UNIT 28 CON1MUNI"FARIANISM AND CIVIC REPUBLICANISM

Structure

28.1 Introduction

28.2 Communitarianism: An Introduction

28.3 The Value ofComn~unity Membership

28.4 The Cornmunitarian Position on State Neutrality

28.5 Civic Republicanism: An Introduction

28.6 The Idea of Republican Freedom

28.7 Tlie Idea of Republican Government

28.8 Sunimary

28.9 Exercises

28.1 INTRODUCTION

The major concern ofthis unit is to introduce, understand and compare the communitarian and civic republican perspectives in political theory. These perspectives have gained considerable importance and acceptance in conteniporasy political theo~y. Such importance and acceptance may be explained on two grounds: firstly, both these perspectives contain diflerent forceful and somewhat valid critiques ofthe political tradition of liberal itldividualistn- alradition that has occupied a dominant position in modem political thinking and political practice; and secondly, through their critiques, these perspectives develop meaningful and seemingly relevant alternative conceptualizations of such political ideas as fieedon~, justice and the relationship between the citizen and the state.

Since con~munita~~ianism and civic republicanism are essentially critiques o c and present themselves as alternatives to, liberal individualism, it would be llelpful to begin with an interpretive summary of the liberal individualist perspective in political theory. It may be mentioned that an elaborate and thorough treatment oftl~is perspective is given in other units ofthis course. In this unit, our attempt would be limited to an understanding of so~lie of its main arguments, which would in turn facilitate our understanding of co~iimu~iitaria~~is~n as well as civic republicanism.

Liberal individualisni is essentially one of tlie nlaliytheories oi'tlie nature ofself, tlie relationship between the citizen and the state and the propcr scope ofstate activities. Some of its main advocates include Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Jeremy Benfhani, J.S.Mil1, David Ricardo, I-Ierbert Spencer and inore recently, John Rawls, EA. Wayek and Robert Nozick. Tliese political thinkers have offered ideas and arguments, which though different and sometimes conflicting, combine to constitute what is labeled as tlie liberal individualist perspective.

Some ofthe main principles of liberal individualism are universalism, egalitarianism, secularism and the separation between tlie public and the private. However, what distinguishes this perspective from many others is its support and advocacy of tlie principle of individualism, T~idividualism is a principle that recognizes and respects the individual as the pri~nary unit of social and political iheoly

and explanation. An individual is one who is free, rational and capable ofself-detennination. People are rational in that they are the bestjudges oftheir interest; they are capable of self-determination in that they are capable of determining their own conception ofthe good; and are & in that they possess die ability as well as the right to question their participation in existing social practices and opt out ofthem, should these practices seem no longer worth pursuing. On this account, individuals possess the ability to detach themselves or step back from any particular social practice and choose whetherthey want to continue pursuing it or not. The individual, in other words, is prior to and stands at a distance from hidher cultural and community identities and values. Rawls expresses this argument in the following phrase: 'the self is prior to the ends, which are affirmed by it'.

Since people are fiee, rational and capable of seif-determination, their interests are better promoted by letting them choose for themselves what sort of life they want to lead. Individual interests are harmed by any attempt on the part ofthe state to enforce a particular view ofthe good life. The primary value in a liberal political order, in other words, is the neutrality ofthe state. A neutral state may be defined as a state, which does not favour, protect, promote or contrarily discriminate against or penalize any particular individual conception ofthe good. Rather, such a state provides a neutral fi-amework within which different and potentially conflicting conceptions ofthe good can be pursued. In fact, fiom the liberal individualist standpoint, a free and just state is one which remains neutral and equally tolerant of the different conceptions ofthe good life held by,its individual citizens, without promotingor penalizing any of such conceptions.

What then, according to liberal individualisn~, are the legitimate functions ofthe state? In the liberal individualistic view, people possess natural or pre-political freedom: state is not a natural entity; rather it is an artificial, but a necessary construct; a necessary evil. Since freedom is natural to the individual, the function ofthe state should mainly be that ofguaranteeingand protecting individual freedom. The state, in other words, is a mechanism for safeguarding the personal security and political rights of citizens, who enter into political life and place themselves under external authority for the limited end of protection against unwarranted interference by others. This idea offreedom as the absence of interference by others, otherwise known as the negative conception of freedom, has dominated much ofthe liberal individualist tradition.

The individualist conception ofthe self, tlie idea ofstate neutrality and the idea offreedom as no%- interference form an important, if not the basic core ofthe political theory of liberal individualism. While much ofmodern political theory and political practice has been influenced and dominated by these ideas, they have been met with strong criticism from a number oftheoretical perspectees, some ofwhich are fascism, sarvodaya, communism and feminism. Two profound critiques ofthe liberal individualist perspective are found in the communitarian and civic republican perspectives. AS mentioned above, these perspectives not only criticize the basic premise of liberal individualism, they also put forward different compelling alternative conceptualizations of the nature of the self, the relationship between the state and the citizen and the idea of freedom.

28.2 COMMUNITARIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION

The co~n~nunitarian perspective developed and became central to political theory during the 1980s with the publication ofMichael Sandel's Liberalism andthe Limits ofJustice (1982). In this book, Sandel develops one ofthe most forcehl critiques of Rawlsianiiberalism, the statement ofwhich is found in John Rawls's A Theoq)ofJutice (1 971). Other political thinkers who have contributed to the development of communitarianism, although in different ways are Alisdair MacIntyre, Michael

Walzer, Charles Taylor and Will Ky~nliclta. It is woi-thy of li~ention that communitarian political thinkers are deeply inspired by the ideas of Aristotle, Hegel and Rousseau. With the development ofcom~~~unitwianism, tlie theoly of liberal individualism has found it's most distinctive and rigorous challenge and critique. 111 factt, this critique has allowed for the development ofwhat is now known as the 'liberal-comniunitarian debate' - a debate which has continued in one way or the otherto inform a great deal of the study of political theory.

The debate between individualism and communitarianis~~i centers around the question: is political reality shaped by the decisions and actions of individuals, defincd as persons standing at adistance (or separate) ftom community bonds or is it shaped by social beings whose identity and behaviour is defined by the social gro~~ps/con~munities to which they belong? Should thejust state be constructed from the standpoint of how to foster the well being of individuals or should it be constructed from tlie standpoint of how to realize an ideal comniunity? In other words, is tlie basic unit ofpolitical analysis the individual orthe community? In sesponding to this question, liberals and co~nmunitarians hold different and apparently conflictingpositions. While the liberal individualists, as mentioned in the brief introduction given above, sees political rcality to be shaped by the decisions and actions of free and rights-bearing individuals, con~munitarians emphasize the relatioilship between the person and the comniunity and see this reIationship to be the bedrock ofpolitical theory and practice. The liberal-communitarian debate is, ~~~~~~efore, essentially a debate between those who favour individual rights and autonon~y and those who emphasize the bo~~ds ofcommunity in political life.

Co~nniunitarians are first and foremost concerned with community. Two or more people may be understood to constitute a con~munity when they share acommon conception ofthe good and see, this good as partly constitutive oftheir identity or selves. Such a "constitutive community" may be a close fiiendship, family nlationship, neiglibourhood or even a compreliensive political community. Comn~unitarinns insist that each of us as individuals develop our identity, talents and pursuits in life mainly in and through the context ofa conirnunity. We are by nature social and cultural beings. Since the commi~nity deternines and shapes individual nature, political life must start with a concern for the community, and not the individual. In other words, tlie locus of philosophical reflection on the ideal and just state ought to be the coln~iiiinity and not the individual.

Colnmunitarians criticize liberal political theory mainly for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic. The liberal conceptions of the sctf and the relationship between the individual and the state are, tiley argue, inherently flawcd, unduly limited as well as misrepresentative of the true nature of society. In the communitarian view, it is not enough to think in terms of a two-level relationship with the individual at one levcl and the state at the other. Groups and communities occupy an important intermediate positioli between the individual and the state and should be includcd ainong the kinds of rights and duty bearing units whose inter- relationships arc explored. By prioritizing the rights and freedom of individuals and by neglecting the iniportance and contribution of conitnunity membership to social and political life, liberal 'individualism ignores the extent to which it is the community/culture in which people live that shape who they are and the values they have. In the sections below, we,examine the communitarian understanding of the value oi'community membership as well as its position on the idea of state neutrality.

28.3 THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

A great deal of conimimitarian thought has presented itself in tenns of an espousal of the value and impostance of corninunity membership to both peoples'lives in general, and to the decisions they

~iial<e in the political sphere in particular. Such an espousal is made with an explicit reference to arid a whole rejection oftlie individualistic collception ofthe self. The essence ofthe cornmunitarian claim is that in defining its as individuals, liberal individ~~alisni places 11s at a distance, infact detaclies us from our social ends and conceptiorls ofthe good in a way that siniply fails to correspond to the way in which we actually relate to these ends. Such a conception of the self, as detached and separate fioni social ends, is according to cornmunitarians, disputable on two grounds: first, that it devalues, discounts and downgrades the impot-tance of cotnlnunity membership; and second, that it presents a flawed ilnderstariding oftlie relation between the selfand its ends.

On the first criticism, conirnunitarianislii challenges liberal individualis~n for downgradi~ig and discounting the ilnportance ofcommunity. More specifically, they criticize individualism for ignoring the extent to which it is the society or conimimity wliic!~ people live in that shape who they are and the values they have. For com~iiunitarianism. tlie community is a fundamental and an irreplaceable ingredient in the good life oftlie person. However resilient and independent people [nay be, liuma~i existence outside social and community life is tinthinkable as well as ~~ndesirable. People, according to communitarians, are not Robinson Cr~rsoes able to live in colnplete and permanent isolation: rather they are constituted and shaped through their membership of particular communities. As human beings we are essentially members of a family, religion, tribe, race and nation, As such, rather than being distant koni social and co~nlnunity ends and values, we have a history and are placed/positioned in specific social circumstances. The attachments and the moral engagemen'ts that derive fiorn sucli cotnmirnity membership determine "who we are" and shape "tlie values we Iiave". By ignoring tlid i~npo~tance and contributions ofcon~rnunity membership, liberal individualisln constructs a conception ofthe self, which isdivorced from the social reality that constitutes it.

On the second criticism, cori~niunitarianism attacks individi~alisln for holding a mistaken or falsc understanding ofthe relationship between tlie selfand its ends -one that sees individual ends and conceptiorls oftlie good to be formed independently and prior to society. As briefly discussed above, liberal individualisln regards 'tlie selfto be prior to its ends' in the sense that individuals reserve tlie right lo question, revise and reject tlieir lnost deeply held convictioris about the nature ofthe good life, ifthese are I'oilnd to be no longer woltli pursuing.

Criticizing the liberal individualist conception oftlie relationship between the selfand its ends, communitarians ask whether we can really step back from particillar vaiues tliat we Iiavc arid change them for new ones, or are we rather made the very people tliat we are by tlie values that we endorse so tliat detachriient is impossible? Hi~nian beings, they argue, are essentially social beings. As sucl~, we neither choose nor reject our social and conini~~riity ends and attachments; rather we discover therii. We are neither fi.ee nor standing at a distance from our social and coln~nunity ends; instead, we find ourselves located/situated in them. For instance, we do not choose our family, caste or nation; we find o~lrselves located in tliern. We then determine our conception ofthe good and elids given our place, position and situation in a family, religion and nation. According to co~iiniu~~itarianis~ii we are never free from all social roles and community identities. Our mem bersliip of social gt.oups and conimunities determine and constitute our identity and ~uiderstatiding oftlie good life. We cannot always stand back and opt out of social relations and cornmullity iiiembersliip. Our social relations and roles, or at least sorne must be taken as given. As Saridel notes 'I can interpret the tileaning of tlie roles I find myself in, but I cannot reject tlie roles themselves, or t l ~ e goals internal to them as wol-thless. Since these goals are constitutive of me as a person, they have to be taken as given in deciding what to do with my life; the question ofgood in 11iy life can only be a question of how best to interpret theis meaning. It lnaltes no sense to say that

they have no val~le for me, since there is no *me' standing behind them, no self prior to their c11,Is or constitutive attachments. The self is constituted by and not prior to its ends'.

In this way conimunitaria~is denounce the aliistorical. asocial and disembodied conception of the individual self. According to them, this conception overlooks tlie ways in which it is the kind of society in which people live that atyect thcir understanding, both of themselves and of how they sho~lld lead their lives. A valuable life, they argue, is one that is filled with co~nn~i t~nents and relations: and what makes them co~n~nit is precisely that they are not the sort of things that people can or ouglit to question every day.

In the communitarian perspective then, to accept the individualistic conception oftlie self is to see olieself as disembodicd, detaclicd and sharing a vafuntary relationship with one's social ends and attachments. They oppose this voluntaristic pictitre of'tlie relationsliip between the selfand its ends for ignoring the extent to which we are embedded or situated and paletially constituted by social roles and community membership. Sandel criticizes t l~is conception of the self for being c '~lneti~~~~nbered". A Iternativcly, he advances the notion ot'the "sit~~ated self', the sclf or subject who is ilivariably a lnernber of a con~rnunity and whose well being rcsts orr tlie good of liis/her community. For Sandel, as lor other co~nlnu~iifaria~is, the common good oftlie community is prior to the rights oftlie individuals

28.4 THE CQMMUNlTARlAN POSlTlON ON STATE'NEUTRALITY

An equally important concern ofthe commi~nitaria~i perspective has been to discern the nature atid legitinlate scope oftlie state. In addressing this concern, col~uiiilnitarians develop an understanditig wliich is different, and in conllict with the doliiinnnt liberal idea of the state. As briefly mentioned above, liberal individualists identify ajust state as a minimal and neutral politicalauthority, the fi~nctions ofwhich are liliiited to tlie protection of individual rights and the maintenance of law and order, The state, rather tlian intel-firing i l l tlic detennination ofthe good, ought to be equally tolerant ofdiffercnt conceptioiis of the good, witkoirt prolnotilig andlor penalizing any ofsucli conceptions.

In furnishing their understanding ofthe nature of the state, cot~~~liuni~arians ofYer a strong critique ofthe idea of state neutrality. According to them, the view that the state should bc value-neutral, whereby ilidividuals are left free to make tlieirown choices stems from an atolnistic belief that ailtonolny is protected only when judgements about tlie good life arc laken out ofthe political realm and made on an individi~al (private) basis. Re-jecting such ''aton~ism", cornrnunitarians argue that, in reality, individual judge~nents require the sharing ofexperiences. the give and take ofcollective deliberation and tlie collective evaluation ol'sliared practices. In other words, peoples' clloices abo~jt t l~e good lifc can only be exercised in a pnrtic~llar sort of commi~nity and not a cilltural ~iiarketplace guided by fseedom and neutrality, of the type guarantedd by liberal i~idividualism,

111 advancing an alternative account, 6f the nature of tlie slate, cornrnunitarians argue for tlic abandonmenl of liberal neutralily in favo~tr orthe politics oftlie common good. The common good is,conceive as a substantive conceptioli of tlie good lil'e, which defines the community way of life as we I as ~rovides stan ards fro111 which individual preferences and values are \ I' evaluaLed. In otlie~ words, the comnioli good fornis the basis on wliich different co~~ceptions of the good are ranked. 'The weight given to an indididual's conception then depends on how much it cosrespolids,to or deviates fioni the conlliion good.

The common good, cori~~nunitarians believe, is required not only for guiding people's decisions about the good life, but also for establishing a just and legitimate political co~iimunity. According to Taylor, the common good is required to vindicate and make legitinlate the j~~stice-demands ofa welfare state. At the heart of the theory ofjustice in a welfare state is the claim that those privileged ought to sacrifice a portion oftheir rights and rewards for the sake ofothers (the underprivileged). For instance, in a liberal capitalist society, the propertied are required to sacrifice solne oftheir property (derived in the form of taxes) for the benefit ofthe non-propertied and for sustaining a just society. According to Taylor, claims for such a sacrifice in an individualistic society would seem improper, if not unjust, as we would be required to sacrifice our rightdpropet-ty for the sake ofthose witli whom we share no colnm~lnity identity or comlilon way of life. Ifwe are distanced from a con~munity or shared way of life, we would necessarily be ilnwilling to shoulder sucli justice- demands of a welfare state. Justice, co~nniunitarians argue, is rootcd in a community whose primary bond is the shared understanding ofthe good. A just state then, is not one that remains neutral towards all individual conceptions ofthe good: rather it is one wl~ich encourages its citizens to adopt conceptions oftlie good that agree with the colnlnon good, \vhile discouraging conceptions of the good that conflict with it.

In the communitarian view then. the guarantee of a free and just state is deeply intertwined with the well being ofthe community. The ideal state is one that elnploys its power and authority to encourage the continuation and health oftliose cultural traditions and values that serve to determine the comrnon good. Commu~iitarianism, thils, endows the state witli apositive hnction of prornoting the common good, rather than tnerely with a negative filnction ofensuri~lg an absence of interferellce in the realm of individual rights. It is worthy of mention that a number of political theorists in India are influenced by and draw from the arguments oftlze communitarian perspective.

. So far we have concentrated on the communitarian perspective in political theory. In the following sections, we examine thk main ideas and arguments ofthe civic republican tndition and attempt to compare this tradition with the comrnunitarian perspective.

28.5 CIVIC REPUBLICANISM: AN INTRODUCTIOIV

Civic republican political theory takes its starting point fiom a long established tradition ofthinking about politics-atmdition that is understood 10 have contributed sigliiticantly to the development of democracy. This tradition is associated witlt silch political thinkers as Aristotle, Cicero, Guicciardini, Machi veICi, Janles Harringon and Rousseau as well as with the many commonwealth theorists of

t t the 18 century. In recent tinyes this tradition has been defended and developed by Hannah Arendt, John Pocock, Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit. among others.

The term republicanism is defined and understood in contrast with nlonarcl~y or the personal rule of kings and emperors. Wl~ereas a monarch enjoys personal authority over his subjects and rules his realm as his personal possession and more or less Lo realize his personal interests, government in a republic is, in principle, the common business ofthe citizens conducted by them for realizing the common good. The idea of republ icanism, thus, develops from a desire and the attempt to replace 'the empire oflnen with the empire of law'.

The civic republican perspective begins by adopting some ofthe important ideas of Greek political thought. Infact, civic republicat~is~n begins, as does Gtzck political thinking, from the premise that man is by nature a social-political animal. Men, however, arealso moral beings as they embody certain rnoral purposes. Naturally therefore, and in order to realize their interests and develop their

true selves, nlen ri~ust live together i n a political association, more specifically in a self-governing political con~munity. A self-governing political co~nniunity is one in which citizens participate to realize the good of both the individual as well as the collective. In a republic then, citizens are essentially virtuous as they piace tlie co~nnion good above their particular individual goods. To put in a nutshell, a good polity is an association of good citizens, good citizens being those who possess the qi~ality ofcivic virtue or the predisposition to seek the good of all in public matters. To use Aristotle's words, the end ofa political comniunity "is the good life and the good in politics is the comtnon interest7'.

Underlying and contributing to the civic republican ideal of a good polity are somewhat distinct ideas of freedom and government - ideas, which republicans conclude, go beyond and are deeper than tlie do~iiinant liberal notions of freed0111 and government. It is this distinctiveness whicli, they believe, makes civic republicanis~n a conipelling theory of political order and freedom. Below, we exaniine the civic republican ideas of freedom and government.

28.6 THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN FREEDOM

At the Iieart ofcivic repi~blicanis~n is a distinct and supposedly rich idea of freedom. According to republican theorists, this idea of freedorn contributes to the discourse on freedom by going beyond tlie traditional dominant liberal conception offreedom. To understand thedistinctness and contributions ofthis idea. it would be Iielpli~l to give a summarized account ofthe traditional conceptions of freedom.

In an important work titled Two Concepts qf Liherfy (1 958), Isaiah Berlin drew a distinction between what lie understood to be two difircnt conceptions of liberty, namely negative and positive liberty. The idea of liberty has since been i~nderstood with reference to this distinction. According to Berlin, the negative conception of liberty required the absence of interference by others, where interl'erence be understood broadly to mean any intentional form of obstruction or coercion. The positive conception of liberty, alternatively, required a presence rather than an absence - the presence of self-mastery, where self-mastery is interpreted as the ability of an individual to master his passions with his reason. In 1988, Benjamin Constant, in a famous lecture titled, "'The Liberty of the Ancients and the Liberty of the Moderns" developed the distinction between negative and positive liberty: while the 'liberty of the moderns' was identified with the negative conception of liberty, defined as tlie absence of interference, the 'liberty ofthe ancients' was dcfined differently, yet positively as the right of the individual to participate in the process ofdernocratic self-determination. It is worthy af~nention that the liberal political tradition has been domi~zateci by the negative conception of freedom as non-interference.

According to tlie civic republican tmdition, the dis'tinction between negative and positive freedom, between the liberty ofthe ancients and the liberty of the moderns, fails to capture the true essence and value offreedom. As an alternative, republican theorists develop and advocate the idea of republican freedo~n. Republican freedom, they argue, although akin to the traditional distinction, transcends it to deliver a richer and more valid account of freedom. As noted by Pettit, "the republican conception of liberty is akin to the negative one in ~naintaining that what liberty requires is the absence of something, not necessarily the presence. It is akin to the positive conception in Iiolding that that which must be absent has to do with mastery rather than with interference. Freedom consists, not in the presence of sel f-mastery, and not in the absence of interference by others. but rather in the absence of mastery by others: in the absence . . . of domination. Freedom just is non-domination".

Underlying the republican notion of freedorn as non-domination is an understanding ofthe meaning of domination as well as its relationship with interference. Domination, as understood by the republica~is; isthe ability and capacity ofone agent to exercise power over the other, pallicularly the power ofarbitrarv interference. In other words, a person is don~inated by an other, and thereby unfree, to the extent that the other has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in hidher affairs. Such a relationship ofdomination is exemplified in the relationship between master and slave/servant, employer and employee and even I~usband and wife, where the dominant agent interferes arbitrarily in the affairs ofthe other; thereby restricting the heedom ofthe other. According to civic republicans, the distinction between negative and positive liberty fails to address the denial of freedoin asdominatioli. It is such indifference to the notion of donlination as adenial of freedom that allowtd liberals to remain for long tolerant ~Trelationships of dominance at home and in workplaces.

The relationship hctween domination and interference, according to republicans. is deeper as we11 as more proble~natic than is apparent. Do~nination, as they argue, can be expcrienced and exercised witho~~t actual interference. such 3s experienced by the lucky slave. Contrarily, interference can be practiced without real clomination such as in the case ofa good polity, which interferes in the lives oftlle citizens to promote their welfare and we11 being. It is, therefore, possible to have domination without interferencejust as it is possible to have interf'erence without domination. What we need to protect o~~rselves from is nor. all f*orn~s of interference, but only those forms of interference, which are of an arbitrary dominating nature.

On this ground, the negative conception of freedom as non-interference appears insufficient as it fails to distinguish between desirable and arbitrary forms of interference. It ignores the extent to which interference lnay in sorne cases contribute to the sustenance and pro~notion of individual freedom and welfare. The Indian State, for instance, interferes in the fi-eedom of its citizens, in diffemnt ways, sucli as to ban certain evil practices sanctioned by religious custom, like untouchability andsati, as well as to provide certain specific rights and welfare in the form ofaffirmative action to the underprivileged sections of society. I n fact no st states. if not all, interfere in the econo~nic life of their citizens through policies oftaxation, which is then etnployed for the distribution ofwelfare goods such as health, education and housing, atnong many others. By defining freedom simply as non-interference, political theo~y would indeed be ins~~ficiently placed in justifying such necessary acts of interference by the state. The idea of republican lieedom as noti-domination gives space for such laws, which altl10~1g11 do ititerfel.e, do not enslave or dominate but rather free one from domination and subjugation by othel-s.

As mentioned above, the negative conception of freedom as non-interference follows from the liberal understanding offreedo~n as natural and the state as a necessary evil. For the republicans, in contrast, the cause of fieedom rests scluarely wit11 the law and the state. The laws of a good state - a republic, create tl1c freedom enjoyed by citizens; they do not offend against that freedom. The state, in this view, is not antagonistic to civic Freedom: rather it is "freedom-friendly". To use Harri~~gton's words, *'liberty, in the proper sense, is Iibertyb the laws, not Iibertyfrolnthe laws".

It may be noted that-with the ideaof freedom as non-domination, civic rep~tblicanism tends to agree with the coriception of Geople as situated in certain communities and cultures rather than with the individualistic conception ofthe self as detached and disembodied. Doruination is often associated with certain cultural ~narlters SLICII as gender, race, religion and class anlong others. A person facing domination is more liltely to belong to a vuInerable class. Freedoni as non-domination can be enjoyed and guaranteed only in so far as the salient groups to which these people belong enjoy it.

Upliolding tlie republican idea ofti-eedom, Pettit argues. tliat it is o~ily when tlle idea offi-eedoni as non-interfewr~ce is replaced with tliat ol'frcedorii as lion-domination would the political theory and practice ot'such stri~gglcs as l'emi~lism, multiculti~ralism and envirunmen~alism gain recognition and response. Iiifact. it is arguecl tliat tlie republican notion oi'fi.cedom wcnt out o f i'asliion in tlie 18th century, when citizenship was extended beyond tlic real111 ofpropertied males, and when it was no longerpossible to tliink oi'mnltingall citizelis, particularly woriien and servants, free in the rep~~blican sense. Freedom, ifgi~itranteed to all, had to bc less demnnding.

It may not be incorrect to arguc: that under-lying tlie rep~tblican idea of'freedorii as non-domination is a value ofcquality, wliercby no one is dominated by, and t l i~~s i~rieqi~al to the other. Frcedom reqi~ires tlie capacity ofcacli individ~~al to staiitl asi111 C C I L I ~ I with f e l l o ~ c i t i ~ e n s in shared awareness tliat no one lias tlie po\\fcl- ofasbitral.y interl'crence over tlic otl~cr. 'I'lie idea of sepublican fieedoni appears to be somecvhut niore co~npatible with and wcl I-disposed to tlic ideas ol'democracy, welfare and enipowcrnient - idcas that have gaincd ci~i.rency and iml~orta~ice in conteriiporary political theory and practice.

28.7 THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

Based on tlie republican idea of'lkeedom as nun-clominntio~i is the idea ol'rcp~~blican government. Freedom as ~iu~-~-Jo~ninat io~i , as republicans believe, \vould be achieved only WIICII each citizen feels that lie/slie is not being rulcd or dominated by tlie power ol'otl~ers, but by liisllier own interests. As S L I C ~ , rcpublican fiecdom is the desire not to r ~ ~ l e but rathcr- not to bc ruled. 'l'liis, republicans believe, neccssitatcs adiilkrent alid a more incl~~sive ide~~of'govcmmcnt. Below, we examine the idea ol'a republican government.

Underlying the iclcrl oftlie rcp~~blican government asc the pri~iciplc of' civic virtue, the idea of coni~iio~i good and tlie notion ofactive civic participation. Tkc repi~blicnn idea oi'civic virtue niay be understood as he willingness to set the columon goocl ;~bnve one's own or fttmily's interests. Infact, the idea of citizc~ls being vi~.tuous is an integral part of tlie tradition ol'civic republicanism. Civic repubIic:lnisrn. i n ii sinii lar vein with com~iii~nitarixns, r e q i ~ i ~ t s that wc :IS

citizens place tlie common good above our parlicular inciivici~~al interests. For it is only by placing the common good -the good of all - :~bovt: 0111. private interests that we would guarantee and realize tlie value of Sreeclom as non-domination. Republicn~is emphatically claim tliat withot~tcivic v i~~ut ' , [lie republic wi I I degenerate into a battlefield ol'rival intcrests.

While the repi~blicnn doctrine lays great strcss on tlie ti~nda~iiental importance ofcivic virtue, it lays eq~1a1 stress on tlle fiagi lity ol'virtue -the danger that rt people or its le:lders would become corn~pt, thereby tllrealening tlic republic. Civic republicans are cautious of the state oi'ftcinls exercising power in an arbitrary \my, tllercby denying republican fi~ocdom. I-low then can the state and its of?cials be ~srcvznted lisorn exercising power in an arbitrary way? Repi~blicans also recognize that peoplc clu 11ot makc LIP 11 per-Seclly Iianiio~iious or Iiomogeno~~s body with identical intel-ests; rather they are divided 011 the basis of interests. Such division of interests could translate into a niajor threat to both civic virtue and [lie republic. I-low thcii slioi~ld a t.epwblic be organized so as to reconcile tlie different co~ifl icting interests in society?

It is to gi~ard a g a i ~ i s ~ S L I C ~ ~ i.Iii.eats to tlie republic that civic rcpublica~iism advocates a ~iuniber of measures. tlie most important of which is active civic participation. Activc civic participation, republicans argue, is essentially 'tlie price of liberty' -the tool wii.11 which citizens can place an eternal vigilance on the govelnnlcnt and its oflicials. Active participation ensures that a powerful

group or citizen does not dominate or violate the freedom of others by talting control of tlle government. Infact. active civic participation is understood to be a prerequisite and a condition for the guarantee of republican freedom.

The republican idea ofcitizetlship, however, ouglltto be contrasted with tlie liberal ideaofcitizenship: while the latter regards citizenship as a right passively enjoyed by citizens who desire fi-eedom fro111 esternal restraints, tlie i'ornmer identifiescitizensliip witli those rights which empower citizens with tlie freed0111 to actively engage with other citize~is under conditions and in pul.suance of freedom and equality. Citizenship, ill the republican view, is an office and a responsibility that is proudly assumed by citizens. To be a citizen in a republic is to be a self-governing ~iieniber of a self- governing conimunity.

In addition to civic participation, civic republicanism argues in favoiir ofco~~stitutionalism as a ~neasure to guard against threats to republican virtue. Tlie task ofcivic repi~blicanisrn is to design a constitution that wo~11d reflect ant1 bala~ice tlie diverse interests in society. The British Constitution isoften cited as an exaniple ofsuch a balance wherein tlie interests ofone-the monarch, tlie few -the arisLocracy, and tlie many- the co~i i~i io~i people, are balanced in tlie mixed govern~nent of tlie Crown, tlie House of Lords and tlie House of Commons. Tlle idea of a separation of powers arnong tlie legislature, tlie executive and the judiciary is also identified as an eqiially impel-tant guard. According to rep11 blici~ii theorists, 111e concentration ofpowers i l l tlie hands ofone person or group is tlie most potelit source of domination and sirbjugation ol'otliers.

The advocacy oftlie ideas ofcivic virlue. co~iinio~i good, active civic citizenship, mixed constitutions and separation of po\vers make up an impo~.tant, if not t lie core of tlie idea of republican government. Understandably then, civic republica~iism is seeti to be co~nple~lie~itary if not in support oftlie idea of de~nocrncy. It is wit.11 iliese ideas of government as well as with tlie idea of freedom as non- domination that rep~~blicans aini at replacing 'the empire ofmen with tlie empire of laws'.

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28.8 SUMMARY

In tlie sections above, we have examined, separately though, two important perspectives in contemporary political theory, namely co~iimi~nitarianism and civic republicanism. In this section and by way of concl~rding this unit, we niake a comparative assess~iient of tliese perspectives by Iiigliligliting tlie ideas 011 wliich tliey complement and differ from each other. We also attenipt to bring out some of the st]-engtlis and weaknesses of these two perspectives.

'I'o begin with, we look at [lie points of co1ii13Icliientarity between tliese two perspectives. As rne~itioned above, both com~~iunitarianisn~ and civic republicanisni contain I'orcefi~l critiqiies and co~iipel l i n ~ alternatives lo tlie ideas of liberal individualisl~i. Firstly, they botli begin by cllaracterizing I I L I I I I ~ I I S as social and political animals who in order to realize their interests and lead good lives o i~gh t to live in rissociation witli one another. Secondly, both perspectives criticize the libcral individualist conception of tlie self as a self detached and disenibodied from its ends: while fbr the cornn~~~nitarians this conception is unreal, the rept~blicans see it to be i~~ldesirable for tlie establishment o f a good and fiee polity. l'hirdly, botli endow tlie stace witll'a positive rather than a negative role. In fact a just state, according to both perspectives, rather than being neutral, is one 1-hat protects and promotes Ilic common good. ina all^,-botli co~~~~i~~~n i t a s i a l i i s r i i and civic rcp~~l~l icanis~i i see the community and ct~ltl~ral ~iiembersliip as playing on i~npol-tant role in deter~iii~iing the clioices that we ~iialce in the public sphere: while coni~ii~~~iitarians 21-e more candid about tlie centrality ofco111111~11iity membership to i~idividual choices,

civic republicans make a more subtle statelllent when they advocate tlie idea of freedom as now doiiiination.

An impol-tant dift'ercnce bet wee!^ these perspectives is that wliiie the cotnmunitarians reject the possibility ofa neutral state, civic rep~~blicanisni advocates tlie possibility ofa state, wliich transcends religio~~s and other related divides,

Indeed, both com~ii~~nitariariis~~i and civic republicanism make eq~lally. although somewhat ditierent important and conipellingcontrib~itio~is to political theory. So~iie ol'such contributions are tlle comti-~unitarian understanding of tlie relationship betwecn the person and tlie community, the importance of comtnutiity niembersliip and vali~es in the determination of peoples' choices, tlie critique oftlie idua ofstate neutrality, the republ icari idea of heedom as non-domination, the nuanced understanding oftlie relationship between duminatio11 and interference and the emphasis an civic virtue 2nd pat-ticipation.

While the cornm~~nitarian ilrid civic republican perspectives are recognized for tlie contributions they riialte to contemporary pol itical theory, they have been criticized by some political theorists, particularly liberal individualists. According to lhese political tlieo~.ists, by prioritizing colii~ni~nity niembersliip, cornm~~tiitarinns undervalue the i~iiportnnce of individual rights and aulonomy. Infact they leave tlie indivitlual a hostage to the will and good of tlie comm~~nity, which could, and oftcn does redi~ce tlie space of individual Sruedom and choice. The idca ol'a C O ~ T I I I I ~ I I good is criticized on Ilie groi~~~cIstIiat such 3 good is dil'ficult to deterniine in societies that are characterized by dcrp pluralisn~. Infact il'dcterniined, the idca of the colnnioti good can have conservative and repl-essive conno~ations, tiiainly because it woi~ld provide a standard from wliich individuaf conceptions of the good wo~~lcl be judged and thereby, advanced or eliniinated. Both tl~ese perspectives. therel'ore. Ptil to see aticl guard against tlie possibility of the common good becoming n perpetrator ol'dotni~~ntion and ir?justice.

To conclude it may bc appropriate to say that Ibr us in India, an understandi~~g ofthe com~nunitarian and civic rep~~blicari perspectives is rclevant in tc~ms ol'botl~ politicill theory and political practice. 011 one hand, wc need to ~~nders~and and assess the difl'ercnt contributions niade by these perspectives in.their critique of liberal inclivid~~alism as well as ofthe alternative principles they advocate. 011 the other Iland, we need to relate these conlributions and nlternativc principles to our present political practice.

28.9 EXERCISES

I ) Wliat do you understand by communitarianism? Explain in your own words,

2) Discuss the value o fco t i~~ i~~~n i ty membership.

3) Exatnine the c o ~ i i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t i i f a r i ~ i ~ ~ positiorl 011 statc ~ieutrality.

4) Write an essay on civic republicanism.

5 ) Discuss tlie ideas of rrpublican ficedom and government.