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Unit 3Fisheries Enforcement: major
aspects
Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08 Apia, Samoa
Peter Manning - FAO
Secretariat of the Pacific Community
FMR: Main components
Fisheriesmanagement
system,
FMS
Monitoring,control &
surveillance,MCS
Fisheries judicial system,
FJS
•All links in the same chain•Interdependent•Each must be designed w.r.t. the others
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY MCS?
Monitoring – collection and analysis of data and information on fishing activities– information for improving fisheries management
- data generation monitoring• biological• economic
– information for enforcing existing rules – enforcement monitoring
MCS – meaning...
Control –terms and conditions under which resources can be harvested
Surveillance – observations required to maintain compliance with the regulatory controls
Enforcement monitoring...
....of biological restrictions– gear restrictions – area restrictions– closed seasons– other biological restrictions (eg minimum
fish size)
Enforcement monitoring...
....of direct economic restrictions:– effort restrictions– TAC
....of indirect economic restrictions:– taxes– property rights
MCS – integrated into management system
• Management strategies and plans must be enforceable
• If not, credibility of fisheries management authority undermined
Questions in devising management measures from MCS perspective:
• Practical requirements to implement• Previous successes or failures• What will encourage compliance• Consequences of non-compliance• Cost of implementing management measures,
cost of non-compliance
note well...
need to consider level of compliance in relation to costs eg:
- 100% at high cost- 75% at low cost
Table 2.12 Fisheries Management Costs Year: 1997 (Source: Primarily Wallis and Flaaten 2000)
Countries MCS-costs as a fraction of revenues (%)
MCS-costs per volume of landings USD/metric tonne
Australia* 11% 408
Canada 8% 153
Greece 9% 236
Italy 4% 139
Iceland 2% 9
Japan* 4% 104
Mexico 2% 14
New Zealand 8% 66**
Norway 7% 34
Spain 1% 37
UK 8% 94
United States 18% 143
EU (total) 6% 87
OECD (total) 6% 71
* Enforcement costs not included. ** Author’s estimate (From: R Arnason’s course note)
MCS costs(especially enforcement)
EffortEcomp
MCScosts
The Sustainable Fisheries Model
Value,$
Effort
Biomass
Costs
Sustainablerevenues (yield)
Sustainablebiomass
MSYOSY
Impact of MCS costs on the optimal fisheries policy
Costs without MCS
Costs with MCS
EffortE* E**
Is it worth breaking the rules:
• Expected value of a violation, V(z): Let z be a violation Let (z) be the (expected) profits from
the violation Let C(z) be the expected penalty for
committing the violation => V(z)=(z)-C(z)
Example of C(z)C(z)= p1(discoveredz)p2(guiltydiscovered)p3(penaltyguilty)penalty p*penalty
Expected costs of violations
P1 P2 P3 P*0,1 0,5 0,8 0,0400,5 0,5 0,8 0,2000,5 0,1 0,5 0,0250,1 0,1 1 0,010
Arithmetic of probabilities
So basically p* will not be large in most cases!!
V(z)=(z)-C(z)
• C(z)=p*penalty• But p* is usually very low
• penalty will have to be high to make V(z) negative
compliance vs enforcement
- participation in management decision-making engenders ownership of rules
- management measures legitimate? ie fair and workable
- public perception of management authority can have an effect on overall compliance
surveillance...
• by whom – peer surveillance? fisheries enforcement officer? local police?
• how – depends on management measures• when – constant or periodic• where – might be at sea, at landing sites etc
Fisheries judicial system....
• legislative framework adequate• courts need to be aware of value of the gains
from violations– seminars for judges, magistrates– establishment of special courts