement (but not replacement) to local fire forces



could enable this work. Simplified command, operational,and administrative procedures could empower the field firecommanders. Most of the NPS areas in the western UnitedStates have comprehensive fire management plans preparedand on file (NPS 1992). Working strategies are lacking,however, as well as essential resources and field flexibility.Many opportunities exist for human-ignited prescribed fireprograms in smaller wildernesses. Thus, many of the presentdifficulties with naturally occurring prescribed fires may beresolved. Smoke management can be a protracted problemfor small areas, too.

Point/Counter-PointLegal issues surround the use of prescribed fire in the

next century. Guidance in the form of United States Code(18 USC 1855, 1856) covers issues such as fires kindled, leftunattended, or unextinguished by Federal agencies (U.S.Code 1982). The internal administrative discussion aboutprescribed fires, the external regulatory climate, andinteragency distrust following Yellowstone 88 all combineto deflect attention from the focus of the IC/burn boss to theforces that make or break successful fires on the fire ground.Land managers are well-advised to await a wildfire ratherthan bother with all of the prescribed burn risks and headaches.Individual commitment must be to a shared responsibility(Mutch 1977) for total fire management.

“Mobile Tactical Teams” that are specially trained andequipped to initiate and see through prescribed burningprojects (USDA-USDI 1989) may encounter several barriers.Most are fiscal and administrative concerns.

Dr. Biswell once stated that fire control agencies shouldbalance the money used in the fire program in thirds:suppression, prevention, and controlled burning. This ideadid not really work. Perhaps the concept could be applied inreverse. “Base” fire management funds “saved” by efficientoperations could be designated for prescribed fire operations,if such operations have been targeted in a plan. This approachis an incentive to save funds to get more fuels/vegetationwork done.

We do need sensible and sustainable funding sources topay for the integrity of natural processes. A potential sourceis a percentage of the Land and Water Conservation Fund(P.L.88-578, September 3, 1964, and as amended) inproportion to wilderness use for the NPS, the USDI Bureauof Land Management (BLM), and the USDI Fish and WildlifeService (FWS). The Forest Service might assess a specialuser fee permit for each wilderness entry.

My thesis is that tactics derive from strategy and ourstrategies are deficient. I have proposed an integrated strategyfor prescribed fire management actions. Interior line actionsawait refinements of strategic interagency cooperation, andour resolve to act. I have the patience to wait, but theproblems are not going away. And the fire is still in thewood. The decisions must be on the ground and in time towork well. We must do fire work like we walk, a step at atime. For the winds will return where I walk. It is not if, butwhen, the fire shall return, and return once again.

ReferencesBrown, A.A.; Davis, K.P. 1973 Forest fire: control and use. New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Co.; 686 p.Biswell, H.H. 1976. A management plan for restoring fire in chaparral

at the Pinnacles National Monument. San Francisco, CA: USDINational Park Service; 32 p.

Clar, R.C.; Chatten, R.L. 1966. Principles of forest fire management:Sacramento, CA: State of California; 272 p.

Clark, E.E. 1953. Indian legends of the Pacific Northwest: How coyotebrought fire to the people, and how beaver stole the fire. Berkeley,CA: University of California Press; 187-192.

Green, L.R. 1977. Fuelbreaks and other fuel modification for wildlandfire control . Agric. Handb. 499. Washington, DC: U.S Department ofAgriculture; 79 p.

Moore, H. E. 1981. Protecting residences from wildfires: a guide forhomeowners, lawmakers, and planners. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-50.Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station,Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 44 p.

Mutch, R.W. 1977. Fire management and land use planning today: traditionand change in the Forest Service. In: Western Wildlands, Vol 4 (1).Missoula, Mt: School of Forestry, University of Montana; 37-43.

Phillips, C.B. 1971. California aflame! Sacramento, CA: California Divisionof Forestry, 1970 September 22-October 4; 73 p.

Schroeder, M.J. 1961. Down-canyon afternoon winds. Bull. Amer. Meteor.Soc. 42 (8): 527-542.

Swetnam, T.W.; Baisan, C.H.; Brown, P.M.; Caprio, A.C. 1989. Firehistory of rhyolite canyon, Chiricahua National Monument. FinalReport, Chiricahua National Monument; Tucson, AZ: University ofArizona, Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research; 38 p.

United States Codes. 1982. Office of the Law Revision Counsel of theHouse of Representatives Containing the General and Permanent Lawsof the United States, effective January 14, 1983. Title 16 Conservationand Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and Appendix. 679 p.Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

USDA-USDI Task Force. 1989. Interagency Fire Policy Review TeamReport, Washington Offices, Washington D.C.

USDI Bureau of Land Management. 1990. 910 DM 1 Wildland FireSuppression and Management Program; 1990 March 29; Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Office.

USDI National Park Service. 1991a NPS-18. Guideline: Wildland firemanagement. Washington D.C.

USDI National Park Service. 1992 Wildland fire management plan:Chiricahua National Monument. Wilcox, AZ; 91 p.




CONCURRENT SESSION II—Urban Interface Topics



Abstract: The increase of homes in wildlands indicates a signifi-cant change. The build-up of fuels around homes and in wildlandsover time also indicates change. Resistance to change, however,remains the norm. Fires get worse, but plain water continues to beused for fire suppression and property protection. With Class Afoam, the objectives of protection are to wet the exposure rapidly,creating a heat sink, and then leave or apply elsewhere while thefoam remains behind. This foam can be generated in low-, me-dium-, and high-expansion forms. Class A foam can be appliedfrom pump-and-roll monitors, large water capacity structure pro-tection engines, small home protection units, aircraft and conven-tional hose lines. Foam has been successfully applied to savestructures threatened by wildfire and to contain prescribed firesnear valuable resources. As developed at this time, durable foam iscapable of remaining in place as a barrier to fire for 24 to 48 hours.Class A foam technology offers an effective tool to improve theuse of water for structure and resource protection.

Change is constant. For instance, the landscape haschanged, and in rural areas, homes have been built,

increasing the fire protection problem for these areas.In suburban and rural areas, canopy trees grow, the

understory and brush grows, limbs and leaves fall, and fuelscontinue to build up. Residents prefer the ambiance of thickvegetation surrounding their property rather than an occasionalblackened slope from a fuels-reducing prescribed fire. Fuelloading and fuel models continue to change.

In forests and rangelands, prescribed fire is increasinglyrestricted by impacts of smoke emissions and resourceprotection. Burn opportunities are fewer and, when theyoccur, sensitive resources, such as snags, often must besaved. The regulations by which we conduct prescribed firehave changed.

Each of these changes has increased the burden on ourfire suppression and protection technologies. Our job keepsgetting more difficult to perform. The only thing that doesnot change in the fire service is our resistance to change. Forcenturies, plain water has been accepted as the primary fire-extinguishing tool for all Class A or natural fuel fires. Perhapssome time ago this practice was sufficient. Given the annualparade of wildland-urban interface examples of how the fireservice has not kept up with the fire problem, it is time to re-examine how we do business.

Use of Class A Foams on Structures and Wildlands 1

Paul Schlobohm 2

Presuppression measures, such as creating defensiblespace and fireproofing exposures, are significant steps toprotecting structures from wildland fire. But, once a fire israpidly approaching and embers are flying everywhere, thereis only time for protection activities.

The fact is suppression and protection are relied uponfor every wildland-urban interface fire. Certainly, not everystructure can be safely defended from fire, but we have to doour job better in the face of ever-worsening situations.

Why Foam?Possibilities for change begin with that old standard—

plain water. The idea is not to replace it—for water has greatpotential for suppression and protection—but rather to improveit. When a surfactant like liquid dish soap is added to water,water loses its surface tension and gains an emulsifier, allowingrapid wetting of Class A fuels. Without the surfactant, waterclings to itself and runs off fuels to the ground. Some fuels,like cedar shingles, naturally shed plain water. Wetting fuelswith plain water requires time and large quantities of water.A traditional way to counter this dilemma while protectingstructures is to maintain a stream of water on the exposurewhile it is threatened.

The combination of water and a Class A foam surfactantis called “foam solution” and acts like a high-performancewet water. All of the water in the solution is immediatelyavailable for wetting. However, most wood fuels are notable to absorb water all at once. The problem with applicationsof foam solution is that they are short-lived. Wetting occursat the fuel surface, but no solution is left for further andcontinued wetting. And the solution that cannot be absorbedimmediately runs off.

The rapid run-off of foam solution can be slowed byadding air and creating a foam. Foam can hold the solutionin place until it is absorbed by the treated fuel.

Foam also provides a visual reference for an application.A specific depth of foam can be applied. With foam solution,it is difficult to know if any has been applied and if thatamount is sufficient. As long as foam is visible, the fuelbelow the foam is not drying out. Fuels wetted by non-aerated foam solution begin to dry immediately.

Structure ProtectionThe spread of fire from house to house is primarily

because of wind-borne fire brands and radiation. A fire thatstarts on a roof begins as one or more very small fires. Thestructural protection objective with Class A foam is tosufficiently wet exposures to withstand these ignition sources.


2Fire Management Specialist, USDI Bureau of Land Management, Na-tional Interagency Fire Center, 3833 S. Development Ave., Boise, ID 83705.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II


A wet house becomes a heat sink, effectively forcing brandsand flames to spend their energy on drying rather thanigniting the house. An application of foam buys time whilethe fire front burns around and past the structure. And it doesthis without the need for continuous application.

Because foam is effective well after application, the fireapparatus and crew can move on and treat other structures orleave the area if necessary. The opportunity for multiple-structure applications has led to the development of apparatusdesigned for rapid and continuous foam discharge. Thesewildland/urban interface foam engines carry 1,000 to 3,000gallons of water and at least 40 gallons of foam concentrate.They are plumbed to deliver compressed air foam throughmonitors or side ports. During pump-and-roll they can deliverthe water flow at which the pump is rated. Using thecompressed air foam system this type of engine can dischargeat least 100 gallons per minute of water as foam for exposureprotection a distance of 200 feet. The large water capacityand the flow-conserving use of compressed air foam meansthese engines often will be pumping off the same water loadlong after conventional Type 1 engines have run out of waterand hydrants have lost pressure.

Although this type of apparatus has been in great demandfor structure protection over the last few years, such anengine is not necessary for success with foam. Anythingthat can deliver water can also deliver foam. The commonfertilizer canister filled with dish soap and attached to agarden hose can be effective. Several commercial homeprotection units are designed for foam use. On fire apparatus,foam concentrate can be added from a proportioner plumbedinto the water line or dumped into the engine water tank.Aspirating nozzles will make foam at the end of the hose.Compressed air foam systems will pump foam through thehose and increase discharge distance with the energy fromthe air compressor. Rotor- and fixed-wing aircraft createfoam by dropping foam solution through the air.

Extinguishment

For those structures that become involved and for gainingcontrol over the adjacent wildland fire, foam is again animprovement over plain water. Water is primarily effectiveat suppressing open flame by cooling. Foam solution changesthe structure of water so that water is more completely usedfor heat absorption. The thin films of foam solution, whichare the bubbles in foam, expose a greater surface area ofwater for absorbing heat than solid streams or drops ofwater. The amount of water in the extinguishing foam can beadjusted to meet the heat output of the fire, also known as thecritical application flow rate. Flame knockdown is oftenimmediate. The clinging nature of the foam structure worksto suppress vapors and eliminate smoke. Improved penetrationof water reduces hold-over fires. More complete utilizationof water results in reduced water damage inside structures.

Prescribed Fire

Foam is making water a more effective tool for prescribedfire. Foam is used to create fuel breaks and burn unitboundaries, to protect important resources within the unit,and to reduce secondary smoke emissions. The objective offuel break and resource protection applications is similar tothat of structure protection: to raise fuel moisture and createa heat sink until the ignition threat passes. With smokereduction, the objective is to turn black to white, to cover theentire burn area as quickly as possible.

In many fuel types, foam is being used as a fuel break,sometimes as a “light hand on the land” approach in place offire trail cut by machine or hand crew. A single foam trail,made from a hoselay or during pump-and-roll, becomes ananchor or boundary from which to ignite a prescribed firearea. Wide holding lines are created by firing out betweentwo foam trails. High– (over 200:1) and medium– (20:1 to200:1) expansion foams are being used to create fire traildownhill from ridgetop to draw. No long hoselay plumbingis necessary to create the barrier; a river of foam slidesdownslope from the nozzle.

Special resources, such as wildlife corridors, are beingprotected from prescribed fire with appropriate foamapplications and ignition techniques. Low-expansion(compressed air or aspirated) foam is applied to tree trunks,canopies, and other long-distance exposures. Medium- andhigh-expansion foams are applied to the surface and groundfuels around the exposed resource. Ignition is timed to theeffective lifetime of the foam.

After ignition, foam is being used to suppress smokewith a tactic called Rapid Mop-up. Rapid Mop-up is theapplication of a blanket of foam over the entire burn area assoon after ignition as possible. The blanket of foam effectivelysmothers the residual fire, cutting off secondary smokeproduction. Solution draining from the foam works toextinguish the fire before the fire becomes deep-seated.Smoke venting through the foam blanket indicates areas ofheat that will require more firefighter attention. This techniquehas been effective at reducing smoke emissions, firefightersmoke exposure, and mop-up costs. The long discharge ofcompressed air foam and the long downhill flows of medium-and high-expansion aspirated foam have helped make thistactic practical.

Durable Foam

Class A foam products in use today are, in part, synthetichydrocarbon surfactants. Much like liquid dish soaps, thesecomponents produce the rapid drainage and extinguishmentproperties exhibited by Class A foam. These surfactants arealso the reason that Class A foam is short-lived. Relative toother foam, such as protein foam, Class A foam is a poorfoaming agent. The longest time one can expect it to bevisible in hot, dry conditions is about an hour, and usuallymuch less. The success of Class A foam in structure and



and each one has a place in a foam use strategy. Low-expansion foam is needed to reach long distances. Compressedair foam offers lighter hose weights, and medium- or high-expansion aspirated foam quickly covers ground fuels. Durablefoam holds water in place for a 12-hour shift. The ability toadapt water into the most appropriate form of foam for thesituation is important to successful foam use.

A flexible air strategy with foam is also possible, butneeds more development.The use of foam from rotor- andfixed-wing aircraft shares the same advantages as ground-applied foam in comparison to plain water for protection andsuppression in the wildland-urban interface. Developmentof tactics to coordinate air and ground foam apparatus/resources can lead to improved utilization of the technology.

ConclusionFire protection responsibilities are growing more difficult.

It may be time to change strategies to keep pace with thechanging fire scenario. One strategy for structure protectionand prescribed fire is the use of Class A foam. In a widevariety of application schemes, Class A foam technologyunlocks the full potential of plain water for fire suppressionand protection.

resource protection has been largely because of wetting andgood timing, not longevity. Sometimes during structureprotection, foam must be reapplied because the impendingfire has not yet arrived. The limitation for prescribed fire isthat the unit may have to be ignited soon after foam isapplied. If winds aloft change and the burn must be postponed,the foam applied is wasted.

To address this short-useful-lifetime limitation of ClassA foam, products with longevity, generically called DurableFoam, are being developed. These foams will be created withthe same equipment currently used to make Class A foam. Adurable foam will be able to hold water as a foam for 24 to 48hours. Prototypes are already capable of these lifetimes.

Durable Foam will enable one application per structure,well in advance of the fire. It will allow for one applicationas the prescribed fire unit boundary, even if the ignition timeis delayed 1 or 2 days.

A Foam Use StrategyFoam use can be as simple as buying concentrate, pouring

it into the watertank, and applying foam solution withconventional water nozzles. This is a good place to start.However, foam may be formed from a variety of methods




Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) 1

Jack D. Cohen 2


2Research Physical Scientist, Southern Research Station, USDA ForestService, Southern Forest Fire Laboratory, Route 1, Box 182A, Dry Branch,GA 31020.

Abstract: Major wildland/urban interface fire losses, principallyresidences, continue to occur. Although the problem is not new,the specific mechanisms are not well known on how structuresignite in association with wildland fires. In response to the need fora better understanding of wildland/urban interface ignition mecha-nisms and a method of assessing the ignition risk, USDA ForestService Fire Research is developing the Structure Ignition Assess-ment Model (SIAM). SIAM uses an analytical approach that re-lates the potential for sustained structure ignitions to the locationand characteristics of adjacent fires and the structure’s materialsand design. SIAM’s ignition risk assessment is based on a worstcase estimate of the direct effect of flames leading to ignitions aswell as ignitions from burning embers (firebrands). Initial SIAMresults indicate that the flames of burning vegetation are not greatlyeffective in creating sustained ignitions. This suggests that fire-brands and adjacent burning structures are significant causes ofstructure ignitions. Current experimentation is directed towardverifying these SIAM results.

Residential losses associated with wildfires first gainednational attention during the 1985 fire season in which

about 1,400 homes were lost. This condition has been calledthe wildland/urban interface (WUI) fire problem and wasraised as a critical national issue at the Wildfire StrikesHome conference in 1986 (Laughlin and Page 1987). Sincethen, the WUI fire problem has remained prominent.“Structures threatened” has typically appeared on fire situationreports. Since 1990, California alone has suffered over $2.5billion in residential property losses associated with wildfires.These property losses principally occurred in residentialareas that were within or adjacent to wildland vegetation.And the number of people who will live in or adjacent towildland areas has continued to increase, thereby furtherincreasing the WUI problem (Davis 1990). Without mitigation,the WUI fire losses are likely to continue or increase.

The characteristic property losses during WUI fires arevery different from the average United States residential firelosses. The 1991 U.S. residential fire loss statistics (includingthe Oakland fire losses) illustrate the characteristically higherfire losses experienced during WUI fires. Of the 1991 U.S.total fire occurrences, WUI fires account for less than 0.6percent of the occurrences; however, WUI fire losses account

for 27 percent of the 1991 property losses (Karter 1992).This reflects the higher fire losses per residence for a WUIfire than for a typical residential fire. During a WUI fire,ignited structures typically result in a total loss. Recentmedia coverage of the October 1993 WUI fires in the LagunaHills of southern California show standing houses adjacentto complete destruction—a sight typical to any WUI fire.The increasing frequency of WUI losses and the intensedestruction associated with WUI fires provide compellingreasons to mitigate the problem.

“Wildfire Strikes Home!” the document of the 1986WUI meeting (Laughlin and Page 1987), recommends neededresearch for WUI fire problem mitigation. Many of therecommendations continue to be viable:

• Managing hazards in an esthetically acceptablemanner

• More knowledge about the relation of buildingdesign and clearance to fire hazards

• More knowledge about ignitions from windtransported burning embers

• Techniques to evaluate and identify fire risk.The Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) and

its associated research specifically address these issues.

Ignition Assessment for ImprovingStructure Survival

After a WUI fire, structure survival is visible in varyingdegrees. This outcome can result from a complex, interactivesequence of events involving the ignition and burning ofvegetation and structures. It is accompanied by varying effortson the part of firefighters and homeowners to prevent furtherburning and extinguish the existing blaze. The developmentof an assessment method requires an explicit description (atsome resolution) of the processes involved.

Structure survival involves factors influencing ignition,and given an ignition, factors influencing the fire suppression.Thus, structure survival assessments also require considerationof the suppression factors. Analysis reveals that the factorsinfluencing suppression are very dependent on the currentsituation at the time of the fire, thus making a prior descriptionof the suppression factors unrealistic (Cohen 1991). Thegeneral process leading to structure survival or loss must“pass” through the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an ignition(fig. 1). Therefore, assessing the ignition factors for the purposeof improving ignition resistance can result in an improvedchance of survival. SIAM depends on the ability to describethe general factors that influence the potential for ignition.



• Ability of fire agencies to assess wildland/urbaninterface fire risks for pre-suppression andsuppression planning.

To achieve these applications, SIAM uses an analyticalapproach to establish relationships between the structuredesign and the fire exposure that results in the assessment ofpotential ignitions. Because actual fire conditions of a futurefire are unknown, worst-case assumptions are used. Forexample, it is not known how and in what sequence theflammables around a structure will burn; therefore, it isassumed that all flammables adjacent to the structure willburn at the same time. If conditions are not well understood,e.g., firebrand (flying embers) exposure and ignition,judgments based on physical reasoning are used. Because ofthe various unknowns, SIAM rates only the potential forstructure ignition; it does not predict ignition.

A better understanding of the model’s processes can beobtained by examining the components of SIAM from theinput of information to the output of the resulting ignitionrisk rating (fig. 2).

The SIAM model consists of six principal processingsteps (items in the brackets refer to fig. 2):

1) [Structure Design, Topography, Fire Weather Severity,Fuels, Expert Designated Fire Behavior]

SIAM inputs require the description of the structure andsite conditions, including a fire professional’s estimate offlame lengths that are consistent with the chosen potentialsevere fire weather conditions. The Structure Design inputsrelate to the general design, e.g., roof flammability, exteriormaterials, windows, nooks and crannies, and exterior dimen-sions. The Topography input refers to the degree of slopeand whether it is upslope or downslope from the structure.Also included is the structure/slope set-back, i.e., the horizontaldistance between the structure and the slope. The Fire WeatherSeverity is a selected level of weather conditions for planningWUI fire safety. The inputs explicitly involve windspeed,

The WUI fire problem can be examined on the premisethat structure survival is the essence of the problem, andthat structure ignition is the critical element for survival:homes that do not ignite do not burn. SIAM addresses thepotential for structure ignitions rather than the potential forstructure survival.

The Structure Ignition AssessmentModel (SIAM)

SIAM is designed for the purpose of assessing potentialstructure ignitions during wildfires burning in vegetationand structures. The model uses general descriptions of thestructure, the topography at the building site, and the potentialfire characteristics around the structure to compute an indexof ignition risk. It is designed to provide a flexible approachtoward achieving residential fire safety by rating the potentialfor ignitions based on a structure’s ignition resistancecharacteristics and its potential fire exposure. Thus,homeowners and developers can “trade off” various designfeatures of a building’s exterior and its surroundings to meetfire-safe requirements.

SIAM is intended for the facilitation of improved firesafety as well as to identify potential wildland/urban interfacefire problems. In its basic form, the model can be adapted toa variety of applications ranging from single home assessmentsto planned developments. The basic applications can include:

• Establishment of fire safety requirements basedon potential ignition risk for a mix of factors.

• Integration of a resident’s exterior home designand landscaping interests with fire safetyrequirements.

• Integration of a developer’s home and neighborhooddesign interests with fire safety requirements.

Figure 2 —The Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) uses theinputs (double line boxes) to calculate the potential for ignitions fromdirect flame exposure (Heat Transfer) and exposure to aerially trans-ported burning embers (Firebrands). SIAM produces a dimensionlessignition risk rating index, not a prediction of outcomes.

Figure 1 —Structure survival depends on factors influencing ignitionand factors influencing effective fire suppression. Regardless of the firesuppression effectiveness, survival initially depends on ignition.



spread are not calculated by SIAM—they are now directinputs. Through personal expertise and/or fire behaviormodeling, the user determines the fire behavior that matchespreviously chosen fire severity conditions. This change hasoccurred because the application is largely out of context foravailable operational fire models. The intent is to producegreater model reliability by involving the user in thedetermination of the fire behavior characteristics.

Experiments in Support of IgnitionAssessment Modeling

Several aspects of ignition require a better understandingbefore SIAM can reliably rate ignition risk. These issues arebeing approached through experimental methods. Currently,an experimental examination is being done to better understandthe effect of windows (principally window breakage) onpotential ignitions. In conjunction with the windowexperiments, the flame radiation heat transfer model and theignition model are being examined for their reliability. Theexperimental work is not complete, but preliminary resultssuggest some important considerations.

Window Breakage TestsWindows often fracture when exposed to a nearby exterior

fire. The structural fire problem regarding windows involvesthe fracture and subsequent collapse, in which an opening iscreated. In the wildland/urban interface context, firebrandsare a very important structure ignition source. Experienceindicates that any opening to the interior of the structureincreases the potential for ignition. In the context of SIAM,windows are an important factor principally if a fire exposureresults in a window fracture and collapse, but without aconcurrent exterior ignition, because the only effect of thefire exposure is to create an opening, and thus an entry pointfor firebrands. The experiments are designed to address thequestion of window collapse specific to SIAM needs.

The window breakage experiments have been conductedin two phases. The first phase uses relatively small windowsexposed to relatively low heat fluxes (heat flux = energy/time/area). The window pane dimensions measure .61 metersby .61 meters by 4.8 millimeters thick. A wooden sash holdsthe glass panes in a wooden frame. Tests are conducted onboth plate and tempered glass types, and in single pane anddouble pane arrangements. The window heat exposures consistof average total heat fluxes of 9.3 kW/sq m, 13.6 kW/sq m,and 17.7 kW/sq m for 300 seconds (kW/sq m = kilowatts persquare meter). The experiments use the USDA Forest Service’sSouthern Forest Fire Laboratory’s wind tunnel facility and apropane fueled flame source.

Phase 1 has been completed. Preliminary results indicatesignificant differences between plate and tempered glass,and the potential integrity of double pane windows comparedwith single pane arrangements (table 1). The results showthat for every test of single pane/plate glass, window breakage

temperature, and fine fuel moisture content. Implicitly, theFire Weather Severity guides the user in designating, and/orcalculating, the fire behavior characteristics. The Fuels inputsrequire the designation of the type of flammable material(e.g., grass, shrubs, trees, wood piles, structures), thedimensions of its area, and its distance from the structure.The Expert Designated Fire Behavior includes flame lengthand rate of spread if appropriate. These fire behavior inputscan be calculated through the BEHAVE Fire BehaviorPrediction System (Andrews 1986, Andrews and Chase1989) and/or estimated experientially.

2) [Flames]On the basis of input information of the fuel type, the

fuel locations and the fuel length/width dimensions,windspeed, topographic slope, and flame lengths, SIAMcalculates flame size, flame angle, burning residence time,and the structure’s exposure to flame radiant heating andflame or convection column contact.

3) [Heat transfer]SIAM uses a physical heat transfer model to relate the

calculated flame characteristics to the radiative and convectiveheat transfer. Worst-case assumptions are used for suchitems as the flame temperature and the flame/wall geometry.

4) [Firebrands]The firebrand exposure depends on the amount and size

distribution of the firebrands generated. Using physicalreasoning and experience, a structure’s firebrand exposurecorresponds to the type of fuel in the wildland/urban interfacearea and the general fire intensity. The type of fuel (e.g.,grass, shrubs, trees, buildings) relates to the general size ofthe firebrand, while the fire intensity relates to the fire’slofting capability.

5) [Ignitions]An empirical ignition model (Tran and others 1992) is

used to relate heat transfer to the potential for sustainedignitions of wood. The assessment of the potential forignition on exterior wood building materials depends onthe magnitude of the heat transfer, and the burning time.Using physical reasoning, the potential for ignition byfirebrands is subjectively related to the firebrand exposureand the structure’s exposed flammable nooks and cranniesand roof material. SIAM calculates the influence of firebrandson the ignition potential separately from the direct flameheat transfer influence.

6) [Ignition risk rating]The assessments for ignition potential from direct flame

heat transfer and firebrand exposure are subjectively combinedfor the entire structure. The final risk rating recognizes thepotential interactions between structure heating (withoutignitions from flame heat transfer) and firebrand ignitioneffectiveness. The final rating is a dimensionless quantity,linearly related to potential structure ignition (Cohen andothers 1991).

An important procedural change has occurred with regardto the determination of the fire behavior characteristics. Firebehavior characteristics such as flame length and rate of



at its peak burning period, compared to 30 kW/sq m for thelower intensity profile.

Although the Phase 2 testing has just begun, significantresults have already been observed. The 50 kW/sq m heatflux tests resulted in glass breakage and virtually completewindow collapse. Immediately following the window collapse,wall ignition occurred followed by sustained burning. The30 kW/sq m heat flux test also resulted in glass breakage andvirtually complete window collapse, but without wall ignition.

Thus, these initial experiments showed that windowscan be a significant factor for potential structure ignitions,by allowing interior firebrand penetration without theoccurrence of an exterior structure ignition. Continued windowexperimentation will better define the differences in windowcollapse between the Phase 1 and Phase 2 experiments andextend the range of test conditions beyond Phase 1. Questionsremain as to whether the large windows will break withoutcollapse, to what extent a double pane arrangement mitigateswindow collapse, and whether tempered glass in either asingle pane or double pane arrangement will prevent windowcollapse until exterior ignitions occur.

Wall Ignition TestsIt is important to verify that SIAM is consistent with

real situations. An initial step in this verification process isto measure total heat flux and observe ignition occurrence atthe wall section concurrent to the window breakage tests. Bycomparing measured observations with model results, theseexperiments provide a physical test under high heat fluxconditions with relatively large flames, and with a heat flux/time relationship similiar to actual vegetation burning (fig.3). Ignition observations can be compared with the ignitionmodel (Tran and others 1992).

Ignition model calculations using heat flux calibrationdata provide an estimate of sustained ignition occurrence(sustained ignition = continued flaming after the initiatingheat source is discontinued). Figures 4, 5, and 6 show theheat fluxes with the flux-time ignition calculationsuperimposed (right axis values). The horizontal linedelineates the flux-time value that corresponds to the pilotedignition point (piloted ignition = the presence of a hot sparkor small flame that initiates flaming). Inspection of figure 4indicates that the flux-time exposure (65 cm distance) shouldreadily result in an ignition. This can be seen by comparingthe flux-time curve with the piloted ignition value. Thelower heat flux shown in figure 5 (100 cm distance) resultsin a much lower flux-time magnitude and indicates a marginalcondition for ignition.

The actual tests produced results consistent with theignition model calculations. At the higher heat flux (65 cmdistance), the wood siding readily ignited with sustainedflaming. The lower heat flux test (100 cm distance) did notresult in ignition. Figure 6 illustrates the average total heatflux at a location adjacent to the glass pane in the woodwindow frame. At this location, the flux-time calculation

Table 1—Phase 1 window breakage results

Heat flux (kW/m2)

Glass type and arrangement 9.3 13.6 17.7

Plate glass:

Single pane 4/41 4/4 4/4Double pane

Outer pane 4/4 4/4 4/4Inner pane 0/4 3/4 3/4

Tempered glass:Single pane 0/4 0/4 0/4Double pane

Outer pane 0/4 0/4 0/4Inner pane 0/4 0/4 0/4

1 Number of tests in which window pane broke per number of tests.

resulted at each heat flux, yielding a ratio of 4/4. For doublepane/plate glass at the lowest heat flux, 9.3 kW/sq m, onlythe outside pane broke in each test (4/4; and 0/4). The higherheat fluxes resulted in inside pane breakage in 3 of 4 tests.However, from observation during the experiments, the degreeof fracture to the inside pane, i.e., the number of cracks, wasless than for the outside pane. No breakage occurred totempered glass panes due to the fire exposures.

Although all heat fluxes resulted in plate glass breakage,none of the windows collapsed leaving an opening. In eachcase, the wooden sash held the glass fragments sufficientlyto prevent collapse. This raised the important question iflarger windows and higher heat fluxes of shorter durationwould result in collapse.

Phase 2 of the study used larger windows and higherheat fluxes. The panes were plate glass, measuring .91 meterswide by 1.5 meters tall, and 6 millimeters thick. The paneswere held in a wood frame by a wood sash that was part of awall section 2.5 meters tall by 3.4 meters wide. Exteriorplywood siding (T-111, unpainted) covered the wall duringthe glass breakage experiments.

The tests were conducted in the USDA Forest Service’sSouthern Forest Fire Laboratory’s combustion facility usingprecisely constructed, oven-dried wood fuel cribs. The entirecrib was simultaneously ignited, resulting in maximum flamedimensions of about 1.3 meters wide, 3.1 meters high, and .8meters deep. Because heat flux sensors could not be placedat the glass surface, calibration measurements determinedthe window heat fluxes instead of real time measurements.The heat flux sensors were located in a non-flammable panelthat was placed in the window opening. The calibrationmeasurements generally covered the area of highest totalheat flux for the wall section. The average highest total heatfluxes were measured during calibration tests performed attwo different intensity levels (fig. 3). These intensity levelscorrespond to the different flame-to-wall distances noted inthe figure. The highest intensity level exceeded 50 kW/sq m



does not reach the ignition point, which is consistent withthe no-ignition occurrence.

Preliminary SIAM ResultsAlthough SIAM is not ready for operational assess-

ments, the component models for heat transfer and ignitioncan be used. Thus, given constant flame characteristicsand distances, estimates of the time required for ignitioncan be calculated. Preliminary SIAM results can be examinedfor flame descriptions relevant to burning vegetation andburning structures.

The ignition model (Tran and others 1992) uses incidentradiant heat flux (not the net heat flux) to calculate anignition time. For a given constant heat flux, the ignitionmodel provides a relationship between radiant heat flux andthe amount of time for the piloted, sustained ignition ofwood (fig. 7). At heat fluxes below 30 kW/sq m, the heatflux/ignition time relation has a high rate of change; therefore,small changes in heat flux can result in large changes toignition time. Considering that vegetation fuels (without acontinuous bed of large stem wood) have flaming residencetimes generally less than 120 seconds, a small change in heatflux can make the difference between an ignition and noignition. Also, people are more sensitive than wood to theradiant heat fluxes: at 16 kW/sq m, skin blisters form after 5seconds (Drysdale 1985), but wood takes 1,200 secondsbefore piloted ignition.

Because actual fire conditions are not predictable, SIAMcalculates the radiation heat transfer for a worst-case situation.The flame is assumed to be a constant, 1,200 degrees Kelvin,gray body emitter over its entire dimensions. And, the radiationview from the wall to the flame is assumed to be that of twoparallel surfaces with their centers aligned. Based on these

assumptions and given flame dimensions, a relationship existsbetween the radiant heat flux and the flame-to-wall distance(fig. 8). The given flame dimensions represent possiblevegetation fire conditions (e.g., 5 m wide by 2 m high flame= a low flammable hedge row; 5 m wide by 15 m high flame= a fully torching tree). SIAM uses the heat fluxes to calculatethe potential for ignition.

The ignition times (fig. 9) for a flat wood surface areassociated with the heat fluxes of figure 8. The ignition timegraph shows the minimum time for ignition related to theflame-to-wall distance for the given flame dimensions. Thegraph is limited to 300 seconds because the burning time ofthe flame front in vegetation fires is generally less than 5minutes. Note that with the exception of the two largestflame sizes, the flames have virtually no direct significancebeyond 10 meters (33 feet). These preliminary results suggestthat vegetation management activities are most effective inthe areas immediately surrounding the structure. However,vegetation is not the only potential flame source adjacent toa residence. The neighbor’s house may also be a fire threat.

Local agencies often focus on flammable vegetation asa factor in wildland/urban interface fire safety concerns.However, depending on the distance between residences(structure density), neighboring structures can be a verysignificant ignition source.

The radiant heat flux is a function of distance betweenstructures and structure size (worst-case conditions areassumed) (fig. 10). The calculations assume that the entirewall is burning and that the flame is a rectangular, blackbody emitter at a constant temperature of 1,200 degreesKelvin. The walls are assumed to be parallel with theircenters aligned. Importantly, larger structures produce higherheat fluxes, and thus if burning, larger structures are a greaterthreat to neighboring structures (fig. 10).

Figure 3— Total incident heat flux and flame distance comparison for the 65-cm and 100-cmcalibrations from the Phase 2 portion of SIAM experimentation. Calibration tests such as theseindirectly determine the window heat flux exposure.



Figure 5— Fire test calibration for the 100-cm flame to wall distance.The flux-time value (right axis reference) is a cumulative quantity thatempirically relates to piloted, sustained wood ignition (Tran and others1992). The flux-time value begins to increase above the critical incidentradiant heat flux (greater than 13.1 kW/sq m) and ceases when the heatflux falls below the critical flux. Ignition is expected at a flux-time valueof 11,501, which corresponds to the ignition line. The heavy, S-shapedcurve is the flux-time curve.

Figure 4— Fire test calibration for the 65-cm flame to wall distance. Theflux-time value (right axis reference) is a cumulative quantity thatempirically relates to piloted, sustained wood ignition (Tran and others1992). The flux-time value begins to increase above the critical incidentradiant heat flux (greater than 13.1 kW/sq m) and ceases when the heatflux falls below the critical flux. Ignition is expected at a flux-time valueof 11,501, which corresponds to the ignition line. The heavy, S-shapedcurve is the flux-time curve.

Figure 7— Minimum ignition time vs. radiant heat flux. Given aconstant radiant heat flux, the ignition model (SIAM) can be used toestimate the time required for sustained ignition on a flat woodsurface. The references to pain and blistering relate to exposed skinat the given radiant heat fluxes.

Figure 6— Wall fire test without ignition for the 100 cm flame to walldistance. The flux-time curve (right axis reference) is based on mea-sured heat fluxes of the wood wall panel adjacent to the window. Themaximum flux-time quantity did not achieve a value equal to or greaterthan the critical ignition level.


8 meters (26 feet) for the one-story structure and about 12meters (39 feet) for the two-story structure. Although theseexamples are hypothetical, past wildland/urban interface firesinvolving high-density residential neighborhoods (e.g., Oakland,1991) indicate the importance of structure-to-structure ignition.

Figure 11 provides the minimum ignition times basedon the heat fluxes shown in figure 10. The graph extends togreater ignition times because structures characteristicallyburn longer than vegetation. Inspection of the ignition timessuggests that the clearance between structures should be about


Figure 8— Radiant heat flux vs. distance for burning vegetation. Theamount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decrease depends on theflame size. The distance refers to the distance from the flame. Basedon these heat fluxes, ignition times are calculated as a function ofdistance. As the distance increases, it takes longer for sustainedignition to occur.

Figure 9— Ignition time vs. distance for burning vegetation. Theamount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decrease depends on theflame size. The distance refers to the distance from the flame. Basedon these heat fluxes, ignition times are calculated as a function ofdistance. As the distance increases, it takes longer for sustainedignition to occur.

structure ignitions rather than predicts structure ignitions. SIAMdoes not address structure survival, but assumes that loweringa structure’s ignition risk leads to improved chances for survival.

SIAM development involves experimental work to gainneeded understanding and to verify the reliability of SIAM’scomponent models. Current experiments involve determining

Conclusions

The Structure Ignition Assessment Model is beingdeveloped as a tool for the purpose of reducing high residentialfire losses associated with wildland fires. In the context ofwildland/urban interface fires, SIAM rates the potential for

Figure 10— Radiant heat flux vs. distance for an adjacent burningstructure. The amount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decreasedepends on the flame size. The distance refers to the distance fromthe flame. Based on these heat fluxes, ignition times are calculatedas a function of distance. As the distance increases, it takes longerfor sustained ignition to occur.

Figure 11— Ignition time vs. distance for an adjacent burning structure.The amount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decrease depends on theflame size. The distance refers to the distance from the flame. Based onthese heat fluxes, ignition times are calculated as a function of distance.As the distance increases, it takes longer for sustained ignition to occur.The radiant heat flux from structures is not necessarily greater than fromvegetation, but the characteristic burning time is longer; thus the ignitiontime axis covers a greater range for burning structures.



the significance of windows regarding the potential forstructure ignition. Concurrently, these experiments are aninitial effort to verify the reliability of SIAM’s heat transferand ignition models. The experimental work is not complete,but it has generated preliminary results regarding the behaviorof heated windows and the verification of the ignition model.

Preliminary results of the Phase 1 window experimentsproduced significant differences between glass types andpane arrangement. These results suggest that for an exteriorfire exposure, the double pane arrangement improves windowintegrity, and significantly, tempered glass is much morethermally resistant than plate glass.

The Phase 2 experiments (not completed) havedemonstrated that windows can break and collapse from fireexposure without the occurrence of an exterior structureignition. This finding has determined that SIAM requireswindow information in the description of significant designfeatures that contribute to structure ignitions during wildland/urban interface fires.

Although model verification is just beginning, theobservations from the accomplished tests suggest that thepreliminary SIAM results are reasonable. The 35-cm fire-to-wall distance change (for the specific fire dimensions) resultsin the difference between wall ignition versus no ignition.Analysis of the measured heat flux data using the ignitionmodel produces results consistent with the observed ignitionoccurrence. This suggests that the SIAM ignition modelreasonably represents the relationship between incident radiantheat flux and ignition.

Preliminary SIAM results suggest that ignitions fromflames (radiant and convective heat transfer) occur fromfires within the immediate surroundings of the structure.Except for the case of large flame heights and an extensivefireline, ignitions result from flames within 15 meters (50feet) of the structure (fig. 9). But, ignitions on structures andadjacent vegetation commonly occur while fires burn atdistances considerably greater than 15 meters. This findingconcurs with personal observations that firebrands are asignificant source for structure ignitions.

These results suggest that to reduce ignitions, the distancesfrom a structure for managing vegetation are much smallerthan the lofting distances for firebrands. Thus, beyond somerelatively short distance from the structure (depending onthe vegetation and topography), vegetation management hasno significant benefit for reducing flame generated ignitions.Vegetation management, on the other hand, cannot beextensive enough, in a practical sense, to significantly reducefirebrand ignitions. Therefore, the structure and its immediatesurroundings should be the focus for activities intended forimproving ignition risk.

Neighboring structures are a significant potential ignitionsource. SIAM results suggest that at distances betweenstructures of less than 5 meters, structures can become theprincipal source for ignitions (not including the additionaleffect of firebrands from structures). In high-densityresidential areas containing highly flammable structures (e.g.,residences with flammable roofs), vegetation managementmay not be sufficient to prevent widespread fire destruction.

ReferencesAndrews, Patricia L. 1986. BEHAVE: fire behavior prediction and fuel

modeling system—BURN subsystem, part 1. Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-GTR-94. Ogden, UT: Intermountain Research Station, Forest Service,U.S. Department of Agriculture; 130 p.

Andrews, Patricia L.; Chase, Carolyn H. 1989. BEHAVE: fire behaviorprediction and fuel modeling system—BURN subsystem, part 2.Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-GTR-260. Ogden, UT: Intermountain ResearchStation, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 93 p.

Cohen, Jack D. 1991. A site-specific approach for assessing the fire riskto structures at the wildland/urban interface. In: Nodvin, StephenC.; Waldrop, Thomas A., editors. Proceedings of the fire and theenvironment: ecological and cultural perspectives internationalsymposium; 1990 March 20-24; Knoxville, TN. Gen. Tech. Rep. SE-GTR-69. Asheville, NC: Southeastern Experiment Station, ForestService, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 381-383.

Cohen, Jack D.; Chase, Richard A.; LeVan, Susan L.; Tran, Hao C. 1991.A model for assessing potential structure ignitions in the wildland/urban interface. In: Proceedings of the 11th conference on fire andforest meteorology; 1991 April 16-19; Missoula, MT. Bethesda, MD:Soc. of Am. Foresters; 50-57.

Davis, James B. 1990. The wildland-urban interface: paradise orbattleground? Journal of Forestry 88(1): 26-31.

Drysdale, Dougal. 1985. An introduction to fire dynamics. New York:John Wiley and Sons; 424 p.

Karter, Michael J. 1992. NFPA reports on 1991 U.S. fire loss. NationalFire Protective Association Journal 86(5): 32-43.

Laughlin, Jerry; Page, Cynthia. 1987. Wildfire strikes home. In: Laughlin,Jerry; Page, Cynthia, editors. Report of the national wildland/urbanfire protection conference; 1986 September; Denver, CO. NFPA No.SPP-86. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association; 89 p.

Tran, Hao C.; Cohen, Jack D.; Chase, Richard A. 1992. Modeling ignitionof structures in wildland/urban interface fires. In: Proceedings ofthe 1st international fire and materials conference; 1992 September24-25; Arlington, VA. London, UK: Inter Science CommunicationsLimited; 253-262.



Strategies for and Barriers to Public Adoption of FireSafe Behavior 1

Ronald W. Hodgson 2

Abstract: A recent survey of people living in wildland-urbanintermix neighborhoods in a portion of the Sierra-Cascade foot-hills identified perceptions of defensible space that block its rapidand widespread adoption. A companion survey described commu-nication channels used by residents to acquire information aboutlandscaping and identified opinion leadership characteristics. Nei-ther lack of awareness of the wildfire threat, lack of basic knowl-edge of defensible space, nor skepticism about defensible spaceeffectiveness were a barrier to adoption of wildfire defenses byproperty owners. Perceived costs and labor requirements, lack ofspecific knowledge about how to do the required work, lack oftime or assistance to do the work, and the difficulty of disposing oflarge amounts of brush generated in the initial conversion to defen-sible space were serious barriers. Biomass harvesting was experi-mented with to dispose of brush and to cover some of the costs ofinitial conversion. Social marketing and community organizationmethods were used to promote and carry out the project. Theapproach proved effective. Results showed excellent promise forthe use of biomass harvesting in thickly settled subdivisions.

I n spite of years of effort to encourage the adoption ofdefensible space—a safe zone that protects a structure

from fire—only a relatively small proportion of wildland-urban intermix residents have changed their landscapes tohelp protect their properties from wildfire. Even more rareare entire neighborhoods and communities protected bystrategic wildfire defense preparations. The annual drama offlames, ashes, and despair broadcast on California prime-time television and featured on the front pages of newspapersfrom the smallest weekly to national circulation giantsregularly alerts residents to the potential danger. Clearlyother barriers must block widespread public adoption ofwildfire defenses.

Investigations to identify these barriers began withSurvival by Design workshops held at Chico and Pomona,California, in which fire management specialists presentedthe problem to selected community leaders who then evaluatedthe potential of defensible space as a “product” that wildland-urban intermix residents might adopt. A pair of surveys ofwildland-urban intermix residents in the aftermath of the

“49’er Fire” were administered. The workshops and the twosurveys together generated information needed to create aneighborhood-based approach to the promotion of wildfiredefense preparations. This approach is now being tested inneighborhoods in high fire hazard areas in northern California.

The organization and education elements of the approachwere tested on a small scale in Paradise, California withsome success. A study of the potential of biomass harvestingon small private ownerships to reduce the fire hazard wasproposed in the Shingletown Ridge area. The project wasfunded, and during the spring and summer 1992, a successfuleffort at neighborhood organization for hazard reduction andbiomass harvesting demonstrated the potential of theneighborhood based approach, but also revealed the need forlarger scale operations and planning. A proposal is currentlybeing considered by the California Department of Forestryand Fire Protection (CDF) to prepare a wildfire defensepreparations plan for an area of about 40,000 acres on theShingletown Ridge that can be implemented throughcommunity action with assistance from National ForestStewardship funds and other public conservation programs.

Concurrently, a neighborhood-based hazard reductionprogram was implemented in the Middle Creek watershedwest of Redding. The approach was similar to the Shingletownarea study but involved more financial commitment fromproperty owners. The Middle Creek project began as a soilconservation and erosion reduction project designed, in part,to protect the endangered winter run salmon spawning beds.Fire defense preparations for the watershed were undertakenwhen it was realized that a repeat of the 1972 Swasey Firewould destroy erosion protection investments as well asburn many homes and threaten lives.

These studies showed that strategic defensible space(wildfire defense preparations) can be successfully promotedon a large scale if the idea is marketed using the naturalsocial and communication structure of the communities,perceived barriers are removed, and neighborhood initiativesare supported.

This paper describes the barriers revealed by the surveyof residents in wildland-urban intermix neighborhoods, andother barriers that impede the implementation of defensiblespace promotion projects. The most appropriate approachfor marketing community wildfire defense preparations willalso be discussed.


2 Professor, Department of Recreation and Parks Management, CaliforniaState University, Chico, CA 95929.



From Suppression To Integrated FireManagement

One central objective of wildfire management is tominimize the sum of fire losses and costs. That objectiveapplies to prevention and pre-suppression as much as to firefighting. Prevention and fuels management are (or ought tobe) equal partners with suppression in the management offires to reduce as much as possible the negative impacts onpeople’s lives and their social and economic systems.However, currently our thinking is dominated by suppressioneven in the case of defensible space design and promotion.

As presently conceived, defensible space is a collectionof actions, including vegetation management aroundstructures, that will provide a safe place to defend the structureand reduce the vulnerability of the structure to ignition.Defensible space includes other elements, of course, such assigning, adequate roads, and water supplies, and all are to beprovided in an effort to defend individual structures easily,safely, and more effectively. If defensible space were widelyadopted, fewer resources from perimeter control would bereassigned to structural defense, allowing quicker containmentof the fire.

The unexpressed assumption of this viewpoint is thatthe values at risk are contained in the structure and that thelandscape is expendable. The actual facts are very different.The survey revealed that about one person in five consideredprotection of the landscape more important than protectionof the structures. Those who work with urban-wildlandintermix (also known as the “I-zone”) residents have beentold that if the landscape is lost, people will not want to livein the area anymore. After the 49’er fire, many people whominterviewers looked for within the fire perimeter had sold ormoved out since the fire, even if the structures were saved.Other evidence of the importance of the environment ismore obvious. For example, people build expensive homesin the I-zone and commute longer distances to work, evenwhen they could live in good suburban neighborhoods closerto their jobs.

Concern for erosion control and water quality (asillustrated by the Middle Creek watershed project) also suggestthat the landscape may be more highly valued than thestructure. Those who value wildlife and energy management(shade and protection from wind) also suggest this. Homesmay be quickly rebuilt, but 100-year-old trees cannot bereplaced by insurance.

If fire destruction does result in the departure of manyresidents, the social structure of the neighborhood will bedisrupted. Friends will be separated. Feelings of security andpredictability will decline. Uncertainty will increase, anddistress and anxiety may follow. The quality of life will bemarkedly diminished. Recovery from disasters is enhancedif conditions can be returned to near normal as soon aspossible (Albrect and Adelman 1987, Drabek 1986, Lindelland Perry 1992). If the setting can be protected or repairedquickly, the familiar pace and flow of neighborhood life

may be easier to restore. If so, the important human, non-property losses associated with wildland-urban intermix firescan be reduced.

Ultimately, of course, if the landscape does not burnintensely enough to kill the larger trees and other importantvegetation, it is less likely to destroy structures. If the rate ofspread is slow enough to permit residents to escape easily andunhurriedly, it will also be easier to bring adequate suppressionforces to the attack. Any vegetation management strategy thatprotects the landscape values at risk will also protect structuralvalues and human life imbedded in that landscape.

A second important, unspoken assumption in ourapproach to fire protection for the wildland-urban intermixis that the wildfire will burn out of the wildlands into thesettlements to threaten lives and destroy homes. Althoughthat often occurs, these fires usually start in or on the perimeterof an I-zone settlement. The risk of ignition in the wildlands,with the exception of lightning, is concentrated in areas ofhuman activity. Human activity with fire potential is mostconcentrated in wildland-urban intermix settlements. Thereone finds the greatest potential for children with matchesfires, the greatest opportunity for equipment fires, the greatestlikelihood for escaped debris fires, and the chance thatstructure fires will spread to the wildlands.

I-zone fires that threaten lives and homes are those thatprobably start in a settled area and grow to dangerousproportions because the settlement and its immediateenvironments have not been treated to reduce the fuels, alterthe fuels to make them less flammable, eliminate the fireladder, and create fuel and fire breaks to contain the risk.

Viewed from this perspective, the usual recommendationsof defensible space with the focus on assisting suppressionforces with individual structure protection are less sensiblethan defensible space designed to contain risk by managingvegetation throughout the settlement and its immediateenvironment and to prevent fires that will inevitably startwithin the settlement from spreading rapidly, growing todestructive intensities, and burning into the wildlands andthen into other settlements.

This risk containment strategy, fortunately, works bothways. It will also reduce the danger from fires burning out ofthe wildlands into the settlement.

Finally, this shift in perspective requires that preventionnot be equated only with Smokey Bear programs for kidsand information and education programs for adults. Preventionis not only posters, state fairs, rodeos, parades, exhibits atthe mall, team teaching, or television, radio, and newspaperpublic service announcements (PSA’s) , news stories, andfeatures. Of course all of that is an important part of a fireprevention strategy, especially in the wildland-urban intermix.However, the engineering leg of prevention’s tripod(engineering - education - enforcement) is just as important.In the I-zone, engineering means, among other things, large-scale vegetation (fuels) management. If prevention seemsnot to stand on its own today, it is partly because theengineering leg has not been as developed as enforcement,



Barriers to Implementationof Defensible Space

Several concepts must be defined to describe how peopleperceive technology. Observability is the degree to whichpeople can “see” the technology and its positive effects(Rogers 1983). Trialability is the degree to which thetechnology can be experimented with on a small scale beforethe decision has to be made to invest in it (Rogers 1983).

Plasticity is another important characteristic of newtechnology influencing its potential for adoption: it is thedegree to which the technology can be modified to fitindividual innovator’s situations without adversely affectingits relative advantage. Rogers (1983) does not discuss“plasticity” per se but does describe the role of “reinvention”in adoption.

Relative AdvantageRelative advantage is the degree to which a new

technology is perceived to be better than alternatives. Costs,labor requirements, discomfort, and effectiveness for theintended purpose are all part of relative advantage (Rogers1983). Four out of five people surveyed believed thatdefensible space would help save their property in the eventof a wildfire. For most people, defensible space is perceivedto be effective for its intended purposes. Still, one in fivedoes not think it will help save their property. We do notknow whether that is because they do not think it will savetheir homes or because they think of their property in alarger sense to include the landscape.

Lack of defensible space implementation is not becausepeople are fatalistic. Less than one in ten thought that if ahouse burns it is a matter of luck.

About half of the respondents to the survey believedthat defensible space would cost them more money in thelong run than the alternative. Less than one in twenty thoughtdefensible space would cost less. Clearly, defensible spaceis at a relative disadvantage with respect to costs. This is animportant barrier to widespread adoption. Increasing thenumber of people who implement defensible space in thewildland-urban intermix depends heavily on our ability tobring the perceived initial conversion and long-termmaintenance costs down.

Almost two thirds thought the work required to maintaindefensible space would be about the same as that required bytheir current landscape. Nearly 30 percent, however, thoughtit would be harder, and less than one in ten said it would beeasier. Defensible space has no labor-saving advantage tomake it attractive to wildland-urban intermix residents.

More than half thought it would be difficult to find thetime to make the landscape more fire safe, while a quarterthought it would be easy.

Although no question about the perceived discomfort ofcreating and maintaining defensible space was asked in thesurvey, later focus groups in Paradise raised concerns overpoison oak, snakes, and Lyme disease. Some residents may

information, and education. Even the information andeducation leg, although large, is presently weak in itsapplication of modern communication and marketing theory.

In summary, we need to think more about strategies toprevent wildland-urban intermix fires from quickly spreadingand growing to destructive power. We must cool the inevitablefires down, slow them down, and keep them on the ground togive suppression forces time to arrive and control them andto limit losses experienced between ignition and mop-up.Fire intensity and rate of spread are functions of topography,weather, and fuels. Only fuels are significantly within ourcontrol. We need to shift our thinking from the suppressionperspective. We need to shift the way we think of preventionfrom ignition reduction to include reduction of the potentialfor fire damage and threat to life through large-scale fuelsmanagement within and surrounding settlements. We needto work with whole neighborhoods and settlements insteadof targeting only individual property owners to develop andimplement a coordinated set of wildfire defense preparationsthat integrate suppression, fuel management, and preventionin a cost-effective, holistic approach to fire protection.

Landscape for Wildfire DefenseManagement

If apathy, lack of knowledge of defensible space, orskepticism about the effectiveness of defensible space is notthe problem, what has prevented people from protectingthemselves and their property from wildfire? Innovationdiffusion theory suggests that the problem might lie withpublic perceptions of defensible space as an innovation.Research has shown that an innovation will earn acceptanceslowly unless it is thought to have a relative advantage overalternatives, and is compatible with values and acceptedways of doing things, relatively simple to understand anduse, observably beneficial, trialable on a small scale beforefull scale commitment is required, and adaptable to individualsituations without losing effectiveness (Rogers 1983).

To assess public perception of defensible space, samplesof residents of selected wildland-urban intermix neighbor-hoods between Grass Valley and Paradise, California weresurveyed. The results make it clear that, at least for these I-zone residents, people know about defensible space andbelieve that it is effective. They also believe that it is costly,somewhat complex, and potentially incompatible withlandscape values. Other perceived characteristics are notentirely positive. It appears that the characteristics ofdefensible space itself, as perceived by potential users, createbarriers to its widespread adoption.



be reluctant to work on the undeveloped parts of their lots forthese reasons. Because of this perceived barrier, finding waysto get the initial conversion work done for residents withoutrequiring them to expose themselves to these perceived dangerscould make defensible space more attractive.

Although defensible space is believed by four out offive people surveyed to help protect their property fromwildfire, many remain skeptical. Perceived costs, labor, timerequirements, and perhaps aversion to snakes, poison oak,and Lyme disease leave defensible space without a clearrelative advantage. This, in part, accounts for the low levelof implementation in the wildland-urban intermix in spite ofsustained promotional efforts. To achieve greater adoption,costs, labor requirements, and time demands must be lowered.

Complexity

Complexity is the degree to which people find the newtechnology difficult to understand and use (Rogers 1983).Two-thirds of those surveyed believed that they would haveto change their landscape to make it fire safe. About 17percent thought they would have to make many changes.

More than half of those surveyed understood the differentkinds of landscape features and how they protect propertyfrom wildfire. Only about 15 percent did not understandthose features. In fact, we have found that people in theneighborhoods where we have worked learn the basicprinciples of fire behavior easily and can apply them to theirlandscaping decisions pretty well.

Less than two-thirds said they would need to learn newthings about landscaping to make the changes required fordefensible space. The good news is that they would enjoylearning more about landscaping for the most part.

Considerably less than one in five did not know whichfeatures in a landscape make it more or less fire safe.

About one-third of the respondents said it would be hardto know which plants grow in a fire safe landscape. Nearlyanother quarter were uncertain. Increasing the adoption ofdefensible space will require better and more availableinformation on recommended plant materials and landscapedesigns that provide wildfire defense and will survive awildfire. Locations that sell the plants seem difficult to findto about one in five, while another fifth are unsure.

More than a quarter thought a defensible space landscapewould be more complicated to maintain. Almost two-thirdsthought it would be about the same, and less than one in tenthought it would be less complicated. Of those who thoughtit would be more complicated, few thought it would be muchmore complicated. Perceived complexity of maintenance isa barrier for a few but is not a major barrier to adoption.

Although survey data were not obtained about brushdisposal in neighborhoods in which defensible space hasbeen promoted, difficulties in disposing of the large amountsof brush produced in the initial conversion to a fire safelandscape add significantly to the perceived complexity atthe implementation stage. The amount of brush produced is

dangerous to burn, it is costly and difficult to haul, andlandfills won’t take it anyway. This is a major barrier towidespread adoption.

Overall, people generally do not find it difficult tounderstand defensible space and how it works to protecttheir property. The major sources of complexity are theamount of work needed to make property fire safe, lack ofcertain how-to-do-it information, and especially, the difficultyof disposing of the brush.

Compatibility

Compatibility is the degree to which the new technologyis perceived to fit with existing values and ways of doingthings (Rogers 1983). A little more than 40 percent believedthat natural landscapes are more beautiful than plantedlandscapes while an almost equal number disagree.

More than one-third believed that few changes shouldbe made in the natural landscape while more than half arewilling to make changes.

Modifying what is seen as the natural landscape andreplacing it with a planted landscape is not compatible withattitudes of many of the people who responded to the survey.Defensible space and wildfire defenses in general need to beunderstood as compatible with natural landscape values.Landscaping for wildfire defense will be more attractive if itcan be shown to restore and protect wildlife, watershed,esthetics, air quality, and other values.

RecommendationsPublic perception of defensible space was least acceptable

in terms of its relative advantage and complexity. That isenough, however, to slow adoption of wildfire defensepreparations among I-zone residents. Promotion strategiesthat increase perceived relative advantage and reduceperceived complexity will accelerate the adoption of defensiblespace among residents of the wildland-urban intermix.

The establishment and maintenance of defensible spaceshould be made less costly in terms of money, labor, time,and discomfort for the wildland-urban intermix landowner.Biomass harvesting may be one way to do this in certaincircumstances. Chipping and scattering the material back onthe ground may be another. Use of light under burning afterinitial mechanical or hand treatment may also work. Betterinformation should be provided on costs and more cost-effective vegetation management equipment for the wildland-urban intermix.

In addition, the complexity of defensible space asperceived by land owners should be reduced. Improvedmethods of brush disposal and maintenance will help.Education about fire behavior and landscaping is needed.Plant materials and landscaping advice should be morereadibly available.

Perceived incompatibility with values for naturallandscapes will be a barrier to some. The best way to handle



things that will burn and the characteristics of those things andthe topography and weather that cause them to burn intensely.

Fires will start in the wildland-urban intermix. They aremost likely to start where human activity is concentrated.Those concentrations are typically settlements. The fire thatdestroys homes in the wildland-urban intermix probably willstart in a settlement and grow to dangerous intensity becauseavailable fuels (and weather and topography) allow it togrow rapidly. Suppression forces find they must deal withhuman safety and structural protection when they arrive andare unable to take direct action on the fire itself. One solutionis to contain the risk through a settlement-wide effort athazard reduction to cool the inevitable fire down, slow itdown, and keep it on the ground.

Risk containment requires a community- or neigh-borhood-based marketing effort. Neighborhoods are goodmarket segments to target with fire prevention education andpromotion because the residents are relatively homogeneousin terms of socio-economic characteristics, tastes andpreferences for home and environmental characteristics, andthey face the same fire threat in the same fuel type. Marketingis not selling. Marketing attempts to discover the sort of“product” the consumer wants and then to produce, price,promote, and deliver the product. With some modification,the marketing approach has been successfully applied topublic safety and health campaigns similar to fire prevention.

In the areas studied to date, the slow rate of adoption ofwildfire defenses by people living in the wildland-urbanintermix is not the result of lack of knowledge, motivation,or skepticism about the effectiveness of defensible space.Instead, a number of barriers have resulted from perceptionsof defensible space. Defensible space does not have a clearrelative advantage compared to alternatives; it is perceivedto be somewhat complex, and has the potential to conflictwith important values or established methodologies. Increasingthe rate of adoption and use of wildfire defenses in thewildland-urban intermix requires fire prevention officers tobe conscious of perceived barriers and work to remove ormitigate those barriers.

AcknowledgmentsRay Stewart of the California Department of Forestry

and Fire Protection (CDF) Shasta-Trinity Ranger Districtencouraged me to propose a study in the Shingletown Ridgearea. Mike Jones and Cynthia Reese, of the Western ShastaResource Conservation District, developed and implementedthe Middle Creek Watershed fire protection project. Survivalby Design workshops were sponsored by the USDA ForestService, CDF, and California State Universities at Chico andPomona. The surveys of I-zone residents were sponsored bythe Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service,and the CDF. The Paradise field test was sponsored by theCDF and California State University, Chico, with thecooperation of the Paradise Fire Department. The Shingletown

compatibility difficulties is to adopt a marketing perspective.In marketing, one does not “sell” the idea by trying tochange attitudes and values. Instead, one attempts to modifythe product to fit existing attitudes and values (Kotler 1981,Solomon 1989). Neighbors and opinion leaders are importantwhen compatibility is in question (Rogers 1983). Illustrationsof typical neighborhood landscape designs that are fire safeand provide for wildlife, watershed, esthetics, and othervalues identified during marketing research will help.

Defensible space promotion programs should be targetedat neighborhoods and other relatively homogeneous groups.Resident input into planning and implementation should beextensive and their concerns, interests, and suggestions shouldbe incorporated into the wildfire defense plan. Residentsshould be involved in the development and implementationprocess as a community to the greatest extent possible.Marketing is most effective when it is targeted to homogeneousmarket segments; neighborhoods tend to be socio-economically homogeneous and, in the I-zone, share thesame wildfire threat.

Rapid implementation of defensible space in neighbor-hoods will be facilitated by ensuring that the benefits areobservable. In the Shingletown Ridge project, we encouragedneighbors to pile brush for chipping at the roadside. Thegrowing numbers of piles and later, the activity of the chippingoperation to dispose of the brush communicated clearly toother people in the neighborhood that fire safe work wasbeing done. Participating lots should be marked with anemblem of some kind showing that hazards have been reduced.

Not everyone is willing to implement landscaping forwildfire defense fully without seeing how it will look ontheir own property first. By making the neighborhood-basedhazard reduction project an annual event, skeptics have theopportunity to try it out on a small part of their property.When they find they like it, they will fully implement fire-safe landscaping at the next opportunity.

Defensible space is adaptable to the requirements ofeach setting and to the tastes and preferences of most people.Its attractiveness will be enhanced if that flexibility ismaintained. Attempts to make specific fire-safe rules andapply those rules to every site will result in less adoption andless effective wildfire protection. By educating people aboutfire behavior and advising them on applications of hazardmanagement to their particular situation, more people arelikely to accept defensible space.

SummaryFire prevention is more than information and education

aimed at reducing the numbers of fire starts. That is part ofprevention—a very important part—but fire prevention worksbest when supported by three legs: information and education,enforcement, and engineering, and integrated with suppressionand fuels management. In the wildland-urban intermix,engineering involves hazard management. Hazards are those



Kotler, Philip. 1982. Marketing for nonprofit organizations . EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall; 528 p.

Lindell, Michael K.; Perry, Ronald W. 1992. Behavioral foundations ofcommunity emergency planning. Washington, DC: HemispherePublishing Corp.; 309 p.

Solomon, Douglas S. 1989. A social marketing perspective oncommunication campaigns. In: Rice, Ronald E., Atkin, Charles K.,eds. Public Communication Campaigns. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA:SAGE Publications; 416 p.

Rogers, Everett M. 1983. Diffusion of innovations, 3rd ed. New York:The Free Press; 453 p.

study was sponsored by the CDF and California StateUniversity, Chico, with the cooperation of the Shasta ForestVillage Property Owners Association and Water Company.

ReferencesAlbrect, Terrance L.; Adelman, Mara B. and Associates. 1987.

Communicating social support. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications;317 p.

Drabek, Thomas E. 1986. Human system responses to disaster. NewYork: Springer-Verlag; 509 p.



Neighborhood Organization Activities: Evacuation Drills,Clusters, and Fire Safety Awareness 1

Dick White 2

Motivations for Emergency PreparednessCommon sense—and the historical record of major fires

here—contributed to a background level of concern forengaging in emergency preparations. But most of the activitiesdescribed here began after the Loma Prieta earthquake of1989 and were intensified greatly by the occurrence of theOakland/Berkeley Hills Firestorm in October 1991.

Sources of Information and HelpAlthough the residents may have conceived of a few

novel twists, most of the preparedness actions we have takenwere suggested in publications and courses made availableby many organizations. Here are some that we have used:

• Berkeley Office of Emergency Services: DisasterFirst Aid Handbook and Search and RescueHandbook, plus courses on these topics.• Oakland Office of Emergency Services: COREProgram (Citizens of Oakland Respond toEmergencies) courses covering individual andgroup preparations, medical disaster, light searchand rescue, and light fire suppression, followedup by a realistic earthquake drill at the OaklandFire Department Training Center.• American Red Cross: Your Family DisasterPlan (with FEMA co-sponsorship), and otherbooklets.• California Department of Forestry and FireProtection: Video “Fire Safe — Inside andOut,”pamphlet “Fire Safe, California!,” and otherpublications.• East Bay Municipal Water District: Firescape:Landscaping to Reduce Fire Hazard.• Others: KTVU Channel 2 Television: Video,“The Oakland/Berkeley Hills Firestorm, October20, 1991.” University of California emergencypreparedness fair. Vendor information.

The Three P’s:Preparations, Plusses, Problems

In the hope that our experience might be useful toothers, here is a summary of what we have done to increaseour readiness for responding to emergencies. The emergencieswe foresee—through a veil of denial—are two. One is amassive, fast-moving fire coming from any direction of thecompass. The other is a major earthquake that severelydamages many of our dwellings and roads, disrupts electricity

Abstract: Emergency preparedness activities of one Berkeley-Oakland Hills neighborhood at the wildland/urban interface in-clude establishing clusters that reduce fire hazards and fuel loads,setting aside emergency supplies, and identifying evacuation routes;taking emergency preparedness courses from the Offices of Emer-gency Services of Berkeley and Oakland (the CERT and COREprograms); and setting up and exercising a citizen-band radionetwork. With the cooperation of the Berkeley and Oakland fireand police departments, on-foot evacuation and earthquake drillshave been held. Problems discovered relate to liability, absenteeownership of lots, and response time of the official emergencyradio system.

The Story

This is the story of one neighborhood’s preparations forresponding to a major emergency, whether large fire or

severe earthquake.The Setting: The neighborhood contains roughly 235

dwellings, sited densely on a hill on the urban/wildlandinterface located nearly atop the Hayward earthquake fault.There is just one road for access to the neighborhood, thestreets are steep and full of tight curves, and no street ismuch wider than 15 feet. The utility lines are carried overheadon old poles. Shrubs and trees abound both inside and justoutside of the neighborhood.

Political Landscape: The neighborhood lies partly inBerkeley and partly in Oakland. It abuts University ofCalifornia land on several sides, and it touches East BayRegional Park land. A neighborhood association was foundedin 1926, reportedly in response to the issue of providingbetter emergency access for fire-fighting equipment. Anadditional access road has not been built, and the idea ofsuch a road is not popular with residents because it is believedlikely to trigger the development of presently undevelopedlots in the neighborhood.

Cast of Characters: The neighborhood is populated by“team-players” and dedicated individualists, homeowners,landlords, tenants, long-term residents, and absentee ownersof undeveloped lots, plus unknown transients who campoccasionally in the adjoining woods.


2Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sci-ences, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.



(clusters) of five to ten dwellings each to cooperate locallyin preparing for and dealing with an emergency, andcommunicating with the neighborhood as a whole; and wehave invested in some means for improving our ability todeal with an emergency (table 1).

Neighborhood Clusters We have approximately 15 clusters of five to ten nearby

dwellings. Each has a cluster representative and an alternatewho help plan activities, such as drills, and communicate totheir neighbors about the preparations one should make, the

and water supplies, cripples telephone communications,injures many people, and possibly leaves the neighborhoodisolated to take care of itself for at least 72 hours.

While engaging in preparedness activities, we haveexperienced many positive side benefits—we will refer tothem here as “plusses.” And we have identified some problemsthat we hope can be overcome.

Preparations

We have attempted to learn what needs to be done incase of emergency; we have set up small local groups

Table 1—Neighborhood preparedness activities

Fire prevention

Awareness through information dissemination.City inspections and followup (spark arrestors, clear zones, etc.).Clearing by individuals (city pickup of clippings, chipper, dumpsters).Roof replacement and tree removal and trimming by individuals.

Neighborhood organizationCluster formation (use for two-way information transfer):

5-10 households; identify occupant skills and needs; sketch and tag utilityshutoff locations.

Spreadsheet (each address, names, phone numbers, skills, needs)Neighborhood association

Committees—emergency preparedness, etc.Entire neighborhood informational meetings.

Communications

Telephone trees (through clusters)Citizen band radio network

• 40-channel, 5-watt; 24 units purchased by individuals

• Protocols, practice drills, neighborhood maps

• Coverage: “command center” to top and bottom of hill, end-to-end of fire

trails, inside house to inside house, AC-DC on standby.

Courses

Berkeley “CERT”:Medical disaster (3 hour).Oakland “CORE”

Module 1: individual preparedness (18 people).Module 2: group preparedness (18 people).Module 3: Medical emergency; light search and rescue; light fire suppression;

“final exam” drill—simulated earthquake (OFD Training Center).

Disaster planning and practice

Command center identified, storage building stocked.Emergency medical location identified.On-foot escape routes identified and tested.Medevac site discussed (?)Emergency police access paths discussed (?).

Practice drills

Mar. ’93: on-foot neighborhood evacuation (emphasis: walking out).Oct. ’93: on-site earthquake response (emphasis: learn your local area).Mayday ’94: on-site earthquake response (emphasis: ready for 72 hours?).

Liaison

Interactions throughout with city and university emergency personnel.



emergency supplies to store, the marking of utility shutoffvalves and switches, and so on. The cluster representativesalso communicate to the chairmen of the neighborhood-wide emergency preparedness committee relevant localinformation, such as current names and phone numbers ofall residents, which residents are usually at home during theday and are willing to provide timely information aboutconditions in case of emergency, and the locations of residentshaving special needs that should be promptly dealt with incase of emergency. This information for the entireneighborhood is entered in a spreadsheet (Excel) by thecommittee chairmen.

Courses Some 20 residents completed the three-module CORE

courses and survived the final drill held at the Oakland FireDepartment Training Center, albeit with receipt of witheringbut helpful criticism. Others have taken Berkeley CERTcourses. Several took other courses on similar topics.

Citizen-Band (CB) Radios About two dozen residents have purchased 5-watt 40-

channel CB radios in order to facilitate communicating overthe neighborhood in case of emergency. Costs ranged from$60 (on sale) to about $90. A set of protocols has beenprepared, and several drills a year are held to familiarizepeople with the use of this tool — “be brief,” “terminatetransmission with ‘over’ even though it seems silly at first,”“start on channel X and move up to channel Y in case ofinterference,” and so on. We have tested the range of theradio system and located a spot (“Command Central”) to andfrom which transmissions can be understood regardless oftheir point of origin.

Some residents also purchased AC-DC converters ($12)and leave their radios always powered (with “Squelch” controlset so they are quiet until a local transmission is made). Inseveral cases where actual structure fires occurred in theneighborhood, the network was activated by a call from analert CB owner, showing that it is not necessary for a givenindividual to be present to get the network going.

Maps Residents prepared a number of different kinds of maps,

including the following:• Map of the streets and the trails in the surrounding

hills.• Map of all properties, obtained from Assessor’s

office.• Map showing location and boundaries of all

clusters.• Detailed map of each cluster showing location of

all utility valves and shutoffs.• Maps showing preferred escape paths.• Map for use by CB radio users to identify origins

of transmissions.

Emergency Supply ShedAt a central location, two clusters assembled an 8-foot

by 8-foot prefabricated shed to hold cluster supplies andcertain neighborhood-wide supplies (maps, logsheets for usein an emergency, etc.). The shed also holds a 12-volt storagebattery, which is trickle-charged by a solar panel, to powerCB radios for an extended period.

PathsIn addition to the obvious escape routes, we have

identified and marked (with inexpensive reflective 2-inchdots) several additional escape paths. One resident constructedat personal expense a bridge over a small creek and a set ofsteps to create a safe exit from one difficult area.

Drills In 1993 two neighborhood-wide drills were held:

March 1993: Commencing at noon on a Sunday, about 120residents walked out of the neighborhood on streets or trailsto an assembly point (parking lot of the University ofCalifornia football stadium). CORE trainees monitored theevent, and the CB network was exercised. At the stadium,Berkeley and Oakland Fire and Police Departments hadstationed equipment and personnel, providing an instructiveand enjoyable social experience for residents who participated.

October 1993: A supposed earthquake brought residentsout to interact within their clusters (talking about preparedness,walking from house to house to show where utility valvesand shutoffs were located). Simulated problems had beendistributed among the clusters: several mannequins (loanedby the Oakland Fire Department Training Center) representedinjured people; portable gas shutoff demonstration units (fromthe Berkeley and Oakland Offices of Emergency Services)were available for practice; and a number of “downed utilitywires” were scattered about for residents to find and reportusing the CBs. About 20 residents later attended a streetdemonstration and description by an Oakland firefighter ofthe emergency supplies that he always carries in his personalauto. Afterwards, some clusters held a potluck or picnic.

Plusses

While the goals of these activities were serious, theactivities had unexpected positive side benefits. People becamemuch better acquainted with their neighbors. Several residentsagreed formally to allow parts of their property to be usedfor emergency purposes. Residents met emergency personnelfor the first time, in relaxed circumstances.

Cooperation among the constituencies involved has beennotable. The University of California has funded brushreduction by a herd of 600 goats on land that adjoins theneighborhood; a grass fire that occurred was reportedly muchless dangerous than it would otherwise have been. TheUniversity also installed two solar-powered emergency callboxes on its lands quite close to the neighborhood. Thesecould be used to relay to the 911 emergency system earlywarning of a fire, and (being cellular phones) might serve asa needed communication link for the neighborhood after a



major earthquake. The East Bay Regional Parks and theUniversity cooperatively used a brush hog to clear fire trailsin the area.

In the courses offered, whether a given resident lived inthe Berkeley or Oakland part of the neighborhood was of norelevance. Stimulated by prodding from residents, city officeshave taken legal means to encourage various property ownersto reduce fuel loads on their lots. Another example ofcooperation was the completion of one city’s installation ofreflective blue hydrant markers (“Bott’s dots”) by the othercity, when the first city ran out of reflectors.

Problems

Though we are encouraged by what has happened thusfar, we cannot ignore some important problems that we see:

Fuel Loads Remain High In spite of more vigorous action by city agencies and

urging by neighbors, the fuel load in the neighborhood and inthe lands immediately adjacent to it remains dangerously high.

Contradictory AdviceResidents have been told that bamboo groves are, and

are not, a fire hazard; only fuel on the ground matters, andthat the limbs are unimportant; and foam is good for fightingstructure fires generally, and that it is not. Most worrisome,some emergency personnel recommend privately that residentsobtain fire hose and be ready to use it, but official policyforbids it.

Volunteer Labor Is Not AllowedOstensibly because of the fear of legal liability in case of

an on-site injury, residents have been unable as yet to findpersons in authority willing to let them volunteer their labor tohelp reduce fuel loads in the lands that surround theneighborhood. At the same time, budget limitations have severelyrestricted fuel reduction programs that use paid laborers.

Slow Response of Official Emergency Radio Station The local 1610AM emergency radio station is slow to

mount and remove announcements that residents might needto rely upon. For example, the March 1993 drill was supposedto have been started by a broadcast announcement, uponnotification by the Berkeley Police, but the announcementwas first broadcast twenty minutes after the drill started.Announcement of the October 1993 drill, which was supposedto have been taken off the air at the end of the drill, was stillbeing broadcast two days later. And description of a wildlandfire 5 days earlier was still being broadcast 5 days later whenanother wildland fire in a nearby area occurred. (Our reasonfor concern about having prompt response of the station willbe made clear below.)

Waning InterestWith the fading of memories of Loma Prieta and the

firestorm of 1991, the sensed urgency of making emergencypreparations fades, and some residents lose interest.

Suggested SolutionsHere are some suggestions regarding these problems.

The issue of cost is also discussed below.

Prevention

• To guide residents on what is dangerous, andparticularly what conditions on lots under absenteeownership should be corrected, ask high-rankingfirefighters from both cities involved to give a 1-to 2-hour walking tour of the neighborhood. Cityoffices that issue citations for cleaning up shouldalso be represented, along with the neighborhood’semergency preparedness committee.

• To reduce fuel loads on adjoining lands, organizea few work parties of volunteers from theneighborhood. This might also help our problemof waning interest. In addition, since the estimatedcosts of crucial clearing are relatively low (seebelow), an effort should be made to fund theseprojects from a source other than the University,in view of their wide benefits.

• The goat brush-clearing program is threatened forbudgetary reasons. Its effectiveness has beendemonstrated, and it should be continued.

• Provision of dumpsters and the visit of achipper have convinced many residents to cleartheir properties, and both should continue to bemade available.

Emergency Response

Our CB radio network has already proven useful inemergencies, but we are unable to communicate via thatmeans with the most relevant emergency service, the BerkeleyPolice Department (BPD). Acquisition of a CB base stationfor use in BPD headquarters has been requested, but nomoney has been allocated. Can this small amount of funding($250) be found elsewhere if necessary?

Telephone trees have proven useful, but they are clearlytoo cumbersome for use in communicating the urgent needto take a particular emergency action (for example, to evacuateon foot to the south because an as-yet-unseen major fire isapproaching from the north). A suggested approach thatcould provide an early neighborhood-wide warning is outlinedin figure 1. It relies on the ability of the emergency broadcaststation to transmit quickly detailed emergency advice. Amodest amount of equipment is also needed. If we can solvethe “people” problems associated with getting the radiostation to carry really current information and obtain themodest amount of funding required for equipment (around$250), this system could be functioning within weeks.

Financial Issues

Here are the estimated costs of the possible solutionsjust described:



in taking the other emergency response steps described above,residents have spent in excess of $5,000 during the past 2years. In view of this, allocation of public funds for some ofthe projects listed above seems equitable in view of theenormous cost that would be avoided if another majorconflagration were prevented.

ConclusionsWe look forward to continuing to work with emergency

organizations in order to reduce the seriousness of theemergencies that will inevitably arise in the future. We hopethat we can keep our neighborhood actively involved in thiseffort, through focussed periodic drills, the stimulation ofvolunteer work to reduce surrounding fuel loads, and throughbeing further trained in emergency procedures.

Acknowledgments

The following neighborhood residents played especiallyimportant roles in the activities summarized above: LindyHahn, Sydney Kennedy, Penny Rink, and Marianne Tanner.Thanks also go to Debora Reismann, of the CORE Program,and other individuals too numerous to mention by name inthe Offices of Emergency Services, Fire Departments, andPolice Departments of both Berkeley and Oakland, as wellas emergency personnel and other staff members at theUniversity of California, Berkeley.

• Acquire and install CB base station at BPD soresidents can communicate with police whenlandlines are down: $250.

• For the local police-activated alarm system,acquire necessary equipment ($200), install atone location ($150), and pay cost of telephoneservice for one year ($150). Non-recurring costs:$350. Recurring cost: $150 annually.

• Thin the University of California wildland northof neighborhood, leaving it amenable to periodic“touch-ups”: $3,000.

• Similarly, thin the University of Californiawildland east of neighborhood: $4,000.

We have not been able to estimate the costs of some ofthe other items referred to above. In addition to the itemsdiscussed, there are more expensive problems that needcorrecting. One is the repair of a washout in one of the fireaccess trails near our neighborhood. Another is replacingold, heavily laden utility poles in neighborhood areas, towhich access during an emergency would be vital, withunderground utilities. (There is a program for gradualreplacement of overhead lines, but the replacement scheduleis reportedly “booked up” through the next decade. Emergencyconsiderations should be given priority.)

One may well ask, should not individual residents bearthe costs of fire prevention and emergency response? Theanswer is, to a large measure they have. Many residentshave replaced wooden roofs with fire-resistant roofs, havehad trees taken down and other growth removed. In addition,


Figure 1 – Proposed warning system for neighborhoods: If a specific warningregarding evacuation or the like is to be made to a given neighborhood (Hill C),the police would record the message for broadcast on the emergency radiostation, and then dial a telephone located on Hill C. After the phone is“answered” (by the commercially available device), police personnel use theirpush-button phone keypad to send a 3-digit code that triggers sounding of anaudible alarm. The meaning of the alarm is “tune in to the emergency radiostation for instructions.”



Yet, in moving to the urban-wildland interface, these peopledo not wish to give up their lifestyle. Nor do they seem toaccept any inherent risk.

Let’s not kid ourselves; there is risk. Remember all of thenatural disasters this country has experienced recently: fires,floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, mudslides, etc. Every squareinch of land carries a degree of risk, some more than others.

People can reduce their losses from natural disasters,but cannot eliminate them completely. For example, theycan avoid living in areas of high risk; they can constructbuildings or modify the site to withstand the hazard byinstalling Class A roofing or removing vegetation; they canconstruct structures to prevent the hazards, such as sea wallsto protect bluffs from being eroded by ocean wave action;they can purchase insurance; or they can do nothing and taketheir chances.

The urban-wildland interface dwellers try in vain tobring all the urban amenities and safeguards with them. Theconsequences are far more significant than most people realize.

Housing and business developments, at the very most,demolish all remnants of the native ecosystem. At the veryleast, developments subdivide the ecosystem so it will nolonger function as the same system. The effects of thesealtered areas stretch beyond their physical boundaries.

Fire Management in theUrban-Wildland Interface

Let’s put this into a wildfire protection scenario. Acounty permitting agency grants a developer the right tobuild on vacant property bordering a state park. Permittingagencies rarely take into consideration that wildfires are aninherent natural hazard of most sites, so many permits arenot routinely sent to the fire protection agencies for review.

In order to increase the number of units per acre, there isan incentive for the developer to site buildings close toproperty lines.

Frequently the developer will scarify the entiredevelopment for ease of construction and replant with non-native plants, some of which may invade the adjacent nativeecosystem in the park. Time passes, and the plants withinand adjacent to the development grow, eventually attractingthe attention of the fire protection agencies. The privatehomeowner or state parks are then put on notice to clearvegetation to create defensible space and weed abatementfor the structure.

Either because of this notice, or to reduce his insurancepremium, the private landowner may trespass onto parkproperty to clear vegetation, demand that Parks clear their

Abstract: Each parcel of government land carries specific landuse constraints and objectives. This is also true of private housingand business developments. When government land, which wasacquired to protect the natural or cultural resources, borders pri-vate land, which was acquired to build and protect houses orbusinesses, conflicts arise. The flammable native vegetation on theagency land is both a threat to the adjacent private landowner andthe primary resource that the agency is sworn to protect. Thispaper covers the California Department of Parks and Recreation’sresponse to this conflict.

All of the previous presentations in this concurrent sessionon the urban-wildland interface have focused on the

protection of lives and buildings on the urban side of thefence. I would like to give a different perspective as themanager of land on the other side of the fence: the wildlands.

Most of you know that all government land is not managedthe same; each Federal, State, county, or city land managementagency has its own missions and objectives for each parcelof land. However, much of the lay public makes no distinction.

The California State Park System, like the NationalPark System, is a conglomeration of properties that wereacquired to protect and manage: historic and archaeologicfeatures, sensitive species of plants and animals, andrepresentative examples of California’s spectacular varietyof ecosystems. That is the “Parks” part of our name. Itsemployees, including myself, have the responsibility, bylaw, to protect these features.

The other part of our name, “Recreation,” indicates ourmission to provide access so that the general public mayenjoy these lands.

All private land is not managed the same, either, yetprivate property owners do share one goal with the CaliforniaDepartment of Parks and Recreation—to protect theirinvestment. Buildings are usually the most important investmentfor homeowners and business owners. The natural and culturalresources are the most important investment for Parks.

Moving Back to NatureProtecting one’s investment is an illusive concept. People

usually move back to nature to escape the problems of thecity. Parks provide some of the “nature” that people seek.

Conflicts Between Natural Resources andStructural Protection 1

Stephen Bakken 2


2Forester, California Department of Parks and Recreation, 1416-9thStreet, Sacramento, CA 95814.



property, or notify fire protection agency of the dangerouscondition perpetrated by Parks.

The fire protection agency may cite Parks for non-compliance of the ordinances. In some cases, the fire protectionagency may elect to clear the park property and bill theDepartment for the work. To add insult to injury, theDepartment is asked to pay for a destructive action on itsproperty that is in direct conflict with its mission to managenatural ecosystems.

What is the primary purpose in constructing fire andfuel breaks? According to the newspapers, it is to protecteveryone from wildfire. But look at this from Parks’perspective. Like everyone else, Parks is concerned withprotection of human life and will evacuate all park visitorsand employees’ families during a wildfire. The Departmenthas even gone so far as to close a park when the fire dangerrating reaches extreme. And yes, like everyone else, Parks isconcerned with protection of its facilities and performs therequired vegetation clearance around structures. Indeed, someof these structures are irreplaceable historic buildings.

However, the Department is most concerned with theprotection of its principal investment—the natural and culturalfeatures. This is why the land was acquired and why eachpark unit is unique.

Parks usually does not want its native wildlands protectedfrom wildfire; indeed, fire is the most important agent in themanagement of a dynamic functioning ecosystem in manyareas of California.

Sometimes Parks might prefer that fire occur in a moreplanned fashion (i.e., prescribed burning), such as wherelong-term fire exclusion has produced an extremely highbiomass, but we are usually not concerned that the plantsand animal species will be irreparably damaged by anunplanned fire.

Ironically, some of the techniques used to protect livesand structures from fire can be very damaging to the naturaland archaeologic features. Parks is most concerned withbulldozer activity, be it for a firebreak made at the beginningof fire season, or for a fire control line made during awildfire. Firelines accelerate erosion, destroy archaeologicalartifacts, allow invasive exotic plants to establish, and degradethe visual esthetics of the park. The vegetation usually recoversquickly on burned areas regardless of whether the fire wasplanned or not, but may not return to dozed firelines fordecades because the organic surface soil and stored seed hasbeen removed.

The Department is also concerned with tree felling; ittakes a long time to replace an old-growth tree that wasdropped to extinguish a smoldering fire high on its trunk.

Most of the bulldozer lines on native wildlands are notto protect the park. They are constructed and maintained toprotect the surrounding businesses and homes. This is anexample of an indirect impact that stretches far outside ofthe private ownership boundaries.

I am not here to point fingers at the fire suppressionagencies; they are only doing their job—to protect life and

property. Indeed, if they do not diligently carry out that duty,they may be sued.

A newspaper editorial during the recent southernCalifornia wildfires was entitled “Public Lands Shouldn’tBe Allowed to Become Lingering Hazards to Lives andProperty.” It would seem that Parks is negligent byperpetuating a hazardous condition.

What would be considered best management practicesin this simplified example: a 10,000-acre park with onevegetation community, say chaparral? Parks would be remissin its mission if it attempted to manage all of this communityas one homogeneous block. Biological diversity would bebetter served if Parks were to maintain a mosaic of differentage classes of the chaparral. The most ecologically suitablemeans to accomplish this is to burn scattered plots of theolder aged chaparral each year.

Yet even this management scheme leaves more than halfof the park in a flammable condition. Given hot, dry, windyconditions, a wildfire could spread in any continuous cover ofchaparral and threaten adjacent property owners. This is aparadox. Parks can accomplish its mission using the mostsuitable ecological tool and successfully reduce wildland fuels,yet be held liable for maintaining a “hazardous” condition.

The political solution to this hazardous condition isfrequently unilateral: “Parks needs to construct fire breakson its land to protect the private landowner,” or, if you havebeen following the Mount Diablo State Park controversy,“Parks needs to put non-native cattle on its land to protectthe private homeowner.”

Do I sound a little defensive? Well, I fail to see why it isParks’ responsibility to trash some of its most importantinvestments—its natural and archeological resources, in orderto protect someone else’s investment. Yes, native vegetationwill propagate a fire, but as the Oakland Hills wildfire remindedus, so will exotic plants, shake roofs, and redwood decks.

SolutionsIt is the coordinators’ wish that this conference initiate

some concrete change in the way society does business atthe urban-wildland interface. From the fire perspective, Iwould like to see two changes:

First, eliminate all of the barriers to prescription burning.Everyone here is probably aware of how difficult it is toconduct a prescription burn in the urban-wildland interfacearea given air quality constraints, burn logistics, potentialliability, and public sentiment. Yet, this is the only tool thatcomes close to meeting the needs of my agency in managingnatural resources while providing a reasonable degree ofprotection for the adjacent landowner. The greatest barriersthat I see are smoke management constraints and the threatof litigation against the landowner and fire protection agency.

Second, the scope of liability for wildfire damage againstland management and fire suppression agencies must beseverely limited. As long as managing a native ecosystemusing best management practices is determined by the courts



to be equivalent to “maintaining a hazardous condition,”then there can never be a solution.

The current situation is unworkable for my department.When a wildfire occurs, Parks either accepts significantresource damage from suppression activities or risks litigation.The only acceptable tool available to my department,controlled burning, will never be used to its full extentbecause of the gauntlet of constraints. When Parks is able toconduct a prescription burn, we still face litigation threat. Aprescription burn that escapes is worse from a liabilitystandpoint than an arson or accidental wildfire. Even asuccessful prescription burn can generate lawsuits. Forexample, if heavy rainfall, following a controlled burn,

produces a mudslide that destroys a home, Parks will likelybe sued.

In conclusion, without significant change in theconstraints to prescription burning and especially tort liability,Parks will be unable to accomplish its mission in the urban-wildland interface zone.

I should not close without saying that Harold Biswell,or “Doc” as we called him, was instrumental in starting theDepartment of Parks and Recreation’s Prescribed BurnProgram. I believe that he would smile if this conference inhis honor was instrumental in changing the way societymanages fire in the urban-wildland interface.


PANEL DISCUSSION:Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems



Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems 1

Neil R. Honeycutt 2

The urban and wildland interface (mix) problem exists inmany communities in the United States. To effectively

deal with these complex issues, cooperative approaches shouldbe used to solve regional problems. This panel discussed theunique programs currently at work in Alameda and ContraCosta Counties in northern California. These programs weredesigned after the 1991 Oakland hills firestorm to addressthe specific problems in this predominantly urban intermixlocale. The panel discussed the benefits derived from the

formation of regional cooperatives that go beyond traditionalgeopolitical boundaries. The East Bay Fire Chiefs’Consortium and the Vegetation Management Consortiumoperate as components of the Hills Emergency Forum. Thepublic sector Chief Executive Officers are responsible forensuring that the lessons from the Firestorm are translatedinto public policy. The Bay Area Wildfire Forum is a private,nonprofit group of northern California firefighters.


2Chief, Fire and Rescue Branch, State of California, Office of EmergencyServices, 2800 Meadowview Road, Sacramento, CA 95832.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:…Urban Interface Problems


Formed in response to the October 20, 1991, Oakland/Berkeley hills firestorm, the East Bay Vegetation

Management Consortium (EBVMC) is a voluntary associationof public agencies concerned with vegetation managementand planning related to fire hazard reduction in the Oakland/Berkeley hills. To date, a total of nine agencies areparticipating in the EBVMC, including local cities, parkdistricts, public utilities, and educational and researchfacilities. Each agency owns or is responsible for significantopen-space lands in the East Bay hills. The EBVMC ispreparing a Vegetation Management Plan (VMP) orientedtoward fire hazard reduction; this planning effort is fundedby the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, with FEMAand EBVMC agencies splitting the $330,000 total projectcost. The VMP project was initiated in August 1993 and isprojected to be completed by September 1994. The VMP hasbeen developed with substantial public input by a team ledby Amphion Environmental, Inc., an Oakland-based planningfirm. The University of California, Berkeley, is also contracted

to the EBVMC to develop a geographic information system(GIS) for the VMP. A Technical Advisory Committee andCitizen’s Advisory Committee have been formed to providereview and comment on the VMP as it is developed. Severalseries of public workshops will also be presented to providethe general public with the opportunity to learn and commentabout the VMP. The basic goal of the VMP is to reduce therisk and potential loss from future wildfires in the East Bayhills. This basic goal will be achieved by improvingcommunication and coordination of work planning andactivities between local agencies, establishing a resource-based approach to vegetation management (as opposed to ajurisdictional approach), and developing and implementinga consistent set of standards for vegetation managementactivities (ranging from land management prescriptions toresidential parcel inspection criteria). Ultimate success forthe EBVMC will depend on public support and political willto change traditional jurisdictional approaches to resourcemanagement and program funding.

The East Bay Vegetation Management Consortium:A Subregional Approach to Resource Managementand Planning 1

Tony Acosta 2


2Parks Service Manager, Oakland Office of Parks and Recreation, 1520Lakeside Dr., Oakland, CA 94612.



Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems:East Bay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium 1

Michael Bradley 2


2Fire Chief, City of Hayward Fire Department, 25151 Clawiter Rd.,Hayward, CA 94545.

The traditional approach to planning for public fireprotection has been based on independent actions by

each fire department or district. The county fire chiefs’associations, while providing interagency communication,were not adequate to deal with the regional nature of thewildland urban interface problem. The formation of the EastBay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium grew out of the need to provideregional solutions to these problems. This group is composed

of representatives from all agencies that provide protectionin Alameda and Contra Costa Counties in a common urbanwildland interface zone more than 30 miles in length. TheEast Bay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium serves as a clearinghousefor issues such as policy development, vegetationmanagement, public education, fire response planning, andcoordination of interdepartmental training.




Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems:the Bay Area Wildfire Forum 1

Todd E. Bruce 2

Abstract: Fire agencies throughout the San Francisco Bay Areaformed a grassroots organization to influence a firesafe environ-ment. The Bay Area Wildfire Forum (BAWF) was organized in1992 to coordinate wildland fire training while promoting andencouraging further activities regarding wildland firefighting andfire prevention.

The Bay Area Wildlife Forum (BAWF) has sponsored,organized, and instructed four live fire training burns in

the last 2 years. Hundreds of student firefighters learned tocontrol, suppress, and survive a wildland fire. Also, a newsletteris circulated every other month to provide a valuable meansof interagency communication. This has never before occurredwithin Bay Area fire departments. BAWF attributes its successto regional coordination, cooperation, and participation.

The San Francisco Bay Area has fast developed a firehistory like that of southern California. The problems includeyears of drought, an oppressed vegetative fuel load, and thebuilding of homes in the once undeveloped wildlands. BayArea fire departments, already stretched thin by staggeringbudget cuts, have recognized that they can no longer handlethese problems alone.

After the Tunnel Road Fire of October 1991, severalBay Area firefighters discussed the problems they werefacing with today’s wildfires. Most departments wereexperiencing problems with staffing levels. Differentequipment, technology, procedures, terminology, and radiofrequencies have created operational nightmares. Theyrecognized the need for fire departments throughout the BayArea to network on a regular basis.

Thus a grassroots organization, the Bay Area Wildfire Forum(BAWF), was formed. The bi-monthly meetings are hosted by adifferent fire agency. An educational presentation is given,followed by a roundtable discussion, and then the host firedepartment presents its agency’s wildland firefighting program.

BAWF has made available to all member departments acadre of highly skilled wildland firefighting instructors. Inlight of today’s budgetary belt tightening, this is an invaluableresource. BAWF will also provide assistance to communitiesthat want to develop a pre-suppression plan by designatingthe high-risk areas in the community and developing a written

report. The plan can outline the local streets, fire hydrants,back-up water supplies, command post locations, staging areas,designated radio frequencies, helicopter landing zones,evacuation areas, etc. BAWF has established an excellentlibrary of educational books, pamphlets, slides, and videos.Additionally, BAWF has a speakers’ bureau for public speakingengagements in community organizations and schools.

It is the vision of the Bay Area Wildfire Forum that, oneday, all the Bay Area fire departments will have a workingknowledge of each other’s organization and a sustainedcommitment by each organization to educate their communityand enforce a wildfire hazard reduction program.

Mission StatementThe mission of the Bay Area Wildfire Forum is to

provide for a broad base of support for speaking with aunified voice influencing a firesafe environment throughoutthe Bay Area and surrounding communities; to provide,through cooperation, practical and usable technology on anoutreach basis; to assist the general public, planners, andgoverning bodies in implementing firesafe practices; tocoordinate wildland fire training and fire safety activities;and to provide a model for agency cooperation and leadershipto other areas of the state and country, which are examplesof the progress that can be achieved through local, State,private, and Federal cooperation.

Goals• To provide a forum for a group of local, state,

private, and federal fire agencies who all have acommon interest in the advancement andpromotion of wildland fire control, training, andprevention.

• To promote and encourage standardization inwildland fire control.

• To promote and sponsor wildland trainingthroughout the Bay Area.

• To promote enhanced interagency communications.• To be a resource center for wildland public

education and wildland fire prevention materials.• To promote pre-fire suppression planning

throughout the Bay Area.• To remain available to anyone interested in the

promotion of wildfire interagency cooperationand training.• To sponsor the construction of a wildland fire simulator.


2Fire Captain, Santa Clara County, Central Fire Protection District,14700 Winchester Blvd., Los Gatos, CA 95030-1818.



In June 1993, firefighters from four counties participatedin a 110-acre training burn. Representatives from two othercounties were on hand to observe the exercise, gather informationand report back to their respective agencies. The local mediawas invited to participate in the activities. The media attendeda survival course, developed by BAWF, to give the media thetools needed to survive a wildland fire incident.

CommunicationsA newsletter is written, published, and circulated by the

members and distributed every other month. This providespertinent interagency information regarding training,prevention, and political and organizational facts. Includedare training tidbits, meeting minutes, and other essentialinformation. This has proven to be a valuable means ofinteragency communications that has never before occurredwithin the Bay Area fire departments.

ConclusionThe Bay Area Wildfire Forum is committed to raising

the level of service, increasing efficiency, and maintaininginteragency cooperation. Total support and participation byits member departments will be the only means by whichgoals will be accomplished. It is our hope that egos can beset aside so agencies will talk and begin to walk side-by-side. Many agencies have taken the first step, to endorseand support our organization. The next step is to get involved,assist with change, take a chance, and stake ownership sothe same message can be sent to the public, lawmakers, andour firefighters.

Accomplishments BAWF has more than 50 member agencies and a handful

of individuals. BAWF has the full support and endorsementof the California State Fire Marshall, California State Boardof Fire Services, eight of the nine Bay Area County FireChief and County Training Officers Associations.

Being a grassroots organization, BAWF has recognizedthe necessity to bring aboard a group of individuals who,based on their experience, can assist the command staff inavoiding “reinventing the wheel” and other common mistakesthat new organizations are prone to make. This advisoryboard is composed of Dan Coffman, State Board of FireServices (SBFS); Mike Vonada, SBFS; Chief Mike Bradley,Hayward Fire Department; Battalion Chief Mike Martin,California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection;Battalion Chief Bobby Dixon, Milpitas Fire Department;John Ackerman, Publisher, American Fire Journal; and ChiefDouglas Sporleder, Santa Clara County Central Fire District.

Live Fire Training BurnsBAWF is most proud of its success with live fire training

burns. It has sponsored, organized and instructed four livefire training burns in the past 2 years. Hundreds of studentslearned to control, suppress and survive wildland fires whileunder controlled live fire situations. Student firefighters wereplaced inside a tent shelter, and the fuel around them wasburned. This simulated the heat, smoke, and sounds that onewould encounter if forced to deploy their fire shelter.



Social and Environmental Issues in Developing Vegetationand Fire Management Plans 1

Leonard Charles 2

Abstract: To reduce the risk of wildfire in the California urbaninterface often requires actions that will be viewed by members ofthe public as having adverse effects on such resources as wildlife,vegetation, views, air quality, and recreational opportunities. Thesecitizens can substantially delay and even thwart development offire management plans. In developing such a plan for an area insouthern Marin County, California, public agency staff and itsconsultants encountered significant public opposition. The suc-cessful completion and adoption of the plan required an extensivepublic participation process. The rationale and format for thepublic participation process are described. As important as theformat selected is the mindset of the staff and consultants involvedin the process. The attitude of “care” on the part of staff andconsultants is investigated and found to be a critical attribute indealing with the public on controversial plans.

The preparation of a plan for managing vegetation toreduce fire hazard in the urban interface requires not

only the involvement of the necessary scientific andprofessional experts but a willingness by the lead agencystaff and any consultants engaged by the lead agency tothoroughly and objectively comply with environmental reviewrequirements (e.g., National Environmental Protection Agency[NEPA] or, in California, possibly California EnvironmentalQuality Act regulations). This environmental review mustinclude an open dialogue with environmental and communitygroups who may have significant questions and concernsregarding proposed vegetation manipulation. To ignore thesequestions or concerns can significantly delay approval andimplementation, jeopardize eventual implementation of theplan, and/or foster a future atmosphere of distrust betweenthe agency and the local community. Active and wholeheartedinclusion of the public, including critics, can result in moreenvironmentally sensitive plans than might otherwise be thecase. Ultimately, dialogue with the public improves thechance of plan adoption and implementation, and it canfoster an environment wherein the public is more confidentof agency sensitivity to environmental and social concernswhen making future land use decisions.

Preparing a Plan for Southern MarinCounty, California

The Marin Municipal Water District (MMWD) owns19,000+ acres in southern Marin County, California. Thisacreage is the primary watershed that MMWD uses to produceand store water provided to 57,000+ residential and businesscustomers (i.e., hookups) in southern Marin County. Thisproperty plus an adjacent 1,200 acres owned by the MarinCounty Open Space District (hereafter referred to as theStudy Area) is heavily used for recreational purposes. Thenumerous Study Area ridges capped by Mount Tamalpais,the tallest mountain in the area, provide the undevelopedvisual backdrop for the many urban communities in the area.The 20,000+ acres that comprise the Study Area are consideredby the public as one of the region’s most important “resources.”

The problem with this splendid resource is that theStudy Area wildland borders residential neighborhoods ofsix cities as well as several unincorporated communities.The urban interface is a classic example of Californiadevelopment, with extremely expensive homes built on steepridges where the trees and chaparral of the wildlandinterpenetrate the residential areas. No border separates thewildland and the developed areas. And wildland vegetation,or fuels, surround the residences for a considerable distancefrom the Study Area boundary. Access to the interface areasis limited; water storage and delivery systems are inadequate.The fire hazard is rated very high to extreme throughout theinterface. Marin County is one of the wealthiest counties inthe United States, and many of the most expensive homes inthe County are located in this interface.

The Marin County Fire Department (MCFD) hasresponsibility for suppression of wildland fires in the StudyArea. In the early 1980’s, MCFD became concerned about thebuildup of fuels on the Study Area and the consequent threatto adjacent residential neighborhoods. From 1982 to 1985,with MMWD approval, MCFD conducted a series of prescribedburns in the remote northern portion of the Study Area. In theautumn of 1985, MCFD conducted a prescribed burn on thesouth face of Mount Tamalpais that adjoins the community ofMill Valley. The objective of this burn was to burn off most ofthe chaparral on the south face of the mountain and theadjacent Marin County Open Space District (MCOSD) ownedNorthridge property. Soon after this prescribed burn wasinitiated, the weather quickly and drastically changed withthe result that only small patches of chaparral rather than thetargeted several hundred acres were burned.

These small burned patches on the mountain were perceivedby a number of individuals as “scars” on the face of a beloved



2Environmental Analyst and Partner, Leonard Charles and Associates,Environmental Analysis and Planning, 7 Roble Court, San Anselmo, CA94960.


mountain, scars that had no effect on reducing fire hazard.Concurrent publication of analyses of the botanical effects ofthe earlier Study Area burns conducted by an independentreviewer described how those burns had produced severaladverse effects on chaparral vegetation (Parker 1986, Parkerand Kelly 1984). Given the identified adverse effects onvegetation and the visual scarring created by prescribed burns,a number of individuals mobilized opposition to a new (1986)MCFD proposal to conduct prescribed burns on the south faceof the Mount Tamalpais. The Districts received letters ofopposition from more than 50 individuals includingrepresentatives of most of the major environmental organizationsactive in the area. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, amongothers, stated that an Environmental Impact Report must beprepared before any consideration of future burning.

MMWD then contacted our firm, Leonard Charles andAssociates (LCA), about what work would be required tosupplement the State’s Program Environmental Impact Report(EIR) on chaparral burning in order to meet the CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act (CEQA) requirements.3 Aftermeeting with our staff, MMWD determined that the State’sProgram EIR was insufficient to meet the stated requests foradditional analyses and information. MMWD and MCOSDengaged LCA and Wildland Resource Management to conducta series of Scoping Meetings with the public to determinewhat studies were required. Three meetings were held withrepresentatives of environmental organizations andhomeowners associations, local fire protection agencies andother pertinent public agencies, and the general public.

The consensus of these meetings was that beforedeveloping a plan for managing Study Area vegetation, theresources on the Study Area needed to be identified as wellas the fire hazard probability, and the future state of theenvironment under existing management (existing manage-ment was primarily “letting nature take its course” and activefire suppression of all ignitions). LCA and Wildland ResourceManagement were engaged to prepare the Baseline Studies(Leonard Charles and Associates and Wildland ResourceManagement 1991). This report included a complete surveyand description of vegetation on the Study Area, an analysisof fuels, computer gaming of wildfire behavior, mapping offire hazards, analysis of future vegetation succession givencurrent management, and installation of a GeographicInformation System (GIS). The conclusions of these BaselineStudies were that there was an extreme fire hazard on mostof the Study Area and in the surrounding residential areas. Inaddition, a number of threats to existing plant communitiesand species given existing management were identified.

The Districts determined that a Vegetation ManagementPlan (hereafter called the Plan) was required to addressthese concerns. After a competitive bidding process, LCAwas engaged to prepare this Plan and the EIR for that Plan.

The Baseline Studies took nearly 2 years to complete. ADraft Vegetation Management Plan was completed in 1.5years and accepted by the Districts in autumn 1993. TheDraft EIR was scheduled to be published in early March1994. By the time EIR review is completed and the Districtscertify the EIR and act on the Plan, it will have been about 4years since the planning process began.

Plan ContentsThe Draft Plan is a site-specific description of vegetation

manipulation to construct a series of fuel reduction zones onabout 1,100 acres. A description and mapping of theprescriptions for more than 300 sites (i.e., polygons) areincluded with a description of the implementation of eachtechnique, and monitoring requirements. The techniquesrecommended include manual and mechanical cutting ofchaparral and woodland understory, thinning of overstockedconiferous stands, and prescribed burning of woodlandunderstory, grasslands, and chaparral.

The Plan also includes programs for controlling andeliminating invasive, non-native plant populations, restoringthreatened meadows/grasslands and oak woodlands, protectingand restoring rare plant populations, and upgrading road andwater delivery systems. A complete monitoring format isincluded as well as staffing recommendations. CoordinatedResource Management Plans and Memoranda of Under-standing programs are identified for critical areas of theStudy Area perimeter that are owned by other agencies orindividuals. The costs for treating each polygon are estimated,and a complete fiscal analysis and funding plan are included.Finally, the Plan includes detailed recommendations for workrequired in the urban interface outside the Study Area. TheDraft Plan, including Technical Appendices and the BaselineStudies, includes over 2,000 pages of text. Prescriptions aremapped on large format maps. Baseline data and prescriptionsare stored in the GIS.

Plan PreparationAll the time, effort, and costs of preparing these studies

and plans may not have been necessary if the vegetationmanagement were proposed in an isolated, rural area of thestate or in areas that had recently and/or repeatedly witnessedthe residential destruction implicit in urban interface wildfires.However, Marin County is an urbanized area, and a majorwildfire has not occurred in the southern half of MarinCounty since 1945. Thus, a number of individuals andorganizations had serious doubts about any plans to makethe area “safer” by burning the vegetation on a treasuredmountain and watershed.

Some may believe that MMWD and MCOSD shouldhave opted to quickly proceed with preparation of a plan toalter vegetation and invited public participation only to thedegree required by pertinent environmental and planninglaws. From this perspective, planning should be the job only


3 Since this paper was originally presented, MMWD has certified the FinalEIR for the Plan and has adopted that Plan. The Plan was adopted in October1994. MMWD is currently implementing the Plan.


of those who ensure public safety and manage Study Arearesources, such as fire protection and ecological experts.This perspective ignores the influence of the environmentalorganizations. It ignores that the environmental organizationsand other interested parties have already complained aboutpast management activities. It ignores the request for a fullEIR made by the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and others.It ignores the independent analyses of Study Area burns thatindicate adverse effects on vegetation. It ignores numerousarticles in the scientific literature that warn against too frequentburning of chaparral and burning “out of season” (J.E. Keeley1989, S.C. Keeley 1989, Parker 1987). It ignores the fact thatMMWD and MCOSD are agencies with elected boards whomust maintain a thorough dialogue with the public they serve.And it ignores that an educated public input can provide dataand perspectives not available to staff and consultants andpotentially improve staff/consultant-prepared plans.

Letters to the Districts opposing any additional burningon the mountain were not submitted only by local citizens.Such renowned scientists and authors as G. Ledyard Stebbins(1986), Peter Raven (Director of the Missouri BotanicalGarden) (1986), H. Thomas Harvey (principal of Harveyand Stanley Associates, Inc.) (1987), and many otherprofessors and scientists submitted letters opposing futureprescribed burning or, at least, requesting that an EIR beprepared prior to consideration of such burning. The CaliforniaDepartment of Fish and Game (1986) recommended noburning on the south and east faces of Mount Tamalpais andthe Northridge property.

The Districts were cognizant of the problems that mightresult if the community was not fully involved in the planningprocess. They wisely insisted that the Plan be prepared by agroup that included all necessary areas of expertise includingpublic participation experts. The 21-member team preparingthe Plan included botanists, fire ecologists, foresters, wildlifebiologists, archaeologists, geologists, hydrologists,cartographers, land use planners, and public participationconsultants. The EIR was being prepared at the same time asthe Plan which allowed pertinent experts to review preliminaryPlan recommendations to ensure that prescriptions would notharm sensitive or valuable resources nor result in unacceptableimpacts; this ensured that the eventual EIR would not exposeunforeseen critical impacts or flaws in the Plan.

Public Participation ComponentWhile conducting the earlier scoping meetings and

preparing the Baseline Studies, the opposition to any use ofprescribed burning and, in many cases, to any manipulationof existing vegetation was evident. From the plan’s inception,because of past disagreements, the agencies and anyconsultants they might hire were considered distrusted. Thestated belief was that staff and consultants were simplydeveloping a plan “to have something to do,” “to manage forthe sake of management,” and to justify their jobs. Somebelieved that the Districts planned to proceed with prescribed

burning no matter what any studies showed, that their mindswere made up, and that the Districts were unwilling to listento opposing viewpoints. Many of these same individualsbelieved that the Study Area did not need management,nature would be better off left alone, and any fire hazardshould be addressed by residents making their homes firesafe, rather than treating wildland vegetation.

Given this opposition and the stated distrust of managementand consultants, the Districts insisted that the consultant teaminclude experts in public participation. A full publicparticipation program was conducted. This included:

• Five community meetings/presentations—Theconsultants made presentations of goals, objectives,and preliminary recommendations. Verbal and writteninput was obtained from thepublic. The meetingswere organized, hosted, and supervised by the publicparticipation consultants.

• An in-depth telephone survey of 400 MMWDratepayers—The public’s opinions were obtainedabout proposed goals, objectives, techniques, andfinancing.

• Presentations were made to the MMWD Board andMCOSD Parks and Open Space Commission, andinput was received.

• Newsletters.• Press releases.• Complete reports prepared as technical appendices

for all public participation efforts.Informal meetings between MMWD staff and the

consultants with various environmental and community groupswere also important efforts. Robert Badaracco, the MMWDLand Manager, hosted a number of field trips with interestedorganizations and individuals. He leased small buses andvans and toured the top of Mount Tamalpais to showindividuals some of the hazards that were being addressed inthe Plan. Consultants generally accompanied him, and togetherthey answered questions and responded to concerns.

MMWD under Mr. Badaracco’s initiative and manage-ment hosted a 2-day symposium, “Vegetation Managementin Natural Areas,” on April 3-4, 1992. Symposium speakersaddressed a range of issues regarding fire hazard reductionin the urban interface. One of the aims of the symposiumwas to expose the local community to the points of view ofexperts throughout California.

The consulting team and MMWD staff voluntarily madecontacts with most of the major environmental organizations.They attended informal potlucks, field trips, committeemeetings, and ad hoc meetings where they made presentations,answered questions, and received input and criticisms. Theymade repeated efforts to inform those who expressed themost concern about the Plan about their timetable, approach,and intentions.

LCA maintains that this type of public participation wasessential to deal with controversial issues involving vegetationmanipulation in such a sensitive area. The actual participationformat and the mindset of the consultants or staff were



to admit one is wrong. Equally, one must be able to clearlyargue one’s position in the case if the opposing view isclearly incorrect.

Although it is incumbent to act in a professional mannerwhen working with the public, an equally important attributeis to care—to care about the environment that has beenmanipulated and to care about other people’s feelings andopinions. The care that consultants and staff brought to themeetings and dialogues with the public was critical in theplanning process. Although all individuals still did and donot agree with the Draft Plan recommendations nor the datathat were used to develop the recommendations, most peoplerecognized that every effort had been made to be sensitive toenvironmental attributes but to also address the objectives ofreducing the area fire hazard. They could see that staff andconsultants cared about the same environment that theycared for and that while we might still be misguided, in theiropinion, we were doing our best. This did not stop peoplefrom continuing to oppose certain aspects or to call foradditional research when preparing the EIR. But for themost part the recriminations and untrusting atmosphere wereeliminated from the final hearings of the Draft Plan.

This care and openness is best expressed in the small,informal meetings and conversations. By meeting in people’shomes or when on walks on the Study Area, issues may bediscussed in a way that rarely occurs in formal meetings orpresentations. Opportunities are available for people to seethat staff or consultants are real people who are informedand care about the environment and the issues. This personalcontact cannot occur in large, formal meetings. Too often,individuals, especially representatives of organizations, havea perceived agenda at these larger meetings, and the abilityto actually converse is lost. The time and organizationalconstraints of these larger meetings also restrict the possibilityof open dialogue. Staff and consultants should strive tomake themselves available for such informal meetings,conversations, and field trips. The trust developed in thesedialogues can then influence the more formal dialogue atlarger public meetings and public hearings.

The Draft Plan is based on continual monitoring ofactions so that prescriptions and programs can be amended ifunforeseen adverse effects are realized. This built-in abilityto alter the Plan combined with a trust of staff and consultants’honesty helped assuage fears that the Districts were “running”over the public with a Plan that, once adopted, would eliminatethe potential for future review and adjustment.

At the final public hearing where the MMWD Boardheard testimony on the Draft Plan prior to approving it sothat the EIR could be completed and distributed, rep-resentatives of most environmental organizations actuallypraised the Draft Plan for its sensitivity. Their remainingprimary concern was how they were going to have somefuture voice in plan implementation (they sought some formof Citizens Advisory Committee), which is a political andnot a planning issue. Although environmental organizationsand other individuals remain concerned about the Plan, the

equally important. Many members of the community hadbecome inured to typical “participation” meetings andapproaches resulting in the common opinion that suchmeetings were simply an exercise, a sham, that allowed thelead agency to claim that it had actively sought public input.Individuals responsible for Plan preparation must be awarethat he or she does not know everything and that there isvalue in divergent opinions. This is easy to say and it seemsself-evident. However, when one has been working on aproject for a long period of time, one begins to feel that one“knows” what needs to be done, what the effects of therecommendations are, what the benefits and costs are, etc.Changing course is difficult to consider once one has investedconsiderable time and energy developing a set ofrecommendations. To listen to points of view that are oftendiametrically opposite is difficult. To be directly or indirectlyaccused of bias and callousness towards plants, animals,views, etc. is difficult. And, to envision that one mightactually be wrong is also difficult.

These critiques of one’s work and one’s self worth arenot simply impassioned outcries. Many of the critics of theplanning efforts for the Mount Tamalpais area are veryfamiliar with the literature on the effects of prescribed burningin chaparral. They have reviewed prescribed burns done inother areas. They know where sensitive wildlife speciesoccur in or near treatment areas. They are educated in theliterature of ecological succession, restoration, etc. They arefamiliar with such alternative techniques as the use of foamand residential defensible space strategies. They are able tofind the articles in the scientific literature that question oroffer an opposite point of view to that held by most membersof the scientific community. For example, a customizedversion of BEHAVE gaming was used to predict wildfirebehavior on the Study Area; the exercise was used to gaugethe efficacy of the recommended fuel reduction zones.Opponents to prescribed burning criticized the use ofBEHAVE gaming as it was not developed for wildfire behaviorin chaparral and were able to cite articles that likewise citedthe limitations of BEHAVE.

The selective use of scientific articles to prove one’spoint or corroborate one’s position is not a new phenomenon.Yet it remains a very effective means of blockingcommunication. Opponents using data from selected articlesor selected sections of articles make a case that arecommendation or finding in the Plan is not accurate. Theymake these selections available to other individuals, manyof whom are already prone to disbelieve the consultants. Theconsultants and staff are then accused of bias, of using onlydata that will support their position, and “if they are biasedhere, then how can we believe anything in this report.” Thus,if BEHAVE gaming in chaparral is inappropriate, as someclaim, then the entire exercise is simply a means of frighteningpeople by using inadequate data. One of the main aims ofpublic participation is to be able to discuss, even argue,about these conflicting claims. And the consultant or staffmust engage in these conversations willing to learn, willing



These people can be quite vicious in their attacks not only onthe data in question but personally. The staff member orconsultant has no need to simply absorb such unwarrantedbehavior. However, such individuals must be handled in aprofessional manner that addresses the attack without allowingthe discussion or the staff member or consultant to becomesimply reactive. When one becomes reactive, the entirepublic might be considered as hostile and the possibility ofconstructive dialogue might be seen as hopeless. It is tooeasy to react and judge a group by one or two obviouslyhostile members.

Care provides a long-term view of the situation. Onecan be angry, defensive, argumentative at times. However, ifcare is present, then one can focus on the fact that most ofthe public involved care themselves and are seeking the bestfor their environment, and that a solution that is effectiveand generally acceptable is possible.

Most importantly, care means to keep an open mind. Acharacteristic of many experts is that they become blindedby the very expertise that is their strength. Expertise shouldnot be a shield to deflect opposing data or theories. To careis to recognize that all of us, despite opposing viewpoints,tend to become defensive about our area of expertise,especially if considerable time and energy has been expendedto develop a plan or recommendation. To care is to continuallybe aware of this defensiveness and to try to remain open to adiffering perspective even when that perspective includes apersonal attack or criticism. It means to be willing to work alittle harder.

Although one cannot necessarily order up care in oneselfor one’s co-workers or subordinates, this attribute should berecognized when selecting staff members and/or consultantsto work on a controversial project. Expertise in one’s field,the ability to effectively write and speak, and other attributesare certainly critical. The propensity to care is an equallyvaluable characteristic.

The Benefits of Public ParticipationIncluding full public participation in the planning process

is not meant simply as a method to deflect criticism of thatprocess. Many real benefits result from involving the public,especially an educated public like the one involved with thisvegetation management plan.

This plan addresses a controversial situation. The planningprocess took about 4 years, and this seems a long time.During the 4 years no work could occur, and one hoped thata wildfire did not ignite. But 4 years is not long for “project”approval in California. Many large development projectstake at least this long from the initial planning stage throughthe environmental and project approval stages. If the Districtshad decided not to conduct the Baseline Studies and simplydeveloped a plan and an EIR on that plan, the EIR mighthave been substantially challenged, including a potentiallegal challenge. Those familiar with the CEQA process inCalifornia know how difficult it is to prepare a legally adequate

general praise for the consultants, staff, and the Draft Plan isan indication that, so far, our approach to working with thepublic is an effective planning tool.

Currently, the Draft EIR is being completed for theDraft Plan. The public and reviewing agencies will reviewthe Draft EIR and submit comments asking for clarificationor additional information. After responding to all comments,the Final EIR will be submitted to the Districts. Once theMMWD Board (as Lead Agency) determines that the EIR iscomplete, it will certify that document. At that point, theBoard can take action to adopt the Plan, which will probablyoccur in May or June 1994.

The Concept of CarePreparation of a Vegetation or Fire Management Plan

requires the full use of the expertise of various professionals.This paper has not focused on this expertise, nor the variousapproaches and techniques available for reducing fire hazardin the urban interface. Such approaches are the subjects formany of the other papers delivered at this symposium. Instead,this paper has focused on the often critical area of involvingthe public in preparing such a plan, because in addition tothe basic professional knowledge, objectivity, and honestythat each participant in the planning effort must maintain,the attribute of care is helpful in resolving controversialplanning matters. The American Heritage Dictionary definesthe verb “to care” as: “to be concerned or interested; provideneeded assistance or watchful supervision; have a liking orattachment; and have a wish, or be inclined.”

These definitions describe the attitude that a staff memberor consultant can bring to controversial planning issues.Consultants must be concerned and interested in the planningissues and the target environment. They should also provideneeded assistance and watchful supervision to ensure thatthe Plan is workable and that the effects are predictable. Oneshould “like” the project, the affected environment, and thepeople involved.

One cannot fake care. One must possess it; at the veryleast, one must have the wish or inclination to see that thejob is done well.

This focus on care is not intended as some “New Age”suggestion of a technique for improving job performance.Obviously, if one does not care about a particular planningeffort, then one will proceed on whatever grounds one hasfound useful or successful in the past. Rather, it is anobservation that in this particular planning effort, as well asour firm’s work on several other very contentious projects,the attitude of care can make the difference in successfuladoption of a plan as well as the creation of an easedatmosphere for future decision-making.

Neither is this attention to care intended as an invitationto be nice to everyone. Some individuals purposely misusedata and public forums to promote their own narrow view.These individuals may have no desire to listen to opposingviewpoints, to compromise, or to reach a workable decision.



EIR that can withstand a vigorous legal challenge even fordiscrete development projects. The difficulty of assessingimpacts on vegetation, wildlife, views, air quality, erosion,etc. for a plan that addresses a wide range of actions invarious habitats over hundreds or thousands of acres isimmense. If a community is unhappy with the planningprocess and the plan, they may find many “incomplete”analyses, omissions, and errors. They are likely to mount alegal challenge to such an EIR. This challenge adds months,even years, to the planning process, especially if the challengeis upheld by the courts, and the EIR must be amended andrecirculated. Cases like these show that the full publicparticipation approach outlined above is especially warranted.

Some of the other major advantages of public participationin this Plan included:

•The Plan preparers were exposed to many scientificarticles and perspectives that they might nototherwise have known existed. Members of thepublic provided the consultants with fullbibliographies of articles on the adverse effects ofburning and re-burning chaparral, especially underwet season conditions. The California Native PlantSociety and others provided data on the botanicalsignificance of the chaparral community existingon the Study Area. The consulting team reviewedthese data and determined that the botanical effects(as well as visual, hydrologic, and fiscal effects)of mass burning and re-burning of large areas ofchaparral or other vegetation would havesignificant environmental impacts. As such, thePlan developed a series of discrete fuel reductionzones on critical ridge lines and other areas wherefire access roads currently exist. Input from thepublic was an essential part of the data base usedto develop the Plan. The local community oftenhas many good ideas and particular knowledgeabout their environment.

•Environmental organizations and other individualswere willing to become participants in Planimplementation. For example, the California NativePlant Society (CNPS) has offered to assist theDistricts in locating sensitive plant populationson treatment sites and to assist in expanding theinventory and mapping for sensitive species. ThePlan includes a section on the extensive volunteerefforts in removing non-native plant populationsand other necessary tasks. Volunteer labor is morelikely from an involved community.

•Thorough public involvement ensured that theplanners had fully investigated their recomm-endations and options to those recommendations.This participation ensured a thorough and objectiveanalysis.

•As previously discussed, full participation builtan atmosphere of trust between the public and the

lead agency. This was beneficial in getting a planadopted without legal challenges. It may result inan atmosphere wherein future planning anddecision making is based on dialogue rather thanconflict.

ConclusionsPreparing vegetation and fire management plans may

involve changing vegetation in ways that are unpopular orunacceptable to certain members of the local community. Inthose cases where controversy occurs, the planning effortmust include an open dialogue with the affected community.The formats for such dialogues are well known to mostpublic agencies. Particularly controversial projects may requirethe inclusion of public participation experts. In either case, itis critical that staff and consultants who are in contact withthe public remain objective and open in discussions with thepublic and that they seek every opportunity of meeting withmembers of the community. An open dialogue assists theplanning process, often improves the chance for adoption ofa workable plan, and can foster increasing trust betweenagencies and the public.

ReferencesCalifornia Department of Fish and Game; [letter to Marin Municipal

Water District]. 1986 August 8. 1 leaf on file with MMWD.Harvey, H. Thomas. [letter to Marin Municipal Water District]. l987

March 16. 1 leaf on file with MMWD.Keeley, Jon E. 1989. Resilience in fire does not imply adaptation to fire:

an example from the California chaparral. In: Sharon M. Hermannand others, ed. Proceedings of the 17th tall timbers ecology conference:high intensity fire in wildlands. May 18-21, 1989; Roslyn, WA: FireResearch Institute; 113-119.

Keeley, Sterling C. ed. 1989. The California chaparral—paradigmsrevisited. Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County; Number34, Science Series; 171 p.

Leonard Charles and Associates. 1993. Draft Mount Tamalpais areavegetation management plan. Report submitted to Marin MunicipalWater District and Marin County Open Space District. 1,326 p.

Leonard Charles and Associates; Wildland Resource Management.1991.Vegetation and fire management baseline studies. Report submittedto Marin Municipal Water District and Marin County Open SpaceDistrict; 625 p.

Parker, V. Thomas. 1986. Evaluation of the effect of off-season prescribedburning on chaparral in the Marin Municipal Water Districtwatershed. Report submitted to Marin Municipal Water District.

Parker, V. Thomas. 1987. Effects of wet-season management burns onchaparral vegetation: implications for rare species. In: Elias, T.S.,ed. Conservation and management of rare and endangered plants.Sacramento: California Native Plant Society; 233-237.

Parker, V. Thomas; Kelley, Victoria R. 1984. The effects of wet seasonfires on chaparral vegetation in Marin County, California.Unpublished report on file with Marin Municipal Water District.

Raven, Peter; [letter to Marin Municipal Water District]. 1986 August 8.1 leaf on file with MMWD.

Stebbens, G. Ledyard; [letter to Marin Municipal Water District]. 1986July 7. 1 leaf on file with MMWD.



PLENARY SESSION—Solutions




2Forester, Sequoia National Forest, USDA Forest Service, 900 WestGrand Ave., Porterville, CA 92357-2035.

Developing this balance is crucial to ecosystemmanagement and will be the challenge of managing publiclands in the future. As issues change, managers of publiclands will be presented with the challenge of resolvingconflicts between maintaining healthy ecosystems, people,and their economics.

Legislative HistoryAlthough the Clean Air Act of 1963 established air

quality standards, it did not require State compliance.Amendments in 1967 required States to establish air qualitystandards but did not provide Federal minimums. In 1970,amendments to the Clean Air Act promulgated Federalstandards for some pollutants as well as criteria for motorvehicles and fuels. In addition, one of the more criticalcomponents of the 1970 amendments was changing Federalresponsibility for the Clean Air Act from the Department ofHealth, Education, and Welfare to the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) (Baggett 1993). In 1970 Congressrequired the EPA to establish deadlines for compliance that,in the following 20 years, became a lesson in understandingthe difficulty in achieving the standards. The 1977 amendmentsrecognized the futility of a 1975 deadline and allowed Statesuntil 1987 to comply. The 1977 amendments focused onstationary industrial sources and introduced the Preventionof Significant Deterioration (PSD), providing the firstopportunity to protect and maintain air quality in areas thatwere cleaner than the national standards. The amendmentsprovided for Federal Implementation Plans (FIPS) if StateImplementation Plans (SIPS) did not achieve compliance.

1990 Clean Air Act and Prescribed FireBecause the 1987 national air quality goals were not

attained, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Actin 1990. The 1990 amendments address four broad categoriesthat may affect the use of prescribed fire in California:

• Federal non-attainment area requirements forPM10 (particulate matter ≤10 microns diameter,1 micron = 10-6 m)

• Conformity• Air Toxics• Visibility

Federal Non-Attainment Area Requirements for PM10

The 1990 amendments require dates for compliance ofPM10 and other Federal non-attainment pollutants based on

Abstract: The Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 offers a challenge tothe future of prescribed and natural fire programs in the UnitedStates. One aspect of maintaining healthy ecosystems for humansand natural resources is clean air. In addition, prescribed andnatural fire programs are an important tool in maintaining healthyecosystems, as well as satisfying the requirements of Federal andState legislation concerning home and structure protection, pro-tecting endangered species, maintaining natural wilderness pro-cesses, providing for multiple use, and providing healthy forestsand resources for future generations. As legislation to protect theenvironment grows deeper and more complex, land managementagencies find themselves in the position of sorting out conflictsand attempting to manage within legal and publicly acceptableparameters. Presenting a solution to this issue of conflicting legis-lative mandates will require: the ability of land management andair regulatory agencies to move beyond their normal roles andreach the best position for responsible ecosystem management,including human health concerns; land management agency coop-eration in developing a uniform position and resolution; the devel-opment of a technically strong and credible resolution that showssensitivity to the public health issue; strong upper managementcommunication to State and EPA management; and timely regula-tory development.

The Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 has been verychallenging to the future of prescribed fire programs in

California. Rules for prescribed fire need to be developed tomeet the requirements of the Clean Air Act of 1990. Thepractice of allowing fire to play its natural role in wildlandecosystems was endorsed in a 1990 General AccountingOffice (GAO) report (GAO/RCED-91-42). The report statesthat attempts to exclude fire from these lands could lead tomajor unnatural changes in vegetation and wildlife andcontribute to uncontrollable wildfires as the result of anaccumulation of fuels. Fortunately, building compatibilitybetween the Clean Air Act and prescribed fire is not aprocess that needs to begin, but one that needs to continueand be strengthened.

Understanding the legislative history of the Clean AirAct and its apparent conflicts with legislation that guidesmanagement of public land is helpful in proposing solutionsthat create a balance between air quality, ecosystem health,and human health.

Working to Make the Clean Air Act and PrescribedBurning Compatible 1

Trent Procter 2

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions


Visibility

An important visibility-related element in the 1990amendments is the formation of the Grand Canyon VisibilityTransport Commission. This development reflected aCongressional desire to protect some of the nation’s mostpristine visibility. Recent research indicates that in additionto impact from nearby industrial sources, polluted air massesfrom California and neighboring western states also impactvisibility (Malm and others 1990, Sisler and others 1989).Under certain meteorological conditions these air massesmay travel hundreds of miles from large urban areas west ofthe Colorado Plateau. The Commission is charged withdeveloping management options for all pollutants and sourcesthat contribute to visibility impairment, including forestmanagement activities. The Commission is expected to havedraft recommendations prepared by June 1995 and a finalreport to EPA by November 1995. EPA must act on the finalrecommendations by May 1997, and California will berequired to implement the EPA requirements by May 1998.

Working Toward SolutionsSolutions should be balanced. Prescribed fire users need

to recognize air as a resource important to ecosystem function,visibility, and human health. Regulators need to understandthat air is but one element of ecosystems that requiremanagement to provide for the welfare of the 30 millioncitizens of California.

Solutions to preserve the use of prescribed fire andreduce the PM10 contribution as a result of prescribed fireinclude:

• Prescribed fire user coordination.• Technically strong resolution.• Communication.• Timely interaction.• Upper management awareness.• Public awareness.

Prescribed Fire User Coordination

Prescribed fire users should coordinate uniformity inproposals to reduce emissions, responses to draft regulations,and communication of the use and benefits of prescribed firein California. Regulators will be much more receptive toincorporating a well coordinated multiple agency positioninto planning documents and rules. Well-coordinated inputdevelops credibility and political strength as opposed toputting regulators in a position that requires technicaljudgments they may not be qualified to make.

A working group is recommended at the State/regionallevel to develop a framework for regulatory positions thatensures continuity of regulations and programs on broadecosystem scales. The risk is that prescribed fire managementoptions might vary dramatically between California’snumerous air pollution control districts. Although statewide

severity. Areas that are non-attainment for the Federal PM10standard and able to demonstrate compliance by August1994 were classified as moderate, and those areas unable todemonstrate compliance by August 1994 were classified asserious:

Moderate Areas Serious AreasImperial Valley Coachella ValleyMammoth Lakes Owens ValleyMono Basin San Joaquin ValleySacramento County South CoastSearles ValleySan Bernardino County

Air Pollution Control Districts classified as serious mustdevelop revisions to the SIPS by August 1994 and demonstratecompliance by January 2001. Regulations to achievecompliance must be in place by August 1997.

The 1990 amendments require air pollution controldistricts not meeting Federal PM10 standards to addressfugitive dust, residential wood burning, and prescribed fire.These elements of PM10 must be incorporated into StateImplementation Plans revisions and subsequent regulations.Air pollution control districts are required to develop rulesthat incorporate Reasonable Available Control Measures(RACM) for moderate areas and more stringent Best AvailableControl Measures (BACM) for serious areas. These measuresmust be developed for fugitive dust, residential wood burning,and prescribed fire following EPA recommendations. TheNational Wildfire Coordinating Group participated in theEPA RACM/BACM guidelines.

Conformity

The conformity portion of the 1990 amendments, aswell as EPA regulations that became effective in January1994, require Federal agencies in Federal non-attainmentareas to demonstrate that agency activities conform to SIPs.California’s plan is a compilation of the States’ air pollutioncontrol district plans.

In Federal non-attainment areas users of prescribed firemust quantify emissions to determine conformity. Projectsmay be analyzed in a collective programmatic plan if emissionsare predictable or as a part of individual project plans. DeMinimus levels, below which conformity determinations arenot required, are set at 70 tons annually for serious areas and100 tons annually for moderate areas.

Air Toxics

Perhaps the most uncertain potential effect of the 1990amendments on prescribed fire may be the portions of thelegislation that deal with toxics. The amendments requirethe EPA to develop standards for about 200 toxics. Some ofthese toxics, such as benzene and aldehydes, can be found inwildland smoke. Little progress has been made on toxicregulation development, but this is one element in the nearfuture with potential to impact prescribed fire users.



• Produce reliable emission factors for allvegetation types.

• Quantify emission reduction techniques.• Model for 24-hour concentration and predict

transport in complex terrain.

Air quality analyses procedures as well as emissionreduction techniques need to be institutionalized in agencytraining programs in order to meet expectations of air qualityregulators. Additional research is necessary to resolveregulatory conflicts associated with emission production,combustion efficiency, and smoke management (Brown 1990).

Timely Interaction

In 1994, planning efforts and regulatory developmentassociated with PM10 are moving forward in California atan extremely fast rate. Programs should not be interrupted,however, while the issue of conflicting laws and mandates isdebated. Air pollution control districts are thus seeking earlyinvolvement to avoid conflicts with rule implementation.

Air districts will likely be conducting CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act (CEQA) analysis with planningeffort and/or rule development, providing an opportunity forevaluation of regulatory impacts on management of publicland and public safety. Prescribed fire users need to understandthe regulatory process. They need to evaluate the timing ofefforts and to whom they should be directed.

Upper Management Awareness

Many Federal, State and county agencies in Californiaare preparing to increase prescribed fire activities for a varietyof politically sensitive reasons including recent catastrophicwildfires, spotted owl habitat needs, and a backlog of firerequired to create more natural vegetation age classes. Therelationship to sensitive issues implies a need to keepmanagement briefed on the status and potential impacts ofimpending air quality regulations on prescribed fire programs.

Public Awareness

Most public agencies that utilize prescribed fire havedeveloped some level of public education designed to explainthe purposes of burning and notify people sensitive to smoke.In light of current regulatory action public awareness effortsshould be increased in order to provide the public withenough information to understand the balance between airquality and prescribed fire. Given the importance of prescribedfire programs, agencies should review and revise every publicawareness opportunity. In addition to taking advantage ofexisting public education programs, agencies should beprepared to be very visible and look for opportunities toprovide presentations at public meetings associated with airquality regulatory development.

coordination is important, the vast majority of effort is requiredwithin individual air basins and air pollution control districts.After all agencies and organizations that may use prescribedfire are carefully identified, working groups need to beestablished. Interagency coordination groups have beenestablished in the South Coast, San Joaquin, and NorthCoast air basins.

Communication

As prescribed fire user coordination groups develop, astrong communication link with respective air qualityregulators will need to be established. Air regulatory agenciesneed to account for the interrelationship of fire with allecosystem elements including air (Bagget 1993). This mightbe accomplished by establishing contacts or developingperiodic meetings with PM10 planning staff. Communicationshould be frequent and strong enough to create an awarenessand appreciation for the needs and objectives associatedwith improving air quality as well as prescribed fire. Dialoguemight lead to a memorandum of understanding that clearlydefines expectations in more detail than planning documentsand rules. In addition, this would provide the framework forcontinuity, despite changing staff. At the State level, therecently formed California Air and Smoke Council willprovide an opportunity for information exchange. Thoseparticipating have included the USDI Bureau of LandManagement, USDI National Park Service, USDA ForestService, California Division of Forestry, EnvironmentalProtection Agency, California Air Resources Board, CaliforniaAir Pollution Control Offices Association, and representativesfrom various air pollution control districts. This group willpropose recommendations to meet regulatory compliancewhile maintaining the option for use of prescribed fire.

Technically Strong Resolution

Prescribed fire users need to improve their ability toquantify and manage emissions (Brown 1990). Althoughresearch needs should be clearly outlined, prescribed fireusers should not hesitate to move forward with professionaljudgments and assumptions using the best informationavailable. For instance, prescribed fire users can:

• Estimate emission factors, if unknown, basedon similar fuel types.

• Estimate total emissions generated.• Apply techniques to reduce and disperse emissions.• Monitor concentrations of PM10 at sensitive

receptors.• Develop an emissions inventory.

The existing limitations must also be distinguished.Prescribed fire users cannot:

• Qualify natural or pre-European emissions inCalifornia.



ConclusionsRegulations associated with the requirements of the

Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 are developing rapidlyto satisfy deadlines developed by EPA. The rationale andprocess to ensure that the Clean Air Act is compatible withprescribed fire are available. Solutions and success are rootedin communication, the ability to compromise, and thedevelopment of a technically credible method for analyzingand reducing emissions.

ReferencesBaggett, Arthur G. 1993. Only Congress can prevent forest fires: a

comment on prescribed and natural fire programs and the CleanAir Act . San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review: 3(197): 221-246.

Brown, James K. 1990. The future of prescribed fire: concerns andknowledge needs. In: Proceedings of the 10th Conference on fire andforest meteorology; 89-96.

Sisler, J.F.; Malm, W.C.; Gebhart, K.A. 1989. Sources of ions producingacidic rain and visibility impairment at Grand Canyon, Arizona.In: Proceedings of the 81st annual meeting of the Air Pollution ControlAssociation.

Malm, W.C.; Gebhart, K.A.; Henry, R.C. 1990. An investigation of thedominant source regions of fine sulfur in the western United Statesand their areas of influence. Atmospheric Environment 24A: 3047-3060.



Comprehensive Fire Prevention Legislation Enacted by theCalifornia Legislature in 1992 after the East Bay Firestorm 1

Rachel Richman 2

other safety requirements. Fire safety personnel and localgovernment officials all participated in developing thesemeasures and presenting them to the California Legislature.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solution in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Legislative aide, Office of Assemblyman Tom Bates, 3923 Grand Ave.,Oakland, CA 94610.

Legislation was enacted by the California Legislature in1992 after the East Bay firestorm on the Oakland/Berkeley

border; it included roofing standards, brush clearance, and





2Research Forester, Southern Research Station,USDA Forest Service,Route 1, Box 182-A, Dry Branch, GA 31020; and Forestry Program Admin-istrator, Fire Control Bureau, Florida Division of Forestry, 3125 ConnerBlvd., Tallahassee, FL 32501.

Florida’s Solution to Liability Issues 1

Dale Wade James Brenner 2

but to serve as an essential prerequisite to the very survivalof these ecosystems.Virtually all Federal and State naturalresource management agencies and some county agenciesuse prescription fire, primarily for hazard reduction, wildlifehabitat improvement, and ecosystem perpetuation. Fire isused in the private sector by ranchers, forest productcompanies, game preserves, farmers, the sugarcane industry,and numerous other land owners to accomplish a wide varietyof objectives. The 120,000 prescribed burn authorizationsgranted in 1994 resulted in the intentional treatment of 8percent (2.3 million acres) of the 29 million acres under fireprotection. Subtracting the acres burned for sugarcaneproduction, land clearing, and agricultural stubble removalleaves, about 1,500,000 acres were treated by prescriptionfire during the unusually wet 1994 year—a figure well belowthe 10-year average.

ChallengesSuperimposed on this fire-maintained landscape is one

of the fastest growing populations in the United States. Thepopulation of Florida increased from 9.7 million in 1980 to12.9 million in 1990, and is projected to reach 15.6 millionby the year 2000. More than 900 immigrants arrive daily,and a large proportion are retirees from northern populationcenters where ancestral links with wildland fire have beensevered. Of the 141,000 housing starts in 1993, 104,000were single-family dwellings. Many new residents want tolive along the ever-expanding urban/wildland interface wherethey will be directly impacted by fire management activities.Concomitant increases in the road network and traffic volumefurther exacerbate the situation. More effort is required tosafeguard the public and protect homes from both wild andprescribed fires.

The public has trouble differentiating between these twotypes of fires. New arrivals are generally not aware of thebenefits derived from the judicious use of fire, nor of its biologicalnecessity. They regard a blackened landscape as obviously adamaged one. They have little tolerance for the temporaryinconveniences often associated with prescribed fire such asslowed traffic, smokey skies, and fly ash in their swimmingpools. Uninformed individuals intentionally setting fires are anenigma to them. Many, who question “wasting” their tax dollarson a practice that seems archaic at best, are retirees who havethe time and inclination to become politically active.

Because of the inherent flammability of many of Florida’svegetative types, and the increased potential for catastrophicfire as fuel loads increase in the absence of periodic low-

Abstract: Prescribed fire is used to treat roughly 5 percent (1,500,000acres) of Florida’s wildland each year. Superimposed on this fire-maintained landscape is one of the fastest growing populations inthe United States. Much of this population increase is a result ofimmigration from northern states where ancestral ties with fire havebeen broken. Many immigrants want to settle along the urban/wildland interface, exacerbating an already detrimental situation.These new arrivals generally view fire as a destructive force ratherthan as a biological necessity. They have little tolerance for thetemporary inconveniences associated with intentional use of fireand view the practice as archaic. Furthermore, many are retireeswho have the time and inclination to become politically active.Recognizing that the public will ultimately decide the future ofprescribed burning, agency and private resource managers havejoined in a cooperative effort to ensure that prescribed fire continuesas a viable resource management option. The three regional pre-scribed fire councils and the Florida Division of Forestry have takenthe lead in a multi-faceted approach to accomplish this objective,including: 1) improving the image and competence of prescribedburners through training and burn-boss certification; 2) educatingthe public through speaking engagements, newspaper and televisioncoverage of prescribed burns, feature stories, videos, and school-teacher guides; 3) enacting state legislation, agency rules, and countyordinances; and 4) opening communication with all parties, includ-ing prompt and even-handed response to complaints.

Florida is endowed with a mild climate and abundantsunshine and rainfall, conditions conducive to rank

vegetative growth. Florida is also the thunderstorm capitalof North America. These factors, coupled with the ubiquitoususe of fire by Native-Americans during the past severalthousand years, have produced a complex of vegetationcommunities, some sustained by chronic low-intensity fireand some by periodic stand-replacement fires. Fire exclusion,tried for several decades earlier this century, was found tobe a short-sighted alternative characterized by escalatingcosts, decreasing probability of success, and unwantedecosystem changes.

Wildfires must be suppressed for numerous reasons, soresource managers have been forced to learn how to harnessthis ambivalent natural force, not only to enhance our lifestyle,



intensity fires, the Division of Forestry (DOF) hasrecommended using fire to reduce hazardous fuel accu-mulations. But all too often, residents do not choose to allowthese recommendations to be followed, and soon thereafter,firefighters risk their lives in an attempt to save homes inthat subdivision.

Absentee landowners are an even more intractableproblem. Vast tracts of land were subdivided and soldworldwide, but relatively few owners ever homesteaded.Again and again, copious plant growth during wet years wasfollowed by the inevitable dry year resulting in disastrouswildfires that stretched available resources beyond capacity.The spread of fire-prone introduced species made the situationeven worse. The Florida legislature addressed the problemof hazardous fuel buildup on absentee ownerships by passingthe Hawkins Bill in 1977 (Wade and Long 1979). This law(Section 590.025 of the Florida statutes) gives the DOFauthority to use prescribed fire, at State expense, to reducehazardous accumulations of wildland fuels on private propertyprovided the landowner does not object (appendix A). Underthis law, more than 100,000 acres have been burned.Disastrous wildfires, however, still plague Florida becauseFlorida, like other states, cannot afford enough “on-call”forces to handle worst-case scenarios.

Fires that threaten or destroy large numbers of homes orcause multi-vehicle accidents make the headlines, alertingthe public to fire management issues. The occasional ill-timed prescribed fire with a bad outcome also receives fullmedia coverage. Individuals and organizations who disagreewith the concept of prescription fire use these incidents tostrengthen their arguments. But even without these events,people criticize the practice of prescribed burning; andalthough criticism may sometimes be justified, many citizensare uninformed or misinformed. An alarming increase insmoke-related litigation is also occurring. Many of thejudgments in these cases appear to give generouscompensation for unsupported arguments.

In 1987, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that: 1) settinga prescribed fire was an inherently dangerous act; 2) thelandowner is liable for damages to others for negligence insetting or maintaining that fire; 3) this liability cannot bedelegated to an independent contractor actually conductingthe prescribed burn; and 4) a landowner wishing to conducta prescribed burn must know what “accepted forestry andburn standards” are and be certain they are applied.

In an effort to respond to public concerns, the DOFdeveloped regulations that allowed termination of a prescribedburn if a complaint was lodged. But the DOF found thisregulation was increasingly abused by callers with a differentagenda. Furthermore, the tourist industry desired clear skies,while some environmental regulators advocated more stringentfire and smoke regulations.

Virtually all county, State, and Federal natural resourceagencies in Florida were espousing similar fire messagesand were practicing what they preached. Nonetheless, firemanagers throughout Florida were witnessing a deteriorating

situation. Conducting prescribed fires that met all regulatoryrestrictions, had no potential smoke impacts on the public,and still achieved the burn objectives in an efficient mannerbecame increasingly difficult. Private individuals who usedprescribed fire found it very difficult to obtain affordableinsurance. The demise of prescribed fire, and along with it,the management and perpetuation of many of Florida’secosystems, was a very real possibility.

SolutionsRecognizing that the public would ultimately decide the

future of prescribed burning, agency and private resourcemanagers joined together in an effort to ensure prescribedfire would continue to be a viable resource managementoption in Florida. Fire councils, similar to the one founded insouth Florida in 1974, were formed in central and northFlorida. These prescribed-fire councils are very pro-active,helping develop posters, publications, and other “handout”materials. They distribute these materials at schools andgarden and community service club meetings in which theydiscuss the advantages and disadvantages of prescribed fire.They hold workshops to enhance the expertise of prescribedburners, host “show-me” field trips, sponsor demonstrationsof emerging techniques and equipment, and co-sponsormeetings that address priority issues, such as the nationalconference on “Environmental Regulations and PrescribedFire” scheduled for March 14-17, 1995.

The prescribed-fire councils are directing much of theireducational effort toward the younger generation. They arehelping develop a teachers’ manual to introduce the conceptof prescribed fire to school children. The role of Smokey theBear, a fire prevention symbol, was expanded to include thebenefits of the judicious use of fire as well. Tall TimbersResearch Station produced two excellent videos on prescribedfire in the south, as well as a number of 20-second publicservice announcements for a Tallahassee television station.

Efforts to educate the public also include writing articlesfor local newspapers that provide a full discussion of potentialdeleterious side effects as well as the benefits of prescribedfire. Inviting the news media, especially local televisionstations, to prescribed burns has proven very successful. Tohelp ensure the safety of the television crew on the burn, aknowledgeable spokesperson is assigned to be with them atall times. Another tactic is to involve local fire departmentsin prescribed burns. This gives department personnel anappreciation for prescribed fire and provides them with somefirst-hand experience in wildland fire behavior.

When necessary, peer pressure is applied to encourageprescribed burners to become better trained and to present aprofessional image. A good professional image is fostered byusing personal protective items, maintaining equipment andtools, using “smoke ahead” signs to warn traffic, notifyingappropriate law enforcement agencies and adjacent landownersbefore ignition, and taking the time to explain prescribed fireto anyone who stops to ask about a burn in progress.



burner from liability for damage or injury caused by fire orresulting smoke unless negligence is proven.

To become a certified Prescribed Burn Manager in Florida,you have to serve in a leadership role on three prescribedfires, and either pass a comprehensive test designed forexperience burners, or successfully complete the 6-day FloridaInteragency Basic Prescribed Fire Course. Begun in 1989,this course is held several times a year at various locationsthroughout Florida. Each class is limited to about 30 studentsand must be sponsored by an organization. Sponsorshipinvolves securing cadre from a short list of “approved”instructors, providing classroom facilities and areas to burn,and arranging for food. Within a region, a sponsor who canprovide student housing is preferred because this facilitatesevening trainee-instructor interaction and helps keep costsdown. In return the sponsor is given 10 of the 30 studentslots; the remainder are allocated on a first-come first-servedbasis. Hillsborough Community College (HCC) handlesregistration, distribution of pre-class study materials, andother administrative tasks. The only formal advertising neededto date is a flier HCC mails out each year with class dates andlocations for the year and a registration form. The primereason many graduates list for attending the course andbecoming certified is the liability benefits associated with thecertification law. Certified burn managers are currentlyattempting to convince insurance companies to offer themprescribed fire liability coverage at an affordable cost.

Florida continues to set aside numerous relatively small(10- to 100-acre) tracts of land to protect and perpetuate,particularly areas containing diminishing plant communities—virtually all plant communities that can be maintained onlythrough periodic fire. As lands adjacent to these parks aresubdivided and sold for home sites, agency resource managersare eventually left with no place to vent the smoke fromprescribed fires. One solution involves passage of a county-wide local ordinance creating smoke corridors for the parkswithin its jurisdiction. Basically, such an ordinance establishesand delineates a smoke transport and dispersion trajectoryfor prescribed burns within a park. Developers are requiredto give potential lot buyers a copy of the ordinance, statingthat the lot is located in a smoke corridor and will occasionallybe impacted by smoke from prescribed fires (appendix C).Other solutions with similar results are being achieved throughdeed restrictions and conservation easements.

The FutureTo date, more than 3,000 prescribed burners have become

certified. This number is expected to increase rapidly whenthe prescribed-burn certification correspondence coursebecomes available. Over 900 burners, many from outsideFlorida, have graduated from the Interagency Basic PrescribedFire School. Thirty sessions, including seven scheduled in1994, have been conducted since its inception in 1989. TheFlorida Prescribed Burning Act has had a positive impact

The Division of Forestry has made several changes inits administrative rules and regulations. It developed a set ofBest Management Practices (BMP’S) for prescribed fireuse, tightened the criteria for issuing nighttime burningauthorizations (smoke from these fires was a major source ofcomplaints), and developed new training courses and safetyrequirements for its fire management personnel. One of thechanges occurred in 1987 when a voluntary statewide programto certify experienced prescribed burners was implemented.As an incentive, the DOF was more flexible when issuingnighttime burning authorizations to certified burn-managers.When the certification program was begun, a person had tohave served in a leadership role on at least three prescribedfires, attend an 8-hour review session, and pass a written testgiven at one of the 17 district DOF offices. The demand forcertification was great, and it soon became obvious that astandardized certification process was needed. To standardizethe certification process, a correspondence course has beendeveloped which is administered by Hillsborough CommunityCollege in Tampa. Now, appplicants who pass the finalexam must prepare a written fire prescription for approvalby the DOF, and then have the results of the burn reviewedby the DOF as the final step to becoming a Certified PrescribedBurn Manager.

The DOF also developed an “official agency statement”about prescription fire. A draft of this statement was sent toselected people and agencies for review. The Forestry Forum,a statewide group of natural resource leaders representingpublic, private, and academic sectors, received a copy. Eachyear this group selects one critical natural resource issue,then develops and implements a strategy to address it. In1987 it selected prescribed fire and asked the DOF to rewritethe statement in the form of a bill for submission to the statelegislature. When introduced in 1989, this bill was not givenmuch chance of enactment, but a dedicated lobbying effortresulted in its passage without serious opposition (appendixB). Legislators strongly supported the bill because they saidit was the first time representatives of industry, conservationorganizations, and state agencies had been in their offices atthe same time promoting the same legislation. Legislatorsconcluded that the bill must be vitally important to themanagement of Florida’s natural resources.

The law, called the Florida Prescribed Burning Act(Florida Statute 590.026), is intentionally general so the DOFcan use the administrative rule-making process rather thanthe legislative process to make changes (Brenner and Wade1992). It includes a preamble that describes the necessity ofprescribed fire and promotes its continued use for ecological,silvicultural, wildlife management, and range managementpurposes, and charges the DOF with promulgating rules forthe use of prescribed fire. It also states that prescribed burnsconducted under the auspices of this Act: 1) require a writtenprescription that must be on site during the burn; 2) beconducted only when at least one certified burner is on site;3) are a landowner right; 4) are in the public interest and shallnot constitute a public or private nuisance; and 5) protect the



on prescribed burning but has not been tested in court yet.Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi have passed similarlegislation, and a similar bill is currently before theAlabama legislature. Planning has begun to teach three ofthe new prescribed (Rx) fire effects courses approved bythe National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) inFlorida in 1994-95.

But we cannot rest on our laurels. Because fire is a two-edged sword that can be easily misapplied, fire managementactivities will continue to be closely monitored by regulatoryagencies and critics. We must demonstrate that we areconstantly striving to improve. Maintaining a good imageand educating the public are continual challenges. And wemust not falter in our effort to convince other lay andprofessional natural resource organizations to demonstratetheir commitment to the need for and use of prescribed fire.For example, the Southeastern Section of The Wildlife Societyrecently passed a resolution recognizing the importance ofprescribed burning in land management. As more organizationspublicly support prescribed fire as a viable requirement tosustain certain ecosystems, our defense will strengthen againstboth those who think all fire management activities not relatedto suppression are ill-conceived, and those who simply believewe should not interfere with natural forces.

To date, Florida’s multi-faceted approach to prescribedburning and smoke management issues has been a success.Whether this success is a result of rear-guard actions or aharbinger of an increased understanding of the need for anduse of prescribed fire remains to be seen. As our populationcontinues to swell, increased conflict between people andthe environment should be expected. Hard decisions willhave to be made. It is incumbent upon fire managers toinitiate dialogue on emerging fire issues, respond to questionsopenly and honestly, show a willingness to correct mistakes,consistently strive to improve fire management activities,and support and conduct research to increase the databaseshowing the necessity of fire to sustain healthy ecosystems.Then, whatever society ultimately decides, fire managerswill have done their part to ensure the decision is based onknowledge, and not an emotional reaction to temporarilyblackened landscapes or smokey skies.

ReferencesBrenner, Jim; Wade, Dale D. 1992. Florida’s 1990 Prescribed Burning

Act. Journal of Forestry 90(5):27-30.Wade, Dale D.; Long, Michael C. 1979. New legislation aids hazard

reduction burning in Florida . Journal of Forestry 77(11):725-726.

Appendix A–Hawkins Bill (Florida Statute 590.025).

590.025 Control burning of wild land; authorization; conditions.

(1) As used in this section, “wild land” means:(a) Uncultivated land other than fallow. Such land may be neglected altogether or

maintained for such purposes as wood or forage production, wildlife, recreation, or protective plant cover.

(b) Land virtually uninfluenced by human activity.(2) At the request of the governing body of a county, the Division of Forestry of the

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services is authorized and empowered, subject tothe provisions and qualifications contained in subsection (3), and provided the owner of theland does not object, to control burn any area of wild land within the county which isreasonably determined to be in danger of conflagration if any open and uncontrolled firewere to occur in the area.

(3) No area of wild land shall be control burned under the provisions of this section unlessnotice of intent to control burn, describing particularly the area to be burned and the tentativedate or dates of the burning, is published in a conspicuous manner in one or more newspapersof general circulation in the area of the burn not less than 10 days prior to the burn.

(4) In addition, the Division of Forestry shall prepare, and the county tax collector shallinclude with the annual tax statement, a notice to be sent to all landowners in each townshipdesignated by the Division of Forestry as a high fire hazard area. Such notice shall describeparticularly the area to be burned and the tentative date or dates of the burning and shall listthe reasons for, and the benefits expected to result from, control burning.History § s. 1, ch. 77-17.



Appendix B–Florida Prescribed Burning Act (Florida Statute 590.026).

590.026 Prescribed burning; requirements; liability.(1) Short Title § This section may be cited as the “Florida Prescribed Burning Act.”(2) Legislative Findings and Purpose.

(a) The application of prescribed burning is a land management tool that benefits the safetyof the public, the environment, and the economy of Florida. Pursuant thereto, theLegislature finds that:

1. Prescribed burning reduces naturally occurring vegetative fuels within wild landareas. Reduction of the fuel load reduces the risk and severity of majorcatastrophic wildfire, thereby reducing the threat of loss of life and property,particularly in urbanizing areas.

2. Most of Florida’s natural communities require periodic fire for maintenance oftheir ecological integrity. Prescribed burning is essential to the perpetuation,restoration, and management of many plant and animal communities. Significantloss of the state’s biological diversity will occur if fire is excluded from fire-dependent systems.

3. Forest land and range land constitute significant economic, biological, andaesthetic resources of statewide importance. Prescribed burning on forest landprepares sites for reforestation, removes undesirable competing vegetation,expedites nutrient cycling, and controls or eliminates certain forest pathogens. Onrange land, prescribed burning improves the quality and quantity of herbaceousvegetation necessary for livestock production.

4. The state purchased hundreds of thousands of acres of land for parks, preserves,wildlife management areas, forests, and other public purposes. The use of pre-scribed burning for management of public lands is essential to maintain thespecific resource values for which these lands were acquired.

5. A public education program is necessary to make citizens and visitors aware of thepublic safety, resource, and economic benefits of prescribed burning.

6. Proper training in the use of prescribed burning is necessary to ensure maximumbenefits and protection for the public.

7. As Florida’s population continues to grow, pressures from liability issues andnuisance complaints inhibit the use of prescribed burning.

(b) It is the purpose of this section to authorize and to promote the continued use of prescribedburning for ecological, silvicultural, wildlife management, and rangemanagement purposes.

(3) Definitions.§ As used in this section:(a) “Prescribed burning” means the controlled application of fire to naturally occurring

vegetative fuels under specified environmental conditions and following appropriateprecautionary measures, which causes the fire to be confined to a predetermined area andaccomplish the planned land management objectives.

(b) “Certified prescribed burn manager” means an individual who successfully completes thecertification program of the Division of Forestry of the Department of Agricultureand Consumer Services.

(c) “Prescription” means a written plan for starting and controlling a prescribed burn.(4) Rules.§ The Division of Forestry of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

shall promulgate rules for the use of prescribed burning.(5) Requirements; Liability.

(a) Prescribed burning conducted under the provisions of this section shall:1. Be accomplished only when at least one certified prescribed burn manager is present on

site while the burn is being conducted.2. Require that a written prescription be prepared prior to receiving authorization to burn

from the Division of Forestry.3. Be considered in the public interest and shall not constitute a public or private nuisance

when conducted pursuant to state air pollution statutes and rules applicable to prescribedburning.



4. Be considered a property right of the property owner if naturally occurringvegetativefuels are used and when conducted pursuant to the requirements of thissubsection.

(b) No property owner or his agent, conducting a prescribed burn pursuant to the requirements ofthis subsection, shall be liable for damage or injury caused by fire or resulting smoke, unlessnegligence is proven.

(6) Duties of Agencies.(a) The Department of Community Affairs, the Division of Forestry of the Department of

Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the Office of the State Fire Marshal shall preparea report to be submitted to appropriate legislative committees by February 1, 1991, thatshall identify actions required to minimize the threat of wildfire in areas where newdevelopment is proposed in or adjacent to wild lands.

(b) The Office of Environmental Education of the Department of Education shall incorporate,where feasible and appropriate, the issues of prescribed burning into their educationalmaterials.

History § s. 2, ch. 90-234; s. 1, ch. 90-296.

Appendix C–Sarasota County Smoke Corridor Ordinance.

Sarasota County Planning Staff Report and Recommendation Reanalysis.U.S. 41/Blackburn Point Road Villade Activity Center Sector Plan No. 89-02-SP

Attachment A

Conditions for Development Approval:

Section A:

V. The respective property owner/developer, their successors or assigns of all parcels east ofU.S. 41 contained within the attached Recommended Future Land Use Plan labeled Figure13, shall cause to be recorded to the Public Records of Sarasota County, Florida, a Notice ofProximity to the existence of the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area. Said Notice shall bein substantially the same form as attached hereto as Exhibit A. Said Notice shall containmetes and bounds descriptions of the entire Parcels D, E, F, G, and H which will have beenprepared by a licensed Florida Land Surveyor. Said Notice shall be recorded at the time ofthe recording of a final plat or condominium plat survey and which O.R. Book and Page shallbe set forth within such plat. Said Notice shall also be required as a part of all DeedRestrictions and Condominium Documents. Said Notice shall indicate the Oscar SchererState Recreation Area’s right to the following: continuing current resource managementpractices to include but not be limited to ecological burning, exotic plant and animalremoval, usage of heavy equipment and machinery and other practices as may be deemednecessary for the proper management of the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area. Alsoincluded shall be a reference that Department of Natural Resources regulations and policiessubstantially restrict mosquito control in the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area. SaidNotice shall also be referred to in all deed and or property restrictions within Parcels D, E, F,G, & H in the Sector Plan, and said Notice shall be subject to review by Florida Departmentof Natural Resources legal staff.



Attachment B

NOTICE OF PROXIMITY TO OSCAR SCHERER STATE RECREATION AREA/CONSERVATION EASEMENT

This Notice date this ______ day of , 199 , and entered into the public record byand , as owners of the property described as:

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT I(Insert description of subject property owned within U.S. 41/Blackburn Point Road Sector Plan

No. 89-02-SP)

WHEREAS, it is the intent of this Notice to make known to the public-at-large that theproperty described in Exhibit “I” attached hereto is located in close proximity to the propertyknown as the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area/Conservation Easement

WHEREAS, it is further the intent of this notice to advise potential tenants andpurchasers of subdivision property located within the boundaries of the property described inExhibit “I” attached hereto, that said property is in close proximity to the Oscar Scherer StateRecreation Area/Conservation Easement.

NOW, THEREFORE, the general public and those parties specifically purchasing orleasing property within the area described in Exhibit “I” attached hereto are hereby notified that:

1. The subject property described in Exhibit “I” attached hereto is located in closeproximity to the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area/Conservation Easement.

2. This Notice is to further advise potential purchasers or tenants of property describedin Exhibit “I” attached hereto that the proximity to the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area/Conservation Easement may result in said purchasers or tenants being affected by: continuingcurrent resource management practices to include but not be limited to ecological burning,pesticide usage, exotic plant and animal removal, usage of heavy equipment and machinery andother practices as may be deemed necessary for the proper management of the Oscar SchererState Recreation Area/Conservation Easement.

3. The nature and extent of the effects of the operations of the Oscar Scherer StateRecreation Area which shall include: All management practices as contained within the documententitled “Ecological Burn Plan Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area” adopted on April 3, 1990,and which may be amended from time to time.

4. All property owners which take title to property within the boundaries as described inExhibit “I” attached hereto, or tenants who may occupy the premises within the boundariesdescribed in Exhibit “I” attached hereto, shall be deemed to have constructive knowledge of thisNotice due to its recordation in the Public Records of Sarasota County, Florida, and further shallbe deemed to have consented to said resource practices, including ecological burning, pesticideusage, exotic plant and animal removal, usage of heavy equipment and machinery and otherpractices as may be deemed necessary for the proper management of the Oscar Scherer StateRecreation Area/Conservation Easement by the recording of a Warranty Deed or other instrumentof conveyance, conveying the property within the boundaries in Exhibit “I” attached hereto, orby executing an occupancy agreement and delivering same to the owner of property containedwithin the boundaries of the property described in Exhibit “I”, their successors or assigns.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the owners have hereunto set their hands and seals this _____ day

of _______, 199 __.

STATE OF FLORIDACOUNTY OF SARASOTA

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day before me, an office duly qualified to takeacknowledgements, personally appearedand ___________________, to me known to be the persons described in and who executed theforegoing instrument and acknowledged before me that they executed same.

WITNESS my hand and official seal in the County and State last aforesaid this ______ day of________, 199 .

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires: (Notary Seal)


The Role of Fire in Ecosystem Management 1

Jerry T. Williams 2

Abstract: USDA Forest Service management practices have sig-nificantly changed. Past practices were predicated on a strong pub-lic expectation for commodity production and protection from theforces of nature that were perceived to threaten that goal. Firesuppression, selective logging, intensive grazing, constrained pre-scribed burning, and a general emphasis on wood fiber productionhave, in part or collectively, changed many forests. However well-meaning at the time, in some ecosystems, these changes have ad-versely affected the health and resiliency of the resource to the pointwhere sustainability may be impeded. Currently the Forest Servicehas modified its focus and its management practices. These changeshave important implications for the agency’s wildland fire manag-ers. This paper describes the role of fire in ecosystem managementand it answers these three questions: 1) what is ecosystem manage-ment? 2) why should fire be considered in ecosystem management?and 3) what role do fire managers have in ecosystem management?

What is Ecosystem Management?

Ecosystem management emphasizes an ecological approachto resource stewardship. It is a holistic approach to natural

resource management that attempts to manage the forest, notjust the trees. It focuses on long-term landscape managementof basins and provinces, not just stands within 10-year planningcycles. The premise is that, in managing for whole, healthyecosystems, we are better able to sustain resource outputs forthe future. Instead of emphasizing short-term resourceextraction, ecosystem management attempts to manage forthe healthy, long-term functioning of the entire system, withthe expectation that, in doing so, commodity and amenityoutputs will follow on a sustainable basis.

In some forests, ecosystem management will requirethat essential ecological processes, such as fire, becomemore widely included. In these forests, the condition of theresource will ultimately be influenced by the ecosystem’sability to function within natural ecological amplitudes.

Certainly, ecosystem management is more a journeythan it is a destination. More than 70 years ago, Aldo Leopoldrecognized the inextricable webs that define the science ofecology and our understanding of ecosystems: “we [mustlearn to] realize the indivisibility of the earth—its soil,

mountains, rivers, forests, climate, plants, and animals, andrespect it collectively” (Meine 1988).

Ecosystem management can also appear to be acontradiction in terms, as Frank Egler remarked, “Ecosystemsare not only more complex than we think, they are morecomplex than we can think” (Egler 1977).

Despite much information about this type of management,we are not yet always able to manage for whole ecosystems.In our attempts to provide for public expectations today—whether clean air or rare owls or big trees—we need to askourselves if we might be managing for one thing at theexpense of another. In managing for discrete components ofthe ecosystem, might we be inadvertently jeopardizing thehealth of a larger whole?

The concern may be most acute in fire-adaptedecosystems. Sustaining these systems in a healthy conditionwill require the use of prescribed burning. The smoke andrisk and cost of those treatments are almost always sociallyintolerable. However, avoiding treatment promises to resultin consequences far worse. In some areas of the UnitedStates, we may be glimpsing some of those consequences.

To understand and manage ecosystems we mustremember a cornerstone to the concept of ecosystemmanagement: the adaptation of our practices in response toacquired knowledge. In that respect, the development of ourthinking and our management practices remain evolutionary.

Why Should Fire be Considered inEcosystem Management?

The biological effects of fire have a profound influenceon composition, structure, and function of forest, brush, andgrassland ecosystems on National Forests. The effects of fireare particularly apparent in short interval fire-adaptedecosystems in which fires resulting from lightning or burningby Native Americans, for example, were the most frequent,generally occurring at 5- to 25-year intervals. These ecosystemswere the first to manifest adverse biological consequencesbecause of fire exclusion. Fire-related ecological problemsare most immediate in short interval fire-adapted ecosystems.

In the prolonged absence of periodic, low-intensitysurface fire, stands undergo relatively rapid changes in speciescomposition and structure that often become predisposingfactors to epidemic insect and disease outbreak and severestand replacement wildfire.

Significant forest health problems appear to be mostconcentrated in short interval fire-adapted types, commonlyrepresented by long-needle pine species (e.g. ponderosa,

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interfaced and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2 Assistant Director—Fire Operations, Fire and Aviation ManagementStaff, USDA Forest Service, Washington DC 20250.



Jeffrey, eastern and western white, red, loblolly, short-leaf,long-leaf, and slash pine). These pine types, as eitherdominants or in association with other species, are estimatedto occur on nearly 30 percent of the suitable timber base onNational Forest lands.

The Blue Mountains in northeastern Oregon andsoutheastern Washington, the mountains in south-centralIdaho, the Colorado Front Range west of Denver, and thecentral Sierra in California—all conifer-dominated shortinterval fire-adapted ecosystems—are areas plagued by seriousforest health problems. They are also areas where severewildfires have recently occurred and, inevitably, will recur.

What Is the Role of Fire Managers inEcosystem Management?

Sustaining short interval fire-adapted ecosystems isexpected to be a difficult challenge. In order to better preparethe Forest Service for the issues that are likely to emerge,the USDA Forest Service’s Fire and Aviation ManagementStaff directed development of staffing paper Fire-RelatedConsiderations and Strategies in Support of EcosystemManagement (Williams and others 1993). This paper madefive recommendations that were recently adopted as fire andaviation management goals:

• Communicate the ecological roles of fire to ourdecision-makers and the public. In short interval fire-adaptedecosystems, complex issues are inherent and the risks thatsurround wildfire threats and prescribed fire applicationssharpen the potential for conflict in the social arena. TheForest Service will more completely develop andcommunicate the scientific rationale behind management offire-adapted ecosystems.

• Display the long-term effects of prescribed fire andwildfire suppression options. The land management planningprocess affords the means to display trade-offs, assess benefitsand consequences, and determine costs among a full rangeof alternatives. In order for the public and our decision-makers to benefit from the information required to makeinformed judgments, fire and aviation management willbetter display the long-term effects of prescribed fire andwildfire suppression options.

• Maintain strong wildfire suppression capability andcontinue to strengthen prescribed fire expertise. Fire

suppression capability will remain a vital cornerstone of theForest Service mission as fire-adapted ecosystems continueto approach high-risk conditions and as private developmentcontinues to expand at the wildland/urban interface. Prescribedfire, despite the concerns that surround its use, remains animportant, ecologically appropriate management tool. Fireand aviation management will develop practitioners thathave the skills to use fire safely and effectively.

• Manage prescribed fire risk: assess it, mitigate it, andseek partners to share it. Risk management will become afundamentally important component of the prescribed fireprogram. A risk assessment process will become the basisfor ignition decisions. Managers will be better apprised ofhigh-risk prescribed burning treatments and avoid them,unless they can be adequately mitigated or risks can beshared among partners. Fair, timely reimbursement will beprovided the public in the event of loss resulting fromprescribed burning escapes.

• Align fire management programs to better complementone another. Although fire policies are sound, program areas(prevention, pre-suppression, suppression, fuel management,and prescribed fire use) will be fully integrated, better reflecta common purpose, and complement one another toward anecosystem management objective.

These goals and actions signal important changes forForest Service fire and aviation management. They requirethat managers take a proactive role in explaining theconsequences of both the presence and absence of prescribedburning and wildfire suppression and fully integrate theseconsiderations into the decision-making process. They alsorequire an improved, more balanced fire managementapproach to land and resource management.

ReferencesEgler, Frank E. 1977. The nature of vegetation: its management and

mismanagement: an introduction to vegetation science. Norfolk, CT.Meine, Curt. 1988. Aldo Leopold: his life and work. Madison, WI:

University of Wisconsin Press.Williams, Jerry T; Schmidt, R. Gordon; Norum, Rodney A.; Omi, Phillip

N.; Robert G. 1993. Fire-related considerations and strategies insupport of ecosystem management, USDA Forest Service, WashingtonOffice Service Staffing Paper.



Structural Wildland Intermix 1

Ronny J. Coleman 2

According to the California Fire Census, more than 390of about 1,000 separate fire departments currently claim tohave an urban wildland interface problem. These communitiesrange in size from small fire districts to metropolitan firedepartments. The census contains numerous data elementsthat reflect both the prevention and suppression capacity ofthe California Fire Service. This document clearly illustratesthat the jurisdiction and structure of the fire service inCalifornia is quite complex, thus contributing to the lack ofa uniform approach to prevention efforts.

The spiraling losses are partially the result of the denialof the fire problem by both individual property owners and,to some degree, local government officials. The mistakenassumption that larger and larger mobilization efforts areneeded to limit losses is also a factor. Although the mediaresponds with major coverage to the scenes of these eventswhen in progress, the follow-up coverage and resolution ofspecific mitigation efforts is of relatively insignificant mediainterest. The California urban/wildland fire problem is notperceived as a major policy consideration by local or Stategovernment when compared to other issues. When the firesare in progress, everyone is interested. As soon as the firesare over, the issue becomes secondary to daily concerns.

Written documentation from the last 10 years of thesefires suggests that the specific findings from each successivefire is consistent with the findings of the previous ones. Themore common factors that lead to catastrophic losses arewell-defined and repeated in report after report. The mitigationefforts that are fairly effective are also well-defined. However,cohesive action that would result in comprehensive changesis lacking. For example, some mitigation efforts apply onlyto the burned area. In actuality, the mitigation efforts must beapplied in areas that have not burned or the effort is wasted.

Fires in the recent past have resulted in a significanteconomic impact on the State. Fire losses are only onefactor. The impact on the tax base and the costs of suppressionare equally important. For example, the Oakland fire of1989 removed over $100 million of assessed valuation fromthe tax rolls of that city alone (in accordance with Revenueand Taxation Code, Article 70 and Article 74). These lastfires will probably result in significant reduction in theassessor’s tax rolls in Orange, Los Angeles, and VenturaCounties. During the period of rebuilding, property taxes arenot paid by the affected property owners. In addition, afterrebuilding, the property owners are protected from incrementaltax increases based on Proposition 13 provisions.

Fire suppression costs are severely impacted by theneed for overtime to provide adequate personnel resources.Initially, responding engines are taken from on-duty

Abstract: Because many major population centers are located inwildland areas, many structures have been destroyed by increas-ingly more costly wildland fires. The structure and jurisdiction ofthe fire service in California are complex, and a uniform approachto fire prevention is lacking. A description of many of the fireissues in the wildland-urban intermix is provided. The relationshipbetween State and local governments is at the heart of many of theissues. Cooperation between State and local governments coupledwith public education and enforcement of current standards andregulations should reduce the occurrence of catastrophic wildland-urban intermix fires.

Wildland fire has been a recurring component ofCalifornia history. Native-Americans intentionally set

fires to the same areas that have currently suffered frommajor fires. Researchers have determined that about 12 percentof the State of California was burned every year by variousNative-American tribes.

In the early 1920’s, at about the same time developmentbegan in the foothills, firefighting agencies became active intrying to prevent fires from occurring in these areas. Fuelloads became extraordinary after about 20 years with nofire. A major catastrophe (the Berkeley fire) occurred inBerkeley as early as 1923.

Major population centers are now located on formerlyuninhabited wildland areas. Fuel loads are of such a magnitudethat the fires have increased in frequency and severity, aredestroying large numbers of structures, and are becomingextremely costly to combat. They are a major factor in whatis now classified as the urban wildland interface or “intermix.”

Frequency of LossIn the past, Californians suffered a major fire loss about

every 7 to 10 years. Catastrophic fires have now occurredeach year from 1990 to 1993. In each of the last three after-action reports, one benchmark statement reflects the increasingseverity of these fires: “this is the largest single mobilizationin the history of California.” The costs to suppress thesefires are substantial and the trend is likely to continue. Wecan reasonably expect another fire of significant loss in thenext 12 to 18 months.


2State Fire Marshall, California Fire Marshall Office, 7171 BowlingDrive, Sacramento, CA 95823.



companies. But, when the engine company leaves thecommunity, it must be backfilled to maintain coverage in thecommunity. This means bringing in personnel on an overtimebasis. Because of Federal Fair Labor Standard Actrequirements, overtime compensation is almost always at atime-and-one-half rate. (Responding agencies usually leavefire engines on the scene of major fires past their original24-hour shift.) A single engine company on a fire isactually two companies at a rate of about $2,000 per day. Asignificant amount of the staffing costs are involved in thetime it takes to demobilize an incident. Some documentedcases show that strike teams can take more than 12 hours toget out of demobilization areas. We are paying the costsportal to portal.

Personnel costs also include workers’ compensation coststhat are inordinately high compared to other types of fires.According to 10 years of firefighter fatality data, 30 percentof all firefighter deaths are attributed to only two types offire: grass and wildland. The death of a firefighter has a pricetag to the taxpayer of about a million dollars per death inworkers’ compensation costs.

The Causes of Property LossesWe are losing more structures in these types of fires

because of (1) the speed of the initial fire; (2) stressedenvironmental conditions; and (3) fire intrusion into a structurebecause of lack of an integrated system for fire resistance.

Speed of the initial fire merely means that many of thesefires are entering into intermix zones and destroying structuresbefore enough resources can be mobilized to make a significantdifference. Although we ultimately deploy hundreds ofapparatuses and thousands of firefighters, resources in thesenumbers are usually not available until after major damagehas already occurred. The rate of heat release in areas withlimited fuel modification is vastly greater than the suppressioncapability available to most fire scenes within the first 4hours of the fire. The Oakland fire scenario, for example,demonstrated that the majority of losses occurred in the first2 hours of the fire. The first 4 to 8 hours of these fires aremore critical now than the next 48 hours. This phenomenonplaces much more priority upon initial attack capability.

Extraordinary losses can also be explained by thephenomena that many structures are lost after the first waveof fire hits. This is because resources are often removedfrom one neighborhood and sent to another area of the activefire front. When the fire front is moving at a faster rate thanthe rate at which resources are arriving, secondary fires areoften left unfought in evacuated neighborhoods. The firesrekindle and destroy structures that could have been saved iffire apparatus had not been redeployed. Although we areproud of our mobilization efforts, the driving of a striketeam from northern California to a fire in Laguna Beachlooks good, but does not reduce actual losses.

Stressed environmental conditions mean that in highwind, high temperature, low humidity weather conditionscoupled with steep topography and dense fuel conditions, noamount of conventional fire suppression can adequately protectstructures that lack defensible space or structural integrity.

Structural intrusion means that structures are not inherentlysafe because of the presence of one feature. For example, inthe recent fire experience, structures with Class A and ClassB roofs were lost because of the lack of design features thatprevent the fire’s intrusion into windows, doors, attics andeaves. Glazing failure, exposed siding, and underpinning ofwooden structures are also a problem. Yet, existing statebuilding standards do not require universal structural integrityfeatures for structures located on hillside sites. A situationalformula demonstrates the potential for losses:

Risk Demand+ = Potential Loss

Mitigation Response

Mitigation ResponseBy assessing risk levels, taking appropriate mitigation

efforts (prevention), and adding to them actual demandsupon the system and the response of firefighter (suppression)forces, the net result is a loss ratio. High risk plus highdemand equals maximum loss. Maximum mitigation plusstrong response reduces potential loss. All mitigation withno response results in significant loss. No mitigation andmaximum responses result in significant loss, also. As riskand demand levels go up, so should mitigation and response.Lastly, risk is not an issue unless it is calculated economically.Maximum response is not a factor unless it is timely.

The economics of the formula are that risk is primarilypersonal and private. Mitigation and response have alwaysbeen considered a responsibility of government. The lack ofaccountability for mitigation by individual property ownersliterally means that the more they are willing to risk, themore it is going to cost the public sector to protect the risk.

The formula is dynamic. It represents the current situationthroughout California. The formula also reveals that if acommunity does not have a mitigation plan, then deployingenough fire apparatus quickly enough to control losses isphysically impossible.

The political vulnerability in this formula is that frequentlyincumbent leadership is criticized for conditions they did notcreate. At the technical level, fire officials understand therelationship of these elements but, at a political level, theissues are often obscured by other considerations. At thetime of a specific emergency, the formula is totally disregardedexcept to evaluate the adequacy of the response and to try toblame the lack of resources.



4290 cannot be enforced by local governments unless theyare contracted with or under State Responsibility Area (SRA).PRC 4291 can be enforced by local governments, but routinelyis not.

Second, State and Federal agencies constantly debatethe issue of fire clearances and vegetation management.Even in CDF’s primary jurisdictions, vegetation managementand prescribed burning are difficult to enforce because oflocal resistance and disputes with environmental agencies.The “kangaroo rat” discussion in Riverside County is oneexample of this debate. The problem is that frequently Stateand Federal environmental agencies will not say “no” tovegetation management activities. They just say “maybe”for so long that eventually no action is taken.

In addition, land-use patterns in portions of the statehave resulted in allowing development in high fuel loadsareas and enforcement efforts have become limited or non-existent. Classic examples of this can be found in MarinCounty, the Tahoe Basin, and all across the Sierra Nevada.

The issue of fuels and fuel modification is probably themost critical question to be resolved in creating defensiblespace. The conflict between the need to retain ground coverfor wildlife habitat contradicts the need to control fuel levelsto protect human habitat. This affects our risk managementefforts to a large degree.

Why Have We Not Solved the Problem?The current situation creates a complex problem without

a simple solution: a significant portion of our state has a“growing” fire problem that is under the jurisdiction of bothState and local government. Local governments are oftenreluctant to deal with the issues and State government isoften restricted in its efforts because of conflicting specialinterest from environmental groups.

The problems of adopting specific solutions are furthercomplicated by the political volatility and economicconsiderations inherent in mitigation efforts. All fire protectionmitigation efforts cost money. An increase in roofclassification increases a homeowner’s costs. Interestingly,adding new fire protection levels actually penalizes a propertyowner by raising the assessed valuation of the property bythe value of the improvements. The Revenue and TaxationCode exempts certain enhancements in fire protectionimprovements (Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 74):

§ 74. Exclusions from definitions of “newly constructed”or “new construction” of certain fire protectiondevices and improvements

(a) For purposes of subdivision (a) of Section 2 ofArticle XIII A of the Constitution, “newlyconstructed” does not include the construction orinstallation of any fire sprinkler system, other fireextinguishing system, fire detection system, or fire-related egress improvement which is constructedor installed on or after November 7, 1984.

Jurisdictional ConflictThe body of knowledge regarding mitigation requirements

that have been proven to work, and fire suppressiondeployment methods are fairly well-defined. The responsecomponent is well-structured through the California Officeof Emergency Services (OES) Master Mutual Aid System,but it lacks a uniform comprehensive approach to theapplication of site mitigation methods. This would involvethe use of adequate standards, an active code enforcementprogram, inspection, and penalties for violations. There isno equivalent to OES-type coordination system in theregulatory process, especially as it relates to defensible spaceand structural integrity.

Consistency is absent because the laws, regulations, andstandards to remedy the exposure problems are scattered amongFederal, State and local jurisdictions. After-action fire recordsidentify the same lack of regulatory controls on specific fires,i.e., roof coverings, defensible space, vegetation management,access and infrastructure problems, and water supply.

The Building Codes and Fire CodesThe California Building Code (CBC) Title 24 was adopted

from a model code, with amendments made by the State. TheCBC must be enforced by all local governments after theState adopts the most recent edition of the Building Code;local government has 6 months to prepare findings of factthat allow them to make Title 24’s minimum requirementsmore strict based on local conditions. A major portion ofmunicipalities have adopted local amendments to the BuildingCode. Yet, very few of these amendments deal with theurban-wildland interface. The Building Code itself does notdistinguish the requirements for structural features based onlocation in the interface. The basic requirements are keyed tothe type occupancy, not to the exposure to a specific hazard.

Have We Learned the Lessons?The lesson that we should have learned from a past fire

is that fire behavior is not exclusive to that fire. The commonthread among past fires is that local action to remedy thesituation did not occur before the fire, and, moreover, manylocal communities have failed to exercise reasonablemitigation strategies in the aftermath of the fire. This hasalready occurred in Oakland. In effect, they are rebuildingthe same fire condition for the future. Further, the fact thatthe average period of ownership of a California dwelling isonly 5 years results in a turnover that creates an informationgap between generations of homeowners in impacted areas.

Two mutually contradictory examples can be highlighted:positive and negative. The first is the success of the CaliforniaDepartment of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) in creatingreasonable site safety conditions by enforcing the PublicResource Code (PRC) Sections 4290 and 4291. PRC 4290 isthe basis for the Fire Safe California program. PRC 4291 isan excellent approach to the business of mitigation. PRC



stage. Yet, the issue of urban wildland fire is conspicuouslyabsent from planning concerns in most communities. Areview of the Office of Public Resources (OPR) report onstrategic growth indicates that discussions of the CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act (CEQA) requirements do notaddress the issue of the urban wildland interface at all.

The second point of mitigation is at the site constructionphase. However, unless the community has adopted a codeor ordinance similar to PRC 4291, there are no requirementsfor site analysis. One of the biggest problems is the lack oftraining of fire and building department inspectors. Thisresults in a wide variety of interpretations of even the simplestof requirements such as clearance distances, glazingrequirements, and attic or eave protection.

Another influence in the mitigation effort is at the propertyowner and community-based action group level. Thedeficiency here is the lack of effective educational efforts toobtain and maintain public support. The CDF and Los AngelesCity Fire Department have two of the most successful efforts,but they are not typical. In some cases, these activities haveactually been rejected by community-based groups who useCodes, Covenants and Restrictions (CCR’s) to promote“ambience” at the expense of safety.

Existing RegulationsWe already have a great deal of statutes and regulations.

Roofing requirements can be divided into two distinctlydifferent levels: Assembly Bill 337 (Bates 1992), requiringClass B roofing and defensible space in Very High Fire RiskSeverity Zones (VHFRSZ); and Assembly Bill 2131(O’Connell 1992) requiring Class C roofing in all otherparts of the state. Both of these bills were signed into lawlast year. Because of post-enactment implementation dates,neither has been implemented and thus has not producedtangible results. The key point is that the exposure to urban/wildland fire situations is a statewide problem. But it is not auniform problem. Attempts at statewide mandates to dealwith the problem almost always face strong resistance fromthose agencies and property owners who will not benefitfrom the new requirements.

However, significant gaps in the Bates bill involve theareas mapped by CDF as VHFRSZ—these can be rejectedby a non-rebuttal response from the local governing body.This does not result in any consequence if they suffer asubsequent fire in that area. If CDF applies the Class Brequirement in an area with a common boundary to a cityidentified as VHFRSZ, and the city does not adopt it forthemselves, we have an exposure problem. If CDF has theauthority to require Class B in their area, and a localcommunity rejects it for other reasons, what has beenaccomplished?

The Public Resource Code provisions used by the CDFare probably the best overall mitigation approaches in thecode system. However, to be used by local government,PRC 4291 requires it to be adopted by each one independently.Model ordinances achieve this, such as the City of La Verneand Napa’s “Hillside Overlay Zone,” but historically very

This concept could be considered for expansion to otherfire protection features because they help control costs ofState and local government.

Access and infrastructure are both expensive to createand to maintain. As a result, local government often lacksthe will to impose more stringent infrastructure requirementsupon specific developers. The public perception of thisproblem is not helpful either. The general public considersmost mitigation efforts unnecessary and an abuse of theirquest for privacy. For those individual property owners whoreject recommendations for improving fire defensibility, thereare few penalties.

The perception that insurance exists to repay people forlost property is based on the notion that compensation isavailable for all property losses. The California Fair Plan,which was created to serve homeowners in high-risk situations,is intended to ensure coverage is available. For the first timein the recent past, even the Fair Plan has asked forsupplemental funds from the contributing companies becauseof the severe losses.

Unfortunately, insurance does not address the problemthat these catastrophic fires result in hundreds of millions ofdollars of public expenditures that are a direct burden to thetaxpayer at both the State or Federal level.

The financial liability to both State and Federalgovernment has grown because of the increased frequencyof catastrophic fires. Local government does not see this as aliability because, after a state of emergency is declared,everyone gets reimbursed for their extraordinary costs. Somecommunities have even indicated these fires are financialwindfalls. The reimbursement is sometimes in excess ofactual expenditures, so there is no reason to complain orremedy the situation. The deep pockets that continue toaccrue liability are the State and the Federal governments. Ifthe trend towards more frequent and wider spread lossescontinues, the costs to government will continue to escalate.Therefore, fire is of statewide concern.

Risk ManagementRisk can be categorized at three separate levels: site

risks, neighborhood risks, and community risks. Site risk is afactor of evaluating building sites and structural integrity,specifically slope and aspect orientation and fuel loadingrelationships. The tool available to accomplish this evaluationis a “Wildland Risk Calculation.” Neighborhood risk is afactor of density, structural conditions, topographical layout,and vegetation management, evaluated by using a “FieldEvaluation Form.” And finally, the community risk level is afactor of infrastructure, community emergency planning,and the level of policy commitment to mitigation gauged byusing the form of OES Disaster Plans.

Mitigation EffortsThe most effective stage for mitigation against urban

wildland fires for all these levels is during the development



Distribution of Existing InformationKnowledge of the appropriate mitigation efforts is not

evenly distributed. In fact, the methods and techniques forcontrolling the problem are not taught in any of the recognizedfire science curricula at community colleges or universities.We do have a fire suppression course on wildland operations,but no fire prevention course is focused on this area. Atremendous amount of information is available, but it hasnot been widely used by local government. The distributionmatrix of proposed state regulations, and the mailing lists toprovide updates on this topic do not currently serve to keepcommunities well informed of appropriate authority, or howto implement more comprehensive regulations.

SummaryThe problems will not be significantly reduced unless

we motivate local government into action, supported by acoordinated state response to the issue of vegetationmanagement and a comprehensive training and educationprogram. Because these types of fires will be difficult toeliminate, all forms of government must be proactive tolimit losses. The issues will focus on costs for solutions andthe ability to avoid conflict with local government.

And finally, the public needs to understand that this is aserious social issue that can be addressed only by cooperationbetween State and local government and that a combinationof education, partnering processes, technology transfer andimproved enforcement of current standards and regulationswill ultimately impact the potential to reverse the trendtowards more catastrophic fires.

ReferencesBates, Tom. 1992. Assembly Bill 337. California Health and Safety Code,

Chapter 6.8.O’Connell, Jack. 1992. Assembly Bill 2131. California Health and Safety

Code, Section 13132.7. California Revenue and Taxation Code; Stateof California.

Rice, Curt; Dave, James. 1989. A discussion of the County General Plan andthe role of Strategic Fire Protection Planning; prepared for the CaliforniaDepartment of Forestry and Fire Protection by Robert L. Irwin, TuolomneCounty Planning Commissioner; 1989 September 30; 35 p.

AppendixCalifornia Department of Forestry and Fire Protection(CDF).California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).California Office of Emergency Services (OES).California State Fire Marshall (CSFM).National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).Office of Public Resources (OPR).Public Resource Code (PRC).State Responsibility Area (SRA).Very High Fire Risk Severity Zone (VHFRSZ).

few have such ordinances. Three other documents in existencecould be used as a basis for adopting local ordinances. Theyare the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 299,the Western Fire Chiefs’ Urban Wildland Interface text, andthe CDF’s Fire Safe Guides for Residential Development.

What Needs to be Regulated?Roof covering is frequently considered as the ultimate

villain in these types of fires, but this is entirely too simplisticand is one of the reasons we are not making progress onresolving the problem. Roofs are an issue, but there aremany other factors that must be considered in the regulatoryscheme, such as:

• Structural integrity—the ability of the structureto withstand intrusion by fire.

• Defensible space—the use of fuel and vegetativemanagement techniques to reduce fire exposureto a vulnerable structure.

• Infrastructure reliability—the ability for firesuppression forces to have access to structuresand for the water supply to remain in service forthe duration of the fire attack.

None of these issues is independently addressed in thecurrent model code, and they are absent from planningrequirements in CEQA. (The Uniform Fire Code currentlyhas a proposed amendment to create a set of requirements formodel code, which will probably be adopted in about a year.)

Current ActionThe political environment regarding imposing new

regulations is not favorable in spite of the fact that almosteveryone agrees that we have a serious problem. Althoughmost local governments readily agree on the consequencesof these fires, many disagree about the preferred solution.To propose more mandated duties on local government isvolatile; yet, at the same time, these same officials are lookingfor leadership in the area. They are under a great deal ofpressure to define activities that get results, and they alsorecognize the need to reevaluate priorities.

The CDF has followed through in its commitment tomap the VHFRSZs. The California State Fire Marshall(CSFM) is in the process of preparing a model ordinance foradoption of the VHFRSZ by local government. Both effortsare on schedule, but are unlikely to make any significantdifference in this problem for a period of 7 to 10 years. Thereason is fairly simple; they apply only to a limited area ofgrowth. They are not retroactive, and they are dependentupon political action by local government.

The major obstacles to significantly reduce the currentpotential for large-loss fires include: (1) lack of knowledgeby local officials as to how to take action; (2) confusion andambiguity about the imposition of structure requirements inbuilding codes based on local conditions; and (3) fundingreduction in the fire prevention capacity of many agencies.




A Balanced Approach: Dr. Biswell’s Solution to Fire Issuesin Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems 1

Carol Rice 2

Abstract: Dr. Biswell’s approach to fire management balancedfire prevention, suppression, and fuel management. Dr. Biswellmaintained that with increased support for fire prevention and fuelmanagement, several profound changes would be anticipated, in-cluding a decrease in the number of wildfires, as well as a decreasein requirements for suppression. Interested persons can help shiftthe current emphasis in fire management to increased support forfuel management (and particularly prescribed burning) by repeat-edly informing the public of the benefits of prescribed burning interms the lay public understands and demonstrating the advan-tages with successful local projects.

On February 15-17, 1994, the Biswell Symposium, FireIssues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, was intended, in part, to memorialize Dr. HaroldBiswell (or “Doc” as he was affectionately known), afervent proponent of prescribed fire to manage fuels in boththe wildlands and in the wildland/urban interface.

Many have heard his message about resource managementin wildland ecosystems, and fire hazard reduction in theurban interface. But Dr. Biswell also considered fire a toolfor resource management in the urban interface and forhazard reduction in wildland ecosystems. The mixing of thetwo areas of interest therefore seemed appropriate for ameeting commemorating Dr. Harold Biswell.

A Balanced Approach Many types of actions and mixes of approaches can be

engaged to solve the “fire problem.” Throughout thisSymposium, solutions have been offered for both specificcircumstances and national situations. The solutions haveencompassed new legislation, revised policies, technologicalimprovements, increased participation in land use planning,and public education. Speakers in the introductory sessionaddressed a city solution and a state solution. Dr. Biswelladvocated a balanced approach as a solution to firemanagement issues where, ideally, fire prevention, firesuppression, and fuel management received an equal levelof support. Of course, to Dr. Biswell, fuel management wasnearly synonymous with prescribed burning.

Currently the world of fire management is not ideal ifjudged by this criteria. Many in fire management recognize

that the mix of prevention, fuel management, and suppressionis not optimum. In a national survey by the Wildland FireManagement Section of the National Fire ProtectionAssociation in 1989, both prevention and prescribed burningprograms were identified as top issues facing fire managementnationwide. In this same survey, an increase in prescribedburning programs was by far the most frequent suggestionfor desired change in fire management policy, and preventionwas listed almost twice as many times as an activity most inneed of funds.

Dr. Biswell maintained that by using the balancedapproach, the number of unwanted fires would decrease as aconsequence of the heightened prevention efforts. Suppressionrequirements would likewise decrease because more of thefuels would be transitioned into a managed condition.Opportunities for successful suppression would become moreplentiful because fuels would become less continuous. Inaddition, a greater percentage of the land would become lessresistant to control as the amount of available fuel (especiallyheavier fuels) decreased on any one piece of land.

A Fuels Management ShiftThere are several ways to shift the current mix of fire

management programs to one with a greater proportion ofeffort allocated to fuels management and fire prevention.

The first way is to explain to the public, the media, andopinion leaders the benefits of fuel management, andspecifically, the benefits of prescribed fire. References aboundabout the benefits of and even the necessity for fuelmanagement, especially prescribed burning. Because thepublic appears to be more convinced by specifics than generalobservations, these references are a useful resource fordescribing the advantages of fuel management. The publichas been especially receptive to explanations of the fireecology of specific sites. A fire manager might use writtenfire histories and fire-scarred trees to explain the natural roleof fire and its inevitability. Local vegetation usually providesnumerous examples of adaptations to fire; “reading thelandscape” makes a great story.

Recently, the public has been responsive to proposalsfor fire hazard reduction with prescribed fire. Resourcemanagers or other interested persons might explain howprescribed burning reduces the biomass left to burn, changesthe structure of the fuel so that it is less likely to burnintensely, and how it can even change the vegetation type toone less resistant to control. Cost comparisons of techniques,or of damage scenarios without action can be persuasivepoints for highlighting the value of prescribed burning. The


2Proprietor, Wildland Resource Management, 134 Journey’s End, Wal-nut Creek, CA 94595.



benefits to fire personnel provided by the training andcommunication opportunities afforded during prescribedburning may likewise be important to a public who dependson a well-trained fire suppression organization. A prescribedburn is often a media event that should be capitalized uponas an opportunity to contact thousands with a message aboutthe value of such actions and programs.

Research has shown that a message needs to be heard400 times before a person’s opinion will be changed oraltered. The message about the benefits of prescribed burningneeds to be told many times and in many ways simply toreach many people. By the end of any outing, field trip orworkshop, Dr. Biswell had told the story of prescribedburning’s benefits repeatedly, but not redundantly.

Telling the story about prescribed burning clearly, statedfor an intelligent but currently uninformed audience, is veryimportant. Dr. Biswell often quoted Albert Einstein, whosuggested that a person did not really understand a conceptif he could not explain it to his gardener. Fire managers needto be able to explain the process of fire, its application, andthe value of fire’s controlled use in terms that mean somethingto the audience.

A successful local project can illustrate the benefits offuel management. Fire managers are able to show theapplicability of fuel management and prescribed burning ina wide range of circumstances when many successful projectsare nearby. Some audiences would prefer to believe fires didand should occur someplace else; thus, the applicability offire’s use in their particular circumstance is best argued byexamples of successful local burns in a variety of conditions.

ConclusionThose responsible for planning and conducting prescribed

burns must persevere to achieve successful projects.Conducting a prescribed burn is not an easy task. Each burnentails challenges regarding scheduling, logistics, com-munications (to the public and between agencies), air qualitymanagement, finances, and many more. However, theseprojects are nearly always well worth the effort. For example,according to John McMillan (personal communication withauthor, September 9, 1993), the site of a prescribed burnconducted by staff on the USDA Forest Service’s PacificRanger District in California was the only green area visiblewithin miles after the Cleveland Fire of 1992. Although itsadvantages to this site are obvious, the illustration of prescribedburning’s benefits are also very powerful for potentialapplication elsewhere.

Dr. Biswell believed in a balanced approach to fire issuesin urban interface and wildland ecosystems, and he workedwith a passion to make it so. He did this by repeatedlyexplaining the benefits of prescribed burning to all those whowould listen and many who would not. He told the messageabout fire’s use in terms all could understand. He alwaysencouraged the wise use of fire and illustrated this withdemonstrations. By mimicking Doc’s actions and approach,we will be able to move closer to garnering the supportnecessary to create that balance Doc was so eager to attain.

ReferenceRice, Carol L. 1989. Personnel, equipment, budget, costs and issues of

Federal fire management programs. Unpublished paper presented tothe Wildland Fire Management section of the National Fire ProtectionAssociation; 1989 May 19; Boston, Massachussetts.



POSTER SESSION



Use of Aerial Photography for Fire Planningand Suppression 1

Alan H. Ambacher 2


2Vice President, Pacific Aerial Surveys, Hammon-Jensen-Wallen &Associates, 8407 Edgewater Drive, Oakland, CA 94621.

Abstract: Aerial photography has long been considered a valu-able tool for wildland fire suppression activities. The Fire Re-sources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergen-cies (FIRESCOPE) mapping program introduced the use of aerialphotography as a critical component of an integrated mappingprogram for daily emergency response for the community ofsouthern California map users. The Oakland fire storm and therecent southern California fires are examples of multi-agencyinvolvement that demonstrate the importance for current informa-tion of existing ground conditions. Aerial photography is onesource for obtaining current information.

Western Federal agencies involved in fire protection,such as the USDA Forest Service, USDI Bureau of

Land Management, and the National Park Service, use aerialphotography as an information base to support fire planningand suppression in wildland areas. As Federal agenciesbecame involved in the multi-agency effort through FireResources of Southern California Organized for PotentialEmergencies (FIRESCOPE) to improve coordination andcommunication, the use of aerial photography as aninformation base was expanded into interface and urban fireresponse areas.

The FIRESCOPE mapping program was designed toprovide fire service agencies with a consistent, standardizedset of cartographic products derived primarily from National,State, and local government mapping programs. The valueof the FIRESCOPE mapping program to partner agenciesdepended upon timely maintenance of operational data layers.Current aerial photography to create orthophoto bases forensuring positional accuracy of data collected by the fireservices, or used directly as an information layer, was deemedcritical to the success of the mapping program. TheFIRESCOPE program concluded that Federal or State aerialphoto sources were not adequate to meet this critical demandfor updated aerial photography. Other sources for aerialphotography had to be developed, including the privatesector companies. Fire service agencies now use geographicinformation systems, electronic vehicle maps, and othertechnology to supplement their mapping programs. Yet, theneed for consistent current map information to support on-

site multi-agency emergency management continues,evidenced during the Oakland fire storm as fire crews fromareas throughout the West arrived to support the City ofOakland Fire Department. Aerial photography from a privatephoto company, such as Pacific Aerial Surveys, can be usedto create a range of photo products to quickly update existingoperational data; as record keeping documents; for strategicplanning, fuel assessment, structure locations, and evaluationhazard potential; and to familiarize emergency personnel onexisting ground conditions before entering an area.

Current and historical high resolution aerial photographyis available at various scales and film emulsions from privatecompanies. The photography is remarkably detailed, allowingfor easy interpretation of ground features such as streetpatterns, access roads, drainage patterns, tank locations, watersources, buildings, parking lots, light and telephone poles,and vegetation characteristics and types. Historical aerialphotography is an excellent source to evaluate land usechange that has occurred over large areas or individual sites.

Photo LaboratoriesAerial photo negatives for Federal agencies are stored at

the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service(ASCS) Aerial Photography Field Office in Salt Lake City,Utah, and the Earth Remote Observing Satellite (EROS)Data Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Although theselaboratories have emergency response plans to create aerialphoto products, the currency and scale of the photography isnot acceptable for information needs by fire personnel duringor after a major interface incident. Also, it is impractical toexpect these laboratories to respond within the first fewhours of an incident to deliver aerial products to fire personnel.

Private laboratories, such as Pacific Aerial Surveys,located within or near the immediate area of concern canprovide digital or hard copy aerial products from their librarystock of aerial photography. By using the information networkwith other aerial photo firms and the government photo labs,Pacific Aerial Surveys can coordinate deliveries of aerialphoto products within hours after receiving the initial request.

Photo LibrariesPacific Aerial Surveys maintains in its photo libraries

current aerial photos of the greater Bay Area, Monterey,Sacramento, Redding, and selected Los Angeles area counties.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session


Pacific Aerial Surveys’ corporate office is located in Oakland,California, where all Company film is stored. Sales officesare located in Van Nuys, Redding, and Monterey, California.

Private aerial photo companies have photo-equippedplanes and calibrated aerial camera systems with 3.5-inch,6-inch, 8.25-inch, or 12-inch lens ready for immediate mission

mobilization. Other sensors can also be flown in theseairplanes. Most companies now use Global PositioningSystems (GPS) technology to control photo exposure stationsso coordinate information and not maps need only betransmitted to a company from a fire command center for aflight to occur.



Characteristics of Coastal Sage Scrub in Relation to FireHistory and Use by California Gnatcatchers 1

Jan L. Beyers Ginger C. Peña 2

Abstract: Plant cover and vegetation structure were examined attwo inland coastal sage scrub sites differing in fire history and useby California gnatcatchers. Salvia mellifera and Eriogonumfasciculatum dominated one site; shrub cover on gnatcatcher–occupied plots averaged 50 percent greater than on unoccupiedplots. At the other site, gnatcatcher-occupied plots had high coverof Artemisia californica and Encelia farinosa while unoccupiedplots were dominated by E. farinosa alone and had half as muchtotal shrub cover. Gnatcatcher territories at both sites had tallershrubs than unoccupied plots. Recently burned areas and areaswith little regrowth were not used by gnatcatchers.

Coastal sage scrub is a fire-dominated vegetation typethat has been largely converted to agricultural and urban

uses in southern California. Less than 20 percent of theoriginal area of this vegetation type probably remains(Westman 1981). The California gnatcatcher (Polioptilacalifornica) lives only in coastal sage scrub in California andBaja California (Atwood 1993); because habitat lossjeopardizes its survival, it has been federally listed as“threatened.”

Inland Riverside County contains numerous remnantareas of sage scrub. Studies of gnatcatcher habitat have beenconducted in coastal Orange and San Diego counties, oftenby biological consultants working for developers (e.g.,Bontrager 1991, Ogden Environmental and Energy ServicesCo., Inc. 1992), but relatively little is known about gnatcatcherrequirements in inland areas (Atwood 1993). In conjunctionwith two ornithologists studying gnatcatcher nesting success,we undertook this study to help clarify the relationship betweenCalifornia gnatcatchers, coastal sage scrub, and fire history.

MethodsTwo study sites were chosen in western Riverside County:

the University of California, Riverside’s Motte RimrockReserve, located in the hills near Perris, California, andLake Mathews, a Metropolitan Water District storage reservoirnear Riverside, California. Almost half of the Motte Reservewas burned in a fire in September 1979; much of the rest

burned in June 1981. California gnatcatcher territories arefound only in the 1979 burn area. We sampled four plotseach in known gnatcatcher territories, in 1979 burn areaswithout gnatcatchers, and in 1981 burn areas. Plots withoutgnatcatchers were randomly selected; plots in territorieswere chosen so as not to interfere with gnatcatcher breedingactivity. On each plot, four line-point transects were randomlychosen perpendicular to a baseline. Vegetation cover wasmeasured every 0.5 m along each 25-m transect by droppinga vertical pointer and recording the identity and height ofeach species touched by the pointer. Sampling was done inlate spring. At Lake Mathews, plots were located in unburnedvegetation occupied by gnatcatchers, unburned vegetationwithout gnatcatchers, and in an area burned in 1990. Samplingprocedures were the same as at Motte.

ResultsAt Motte, plots in the 1979 burn area used by gnatcatchers

averaged 50 percent greater shrub cover than 1979 burn plotsnot in active use. Plots in the area burned in 1981 had littlelive shrub cover and were not used by gnatcatchers (table 1).At Lake Mathews, unburned plots used by gnatcatchers hadalmost twice as much cover as those not used, and Artemisiacalifornica was an important component of the cover. Shrubcover was very low in the 1990 burn plots (table 1). Plots inbird territories had taller shrubs than unoccupied plots atboth sites as well (data not shown).

DiscussionCalifornia gnatcatchers do not rely exclusively on

California sagebrush (Artemisia californica) in inland sagescrub, as they appear to do near the coast (Bontrager 1991).Gnatcatcher plots at Motte were dominated by black sage(Salvia mellifera) and California buckwheat (Eriogonumfasciculatum); those at Lake Mathews had about equal coverof California sagebrush and brittlebush (Encelia farinosa).Sites used by gnatcatchers averaged more than 50 percentshrub cover, similar to results tabulated by Atwood (1993).Recently burned sites were not used by gnatcatchers.Conditions that inhibit shrub recovery after fire, as apparentlyoccurred with the 1981 fire at Motte, could reduce theamount of usable habitat available for California gnatcatchers.


2Research Plant Ecologist and Biological Technician, respectively, Pa-cific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 4955 Canyon CrestDr., Riverside, CA 92507.



AcknowledgmentsPermission to work at the Motte Rimrock Reserve was

granted by Reserve Director Barbara Carlson, University ofCalifornia, Riverside; she also provided information ongnatcatcher territories and safe sampling times. MetropolitanWater District allowed us to work at Lake Mathews. Dr.William O. Wirtz II and Audrey Mayer of Pomona Collegeidentified gnatcatcher territories at Lake Mathews. CarlaWakeman, Michael Oxford, and Peter Coy assisted with thevegetation sampling.

ReferencesAtwood, Jonathan L. 1993. California gnatcatchers and coastal sage

scrub: the biological basis for endangered species listing. In: Keeley,J. E., ed. Interface between ecology and land development in California.Los Angeles: Southern California Academy of Sciences; 149-169.

Bontrager, David R. 1991. Habitat requirements, home range andbreeding biology of the California gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica)in south Orange County, California. Unpublished report preparedfor Santa Margarita Company, Rancho Santa Margarita, California.

Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc. 1992. Ecology of theCalifornia gnatcatcher at Rancho San Diego. Unpublished reportprepared for Home Capital Development Corp., San Diego, California.

Westman, Walter E. 1981. Diversity relations and succession inCalifornian coastal sage scrub. Ecology 62: 170-184.

Table 1—Average percent shrub cover (standard deviation) of plots at Motte Rimrock Reserve and Lake Mathews. “Total”may not equal the sum of each column because shrubs often overlapped.

------------------------------------------ Motte Site ----------------------------------------------Bird Plots1 Non-bird Plots Non-bird Plots

Species 1979 Burn 1979 Burn 1981 Burn

Artemisia californica 4.3 (4.0) 6.1 (10.) 0Encelia farinosa 7.9 (10.2) 0.5 (0.9) 0Eriogonum fasciculatum 19.3 (16.3) 9.5 (8.2) 4.8 (2.0)Salvia mellifera 31.5 (18.1) 24.3 (10.8) 0

Total 62.9 (24.3) 40.4 (12.3) 4.8 (2.0)

---------------------------------------- Mathews Site --------------------------------------------Unburned Unburned 1990 Burn

Artemisia californica 33.6 (19.0) 1.3 (1.6) 0Encelia farinosa 28.2 (10.6) 31.1 (12.7) 2.5 (2.9)Eriogonum fasciculatum 0.4 (0.4) 1.4 (1.4) 0.3 (0.5)Bebbia juncea 0.7 (1.2) 0.1 (0.2) 2.5 (3.5)Lotus scoparius 0 0 5.2 (7.3)

Total 62.9 (11.3) 33.9 (13.5) 10.5 (9.8)

1 Bird plot denotes use by California gnatcatchers; non-bird plot denotes no use by California gnatcatchers in spring 1993.N=4 plots per category at Motte site; n=3 for burned plots at Mathews, n=4 for unburned plots at Mathews.



The Quest for All-Purpose Plants 1

Susan L. Frommer David R. Weise 2

The Problem

The fire safety of a home in the wildland/urban interfaceis influenced by several factors—one of which is the

presence and proximity of vegetation to the home.Landscaping may either provide a significant barrier to firespread and thus potentially increase a home’s fire safety orfavor fire spread and reduce a home’s fire safety. However,fire safety of vegetation is not the only criterion a homeowneror landscape designer uses when selecting plants for use in ayard. Other criteria include drought resistance, erosionprevention, and esthetics.

Many lists of “fire retardant” plants are available intrade magazines, newspapers, and from various publicagencies like water districts and resource conservationdistricts. The bases of these lists are often unknown; firesafety ratings for a particular plant may vary appreciablyfrom list to list, only the genus of the plant may be givenwith no species name, or the same species names keepappearing from list to list including even misidentificationsand misspellings. For example, Cupressus sp is listed in onepublication as being highly flammable (Baptiste 1992);however, Cupressus arizonica was rated as weakly flammablein France for the months of May, June, and October; notvery flammable for July, August, and September; andmoderately flammable in November (Valette n.d.).

Plant lists often fail to consider the fact that plants maybe reasonably fire retardant (however it is defined) whenwatered but become more flammable when dry. Some plantshave a natural ability to retain a higher fuel moisture contentlonger than others after the onset of the dry months, whichprolongs their fire-retardant characteristics later into the dryseason on unirrigated sites.

Furthermore, relying on only one attribute, flammability,as a guide to plant selection ignores the many other functionswe expect from our landscape plants such as the abilities tocontrol erosion on slopes, to shade our homes during thehot summers, to provide food for us and for wildlife, toconserve water, and to be esthetically pleasing. Some listsof “fire-retardant” plants have information about otherdesirable attributes, but there are enormous gaps in thisinformation as well.

A Possible SolutionWe propose to develop a preliminary set of techniques

based on flammability tests for building materials to determineflammability and total heat release rates of intact vegetation,both green and dried. This information can then be used todevise a rating scale for relative “fire retardance” which thencan be coupled with another series of ratings for waterconsumption, frost tolerance, climate modification, erosioncontrol, wildlife habitat, etc. Table 1 lists possible candidatespecies that meet criteria other than flammability. Informationon fire retardance is often missing. This information willhelp homeowners, planners, plan checkers, and others tomake intelligent and economical landscaping decisions basedon the particular hierarchy of needs of each site. Once such asystem exists, fire-safe landscaping decisions will have astronger scientific basis.


2 Partner, Plants 4 Dry Places, Menifee Valley, CA; Supervisory ResearchForester, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 4955Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507.



Table 1– Candidates for fire retardance tests with ratings for other desirable characteristics forlandscape plants.

Plant Fr 1 Wtr Aes Er Oth

Oenothera berlandieri ?2 x x x x

Cistus crispus ? x x x ?

Olea europa ? x x ? x

Rhus ovata ? x x x x

Correa ‘Carmine Bells’ ? x x x ?

Muhlenbergia rigens ? x x x ?

Rhagodia spinescens ? x x x ?

Rosmarinus officinalis ? x x x x

Melia azedarach ? x x ? x

Cistus salviifolius x x x x ?

Baccharis pilularis ? x ? x ?

Salvia microphylla ? x x x x

Myoporum ‘Putah Creek’ ? x x x ?

Heteromeles arbutifolia ? x x x x

Verbena tenuisecta ? x x x ?

Westringia rosmariniformis ? x x ? ?

Salvia greggii ? x x ? x

Acacia redolens ? x x x ?

Calystegia macrostegia ? x x x x

Cistus purpureus ? x x x ?

Prunus ilicifolia ? x x x x

Sophora japonica ? x x ? x

1 Fr = fire resistant, Wtr = drought resistant, Er = erosion resistant, Aes = esthetically pleasing,Oth = other (wildlife habitat, food production, climate modification)

2 x = suitable application, ? = information not available


ReferencesBaptiste, L. 1992. FIRESCAPE—Landscaping to reduce fire hazard.

Oakland, CA: East Bay Municipal Utility District; 16 p.Valette, Jean-Charles. n.d. Flammabilities of Mediterranean species—

I.N.R.A.’s methodology. Document PIF 9328. Avignon, France:Laboratoire de Recherches Forestieres Mediterraneennes; 15 p.


Abstract: The typical computer fire model requires much greaterspatial detail than current weather forecast models provide. Oneway to obtain more spatially descriptive weather simulations is tonest a fine model grid within a coarse one. This paper brieflydescribes a nested grid model with a fine grid interval of 2 km tosimulate weather over Maui, Hawaii.

Wildland fire scientists today strive for greater detail,with the aid of computers. The computer is a virtual

laboratory in which simulated fires burn through spatiallycomplex fuel matrices, in response to weather and terrainconditions. The fire model sees the world as points on aregular grid. In one study of 2,000 ha on the Los PadresNational Forest, California, grid points were spaced 50 mapart (Kalabokidis and others 1991). It is practicallyimpossible to obtain vegetation, terrain and weather conditionsfor a grid this size by direct sampling. The vegetation gridwas digitized from cover type maps and the terrain grid wasobtained from a digital elevation model. But the study lackedthe means to describe weather methodically on a fine grid.In fact, a fire weather model for the Los Padres study grid istheoretically possible, but computationally impractical.

Computer models are used to describe weather worldwideevery day. The National Weather Service Medium-RangeForecast model (MRF) runs on a 160 km grid (approximately).At this resolution, the model hardly sees the Sierra NevadaRange. The spatial resolution is much better in the NestedSpectral Model (NSM), an as yet experimental model with agrid interval of 25 km (Juang and Kanamitsu 1994). TheNSM is much more descriptive than the MRF (fig. 1), but itstill lacks the detail needed for a fire simulation. We aredeveloping a fire weather model for Maui, Hawaii thatemploys a 2 km grid interval. To our knowledge, it is one ofthe most spatially descriptive fire weather models of its kind.

A High-Resolution Weather Model for FireBehavior Simulations 1

Francis M. Fujioka 2 John O. Roads Kyozo Ueyoshi Shyh-Chin Chen 3

An application of the Colorado State University RAMScode (Walko and Tremback 1991), the Maui weather modelsimulates dynamical changes in temperature, humidity, windand precipitation fields, among others. Snapshots of themodel fields every few minutes can provide weatherinformation for fire simulations. The model grid ishierarchical. A National Meteorological Center coarse gridanalysis describes the large-scale weather pattern over thestate of Hawaii. Nested within this grid is a finer grid overthe main islands of Hawaii. The densest grid is a 2 km gridcentered on Maui (fig. 2).

We are just beginning the Maui modeling study.Preliminary results show tantalizing detail of the windcirculation over Maui. In one case, the model describedlocally stagnant winds where smoke dispersion tends to be aproblem. We plan to verify the model to the extent possible,with a mesoscale network of automatic weather stations inMaui’s central valley. We produced computer visualizationsof the model output that show the motions of simulated airparticles released at the 2 km grid points. Each particle iscolor-coded according to the wind speed at its location. Theparticles also leave streaks, similarly color-coded, thataccentuate the flow field.

The model calculations are not trivial. It takes about 12hours of computer time to produce a 12 hour simulation on a100 Mhz workstation. The model physics and the number ofgrid points require a powerful number cruncher. But computersno doubt will run faster, and spatially detailed fire weatherinformation is needed.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosyystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Research Meteorologist, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDAForest Service, Riverside, CA 92507.

3Research Meteorologists, Climate Research Division, University ofCalifornia Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla, CA 92093.



Figure 1 –A comparison of the Medium-Range Forecast (MRF; left) and Nested Spectral Model (NSM; right) forecasts.The gray scale depicts topographic elevation bands, and the vectors represent the wind field.


ReferencesJuang, H.-M. H.; Kanamitsu, Masao. 1994. The NMC nested regional

spectral model. Monthly Weather Review 122: 3-26.Kalabokidis, Kostas D.; Hay, Claire M.; Hussin, Yousif A. 1991. Spatially

resolved fire growth simulation. In: Andrews, Patricia L.; Potts, DonaldF., editors. Proceedings, 11th conference on fire and forest meteorology;1991 April 16-19; Missoula, Montana. Bethesda, Maryland: Society ofAmerican Foresters; 188-195.

Walko, Robert L.; Tremback, Craig J. 1991. RAMS, the RegionalAtmospheric Modeling System, Version 2c, user’s guide. ASTeR,Inc. Ft. Collins, Colorado; 89 p.

Figure 2 –An average of the flow patterns at lower levels in July 1988clearly shows an eddy on the lower northwestern flanks of Haleakala, Maui.


Using a Geographic Information System (GIS) to AssessFire Hazard and Monitor Natural Resources Protection onthe Mount Tamalpais Watershed 1

Thomas H. Gaman Philip Langley 2

A natural resource management geographic informationsystem (GIS) was developed that has proven useful in

urban interface fire hazard mitigation planning and naturalresource protection. A consultant team, selected to preparethe Vegetation Baseline Studies and Management Plan forthe Mount Tamalpais Watershed in Marin County, California,

obtained data from a variety of sources to create 25 datalayers using BASEMAP 2000 GIS. The system provided apractical means for spatial data analysis and storage. It wasalso used extensively for graphic map production for the20,000-acre watershed of the Marin Municipal Water Districtand the Marin County Open Space District.


2Foresters, Forest Data, PO Box 276, Inverness, CA 94937.




The Old Topanga Fire arrived in the Malibu neighborhoodof upper Las Flores Canyon after 3 p.m. on Tuesday,

November 2, 1993. Virtually every home survived the initial10-minute passage of the flame front, but nearly allexperienced a rain of hot embers that continued past dawnon Wednesday. One surviving home was protected by poolwater, Class A foam concentrate, and a fire pump designedfor home-owners living in the wildland/urban interface (fig.1). This Malibu resident is the first known civilian to save a

structure from wildfire using Class A foam technology. Thefire pump, a Defender Foam System model #501 manu-factured by Brushfire Hydrant Co. in Walnut Creek,California, was delivered in March 1991 (fig. 2). The systemsustained extensive damage by the fire, but never failedduring 6 hours of operation. The original design was awardedUnited States patent 4,671,315 in 1987 as the portablebrushfire hydrant. When the patent expires in 2004, thesurviving system will be offered to the Smithsonian Institution.

Homeowner Intervention in Malibu 1

Tom Gardner 2


2Project Engineer, Brushfire Hydrant Company, Walnut Creek, CA94596.

Figure 2 –Portable fire pump used by a homeowner to protect hisresidence with pool water and Class A foam concentrate.


Figure 1 –A home located in upper Las Flores Canyon, Malibu,California, that survived the Old Topanga Fire because of homeownerpreparations.



Historical accounts from early Spanish explorers whocame to California looking for gold indicate that often

they saw many columns of smoke rising from distantmountains. Little did these explorers know that what theywere witnessing was a time-tested demonstration of naturallightning fires and/or “controlled burning,” a techniquepracticed by Native Americans to prevent wildfires in thearea’s wildlands. Today we know this early fire ecologyphilosophy helped shape California’s ecological history.

But in the years that followed the Spanish explorers,controlled burning by new migrations of settlers colonizingthe West was thought to be destructive to our wildlands untila modern-day pioneer in fire ecology training came along.That man was Harold Biswell. His teaching and trainingactivities in fire ecology, especially in southern California’sSan Diego County, during the 1970’s and 80’s continue toinfluence today’s ecologist working to restore fire to theforests, chaparral, and grasslands in this region. Biswell wasable to “transcend” the barrier between scientist and classroom.His “hands-on” concept of training and applying prescribedfire techniques is considered by many observers to be aunique approach to California’s wildlands management.

Harold brought his wisdom and experience to southernCalifornia during the middle 1970’s, when fire suppressionphilosophy and policy had become entrenched in governmentand public agencies responsible for wildlands fire control.Agency leaders were convinced that prescribed fire was ofno value in chaparral and forest vegetation management.They believed it would adversely affect too many peopleand increase the threat of liability. In fact, during this period,the idea of prescribed fire technology and training waspractically non-existent. But Harold Biswell, on the otherhand, firmly believed in the importance of fire and its role innature’s plan. He based his beliefs on extensive researchthat examined not only the thousands of years of “naturalfires” that had occurred in California, but also how NativeAmericans used fire in shaping the state’s landscape. The


2Area Farm Advisor Emeritus for Natural Resources Management, Uni-versity of California Cooperative Extension, San Bernardino County, 777 E.Rialto Ave., San Bernardino, CA 92415

3Prescribed Fire Specialist and Chief of Agricultural Services, San DiegoCounty Department of Agriculture, Building 3, 5555 Overland Ave., SanDiego, CA.

The Legacy of Harold Biswell in Southern California:His Teaching Influence on the Use of Prescribed Fire 1

Walter L. Graves 2 Gary Reece 3

message was long overdue when “Doc” Biswell began hiseducational and training programs in San Diego Countynearly 20 years ago. His persistent and tireless efforts atpromoting the restoration of fire to its evolutionary role inthis region eventually influenced and encouraged stategovernment leaders and others to lay aside the “myths” offire exclusion in southern California.

SummaryWe believe our videotape showing the following field

day and workshop at the William Heise County Park in SanDiego County in May 1983 illustrates Harold Biswell’s teachingand training methodology in fire ecology and the importanceof restoring (controlled) fire to our wildlands. Truly,California’s history was born of fire, and this video capturesProfessor Harold Biswell’s teaching emphasis on fire as anatural component of wildland ecosystems, Native Americans’use of fire in wildland ecosystems, smoke management, theimportance of prescribed fire in fire management, theimportance of training in fire management, and the educationof the public about fire’s role in ecosystem management.

AcknowledgmentsWe thank the Cooperative Extension Visual Media staff

at the University of California, Davis–Harry Stoble, StevenLock, and Robert Singleton–for helping us, with extremepatience, to produce this video. We especially appreciate thewillingness of Visual Media’s Coordinator, Rosalind Rickard,to allow these video production specialists to participate inthis venture. We also want to applaud San Diego County’sDepartment of Parks and Recreation for their courage inimplementing a prescribed fire program at a time in ourhistory when this concept was not considered popular.




residents in fire-prone ecosystems about reducing risk. Theunit is also developing studies to address the relationshipbetween awareness of fire risk and hazard reduction activitiesamong wildland-urban interface homeowners. As part ofthis research, four categories of these homeowners will beidentified, on the basis of their hazard assessment rating andwildfire risk awareness:

• Low hazard rating and Aware of fire risk (L/A)• Low hazard rating and Unaware of fire risk (L/U)• High hazard rating and Aware of fire risk (H/A)• High hazard rating and Unaware of fire risk (H/U)

Conceptual ApproachesThe success of these studies will depend on conducting

personal interviews. In addition to demographic questions(Bureau of the Census-type questions), open-ended questionswill be designed to ascertain the homeowners’ perception ofwildfire risk around their homes, such as:

• How long have you lived at your current residence?• If a fire occurred, how would firefighters locate your

property?• Have you experienced a wildfire at or near your home?• Before that fire, were you concerned that a wildfire

might occur?• How often do wildfires occur in your neighborhood?• If your home burned down tomorrow, what would you

miss most?

Using a “wildfire hazard rating form” (Great LakesForest Fire Compact 1992), the interviewer and homeownercould rate site hazards (e.g., surrounding trees, type of groundcover, fuel storage), structural hazards (roofing materials,decks, and overhangs), and existing hazard reduction (treespruned, leaves raked, roof cleaned outbuildings hazard-free).A “property hazard value” could be calculated by adding thetotal site hazard to the total structural hazard and subtractingthe total hazard reduction.

In conjunction with these studies, geographic informationsystem (GIS) databases could be built and maintained tostore: (1) the information obtained during the interviews, (2)the owner’s perception of risk, and (3) the “property hazardvalue.” This information would facilitate queries like “howmany” and “location of” the homesites with a given propertyhazard, owner risk-perception strata, or a combination ofattributes. A GIS would also support tests for differences indemographic and site characteristics between homesiteswith low/high hazard ratings and homeowners with low/high risk awareness.

Abstract: Researchers in Michigan are designing and supportingstudies to facilitate the identification of fire hazards on homesitesin the wildland-urban interface, to elicit homeowners’ perceptionsof the wildfire risk where they live, and to assess the values thatresidents in fire-prone ecosystems place on reducing wildfire risk.A better understanding of the attitudes and values of interfaceresidents will aid prevention specialists in targeting programs tohelp these residents mitigate wildfire hazards and reduce potentiallosses on their properties.

To help homeowners in the wildland-urban interfaceimprove the chance that their homes will survive a

wildfire, prevention specialists need to understand the manyand varied reasons why homeowners choose to live wherethey do. They need to know which wildfire hazards arepresent on the homeowners’ property that would increaselosses to wildland fire. They also need to assess thehomeowners’ perception of wildfire risk (the probabilitythat a wildfire will threaten their property).

Typically, prevention programs have been focused onthe segment of the wildland-urban interface population thatis most aware of wildfire risk and is most willing to removeor mitigate hazards on their property to reduce risk of propertydamage. A better understanding of risk perception andattitudes toward hazard reduction could help preventionspecialists assess the understanding, values, and needs of allhomeowners residing in the wildland-urban interface.

Morgan (1993) asserts that “the public can be verysensible about risk when companies, regulators, and otherinstitutions give it the opportunity.” He further states thatrisk communication is simple: “Learn what people alreadybelieve, tailor the communication to this knowledge and tothe decisions people face and then subject the resultingmessage to careful empirical evaluation.”

The USDA Forest Service’s Atmospheric andSocioeconomic Relationships with Wildland Fire Work Unit,North Central Forest Experiment Station, is supportingcooperative research at Michigan State University (Fried1993) that will increase the knowledge of homeowners’perceptions of wildfire risk and will assess the values of


2Project Leader—Wildland Fire Research, retired Computer Specialist,and Technical Publications Writer, respectively, North Central Forest Ex-periment Station, USDA Forest Service, 1407 S. Harrison Road, Rm. 220,East Lansing, MI 48823-5290.

3Assistant Professor, Department of Forestry, Michigan State Univer-sity, 110 Natural Resources Bldg., East Lansing, MI 48824-1222

Helping Wildland-Urban Interface Residents ReduceWildfire Hazards 1

Warren E. Heilman 2 Jeremy S. Fried 3 William A. Main 2 Donna M. Paananen 2



Anticipated BenefitsDepending on how the database is sorted and analyzed,

researchers can obtain a variety of information rangingfrom whether fire hazards are associated with income tothe number of homeowners in each of the identifiedcategories. Results can aid the wildfire preventioncommunity’s understanding of the knowledge, attitudes,and needs of homeowners who reside in the wildland-urban interface. Prevention specialists can use thisinformation to select specific prevention programs forspecific groups of homeowners and provide policymakerswith information that can help them in developing cost-efficient programs to reduce the risks associated with firein wildland-urban interfaces.

Acknowledgments We thank Donald Johnson, fire prevention specialist at

the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, ForestManagement Division, Lansing, Michigan, for providingbackground information about wildfire hazard rating.

ReferencesFried, J.S. 1993. Valuing social and economic impacts of fire at the

urban-wildland interface: a proposal. Unpublished study, USDAForest Service Cooperative Agreement #23-93-32.

Great Lakes Forest Fire Compact. 1992. Wildfire: are you and yourhome prepared? Ontario: Great Lakes Forest Fire Compact; 30 p.

Morgan, M. Granger. 1993. Risk analysis and management. ScientificAmerican 269 (1): 32-41.



Mt. Diablo Park: The Role of Fire in a Controversyabout Cattle Grazing at the Urban Fringe 1

Lynn Huntsinger Jeremy Fried Lita Buttolph 2

Mt. Diablo State Park is in rapidly urbanizing CentralContra Costa County, a few miles inland from the

eastern San Francisco Bay. The Park encompasses 18,000acres of mountainous and rolling oak woodlands, chaparral,and grasslands, increasingly surrounded by San FranciscoBay Area suburbs. Easily accessible to millions of nearbyurban dwellers, Mt. Diablo is among the most frequented ofthe California State Park System’s 300 units, with more than500,000 visits annually. The 1989 Park General Plan setgoals for the park that included managing to restore naturalprocesses. The Plan called for removal of livestock grazingfrom most of the park. Controversy over the elimination ofgrazing was of surprising vehemence and has lasted years. Asa result, the General Plan process consumed more State Parktime and resources than any previous Plan—even though thiswas not the first time grazing was phased out of a State Park.

Livestock grazing has been a component of the Mt.Diablo landscape since about 1834, when the mountain’sslopes were part of a Mexican land grant. Founded in 1921,the Park has expanded from its original few hundred acres.In 1979, 2,000 acres of Mt. Diablo Ranch were sold and 281acres donated to the State Park System by the owner, AngelKerley. In exchange, a 10-year grazing lease was signed, butparticipants in the controversy disagreed about the nature ofthe lease. Some argued that the intention was for grazing tocontinue in perpetuity as an exhibit of ranching for localresidents, while grazing opponents contended that there isno written evidence supporting this claim. During the lastdecade, Mt. Diablo Ranch, now a small in-holding, leasedabout 7,500 of the Park’s acres for grazing. The 1989 ParkGeneral Plan decision was to not renew the lease, but toinstead graze a few hundred acres for interpretive purposes.

Ecologically and socially, the grazing controversy echoedthose on Federal lands. Plan proponents pointed to the“scientific evidence” that grazing benefits the environment.For example, grazing proponents argued that cattle refill theecological niche left vacant by the absence of native tule elkand pronghorn antelope. Opponents argued that livestockgrazing is significantly different in distribution and diet,

injuring native plants and encouraging the spread of non-native weeds. But the Park’s location on the urban fringeintroduced a third, less typical viewpoint into the argument:local residents who believed that cattle grazing reduced thethreat of wildfire.

The Cow as SymbolThis public lands grazing controversy had all the usual

players: a remnant rural community for whom the cowsymbolized “wise use” of natural resources to improve humanlife, and grazing opponents, for whom the cow symbolizedhuman exploitation and abuse of natural resources. A newelement was added because of the Park’s suburban-fringelocale: a suburban public concerned about the hazard ofwildland fires spreading to nearby residences. As a result,active participants in the Mt. Diablo debate included ownersof high-priced homes near the Park. This wealthy, well-educated group strongly supported continued grazing in thePark and had the support of many local business interests.

Left ungrazed, the annual grasses of Mt. Diablo’s slopesoften reach 5 feet tall. Tinder-dry in summer and fall, theypose a considerable fire hazard. In Mediterranean climatezones worldwide, wildfire is a normal part of ecosystemfunction, as it is at Mt. Diablo. Grazing advocates, includingsome local Fire Chiefs, believe that grazing reduces firehazard by removing biomass, and perhaps more importantly,preventing brush encroachment into grasslands. Opponentsof grazing believe that only overgrazing reduces fire hazard,and believe that prescribed burning, mowing, and othertechniques should be used instead of grazing. Unfortunately,in rapidly growing Contra Costa County, increasingdevelopment of wildlands and air quality restrictions canmake extensive vegetation management practices, such asprescribed burning, costly and sometimes controversial.Letters from a local homeowner’s association, for example,complained of unsightly blackened earth after a burn.

An Urban Fringe ControversyThe wildfire threat lent unusual power and financing to

the pro-grazing side of the issue, contrary to the usual patternof an “anti-grazing” block composed of people without ruralroots. With homes near the Park commonly priced at morethan $300,000, residents pay a premium for living near


2Assistant Professor of Environmental Science, University of California,Berkeley, CA 94720; Assistant Professor of Forestry, Michigan State Uni-versity, 110 Natural Resources Bldg., East Lansing, MI 48824-1222; Gradu-ate Student Researcher, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322.



nature. They expect nature to be a “good neighbor.” Thisexpectation affects their view of land management policyand practice. In some places, urban residents dislike livingnear grazing operations. Livestock owners complain abouttrespass problems and depredation by pet dogs. At Mt.Diablo, a vocal portion of the local residents believed thatthe benefits of fire hazard reduction outweighed anyinconvenience caused by the proximity of cattle. The livestockowner allied himself with these interests, and the controversybecame a divisive and drawn-out one.

Suburbanites often move to the suburbs to escape urbandangers, and to make a long-term, secure investment in ahome. For many in this controversy, the cow symbolizes asafe relationship with nature. By consuming flammablebiomass, the cow seems to make the mountain a less capriciousneighbor. This vision of the Park as a good neighbor makesrestoration of natural processes difficult, particularly when

one of the most important natural processes at Mt. Diablo isfire. Allowing development to border parks in which thegoal is to restore natural processes makes achieving thatgoal nearly impossible. Ranch lands might be a valuablebuffer between urban/suburban areas and protected orpreserved natural systems. Ranches can provide an incometo private landowners, yet connect preserved areas for wildlifeand buffer developed areas from wildfire, prescribed burning,and other management activities. At the same time, theymay buffer preserved areas from pets, vandals, and otherintensive human impacts. Unfortunately, although thoseconcerned with the protection of wildland systems andrestoration of natural processes are distracted by theirextremely polarized view of that ubiquitous rural resident,the cow, the prospects of achieving effective conservation ofnatural systems have become ever more remote because ofurban sprawl.



Since the early 1960’s, Caribbean pine (Pinus caribaeavar. hondurensis) has been used for reforestation in

northeastern Nicaragua. Caribbean pine is a species thatgrows naturally in the area, but its occurrence has increasedbecause of its use, almost exclusively, as a reforestationspecies. It is thought to rely on the introduction of fire tosuccessfully regenerate in tropical broadleaf zones (Perry1991). Stands in northeastern Nicaragua, however, have beensubject to an intolerably high fire frequency in recent years.In the area under study, 90 percent of the pine stands burnevery year (fig. 1). Whether resource managers can turnaround a self-perpetuating, downward spiral in resourceproduction is an issue of critical importance for future ruraleconomic development in the Miskito region. The currentpathological fire frequency in the Caribbean pine savannasresults from a combination of high levels of fire risk fromhuman sources, and extremely flammable savanna fuels thatthrive on fire. These pines are highly resistant to fire and arerarely killed, although they suffer severe setbacks in woodproduction and vigor for a number of years after a fire (fig.2). The severe fire regime of the last 10 years has reducedthe volume increment for the pines to 60 percent of itspotential (Koonce and others 1993). Even if the introductionof fire into Caribbean pine stands is necessary, the stands ofthe Miskito Coast region of Nicaragua are examples of “toomuch, too often.” Current and planned research in theregion has the general goal of determining fire regimes thatwill optimize the vitality of northeastern Nicaragua’s naturalresources. Current studies are geared toward mitigation ofunwanted fire effects, and understanding stand dynamicsunder the current fire regime.

ReferencesKoonce, Andrea L.; Paysen, Timothy E.; Taylor, Edwin. 1993. Fire

protection and restoration of forests in Nicaragua. OICD Proposalfor joint research with Nicaragua. USDA Forest Service, PacificSouthwest Research Station, Riverside Forest Fire Laboratory, Riverside,California. 4 p.

Perry, Jessy P. 1991. Pines of Mexico and Central America. Portland,OR: Timber Press; 231 p.


2 Research Forester, Research Forester, and Ecologist, respectively,Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 4955 CanyonCrest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507.

Fire in a Tropical Savanna—a Double-Edged Sword 1

Andrea L. Koonce, Timothy E. Paysen, and Bonni M. Corcoran 2

Figure 1 –Area under study in northeastern Nicaragua. The boggylowlands of the Miskito coast region are predominately coveredwith Caribbean pine savannas.

Figure 2 –A typical stand of Caribbean pine in the study area. Theunderstory sedges are highly flammable.




Abstract: Fire managers know the wildland-urban interface fireproblem is a people problem, but recognizing and addressing it arenot the same. Managers have repeatedly stressed the need to avoidbuilding with flammable materials and landscaping with fire-pronevegetation. Yet, residents continually fail to heed their warnings.Apparently, people not only respond poorly to warnings but tendto be oblivious to events that disastrously influence their propertyand lives. Also, the building trades build to satisfy people’s de-sires, community plans do not address the interface fire issue, andgovernments have been unwilling to enact ordinances that controlconstruction. Above all, fire managers would rather “talk” aboutpublic involvement than be immersed in it. These barriers may beremoved, if fire managers overcome their reluctance to publicinvolvement and become leaders in two-way communication withthe people they wish to influence. These goals may be achieved iffire managers will seek training in the social sciences that empha-sizes interpersonal relations, multicultural relations, and commu-nication strategies.

Fire managers know the wildland-urban interface fireproblem is a people problem, but recognizing the problem

and addressing it in ways that are apt to cause interfaceresidents to change their behavior are two different things.Fire managers recommend to people who move into thewildland-urban interface that they build fire-safe homes andprotect them with defensible space. Yet, they are continuallyfrustrated by residents who apparently do not hear or heedtheir warnings and recommendations to fireproof their homesand yards. Why, when taking action to protect their homefrom a wildfire seems obvious, do a majority of people failto comply with fire-safe procedures?

Difficulties in CommunicationManagers are quite comfortable dealing with “things,”

such as equipment, planning strategies, and fire behavior,but they gladly will let somebody else deal with people. Yet,the interface fire problem mandates that managers deal withpeople, like it or not. So, fire prevention managers need tobecome directly involved with their intended audience andto emphasize that building fire-safe communities can beprofitable for business as well as environmentally pleasing

to residents. However, accomplishing the task will requirethat managers reduce their concern with the technical andfunctional aspects of interface fires and become personallyinvolved in two-way communication with homeowners,business people, and community leaders.

Communicating with homeowners is not easy, becausepeople not only tend to respond poorly to warnings but tend tobe oblivious to events that can have a disastrous influence ontheir property and lives. People tend to have varying awarenessof environmental hazards. They tend to believe that variousevents “can’t happen to them” whereas others’ behaviordemonstrates coping with or denial of hazardous events.

People in the building trades are aware that people wantnice homes in attractive locations, so they have constructedattractive homes in the urban-wildland interface—homesthat satisfy the locational, architectural, and landscape dreamsof potential buyers, but contribute to the interface fire problem.If fire managers are to achieve their goals, they must confrontand convince home building professionals to use fire-safematerials and designs.

Community plans frequently do not address the interfacefire issue, and local governments have been unable orunwilling to enact ordinances that control development andconstruction. The unwillingness of governments to enactfire legislation may be related to an avoidance by politiciansto be associated with actions that may be viewed unfavorablyby their constituency (Sampson 1991). Regardless, firemanagers must contact and encourage planners, local officials,and legislators to develop effective zoning ordinances.

In addition, managers should work with insurancecompanies to develop policy incentives that support localplans and ordinances. Overall, premiums for homes built infire prone areas should reflect the higher costs associatedwith the greater risks, but they might be somewhat reducedfor those homeowners who adapt to fire-safe road designs,architectural designs, and building materials.

Manager attitudes also bear on the communicationproblem as a consequence of their preference for workingwith “things” rather than people. They tend to “talk” moreabout public involvement rather than immersing themselvesin it. For the most part, evidence of this preference bymanagers is rather subtle and is depicted by actual behavioras contrasted with professed behavior.

Recommendations and ConclusionsPeople—whether homeowners, design and construction

professionals, or public officials—may be enticed toparticipate in fire safety programs provided they are given

People—Fire Managers Must Talk With Them 1

Arthur W. Magill 2


2Principal Resource Analyst (retired), Pacific Southwest Research Sta-tion, USDA Forest Service, 4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507.



Fire managers, like other resource professionals, tend tobe disinclined to initiate social interaction and to avoidsituations involving abstract concepts and alternativesolutions. The barriers may be removed, however, if firemanagers overcome their reluctance to be directly involvedwith citizen involvement programs and establish two-waycommunication with the people they wish to influence. Thesegoals may be achieved if fire managers pursue continuingeducation in the social sciences that emphasizes interpersonaland multicultural relations, and communication strategies.

ReferencesSampson, R. Neil. 1991. The politics of the environment. Journal of Soil

and Water Conservation 46(6):398-400.

clear messages, presented by credible individuals who specifynecessary actions, and provided the messages are reinforcedlocally. Fire managers should be considered the credibleauthorities on interface wildfires. They are especially effectiveas authorities if they have established themselves in acommunity through direct involvement with public educationand involvement programs, and by soliciting the help ofcommunity leaders through dialogue to fortify the meaningand importance of their messages. The factors proven effectivefor warning of imminent hazards suggest that warnings beclear, specific for the desired response, derived from a crediblesource, reinforced locally, and conveyed by a positive messageon prime-time television.



The Effects of Forest Fire Smoke on Firefighters 1

Richard J. Mangan 2

Abstract: Each fire season, 20,000 to 30,000 firefighters are en-gaged in suppressing wildfires and conducting prescribed burns onfederal lands, and many more are employed in fire suppression onState and private lands. Studies of firefighter exposure to smokeand carbon monoxide indicated only occasional exposure until the1987-1988 fire seasons in the West. During the 1988 Yellowstonefires, 12,000 respiratory problems were reported to medical per-sonnel. To address this problem, the National Wildfire Coordinat-ing Group (NWCG) assigned the USDA Forest Service’s MissoulaTechnology and Development Center (MTDC) the responsibilityto coordinate the national effort looking at the health effects ofsmoke on wildland firefighters. An interagency Technical Panelhas been formed to provide direction and set priorities, and semi-annual newsletters (“Health Hazards of Smoke”) are distributed tomore than 7,000 firefighters nationally and internationally.

Each year, tens of thousands of wildland firefighters areinvolved in wildfire suppression and prescribed burning

on millions of acres in the United States. For many years, theeffects of exposure to smoke and carbon monoxide has beena minor concern, but has never emerged as a high priority.But, in 1987 and 1988, serious smoke inversions lastingmany days and weeks caused significant respiratory problemsin large numbers of wildland firefighters.

In 1989, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group(NWCG) assigned the USDA Forest Service’s MissoulaTechnology and Development Center to coordinate the nationaleffort and serve as the focal point for ongoing and futurestudies on the effects of wildland fire smoke on firefighters.

Study AreasAt a 1989 workshop in San Diego sponsored by NWCG

and Johns Hopkins University, participants representingfirefighters, union leaders, fire management specialists,occupational medicine, toxicology, industrial hygiene, firechemistry, and protective equipment identified eight majorareas of study that would encompass the concerns about thehealth effects of smoke:

• Retrospective Cohort Mortality Study—to determine ifthe long-range health of a firefighter is adversely affectedas a result of past exposures to smoke;

• Prospective Injury and Illness Study—to develop a currentsystem of data collection regarding wildland firefighterinjury and illness to prospectively assess the role ofsmoke in the etiology of acute and long-term injury andillness;

• Chronic Pulmonary Function Study—to determine ifwildland firefighters experience a chronic, acceleratedloss of lung function during multiple fire seasons;

• Integrated Field Study—to establish a mobile team ofindustrial hygienists, wildland fire experts and occupationalmedicine specialists to conduct an intensive, integrated 3-year field study;

• Combustion Product Characterization and Toxicity Study—to develop sampling techniques, study combustionconditions and test diverse fuel conditions;

• Expanded Field Exposure Study—to provide firefighterswith efficient methods for monitoring exposure anddetecting cumulative effects;

• Integrated Risk Assessment—to assess the risk of exposureamong firefighters;

• Risk Management—to develop an interactive programfor use by fire management personnel to select riskmanagement options based upon local conditions.

Completed StudiesAs of this time, completed studies of breathing zone air

samples collected from wildland firefighters and prescribedburners indicated some potential for hazardous exposure(respirable particulates, carbon monoxide, formaldehyde,acrolein). While these exposures have occasionally exceededshort-term exposure limits, very few cases have approachedor exceeded allowable time-weighted averages. Smokeexposure from wildfires is not considered immediatelydangerous to life and health.

Studies on the respiratory effects of smoke exposure onwildland firefighters indicate that exposure during a fireseason may result in small changes in lung function. Thehealth implications of short-term exposure and the potentialhealth effects of long-term exposures have not been quantified.

Laboratory and field studies of respiratory protectivedevices have been conducted. Laboratory studies have focusedon the effects of air-purifying respirators on work performance

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in the Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Fire and Aviation Program Leader, Missoula Technologyand Development Center, USDA Forest Service, Missoula, MT 59801.



and on ways to predict the ability of firefighters to workwhile wearing a respirator. Field studies have included asurvey to determine the field use of respirators, other methodsof risk management, and field trial to evaluate a wide rangeof respirators in actual working conditions.

Current StudiesCurrent projects under the NWCG study include

continued efforts to characterize the hazards of smoke, andto determine the health effects of repeated exposures;laboratory studies of the use of respirators and their effects

on upper body work performance; field trials of existing andprototype respirators, smoke monitoring devices, medicalevaluation and surveillance; and risk management strategies.

AcknowledgmentsBrian J. Sharkey, Project Leader at Missoula Technology

and Development Center (MTDC) and Professor of HumanPhysiology at the University of Montana, has been primarilyresponsible for initiating and guiding the “Health Hazards ofSmoke” effort sponsored by the National WildfireCoordinating Group (NWCG).




2Ecologists, USDA Forest Service, 4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside,CA 92507.

3Research Forester, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA ForestService, 4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507.

4Professor, Biology Department, California State University, San Ber-nardino, 5500 University Way, San Bernardino, CA 92407.

Abstract: Giant saguaro cacti (Carnegiea gigantea) and associ-ated vegetation are being burned by numerous wildfires, especiallyin areas of high public use. Specific fire effects on affected plantspecies and ecosystem resilence need to be defined, and manage-ment techniques for restoration of burned areas need to be devel-oped. A research effort was initiated at the Saguaro Natural ScenicArea, Tonto National Forest, Arizona to determine how fire im-pacts saguaro community structure and species composition; tomonitor fire ignition and spread patterns; and to analyze saguarosurvival, vitality and abundance, and genome variabilty. Resultsfrom this study should improve our understanding of fire in thesaguaro community and facilitate implementation of a pro-activefire management program.

Saguaro cacti (Carnegiea gigantea) and associatedvegetation attract national and international tourists to

the Sonoran desert in Arizona. Saguaros are an integralcomponent of the biodiversity of both flora and fauna in thisdesert. Unfortunately, numerous wildfires concentrated inareas of high public use are destroying the saguaro andseverely degrading many popular vistas, especially along theSaguaro Natural Scenic Area, Tonto National Forest, Arizona.

Fire HistoryAlthough a historical fire regime for this vegetation

type is not presently known, natural fires have probably notbeen a major selecting force for much of the vegetation inthe Sonoran desert. However, anthropogenic impacts includethe introduction and expansion of alien plant species,especially grasses. Their growth has been accompanied byan increase in fire frequency, intensity, and extent. Thischange in fire regime may now threaten many non-fire adaptedspecies. Of particular concern is the tropically evolved saguaro.

In many locations on the Tonto National Forest, thecombination of herbaceous and shrub layers, including themany introduced species, form nearly contiguous and highly

flammable fuels in the saguaros’ range. Increased growth isespecially common during years with heavy precipitation.On the Tonto National Forest, precipitation averages 7.66inches. Rainfall was recorded at 14.24 inches and 13.34inches for 1992 and 1993 respectively. In 1993, after these 2years of above normal rainfall, 104 fires (twice the yearlyaverage) were recorded on the Mesa Ranger District, TontoNational Forest. These fires included both accidental anddeliberate fire ignitions. One arsonist is believed to havebeen responsible for setting multiple fires that burned hundredsof acres. These acres included prime tourist attraction areassuch as the Desert Vista View Observation Point on thepopular Bee-Line Highway.

Saguaro and FireSaguaro can grow to heights of 18 m, weigh more than 2

tons, and is estimated to live about 200 years (Holden andFarrell 1991). Wildfire may kill significant numbers of cactiand succulents that characterize the saguaro communities(Thomas 1991, Rogers 1985, Mclaughlin and Bowers 1982).Specific fire effects on plant species and ecosystem resiliencehave yet to be defined (Ahlstrand 1982).

Fire affects saguaro reproduction and survival. Generally,only one seed in 1,000 may germinate; less than 1 percent ofthese will survive more than 6 weeks (Holden and Farrell1991). Fire may contribute to an increase in juvenile mortality.Saguaro growth is slow, especially during the first few years.In nature, approximate size/age relationships for saguaro are1 cm in height after 5 years, 1 m after 30 yr, and 10 m after100 years (Holden and Farrell 1991). Fire injury may alsolead to increased mortality of mature saguaro (Thomas 1991).

Nurse plants, such as the palo verde, are reported to benecessary for saguaro reproduction and survival (Gibsonand Nobel 1986, McAuliffe 1984, Vandermeer 1980).Ironically, nurse plants may contribute to higher saguaromortality from fire because of increased local fuel loading.

Fire ManagementRogers (1986) compared fire occurrence in desert and

nondesert vegetation on the Tonto National Forest from1955 to 1983; desert fires were fewer, larger, andunsuppressed, compared to the more numerous but smallernondesert fires. A recent update of the fire frequency andacreage burned during the last recorded decade (1983 to1992) showed similar trends (figs. 1 and 2). Ninety percent

Burning in Arizona’s Giant Cactus Community 1

Marcia G. Narog 2 Andrea L. Koonce 3 Ruth C. Wilson 4 Bonni M. Corcoran 2



Figure 1 –Total acreage burned on the Tonto National Forest, Arizonafrom 1973 to 1992.

Figure 2 –Total number of fires recorded on the Tonto National Forest,Arizona from 1973 to 1992.

of this desert vegetation class is composed of the saguaroplant association. Cave and Patton (1984) evaluated wildfireversus controlled burning in the Sonoran desert. They provideevidence that fire alters species composition and dramaticallyreduces cacti presence. They concluded “that any efforts touse prescribed burning should remain experimental until along-term data base exists on which to make more reliablepredictions.” Apparently, hundreds of fire ignitions occurand thousands of acres are burned in saguaro habitats.Although this fire problem continues, this vegetation typestill has low priority for fire suppression resources, such asequipment, personnel, and dollars.

Current ResearchTo justify greater expenditures of fire suppression

resources on the saguaro community, the Tonto NationalForest requested that the Prescribed Fire Research Unit ofthe Pacific Southwest Research Station develop strategiesthat would be effective for the Tonto’s fire managementprogram. In order to evaluate alternatives, some basic researchmust first be conducted.

Our study area is located in the northeast section of thesaguaro’s range on the Mesa Ranger District, Tonto NationalForest. For our preliminary investigations, we have definedfour major objectives: examining fire effects on saguarocommunity structure and composition, including differentplant strategies such as germination or resprouting after fire;monitoring fire ignition and spread patterns during prescribedburns; analyzing the impact of fire on saguaro survival,vitality and abundance; and studying fire effects on saguarogenome variability. We are currently designing studyparameters and will be implementing a 5-year study evaluatingprescription burning and areas previously burned by wildfirein the saguaro community.

SummaryWe believe that fire suppression strategies need to be

implemented to limit fire spread with minimal habitatdisturbance. Currently, we need more information on factorsthat contribute to flammability and fire damage in thisecosystem. After our objectives in this study are met,management strategies and techniques need to be developedfor aggressive restoration of fire degraded areas.

ReferencesAhlstrand, Gary M. 1982. Response of Chihuahuan desert mountain shrub

vegetation to burning. Journal of Range Management 35(1): 62-65.Cave, George H.; Patten, Duncan T. 1984. Short-term vegetation responses

to fire in the upper Sonoran Desert. Journal of Range Management37(6): 491-496.

Gibson, Arthur C.; Nobel, Park S. 1986. The cactus primer. Cambridge,MA: Harvard Univ. Press; 153-160.

Holden, Wesley; Farrell, Robert J., eds. 1991. All about saguaros: Arizonahighways book. Phoenix: Arizona Department of Transportation; 6 p.

McAuliffe, Joseph R. 1984. Sahuaro-nurse tree associations in theSonoran Desert: competitive effects of sahuaros. Oecologia 64:319-321.

McLaughlin, Steven P.; Bowers, Janice E. 1982. Effects of wildfire on asonoran desert plant community. Ecology 63(1): 246-248.

Rogers, Garry F. 1985. Mortality of burned Cereus gigantus. Ecology66(2): 630-632.

Rogers, Garry F. 1986. Comparison of fire occurrence in desert andnondesert vegetation in Tonto National Forest, Arizona. Madrono33(4): 278-283.

Thomas, P.A. 1991. Response of succulents to fire: a review. InternationalJournal of Wildland Fire 1(1):11-22.

Vandermeer, John. 1980. Saguaros and nurse trees: a new hypothesis toaccount for population fluctuations. The Southwestern Naturalist25(3): 357-360.



A Computer Program for Evaluating Prescribed Fire Costs 1

Philip N. Omi Douglas B. Rideout Stephen J. Botti 2

Abstract: How much should prescribed fires cost? What are rea-sonable cost estimates for conducting a burn, in terms of sitepreparation, ignition, and containment? How might a managerascertain if proposed costs are reasonable? Similar questions arisefor any prescribed fire program that involves a large geographicarea. A computer program was developed to answer such ques-tions, based on regression analysis of historical records withinregions of the USDI National Park Service (NPS). Although re-stricted to the NPS, we discovered a cost structure for fuel treat-ments that should apply generally. Cost estimates were found to besensitive to management objectives, geographic region, projectsize, complexity of burn, and potential for escape. The computerprogram is written in PASCAL and designed to address the entirerange of environmental, ecological, and economic factors consid-ered in the NPS prescribed fire data base. This information isuseful to land managers, but also should be of general interest forcomparing fire with other alternatives for managing fuels in wild-land and urban interface areas.

The USDI National Park Service (NPS) Hazard FuelSystem was developed to aid prescribed fire management

within the agency, particularly with respect to budgeting andtracking costs for reducing fuel combustibles on NPS lands.Before the development of this system, the NPS (or anyagency) did not have a standardized procedure for assessingthe accuracy of cost requests from field units for proposedprescribed fire projects.

This paper highlights one approach to assess the rangeof reasonable cost requests; this method can be appliedregardless of public agency jurisdiction, geographic locationand management situation.

ObjectiveOur goal was to develop cost target zones (i.e., ranges of

reasonable costs) for fuel treatment projects, based onimportant predictors of cost variability. The computer programwas designed to display these zones in an interactive format.

MethodsWe obtained electronic data files maintained by the

NPS Branch of Fire Management for recent and future hazardfuels projects submitted by park units. The Hazard Fuelsdata set contains specific information on project size, fuelmodel, project type, ranking score, administrative or legislativemandate, complexity score, and descriptive remarks. Hazardfuel projects are meant to lower the impacts of wildlandignitions that might originate in wildland vegetation typesand pose a threat to public safety, structures, improvements,or cultural and natural resources.

Based on historical funding requests from field units,cost target zones were constructed for Hazard Fuel projects(Omi and others 1994) using standard regression procedures.The regression equation and 95 percent confidence intervalwere used in a computer program (written in PASCAL) todisplay the range of acceptable costs for Hazard Fuel projects.The program queries the user about relevant inputs related tothe entire range of environmental, ecological, and economicfactors considered in the NPS data base. This information isuseful to land managers, but also should be of general interestfor comparing fire with other alternatives for managing fuelsin wildland and urban interface areas.

ResultsRegression coefficients were derived from a step-wise

procedure in which all variables in the Hazard Fuels data setwere initially considered in terms of their contribution toexplaining variation in cost requests. The regressioncoefficients explained 91 percent of the variation in (log-transformed) cost. All coefficients were significant (p <0.01), as explained in Omi and others (1994).

A typical screen from the computer program (RXCOST)was developed from our regression analysis (fig. 1) (Stoneand others 1992). Upon entering the program, a user isqueried about size of project (ac), the National Fire DangerRating System (NFDRS) fuel model, management type (fire,mechanical, biological, or chemical treatment), naturalresource rank (1 to 9), and potential for escape (1 to 9). Thecost per acre target and range correspond, respectively, tothe regression prediction and upper (lower) 95 percentconfidence limits. The user may also request a wider ornarrower target zone than the 95 percent confidence intervalby specifying a range greater or less than one. Future costrequests outside the range of acceptability are not necessarilyinvalid; rather, such requests may indicate the need foradditional rationale.


2Professors of Forest Science, Colorado State University. Ft. Collins, CO80523; Fire Program Budget Manager, National Interagency Fire Center,USDI National Park Service, Boise, ID.



Figure 1 –Representative screen from program RXCOST showing average (target)cost per acre of $74.45 for a 250-acre proposed prescribed burn (management typeF) in NFDRS fuel model C, with natural resource rank 8 (high) and moderate potentialfor escape (7) in the Rocky Mountain region. The range specification of 1.00 uses the95 percent confidence interval to set the upper and lower limit for the target. Proposedprojects which exceed $98.62/acre or fall short of $56.20 (i.e., outside upper and lowerlimits) deserve additional scrutiny.

AcknowledgmentsSubmitted in fulfillment of project objectives for contract

CA 1268-1-1-9002, TO#9, Project BIFC-R91-0163, USDINational Park Service. Additional support for this projectwas provided by the McIntire-Stennis Cooperative ForestryResearch Program.

ReferencesOmi, P. N.; Rideout, D. B.; Stone, J.S.; Botti, S. J. 1994. Controlling fuel

treatment costs in the National Park Service. In: Proceedings of the12th conference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October 26-28,Jekyll Island, Georgia; Bethesda, Maryland: Society of American Foresters.

Stone, J. S.; Omi, P. N.; Rideout, D. B. 1992. RXCOST ver 1.01. USDINational Park Service, National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID.

ConclusionsThe cost target zones identified by the computer program

RXCOST (Stone and others 1992) are those projects whosecost requests are either excessive or under-financed, that is,outside the range of historic acceptability. We believe theestimates from the computer program are applicable to awide range of situations, including different geographicregions, fuel conditions, or other project descriptors.Thesecost ranges from the program should be considered asproviding guidance for improved decision-making, but notas the sole criterion for assessing treatment cost. A costrequest that falls outside the range of acceptability (based onthe computer program) should not be rejected without furtherinvestigation. The resulting analysis might reveal thatprojected costs are justifiable because of extenuatingcircumstances associated with a proposed project, for example.Thus, the zones should be applied with the usual discretionand good judgment associated with crucial decisions.



Potential Nitrogen Losses due to Fire from Pinus halepensisStands in the Alicante Province (Southeastern Spain):Mineralomass Variability 1

Antonio Pastor-Lopez Joaquin Martin-Martin 2

Study Area and MethodsThe study was conducted in Aleppo pine stands located

in Alicante province. Alicante is located in the western coastalMediterranean Basin in southeastern Spain (37o 50' to 38o 55'N and 1o 05' to 0o 10' E). The sites were selected out of ageneral survey for the province during 1985. A total of 120stands were sampled in a range of age, climate, and sitequality conditions. The age of the stands considered isrepresentative of that of the plantations started during thenational afforestation program for soil conservation purposesbetween 1945 and 1985. The silvicultural treatments that thestands have undergone include pruning of the lowest branchwhorl 5 years after planting and a later pruning of 1 or 2whorls in the following 10 years. The existing variability ofthe Aleppo pine stands in the Allicante province isrepresentative of that in the Mediterranean Basin as to therange in climate between subhumid and semiarid Mediterraneanconditions (Nahal 1981). From the 120 stands considered, 4master stands were selected, along a site quality range, toelaborate equations describing destructive biomass sampling,as well as detailed nutrient contents analysis. Ten trees werecut down to obtain biomass equations in each one of the fourstands selected. The stands were representative of the rangeof site qualities that can be commonly expected in the Alicanteprovince (Pastor-Lopez 1992).

To determine the nitrogen pool that could be lost in afire event, the biomass for four fractions was considered:leaves, shoots (stems holding leaves, always smaller than 1centimeter in diameter), fine branches (stems not holdingleaves and larger than 1 centimeter in diameter) and the restof the aboveground structures. The first three constitutedfraction I and the last fraction II. The reason for defining 1centimeter in diameter as the limit is based on the statementby Wells and others (1979) that the plant stems remainingafter a moderately intense burn or a severe fire are greaterthan 0.6 or 1.3 centimeters in diameter. All determinationsof nitrogen contents were done by the Kjeldahl procedure.

To better define the limits of nitrogen available on amore extensive sample, 32 stands more than 25 years oldwere selected out of the above-mentioned sample of 120.Each fraction biomass for these 32 stands was determined byapplying the equations from the master stands to the sampleplot measurements obtained for every stand. Each stand wasassigned a set of the four groups of biomass equations. The

Abstract: Potential nitrogen volatilization during fire was calcu-lated for Pinus halepensis plantations. The stands located in theAlicante province (southeastern Spain) represent a range of sitequalities and are more than 25 years old. Biomass and nitrogencontent for fractions smaller than 1 centimeter in diameter and forthe total were determined. A 70 percent volatilization of the nitro-gen in the biomass represents a loss of 8.2 to 116.5 kilograms perhectare for stands with total aboveground biomass of 5.06 and151.12 tons per hectare. The percentage of nitrogen lost from thetotal biomass is larger in sites of lower site quality.

The effects of fire regimes on the sustainablility ofecosystems constitute one of the main aspects to consider.

Nitrogen is a fundamental element for soil productivity evenin drought-prone ecosystems where water has a dominantrole. Nitrogen outputs through volatilization during fire eventsis very significant. During this century large extensions inthe Mediterranean Basin were planted with different conifersafter fire or other perturbation events. In Spain, Aleppo pine(Pinus halepensis) was used in most of these plantations.The modification of the fire regime, with an increase in fireevents, caused by the nature of these monocultures andhuman actions, has completely modified the temporal scaleand potentiality of recovery in many areas. These factors arefundamental in the sustainability of the long-term productivityof these systems. This paper characterizes the nitrogen poolavailable in the biomass in stands more than 25 years oldalong a range of site qualities. It estimates the potentialnitrogen lost by applying the trends of volatization shown inthe literature. This paper is directed toward defining themagnitude of nitrogen lost in these stands as an indication ofthe amount that would need to be restored in order to avoida reduction in its total pool and therefore productivity ofthese ecosystems.


2Professors, T.E.U. (Titular de Escuela Universitaria) and T.U. (Titularde Universidad), respectively, Departamento de Ecología, Universidad deAlicante, Alicante, Spain. Ap. 99, Alicante-03080 (Spain).



matching criterion was similarity in site index with one ofthe four master stands. Nitrogen content of leaf and shootfractions was determined, using the Kjeldahl procedure, froma sample of 1-year-old leaves and shoots for each of the 32stands. The nitrogen contents fine branch and fraction IIwere assigned by averaging from the master stands the differentreplicates analyzed by fraction (Pastor-Lopez 1992). Eachstand was assigned the same master stand as for the biomassequations. Out of the 32 stands considered, those representingthe limits of nitrogen accumulation on an age and site indexspectrum are included in the following section.

Results and DiscussionThe four stations where destructive biomass sampling

was completed were also studied for nitrogen mineralomassas well as other nutrients (Pastor-Lopez 1992). The resultsobtained illustrate how nitrogen accumulated in differentstructures. Table 1 gathers the information on the dendrometricand stand structure characteristics of these four master stands.

Nitrogen mineralomass and the percentage of it in thedifferent structures included in the fraction smaller than 1centimeter in diameter are included in table 2.

From the 32 stands considered for the more extensiveand representative sample, 7 stands were selected asrepresentative of the limits of variability for age and siteindex. Table 3 includes the dendrometric characteristics ofthese stands.

Nitrogen contents for these stands and the potentialmaximum mineralomass available for fraction I and othersare included in table 4. The percentage of the total above-ground nitrogen mineralomass, represented by the amount ofnitrogen accumulated in fraction I, represents the potentialmaximum amount to be lost in a fire event. Nevertheless,there are different factors that influence this loss.

Woodmansee and Wallach (1981) indicated that two ofthe factors that determine the amounts of elements lost duringa fire include the biomass and the elemental composition ofthe vegetation. This information has been shown already andwould reflect a maximum to be lost; nevertheless, intensityand duration of the fire play a very important role in determiningthe limit. White and others (1973) determined that completevolatilization occurs at temperatures above 500 degrees Celsiusand almost none below 200 degrees. Rundel (1981) pointedout with several examples the importance of the temperatureof the fire in relation to the amount of nitrogen volatilizationexpected. The range given by him varies between 58 and 85percent under laboratory conditions. Lobert and others (1990)give a value of 90 percent.

Bernard and Nimour (1993) determined, for Pinushalepensis in laboratory conditions, ignition temperaturesbetween 235 and 330 degrees Celsius. They indicated thatlignin, lipids, some or all the holocellulose and the asheswere the residues from combustion at these temperatures.On the other hand, they pointed out that volatization of thesubstances depended on the water content and chemical

Table 1—Dendrometric characteristics of the four master stands

Stand codes

Characteristics1 8601 6502 3702 1701

Age (years) 28 36 27 32

Density (trees/ha) 1550 1600 1682 1350

Site index (height 4.8 3.2 1.4 1.5

in meters at 20 years)

Basal area (m2/ha)1 34.86 23.61 3.45 9.77

1Measured at 0.5 m.

Table 3—Dendrometric characteristics of sample stands.

Stand Age Density Site index1 Total AbovegroundBiomass

yr trees/ha m tons/ha

191 25 2600 1.8 13.30643 28 2700 0.6 5.060

211 39 2350 0.5 5.613141 42 1289 2.7 38.554551 42 1079 4.7 92.403901 35 969 5.8 116.562811 32 2720 5.4 151.120

1Site index (height in meters at 20 years).

Table 2—Nitrogen mineralomass and relative percentage by fractions

Stands 8601 6502 3702 1701

Nitrogen mineralomass (kg/ha)

Fraction I 161.4 61.4 14.9 30.0

Total 311.4 96.5 19.7 40.6

Percentage of total nitrogenmineralomass by fraction

Leaves 28.83 38.71 45.23 47.92

Shoot1 8.26 5.44 6.30 7.87

Fine Branches2 14.74 19.49 23.95 17.99

Fraction II3 48.17 36.36 24.52 26.22

1“Shoot” refers to those holding leaves.2“Fine branches” refers to stems with diameter smaller than one centimeter.3Fraction II includes rest of the above-ground structures of the tree.



composition of the structures burned, for which thephenological state had important consequences. Nomeasurements had been done, in natural conditions, of thetemperature reached during ignition for these stands, nor forAleppo pine. The dense crown characteristic of the speciesand the low height (2 to 8 meters) due to limitations in soilproductivity ensure that most fires in these stands will behavelike crown fires. For the interval of 300 to 400 degreesCelsius the percentage of nitrogen volatilized represents 50to 75 percent of the total amount in the biomass, accordingto White and others (1973). Rundel (1981) indicated lossesof 70 percent for Pinus.

If we consider 70 percent as a compromise between thehigh levels obtained in the laboratory and the lower onesobserved in natural conditions, the range of nitrogen lost forAleppo pine in the plantations studied would be between8.18 and 116.47 kilograms per hectare for stands withrespective total aboveground biomass of 5.060 and 151.120tons per hectare. Although not validated, this paper gives thefirst estimates on the potential losses of nitrogen in a broadrange of site qualities. The frequent use of the species aroundthe Mediterranean Sea and the new European economiccommunity policy for afforestation of abandoned agriculturallands will increase the extension of these stands. The highincidence of fire along these areas, caused by arson oraccidents, could be considered the most important source ofatmospheric emissions in these areas. On the other hand, as

Debano and others (1979) indicated, the total amount ofnitrogen on an area basis is always reduced after a fire, inrelation to the prefire status. The need to determine theagents that restore the original nitrogen levels and their rateis fundamental for maintaining the productivity of thesesites. Ulex parviflorus is a typical leguminous evergreenspecies that responds with a prominent increase in coverafter fire events. Its nitrogen-fixing capacity should bedetermined in order to define the magnitude and timing of itsinput. The magnitude and timing in the input of nitrogen fixthat is mentioned in the previous sentence must define whichare the potential management procedures to deal with Ulexparviflorus. The extended belief is that this Ulex, because ofits high flammability and large accumulation of dead material,must be eliminated. This action could represent a depletionof the greatest input of nitrogen to the system during thegrowth periods following the fire.

The percentage of nitrogen lost from the total in thebiomass is clearly larger in the sites with a lower site quality.These sites should show more efficient mechanisms to restorenitrogen or they will be much more susceptible to degradationby future fire events. In other words, under a similar fireperturbation regime, low-site-quality stands will be moresusceptible to losses in long-term site productivity than otherstands with higher site quality.

Table 4—Nitrogen contents, mineralomass and percentage of nitrogen from aboveground total forplantations representing the limits of age and site index.

Nitrogen content Nitrogen mineralomass

Stand Shoots Leaves Shoots Leaves Fraction I Fraction II Total N inFraction I

---------- pct ---------- ------------------------- kg/ha ------------------------- pct

191 0.410 1.020 1.79 19.76 29.28 17.55 62.5

43 0.265 0.615 0.50 6.27 11.68 3.63 76.3

211 0.330 1.990 0.69 21.64 27.58 4.17 86.9

141 0.587 0.868 6.27 44.24 72.63 34.61 67.7

551 0.746 1.113 14.87 86.16 110.64 157.45 41.3

901 0.742 1.456 17.82 135.04 164.36 200.15 45.1

811 0.628 1.095 21.77 130.06 166.39 259.28 39.1



Nahal, I. 1981. The Mediterranean climate from a biological viewpoint.In: Di Castri, F.; Goodall, D.W.; Specht, R.L., eds. Mediterranean-type shrublands. Ecosystems of the world. Volume 11. Amsterdam:Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company; 63-86.

Pastor-López, A. 1992. Biomasa, Producción primaria y Flujo de Materiaorgánica en Repoblaciones Forestales de la provincia de Alicante.Aplicaciones a la Géstion Forestal. PhD Thesis. University of Alicante,Alicante, Spain; 309 p.

Rundel, P.W. 1981. Fire as an ecological factor. In: Lange, O.L.; Nobel,P.S; Osmond, C.B.; Ziegler, H., eds., Physiological plant ecology I.Responses to the physical environment. Encyclopedia of plant physiology.New Series Vol.12A. Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag; 501-538.

Wells, C.G.; Campbell, R.E.; DeBano, L.F.; Lewis, C.E.; Fredricksen, R.L.;Carlyle Franklin, E.; Froelich, R.C.; Dunn, P.H. 1979. Effects of fire onsoil. A state-of-knowledge review. General Technical Report WO-7.Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; 34p.

White, E.M.; Thompson, W.W.; Gartner F.R. 1973. Heat effects on nutrientrelease from soils under ponderosa pine. Journal of Range Management26: 22-24.

Woodmansee, R. G.; Wallach, L. S. 1981. Effects of fire regimes onbiogeochemical cycles. In: Clark, F.E.; Rosswall, T., eds. Terrestrialnitrogen cycles. Ecological Bulletin (Stockholm) 33: 649-669.

Acknowledgments Funding for this research was provided by the Ministerio

de Educacion y Ciencia, Conselleria de Agricultura y Pescade la Comunidad Valenciana y Diputacion Provincial deAlicante. The Unidad Forestal de Alicante and his AgentesForestales have played a fundamental role in site locationand field sampling. We thank D. Juan Giner for his continuedsupport. In particular, we thank Nicolas Gimenez, SilviaIvars, M.C. Martinez, Manuel Valera for their contributions,and Edelmiro Zafra for his assistance in the chemical analysis.

ReferencesBernard, M.; Nimour, N. 1993. Inflammabilité des végéteaux

mediterranéens et feux de fôrets. (1ère partie): Rôle de l’eau surl’exothermicité de leur reaction. Science Technique Technologie 26.

Debano, L.F.; Rice, R.M.; Conrad, E. 1979. Soil heating in chaparralfires: effects on soil properties, plant nutrients, erosion, and runoff.Research Paper PSW-RP-145. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forestand Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture;21 p.

Lobert, J.M.; Scharffe, W.M.; Hao, W.M.; Crutzen, P.J. 1990. Importanceof biomass burning in the atmospheric budgets of nitrogen-containing gases. Nature 346 (6284): 552-554.



Susceptibility to Potential Erosion after Fire in MediterraneanEcosystems in the Alicante Province (Southeastern Spain) 1

Antonio Pastor-Lopez Joaquin Martin-Martin 2

percent of the naturally vegetated area. Sixty-eightmunicipalities were affected at least once (48.6 percent). Forthese municipalities, the area burned added up to 28.8 percentand 55.8 percent of their total and natural vegetation areas,respectively. Although information was not available onareas that suffered recurrent fires, it was evident that firewas an important perturbation in these ecosystems.

We studied fires 100 hectares or greater in area. Date ofoccurrence, area of extent, and location were used tocharacterize the fire regime. To define the precipitation regime,15 climatological stations available from the area were used.The burned areas were assigned the climatological data fromthe closest station for the first year after fires, which is whenthe highest susceptibility to erosion occurs (Debano andothers 1979), and we then evaluated four variables. First,total precipitation was examined for 1 year after the fire. InMediterranean-type ecosystems in southern California,erosion during the first year can be as much as 35 timesgreater than normal (Wells 1982). Next we examinedprecipitation that had been measured between the fire andthe beginning of the next growing season, which, unlikesouthern California, begins in March for most higher plantsbecause of the cooler winters in the Alicante province. Thisinformation was used to evaluate both the possibility of highprecipitation when the vegetation cover was minimal as wellas the potential availability of water for plant regrowth andthus soil protection. We also evaluated precipitation duringthe first October after fire. Sanchez (1989) conducted a 5-year study in Alicante and found that 57 percent of theerosion events and 54 percent of the sediment accumulationoccurred in October. And lastly, precipitation during theSeptember-October-November period after the fire wasexamined because this season tends to have the greatestamount of precipitation, according to more than 30 years ofobservations collected by the network from the CentroMeteorologico de Levante.

Results and DiscussionDuring the 20-year period, two main peaks of the area

burned (over 8,000 hectares per year), which were separatedby 12 years with values below 4,000 hectares per year. Thetwo maxima occurred in 1978 and 1990. On a monthly basis,42.5 percent of the area burned in August, followed by 25.3,15.1 and 10 percent in July, September and Octoberrespectively. The number of fires was 10 percent greater inSeptember than in July, indicating larger fires in the latter.Fires did not occur in January and March, and no more than

Abstract: Postfire precipitation regimes are important to the dy-namics of the physical and biological processes occurring afterfire. From 1972 through 1991, 143 fire events of at least 100hectares occurred in Alicante province, Spain; 42.5 percent of thearea burned in August. The trends for total, pregrowth season,October, and September through November precipitation for 1year after each fire are shown. Half of the burned areas receivedmore than 349 (and up to 880) millimeters of rainfall before thegrowing season and between 44 and 325 millimeters during thefirst October after fire. Erosion events before the beginning of thegrowing season and spatial relocation of ash layer materials on awatershed basis are major factors expected to contribute to post-fire erosion.

Fire has been an active agent in the evolution and shapingof the structure of vegetation in the Mediterranean Basin.

Nevertheless, the increase in fire frequency by arson ormanagement actions has modified disturbance regimes to alevel that might exceed the resilience of the system.

Despite the difficulty of quantitatively linkingprecipitation and erosion, the frequency of erosion eventshas been clearly related to specific macroclimatic conditions.In the Alicante province in southeastern Spain, the highesterosion frequency has been observed in October. Fire mayaffect soil fertility via the export of large quantities of nutrientsthrough debris flows and run-off. Identifying the rainfallregimes experienced by burned areas after a fire can helpdefine the framework in which these ecosystems develop.This paper addresses the problem of susceptibility to erosionin postfire conditions.

Study Area and MethodsThe province of Alicante is located in the western coastal

Mediterranean Basin on the southeastern Iberian Peninsula(37o 50' to 38o 55' N and 1o 05’W to 0o 10' E), with 581,901hectares and 140 municipalities. The province has an importantwildfire problem. In 20 years (1972-1991), 62,074 hectaresburned in 143 fires of at least 100 hectares each. This arearepresents 10.7 percent of the whole province and 26.7


2Professors, T.E.U. (Titular de Escuela Universitaria) and T.U. (Titularde Universidad), respectively, Departamento de Ecología, Universidad deAlicante, Alicante, Spain. Ap. 99, Alicante-03080 (Spain).



2.1 percent of the area burned in any other month. Themedian fire size was 225 hectares. Seventy-eight percent ofthe fires were smaller than 500 hectares and 8.4 percent weregreater than 1,000 hectares. The largest fire was 6,800 hectares.

Total precipitation during the first year postfire rangedbetween 126 and 1,210 millimeters. Half of the fire areasreceived less than 523 millimeters and 25 percent receivedmore than 775 millimeters. Most of the values in the lowerquartile fell between 200 and 390 millimeters. This patternis typical of the subhumid mediterranean climate of the area.The amount of rain falling between the fire and the start ofthe growing season (March) ranged between 6.4 and 880millimeters with 75 percent of the fires receiving less than478 millimeters. The upper limit of the lower quartile was188 millimeters and 50 percent of the sites received morethan 349 millimeters. The first October after a fire hadprecipitation totals between 0 and 325 millimeters, although50 percent of the stands received less than 44 millimeters.Only 8 percent of the cases received no precipitation at allduring this month, while just 5 percent received more than200 millimeters. Fire events followed by zero precipitationdid not occur during the September-October-Novemberperiod, and just 5.6 percent received less than 50 millimeters.Although rainfall ranged between 9.6 and 761 millimeters,75 percent of the cases had less than 210 millimeters and just1.3 percent had more than 400 millimeters.

The amount of precipitation that fell before any vegetationcovered the soils could be as high as the mean annualprecipitation in the semiarid areas of the province. The ratesof erosion during the pregrowth periods should be studied; ifsignificant erosion occurs before plant growth begins,revegetation efforts would be ineffective because ofphenological constraints. Some type of physical interventionwould be the only way to reduce erosion. That 25 percent ofthe stands received more than 134 millimeters of rain inOctober should not be considered proof of high susceptibilityto erosion—we found no evidence in the literature connectinghigher precipitation with higher erosion. The erosion eventsrecorded by Sanchez (1989) indicated that neither totalprecipitation nor maximum intensity explained the amountof sediment produced. A rainfall of 25 millimeters with amaximum intensity of 68 millimeters per hour produced352.4 grams per square meter of sediment, while anotherevent with a total of 45.4 millimeters and an intensity of 130millimeters per hour produced 63.1 grams per square meter.

This first postfire rainfall will determine the state anddistribution of the ash layer. The importance of this layerdue to the accumulation of nutrients is important for themicrobial and plant postfire communities. The total nutrientstatus of the ecosystem could be largely modified dependingon what happened with this layer. Movement of the ashlayer by rainfall events should be studied to determine whethernutrients are actually lost from the system or simply relocated.The problem indicated by Debano and Dunn (1982)—thaterosional losses of nutrients from on-site movement maydiffer considerably from those for the entire watershed—must be considered given the high amount of nutrientscontained in the ash layer.

AcknowledgmentsWe thank Angel Mediavilla from the Unidad Forestal

de Alicante; Carmen Elvira, Mavi Flor, Macu Gonzaga,Jesus Lara and Pepa Ibanez for data entry; the staff of theCentro Meteorologico de Levante, Valencia for help withthe climatological data and Jan Beyers and Susan Conardfor their comments and English revision that further improvedthe original version.

ReferencesDebano, L. F., Dunn, P.H. 1982. Soil and nutrient cycling in

Mediterranean-type ecosystems: a summary and synthesis. In:Conrad, E.; Oechel, W. Symposium on dynamics and management ofMediterranean-type ecosystems; 1981 June 22-26; San Diego, CA.Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-58. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest ResearchStation, Forest Service,U.S. Department of Agriculture; 358-364.

Debano, L.F.; Rice, R.M.; Conrad, E. 1979. Soil heating in chaparralfires: effects on soil properties, plant nutrients, erosion, and runoff.Research Paper PSW-RP-145. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest ResearchStation, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 21 p.

Sanchez, J.R. 1989. Estimacion de perdidas erosivas producidas porlas tecnicas de reforestacion en la Comunidad Valenciana. Dep.C.A.R.N. (Ciencias Ambientales y Recursos Naturales), Univ. Alicante.Informe Conselleria de Agricultura,G.V.(Generlitat Valenciana).

Wells, W.G. 1982. Hydrology of Mediterranean-type ecosystems: asummary and synthesis. In: Conrad, E.; Oechel, W. Symposium ondynamics and management of Mediterranean-type ecosystems; 1981June 22-26; San Diego, CA. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-58. Berkeley, CA:Pacific Southwest Research Station, Forest Service, U.S. Departmentof Agriculture; 358-364.



Operational Fire/GIS Dilemmas—The Fire ReportForm Example 1

Lucy Anne Salazar 2 Martha Shea Flattley 3

Operational applications of geographic information system(GIS) technology for fire management sometimes

develop into dilemmas regarding data acquisition,compatibility, and accuracy. One major component of aFire/GIS database is recorded fire history, such as theinformation contained in USDA Forest Service recordscollected since 1910. These fire report forms were revisedapproximately every decade and included different formats,entry items, naming conventions, and level of detail formaps (if maps were even included). To accommodate GISneeds, the challenge is to find, decipher, compare, and coalescethese fire data into a database that will be useful forincorporating into ecosystem management.

The Six Rivers National Forest was formed from theShasta-Trinity, Klamath, and Siskiyou National Forests in1947. After extensive searching, limited fire records havebeen found for the pre-1947 period. Fire summaries recordedgeneral information such as origin date, fire size class,township, range and section, vegetation type, and generalcause. Original fire report forms were found for portions ofthe Forest, and gaps in the data are obvious. For one RangerDistrict, fire history is recorded for over 80 years, in 12different fire report forms. Fire atlases also exist for someRanger Districts since 1936 and for others since 1910.

Differences in format and naming conventions exist amongthe eight decades of fire reporting. These differences need tobe resolved so that the data, and issues such as groundtruthing and ancillary information (e.g., weather records andnarratives), can be incorporated into a GIS format.

Data ConsistencyForest management and activities have changed

dramatically over the years; these changes are often alsoreflected in the fire report form entries. Representations ofvegetation ignited or burned through by fires is one exampleof an entry item that has gone through several revisions.Entries for “character of cover” in the 1910’s were very

general, including rocks, brush, timber (needles), reproduction,and oak leaves. Descriptions in the early 1920’s becamemore specific, splitting up cover types into timber, brush,ground cover under timber, and ground cover under brush.Later in the 1920’s and throughout the 1930’s the emphasischanged to entries of general categories, such as timber,brush, leaves, and needles. The 1940’s through the 1970’sfocused on entries by species. The codes for the 1980’sreturned to more general cover descriptions (e.g., over-maturetimber, long needle plantations) and included age groupingsfor slash categories.

The National Interagency Fire Management IntegratedDatabase (NIFMID) is currently being developed as acorporate fire database. This GIS compatible database willallow fire data to be shared, analyzed, and integrated intoecosystem analysis and management. NIFMID includes ForestService fire report form entries back to 1970. Pre-1970 firereport form entries also need to be brought into NIFMID toinclude in the analysis. NIFMID currently has 667 possibleentries for the principal vegetation cover at or near the pointof origin of a fire. This list should accommodate the vastmajority of historic entries, but descriptions such as needlesor leaves will have to be included as valid data.

Ground TruthingDuring the early 1900’s fire managers took great care in

filling out fire report forms. This was reflected in the detailof their fire maps and the extent of their narratives. Thisdetail has dramatically decreased so that, currently, a map isnot even required for the fire report forms. In a GIS modethis can create problems, especially when the only locationaldata now recorded is the latitude and longitude of the fire’sorigin. Maps are part of the documentation for large fires,but they are often stored in boxes in warehouses that neverbecome part of a map database. Perimeters have become oflittle consequence for fire reporting, while for ecosystemanalysis they are of utmost importance.

Ground truthing of fires can help determine the conditionsunder which certain areas did or did not burn. This is importantinformation for large area natural fuel treatments andprescribed natural fires. Technologies such as globalpositioning systems (GPS) allow for fire perimeters to beeasily mapped, including islands and different intensitieswithin the perimeter. Aerial photos can also sometimes beused as a substitute for ground truthing, but timing andquality of the aerial photos can have an effect on their usefulness.


2Forester, Six Rivers National Forest, USDA Forest Service, Eureka, CA95501.

3Forestry Technician, Six Rivers National Forest, USDA Forest Service,Eureka, CA 95501.



Ancillary DataEarly fire report forms are filled with interesting anecdotes

and narratives. For example, some provide descriptions offorest guards who would leave for fires with four men andtravel 28 miles by horseback to battle a 500-acre fire. Theseearly fires might appear to have become large because of alack of sufficient resources. Monthly precipitation recordsexist for many weather stations in California back to 1880.By combining these data with fire occurrence records, wesee that often times the large fall fires occurred after periodswith below-normal summer rains or above-normal springrains. Currently, these same weather patterns combined withunnaturally high fuel loadings and the urban wildland intermixcould result in catastrophic fire events. Knowledge of NativeAmerican historical uses of the forest can also provide animportant component in determining how the ecosystemevolved into its current state. Thus, fire report forms containa wealth of knowledge to assist us in our objectives ofdetermining and managing fire’s natural role in the ecosystem.

RecommendationsTo analyze fire’s natural role in the ecosystem, fire

records and maps must be found and preserved as a vital partof the history of each National Forest, community, and localecosystem. We also need to resolve differences in fire reportform entries, and develop a method to incorporate fireoccurrence data into the analysis. And fire managers mustencourage detailed narratives and mapping of fires, includingthe use of global positioning systems (GPS) technologies.These data can be incorporated in a GIS for analysis of fire’snatural role in the environment.



On the morning of October 20, 1991, a fire originated inthe Oakland/Berkeley Hills from rekindling materials

of a 2-hectare brushfire that had occurred the previous day.The ensuing “Tunnel Fire” resulted in the greatest modern-era loss of life and property on record for North Americanurban-interface fires: 25 people died, 2,475 dwelling unitswere completely destroyed, an additional 302 units werebadly damaged. Losses have been estimated in excess of 1.7billion dollars.

This paper describes the spatial dynamics of the “TunnelFire” and provides insights into the interaction ofenvironmental factors contributing to the catastrophic behaviorof the fire.

MethodsAll available direct physical evidence (e.g., photography,

video, communication transcripts) were systematicallyreviewed to ascertain the position of the fire and apparentmechanisms of spread. These data were then corroboratedby interviews with witnesses and public service personnel,as well as reviews of agency incident reports documentingthe fire. Particular attention was placed on cross-referencingknown timed events (e.g., phone calls, transformer explosions)with the position of the fire. From these data, points ofmaximal extent were spatially defined, and lines of commontime were estimated by interpolating between known points,using general knowledge of factors affecting fire behavior.These “isochrons,” or time lines of spread, reflect bothspreading wave front advance and spot fire spread resultingfrom burning brand deposition. Particularly during the initial“blow-up” period, much of the fire’s growth was attributableto spot ignitions, indicating significant unburned areas withina given time-step.

The positions of the fire’s maximal extent at a giventime and known locations of spot fires were then digitizedinto a geographic information system (GIS) over base layersreflecting the fire zone’s topography and infrastructure (roads,parcel ownership, etc.). These spatial features were thenused to help spatially define the fire’s spread. This effort

resulted in two maps of the fire: a map documenting theearly spread period covering the first hour after escape (10-minute isochrons), and a complete spread map showing theentire spread period (1-hour isochrons).

Results and DiscussionThe topography of the origin area can be described as

very steep (30 to 70 percent slope), with a mixture of fuels ofboth wildland and domesticated vegetation types. Understoryvegetation resulted in a well developed surface fuel layer,with added fuel continuity in both horizontal and verticaldimensions coming from an abundance of intermediate andmature Monterey pine (Pinus radiata). Significant areas ofblue gum Eucalyptus (Eucalyptus globulus) were in the firearea, although not within the immediate (200 m) area of thefire origin. Interspersed throughout the fire area on all sidesexcept the east were residential structures, contributingsignificantly to the total fuel load. We have estimated thatthe forested/residential areas where the fire started had inexcess of 100 mg/ha of available vegetation fuels, with atleast an equal mass of structural fuels in discrete, isolatedareas (Sapsis and Martin 1994). Finally, the weather patternson the morning of the fire showed classic extreme highhazard conditions associated with easterly “Diablo” winds.This meso-scale induced weather pattern resulted in hightemperatures (>80o F), very low relative humidity (<15percent), and strong, gusty winds, with average sustainedridgetop winds of 20 mph, and gusts likely at 30 to 40 mph.Also, a relatively strong inversion layer at 600 m is thoughtto have contributed both to accelerated downslope windsand complex local wind patterns (Pagni 1993). Thus, allthree sets of fire environment variables (fuels, weather,topography) could be characterized as being in extremeconditions.

After numerous hot spots became evident during themorning of October 20, active flaming fire escaped from theoriginal burn perimeter at 10:58 a.m., with escape frontsoccurring from both the lower south and middle west areasof the fire perimeter. The east flank fire expanded both southand east into a mixture of north coastal scrub and intermediatepine, causing the latter to partially crown and drive short-scale spotting to the southwest. The east flank expandedtoward Grizzly Peak Boulevard fairly rapidly, indicatingcomplex surface wind patterns, with significant eddyinggenerating upslope (westerly) surface winds that drove surfacefire spread, and overstory ambient winds determining direction


2Graduate Assistants and Professor Emeritus, Department of Environ-mental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berke-ley, CA 94720.

Progression of the Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire” 1

David B. Sapsis 2 Donald V. Pearman 2 Robert E. Martin 2



by clusters of homes, then returning some hours later. Byabout 10 p.m., the final perimeter was determined, coveringabout 520 ha.

ConclusionsThe Tunnel Fire showed extreme fire behavior due to

complex interactions amongst fuels, topography, and weather,with early expansion or “blow-up” driven by a diffuse set ofmass fires resulting from abundant deposition of burningbrands into unburned areas. Later spread in more denseresidential areas was slower and more discontinuous becauseof differences in fuel structure, suppression efforts, reducedweather severity, and more moderate topography. Furtherresearch is required to investigate specific relationshipsbetween fuel, terrain, and weather on extreme fire behavior.Specifically, the intermix of wildland and structural fuelsacross complex landscapes subjected to periods of extremefire weather presents a challenge for fuel/fire behaviormodeling. In particular, investigations of crown fires, andassociated spotting and rapid fire expansion, should not berestricted to purely wildland settings (Anderson 1968,Rothermel 1991).

Acknowledgments We thank all the many individuals and agencies who

contributed time and data to this study. Partial funding forthis work was provided by the National Science Foundationmini-grant program for mitigation of natural and humanhazards.

ReferencesAnderson, H.E. 1968. Sundance fire: an analysis of fire phenomena.

Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-122. Ogden, UT: Intermountain Forest andRange Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department ofAgriculture; 39 p.

Pagni, P.J. 1993. Causes of the 20 October 1991 Oakland hillsconflagration. Fire Safety Journal 21:331-339.

Rothermel, R.C. 1991. Predicting behavior and size of crown fires inthe Northern Rocky Mountains. Res. Paper. INT-RP-438. Ogden,UT: Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, Forest Service,U.S. Department of Agriculture; 46 p.

Sapsis, D.B.; Martin, R.E. [In press]. Fire, the landscape, and diversity: atheoretical framework for managing wildlands. In: Proceedings ofthe 12th conference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October 26-28;Jekyll Island, GA. Bethesda, Maryland: Society of American Foresters.

of spotting materials. The west flank escape appears to havemoved slower and to the west before getting into a ravineand working upslope toward Marlborough Drive atapproximately 11:25 a.m. By this time, the fire had closed inaround itself on the south flank and had spotted acrossBuckingham Drive into the area between Buckingham andTunnel Road. Thus, at about 30 minutes after escape, the firehad moved significantly to the east, crossing over GrizzlyPeak Boulevard; however, it was relatively contained on itswesterly front, with isolated short-scale spotting and wind-driven frontal advance causing the ignition of a few housesalong Buckingham.

During the ensuing 30 minutes (11:30 to 12:00) , the firewas to show an extreme “blow-up” phase, with long-rangespotting coming initially from crowning trees, and later fromstructural fuels as houses became fully involved. During the11:30 to 11:40 period, pines crowning on the east flankcontributed to rapid spot development on the southwest areanear Highway 24, while pine and eucalyptus crowning dictatedthe ridge spotting that eventually resulted in fire crossingHwy 24 near the Lake Temescal parking lot, and the rapidignition of the Hiller Highlands subdivision. We estimatethat, by 12:00, in excess of 700 homes were burning, and thefire was spreading as three discrete fronts: flanking to thesouth toward Horse Ridge, backing to the north into upperVicente Canyon, and moving directly with the overstorywinds into the Rockridge area behind Lake Temescal.

During the next 2 hours, the fire continued to growrapidly in size, both in wildland-dominated areas on theeastern and northern flanks, as well as in residential areastoward the west and south. Particularly in the dense residentialareas, with relatively poor surface fuel continuity, individualhomes ignited because of spot deposition, and then firewould spread to adjacent homes because of radiation anddirect flame contact. In many instances, spot fires formedwell downslope of an unburned area, then grew upslopeduring periods of favorable winds. The complexity of thewind pattern cannot be underestimated; strong evidenceindicated surface winds varied in all directions, because offire-induced winds, as more and more areas became involvedand energy release rates increased (Pagni 1993).

By 2:00 p.m. most of the pure wildland areas had beenconsumed, and fire spread slowed considerably, owing tothe discontinuous and coarse nature of the residential fuelcomplexes, and somewhat flatter terrain. By 5:00 p.m. thenorthern perimeter of the fire was determined, but spreadcontinued in residential areas on the southern flanks, despitereduced winds. The Upper Broadway Terrace area showed aremarkably discontinuous spread pattern, with fire advancing



Comparison of Fuel Load, Structural Characteristics andInfrastructure Before and After the Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire” 1

Scott L. Stephens Domingo M. Molina Ron Carter Robert E. Martin 2

Abstract: Structures rebuilt after the Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire”in 1991 are different in many aspects when compared to theirpredecessors. Data obtained from the city of Oakland indicatehomes have been rebuilt 28 percent larger (square feet). About 50percent of the homes destroyed have been rebuilt, and buildingpermits have been issued for an additional 16 percent. New con-struction mandates facilitated by local and State laws have resultedin the following requirements: class A roofs, chimney spark arres-tors, 1-hour siding for exterior walls, 30-foot clearance of wildlandvegetation. Domestic vegetation is not regulated. Average struc-tural fuel load consumed in the fire was 11.5 kg/m2. Larger homesbuilt after the fire will produce higher structural fuel loads. Im-provements in infrastructure such as roads and water supplies havenot occurred. Improvements have occurred in communication sys-tems. Increases in structural fuel load accompanied by modestimprovements in infrastructure may increase the fire risk in thisurban/wildland intermix.

Vegetation is a critical fuel component in urban/wildlandintermix fires. Without an active fuel management

program, vegetative fuels will accumulate. Many vegetativefuels also have a large amount of fine fuels with a highdegree of horizontal and vertical continuity; fuels of this typecan produce extreme fire behavior when conditions are dry.

The structural fuel component of the urban/wildland intermixis often neglected. In many cases the structural fuel load can belarger than the adjoining wildland fuel load. Combustioncharacteristics are much different in structural and wildlandfuels but both can affect fire behavior of intermix fires.

Changes in infrastructure, building materials andvegetation management have been slow or non-existentfollowing most urban/wildland intermix fires. The public aswell as local and State agencies have short memories aftersuch events. Several positive steps have been taken after theOakland Hills “Tunnel Fire” in northern California that willreduce the probability of such an event occurring again, butmany other problems remain.

This paper will review the changes which have occurredand will summarize the structural and wildland fuel consumedin the Tunnel Fire.

MethodsWildland vegetation inventory was accomplished by

using NASA false infrared aerial slides (1:6,000 and 1:12,000)taken after the Tunnel Fire. The slides were projected over a1.0 by 1.3 meter map of the fire area and perimeters weredrawn around each vegetation type. Numerous trips werethen taken to the burned area to improve the map. Thisinformation was used to create a second map that was furtherimproved by the use of a set of 32 aerial color prints (1:6,000)taken after the fire by Pacific Aerial Surveys. The final mapwas digitized, and areas of each polygon were calculated, byusing the geographical information system ATLAS.

Structural fuel load was calculated by using the averageamount of lumber used to build a home in the westernUnited States (American Forest and Paper Association 1990).The land area occupied by structures was determined usingthe geographical information system. Structural fuel loadwas assumed to be homogeneous over the area occupied bythe structures.

Information was obtained on post-fire construction fromthe City of Oakland. Local fire officials were contacted todetermine concerns in this post-fire urban/wildland intermix.

ResultsThe fire perimeter enclosed 615.2 hectares and was

divided into categories:

Vegetation Category Area (ha)

Eucalyptus (Eucalyptus globulus) 132.1Monterey pine (Pinus radiata) 56.3Northern California coastal scrub 109.7Grassland 2.9Coastal scrub and grassland mosaic 28.5Monterey pine and coastal scrub mosaic 2.3Coast live oak (Quercus agrifolia) and

coastal scrub mosaic 19.2Structures 246.2Highways 18.0

The number of structures totally destroyed by the firewas 2,305 (Gordon 1994). Assuming the average home uses13,000 board feet of lumber to construct (American Forestand Paper Association 1990), this results in a structural fuelload of 11.5 kg/m2 (50.8 tons/acre). This value of structural

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994. Walnut Creek, California.

2Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Environmental Science,Policy, and Management, University of California, 145 Mulford Hall, Ber-keley, CA 94720; Department of Plant Production and Forest Science,University of Lerida, 25006 Lerida, Spain; Battalion Chief, Oakland FireDepartment, 1605 Martin Luther King Jr. Way, Oakland, CA 94612; Profes-sor, Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, Uni-versity of California,145 Mulford Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720.



materials, but increases in the size of the structures willincrease structural fuel load. Infrastructure such as watersupply and road systems has not been improved, increasingthe fire risk in this urban/wildland intermix.

Wildland and structural fuels must be managed to reducerisk in the urban/wildland intermix. Domestic vegetationmust also be managed to reduce risk in the intermix.Emergency infrastructure must be improved to reduce theloss of life and property from these fires. Firefightinghelicopters could be used for initial attack on urban/wildlandintermix fires. Early detection and response would be requiredfor effective fire suppression using helicopters.

References

American Forest and Paper Association. 1990. Housing affordability andtimber supply. Unpublished.

Bush, B., Anno, R; McCoy, R.; Gaj, R; Small, R.D. 1991. Fuel loads inU.S. cities. Fire Technology 27(2): 5-32.

Gordon, D.A. 1994. Categorical data analysis of the Oakland hills fire.Berkeley: University of California, Department of EnvironmentalScience, Policy and Management. M. S. Thesis; unpublished draftsupplied by author.

Stephens, Scott L.; Gordon, D.A.; Martin, R. E.; 1993. Combustibility ofselected domestic vegetation subjected to desiccation. In: Proceedingsof the 12th conference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October26-28; Jekyll Island, Georgia. SAF publication 94-02. Bethesda, MD:Society of American Foresters; 796 p.

fuel load is conservative because it does not include any ofthe interior components of a structure, although it is inaccord with the average United States structural fuel load of14 to 21 kg/m2 (Bush and others 1991).

Examination of post-fire construction permits indicateshomes have been rebuilt on average 28 percent larger.Local requirements of new construction include class Aroofs, chimney spark arrestors and 1-hour siding for allexterior walls. State and local requirements of a 30-footclearance between structures and wildland vegetation arealso enforced.

Domestic vegetation is not regulated by local or stateagencies. Some domestic vegetation is highly flammable.The heat released from one mature tam juniper (Juniperussabina var. tamariscifolia) surpassed 2 megawatts within1 minute of ignition (Stephens and others 1993). In thatstudy mature junipers were harvested and burned at differentmoisture contents. Results from that study (Stephens andothers 1993) along with videotape of the Oakland Hillsfire demonstrate that domestic vegetation can provide anefficient vector for transmitting fire into a structure.

ConclusionStructures in the post-fire urban/wildland intermix in

the Oakland Hills will be built with more flame-resistant



FireNet —A Forum for International CurriculumDevelopment in Fire Science and Management? 1

A. Chris F. Trevitt 2 David G. Green 3 David B. Sapsis 4

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSyposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994. Walnut Creek, California.

2Senior Lecturer, Department of Forestry, School of Resource and Envi-ronmental Management, Australian National University, Canberra ACT0200, Australia.

3Professor of Information Technology, School of Environmental andInformation Science, Charles Short University, PO Box 789, Albury, NSW2640, Australia.

4Graduate Assistant, Department of Environmental Science Policy, andManagement, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

I nternet, a world-wide information technology network,provides the opportunity to set up the exchange and retrieval

of problem-oriented information. FireNet, an internationalinformation retrieval and exchange network for thoseinterested in landscape fires, is one such forum, amongmany hundreds now in operation (Green and others 1993).Anyone with access to a networked computer system, orwith a desktop computer and modem, can subscribe to FireNet.The network allows free correspondence among all subscriberson the list—land managers, researchers, educators—whereverthey are located. In April 1994, FireNet maintained 200subscribers from a number of countries around the world. InDecember 1994, there were 370 subscribers.

In addition to real-time communication possibilities,FireNet is also potentially a valuable educational tool,particularly as more organizations outside the universitysector gain access to Internet. This expanded access impliesthat individual faculty or professional trainers take on therole of “education moderator,” filtering material so that it iscustomized to their particular need or context (Green andothers 1993). Thus, FireNet not only complements the roleof the textbook by providing a window on current issuesunder debate—thereby affording access to more up-to-datesupplementary material and ideas—but also encouragesfeedback to help ascertain the value of this information inthe workplace. Further, it provides an enticing medium forfostering the cooperative development of computer-basedcurriculum materials in fire science and management.

BackgroundThe development of computer assisted learning

applications has been ongoing for the last few years, manytaking advantage of new technologies for dispersal andpresentation of information. For example, in Canada, Thorburn(1990) and Hirsch and others (1993) have pioneered fire-

related developments using videodisk and hypermediatechnologies for education and training purposes. In theUnited States, a new training development group(Cooperative Program for Operational Meteorology,Education, and Training), affiliated with the National WeatherService, has been charged with the responsibility fordeveloping new computer-based distance education modulesfor in-service training, and they hope to begin work on anew fire-weather module in 1994 (Lamos 1993, personalcommunication). At the Australian National University, wehave recently acquired experience in the design, developmentand implementation of a computer-based graphical analysispackage for use by students in analyzing fire weather histories(Trevitt and others 1993), and fire management planningwithin a problem-based learning context (Trevitt and Sachse-Åkerlind 1994).

At the same time as these separate developments havebeen underway, increasing financial constraints have beenexperienced at public educational institutions and otherprincipal national research and management organizations.Training sections in operational groups concerned with firescience and management are often highly understaffed, andupdated course material development is frequently lacking.In the future, we need to exploit opportunities to worktogether more closely, pooling development efforts whereappropriate, and saving on overheads incurred during on-going curriculum development. FireNet provides a uniqueopportunity to realize these gains by facilitating the transferof digital materials over the Internet and thereby achievingsavings for everyone.

Implications of Developing a Digital“Fire” Curriculum

As computer hardware becomes more and moreeconomical, it makes inroads into more and moreorganizations. Simultaneously, the software that is nowbecoming available allows more and more sophisticated andcost-effective data and information storage, transfer andmanipulation. FireNet provides a practical demonstration ofsome of the emerging ways to facilitate text and imageretrieval and interchange between organizations andindividuals. Hypermedia links via Internet are now alsobecoming feasible using the Hyper Text Markup Language(HTML) protocol implemented, for example, by the publicdomain browser application “mosaic,” and this facility is



also provided on FireNet (Green and others, 1993). Thismeans that digital curriculum resources (e.g. text, images,video, sound) resident in the public domain on a computernode connected to the Internet in, for example, Victoria,Canada, can be accessed by managers, researchers, academics,or others with access to a similar networked computerenvironment in Canberra, Australia, and vice-versa.

What form could these “digital curriculum resources”take? Currently, some examples on FireNet are essentiallytext-only student reading materials used in the undergraduateunit “Fire Science and Management” at the Australian NationalUniversity. Text is the simplest form to deal with. However,line diagrams and photos are urgently needed to supplementthis text. A range of text, black-and-white images, and line-drawings are already available at Australian NationalUniversity on a local Macintosh network, and these havebeen used for study purposes by undergraduate studentssince 1993. Copies of personal lecture notes as well assupplementary material have also become available (Trevittand Sachse-Åkerlind 1994). Eventually, a library of relevantcolor slides, video, and sound segments is envisaged as well.Animated graphics, in a true multimedia environment, holdconsiderable promise for communicating particularlychallenging abstract concepts such as those associated withdiurnal variations in fuel moisture and fuel moisture changesat different depths below the fuel and soil surface.Developments of this sort have no real book-based analogs,and, like the work by Hirsh and others (1993), representsome of the new ways in which information technology canexpand and extend the educational process.

In a subject-area such as “Fire Science and Management,”an extraordinarily wide range of relevant material can serveas an information base for training and education. Thisbreadth of material alone is good reason for institutions toshare the burden of collation, synthesis, preparation ofoverheads for lectures, images, development of problem-based tutorials, etc. Most of us with similar professionalinterests and shared educational goals work in geographicisolation from one another and can benefit enormously fromexposure to the ideas and experiences of others workingwith common educational objectives.

For those of us who are in academics, it also makesconsiderable sense to work closer to our operationalcounterparts, and learn about, and from, some of thefrustrations and joys experienced in ongoing programs ofprofessional training. Relevant contacts can be found acrossthe board in forest and land management agencies, as well as

in groups such as National Parks and National Weatherservices. Shared responsibility in developing relatively small(e.g., two to five pages of text plus a few diagrams) modules,dealing with one specific science topic or management aspect,or a case study of a past fire means that, together, we wouldquickly build up a repertoire of relevant resources that eachof us could access. Provided these materials conform tocertain recognized and established international standards,there should be minimal difficulty in ensuring that they aretransferable by digital, computer-based means.

ConclusionsFireNet provides an opportunity for much cross-discipl-

inary, cross-institutional and international collaboration.The curriculum development effort required to compre-hensively address all of the relevant science and managementissues for training and education in “fire” exceeds thecapacity of a single individual operating in isolation. Byusing digital media as a default standard, and thecommunication and information-exchange afforded by newcomputer networks, new opportunities are created forcooperative curriculum development.

ReferencesGreen, D.G.; Gill, A.M.; Trevitt, A.C.F. 1993. FIRENET—an international

network for landscape fire information. Wildfire: Quarterly Journalof the International Association of Wildland Fire 2: 2-30.

Hirsch, K.G.; Hoskins, J. A.; Hoskins, W.D. 1993. A hypermedia systemfor interactive fire behavior training . Paper presented at the 12thconference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October 26-28; JekyllIsland, Georgia. SAF publication 94.02. Bethesda, MD: Society ofAmerican Foresters.

Thorburn, R.W. 1990. Videodisc/microcomputer technology in wildlandfire training . In: Alexander, M. E.; Bisgrove, G.F., eds. The art andscience of fire management. Forestry Canada Northwest. Informationreport NOR-X-309; 100-101.

Trevitt, A.C.F.; Sachse-Åkerlind, G. 1994. A District Fire CommitteeSimulation in the professional forestry curriculum: a case study ofcomputer-facilitated problem-based learning. In: Chen, S.E.;Cowdroy, R.; Kingsland, A.; Ostwald, M., eds., Reflections on problem-based learning, Sydney: Australian Problem Based Learning Network;347-369.

Trevitt, A.C.F.; Stals, L.; Sachse-Åkerlind, G. 1993. Education and trainingin fire meteorology and climate: a role for computer-assistedlearning? In: Proceedings of the 12th conference on fire and forestmeteorology; 1993 October 26-28; Jekyll Island, Georgia; Bethesda,Maryland: Society of American Foresters; 399-408.



Analysis An Arc/Info geographic information system (GIS) was

used to analyze the temporal and spatial distribution ofALDS recorded strikes. Density of lightning strikes wasfound to be positively correlated with elevation (Pearson’sr = +0.902). The mean annual densities of strikes werecalculated for 305-meter (1,000-foot) increments in elevation:

Elevation (Meters) Strikes per Square Kilometer

0 - 305 0.228

305 - 610 0.297

610 - 915 0.313

915 - 1220 0.860

1220 - 1525 1.063

1525 - 1830 1.367

1830 - 2135 2.767

The temporal analysis revealed that lightning activity isconcentrated in the late summer. August alone accounts forapproximately 42 percent of the mean annual total of strikes.The strikes recorded for the months of July, August, andSeptember account for 85 percent of the mean annual total.No other month accounts for more than 5 percent of themean annual total. This high activity period precedes theseason of most extreme fire weather, which is frequentlycoincident with hot, dry Santa Ana winds.

Studies of the occurrence of Santa Ana winds in southernCalifornia from 1951 to 1960 (Schroeder 1964) and in SanDiego County from 1970 to 1979 (Latham 1981) reveal thefollowing frequencies of Santa Ana winds:

Month Schroeder and others Latham (1981)(1964) 1951-60 1970-79

July 2 0August 0 0September 11 4October 19 13November 26 15December 18 13

The three peak months of Santa Ana wind occurrenceare October, November, and December. July and August,which are the peak months for lightning activity, have thelowest frequency of Santa Ana winds.

Lightning Strikes and Natural Fire Regimesin San Diego County, California 1

Michael L. Wells 2 David E. McKinsey 3

Abstract: Data from the Automated Lightning Detection Systemwere analyzed for the years 1985-1990 for San Diego County,California. The density of lightning strikes was found to bepositively correlated with elevation. Temporal analysis revealedthat lightning occurs most frequently in the months of July,August, and September preceding the peak of Santa Ana windactivity in October, November, and December. This suggeststhat a natural fire regime for this region would be typified byfrequent, low-intensity fires and that large, high-intensity fireswould be relatively rare.

L ightning is the only significant natural source of wildfireignition in southern California (Keeley 1981, Krausmann

1981, CDF 1986-1991, USFS 1985-1990). Therefore, in orderto understand the characteristics of wildfire occurrence in theabsence of human influences (i.e., natural fire regimes), it isnecessary to determine the distribution and frequency oflightning strikes. Researchers have used meteorological recordsand reports of lightning-caused fires to estimate the distributionof lightning and its importance to regional fire regimes.However, weather reports tend to underestimate lightningactivity (Wells and McKinsey 1993), and artificial structuresinterfere with the establishment of lightning ignitions (Minnich1987). Reliance on these methods leads to underestimationof lightning activity and lightning-caused ignitions.

The advent of the Automated Lightning Detection System(ALDS) in 1985 by the Bureau of Land Management hasgiven researchers a new source of information to evaluatethe distribution of lightning strikes. ALDS uses a network ofradar lightning detectors to triangulate the location of lightningstrikes (German 1990). Studies utilizing ALDS data havebeen made for northern Baja California, Mexico (Minnichand others 1993) and Yosemite National Park (VanWangtendonk 1991).


2Associate State Park Resource Ecologist, California Department ofParks and Recreation, San Diego Coast District, 3990 Old Town Ave., Ste.300C, San Diego, CA 92110; Doctoral student, Department of Geography,San Diego State University, San Diego, CA; and Research Associate,Department of Biology, University of San Diego, CA.

3Technical Manager, The Mary and Steven Birch Center for EarthSystems Analysis Research, Department of Geography, San Diego StateUniversity, San Diego, CA.



ConclusionsThe following conclusions summarize the findings of

this study:• The density of lightning strikes is positively

correlated with elevation.•The period of maximum lightning activity is during the late summer months of July, August, and September.

• Lightning is much less frequent during the monthsof October, November, and December when thefrequency of Santa Ana winds peaks.

From these conclusions, we can infer the characteristicsof hypothesized natural fire regimes in San Diego Countyand how those characteristics have been altered by humaninfluences. Fire records from San Diego County demonstratethat current fire regimes are dominated by human-causedignitions (Krausmann 1981, CDF 1985-1990, USFS 1985-1990). Data collected by Krausmann (1981) and Keeley(1981) reveal that frequency of ignition in the current human-dominated fire regime peaks at between 300 and 900 meterselevation (1,000 and 3,000 feet). This alteration is due tohuman influences such as destruction of wildland habitats atlow elevations, increases in human-caused ignitions near theurban interface, and the placement of electrically groundedartificial structures at high elevations (Minnich 1987).

Additional inferences can be drawn relating natural fireregimes to climatic variables. Lightning activity peaks duringthe months of July, August, and September when wildlandfuels are usually dry enough to burn. Santa Ana winds occurinfrequently during these months. This suggests that alightning-dominated natural fire regime would be characterizedby frequent, summer season fires of relatively low intensity.Less frequent, late season lightning storms could be followedby Santa Ana winds resulting in larger and more intensefires. In the recent past, the coincidence of human-causedignitions and Santa Ana events has resulted in large, highlydestructive fires. In a natural, lightning-dominated fire regimesuch episodes would be rare.

ReferencesCalifornia Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. 1986-1991. Wildfire

Activity Statistics (1985-1990). Sacramento, California: CaliforniaDepartment of Forestry and Fire Protection.

German, S.C. 1990. Initial attack management system (IAMS), informationpackage. Boise, Idaho: Boise Interagency Fire Center; 21 p.

Keeley, J.E. 1981. Distribution of lightning- and man-caused wildfiresin California . In: Conrad, C.; Oechel, W., technical coordinators.Proceedings of the symposium on dynamics and management ofMediterranean-type ecosystems; 1981 June 22-26; San Diego, California.Gen. Tech. Report PSW-58. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forestand Range Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department ofAgriculture; 431-436.

Krausmann, W.K. 1981. An analysis of several variables affecting fireoccurrence and size in San Diego County, California: San DiegoState University. Master’s thesis.

Latham, V.O. 1981. 500 millibar circulation patterns related to SantaAna weather in San Diego County, California: San Diego StateUniversity. Master’s thesis.

Minnich, R.A. 1987. Fire behavior in southern California chaparralbefore fire control: the Mount Wilson burns at the turn of thecentury. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 77:599-618.

Minnich, R.A.; Franco-Vizcaino, E.; Sousa-Ramirez, J.; Chou, Y. 1993.Lightning detection rates and wildland fire in the mountains ofnorthern Baja California, Mexico . Atmosfera 6: 235-253.

Schroeder, M.J. 1964. Synoptic weather types associated with critical fireweather. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forest and Range ExperimentStation, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 421 p.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service. 1985-1990. Fire records,Cleveland National Forest. On file. San Diego Ranger Unit, MonteVista, California.

Van Wangtendonk, J.W. 1991. Spatial analysis of lightning strikes inYosemite National Park. In: Andrews, P.; Potts, D., eds. Proceedingsof the 11th conference on fire and forest meteorology. Bethesda,Maryland: Society of American Foresters, 11: 605-611.

Wells, M.L.; McKinsey, D.E. 1993. The spatial and temporal distributionof lightning strikes in San Diego County, Calif. In: Proceedings GIS/LIS, volume 2; 1993 Nov. 2-4; Minneapolis, Minnesota. Bethesda,Maryland: American, Congress on Surveying and Mapping; 768-777.



consumption (Tran 1990). Reduced heat release rate is animportant characteristic of fire-retardant-treated wood (LeVanand Tran 1990, Sweet and others 1993). We have used heatrelease data to predict test results (Tran 1992) for ASTM E84 (ASTM 1991). Because of its small specimen size, thecone calorimeter can provide data only for materials. Withits 1-m2 specimen, the ICAL provides the ability to testassemblies (Urbas and Shaw 1993) and specimens that includejoints and other nonhomogeneous characteristics of buildingmaterials in the field. The ICAL is being developed at theWeyerhaeuser Fire Technology Laboratory in cooperationwith the American Forest and Paper Association. The methodis currently being considered by ASTM Committee E-5 onFire Standards.

Concluding Remarks Modern fire test methodologies provide data suitable

for theoretical models and a range of fire exposures. As aresult, we are better able to develop fire hazard assessmentsfor a variety of situations, including structures in the wildland-urban interface. Better fire hazard assessment methodologiesand specific design objectives will lead to code requirementsthat provide a high level of fire safety and design flexibility.

ReferencesASTM. 1991. Standard test method for surface burning characteristics

of building materials. Designation E 84-91a. Philadelphia, PA:American Society for Testing and Materials.

ASTM. 1992. Standard test method for heat and visible smoke releaserates for materials and products using an oxygen consumptioncalorimeter. Designation E 1354-92. Philadelphia, PA: AmericanSociety for Testing and Materials.

ASTM. 1993a. Standard test method for determining material ignitionand flame spread properties. Designation E 1317-93. Philadelphia,PA: American Society for Testing and Materials.

ASTM. 1993b. Standard test method for heat and visible smoke releaserates for materials and products. Designation E 906-83 (Reapproved1993). Philadelphia, PA: American Society for Testing and Materials.

Cohen, Jack. 1995. Structural ignition assessment model (SIAM). In:Proceedings of the Biswell symposium: fire issues and solutions; 1994February 15-17; Walnut Creek, CA.

DiNenno, P.J.; Beyler, C.L. 1992. Fire hazard assessment of compositematerials: The use and limitations of current hazard analysismethodology. In: Hirschler, Marcelo M., ed. Fire hazard and fire riskassessment, ASTM STP 1150, Philadelphia, PA: American Society forTesting and Materials; 87-99.

LeVan, Susan L.; Tran, Hao C. 1990. The role of boron in flame-retardant treatments. In: Hamel, Magaret, ed. Proceedings of the 1stinternational conference on wood protection with diffusible preservatives,Proceedings 47355; 1990 November 28-30; Nashville, TN. Madison,WI: Forest Products Research Society; 39-41.

Modern Fire Test Methodologies for Building Materials 1

Robert H. White Mark A. Dietenberger 2

Abstract: New fire test methodologies for building materials andrelated theoretical models are leading to improved fire hazardmethodologies for a variety of situations, including structures inthe wildland/urban interface.

Traditional fire test methods have represented the firststep toward replacing material-specific code requirements

with performance-based requirements for building materials.These traditional methods have provided data for only onespecific exposure (White and Nordheim 1992). By testingmaterials at various external heat fluxes (Tran and White1992), the data obtained are more useful in fire models andhazard assessments. The parallel developments of theoreticalfire models and state-of-the-art test methodologies havemade it possible to improve fire hazard assessments (DiNennoand Beyler 1992). The development of performance-basedfire safety requirements that specify design objectives was amajor topic at a recent conference (Worcester PolytechnicInstitute 1991).

Fire Test MethodologiesThree modern fire test methodologies are: the lateral

ignition and flame spread test (LIFT), the American Societyfor Testing and Materials (ASTM 1993a); the cone calorimeter(ASTM 1992); and the intermediate scale calorimeter (ICAL)(Shaw and Urbas 1993). At the USDA Forest Service’sForest Products Laboratory (FPL) in Madison, WI, we areusing a LIFT apparatus to develop ignition criteria for theStructure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) (Cohen 1995,Tran and others 1992). SIAM is being developed jointly bythe FPL and two USDA Forest Service Research Stations:Southern and Pacific Southwest. Test results from the LIFTinclude minimum external heat flux for and surfacetemperature at piloted ignition, and minimum surfacetemperature and flame heating parameter for lateral flamespread. Oxygen consumption technique provides a convenientway to obtain heat release data. The best known apparatususing this technology is the cone calorimeter. At FPL, wehave modified our Ohio State University (OSU) apparatus(ASTM 1993b) to obtain heat release rates using oxygen

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented as a poster at theBiswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface andWildland Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California.

2Supervisory Wood Scientist and Research General Engineer, respec-tively, Forest Products Laboratory, USDA Forest Service, One GiffordPinchot Drive, Madison, WI 53705-2398.



Shaw, James R.; Urbas, Joe. 1993. An intermediate-scale calorimeter forbuilding materials and assemblies. Fire and Materials 17: 259-263.

Sweet, Mitchell S.; LeVan, Susan L.; White, Robert H.; Tran, Hao C.;DeGroot, Rodney. 1993. Fire performance of wood treated with acombined fire retardant and preservative system. Unpublished draftsupplied by senior author.

Tran, Hao C. 1990. Modifications to an Ohio State University apparatusand comparison with cone calorimeter results. In: Quintiere, J.G.;L.Y. Cooper, eds. Heat and mass transfer in forest: Proceedings of theAAIA/ASME thermophysics and heat transfer conference; 1990 June18-20; Seattle, WA. New York. The American Society of MechanicalEngineers: 141: 131-139.

Tran, Hao C. 1992. Experimental data on wood materials. In: Babrauskas,V.; S. J. Grayson, eds. Heat release in fires. New York: Elsevier

Applied Sciences, chapter 11, part b. Tran, Hao; Cohen, Jack D.;Chase, Richard A. 1992. Modeling ignition of structures in wildland/urban interface fires. In: Proceedings of the first international fire andmaterials conference; 1992 September 24-25; Arlington, VA. London,UK: Inter Science Communications Limited: 253-262.

Tran, Hao C.; White, Robert H. 1992. Burning rate of solid wood measuredin a heat release rate calorimeter. Fire and Materials 16: 97-206.

Urbas, Joe; Shaw, James R. 1993. Testing wall assemblies on anintermediate-scale calorimeter. Fire Technology 29(4): 332-349.

White, R.H.; Nordheim, E.V. 1992. Charring rate of wood for ASTM E119 exposure. Fire Technology 28(1): 5-30. Worcester PolytechnicInstitute. 1991. Proceedings of the conference on fire safety design inthe 21st century; 1991 May 8-10; Worcester, MA: Worcester PolytechnicInstitute; 382 p.



Brush Fire Hazard: An Analysis of the Topanga Fire Storm 1

James A. Woods 2

In the fall, the annual Santa Ana winds blow from the highdeserts of the Western United States, over the San Gabriel

Mountains and through the greater Los Angeles Basin. Whenfire is introduced into the chaparral ecosystem of southernCalifornia, these hot, dry, nearly hurricane force winds cangenerate immense fire storms. This is precisely what happenedfor a 2-week period starting in late October and ending inearly November 1993. More than 20 major brush fires burnedduring this time. One devastating fire, in particular, was theTopanga Fire Storm. This fire was started by an arsonistaround 10:40 a.m. on November 2, and over the course ofthe next 5 days, burned over 16,500 acres, destroying ordamaging nearly 350 homes.

Fire is an integral part of the chaparral environment ofCalifornia, and as urban areas expand and encroach intowilderness regions, the need to establish the level of firehazard in a region increases. Geographic information system(GIS) technology is a valuable tool in fire management(Gronlund and others 1994, Salazar 1989). One applicationof GIS technology to the wildland/urban interface problemhas been the replication of fire hazard models (Woods 1992).

GIS TechnologyWoods (1992) used two different GIS’s—IDRISI, a

raster-based GIS, and Atlas GIS, a vector-based system—toreplicate several fire hazard models. He showed that thedistribution of fire hazard can be vastly different for a givenarea, depending on which methodology is used. The threemodels used were: the Burning Index model, used by theCalifornia Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Phillips1983); Schmidt’s Fireline Intensity model (Schmidt 1978);and the Los Angeles County Fire Department’s Brush FireHistory Hazard model (Pierpont 1991).

A portion of the Santa Monica Mountains, in Los AngelesCounty, was used as the study area. The geographic variableswhich each model used (topography, vegetation, brush firehistory, etc.) were digitized and stored as separate imagesand layers in both IDRISI and Atlas GIS, respectively. Theseimages and layers were then analyzed, combined, and

compared on the basis of each hazard model’s guidelines, toreplicate the hazard models. The final models were thenstored as images and layers.

Because the Topanga Fire Storm was located whollywithin the confines of the study area used by Woods (1992),all of the data necessary for an analysis was pre-existing inhis data base. The only operation necessary was for theperimeter of the Topanga Fire Storm to be digitized andstored in both GIS’s. That portion of each fire hazardmodel which fell within the confines of the Topanga firecould then be extracted to create new images and layers.These new images and layers represent what the level offire hazard was, per each original fire hazard model, withinthe fire zone.

Comparison of Fire Hazard ModelsThe three models use different criteria for determining

the level of hazard, but each of them divides fire hazard intothree categories, making a comparison relatively easy. Thougheach model uses different terms to describe their level ofhazard, for this paper, the terminology will be: Low, Medium,and High.

Analysis of each of the models indicates that the FirelineIntensity model and the Brush Fire History model are muchcloser to each other in the percent of land in each hazardcategory, while the Burning Index model was quite dissimilarto each of the other two. The Fireline Intensity model places38.2 percent of the land in the Low hazard category, 25.1percent in the Medium, and 36.7 percent in the High, whilethe Fire History model places 21.9 percent of the land in theLow hazard level, 37.4 percent in the Medium, and 40.7percent in the High. The Burning Index model, on the otherhand, places only 2.7 percent of the land in the Low hazardlevel, 50.2 percent in the Medium, and 47.1 percent in theHigh fire hazard level.

However, a visual analysis of each of the maps indicatesthat there is great disparity between all three models. TheFireline Intensity model (fig. 1) and the Burning Index model(fig. 2) have a similar underlying pattern, since vegetation isone of the most important factors in each model. The BurningIndex model also incorporates slope, which accounts for thediscontinuity of hazardous areas. Since the Fire Historymodel (fig. 3) is based solely on the fire history of the region,there is no influence from either vegetation or topography.The Low category, in the original model, represents 1-10years since the last brush fire. Medium represents 11 to 29years, and High represents areas which have not burned in

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the BiswellSymposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and WildlandEcosystems, February 15-17, 1994, at Walnut Creek, California.

2Geographer, Geo-Cart Systems, 3014 Nipomo Avenue, Long Beach, CA90808-4225.



Figure 2– Burning Index fire hazard model of the 1993 Topanga Fire Storm.

Figure 1– Fireline Intensity fire hazard model of the 1993 Topanga Fire Storm.



Figure 3– Brush Fire History fire hazard model of the 1993 Topanga Fire Storm.

more than 30 years. As a result, the fire history map becomesa vegetation age map.

None of these models are designed for use as a predictivetool. The Burning Index model is designed to define wherethe potential fire hazard is so that building codes can beimplemented, whereas both the Fireline Intensity and FireHistory models are designed to help with fire responseplanning. Further research would be to implement a firesimulation model, such as FIREMAP (Ball and Gurtin 1991),and then make a comparison between the actual fire and thecomputer-simulated fire.

ReferencesBall, George L.; Gurtin, D. Phillip. 1991. FIREMAP . In: Nodvin, Stephen

C.; Waldrop, Thomas A., eds. Fire and the environment: ecological andcultural perspectives. Proceedings of an international symposium; 1990March 20-24; Knoxville, TN. Gen Tech. Rep. SE-69. Asheville, NC:Southeast Forest Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Departmentof Agriculture; 215-218.

Gronlund, Amy Goulstone; Xiang, Wei-Ning; Sox, Joseph. 1994. GIS,expert system technologies improve forest fire managementtechniques. GIS World 7(2): 32-36.

Phillips, Clinton B. 1983. Instructions for zoning fire hazard severity instate responsibility area in California. Sacramento, California:Resources Agency, California Department of Forestry.

Pierpont, Don. 1991. Captain, Vegetation Management Division. Los AngelesCounty Fire Department. Personal conversations and phone calls.

Salazar, Lucy A. 1989. Fire management on the frontier of GIS technology.In: Forestry on the frontier. Proceedings of the 1989 Society of AmericanForesters Convention; 1989 September 24-27; Spokane, WA. Bethesda,Maryland: Society of American Foresters; 64-69.

Schmidt, R. Gordon. 1978. An approach to hazard classification. FireManagement Notes 39(3): 9-11,19.

Woods, James A. 1992. A geographic information system for brush firehazard mapping and analysis. Long Beach: California State University;65 p. Master’s Thesis.


PSW-GTR-158

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