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United States Fire Administration

Technical Report Series

Massive Leak of Liquified Chlorine GasHenderson, Nevada

Federal Emergency Management Agency


National ‘Fire Data Center

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United States Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

The United States Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout thecountry. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion fordeciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessonsbring to light new knowledge about fire -- the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior infire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yetanother fire tragedy report.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at national and regional fire meetings.The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fireservice. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from USFA; announcements of theiravailability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakerswho must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fireservice to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, andother related areas

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigatorinto a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insurethat USFA’s assistance and presence would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review ofthe incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediatelyafter, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects ofthe incident can be made. Local authorities review USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFAinvestigator or team is available to local authorities should they wish to request technical assistance for theirown investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation,Arlington, Viii its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire Administration incarrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The United States Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from Fire ChiefWilliam Bunker of the Clark County Fire Department as well as Assistant Fire Chief Tom Alexander andPublic Information Officer Robert Leinbach of his staff, and also Battalion Chief William Kourim of the Cityof Henderson Fire Department. Information was also provided by Cathleen Faulx, Emergency ManagementCoordinator of the Clark County Emergency Preparedness Office and Plant Manager Clifford H. Barr ofPioneer Chlor Alkali Company, Inc.

For additional copies of this report write to the United States Fire Administration, National FireData Center, 16825 South Seton Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727.

Massive Leak of Liquified Chlorine GasHenderson, Nevada

(May 6, 1991)

Report by: J. Gordon Routley

This is Report 052 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conductedby TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the UnitedStates Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency


National Fire Data Center

Investigated by:

Local Contacts:

Massive Leak of LiquifiedChlorine Gas

Henderson, Nevada

J. Gordon Routley

William Bunker, Fire ChiefTom Alexander, Assistant Fire ChiefRobert Leinbach, Public Information OfficerClark County Fire Department575 East Flamingo RoadLas Vegas, Nevada 89119(702) 455-7311

Cathleen Faulx, Emergency Management CoordinatorClark County Emergency Preparedness225 Bridger AvenueLas Vegas, Nevada 89155

William Kourim, Battalion ChiefCity of Henderson Fire Department239 Water StreetHenderson, Nevada 89015(702) 5652307

Clifford H. Barr, Plant ManagerPioneer Chlor Alkali Company, Inc.8000 Lake Mead DriveHenderson, Nevada 89015(702) 565-8781

OVERVIEW

A massive leak of liquified chlorine gas created a dangerous cloudof poison gas over the city of Henderson, Nevada, in the early morninghours of May 6, 1991. Over 200 persons were examined at a local hospitalfor respiratory distress caused by inhalation of the chlorine andapproximately 30 were admitted for treatment. Approximately 700individuals were taken to shelters. It is estimated that from 2,000 to 7,000individuals were taken elsewhere.

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SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Situation Chlorine release caused by leak of brinefrom heat exchanger mixing with liquifiedgas. Mixture created corrosive acid whichate through pipes when product wastransferred from storage tank. Leakincreased as acid ate larger hole in pipe.

Delayed Alarm Plant employees believed they could containthe leak. Fire Department notified bypasser-by who was unsure of source.Response delayed until second call providedadditional information. Further delaycaused by long response distance andseveral possible sources to check for hazmatrelease.

Jurisdiction Plant is located in Clark County islandsurrounded by the City of Henderson.Population at risk primarily in City.Agencies work together effectively.

Injuries Firefighters and plant personnel overcomewhen chlorine cloud moved in unexpecteddirection. Command Post had to berelocated three times to avoid moving cloud.Some residents exposed during evacuation;over 200 examined at hospitals; 30 admitted.

Evacuation Citizens evacuated as leak continued toexpand and control efforts provedunsuccessful. Approximately 700 peopletaken to shelters; 2,000 to 7,000 takenelsewhere. Police officers assisting withevacuation and traffic control exposed to gascloud.

Control Measures Corroded valve allowed product to flow.Fire Department HazMat Team and plantpersonnel entered together to stop flow.First attempt to stop flow by inserting blankflange was unsuccessful; Teflon coated platehad to be used because of rapid corrosion ofsteel.

Extent of Leak Approximately 70 tons of chlorine escaped.Cloud dissipated with morning heat andwinds.

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LOCATION

The Pioneer Chlor Alkali facility is located in an industrial area,approximately 10 miles southeast of Las Vegas, Nevada. It is one of severalchemicals and materials processing facilities that are located in the BasicManagement Inc. complex. When the BMI complex was established,during World War II, it was located in the desert, several miles from anyexisting populated areas. Henderson was established nearby as a supportcommunity for the industries that were located in the complex. The LasVegas metropolitan area has experienced rapid growth during the lastdecade and the City of Henderson has become a heavily populated suburbwith more than 60,000 residents. The BMI complex currently occupies anunincorporated “island” under the jurisdiction of Clark County and isalmost completely surrounded by the incorporated City of Henderson.

Public concern with the materials that are produced and stored inthe BMI complex has created pressure to relocate the complex, away frompopulated areas. Several hazardous material incidents have occurred inthe immediate area, including an explosion of ammonium perchlorate at anadjacent facility in 1988, which resulted in two deaths and 372 injuries thatincluded 15 firefighters. The most recent incident occurred while theNevada State Legislature was considering a bill to require the complex tobe relocated to an isolated area, approximately 15 miles north of LasVegas. (For a detailed description of the earlier incident, refer to Report021 of this series, “Fire and Explosions at Rocket Fuel Plant, Henderson,Nevada.“)

ORIGIN OF THE LEAK

Pioneer Chlor Alkali produces chlorine gas through the electrolysisof sodium chloride (table salt). The chlorine is used primarily for watertreatment and is shipped to clients in railroad tank cars and highway tanktrucks. By-products of the process, including hydrogen gas and sodiumhydroxide, are used by other companies in the BMI complex. The chlorineis compressed and stored as a liquified gas in a bank of eight storage tanks,each of 150 ton capacity. The system has a storage capacity ofapproximately 1,200 tons, although company officials indicate that theirpolicy is to limit the storage on hand to 300 tons or less.

Chlorine (Cl2)Molecular WeightBoiling TemperatureImmediate Danger to Life or

70.929°F

Health 30 parts per million (ppm)

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Short Term Exposure Limit 3 ppmExpansion Ratio (Liquid to Gas) 450-500

The liquified chlorine is stored in tanks at a pressure ofapproximately 50 psi and temperature of approximately 30°F. The chlorineis dried in the process of compression and, when dry, is noncorrosive. If itis contaminated by water or water vapor, hydrochloric acid is produced andthe resulting product is extremely corrosive. It is believed that a tubefailure in a heat exchanger allowed water to mix with the chlorine goinginto one of the storage tanks. When workers began to transfer thecontents of that tank to a railroad tank car, the corrosive liquid began torapidly deteriorate the steel piping system.

The leak was first detected by automatic monitoring equipment,located near the storage tanks, at approximately 0110 hours. Employeesresponding to the alarm found a pinhole-size leak in a 2-inch elbow,located on a catwalk level approximately 10 feet above ground. The leakwas a few feet beyond the valve on the discharge side of the pump whichwas used to transfer the liquid from the storage tanks to the rail carloading rack.

Attempts were made by plant personnel to stop the flow and patchthe leak. The pump was shut down and the discharge valve was closed tostop the flow from the storage tanks to the leaking pipe. Managementpersonnel were notified and members of the company’s emergency teamwere called to respond to the plant. At this time the leak was consideredto be minor and employees believed that it could be controlled withoutcausing a major hazard to the plant or the surrounding area.

Plant employees were considered to be proficient in handlingsituations of this type. The Chlorine Institute, a trade association ofcompanies involved in the manufacturing, distribution, and use of chlorineand related products, coordinates a system of mutual aid emergencyresponse teams. These CHLOREP teams are made up of membercompany employees who are trained and equipped to respond toemergency incidents involving chlorine. Pioneer Chlor Alkali operates theCHLOREP team for Southern Nevada and surrounding areas and theemergency response team equipment is stored within its facility. Jointtraining exercises had been conducted with the Clark County FireDepartment HazMat Team and other area fire departments.

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE

At approximately 0150 hours a citizen notified Henderson PoliceDepartment that she had encountered a strong offensive odor when passingnear the BMI complex on a major highway. The highway passes withinone half mile of the complex, and the caller was concerned that therecould be a release coming from one of the occupancies. The call wasrelayed to the Las Vegas City Fire Department Communications Center,which provides communications for the Clark County Fire Department.Since reports of odors in the area are a frequent occurrence, theClark County Battalion Chief was notified, and he made the decision towait for a more positive report of an incident before responding. Thecommunications personnel began to call the industries in the area to askif any of them had a problem.

At approximately 0200 hours a second call was received, this time bythe Fire Communications Center, reporting a strong odor in the area. Afull first alarm assignment was dispatched, including the Clark CountyHazMat Team. The response time for the first units was 14 minutes dueto the distance from the closest Clark County fire station. The firstarriving units had some difficulty identifying which of several separatefacilities was the source of the problem, until the odor was encountered.The odor was immediately recognized as chlorine, and the units weredirected to the correct location.

Arriving at the gate of the Pioneer Chlor Alkali facility, the ClarkCounty Battalion Chief found several employees who had been exposed tochlorine gas and were in need of medical attention. Employees reportedthat they were in the process of shutting down the plant and isolating theleak. They believed that the leak was successfully isolated and that theycould handle the situation at that time.

Within a few minutes the atmosphere around the plant entrancebecame enveloped by the chlorine cloud and most of the plant employeesdonned their emergency escape respirators. The Battalion Chief requestedassistance and ordered the area to be evacuated shortly before he andseveral other Fire Department members were overcome. All FireDepartment and plant personnel evacuated to a location approximately onehalf mile uphill from the plant, where a Command Post was established.The Henderson Fire Department Battalion Chief, who had responded onmutual aid, assumed command and requested additional assistance, whilethe Clark County Battalion Chief and several other Fire Departmentmembers and plant employees were treated and transported to hospitals.

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The Clark County Assistant Fire Chief responded from his homeand assumed the duties of Incident Commander. He assigned theHenderson Battalion Chief, who was most familiar with the area, as theOperations Chief in the Incident Command structure. The second arrivingClark County Battalion Chief was assigned to supervise the HazMatGroup, due to his HazMat Team experience. Additional fire and medicalunits were directed to respond to a staging area adjacent to the CommandPost. Liaison was also established with the Las Vegas Metropolitan andCity of Henderson Police Departments at the Command Post.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Strategic decision making at this point focused on several factors:

1. Plant employees believed that the leak was isolated and would stopas soon as the residual chlorine had escaped from the piping system. Theplant’s chlorine production had been shut down and the valve between thestorage tanks and the leaking valve was closed. This would leave only theliquid that was already in the piping system that could leak out. Theybelieved that the corrosive liquid was eating away at the elbow, but thatnot more than 1,000 lbs. of chlorine could escape. Based on thisinformation, there was no point in risking personnel to take additional leakcontrol actions.

2. The population immediately at risk included only the adjacentindustrial facilities, most of which were shut down and evacuated. Onefacility could not be shut down and a minimal crew was left to operate it,while wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. These employees weretrained in hazmat procedures.

3. The use of water fog to accelerate vaporization or to absorb thevapors would have required the commitment of personnel and equipmentin a hazardous area. Long hose lines would have been required to placemaster stream appliances in positions where they might be effective, andthe acid produced by the combination of water and chlorine could havecaused a grater damage to plant facilities and equipment.

At this point the situation appeared to be stable. Based on thestrategic considerations, a cautious ‘“wait and see” approach was taken andall personnel were kept out of the immediate area of the leak. HazMatGroup members with monitoring devices were deployed in an attempt todefine the location and track the progress of the gas cloud. City ofHenderson officials assembled at the Command Post and maintained animmediate awareness of the situation. Additional resources were staged

Page 6

and precautions were taken, in case the situation changed and evacuationbecame necessary.

EXPANDING GAS CLOUD

It was very difficult to accurately predict the size or travel of the gascloud resulting from vaporization of the liquid pool on the ground. Theflow rate of the leak could not be determined and the size of the resultingliquid pool could not be observed, since the storage tanks are surroundedby other processing equipment. The developing cloud could not be visuallymonitored due to the darkness and the location of the problem within thefacility.

The heavier-than-air chlorine vapors have a tendency to move alongthe ground and concentrate in low spots. The BMI complex is located in arelatively high area and the terrain slopes down toward the north forseveral miles. A dry wash provided a low path for the heaviestconcentration to migrate into a sparsely populated area north of the BMIcomplex A growing cloud of lower chlorine concentration covered anexpanding area along the ground. The wind was unusually calm and slowlypushed this cloud in the uphill direction, toward the Command Post andtoward more populated areas to the east and west. Indications are that thegas cloud simply expanded under the cool and dry atmospheric conditionsand moved slowly over the general area, while the amount of vaporizedchlorine in the atmosphere continued to increase.

Weather Conditions:Temperature 65°FRelative Humidity 15%Wind 0-5 mph, variable direction

As time progressed it became evident that the chlorine cloud wascontinuing to grow. Subsequent investigation showed that the corrosiveproperties of the liquid had damaged the valve on the discharge side of thetransfer pump, allowing a continuous supply of chlorine from thecontaminated storage tank to reach the leak. The leak also increased inflow rate, as the corrosive properties of the liquid ate a growing hole in thesteel elbow. These factors created a pool of liquid, which allowedincreasing quantities of chlorine to vaporize into the atmosphere. Beforethe leak was stopped an estimated 70 tons of liquified chlorine gas escaped,making this one of the largest recorded leaks of this type in the United States.

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EVACUATION

At approximately 0330 hours conditions began to deteriorate rapidly.The Command Post and Staging Area were suddenly enveloped by the gascloud and had to be evacuated. Although the Command Post was uphillfrom the plant, unusual wind conditions allowed the gas cloud to movealong the ground and envelope the area without warning. The CommandPost was relocated first to a convenience market parking lot, which alsobecame untenable, and then to a race track parking lot, several miles fromthe source of the leak. Reports of strong odors in the occupied residentialareas and downtown portions of Henderson caused the IncidentCommander to begin evacuations of residents in affected areas.

At approximately 0345 hours a state of emergency was declared bythe County Manager, and the Clark County Emergency Operations Centerwas activated. Preparations were made to provide temporary shelter forlarge numbers of evacuees, using designated schools and the many hotelsand motels in the Las Vegas area. The Red Cross established temporaryshelters in predesignated schools, while the Convention and VisitorsBureau began to notify its members of the situation.

The large parking lot at the race track provided an area forassembling resources, in case larger scale evacuations were necessary. Fire,medical, police, and other resources from several jurisdictions were stagedand organized to respond to changing conditions. The number of agenciesand jurisdictions involved utilized a variety of radio systems andfrequencies. This problem was somewhat resolved by the fact that most ofthe fire service command officers and some of the police officials hadcellular phones in their vehicles and these were used to supplement radiocommunications. No specific serious problem was caused by thesecommunications difficulties though the overall operation was not as smoothas it could have been if integrated radio communications systems had beenavailable.

The Clark County School District made school busses available tothe Fire Department and 50 off-duty firefighters were called in to drivethem. Each bus driver was provided with an SCBA, in case acontaminated area was encountered, and two teams were made up with fullcrews of SCBA-equipped firefighters standing by to take busses intocontaminated areas to rescue residents in immediate danger. Policeofficers were assigned to notify residents in the predicted path of the cloud,while firefighters were assigned to areas where the presence of chlorinecould be detected. An estimated 2,400 residents were evacuated from theirhomes and from local businesses.

Page 8

Monitoring of the gas cloud was continued by fire departmenthazmat teams from Clark County, Las Vegas City, and Nellis Air ForceBase, in addition to county and state environmental health personnel.Sampling tubes were used to measure the chlorine concentration at groundlevel, and the readings were plotted on a map to track and predictmovement of the cloud. A police helicopter was assigned to visually trackthe movement of the cloud.

Most of the readings indicated concentrations that produced astrong odor and respiratory distress but were below levels immediatelydangerous to the life and health of most persons. All hospitals in themetropolitan area were alerted to stand by for large numbers of patients,and approximately 250 were examined in emergency rooms. Several policeofficers, who were exposed while evacuating residents, directing traffic andperforming other functions in the area, were among those patients. Themajority of the patients recovered quickly when removed from thecontaminated atmosphere. Individuals with asthma and other breathingproblems were severely affected by even minor exposure to the gas andaccounted for most of the hospital admissions.

St. Rose Dominican Hospital, in downtown Henderson, was locatedwithin the affected area, and a decision was made to leave the patients inthe building with the air handling system set to recirculate the interior air.Air samples indicated that the ventilation system could maintain a safeinterior atmosphere, in spite of the outside conditions. This was felt to bepreferable to risking moving the patients outside into the contaminatedatmosphere. A retirement home in the direct path of the gas cloud wasevacuated.

LEAK CONTROL

As the sun began to rise, the cloud became more visible and itsextent could be estimated. Several square miles were blanketed with agreenish haze, sitting just above ground level. It became obvious that theleak was not controlled and that direct action would be needed to stop theflow. It was not known how much liquid had leaked out, but the amountthat could potentially escape was now estimated at 100 tons or more.Consultation with plant personnel led to the conclusion that the leak couldonly be stopped by placing a blank flange in the line between the storagetank and the leaking elbow. An entry team was assembled, including bothFire Department and plant emergency personnel, to go in and insert theblank flange.

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Note: A blank flange is a solid plate, cut to the appropriate size to fitbetween the two pieces of a flange pipe connection. To insert theblank flange, the bolts must be removed from the existing flangedconnection and the plate inserted between the two halves. The boltsare then reinstalled and tightened.

The entry team dressed in Level B protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus approached the area of the leak. Theyfound that the hole in the pipe had expanded to approximately one-inchdiameter and was producing a steady stream of liquid chlorine. The liquidhad formed a pool from which the chlorine was vaporizing rapidly.

To install the blank flange it was necessary to work within two feetof the actual leak, under the spray of the leaking liquid. Plant employeesperformed the actual installation of the blank flange, backed-up by FireDepartment members. The first attempt, at approximately 0630 hours,proved unsuccessful when the highly corrosive liquid damaged the steelplate before the bolts could be tightened. A second attempt wassuccessful, at another flange location, using a Teflon-coated steel plate.The leak was stopped by approximately 0730 hours.

With the leak stopped, the problem began to diminish. Theremaining liquid on the ground vaporized quickly and the vapor cloudbegan to dissipate under improving weather conditions. Over the nextthree hours the heat of the sun warmed the ground and provided buoyancyfor the cloud, while a more normal wind condition helped to move it awayfrom the populated area. By 1000 hours the cloud had dispersedcompletely and evacuees were allowed to return to their homes andbusinesses.

For the next 24 hours there was a continuing concern that more ofthe stored chlorine might have been contaminated with water and thecorrosive mixture could be eating its way out of additional tanks andpiping. The Clark County Fire Department HazMat Team continued tostand by until sampling of the remaining storage concluded that thecontaminated chlorine was contained in one storage tank and most of itscontents had leaked out. Preparations were made to disassemble the heatexchanger where the problem was believed to have originated.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. The problems associated with a high-risk occupancv in onejurisdiction. creating a problem in a different jurisdiction. present obviouschallenges for emergency planning response agencies.

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In this case the responding agencies worked well together, but thedeficiencies of the regulatory and planning processes were a major focus ofattention after the incident.

2. The Incident Command Svstem (ICS) proved to be extremelyeffective in this incident. particularly in coordinating the efforts of severaldifferent agencies at the scene.

The ability to assign major responsibilities to command officers fromdifferent fire departments, without any problems, is evidence that thepersonnel are trained and prepared to operate effectively.

3. The lack of effective radio communications between agencies was aproblem at this incident.

Cellular telephones were used very effectively to supplement publicsafety radio capabilities and proved to be reliable under thesecircumstances. In other situations cellular telephone service has beencompromised by the number of persons trying to use the systems underemergency conditions and particularly the heavy use of the systems by newsmedia personnel. The location and time of day may have been key factorsin making the cellular network responsive in this incident. Note: CentelCellular will block off communications allowing only emergency personnelphones to work if the system starts to overload.

4 . The decision between evacuating residents and warning them toremain indoors. with windows and outside air inlets closed. is often critical.

In this case, it was considered more practical to keep patients insidethe hospital than to expose them to the outside atmosphere. This took intoconsideration the susceptibility of the patients to chlorine exposure, theability to exclude outside air from the ventilation system and theavailability of medical personnel and equipment inside the hospital. Somearea residents reported that they were notified to evacuate and wereexposed to the chlorine cloud while waiting for busses to pick them up.The risk of exposure during evacuation may have been greater than therisk if they had remained indoors.

5 . The use of busses operated by fire department personnel is apractical means to evacuate residents.

It is more feasible to have firefighters drive busses than to train busdrivers to use SCBA. It is equally difficult for firefighters using SCBA toconvince residents to expose themselves to the outside atmosphere in order

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to evacuate, unless the residents are already in distress. The contingencyplan, sending a crew of SCBA-equipped firefighters on a bus to enter andevacuate an area in immediate danger, is a practical innovation.

6 . Police officers. who are not orovided with or trained to use SCBA.were effective in evacuating areas ahead of the contamination. but couldnot function in the contaminated areas.

Several police officers who were assigned to traffic control or toassist with evacuation were exposed to the chlorine cloud and transportedthemselves to medical facilities for evaluation in the later stages of theincident.

7 . Due to the relatively low concentration of chlorine in the gas cloud.in this case. the oredominant medical condition was limited to shortduration respiratory irritation.

Chlorine is detectable by odor at very low concentrations and is arespiratory irritant between 3 and 30 ppm. Individuals with chronicrespiratory problems, such as asthma, were quickly affected and accountedfor most of the hospital admissions.

8. It proved to be extremelv difficult to determine the size. shape. andmovement of the chlorine cloud.

Helicopter observation was a valuable asset, particularly withincreasing daylight. Ground sampling over large areas is difficult tocoordinate and requires careful mapping to be effective. An attempt wasmade to predict dispersion of the chlorine using CAMEO (a computermodel program), but complicated factors of terrain, slope, temperature,wind velocity, relative humidity, and an unknown rate of release madepredictions extremely difficult.

9. The application of water to the vapor cloud was considered in thissituation to accelerate the evaporation of the pooled liquid.

Conventional wisdom suggests that massive applications of waterspray could absorb chlorine from the air, resulting in a dilute liquidsolution. Chlorine has a low rate of solubility in water, and, with a largeleak, there is a concern that applying less-thansufficient volumes of waterwould create a corrosive fog. Applying water to a container of liquifiedchlorine could heat the contents to their boiling temperature and cause thecontainer to rupture. It is often difficult or impossible to estimate the flowand rate of vaporization from a leak to make such determinations.

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10. The delav in notification of the Fire Department and other agenciesindicates a problem with plant personnel and the established standardoperating procedures at the facility.

A review of communications tapes reveals that no call was receivedby the Police or Fire Departments for this incident from the facility. Aprivate sector ambulance provider had been requested to respond totransport plant employees who had been exposed to the chlorine gas.

11. While emergencv procedures had been planned for the chlorinefacility itself. there was no specific plan for notification or evacuation in theevent of a chlorine leak or other emergencv extending: beyond the propertvline.

Due to the risk created by the chemical industries in the area, theneed for emergency warning systems should be evaluated. This level ofplanning requires both private and public sector participation.

12. The fact that the incident occurred at the facility where theCHLOREP Team equipment was stored caused unusual problems.

Most of the equipment that could have been most valuable in tryingto secure the leak could not be reached because it was in the hazardousarea. This included the SCBA units normally used by the team members,which are of a different type from those used by area fire departments.Another chemical plant in the area was able to provide the needed SCBAsfor the plant members on the entry team.

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Appendices

A. Chlorine Leak Incident Area Map, Pioneer Chlor Alkali Facility,and Diagram of Leak Location

B. Technical Articles on Chlorine and Dealing with ChlorineEmergencies

Appendix A

Chlorine Leak Incident Area Map,Pioneer Chlor Alkali Facility

and Diagram of Leak Location

Chlorine Leak Incident Area Map

Henderson, Nevada

Pioneer Chlor Alkali Facility

Diagram of Leak Location

Appendix B

Technical Articles on Chlorine and Dealing WithChlorine Emergencies

Chemical Data Notebook Series:

A ccording to an unreleased re-port by the U.S. Environmen-

tal Protection Agency (EPA)concerning hazardous material in-cidents from 1980 through 1985,chlorine caused more deaths andinjuries than any other toxic chem-ical involved in these accidents.Out of some 6,928 incidents re-viewed by the EPA, chlorine wasinvolved in approximately 665 ac-cidental releases and caused 135deaths and nearly 1,500 injuries.

PROPERTlES AND APPEARANCE

Chlorine is a member of the familyof elements known as halogens(other members are fluorine, bro-mine, iodine, and astatine, whichis radioactive and very rare). Ayellowish-greenish gas that is 2.45times heavier than air and veryslightly soluble in water, chlorinedoes not exist in the elementalform, but in molecular form. Thechemical symbol for chlorine is Cl,but when it is generated, it exists asthe diatomic molecule, Cl2.

Like many other gases, chlorineis usually liquified for transporta-tion and storage. This is done foreconomic reasons, since you canget so much more material into agiven volume as a liquid ratherthan as a gas or vapor. For in-stance, chlorine produces 457 cu-bic feet of gas for every cubic footof liquid. This means, of course,that you can store or transport 457times more chlorine as a liquidthan as a gas.

Liquid chlorine (like the gas) hasa greenish-yellow tint, and a spe-cific gravity of 1.56 (as opposed toits vapor density of 2.45). Ofcourse, whenever liquid chlorineis exposed to air, it begins to boilaway since its boiling ‘point isabout -30°F.

The chemical properties of chlo-rine make it an oxidizer, a corro-

ChlorineBY FRANK L. FIRE

sive, and an irritant (as DOT mightclassify it) or toxic (as IMO classi-fies it with a 2.3 designation at thebottom of a DOT placard). Allthese features make chlorine ahighly reactive material, which isthe reason that chlorine is so im-portant to industry, being used inthe manufacture of a great varietyof chemicals and materials, amongwhich are bleaches, plastics, rub-ber, dyes and pigments, pulp, pa-per, refrigerant gases, fire extin-guishing agents, disinfectants, andin the production and/or process-ing of innumerable specific organ-ic and inorganic chemicals.

Chlorine may also be found inlarge quantities in water treatmentand sewage treatment plants.Chlorinated hydrocarbons (whichmeans that chlorine has beenchemically attached to a hydrocar-bon by substituting it for a hydro-gen atom) are very valuable to in-dustry as solvents, de-greasers,and other important commercialuses, so chlorine may be found inany industrial plant that manufac-tures these materials.

Chlor ine has one synonym,bertholite, but may sometimes bereferred to as molecular chlorineor liquid chlorine.

IDENllFlCATlON

Chlorine containers can be identi-fied by the use of the Departmentof Transportat ion (DOT) non-flammable gas placard with theUN designation 1017 in the centerof the placard or next to the plac-ard. Its Standard Transportation

F R A N K L . F I R E i s t h e d i r e c t o r o f m a r k e t i n g f o r

Americhem Inc. in Cuyahoga Falls. OH. A chemis-

try of hazardous materials instructor at the Univer-

slty of Akron, he is also an adjunct instructor of

hazardous materials at the National Fire Academy.

M r . F i r e I s t h e a u t h o r o f A C O M M O N S E N S E A P -

P R O A C H T O H A Z A R D O U S M A T E R I A L S . a n e w

book published by Fire Engineering Books.

Reprinted with permission from FIRE ENGINEERING

Commodity Code (STCC) numberis 4904120, and its National FireProtection Association (NFPA) rat-ing (704) is 3-0-0-OXY. DOT re-quired labels are non-flammablegas and poison.

HAZARDS

Chemical actions and reactions

Although chlorine does not burn,which is the reason for the DOTdesignation as a non-flammablegas, like oxygen, chlorine doessupport combustion. As a matterof fact, chlorine is almost as effi-cient an oxidizer as oxygen. Thismeans that any ordinary combusti-ble or very flammable materialmay become explos ive whenmixed with chlorine. Therefore,all combustible materials, particu-larly organic substances, and allpowdered metals and many metalcompounds must be kept sepa-rated from chlorine.

If chlorine is released anywherenear a fire incident, efforts must bemade to keep the chlorine gas fromreaching the fire. Since chlorine isa very powerful oxidizing agent, itwill intensify the fire to the pointwhere no ordinary firefighting ef-fort will be able to control it-sim-ilar to the addition of pure oxygento the fire.

The fact that gaseous chlorine isso heavy (2.45 times as heavy asair) means that the gas “hangs to-g e t h e r ” a n d f l o w s a l o n g t h eground, seeking low spots in theterrain. Obviously, these areas areextremely dangerous because ofthe concentration of chlorine. Thishazard can exist quite far from theinitial incident, and, dependingon the size of the release, evacua-tion distances downwind mayhave to be extended one to twomiles or more.

An interesting method of chlo-

FIRE ENGINEERING/July 1986 25

rine detection in low-lying areas,and in basements or other con-fined areas into which chlorinemight have flowed and becometrapped because of its high vapordensity, is the use of a rag soakedwith ammonium hydroxide, tiedto the end of a long pole. If this ragis waved around in an atmospherecontaining chlorine, a white cloudwill form wherever the rag con-tacts chlorine. However, althoughthis detection method will warn ofthe presence of chlorine, it will notindicate the level of concentration.

If you suspect that chlorine ispresent, keep your mask on. Theuse of gas sampling and detectiondevices will accurately measurethe presence of chlorine at levelsthat are very low, but still harmful.

Driving into a cloud of chlorineis dangerous to the vehicle as wellas to the occupants. Being a strongoxidizer, the chlorine will supportthe combustion of gasoline or die-sel fuel, and there can be severedamage (corrosion) to the engine ifchlorine is pulled through withair, making the engine race as if atfull throttle.

In addition to its oxidizing pow-er, chlorine is a very strong corro-sive, especially where large quan-tities come in contact with water.Chlorine will react with almost allmetals at elevated temperatures,and some metals, like copper, mayspontaneously ignite in the pres-ence of chlorine.

Personal

Needless to say, chlorine is verycorrosive to skin and eyes, andcontact with the liquid or gas mustbe avoided at all costs.

If being an oxidizer and corro-sive is not enough to make chlo-rine highly hazardous (and it is), itis also toxic when present in suffi-cient quantities. The TLV (thresh-old limit value) for chlorine is 1ppm and the short-term exposurelimit (STEL) is 3 ppm for 15 min-utes. You should be able to detectthe presence of chlorine aroundthe 3 ppm level (perhaps even aslow as 0.02 ppm) as a pungent,choking, irritating odor, describedas acrid. It may also resemble theodor of household bleach (whichcontains chlorine).

Irritation of the eves, mucousmembranes, and respiratory tract

may occur at concentrations be-tween 3 ppm and 15 ppm. Expo-sures at 15 ppm will cause immedi-ate irritation of the throat, whilelevels of 50 ppm are dangerous, of-

GlossaryAtom - The smallest part of an ele-ment that can still be identified as theelement.

Bolling point - The temperature atwhich the vapor pressure of a liquidjust equals atmospheric pressure.

Diatomic - Made up of two atoms, asin a diatomic molecule.

Element - A pure substance thatcannot be broken down Into simplersubstances by chemical means.

Gas - A state of matter defined as afluid with a vapor pressure of 40 psiaat l00°F.

Molecule - A chemical combinationof two or more atoms, either of thesame or different elements. Thesmallest particle of a compound thatcan still be identified as thecampound.

Specific gravity - The weight of asolid or liquid as compared to theweight of an equal volume of water.

STEL - Short-term exposure limitThe maximum amount of material towhich a person may be exposed overa period of time without harmfuleffects.

TLV - Threshold limit value. Theamount of a substance to which anaverage person in average healthmay be exposed in a 40-hour workweek without harm. The values maybe averaged over time, and the TLVmay also be referred to as TWA ortime weighted average.

Vapor density - The relative densit)of a vapor or gas as compared to drya i r .

Vapor pressure - The pressure ex.erted by vapor on the sides of a container at equilibrium. Equilibrlum isreached when the vapor pressure ofthe vapor in the container hasstabilized.

ten resulting in severe breathingdifficulties, and exposure to chlo-rine concentrations of 1,000 ppmfor even a very brief period may befatal.

Since chlorine is so irritating,exposure to very high concentra-tions is rare, unless the exposedperson is unable to leave the area.Initial irritation of eyes and themucuous membrane of the noseand throat is followed by coughingand a constriction of the chest, ac-companied by a feeling of suffoca-tion and pain. Pulmonary edemafollows in severe exposures.

Victims of severe inhalationproblems must get fresh air imme-diately, artificial respiration ifbreathing has stopped, and medi-cal attention as soon as possible.(For those applying artificial respi-ration, beware of the chlorine inthe victim’s airways.)

For those victims who have con-tacted the liquid, all contaminatedclothing must be removed, and alla f fec ted body par t s mus t bewashed with large amounts of wa-ter. Medical attention must be giv-en immediately.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Protective clothing is required ifthere is any possibility of contactwith chlorine. This means wear-ing positive pressure self-con-t a i n e d b r e a t h i n g a p p a r a t u s(SCBA), full faceshields, rubberboots, as well as gloves and cloth-ing that is impervious to chlorine.Impervious materials includepolyvinyl chloride, chlorinatedpolyethylene, Viton, and neo-prene. Fully-encapsulating suitsmay be required in some instances.

Gas masks with chlorine car-tridges or chlorine cartridge respi-rators with full facepieces are satis-factory for low concentrations (25ppm or less), but should not beused if there is the slightest chancethat the concentration may behigher.

HANDLING

Spills

Remember that spilled/releasedliquid chlorine will be in an envi-ronment that is somewhat warmerthan the chlorine itself, and thiswill promote boiling and rapidgeneration of chlorine gas. Be



28 FIRE ENGINEERING/July 1886

aware of the generation of this gas-eous chlorine and the direction itwill travel.

Water fog may be used to directthe movement of gases and willeven absorb some of them. In allcases, however, be careful that wa-ter is not added to the spill, sincethis will increase the generation ofgases. Also be careful to accountfor runoff, as this will contaminatewater supplies.NOTE: Although chlorine is usedto purify water, the amount thatends up in the drinking water sup-ply is carefully controlled, and ex-cess ive amounts can be veryharmful.

In the case of a spill on land,containment procedures used forother liquids may be utilized, eventhough chlorine will be rapidlyevaporating since the ambienttemperature will probably beabove chlorine’s boiling point.These techniques include digginga pit, building dikes, or diggingtrenches. Sand or soil may be usedas diking material. In each case,however, liquid chlorine may seepinto the soil, spreading contamina-tion. Usually after an incident hasended, several inches (or feet) ofcontaminated soil may have to beremoved.

If it is deemed necessary to re-tard the release of chlorine gasfrom the exposed liquid, a fluoro-protein foam or a special chlorinefoam may be applied to the surfaceof the spill. This procedure shouldbe considered only as a short-termsolution, however, since the foamwill break down and the genera-tion of gases will resume.

If the release is the result of aruptured container and no pit hasbeen dug or no dike has been con-structed, a corrosion-resistantpump may be used to pump theliquid back into the leaking con-tainer or into chlorine-resistantcontainers (made of plastic, glass,or the same metal as the originalcontainer). These are short-termsolutions, producing semi-closedsystems to hold the chlorine untilan adequate/proper container canbe secured.

Again, any exposed chlorine liq-uid will be boiling and generatingchlorine gas, so anyone workingon the containment proceduremust be properly protected and


evacuation downwind must be aprime consideration.

The use of chlorine kits is recom-mended by shippers to handlesmall leaks from various size chlo-rine containers. The kits, labeledA, B, and C, are for containersranging from one ton to bulk stor-age railcars.

All efforts must be made to keepthe liquid from entering a sewer orwaterway, as this will cause the in-timate mixing of organic material(fuel) with the liquid chlorine (oxi-dizer). All that is needed to com-plete the fire triangle is an energy/ignition source, which, if found,can cause a spectacular under-ground explosion that could affectan entire city.

Entrance of liquid chlorine intoa waterway will also cause seriousprob lems to the wa te r down-stream. Care must be made towarn all users of the water, indus-trial as well as municipal. In allcases, the operators of the sewagetreatment plant through which thecontaminated water may pass mustbe notified.

In some cases, mixing activatedcharcoal into the contaminatedwater will cause adsorption of thechlorine onto the charcoal, whichcould then be removed from thewater by screening it out. In everyinstance, however, notify waterusers downstream.

Neutralization

Some references call for neutraliz-ing chlorine spills, but do not spec-i fy the p roper neu t ra l i za t ionagent. One possibility is absorp-tion with fly ash or cement powderand the addition of caustic soda. Asin any situation where chemicalswill be added to accidentally re-leased substances to neutralizethem, care must be taken not tocause the situation to worsen.

When preplanning for the possi-bility of a chemical release, quali-fied experts should be consulted tode te rmine sa fe neu t ra l i za t iontechniques, and, if possible, re-tained on call in the event of anemergency.

Consideration should be givento trying to divert contaminated

water until it can be properly heat-ed to eliminate the chlorine. Thismay require damming and I or dik-ing the waterway, and divertingthe water through some land-based decontamination station. Itmay even be possible to divert thecontaminated water through asewage treatment plant, but per-mission must be obtained from thesewage plant operators before thistactic can be used.

SUMMARY

In any release, all emergency per-sonnel must be aware of all thehazards presented by chlorine.Since chlorine boils at -30oF, thatmust be the maximum temperatureof the liquid, and any water ap-plied to it will be at least 63° warm-er, causing an increase in the gen-eration of gaseous chlorine. Thiswill increase the intensity of thefire and the amount of toxic gasesin the air.

Also be aware of the possibilityof uninvolved chlorine containersexploding whenever they are sub-jected to extreme heat. n



DEALING WITH CHLORINE EMERGENCIES

CHRISTOPHER KELLY

Los Angeles firefighters battling agreater-alarm fire in a lithographyplant were unaware that 15 cylindersof chlorine were stored illegally in thebuilding. When heat melted the safetyplugs on the 150-pound cylinders,poisonous chlorine gas affected 44 fire-fighters, some severely.

Five months later, Los Angeles fire-fighters were fighting another greater-alarm in Leslie’s Pool Mart, whenwater mixing with chlorinated powderin burning plastic and cardboard con-tainers resulted in a gigantic, cloud ofchlorine gas. Some 5,000 people wereevacuated, and more than two dozenfirefighters suffered from chlorine in-halation.

Kits and gear recommended by theCI.

These fires illustrate the problemswith chlorine as a liquefied gas underpressure, and as a calcium or sodiumhypochlorite and other chlorine-con-taining compounds. Except under un-usual circumstances, chlorine is neitherexplosive nor flammable, although itwill support combustion. Chlorine hastraditionally been a scare word in thefire service. It need not be. With knowl-edge and training, chlorine emergen-cies can be handled with relativesafety.

12

Because chlorine is one of the mostwidely-used chemicals, firefighters canencounter it in both industrial districtsand residential neighborhoods. Whilechlorine is popularly associated withwater purification and laundry bleaches,its major users are producers of plas-tics, synthetic fibers, solvents, andpaper. With backyard swimming-poolsbecoming commonplace throughoutthe United States, quantities of water-purifying hypochlorite in liquid, gran-ular, or tablet form are stored undervarious trade names at suburban hard-ware and pool-supply stores.

Cylinders of chlorine are loaded ontotruck.

Chlorine’s pungent, abrasive stink isunforgettable to firefighters exposed toit. This odor is even detectable at lowlevels of concentration when chlorineis colorless. Higher concentrations ofgas, which can be fatal, produce agreenish-yellow vapor cloud. The chlor-alkali industry, however, has an excel-lent safety record, and its Chlorine In-stitute (CI) in New York City providesguidelines for firefighters.

Chlorine emergencies often involvepressurized cylinders containing theliquefied gas. There are three sizes:100 and 150 pound, and ton.

Chlorine is also transported in rail-road tank-cars carrying up to 90 tons,

trucks. which can carry 15 to 20 tons,and barges with capacities of up to1100 tons. Regardless of size, cylindervalves and fittings are basically simi-lar through industry-wide standard-ization.

CI emergency kits containing toolsand other devices for capping or closingleaking valves and sealing sidewallleaks are frequently kept by users ofchlorine. Chlorine-hauling tank trucksare required to carry them in the cabs.Some fire departments, notably Balti-more and Los Angeles, own their own.

Ton container being loaded ontobarge.

Task Force Commander Ralph E.Davis of the Los Angeles City Fire De-partment recently compiled lists of lo-cations of these kits throughout thecity. The CI recommends that theseemergency kits (A for cylinders, B forcontainers, and C for tank trucks andrail cars) be made available in an emer-gency to firefighters or other qualifiedpersonnel. There are now 5800 kits inlocations around the country. Pamph-let 35, available from the CI, givestheir exact whereabouts.

Tank-truck emergencies are foughtwith kit C.

The CI recommends that: (1) fire-fighters approach chlorine emergenciesfrom an upwind direction while wear-ing full protective clothing. including

Firehouse/December 1977

Reprinted with permission from FIREHOUSE Magzine

self-contained breathing apparatus, (2)only personnel required to remedy theproblem enter the contaminated area,(3) for safety, firefighters should workin pairs, (4) as an added precaution, alifeline be attached to each firefighter.

Evacuation should be preplanned.Chlorine is two and a half times heavierthan air, and therefore tends to cling tothe ground, sometimes settling in lowspots such as basements, elevatorshafts, and pits. Portable fans or blow-ers commonly tied on apparatus canbe helpful in dissipating the gas.

The ability of one cubic-inch of liquidchlorine to expand into about 460 cubic-inches of gas indicates the potentiallygigantic vapor cloud that can be formed.Research has shown that a ruptured55-ton tank car of chlorine can resultin the instantaneous release of about25 percent of the liquid, or about25,000 pounds of chlorine. Thereafter,10 pounds of chlorine per second willbe continuously emitted as the liquidevaporates due to heat picked up fromthe surrounding environment.

Chlorine emergencies are generallyof two types:

(1) Leaking Containers. Immediateaction must be taken because chlorineleaks become progressively worse. TheCI emphasizes that water must neverbe used, because the corrosive com-bination of water and chlorine increasesleaking. The best method for locatingleaks is with a swab dipped in commer-cial aqua ammonia, often kept at largechlorine installations. The mix ofammonia and chlorine will result inpuffs of white vapor, itself highly toxic,from the leak. Equipment and pipingleaks can best be stopped by shuttingoff the valve with a crescent wrench.Puncture leaks can be reduced by turn-ing the cylinder so that gas escapes in-stead of liquid, since the weight of thegas that would escape would be one-fifteenth that of the liquid chlorinethat would escape from a comparablepuncture.

Leaking tank cars or trucks createother problems. “It is generally advis-able to keep the vehicle or tank carmoving until open country is reachedin order to disperse the gas and mini-mize the hazards of its escape,” saysthe CI.

(2) Overheating Under Fire Condi-tions. Chlorine problems can escalaterapidly because the fusible safetyplugs will melt at 158 to 165 degreesFahrenheit. The CI recommends thatcylinders, ton containers, tank cars,and trucks be removed immediatelyfrom the danger area. If the cylinderscannot be moved and are not leaking,cooling fog streams should be appliedcontinuously until the fire is out.

Fire poses another threat at truckcrashes or tank-car derailments. If thetruck is carrying cylinders, those in-tact should be removed. When a truckor tank car is leaking and cannot bemoved, the area must be evacuated.

Hypochlorite and other chlorine-con-taining products present a seriouschallenge to firefighters. There is dis-agreement over the best way to handlefires involving hypochlorite. “It’s adamned if you do, damned if you don’tsituation,” says LAFD Battalion ChiefLeo K. Najarian, a hazardous-chemicalsexpert. “Most chemical compounds as-sociated with servicing swimmingpools are formulated to produce chlorineon contact with water,” says Najarian.“In addition to liberating chlorine,many of them also release oxygen andare therefore classified chemically asoxidizers or supporters of combustion.

“Companion chemicals relating topool-service are mineral-acid com-pounds such as muriatic (hydrochloric)acid which are used to maintain theproper pH balance. When these poolchemicals are exposed to heat, water,and contamination with other chemi-cals, and. come in contact with com-bustibles, the result can be fire, explo-sion, and release of extremely toxicgases such as chlorine and products ofcombustion.”

Najarian says that fire hazard isacute in establishments supplyingthese chemicals, which are often pack-aged in combustible plastic and card-board containers. “Firefighting activi-ties in this type of occupancy are ex-tremely critical. The application ofwater for extinguishment purposes cancreate greater problems than thoseposed by the fire. due to the resultingproduction of toxic gases. On the otherhand, if water is not applied, the gaseswill still exist, but not in the amountsthat the water would cause. Withoutwater, the possibility of an explosionoccurring from an uncontrolled fire in-volving large amounts of these oxi-dizers becomes a definite possibility.

There is no ideal solution. One ap

proach is a fast, hard-hitting attackwith master streams boring into thetire, while firefighters try to removechemicals that are not involved, or toavoid wetting them. ‘This is easiersaid than done,” admits Najarian. “Itwould appear that exposures of thepublic to this hazard could best beavoided through stricter zoning lawsthat would require more isolation ofthe chemicals themselves and atgreater distances from inhabitedareas.”

Chlorine-exposure victims are mostlikely to suffer eye irritation, cough-ing, and labored breathing. In extremecases, death by suffocation results.There is no known antidote for inhala-tion of chlorine gas. The best treat-ment is 100-percent oxygen at atmos-pheric pressure for no longer than onehour at a time. Full recovery is certainin virtually all cases. Skin or eye con-tact with chlorine will result in burns.Rec mmended treatment is thoroughflushing of the affected area withwater.

The CI offers free round-the-clockemergency assistance for potential oractual emergencies through CHLOREP(Chlorine Emergency Plan) consistingof 60 teams at plant locations in theUnited States and Canada. CHLOREPexperts in the 48 contiguous states canbe reached by calling CHEMTREC(Chemical Transportation EmergencyCenter) in Washington DC, at this toll-free number, 800424-9300. Canadianhelp will be provided through TEAP(Transportation Emergency AssistancePlan). The Canadian phone numbervaries by region.

Planning is the key to minimizingchlorine problems. (1) Know wherechlorine is being used and stored inyour first-alarm district. (2) See thatall chlorine transportation and storagefacilities are properly labelled. (3)Make certain both you and the usershave an emergency plan.

With planning and education, chlor-ine emergencies should be no cause forpanic.

Reprinted with permission from FIREHOUSE magazine

HOW TO GET HELP FORCHLORINE EMERGENCIES

CHLOREP, the CHLORine Emergency Plan, has beenorganized by the Chlorine Institute to advise and assist at

any potential or actual emergency involving chlorine gas. Itoperates on a 24hour. 7-day-a-week basis from 60 plant

locations in the United States and Canada.

CHLORINE USERS should post suppliers’ emergency num-bers near point of use, and call them if an emergency

occurs. If supplier cannot be reached, call the numberbelow for your location.

EMERGENCY SERVICES handling a chlorine emergency

should call the appropriate phone number below.

In the UNITED STATES, summon help through CHEM-

TREC, the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center at

the Manufacturing Chemists Assn. in Washington, D.C.:

48 contiguous states (toll free) 800-424-9300If “800” number cannot

be reached from your phone,call the “202” number instead.

Alaska and Hawaii(telephone advice only)

District of Columbia

202-483-7616

483-7616

In CANADA, summon help through any regional controlcentre of TEAP, the Transportation Emergency AssistancePlan of the Canadian Chemical Producers Association.

Atlantic Provinces andeastern/central Quebec

Southwestern Quebec

819-537-l123(Shawlnigan, Que.)

514-373-8330(Valleyfield, Que.)

Eastern Ontario 613-348-3616(Maitland, Ont.)

Central Ontario 416-356-8310(Niagara Falls, Ont.)

Southwestern Ontario 519-339-3711(Sarnia, Ont.)

Northern/western 705-682-2881

Ontario (Copper Cliff, Ont)

Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 403-477-8339

and Alberta (Edmonton, Alta.)

British Columbia 604-929-3441(Vancouver, B.C.)

Reprinted with permission from the Chlorine Institute, Inc.

Documents

United States Fire Administration - Texas A&M University, College