United Launch Alliance Update to Huntsville and Decatur ...hsvchamber.org/images/gov_affairs/ULA_Presentation.pdf · UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE (ULA) PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Unpublished

Copyright © 2015 United Launch Alliance, LLC. Unpublished Work. All Rights Reserved. UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE (ULA) PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

United Launch Alliance Update to Huntsville and Decatur-Morgan

Chambers of Commerce

Kevin Bargo Les Kovacs

April 20, 2015

UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

This document contains United Launch Alliance (ULA) Proprietary Informa;on and trade secrets and/or commercial or financial informa;on that is privileged or confiden;al and is therefore exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Informa;on Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552). Public disclosure of any informa;on marked ULA Proprietary Informa;on is prohibited by the Trade Secrets Act (18. U.S.C. Sec 1905) and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. Sec 1831 et seq.) ULA Proprietary Informa;on is not to be used or made available to others without the prior wriRen permission of ULA.

29 April 2015 | 2 ULA PROPRIETARY INFORMATION. See Title Page For Details.

History of the Evolved Expendable Launch System (EELV)

§  The roots of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program can be traced back to the Space ShuRle Challenger accident in 1986.

‒  Prior to Challenger, U.S. Government policy was to use the ShuRle for all missions— in order to share the cost across the government.

§  AYer Challenger, space policy was significantly narrowed to those missions that required the ShuRle’s unique capabili;es and humans

‒ Servicing the Hubble telescope, construc;on of the ISS §  The DoD quickly accelerated efforts to build the Titan IV launch vehicle to meet heavy liY needs and moved smaller missions off ShuRle to the Atlas and Delta launch vehicles § Maintaining the produc;on lines, infrastructure and overhead of Titan (Lockheed), Atlas (General Dynamics), and Delta (McDonnell-‐Douglas) fleets of vehicles from three different prime contractors became cost prohibi;ve


q  EELV program begins as a series of concept studies in the mid-1990s with the goal to reduce the cost compared with continuing the legacy Titan, Atlas, and Delta programs. –  DoD provided ~$500M to each of the two teams, one from Lockheed

and one from McDonnell Douglas (later became Boeing). q  Lockheed’s design was dubbed the Atlas V, an evolution that

combined aspects of the older Atlas and Titan rocket families. –  The Atlas V included the Russian RD-180 engine –  Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. government encouraged U.S.

companies to engage Russian aerospace and defense industry to provide productive peaceful work, rather than risk proliferation of critical technologies, weapons systems and know-how to bad actors.

q  Boeing designs and builds the Delta IV: A combination of heritage and new design. –  Boeing utilizes a new RS68 liquid hydrogen engine built by Aerojet

Development of EELV


q  Both the Atlas V and Delta IV were designed and built as commercial developments, not government funded programs.

q  DoD was leveraging projected commercial demand –  In the late 1990s, the projected demand for commercial satellite

launches was expected to skyrocket to meet the needs satellite communications systems, many of which were backed by billionaires from the software and high-tech industries (Gates, Allen, McCaw, et al).

–  The market for these large satellite communications systems never materialized; largely because terrestrial cellular and broadband communications beat them to the market and proved to be a more attractive and less risky investment.

q  Most these commercial satellite efforts were abandoned, and with it the commercial demand for space launch evaporated; leaving the U.S. government as the primary customer.

Development of EELV Continued


Delta IV Heavy


Atlas V


q  During development of the new Atlas V and Delta IV and Delta IV rockets the existing launchers Experienced six failures over a period of 10 months in the 1998-1999 including a shocking three consecutive Titan IV failures q  These failures were a major wake-up call for the Air Force that would lead to significant increase in the Air Force’s involvement in overseeing the Atlas V and Delta IV programs. q  The EELV program started as a commercially driven effort it transformed

into a core program for DOD that was required for national security success.

q  While both Atlas V and Delta IV were funded primarily by industry, the

approach to program management morphed into a traditional government funded program, with all the related processes, oversight, and reporting.

Failures Transform Approach to EELV Management


q  ULA was formed out of necessity – –  With the collapse of the commercial satellite market there was not

enough market share to sustain two separate launch providers

q  Even the savviest investors were wrong on the commercial satellite market needs. –  Terrestrial cellular and broadband communications beat commercial

communications satellites to the market

q  ULA remains the only fully qualified and certified provider to service all the National Security Missions requirements of the U.S. government and many satellites ordered by NASA.

Formation of United Launch Alliance (ULA)


q  ULA’s Manufacturing is headquartered in Decatur, Alabama q  1.6 Million Sq. Ft. housing the world’s most advanced state-of-the-art production facility q  ULA’s Decatur facility:

–  Employs over 800 rocket technicians –  Works with 39 suppliers, and –  Supports more than 4,000 jobs in the state

q  The production facility is a national asset q  The north Alabama site was selected for its pro-business

environment, skilled workforce availability, access to transportation and training and strong commitment from the state.

q  Groundbreaking at the 350-acre project took place Nov. 3, 1997. The first Delta IV launch vehicle rolled out of facility in 2001.

q  In 2009, ULA began transitioning Atlas V production to the facility. The first Atlas V booster left the factory in March 2010.

ULA Decatur Operations


q  At the Cold War there was significant concern within the U.S. that scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union (FSU) would sell critical technologies, and weapons technologies, to rogue groups.

q  Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations took initiatives to engage FSU scientists in peaceful, productive activities to dissuade them from proliferating their technology and know-how. q  One result of this was a partnership between Russia and Lockheed

to use the Russian RD-180 rocket engine on the Atlas V rocket. –  The RD180 was technically superior to U.S. engines, –  was much less expensive, –  helped the government achieve its nonproliferation goals

Why Russian engines on the Atlas?


q  To address these risks, U.S. industry secured the design and manufacturing details to domestically produce an RD-180

q  US Industry demonstrated the capability to reproduce many key

components of the RD-180 engine. q  A full-up engine was never produce because the U.S. Government

never followed through with the funding to actually produce a domestic engine.

q  Instead, the government accepted the risk of a supply disruption by maintaining a multi-year inventory of RD-180s on hand.

Addressing Risks of RD180


q  The Russian supplier for the RD-180 engine, Energomash, has an excellent track record of supplying engines on time

q  Russia’s invasion of Crimea in February 2014 dramatically

increased tension between the U.S. and leaders of Russia q  The FY15 Defense Authorization included a provision (sec 1608)

that prohibits DoD from awarding space launch contracts for rockets with Russian engines. –  The provision grandfathers current ULA contracts which cover the next

few years –  But not all necessary launches occur over the next several years.

New Concerns with RD180 Use


Blue Origin BE-4 Engine

q  Liquid Oxygen, Liquefied Natural Gas (LOx/LNG) Engine –  Oxygen Rich Staged Combustion (ORSC) cycle –  550klbf Sea Level Thrust, 325 sec Vac Isp –  Moderate Performance Version of a High

Performance Architecture –  Low Recurring and Life Cycle Cost

q  LNG Fuel –  Enables Autogenous Tank Pressurization –  Low Cost Enables Extended Test Program –  Simplifies Decontamination Prior to Vehicle

Installation –  Improves Operability and Safe Operations –  Commercially Available Liquefied Methane

q  Blue Origin In-house Development –  Analysis - Component Testing –  Design - Engine Testing –  Fabrication

Blue Origin PROPRIETARY DATA/Subject to Export Control


Aerojet Rocketdyne AR-1 Engine

AR PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

Liquid Oxygen, Kerosene (RP-1) Engine

- Oxygen Rich Staged Combustion (ORSC) - 2 engines, Twin Pack arrangement - Turbine Inlet Temperature, 1483 oR - Chamber pressure, 3100 psi - Thrust, 1165/1052 (vac/SL), klb - ISP, 337.5/304.7 (vac/SL), sec - Nominal Engine Mixture Ratio, 2.72:1 - Throttle range, 40-100% - Preburner Mixture Ratio, 48.9:1 - Nozzle Area Ratio, 38.8:1 - Weight, 17,200 lbm (NTE) - Thrust/Weight , 67.7/61.1 (vac/SL)


Evolutionary Next Generation System

New Technology Enablers

NGLS Atlas V

Delta IV

BE-‐4

5M Booster

Centaur

ACES* *2nd Gen NGLS Common

Avionics

4M PLF 5.4M PLF (mod)

SRBs

Low Risk Consolida;on of Atlas & Delta


Product Evolution Roadmap

Accesses New Markets

2014 2020

NGLS ACES Single Core

HLV Capability

2023

Phase 1 Phase 2

NSS, Science Crew, Cargo, Commercial

Space Control MulVple InserVons Commercial Human Space Flight

ACES

American Engine

5 x

4 x

Current State

30t

20t

5 x

Split Service

30t

20t

NGLS

American Engine

6 x

Split Service

30t

NGLS 25t

6 x

NGLS 35t Class

2018

Today Phase 3

NGLS Heavy >50t Class

Extensibility


Launch Service Provider Capabilities


DMSP

SBIRS

GPS III

GPS IIF

WGS

AEHF

MUOS

HLV West

HLV East

Mission Pe

rformance, Impu

lse GPS III Dual

A

B OTV

C

D E

F

D IV (4,0)

D IV (4,2)

D IV (5,2)-‐(5,4)

D IV HLV

A V 401

A V 501

A V 411-‐431

A V 511-‐552

Atlas Delta

ULA Product Line – Capabilities

Atlas & Delta Redundancy Across >80% of Market

Single SVck Gap

DIV-‐H

F9H

F9v1.1


Worldwide Launch Demand

q  Worldwide Launch Rate Avgs 60-80/yr (92 in 2014) q  60% of Launches Are Not Available to U.S. Providers

–  Military or Science satellites for China or Russia

q  U.S. Launched 25% of Total World Market in 2014 –  23 Launches: (14) EELV, (6) Falcon 9, (3) Antares

q  25% (~20 launches) Theoretically Available, But… –  Satellite customers intentionally rotate among launch suppliers to spread risk –  Launches currently split among 3 main competitors: Ariane (Europe), Proton and Sea Launch (Russia) –  Adding an additional qualified supplier would add an additional 5-7 launches per year

q  Additional 5-7 Launches for US Suppliers Would Total about 30 US Launches/Year (Current 23+7)

–  Does NOT include Human Launch Services Potential of 2-3 Launches/Year


NASA

Commercial

NaVonal Security Space

Recapitaliza5on of NSS Space

End of Interna5onal

Space Sta5on

Opera5on Annu

al Launche

s

All-Up Market Opportunity Addressable Markets

ULA Remains Viable by Accessing NASA ISS & Commercial Markets

6 to 7

Crew & Cargo Growth

Documents

United Launch Alliance Update to Huntsville and Decatur ...hsvchamber.org/images/gov_affairs/ULA_Presentation.pdf · UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE (ULA) PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Unpublished