I t is clear that the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has had a variable track record in planning effectively for the future and in using the resources available to it to obtain the best value for money for UK

taxpayers. As well as numerous reports by the National Audit Office (NAO) and the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, both the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 20101 and Lord Levene’s Defence Reform report of 20112 again drew attention to the situation and highlighted a number of underlying reasons for the department’s poor performance, along with a series of recommenda-tions on how it could address them. Such a situation, where the MoD has to conduct major transformation while managing a vast portfolio of activity, has been made all the more critical by the impact of the finan-cial crisis and economic recession, which has necessitated an effort to

United Kingdom Defence Acquisition in the Age of AusterityPeter D. Antill and Jeremy C. D. Smith from Cranfield University’s Centre for Defence Acquisition, based at the UK Defence Academy, review the challenges facing the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as it steers a course through transformation and austerity

bring government spending under control to reduce the UK’s budgetary deficit. Defence, although not hit as hard as some other departments, is still expected to deliver its share of savings, estimated at £4.3 billion by 2014-153. This article looks at the current issues that are facing the UK MoD during this time of transition in respect of defence acquisition, including the reform of the MoD, the reform of Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), the restructuring of the UK Armed Forces and their support with Future Force 2020, the Whole Force Concept (WFC) and the Total Support Force (TSF), and the on-going inventory problem.

While it is encouraging that the MoD has recognised that there is a need for change and has put in place a set of governance structures in order to enable that to happen, to work effectively these arrangements need the following4:

Success in Afghanistan is a major priority within the MoD’s new defence vision

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a unified vision of what the Department should look like, if it is to effi-■■

ciently, effectively deliver defence capability, and how to get there;necessary cultural change to be determined, then such change to be ■■

led and sustained, and revised processes and procedures introduced;united, consistent and strong leadership across the military, civilian ■■

and political arenas throughout the entire (decade-long) process; andthe Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) to have the appropriate ■■

responsibility and authority to undertake this transformation and to be able to hold those responsible for its delivery to account.

In line with this transformation programme, the MoD published a new defence vision in its most recent business plan5, which included the follow-ing priorities:

succeeding in Afghanistan;■■

continuing to fulfil our standing commitments;■■

succeeding in other operations we are required to undertake;■■

restructuring the Armed Forces and their capabilities;■■

implementing the new Defence Operating Model; and■■

delivering defence in the most effective, efficient and sustainable ■■

way possible.

With regard to the last two priorities listed, a transformation package consisting of a portfolio of 37 programmes with an additional 10 deliver-ables was put together, which are split into tiers – Tier One (the most criti-cal programmes and subject to detailed oversight by the Defence Operating Board – Transformation), Tier Two (other change programmes) and Tier Three (additional security and defence commitments). This activity is led by the Defence Operating Board (Transformation), which meets once a week and is chaired by both the Second PUS and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, with the Director General Finance being the other permanent member and both the Director General Transformation and Director Corporate Strategy attending regularly. The Board is supported by the Defence Transformation Unit and holds those delivering the transformation activity to account, as well as looking at portfolio risks, issues and dependencies. Each transformation programme is supposed to have a senior responsible officer, with those for the Tier One programmes being formally appointed by the PUS and accountable to the Defence Board6.

However, the emphasis on cutting non-frontline costs (frontline costs are expected to fall after the UK starts pulling out of Afghanistan in 2014) has meant an emphasis on short-term cost reduction. The Defence bud-get, unlike other departmental budgets, has a relatively high level of fixed costs in the short term, and a significant proportion, in both operational-expenditure terms and procurement terms, is committed years in advance. As a consequence, the MoD is left with relatively little room for manoeuvre when it comes to trying to reduce spending, especially in the short term. Given that personnel costs comprise over one third of the budget, a large proportion of the savings the MoD needs to make will come from reducing personnel numbers, both in the armed forces themselves and within the Department’s civil servants. The numbers outlined in the SDSR were sub-sequently revised upwards in the spring of 2011 to 29,000 civilians (34 per cent of the total) and 25,000 military (14 per cent of the total)7.

Given that the MoD is still developing the details associated with Lord Levene’s new operating model – despite it being introduced in December 20118 – the reductions in personnel numbers will be well advanced before the final details have been worked out, which means these reductions have been put into effect while there is still a significant lack of clarity as to exactly what the MoD’s requirements will be with regard to its future workforce, in terms of both numbers and makeup. There is therefore a

significant risk of additional skills gaps developing, making the Department increasingly reliant (in the short to medium term) on external expertise – the cost of which has grown from £6 million in 2006-07 to £270 million in 2010-11. In being pressured to reduce costs in the short term, and looking to do so by reducing the numbers of both civilian and military personnel, the MoD faces a serious impact on morale as well as critical-skill shortages in the future, with consequent effects on its consultancy expenditure – something that should have been forecast9.

Reform of DE&SThe MoD has a long history of reforming the way it buys and supports equipment and services, going back to the creation of the Procurement Executive (1971), the Defence Procurement Agency/Defence Logistics Organisation (1999) and, most recently, Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) in 2007. Reform of DE&S was a key part of Lord Levene’s report into reforming the MoD10, but is also built upon the Defence Materiel Strategy (DMS)11, as well as Bernard Gray’s report of 200912. While some progress has been made, with the Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM) being a member of the new Defence Board, having the lead for commercial and industrial policy across defence, and the independent costings available from the Cost Assurance and Analysis Service (CAAS) now being mandatory in the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) capability (Cap) area (which will be extended to the Frontline Commands as part of the wider reform of financial management), there is still much to do. Over the past 15 years, numerous

initiatives have attempted to reform defence procurement/acquisition, including Smart Procurement, Smart Acquisition, the Defence Acquisition Change Programme and the Defence Acquisition Reform Programme, with only moderate success as there still exist major cost and time overruns in defence acquisition, with the average being a 40 per cent increase in the projected cost and an 80 per cent increase in the time taken to enter into service. Analysis identified three underlying causes, these being13:

an overheated programme;■■

a weak interface between DE&S and the wider MoD resulting in ■■

poor discipline and change control – contributing to the ‘Conspiracy of Optimism’ and ‘Specification Creep’; andinsufficient levels of business capability in DE&S for the size and ■■

complexity of the programmes it is asked to deliver – in other words, a shortage of commercial skills.

In order to address these problems, the DMS has considered various organisation-design options to move away from the current structures that have hindered past attempts at improving defence acquisition, with three options being presented to ministers14:

In being pressured to reduce costs in the short-term, the MoD faces a serious impact on morale as well as critical-skill shortages in the future

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a Trading Fund (TF);■■

an executive, non-departmental public body with a strategic partner ■■

(ENDPB/SP); anda government-owned – contractor-operated (GOCO) entity.■■

While the MoD was seemingly moving towards favouring the GOCO option15, with the GOCO outsourcing at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) one of the major examples cited by both ministers and the Department, it is difficult to establish exactly how successful that has been, as it has not been fully open to public scrutiny (for obvious national security reasons), plus a GOCO DE&S would be on a much larger scale altogether. In addition, a number of questions remained unanswered, which included16:

What would be the impact on timelines, the decision-making process ■■

and autonomy?Would bureaucracy increase or decrease?■■

What impact would it have on the opportunities for smaller businesses?■■

How would the larger companies leverage this position in terms of ■■

providing a more efficient solution for the government in terms of what they procure?How would a lead company to run DE&S be chosen?■■

How long would the contract be for?■■

Would the DE&S lead company be able to make decisions or simply ■■

give advice?How could any DE&S lead company make money while the MoD ■■

saves money?How would a DE&S lead company handle UK involvement in existing ■■

and prospective international projects?What financial risks would any DE&S lead company be asked to take ■■

on board?How would a GOCO be held accountable by Parliament?■■

Would a DE&S lead company have responsibility for safety and envi-■■

ronmental impact?

Unfortunately for the MoD, events over the summer seem to have thrown this preference for the GOCO option into doubt. This was due to the failure by security contractor G4S to provide enough guards for the Olympic Games. G4S had been contracted to provide 10,400 person-nel but fell short by some 4,700, which meant that the difference had to be made up by military personnel. This was in part down to the very different performance models used by the MoD and armed forces com-pared with that of an organisation in the private sector. This failure has meant that the Secretary of State for Defence is “rethinking his attitude to private-sector procurement” and learning about “when it was appropriate to adopt either model”17.

Future Force 2020, the Whole-Force Concept and Total-Support ForceThe SDSR outlined the model towards which the UK Armed Forces will evolve in the next eight years, entitled ‘Future Force 2020’. Underpinning this is a new set of Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) that includes an ability to conduct18:

a medium- to long-term stabilisation operation at brigade level ■■

(approximately 6,500 personnel) with air and maritime support, along with one short-term complex intervention (around 2,000 personnel) and one short-term simple intervention (1,000 person-nel), or;three short-term operations if there is no existing long-term stabili-■■

sation operation, or;for a limited time and with sufficient warning, a major one-off ■■

intervention of around 30,000 personnel (three brigades) with air and maritime support.

In addition, forces will generally be in one of three states at any one time19: the Deployed Force – forces currently engaged on operations;■■

the High-Readiness Force – forces kept at a high level of prepared-■■

ness to rapidly respond to a threat or crisis; andthe Lower-Readiness Force – forces that have recently returned from ■■

operations, stepped down from high readiness or about to rotate into a state of high readiness.

For the armed forces themselves, this means that:the Royal Navy will continue to provide maritime defence of the UK ■■

and the Overseas Territories (including the Falklands), maintain a continuous-at-sea deterrence (with the four Vanguard-class subma-rines being replaced after 2028) and play a major role in UK for-eign policy around the world. The Royal Marines of 3rd Commando Brigade will maintain the capability to rapidly deploy a commando group of around 1,800 personnel at short notice20;the British Army will continue to contribute to the UK’s stand-■■

ing commitments, provide light specialist forces for short-term interventions, keep in readiness sufficient multi-role forces to undertake more complex interventions or a stabilisation opera-tion, and retain the ability to command UK and allied forces up to theatre level. It will restructure around two elements - the Reaction Force (a divisional HQ with three armoured infantry brigades and 16th Air Assault Brigade) and the Adaptable Force (a divisional HQ with seven regionally-based brigade HQs), along with a pool of support units; 21 the Royal Air Force (RAF) will continue to provide air defence of ■■

the UK and the Falklands Islands, an expeditionary capability to support enduring land operations, tactical and strategic airlift (both fixed-wing and helicopters), specialist support such as ISTAR and the RAF Regiment. Its fast-jet fleet will eventually coalesce around the Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter, while the transport fleet will coalesce around the C-17, A330 and A400M22;

While being couched in terms of making the UK Armed Forces more ‘rel-evant’ and ‘effective’ for the 21st Century, if viewed alongside the changes mentioned above, it is a major reduction in defence capability for the UK in order for the MoD to balance its books as23:

the Royal Navy is having to reduce its personnel by more than 5,000 ■■

(to 30,000), its frigate and destroyer force will shrink from 23 to 19, its carrier force from three to two (with only one of these at sea at any one time), lose a Bay-class amphibious support ship and have no fixed-wing aircraft until the JSF enters service (around 2020) as the Sea Harriers were retired early in 2006;the British Army is having to reduce its personnel from 102,600 to ■■

around 82,00024 (leaving it the smallest it’s been since the Boer War25), reduce the infantry force by five battalions, reduce the numbers of Challenger II tanks by 40 per cent and heavy artillery by 35 per cent, and effectively reduce the number of deployable brigades to four; andthe RAF will have to reduce its personnel by over 7,000 (to around ■■

33,000), has lost the Harrier force, will not receive the Nimrod MRA4 (despite the programme being virtually complete and over £4 billion already spent it was decided to scrap them26), will lose the VC10/TriStar fleet and lose the C-130 Hercules fleet 10 years earlier than planned.

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The WFC was one of a range of ideas and initiatives to emerge from the SDSR of 201027. It was subsequently formalised in Key Recommendation 11 of the Defence Reform report, which stated that28:

In line with the overall capability planning and financial manage-ment model, the Department should afford greater priority to man-aging its ‘human capability’ as a strategic resource, to ensure a better balance with its consideration of equipment capability. Specifically, it should develop the ‘Whole-Force Concept,’ which seeks to ensure that Defence is supported by the most cost-effective balance of regular military personnel, reservists, M0D civilians and contractors.

The WFC is therefore said to be built upon three pillars: the Regulars and Reservists who serve in the Armed Forces; the civilians who work along-side them; and the contractors who support them on operations. It is, as its name suggests, conceptual and, as was emphasised by the Independent Commission to Review the UK’s Reserve Forces29, should not be thought of as representing a rigidly definable structure. The Commission stressed the dynamic nature of the WFC: that at any given time the contributions the three pillars make to the Whole Force should aggregate up to represent what is most operationally relevant and cost effective.

In addition to a review of reserve forces, a number of other enabling studies and initiatives underpin the WFC. Among them are: a review of the estates implications; a review of existing terms and conditions of ser-vice, and how a new employment model, as the MoD terms it, could be structured. This will be based on “flexible structures, segmented careers,

categories of readiness, and the mix of Regulars and Reserves with gradu-ated commitment, set within a tri-Service structure, with options for full- and part-time working”30. Other reviews have focused on strategic force development and force generation. An important subset of the WFC is the Total Support Force (TSF) that will be explained in more detail below, but it is worth noting that to turn the concepts of both the TSF and the WFC into concrete reality will require that the mix of Armed Forces Regulars and Reservists, MoD civil servants, and contractors, is optimised. In order to achieve this, optimisation will demand the balancing of affordability and operational risk.

The Independent Commission to Review the UK’s Reserve Forces rec-ognised the critical contribution of the reserves to the WFC, but also the need for their quality and availability to be guaranteed. This would, they said, require an improvement in the proposition (prospects, responsibilities

In addition to a review of reserve forces, a number of other enabling studies and initiatives underpin the WFC

HMS Dauntless patrolled round the Falklands on her maiden voyage. Defence of the islands is a key standing commitment of the UK

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and rewards of reserve service) to the Reservists, a change to legislation to enable more routine mobilisation, better employer support and employ-ment protection, and better methods to achieve the integration of Regulars and Reservists. Within the UK MoD, the Defence Medical Services are considered to be leading practitioners of the WFC, but work done by the Commission to review the Reserve Forces suggested that the UK could also learn much from the experience of its ABCA partners31, who employ a whole-force approach – in particular the US and Canada.

Total Support ForceThe TSF, on the other hand, was proposed by SDSR Support Study 3.4. The MoD’s vision for the TSF is of an end-to-end support force “capable of deploying and operating with fully integrated support capabilities derived from a pre-planned mix of military and civilian individuals and organisa-tions”32. The TSF requires that Reservists and contractors from industry be integrated into regular-force structures against readiness assumptions and agile force generation requirements. It envisages “the greater planned use of contractors on operations, in functions that are commensurate with the category of threat level in order to accommodate force protection and duty

of care responsibilities, normally with an increasingly higher proportion of contractors on successive roulements for enduring operations”33.

The UK MoD has outsourced much of its support capability: achiev-ing support for many of its major platforms and equipment assets through long-term contracts for availability (CfA), and securing the provision of commodities and services through a range of other, often shorter dura-tion, contracting arrangements. One obvious manifestation of the extent of this outsourcing activity has been the number of contractors deployed in support of UK operations – approximately 6,000 in Afghanistan currently, representing a ratio of two contractors for every three uni-formed military personnel34. These contractors provide vital support to UK operations in logistics, infrastructure support, and the maintenance and operation of battle-winning equipment. However, the provision of this support, while vital to operational success, has not been as coherent as the MoD, and in particular operational commanders, would wish it to have been. The intent behind the TSF is that it brings this coherence to the integration of Regulars, Reservists and industry personnel, creating a single-support force. A successful TSF should deliver assured support for the operational commander, a safe and secure working environment for

An employee of the Defence Support Group repairs the crane on a MAN SVR recovery vehicle at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The UK’s Total Support Force will see even greater reli-ance on civilian contractors during operations

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industry personnel, good value for Defence, and an acceptable reward for industry. It should be pre-planned and end-to-end. The TSF vision sees industry and the MoD working together to deliver assured support from an established home base, along the Joint Support Chain and into the theatre of operations. The scale and scope of industry commitment to operations will be shaped by their attitude to risk and what they deem to be an accept-able balance of risk and reward. To make such an informed assessment will require the sharing of information, including that associated with the physical risk taken with deployed operations. This will require a change of mindset, based on the principle of ‘need to share’ rather than ‘need to know’, and it will also demand greater integration of MoD and industry information systems.

It is envisaged that the TSF will comprise several categories of person-nel, among them: Regular Servicemen and women, trained and available to deploy at short notice, to provide immediate support to operations; Reservists, mobilised and trained to deliver support at longer notice; con-tractors from industry who will provide equipment and logistic support under CfA arrangements; and civilian workers who may be recruited locally to provide unskilled labour. Industry personnel are envisaged to fit into three broad categories: Integrated Partners, who will be part of the mili-tary-force structure and who will plan, train and deliver together; Essential Contractors, who the MoD needs to deliver into operational effect, but who require limited support from the MoD, and who deliver a specific service such as freight distribution; and Ancillary Contractors, who will provide generic services that are probably freely available on the commercial market and may be sourced locally. Categorising support personnel in this fashion is expected to bring greater coherence to the planning and delivery of support, both in the home base and in the theatre of operations that the MoD requires.

Currently, Navy, Army and Air Commands are engaged in a range of TSF feasibility studies and implementation initiatives. Inevitably, financial pressures are influencing where the Commands are focusing their work, as well as constraining them. Successful implementation of the TSF will be dependent on the new employment model referred to above, “under-pinned by the appropriate legal framework, and a basing strategy that enables a strong link between the Home Base and the operational area”35. The ability of industry to contribute to force generation and then sustain a cost-effective, enduring capability, noting political and legal constraints that might apply in the build-up to conflict, is key. The associated risks must be understood and clearly stated36.

The inventory problemIn its June 2012 report on the Defence Inventory37, the National Audit Office (NAO) observed that the Department’s inventory holdings are increas-ing, which is the result of a number of factors: an increase in operational activity over the past decade, and the procurement of new equipment to prosecute operations, including capabilities procured against an acceler-ated timescale via the Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) process; a failure to dispose of inventory it no longer requires; the purchase of more inventory than it uses; and the creation of greater visibility of its stock levels by recording more inventory on its IT systems. Amyas Morse, Head of the NAO, observed that “in the current economic climate where the Department is striving to make savings, it can ill-afford to use resources to buy and hold unnecessary levels of stock, and it clearly does so. The root cause of excess stock, which the Department is seeking to address, is that management and accountability structures currently fail to provide the incentives for cost-effective inventory management”38. The Gross Book Value (GBV) of the Defence inventory39, at the time of the Report’s

publication, was £40.3 billion – a value that continues to increase at a rate of approximately £200 million per month.

The MoD has been aware for some time of the financial value tied up in its inventory, of its inherent complexity, and of the shortfalls in its inven-tory management (IM) processes across maritime, land and air domains. It has instigated a number of initiatives aimed at improving its inventory position, among them the Defence Inventory Effectiveness Transformation (DIET) project that originated in the IM Diagnostic Study, which ran from January to July 2007, and the Stock Transition Programme (STRAP), that followed DIET and has become the Defence Stock Transition Programme (DSTP). Both DIET and DSTP focused on the classification and segmentation of the inventory, with the aim of implementing more appropriate and cost-effective management systems, and on disposal of surplus inventory. DIET, in particular, also directed attention to the paucity of qualified and experi-enced inventory managers and put in place an up-skilling programme to address the shortfall.

Responding to the NAO reportIn responding to the NAO report, the MoD has taken what is arguably a more strategic approach. It has commissioned the development of a Strategic Inventory Management Plan that is expected to be published in the near future. It has also vested ‘ownership’ of the Defence inventory in the appointment of Director General Resources in DE&S, and he has issued direction to the DE&S Operating Centres aimed at improving the scrutiny of equipment-support solutions, including their provision for inventory management. A number of other studies and research projects are under-

way, some of them focusing on what has been an enduring problem for the MoD: the disjointed nature of its logistics information systems and the quality and availability of its spares demand and consumption data. Supply chain theory has long recognised that to enable the efficient and effective flow of materiel downstream from the supplier to the ultimate user, there must be an accurate and timely flow of demand and consump-tion data upstream. As the NAO observed in its 2011 report on The Use of Information to Manage the Logistics Supply Chain, the MoD has not been able to achieve this effective information flow because its information systems have been disjointed and lacking in required functionality. The NAO concluded that the “Department’s use of information to manage its supply chain falls short of general logistics industry best practice”40. The NAO also reported on the new logistics informa-tion systems being developed under the Logistics Network Enabled Capability Programme, and their deployment should make a significant contribution to improving the flow of logistics information as they are rolled out. The MoD will continue to manage its stock within its broad accounting categories, which are: raw materials and con-sumables, capital spares, and guided weapons, missiles and bombs.

In a more strategic approach, the MoD has commissioned the development of a Strategic Inventory Management Plan

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It is also expected to continue the work done in DIET and DSTP to segment the inventory, using appropriate measures, such as the rate at which it turns over (slow-mover, non-mover, and so on), financial value, procure-ment lead-time, or other criticality measure, in order to develop and apply stock management regimes that make sense. In many cases these will be automated; in others they will require a higher level of manual intervention, ideally by a more appropriate number of qualified and experienced inventory managers.

ConclusionFor most organisations, any one of these issues would be a major chal-lenge, involving a significant amount of time and effort to properly and effectively deal with it in such a way as to leave the organisation in good shape to face the future. Such a challenge would be complicated by having to do it during a time of austerity, with pressure to make savings in its budget, itself a major driver of the restructuring process. The MoD has to restructure itself, its central acquisition body, and the Armed Forces themselves as well as deal with a significant problem with regard to an ongoing accumulation of inventory, a problem that

will only get worse once the drawdown from Afghanistan begins. All this, including a major reduction in both civilian and military person-nel numbers, is assessed to have made morale somewhat fragile in both the Armed Forces and Civil Service. To bring this to fruition, the MoD needs an effective and workable change-management strategy that also needs to alter the culture of the organisation and staff behav-iours. They have made a start – only time will tell if they succeed. ■

The MoD has to restructure itself, its central aquisition body, the Armed Forces as well as deal with ongoing inventory accumulation

A Naval Strike Wing Harrier rises from HMS Ark Royal’s hangar. HMS Ark Royal was decommissioned in 2011. With the withdrawal of the Harrier, the Royal Navy no longer operates any fixed-wing frontline aircraft

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HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The 1.

Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm7948, October 2010, available

here: www.number10.gov.uk/news/strategic-defence-review/ as of

1 October 2012.

Lord Levene, Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure 2.

and Management of the Ministry of Defence, June 2011, located at

www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/B4BA14C0-0F2E-4B92-BCC7-8ABFCFE7E000/

0/defence_reform_report_struct_mgt_mod_27june2011.pdf as of

1 October 2012.

HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, Cm7942, October 2010, paragraph 2.84, 3.

located at cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_completereport.pdf as of 1 October 2012.

National Audit Office, Reforming the Ministry of Defence, Briefing for the 4.

Committee of Public Accounts, February 2012, p. 6, at www.nao.org.uk/

publications/1213/reforming_the_mod.aspx as of 5 October 2012.

Ministry of Defence, Business Plan 2012-2015, 31 May 2012, located at www.mod.5.

uk/NR/rdonlyres/21363C3C-5452-435D-9D6C-7B73069B6E27/0/mod_plan_

final_11_06_12_P1.pdf, as of 5 October 2012.

Op Cit. NAO, February 2012, p. 8.6.

National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Managing Change in the Defence 7.

Workforce, HC1791, February 2012, p. 5, at www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/

defence_workforce.aspx as of 9 October 2012.

Ministry of Defence, Defence Reform – Blueprint for the Future Department, 16 8.

December 2011, located at whitehall-frontend-production.s3.amazonaws.com/

system/uploads/attachment/file/425/85_20111216_Departmental_Blueprint_

Dec_11_final_for_circulation-U.pdf as of 10 October 2012.

House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Ministry of Defence: Managing 9.

Change in the Defence Workforce, HC1905, pp. 3-5, currently located at www.

publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1905/1905.pdf as of

9 October 2012.

Op Cit. Lord Levene, 2011, pp. 50-52. 10.

Ministry of Defence, ‘New Defence Materiel Strategy Announced’, Defence Policy 11.

and Business News, 31 May 2011, located at www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/

DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/NewDefenceMaterielStrategyAnnounced.

htm as of 10 October 2012. For an update, see Hammond, Rt Hon Philip,

Defence Materiel Strategy Update, dated 17 July 2012, located at www.parliament.uk/

documents/commons-vote-office/July_2012/17-07-12/10-Defence-Material-Strategy-

Update.pdf as of 10 October 2012.

Grey, Bernard, Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence 12.

– An Independent Report by Bernard Grey, October 2009, located at www.

mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/78821960-14A0-429E-A90A-FA2A8C292C84/0/

ReviewAcquisitionGrayreport.pdf as of 10 October 2012.

House of Commons Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition: 13.

Written Evidence from the Ministry of Defence, DAQ001, 21 May 2012, located

at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/

acquisition/m01.htm as of 10 October 2012; Pannu, Amman, How would GOCO

procurement work in practice?, 17 August 2012, defencemanagement.com, located at

www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=20517 as of 10 October 2012.

Op Cit. HCDC, 21 May 2012.14.

Hopkins, Nick, ‘Private company could take over armed forces’ supply’ in The 15.

Guardian, 17 July 2012, at www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/17/private-company-

armed-forces-supplies as of 10 October 2012.

RUSI Acquisition Focus Group, The Defence Materiel Strategy and the GOCO 16.

Proposal for Abbey Wood, July 2012, at www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/GOCO_

Briefing.pdf as of 10 October 2012; Op Cit. Pannu, 2012.

Editorial, Hammond: G4S issues force private sector rethink, 14 August 2012, 17.

Footnotes

defencemanagement.com, at www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.

asp?id=20586 as of 10 October 2012.

Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy Fact Sheet No. 5: Future Force 2020 18.

Summery, located at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/

Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf as of 18 October 2012.

Ibid.19.

Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy Fact Sheet No. 6: Future Force 2020 – 20.

Royal Navy, 2010, located at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/

Factsheet6-Royal-Navy.pdf as of 18 October 2012.

British Army, Transforming the British Army, July 2012, located at www.army.mod.21.

uk/documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf, as of 18 October 2012.

Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy Fact Sheet No. 8: Future Force 2020 – 22.

Royal Air Force, 2010, located at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/

resources/Factsheet8-RoyalAirForce.pdf as of 18 October 2012.

Starting figures taken from: IISS, The Military Balance 2011, 2011, pp. 157-161, 23.

London: Routledge.

Rogers S. and Sedghi, A, ‘Army Cuts: How Have UK Armed Forces 24.

Personnel Changed Over Time?’ in The Guardian, 5 July 2012, at

www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/sep/01/military-service-personnel-total

as of 19 October 2012.

BBC, ‘Cutting of 17 Army Units Faces Criticism’ on the BBC News website, 5 July 25.

2012, located at www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18731157 as of 19 October 2012.

Gordon, L, ‘Sadness as scrapping of £4bn Nimrods gets under way’ on the 26.

BBC News website, 2011, at www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12297139 as of

22 October 2012.

Chris Mace, (D DSR), A Strategic Vision for Defence Support, DSR/VP/001, 27.

15 November 2010.

Op Cit. Levene, 2011.28.

Ministry of Defence, The Independent Commission to Review the 29.

United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, July 2011, located at www.mod.uk/NR/

rdonlyres/263D5F71-30CE-45BC-9442-398B1DC12C93/0/futurereserves_2020.pdf

as of 25 October 2012.

DCDS (Personnel), Service Personnel New Employment Model (A Report by 30.

DCDS(Pers)), SDSR Study 1.1, 16 July 2011, D/DCDS(Pers)/40.

America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.31.

ACDS (Log Ops), Total Support Force - What it means for Defence and Industry, 32.

Presentation to RUSI, 21 March 2011.

Op Cit. Mace, 2010.33.

SO2 Force Policy, ACDS (Logs Ops), Contractor Support to Operations and the Total 34.

Support Force, Presentation to the MoD Acquisition Employment Training Course,

UK Defence Academy, 19 September 2012.

Op Cit. Mace, 2010.35.

Ibid.36.

National Audit Office, Managing the Defence Inventory, HC 190, 28 June 2012, 37.

available here: www.nao.org.uk/publications/1213/managing_the_defence_inventory.

aspx as of

25 October 2012.

Amyas Morse (Head of the National Audit Office), 28 June 2012, quoted here: 38.

www.nao.org.uk/publications/1213/managing_the_defence_inventory.aspx as of

25 October 2012.

GBV is the gross value without adjustment for depreciation.39.

National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: The Use of Information to Manage 40.

the Logistics Supply Chain, HC 827, 31 March 2011, available here:

www.nao.org.uk/publications/1011/logistics_supply_chain.aspx as of

25 October 2012.

21

Defence Acquisition