Unit Two: Realist Theory and IPE Dr. Russell Williams

Outline: 1.  Realism – the Basics 2.  Implications of Realism for State Behavior 3.  Realist Approaches to IPE 4.  Modern Realism and IPE - Hegemonic Stability

Theory 5.  Conclusion 6.  Further Reading

Required Reading:   Cohn, Global Political Economy, Ch. 3.

Class Discussion Reading:   Susan Strange, “The Future of the American

Empire,” Journal of International Affairs, Fall 1988, Vol. 42 Issue 1, pp. 1-17.

1) Realism – the Basics:   Dominant approach to the study of IR, but less important in

IPE?   States are key actor

  E.g. IO’s and MNC’s often only “extensions” of state power

  States are :   “Unitary” - Domestic politics and interests not important   “Rational” - States pursue predictable strategies based

on calculations of self interest   “Survival”   “Power”   “Sovereignty” - Internal and external

  Global politics is a “self help” system – states must look after themselves

  “Politics” more important then economics   Economics only important topic when it relates to

state power

  Skepticism about international law, rules, regimes and values   Rules are for the “weak”. . . .

  Skepticism about cooperation   States only cooperate when then they gain more than

others = little cooperation

  Realism “parsimonious”   Has few variables and leads to clear predictions

Realist Theories of International Relations (IR):   Avoid overgeneralization – not one single theory

i) Classical Realism: (Machiavelli to Morgenthau)   Human nature is bad - hard to trust others   Reject liberal views of human nature

  Therefore, other states are inherent threat

  E.g. Hobbes’ “State of nature”   Makes a virtue of pursuit of power   Other theories seen as “idealism” (E.H. Carr)

ii) Structural Realism (1970-Present)   Waltz, Grieco and Mearsheimer)   More scientific - explored where threats came from

  Three “images”   Human nature?   Domestic Politics?   International Structure – lack of Government?

= International Structure matters!!!   Global anarchy means states have to be amoral in

the pursuit of power   Only two independent variables:

  Anarchy   Distribution of power in the interstate system

  Large impact on policymakers in US   More role for economics . . . (E.g. Thucydides)

2) Implications for State Behavior:

a) The “Security Dilemma”: Security and pursuit of power is a “zero sum” game

  Any increase in my security or power means a decrease for others . . . = Cooperation unlikely

b) “Relative gains” more important then “absolute gains”

  States only cooperate to pursue relative advantages over others =E.g. IO’s seen as tools of powerful states which hurt

the interests of weaker states

c) State policy driven by international structure and position in the global “balance” of power

  Powerful states will pursue different strategies from weak – try to ensure the status quo =E.g. Only economically powerful support free trade

Bottom Line:   Cooperation difficult   States unlikely to expose themselves

to interdependence

3) Realist Approaches to IPE

a) Proto-realism and economics:   Most classical realists integrated international

economics in their analysis.   Economics seen as a source of conflict and war

  E.g. Imperialism

  Economy important to state power   E.g. Thucydides and the Athenians

b) “Mercantilism” (16th to 18th Century)

Classical mercantilism:   States’ power dependent on treasure   Gold is key to power of emerging sovereign

states

  States seek to increase their holdings of gold and silver through:   Conquest and colonies   Increase exports, decrease imports

  Problems?

c) Economic Nationalism and Neo Mercantilism:   19th and 20th century and beyond . . .

  Industrialization seen as key economic goal   Necessary to independence (sovereignty)   Essential to military might (security)

  States need industrial development to survive (Friedrich List)   States should:

  Adopt high tariffs (protectionism)   Encourage development of national industries

Implications of Realist approaches for economic relations:

  Economic cooperation likely to be difficult   Only possible if it reflects the distribution of power

  I.e. A dominant state promotes economic integration for its own interests   Must be powerful enough to force others to

participate Or,

  Must be so economically-central that paying the costs of interdependence produce net benefits . . .

  Free Trade and “globalization” unlikely in normal circumstances

  Tendency to downplay the importance of international economics

4) Modern Realism and IPE:

Post War Period:

  Liberal free trade collapsed prior to WWII “Economic nationalism”

  Post War Realists believed economic cooperation had to be enforced by dominant states   Could reduce threats and conflict

  Breton Woods system and free trade possible because:   US military and economic dominance   Threat of the Soviet Union = other states had no choice but to

cooperate

1970’s - Post War System under stress:   Economic crises:

 US decline?  US economy relatively smaller  Economic success of Germany and Japan

 OPEC  Global economic slowdown  Financial instability = end of dollar standard

  “Détente” – decline of the cold war   Result: Realists begin to pay more attention to

economics =Declining economic cooperation in north and ear of

the “new protectionism” =Post War liberal economic order under threat????

“Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)”:

  1980s realists argue, “politics” still dominant over economics =Economic “cooperation” becoming more difficult because

of declining US power

  HST claim: Economic system can only be “stable” and “open” when there is a hegemonic state.   “Hegemony” (Realism): Leadership, or dominance of

international system by single state

HST assumes:   Like liberalism, free trade and globalization good in

theory, but unlikely to occur because states mistrust one another under conditions of anarchy

  “Free trade” and economic cooperation seen as “public goods”  Non excludible and non rival

=“Free riders” – collective action problems

“Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)”:

  Hegemonic state can either:   Provide public goods itself - So dominant economically

that it is in its interest to do so.   Force “free riders” to provide public goods

  Key claim: Hegemony = Liberal economic order

  Problems:

  What is hegemony????  Economic or military?  “Soft Power” or ideology?

  How do we know when a state is hegemonic, or the world is uni-polar?

“Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)”:

  Problems:

1) Risk of tautology   “Reading of the dependent variable”

2) Empirical record?   If US had declined by 1980s, why globalisation?

Contemporary Realism:   Retreat to “High Politics”?

  Post 9/11 return to emphasis on security and military conflict

  Economic issues have been “securitized”

Conclusions :

a) Strengths of Realism:  Parsimony  Focus on distributional outcomes – who gains

what . . . .  Rejection of idealistic prescriptions of how the

world should be

b) Weaknesses of Realism:

 Domestic politics?  Under emphasis of importance of wealth and

economics   “Venal conservatism” replaces idealism  Empirical problems  There seems to be a lot more economic

cooperation then realists assumed likely  Does HST overcome this problem?

Further Reading:   Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,”

Foreign Affairs, 78-2 (March/April 1999), pp. 35-49.   Example of realist analysis of contemporary US challenges.

  Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, 42-3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507.

  John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19-3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49.   Examples of realism’s critiques of liberal challengers

For Next Time: Unit Three: Thinking Liberally - Diversity and

Hegemony in IPE (September 29 & October 1)

  Required Reading:   Cohn, Ch. 4.

  Class Discussion Reading:   Eric Helleiner, “Economic Liberalism and Its Critics:

The Past as Prologue?,” Review of International Political Economy, 10-4 (November 2003), pp. 685-696.