UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ...€¦ · case no. 3:10-cv-845-j-32mcr plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY OF LAKE WORTH EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:10-cv-845-J-32MCR

PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF

LITIGATION EXPENSES AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Case 3:10-cv-00845-TJC-MCR Document 107 Filed 06/22/12 Page 1 of 27 PageID 1431

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii

MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES .......................................................... 1

MEMORANDUM OF LAW .......................................................................................................... 1

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................ 2

II. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 5

A. A Reasonable Percentage of the Fund Recovered is the Appropriate Method To Use in Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in the Eleventh Circuit ................... 5

B. The 25% Fee Request Is Equal to the Eleventh Circuit’s Benchmark Fee Award ...................................................................................................................... 6

C. Additional Factors Further Confirm That the Requested Fee is Fair and Reasonable .............................................................................................................. 8

1. The Time and Labor Required .................................................................... 9

2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Issues .................................................. 11

3. The Skill Required to Perform the Legal Services Properly, and the Experience, Reputation and Ability of the Attorneys ............................... 13

4. The Preclusion of Other Employment ...................................................... 14

5. The Contingent Nature of the Fee ............................................................. 15

6. The Amount Involved and Results Achieved ........................................... 16

7. The Undesirability of the Case ................................................................. 16

8. Awards in Similar Cases ........................................................................... 16

9. The Time Required to Reach Settlement .................................................. 17

10. The Reaction of the Class ......................................................................... 17

D. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Request for Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses Should Also Be Awarded in Full .......................................................................... 18

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 20


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s) CASES

Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ......................................................................................5

In re BellSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 1:02-cv-2142-WSD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98429 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2007) ..........................8

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980) ...................................................................................................................5

Camden I Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991) ......................................................................................... passim

In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ......................................................................................8

David v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., No. 08-CV-22278, 2010 WL 1628362 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2010) ...........................................13

Eslava v. Gulf Tel. Co., No. 04-0297-KD-B, 2007 WL 4105977 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2007) ..........................................7

Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 98-1281-Civ., 2002 WL 34477904 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2002) ...........................................8

Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................6, 9, 17

Flournoy v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. CV 205-184, 2007 WL 1087279 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2007) ..................................................7

In re Friedman’s, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:03-cv-3475, 2009 WL 1456698 (N.D. Ga. May 22, 2009) .................................7, 15, 16

Garst v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., No. 97-C-0074-S, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22666 (N.D. Ala. June 25, 1999) ...........................6

In re HealthSouth Corp. ERISA Litig., No. CV-03-BE-1700-S, 2006 WL 2109484 (N.D. Ala. June 28, 2006) ....................................8

Hirsch v. PSS World Medical, Inc., No. 3:98-cv-502-J-32TEM, slip op. at 1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2005) .........................................7

Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ..............................................................................................11


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Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) .....................................................................................................9

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................15

LaGrasta v. Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, No. 2:01-CV-251-FTM-29-DNF, 2006 WL 4824480 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) ......................7

Mashburn v. Nat’l Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Ala. 1988) .........................................................................................11

In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) .......................................................................................5

Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) ...................................................................................................................5

Pinto v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ..........................................................................7, 11, 15

In re Profit Recovery Grp. Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:00-CV-1416-CC, slip op. at 7-8 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2005) ............................................8

Ressler v. Jacobson, 149 F.R.D. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992)..................................................................................... passim

Sewell v. D’Alessandro & Woodyard, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-343-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 6047085 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011)........................7, 9

Smith v. Wm. Wrigley Co., No. 09-60646, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2010) .................................................................7

Stahl v. MasTec, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-1265-T-27TGW, 2008 WL 2267469 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2008) ........................7

In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ................................................................................8, 14

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., C.A. No. 99-C-7410 (JBZ), 2005 WL 2451958 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2005) ..................................8

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99 MDL 1317, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43082 (S.D. Fla. April 19, 2005) .........................8

Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 607 F.3d 742 (11th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................11


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Waters v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) .......................................................................................6, 8, 10

In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 3:04-cv-194, 2008 WL 815724 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2008) ................................................7

STATUTES

FSA §§ 175.071 & 185.05 .............................................................................................................12

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 .......................................................................................................................1, 13

Local Rule 3.01(g) ..........................................................................................................................1

1 Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards, § 2.19, at 73-74 (3d ed. 2006) .............................................18


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MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

Plaintiffs’ Counsel – Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson, Bernstein Litowitz Berger

& Grossmann LLP, and Sugarman & Susskind, P.A. (collectively, “Plaintiffs’ Counsel”) –

having achieved a recovery of $8,500,000 in cash, plus interest (the “Settlement Fund”) for the

benefit of the Class – respectfully move the Court, pursuant to Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules

Civil Procedure, for an order approving Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees equal

to 25% of the Settlement Fund, and for reimbursement of litigation expenses in the amount of

$52,365.98.

The instant Motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Law and by the

accompanying Joint Declaration of Robert D. Klausner, William C. Fredericks and Kenneth R.

Harrison, Sr., dated June 22, 2012 (the “Joint Declaration” or “Joint Decl.”) and the exhibits

annexed thereto.

Plaintiffs’ Counsel certify pursuant to Local Rule 3.01(g) that they have conferred with

counsel for Defendant Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. (“Defendant” or “Merrill

Lynch”) and that Defendant does not oppose this motion. The deadline for Class Members to

object to the Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses is

July 6, 2012. To date, no objections have been received.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Plaintiffs’ Counsel respectfully submit this memorandum of law and accompanying Joint

Declaration in support of their motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 25% of

the Settlement Fund. Plaintiffs, the respective Boards of Trustees of the City of Lake Worth

Employees’ Retirement System, the City of Lake Worth Police Officers’ Retirement System, and


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the City of Lake Worth Firefighters’ Pension Trust Fund (collectively, the “Plaintiff Plans”),

have each have unanimously approved the fee request and believe it to be fair and reasonable.1

Plaintiffs’ Counsel also seek reimbursement of $52,365.98 in litigation expenses incurred

in the Action. For the reasons set forth below and in the accompanying papers, Plaintiffs’

Counsel respectfully submit that their application for an award of attorneys’ fees and

reimbursement of expenses is reasonable and should be granted in its entirety.

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The proposed Settlement, which represents a recovery of nearly 60% of the estimated

maximum damages in this case, is an excellent result for the Class that was achieved only

through the skill, work, and tenacity of Plaintiffs’ Counsel.

The prosecution and settlement of this litigation against Merrill Lynch required extensive

efforts on the part of Plaintiffs’ Counsel, given the complexity of the legal and factual issues

raised by the claims asserted by Plaintiffs and the vigorous defense of the action by Defendant

and its nationally known counsel. As detailed in the Joint Declaration, among other things

Plaintiffs’ Counsel: (i) conducted an extensive factual investigation and thoroughly researched

the applicable law with respect to the claims asserted against Defendant and the potential

defenses thereto; (ii) filed a detailed class action complaint based on Plaintiffs’ Counsel

investigation and research (the “Complaint”); (iii) successfully opposed Defendant’s motion to

dismiss the Complaint; (iv) filed comprehensive motion papers in support of class certification,

including multiple supporting declarations and exhibits; (v) conducted extensive fact discovery,

which included serving and responding to document requests and reviewing and analyzing over

1 All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated March 23, 2012 (ECF No. 96-1) (the “Stipulation”).


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two million pages of documents received from Merrill Lynch; (vi) took three depositions of

Merrill Lynch representatives and defended depositions of a representative of each of the three

Plaintiff Plans; (vii) participated in arm’s-length settlement negotiations before retired Judge

Herbert Stettin, a highly experienced and well-respected mediator, which included a full-day

mediation session and preparation and submission of detailed mediation briefs in advance of the

mediation; (viii) conducted subsequent negotiations with respect to final terms of the Settlement;

and (ix) prepared the Plan of Allocation, which was designed to make the claims administration

process as easy and straightforward as possible for all Class Members.

Moreover, for the reasons detailed in the Joint Declaration at ¶¶ 26-32 and in Plaintiffs’

Motion For Final Approval of Settlement and Approval of Plan of Allocation and Incorporated

Memorandum of Law (the “Settlement Brief”) at § III.B.1, success in this action was anything

but assured. For example, the resolution of a pending Florida Supreme Court case on the scope

of Florida’s economic loss rule threatened Plaintiffs’ ability to establish liability and to maintain

this suit as a class action; Plaintiffs’ primary theory of liability was based on as-yet untested

interpretation of a Florida statute that requires investment consultants to charge Florida pension

plans on a “flat fee” basis; and Defendant had credible arguments that any damages potentially

recoverable by the Class would have had to be significantly reduced to reflect the “quantum

meruit” value of various services (notably brokerage services) that Merrill Lynch indisputably

provided to the Class members. Accordingly, from the inception of this litigation, there was a

substantial risk that, even with their most vigorous efforts and the expenditure of all necessary

litigation costs, Plaintiffs and the Class would ultimately recover little or nothing on their claims

-- and that Plaintiffs’ counsel would recover little or none of the value of the time and expenses

they incurred in prosecuting this action.


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Plaintiffs’ Counsel have represented the Class on a purely contingent-fee basis and have

received no compensation to date for their work in this Action. Given the complexity and

amount of work involved, the skill and expertise required, and the risks that counsel undertook,

Plaintiffs’ Counsel respectfully submit that the requested award of 25% of the Settlement Fund

and reimbursement of litigation expenses in the amount of $52,365.98 is fair and reasonable

under the circumstances of this Action. Indeed, as discussed below, (a) 25% is the benchmark

figure established by the Eleventh Circuit for use as a percentage award in common fund class

actions, and (b) the specific factors that the Circuit has identified for assessing the

reasonableness of the award, including the time and skill required, the risks involved and the

contingent nature of the fee, all support an upward adjustment from that benchmark. Moreover,

federal courts in this Circuit and throughout the nation, recognizing the risks and effort generally

expended by counsel to obtain favorable results, have frequently awarded greater fees and

expense reimbursement in comparable cases.

In addition, Plaintiffs’ Counsel respectfully submit that the litigation expenses for which

reimbursement is sought are of the type customarily incurred in class action litigation, were

reasonably necessary to successfully prosecute this Action, and should accordingly be

reimbursed in full.

The requested fee amount here is also supported by the Plaintiff Plans, three sophisticated

public employee retirement plans that have been closely involved in the prosecution of the

Action and the negotiation of the Settlement. In addition, although Notices have been mailed to

each of the 78 Class Member Plans which advised them that Plaintiffs’ Counsel would seek a fee

award of 25% of the Settlement Fund and reimbursement of expenses in an amount not to exceed

$100,000 (an amount which is greater than the $52,365.98 in expenses for which counsel are


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now actually seeking reimbursement), to date no Class Member has filed any objection to either

the requested fee or requested expense reimbursement amount.2

In sum, the requested fee award and reimbursement of expenses are fair and reasonable,

and Plaintiffs’ Counsel respectfully submit that their motion should therefore be granted in full.

II. ARGUMENT

A. A Reasonable Percentage of the Fund Recovered is the Appropriate Method To Use in Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in the Eleventh Circuit

Courts have long recognized that attorneys who represent a class and achieve a benefit

for class members are entitled to be compensated for their services, and that, where a class

plaintiff successfully obtains a common settlement fund, the costs of litigation should be spread

among the beneficiaries of that fund. Thus, attorneys who obtain a recovery for a class in the

form of a common fund are entitled to an award of fees and expenses from that fund as

compensation for their work. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Mills v.

Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); Camden I Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d

768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991). Courts have also recognized that, in addition to providing just

compensation, awards of attorneys’ fees from a common fund serve to “encourage skilled

counsel to represent those who seek redress for damages inflicted on entire classes of persons,

and to discourage future misconduct of a similar nature.” See, e.g., In re MetLife

Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); accord Allapattah Servs.,

Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“Attorneys who undertake the

risk to vindicate legal rights that may otherwise go unredressed function as ‘private attorneys

general.’ . . . Unless that risk is compensated with a commensurate reward, few firms, no matter

2 The deadline for filling objections to the fee and expense application is July 6, 2012. Should any objection be received, it will be addressed in Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s reply papers that will be filed on or before July 20, 2012.


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how large or well financed, will have any incentive to represent the small stake holders in class

actions against corporate America, no matter how worthy the cause or wrongful the defendant’s

conduct”); Ressler v. Jacobson, 149 F.R.D. 651, 657 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (“public policy favors the

granting of counsel fees sufficient to reward counsel for bringing these actions and to encourage

them to bring additional such actions”).

In Camden, the Eleventh Circuit announced the rule that “attorneys’ fees awarded from a

common fund shall be based upon a reasonable percentage of the fund established for the benefit

of the class.” Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774; accord Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d

1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2012); Waters v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th

Cir. 1999). A percentage-based fee award accomplishes several objectives:

First, it is consistent with the private market place where contingent fee attorneys are regularly compensated on a percentage of recovery method. Second, it provides a strong incentive to plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain the maximum possible recovery in the shortest time possible under the circumstances. Finally, the percentage approach reduces the burden [on] the Court to review and calculate individual attorney hours and rates and expedites getting the appropriate relief to class members.

Garst v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., No. 97-C-0074-S, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22666, at *83-*84

(N.D. Ala. June 25, 1999) (citations omitted). Each of these rationales also warrants a

percentage-based award here.

B. The 25% Fee Request Is Equal to the Eleventh Circuit’s Benchmark Fee Award

In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has also established 25% of the settlement fund as a

“benchmark” (and presumptively reasonable) fee award in common fund cases. See Faught, 668

F.3d at 1242 (“25% is generally recognized as a reasonable fee award in common fund cases”);

Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774-75 (“[t]he majority of common fund fee awards fall between 20% to

30% of the fund,” and district courts consider the middle of that range – 25% – as a “benchmark”


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which “may be adjusted in accordance with the individual circumstances of each case”); Eslava

v. Gulf Tel. Co., No. 04-0297-KD-B, 2007 WL 4105977, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2007) (“the

benchmark for a common fund case is 25%”); Flournoy v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. CV 205-

184, 2007 WL 1087279, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2007) (“the appropriate standard for fee awards

in common fund cases is a percentage of the fund . . . with the benchmark award being twenty-

five percent”).

A review of common fund cases confirms that the 25% fee sought by Plaintiffs’ Counsel

is fair and reasonable, and is actually towards the lower end of the range of fee awards approved

by courts within the Eleventh Circuit in cases involving comparably sized settlements. See, e.g.,

Hirsch v. PSS World Medical, Inc., No. 3:98-cv-502-J-32TEM, slip op. at 1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20,

2005) (Corrigan, J.) (attached hereto as Exhibit A) (awarding 30% of $16.5 million settlement);

LaGrasta v. Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, No. 2:01-CV-251-FTM-29-DNF, 2006 WL 4824480,

at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (awarding 30% of $9 million settlement); Smith v. Wm. Wrigley

Co., No. 09-60646, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2010), ECF. No. 102 (attached hereto as

Exhibit B) (awarding 33.3% of $6 million settlement); In re Friedman’s, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.

1:03-cv-3475, 2009 WL 1456698, at *2-*4 (N.D. Ga. May 22, 2009) (awarding 30% of $14.9

million settlement); Sewell v. D’Alessandro & Woodyard, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-343-FtM-29SPC,

2011 WL 6047085, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011) (awarding 30% of $3.6 million settlement);

Stahl v. MasTec, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-1265-T-27TGW, 2008 WL 2267469, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May

20, 2008) (awarding 27.9% of $13.1 million settlement); In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. ERISA

Litig., No. 3:04-cv-194, 2008 WL 815724, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2008) (awarding 26% of $3

million settlement); Eslava, 2007 WL 4105977, at *2 (awarding 30% of $5.7 million settlement);

Flournoy, 2007 WL 1087279, at *2-*3 (awarding 25% of $25 million settlement); Pinto v.


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Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339-10 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (awarding 30% of

$4.25 million settlement); In re HealthSouth Corp. ERISA Litig., No. CV-03-BE-1700-S, 2006

WL 2109484, at *6-*7 (N.D. Ala. June 28, 2006) (awarding 25% of $28.9 million settlement); In

re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., C.A. No. 99-C-7410 (JBZ), 2005 WL 2451958 at *2

(S.D. Fla. July 8, 2005) (awarding 30% of $28.7 million settlement); In re Profit Recovery Grp.

Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:00-CV-1416-CC, slip op. at 7-8 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2005) (attached

hereto as Exhibit C) (awarding 33.3% of $6.75 million settlement); see also Waters, 190 F.3d at

1293-98 (affirming award of 33.3% of $40 million settlement).3

In sum, when judged against the Eleventh Circuit benchmark, and compared to fees

awarded in class action settlements of similar magnitude in this Circuit, the requested 25% fee is

fair and reasonable.

C. Additional Factors Further Confirm That the Requested Fee is Fair and Reasonable

In Camden I, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that there “is no hard and fast rule

mandating a certain percentage of a common fund which may reasonably be awarded as a fee

because the amount of any fee must be determined upon the facts of each case.” 946 F.2d at 774.

The Camden I court recommended that district courts consider several additional factors to

determine whether a requested percentage award is reasonable. Id. These factors include:

3 Fee awards of 25% and greater have been awarded in numerous other cases, including many others involving substantially larger settlements. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1365-66 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (awarding 30% of $410 million settlement); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99 MDL 1317, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43082, at *19-*22 (S.D. Fla. April 19, 2005) (awarding 33.3% of $75 million settlement); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (awarding 25% of $110 million settlement fund); Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 98-1281-Civ., 2002 WL 34477904, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2002) (awarding 28.5% of $48 million settlement); In re BellSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 1:02-cv-2142-WSD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98429, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2007) (awarding 30% of $35 million settlement).


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(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and the length of the professional relationship with the client; [and] (12) awards in similar cases.

Camden I, 946 F.2d at 772 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,

717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). Camden I also recognized that in awarding a percentage fee award a

court may also properly consider “the time required to reach a settlement, whether there are any

substantial objections by class members or other parties to the settlement terms or the fees

requested by counsel . . . and the economics involved in prosecuting a class action.” Id. at 775.

Although the Eleventh Circuit has since stated that a full analysis of the Johnson and

other additional factors is only necessary if the fee request exceeds 25%, see Faught, 668 F.3d at

1242, Sewell, 2011 WL 6047085, at *2, Plaintiffs’ Counsel nonetheless urge the Court to

consider these factors, as they would provide strong support for an upward adjustment to the

benchmark 25% fee in this case -- and thus necessarily provide even stronger support for an

award that is simply equal to the 25% benchmark.

1. The Time and Labor Required

A review of the efforts and time expended by Plaintiffs’ Counsel confirms that the

requested fee is fully justified. The Joint Declaration details the many tasks that Plaintiffs’

Counsel undertook to prosecute the claims against Merrill Lynch, the time and labor they

expended in that effort, and the skill and creativity brought to bear in that effort. As set forth in

greater detail in the Joint Declaration, Plaintiffs’ Counsel, among other things:

• conducted a thorough factual investigation concerning Defendant’s alleged misconduct, which included, among other things, reviewing news reports concerning Merrill Lynch’s practices in the Florida Office and related SEC


10

inquiries, and reviewing various client files for evidence of a pattern of conduct by Merrill Lynch with respect to various Plans (Joint Decl. ¶ 16);

• prepared and filed the detailed Complaint based on Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s factual investigation and their research and analysis of the applicable law with respect to the claims asserted – claims which included a previously untested and creative theory of civil liability based on Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s interpretation of Florida’s statutory provisions requiring investment consultants to use only “flat fee” billing arrangements with respect to their pension fund clients (id. ¶¶ 15-16);

• engaged in substantial motion practice, including the successful opposition of Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint (id. ¶¶ 17-19);

• prepared and served document requests on Merrill Lynch, and reviewed and analyzed over two million pages of documents received from Merrill Lynch in response to those requests (id. ¶ 20);

• deposed three Merrill Lynch representatives, and defended the depositions of representatives of each of the three Plaintiff Plans (id. ¶ 23);

• prepared and filed a comprehensive brief in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, together with multiple supporting declarations and exhibits in support of the motion (id. ¶ 24); and

• prepared for and participated in extensive settlement negotiations, including a full-day in-person mediation session before Judge Stettin following the submission of a detailed mediation brief and supporting exhibits (id. ¶¶ 25, 33-34).

The number of hours Plaintiffs’ Counsel expended on this litigation (over 4,000 hours

with a resulting lodestar of $1,998,685) attests to their extensive efforts. Joint Decl. ¶ 54. The

time and labor expended by counsel here amply supports the requested fee.

While not required in the Eleventh Circuit, an analysis of the requested fee under the

“lodestar/multiplier” approach further supports the reasonableness of a 25% award. See, e.g.,

Waters, 190 F.3d at 1298 (“while we have decided in this circuit that a lodestar calculation is not

proper in common fund cases, we may refer to that figure for comparison”). Here, based on the

$8.5 million Settlement Fund, the requested 25% fee award of approximately $2,125,000

represents only a very modest multiplier of 1.06 on Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s total lodestar. This is


11

well below the range of multipliers frequently awarded in class action settlements of similar

magnitude in this and other circuits. See, e.g., Pinto, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1344 (lodestar

multipliers tend to range from 2.26 to 4.5 and that, while “three appears to be the average,” many

cases have awarded higher multipliers) (citations omitted); Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., 200

F.R.D. 685, 694-96 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (awarding fee representing a multiplier between 2.5 and 4);

Mashburn v. Nat’l Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 702 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (finding that a

multiplier of 3.1 is “not unusual or unreasonable”). As stated in Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s respective

firm declarations attached as Exhibits 2-4 to the Joint Declaration, the hourly rates for attorneys

and other professionals that were used to calculate the lodestar are the same as the regular rates

that these attorneys and other professional charge for services in non-contingent matters and/or

which have been accepted by courts in other federal class action litigation. Joint Decl. ¶ 53, and

Exs. 2-4 thereto.

2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Issues

Plaintiffs’ Counsel faced several novel and difficult issues in this Action, including a

vigorously contested motion to dismiss and numerous difficult and unresolved legal issues,

including the extent to which Florida’s “economic loss rule” and “flat fee” statute applied to the

facts of this case.

As detailed in the Joint Declaration, perhaps the biggest risk facing Plaintiffs and their

counsel in this Action was the risk that the Court would ultimately find that Plaintiffs’ claims for

breach of fiduciary duty were barred by the economic loss rule under Florida law – a risk that

was heightened by the fact that the Florida Supreme Court has heard oral argument on, but has

not yet issued a ruling on, the application of this doctrine in Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh &

McLennan Cos., 607 F.3d 742 (11th Cir. 2010). See Joint Decl. ¶¶ 27-28. Indeed, although this

Court, in its May 2011 order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruled that Plaintiffs’ claims


12

were not barred by the economic loss rule, in that same order the Court expressly reserved the

right to revisit the issue at a later time as subsequent developments might warrant. See Court’s

May 31, 2011 Order (ECF No. 52), at 8.

As also explained in greater detail in the Joint Declaration, Plaintiffs and their counsel

also faced significant risks in establishing the liability of Defendant, including under their novel

theory that Merrill Lynch’s fee arrangements violated the Florida “flat fee” statute, FSA

§§ 175.071 & 185.05. See Joint Decl. ¶ 29. According to Plaintiffs, although Merrill Lynch’s

fee arrangements nominally provided for a “flat” fee amount, Merrill Lynch’s de facto

compensation for providing consulting services violated Florida’s “flat fee” statute because the

total compensation that Merrill Lynch received in connection with providing services to the

Plans varied depending on, inter alia, (a) the amount of “directed brokerage” business that was

channeled to Merrill Lynch’s Citation brokerage system and (b) the extent to which Merrill

Lynch’s clients agreed to invest in mutual funds that paid 12b-1 fees to referring brokerage firms

(such as Merrill Lynch). Id. However, this Action was a case of first impression under the “flat

fee” statute, so Plaintiffs’ ability to establish that Merrill Lynch was liable to the Class under this

statute was uncertain at best.

Moreover, under Plaintiffs’ alternative theories of liability, including theories that Merrill

Lynch failed to adequately disclose the nature of its fee arrangements or the extent to which its

clients would have benefitted by converting to alternative fee structures, Plaintiffs and their

counsel would have had to confront Merrill’s arguments that the nature and amount of its fees

had been adequately disclosed, directly or indirectly, to some or at least a substantial number of

the Plans that are members of the Class. If proven, such considerations threatened both

Plaintiffs’ ability to establish liability on the merits and their ability to certify this case as a class


13

action in light of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. In the absence of class

certification, the likelihood of a successful outcome for the Plans that are members of the Class

would have obviously been greatly reduced, as it would have become economically infeasible for

all but a handful of Plans to pursue their claims on an individual basis. Joint Decl. ¶ 32.4

In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs and their counsel faced substantial hurdles in

recovering the full amount of their alleged damages in the case, even if they prevailed at class

certification and established liability.at trial. In particular, if this litigation had continued,

Plaintiffs would have faced significant challenges in overcoming Merrill Lynch’s argument that

the Class’s maximum recoverable disgorgement-based damages (equal to roughly $14.5 million)

would need to be substantially reduced under the doctrine of quantum meruit to reflect the value

of, e.g., brokerage services that Merrill Lynch indisputably provided to Class members.

Thus, it is clear that Plaintiffs’ Counsel faced multiple novel, difficult and significant

issues in connection with the prosecution of this Action. However, despite these obstacles,

Plaintiffs’ Counsel were able to achieve an excellent result for the Class in this matter. Success

in the face of such obstacles strongly supports the requested fee award.

3. The Skill Required to Perform the Legal Services Properly, and the Experience, Reputation and Ability of the Attorneys

Under these factors, the court should consider “the skill and acumen required to

successfully investigate, file, litigate, and settle a complicated class action lawsuit such as this

one,” David v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., No. 08-CV-22278, 2010 WL 1628362, at *8 n.15 (S.D.

Fla. Apr. 15, 2010), and “the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys” involved.

Camden I, 946 F.2d at 772 n.3.

4 Similarly, if the case had not settled and the Court had found that the Florida economic loss rule applied, or that the “flat fee” statute did not apply, it would also have become much more difficult for Plaintiffs to certify this matter as a class action under Rule 23.


14

Considerable litigation skills were required and called upon here. As noted above, this is

a complex case involving difficult factual and legal issues on the merits, as well as complex

procedural questions relating to class certification. Given the complexity of the Action and the

presence of numerous contested issues, it took highly skilled counsel to represent the Class and

bring about the excellent recovery that has been obtained.

As demonstrated by their firm resumes (attached as Exhibit 3 to Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s

respective firm declarations submitted herewith), (1) Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann

LLP is one of the nation’s leading class action litigation firms, and (2) both Klausner, Kaufman,

Jensen & Levinson and Sugarman & Susskind, P.A, are among the nation’s leading firms

specializing in the representation of employee retirement benefit plans. Without question,

Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s combined skills and experience were a major factor in obtaining the results

achieved in this Settlement.

This court should also consider the “quality of the opposition the plaintiffs’ attorneys

faced” in awarding Plaintiffs’ Counsel a fee. See Sunbeam, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1334; Ressler,

149 F.R.D. at 654. Here, Defendant was represented by Greenberg Traurig, P.A., a nationally

prominent defense firm that vigorous contested this action through a motion to dismiss and deep

into discovery. Joint Decl. ¶¶ 18-25. The ability of Plaintiffs’ Counsel to obtain a favorable

Settlement for the Class in light of such formidable legal opposition confirms the quality of the

representation that Plaintiffs’ Counsel provided here. Accordingly, this factor also supports the

fee requested.

4. The Preclusion of Other Employment

The considerable amount of time spent prosecuting this case — over 4,000 hours (Joint

Decl. ¶ 54) — was time that Plaintiffs’ Counsel could not devote to other matters. Moreover,

Plaintiffs’ Counsel expended this time and effort without any assurance that they would be


15

successful or that they would ever be compensated for their hard work. Accordingly, this factor

also supports the requested fee.

5. The Contingent Nature of the Fee

The contingent nature of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s fees should be given substantial weight in

assessing the requested fee. Courts have consistently recognized that the risk that class counsel

could receive little or no recovery is a major factor in determining the award of attorneys’ fees:

A determination of a fair fee for Class Counsel must include consideration of the contingent nature of the fee ... and the fact that the risks of failure and nonpayment in a class action are extremely high. Cases recognize that attorneys’ risk is “‘perhaps the foremost’ factor” in determining an appropriate fee award.

Pinto, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1339; see also Friedman’s, 2009 WL 1456698, at *3 (“The contingent

nature of fees in this case should be given substantial weight in assessing the requested fee

award.”); Ressler, 149 F.R.D. at 654-55 (“The substantial risks of this litigation abundantly

justify the fee requested herein”). “Lawyers who are to be compensated only in the event of

victory expect and are entitled to be paid more when successful than those who are assured of

compensation regardless of result.” Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981).

This is so because of the risk that after investing thousands of hours, plaintiffs’ counsel may

receive no compensation whatsoever. See Ressler, 149 F.R.D. at 656-57.

Success in contingent litigation such as this is never assured. As noted above, Plaintiffs’

claims in this action faced multiple hurdles that could have resulted in no recovery or

substantially limited the recovery sought. Indeed, because the fee in this matter was entirely

contingent, the only certainties were that there would be no fee without a successful result, and

that such a result would be realized only after considerable and difficult effort. Thus, the

substantial risks of the Action also justify the requested fee.


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6. The Amount Involved and Results Achieved

“It is well-settled that one of the primary determinants of the quality of the work

performed is the result obtained.” Ressler, 149 F.R.D. at 655; see also Friedman’s, 2009 WL

1456698, at *3 (same). Plaintiffs’ Counsel here have achieved a settlement that represents nearly

60% of the alleged total recoverable damages in his case under Plaintiffs’ most aggressive

“disgorgement” theory of damages. This excellent result was accomplished despite the

substantial risks of establishing both liability and damages, and the also significant risks of being

able to maintain this as a class action through trial and any post-trial motions and appeals.

Accordingly, this factor also weighs strongly in favor of the requested fee.

7. The Undesirability of the Case

In certain instances, the “undesirability” of a case can be a factor in justifying the award

of a requested fee. While Plaintiffs’ Counsel did not view this action as undesirable, the novelty

of the claims and defenses presented made the outcome of the case especially difficult to assess,

and accordingly less attractive than other types of complex class actions where the legal

standards are more clearly defined and the ultimate size of the class and potentially recoverable

damages are much clearer at the outset. When Plaintiffs’ Counsel undertook representation of

Plaintiffs in this action, it was with the knowledge that they would have to spend substantial time

and money and face significant risks without any assurance of being compensated for their

efforts. Only the most experienced plaintiffs’ litigation firms would risk the time and the

expense involved in light of the uncertainty of ever obtaining a meaningful recovery – or any

recovery at all. Thus, the “undesirability” of the case also weighs in favor of the requested fee.

8. Awards in Similar Cases

As discussed above in § II.B, Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s requested 25% fee is equal to the

benchmark fee in class action cases that is presumptively fair and reasonable in this Circuit. See


17

Faught, 668 F.3d at 1242; Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774-75. Moreover, as also shown above, in

comparable class action settlements, judges in this District and Circuit (and indeed across the

country) have frequently awarded substantially higher fees, including fees in the 30% to 33⅓%

range. See § II.B, supra. Thus, this factor strongly supports the reasonableness of the requested

25% fee.

9. The Time Required to Reach Settlement

A substantial amount of time was required to resolve the Action. This was not a case, for

example, where the parties were able to reach an early settlement – to the contrary, Plaintiffs’

Counsel had to overcome Defendant’s motion to dismiss, conduct significant document

discovery (including the collection and review of roughly two million pages of documents),

commence deposition discovery, and file their class certification motion papers before the parties

even sat down to mediate before Judge Stettin. And even after an agreement in principle to settle

was reached, significant amounts of additional time were required to negotiate the final terms of

the “long-form” settlement papers and work out the plan of allocation.

Given the vigorously contested nature of this litigation, during the pendency of this

Action, Plaintiffs’ Counsel dedicated over 4,000 hours to the case. Joint Decl. ¶ 54. The

significant amount of time expended on this case further supports the requested fee award,

particularly where the requested 25% fee is only slightly more than sufficient to equal the

lodestar value of the time counsel expended.

10. The Reaction of the Class

Further confirming the reasonableness of the requested fee, to date no member of the

Class has objected to it. Copies of the Notice were mailed to representatives of each of the 78

Class Members (including each of the Plan’s administrators), and the Summary Notice was

widely disseminated over the PR Newswire. See Declaration of Jason Zuena Regarding (A)


18

Mailing of the Notice Packet; (B) Transmittal of the Summary Notice; and (C) Report on

Requests for Exclusion Received To Date (“Zuena Decl.”), attached as Exhibit 1 to the Joint

Decl., ¶¶ 2-5. The Notice expressly advised Class Members that Plaintiffs’ Counsel would apply

for fees in the amount of 25% of the Settlement Fund, and that the deadline for filing objections

to the fee application is July 6, 2012. As of the date of this Memorandum, not a single objection

to the requested fee award has been filed. Joint Decl. ¶¶ 45, 63.5

* * * * *

In sum, Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s requested fee is at the benchmark level for fee awards in this

Circuit, even though numerous factors – including the amount of time and effort expended by

counsel, the difficulty of the issues presented, the quality of the result obtained, and the

substantial contingent risk of the litigation – would have all supported an upward adjustment to

fee actually sought. Accordingly, and for all of the additional reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’

Counsel respectfully submit that the requested fee of 25% of the Settlement Fund is fair and

reasonable.

D. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Request for Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses Should Also Be Awarded in Full

Litigation expenses should be reimbursed if they are “reasonable and necessary to obtain

the settlement.” Ressler, 149 F.R.D. at 657; 1 Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards, § 2.19, at 73-

74 (3d ed. 2006) (“an attorney who creates or preserves a common fund by judgment or

settlement for the benefit of a class is entitled to receive reimbursement of reasonable fees and

expenses involved”).

Plaintiffs’ Counsel have incurred, without reimbursement, litigation expenses in the

Action totaling $52,365.98. Joint Decl. ¶ 66. The expenses for which reimbursement is sought 5 Should any objections be filed, they will be addressed in Lead Counsel’s reply papers to be filed on or before July 20, 2012.


19

are also reasonable in amount; indeed, given that Plaintiffs’ Counsel were aware that they might

not recover any of these expenses unless and until the litigation was successfully resolved, they

took steps to minimize expenses whenever practical to do so without jeopardizing the vigorous

and efficient prosecution of the case. Id. ¶ 67.

The expenses for which reimbursement is sought include, among others, costs for

document management/litigation support services, mediation fees, court reporting expenses, fees

for electronic legal and factual research, long distance telephone, postage and delivery expenses,

costs of out-of-town travel, and photocopying charges. Joint Decl. ¶ 69. These expenses are of

the type that are necessarily incurred in litigation of this nature and that are routinely charged to

clients billed by the hour. Similarly, these expense items are billed separately by Plaintiffs’

Counsel, and such charges are not duplicated in the firm’s hourly billing rates.

In addition, the Notice apprised Class Members that Plaintiffs’ Counsel would seek

reimbursement of expenses in an amount not to exceed $100,000 and the amount sought –

$52,365.98 – is less that the amount stated in the Notice. To date, there has been no objection to

the application for expenses. Joint Decl. ¶ 70.

Because the litigation expenses incurred by Plaintiffs’ Counsel are of the type for which

reimbursement is routinely granted in class actions, and because they were reasonably necessary

to the successful prosecution and resolution of the Action, Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s request for

reimbursement of expenses should be granted in full.


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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court approve as fair and

reasonable Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s requested 25% fee award and request for reimbursement of their

litigation expenses in the amount of $52,365.98.

Dated: June 22, 2012 By: /s/ William C. Fredericks William C. Fredericks (admitted pro hac vice) BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10019 Telephone: (212) 554-1400 Facsimile: (212) 554-1444 [email protected] Robert D. Klausner (Fla. Bar No. 244082) Adam P. Levinson (Fla. Bar No. 055344) KLAUSNER, KAUFMAN, JENSEN & LEVINSON, P.A. 10059 N.W. 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Telephone: (954) 916-1202 Facsimile: (954) 916-1232 [email protected] [email protected] Robert Sugarman (Fla. Bar No. 149388) Ivelisse Berio LeBeau (Fla. Bar No. 907693) Kenneth R. Harrison, Sr. (Fla. Bar No. 0109990)SUGARMAN & SUSSKIND, P.A. 100 Miracle Mile, Suite 300 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Telephone: (305) 592-2801 Facsimile: (305) 447-8115 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Co-Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs

#652915


21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of June, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing

PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND

REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES AND INCORPORATED

MEMORANDUM OF LAW with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also

certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on

the attached Service List, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing Generated by the

CM/ECF system or in some other authorized manner for those counsel who are authorized to

receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.

By: /s/ William C. Fredericks William C. Fredericks


22

SERVICE LIST

David A. Coulson (Fla. Bar No. 176222) D. Porpoise Evans (Fla. Bar No. 576883) GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP Suite 4400 333 SE 2nd Ave Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 579-0500 Facsimile: (305) 579-0717 [email protected] [email protected]

Robert D. Klausner (Fla. Bar No. 244082) Adam P. Levinson (Fla. Bar No. 055344) KLAUSNER, KAUFMAN, JENSEN & LEVINSON, P.A. 10059 N.W. 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Telephone: (954) 916-1202 Facsimile: (954) 916-1232 [email protected] [email protected]

Terry R. Weiss (Fla. Bar No. 057906) GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 3290 Northside Parkway NW, Suite 400 Atlanta, Georgia 30327 Telephone: (678) 553-7328 Facsimile: (678) 553-7329 [email protected]

Robert A. Sugarman (Fla. Bar No. 149388) Ivelisse Berio LeBeau (Fla. Bar No. 907693) Kenneth R. Harrison, Sr. (Fla. Bar No. 0109990) SUGARMAN & SUSSKIND, P.A. 100 Miracle Mile, Suite 300 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Telephone: (305) 592-2801 Facsimile: (305) 447-8115 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]


Exhibit A

Case 3:10-cv-00845-TJC-MCR Document 107-1 Filed 06/22/12 Page 1 of 3 PageID 1458

1The Court declines to award the requested fees of the plaintiff representative(Doc. 297).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

---------------------------------------------------------------x:

JACK HIRSCH, et al. : Case No. 3:98-cv-502-J-32TEM:

Plaintiff, ::

v. ::

PSS WORLD MEDICAL, INC., et al. ::

Defendants. ::

---------------------------------------------------------------x

ORDER AWARDINGATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES

This matter having come before the Court on December 20, 2005, upon the

Application by Plaintiff’s Counsel for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses

(Doc. 296), and the Court, having considered the evidence, all papers filed and

proceedings conducted herein, having found the settlement of this action to be fair,

reasonable and adequate, and the Court having approved the settlement, and good

cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. Plaintiff’s Counsel are awarded (i) attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$4,950,000.00 (thirty percent [30%] of the Settlement Fund) to be paid out of the

Settlement Fund and (ii) costs and expenses, including expert’s fees, in the amount of

$1,213,900.28, to be paid out of the Settlement Fund.1

Case 3:98-cv-00502-TJC-TEM Document 300 Filed 12/20/05 Page 1 of 2 PageID 3209Case 3:10-cv-00845-TJC-MCR Document 107-1 Filed 06/22/12 Page 2 of 3 PageID 1459

2

2. The awarded attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses shall earn interest at the

same rate as the Settlement Fund from the date the Settlement Fund was established

until paid.

3. The awarded attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses shall be allocated in a

manner which, in the good faith judgment of Plaintiff’s Counsel, reflects the contribution

of Plaintiff’s Counsel to the institution, prosecution and settlement of the Litigation.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of December,

2005.

s.copies to:counsel of record

Case 3:98-cv-00502-TJC-TEM Document 300 Filed 12/20/05 Page 2 of 2 PageID 3210Case 3:10-cv-00845-TJC-MCR Document 107-1 Filed 06/22/12 Page 3 of 3 PageID 1460

Exhibit B


Case 0:09-cv-60646-JIC Document 102 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/08/2010 Page 1 of 5Case 3:10-cv-00845-TJC-MCR Document 107-2 Filed 06/22/12 Page 2 of 6 PageID 1462





Exhibit C


Case 1:00-cv-01416-CC Document 203 Filed 05/26/05 Page 1 of 24Case 3:10-cv-00845-TJC-MCR Document 107-3 Filed 06/22/12 Page 2 of 13 PageID 1468












Documents

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ...€¦ · case no. 3:10-cv-845-j-32mcr plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement