Union for 2nd Republic of Iran - (c) Jahanchahi

8/8/2019 Union for 2nd Republic of Iran - (c) Jahanchahi

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Amir Jahanchahi

UNION FOR THESECOND REPUBLIC

OF IRAN

Putting an end to the dictatorship of Ahmadinejad


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Without boldness, courage and sacrifice,

no major challenge is overcome;

no great cause is done.


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Foreword

Why I fight

June 12th, 2009 was a bleak day for my country.

It will also be a bleak day for the 21st century history if thefree world gives in to Ahmadinejad. On

June 12th, he was re-elected president of the IslamicRepublic of Iran; thanks to a massive and unprecedentedfraud. Regardless of the desire for change expressedthroughout the streets of Tehran and the countrys majorcities by the population of Iran. With this re-election,Ahmadinejad took the last step towards absolutedictatorship. This is clearly the greatest threat to humanrights that Iran has had to face for the past thirty years.But the danger that looms ahead for my country is only theemerged tip of the iceberg that reaches the whole regionand beyond, the West and


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all democracies.

For Iran is preparing, deaf to world public opinions, totransgress the last step towards imperialistic and aggressive politics and acquire military nuclear power. We mustrally all our forces to stop this. Should Ahmadinejads

Iran possess the bomb, the world would be only left the power to watch the Near and Middle East set ablaze.There is a simple reason to this: Israel will never accept anIslamist and nuclear Iran. And the western powers cannotignore that unrest in the region would be a plunge into theunknown, maybe even the beginning of World War III.My country and its surroundings are therefore at a turningpoint of their history possibly a turning point of History.

The present situation is comparable in many ways to theone that created World War II in 1939-1945. Are we nowin 1929 when a financial crash led to the Great Depression;or in 1938 when the Munich Pact was cowardly signed,leading to World War II; or both simultaneously?


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Why I fight

Alas, I fear that our opened world and speedycommunications bring these two dates dangerouslytogether, whereas they were a decade apart seventy yearsago.

Should we decide to go on living our comfortable lives, postponing the time to face the truth, like in the 30s; wewould endure the collective responsibility of casting asidethe memory of millions of deaths of World War II.Should we go on ignoring the dangers afoot in my country;our delusions will entail the same deaths and suffering.

I left my country precisely thirty years ago, in September of1979. I was only 19 years old and knew very little, exceptthat despite the historical and ancient connections of my

family with Iran, it was impossible for me to serve the newIslamist oppressors regime. That is why I have been apolitical refugee for thirty years, and as such banned fromIran.

I did however return to my country once, in secret.

It was late spring of 1980; I was living in Paris, where Istudied at Paris II Assas University.


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One afternoon during class break, I decided to go home andtake a nap, in my tiny room in the 15th arrondissement. Iusually stayed in the university during break time and ate asandwich or studied in the library. This decision was trulyunusual all the more that I never took naps. My roomwas spartan, as were my resources at the time: a bed, chair,table and pouf. I am a very pious person, although I donot practice my religion. As I lied down on my bed, Ipondered on the fact that there had to be a justice and that itwas impossible not to see my father ever again, who was inprison since the beginning of the Iranian revolution. I wasconvinced that we would meet again some day. I closedmy eyes and fell asleep with that idea.

Some minutes later, I was awoken by the phone ringing.It was my father I had given my number in the letters wewrote, obviously checked by his jailers. He had just leftprison!

Thirty years later, although I believe like many mysticalIranians


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Why I fight

in spiritual force, I can only say that my presence at homeat the exact time he would try to contact me is only purechance. My father explained that he had been judged atlast. He was sentenced to five years of imprisonment butthat, by an extraordinary chance, he had a temporary permission. It actually looked like the regime wasoffering him a chance to run away, which I later realizedwas true: the mullahs always preferred to clear the countryof their troublesome opponents rather than keep them in prison, where they could prove to be more dangerous.And of course, we were going to seize that chance.

That very evening, I talked to my father over the phoneagain, and told him that I had decided to meet him in

Tehran, at my mothers parents house where he was hiding(a safe place, for my parents had been divorced for severalyears), to help him prepare his escape. He predictablytried to talk me out of it claiming it was too dangerous. Ifirmly argued: Its my duty and more importantly, mypleasure.


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My resources, as I have already said, were scarce at thetime. But with the help of my fathers friends, who neverasked any questions, I was able to get a counterfeit passportand, more important, the resources to organise and financehis escape. Before the Revolution, our whole familywould travel in 1st class. In this case, my ticket waseconomy class and the seat was at the very back of an IranAir 747. I remember my delight in smelling the Iraniandishes that were being warmed up in the trolleys beforebeing served to the passengers.

This was my first encounter with my roots. There were tobe many more all along the trip.

When I arrived in Tehran, I was greeted by one of my bestfriends who had stayed behind the only person who knewI was back. We took different paths: he ferventlysupported the new regime and was even an activecollaborator through his responsibilities in one of thefamous Committees that were so significant inoverthrowing the Shah and in the early days of the IslamistRepublic. I was probably insane to trust him.


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Why I fight

Maybe I was just as insane to have made the trip. Somewould bring up the recklessness of youth. But as far as Iwas concerned, sacred duties superseded danger, and Iwould do it all over again today, if need be.

We spent three days together. My father was releasedfrom prison in a very weak condition, he had lost 3 stone, but those three days were exceptional, in more than oneway. We talked a lot about him, me, the future of ourcountry and the world. But we also needed to prepare hisescape from Iran. The Revolution was still too recent ineveryones minds, and my father was too famous to risk

taking a plane out of the country, even with forged ID: hecould be recognised in the airport. My father wastherefore to leave the country very discretely via Turkey,first in a car, and then on horseback. I then found out thateven a political getaway should be organised with the very people who watch the borders for smugglers. They havethe required networks and accomplices.


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But most of all, during these three days, I walk tirelesslyaround Tehran, deliciously taking in the colours andfragrances of my country I remember that I stoppedseveral times in front of bakers open displays to revel inthe smell of baking bread.

For three days, I watched and smelt. And I came to firmly believe that I could never consider myself as able to liveoutside of Iran. After those three days, I understood thatalthough I had left Iran by the back door, and had no idea ifI would return to my country not through the frontdoor, but simply the official door I was at least sure ofone thing: I would return some day, even if that happymoment would take a long time to come.

Almost thirty years have gone by. I have built my life inEurope, and am immensely grateful. However, over allthose years, my firm belief that my true place is in Iran,serving my country, has remained intact. And when, in2005, I experienced the grief of burying my father in Passycemetery, in Paris, in my mind I only buried himtemporarily: I knew that one day I would repatriate hisbody to Iran.


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Why I fight

Today, my conviction is more than ever consolidated withthe dramatic summer of 2009 and its serious consequences.The fixed re-election of Ahmadinejad did not come as asurprise, but the peoples subsequent anger proved that ourhistory must at last turn a new page.

As of today, every Iranian, of all political sides, must forgetpast divisions and start a resistance against the dictator.

We must get rid of Ahmadinejad.

Firstly, I intend to prove here that there is another way.My country can and will I shall demonstrate it triumphover the despotic regime of Ahmadinejad and end the

hideous Islamist interlude that it is subjected to for thethirty past years. We must then build a modern, boomingand democratic Iran, bearing everyones rights in mind.

But peace will only be possible and long-lasting in the Nearand Middle East if we, the populations of the region, areable to build together the outlines of a vast economic


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cooperation, like the populations of Europe did after WorldWar II, to put an end to of Europe did after World War II,to put an end to barbarity in their countries.

Before demonstrating this way, I must remind how todaysexplosive situation came about.

For, to avoid the worst, you must confront it squarely.


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PART ONE

Why Ahmadinejad wants the

bomb


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1

Imposing Koranic law

throughout the world

To understand the imperialistic plan of Ahmadinejad, andthe threat it is, we must go back to the origins. WhenAhmadinejad built his belief and created his destiny. Wemust go back to the Ayatollah Khomeini. For Ahmadinejadis fulfilling today the dream that Khomeini once nurturedbut that was impossible because of age and circumstances.


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Khomeini admired Hitler. Like the Nazi dictator, besideshis despise of democratic values, he hated the Jews. Hitlerwrote Mein Kampf, a delirious programmatic book, whichseeded the essence of the future Nazi regime. During his political exile, Khomeini wrote three books, TheKingdomof the Learned, The Key to Mysteries and The Explanationof Problems, in which he exposed in the same manner, long before accessing supreme authority, his vision of an idealregime in this case, Islamist. Reproduction in full or inpart of these three books, as well as their translations, wasfully copyright-free, in order to encourage the spreading ofthe authors principles. This is how Jean-Edern Hallierpublished in autumn of 1979, some months after the Islamic

Revolution, the Little Green Book summing up in Frenchthe outlines of Khomeinis beliefs.

I imagine that similar translations were made in otherlanguages. The free worlds democracies, like with MeinKampf, are not interested in these texts, which is a mistakefor they express the intrinsically expansionist nature ofKhomeinis Islamist ideology.


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Imposing Koranic law throughout the world

The homeland of Islam, single and indivisible, was dividedby the dealings of Westerners and despotic and ambitiousleaders, he wrote, To free the Islamic homeland ofWestern domination or influence, we have no other choicethan form a true Islamic government, and strive to

overthrow the other tyrannous so-called Muslim

governments implemented by foreigners. According toKhomeini, a Muslim was a man constantly at war, and hethen went further still: the Holy War, as he wished it, wasa war of conquest, with the ultimate target of imposingKoranic law throughout the world. Now that is what I callexplicit!

Khomeini was greatly influenced, in his youthful days, bythe experience of the Muslim Brothers, a pan-Islamicassociation founded in 1928 in Cairo to overthrow Egyptssecular state and replace it with an Islamic regime. Theideology of the Muslim Brothers was mainly nationalist.And they advocated bottom-up Islamisation:


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first, each individual should be made a good Muslim, andthen the family, population, government, and lastly thewhole nation.

Their failure prompted Khomeini to do the exact opposite:to succeed, the Islamist ideology should first control theapparatus of a rich and powerful State such as Iran. Butmore importantly, it should not be limited to the borders ofthe said State: to stay in control, it should export bytargeting first the mostly Shia Muslim countries, then SunniMuslim countries with a Shia minority, then all Muslimcountries, and lastly the whole world, since, as we saidearlier, the ultimate aim was to impose Koranic law

throughout the world.

This expansionist doctrine was soon implemented. Severalweeks only after the Revolution of 1979, Tehrans newIslamist regime provoked neighbouring Iraq again andagain. It was a carefully chosen target: besides the fact thatIraq was mostly Shia, like Iran, it was a secular republic, aregime that Khomeini spurned: Any secular authority, inany way, has to be atheist, therefore a work of Satan,


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Imposing Koranic law throughout the world

he wrote in The Kingdom of the Learned.

But Iraq had just, that very year of 1979, appointed acertain Saddam Hussein as leader. Thenew Iraqi president,not quite yet a dictator, of Sunni extraction, obviouslyfrowned intensely at the militant Shiism of the mullahs whooverthrew the Shah. And he himself had an eye on Iranianoilfields that he thought were easy to conquer, convincedthat the Iranian army had not yet recovered from thetraumatic Revolution. In these conditions, war wasinevitable. It started in September 1980 and lasted eightyears, a surprise on both sides, making over one milliondeaths, without any side winning or loosing.

My country was left battered and ruined: the Iraniangovernment officially estimated that 300 billion dollars atthe time (in 1988) would be required to rebuild the country.Eight years of war and the enormous cost made the regimetemporarily suppress its expansionist aspirations, or at least,its most visible and provocative aspects.


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For at the same time another strategy, more underhand butterribly efficient, was already being implemented: thebesiegement of Israel.


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2

The Hezbollah octopus

When in June 1982 Iranian Pasdaran the famousGuardians of the Islamic Revolution arrived inLebanon, there were hardly three dozen of them. At thetime, for the Lebanese, even the 35% Shia, Iranians werenothing but foreigners. But a few fanatic emissaries of

Tehrans new regime were sent to Bayreuth in reaction tothe Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. These Pasdaran wereto found the Hezbollah the party of God with themighty efficiency that they revealed during the summer of2006, when Israel made another incursion into Lebanon:this time, although the Tzahal tanks would


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have seemed to have conquered land, the world publicopinion was convinced that the Hezbollah won the battle.During thirty-four days of fierce and bloody war, Israel,despite great resources in the field, could never really get

the upper hand facing an enemy with fewer men andweapons. The psychological impact was tremendous:suddenly Israel no longer seemed invincible to Arabpopulations.

The connection between the Hezbollah and my countrysIslamist regime is not only historical: it has remainedconstant, as Iran has continuously, since 1982, supplied theHezbollah with weapons and money, and influenced all its

decisions. So much so that in the summer of 2007, for thefirst anniversary of the Lebanese war of 2006, Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of the Hezbollah, claimedbefore the press that his organisation fought for Iran.

To the benefit of the Israeli invasion of 1982, TehransIslamist regime was able to make the most of the Lebaneserefusal of Israeli occupation, by injecting money and their

ideology, thus creating in its service, in less than a quarterof a century,


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The Hezbollah octopus

a sophisticated guerrilla force, now one of the mostdangerous in the world, extremely and entirely devoted toits authority. The Islamist regime of Iran will strive toreproduce this model elsewhere, and particularly in

countries bordering Israel. This is practically already doneI will explain later in the Gaza Strip with the Hamas.The next goal is Egypt: in April 2009, Egypts governmentaccused the Hezbollah with organising attacks againstIsraeli tourists in Sinai. The announcement caused muchcomment in the Near East, for it publicly revealed for thefirst time the infiltration of Iran acolytes in Nasserscountry. But the Hezbollah now spreads its tentacles farbeyond including, as we shall see later, South America


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3

September 11th

: a

godsend for Iran

It is not impossible that those who, within the IranianIslamist regime, had been working for some time towards atougher regime had contributed to instigate and facilitatethe September 11th attacks, or had simply been warned. Inany case, the way the United States handled thepost-September 11 did not only rid Iran of one of its mainenemies, Iraq, and marginalise both its competitorsAl-Qaeda and the Taliban, it especially contributed tosetting my country as only reference authority of theMuslim world and the Middle East.


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We recall that President Bushs decision to invade Iraq afterSeptember 11

thwas inspired by the group of ideologists

then affiliated to the White House called theneoconservatives. This small group of hardliners was itself

influenced, in its analysis, by the formal and repeatedaccusations of an opponent to Saddam Hussein in exile,Ahmed Chalabi, who affirmed that Saddam possessedweapons of mass destruction. He also claimed that with asupport network within Iraq, the Americans would begreeted as liberators by the Iraqi population. The followingevents refuted these two fictions. Although the Ba'athdictator certainly embodied absolute evil for his people,there never was any proof of the presence in the Iraqi

territory of weapons of mass destruction and therefore thatSaddam Hussein was a danger to the region and world. Theinvasion of Iraq did however happen, with the deplorableconsequences that we all know.


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September 11th: a godsend for Iran

Not a single American soldier was greeted as a saviour, onthe contrary.

Protected by the American authority, invited to all

Washingtons official receptions, Ahmed Chalabi seemedto be heading for a bright future until the early days of war:the Bush administration even planned to place him at thehead of the new Iraqi government. And then, in spring of2004, he experienced a brutal disgrace: the CIA and FBIstarted investigating him. Ahmed Chalabi was suspected oftransmitting utmost information to Tehran. They thenrealised that he was in fact a gold-digger in the Iranianregimes pay. In other words, he grossly manipulated the

United States.

Unfortunately, the consequences of this sinister farce are farfrom over. In 2011, the American troops will finishwithdrawing completely from Iraq. This announced andinevitable departure will leave the coast completely free forAhmadinejad, who has been waiting for this to happen. Byapplying the method that worked so well in Lebanon, the

Islamist regime has already started to draw benefit from thechaos in which Iraq has sunk, by installing and


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consolidating his hold on the Shia southern part of thecountry, to later finish by taking over all Iraq, then made anauxiliary of Iran.

Similar strategies are also implemented in other weakenedcountries of the region: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain,Dubai, Jordan, Egypt and even beyond. On 25 February2009, Morocco recalled its ambassador in Iran, to protestagainst the declaration of an Iranian high religious dignitarywho explained that Bahrain was once the fourteenth province of Iran meaning: it could soon go back tobeing that. In reality, Rabat cares little about Bahrain, butdoes not like the growing influence of Ahmadinejads Iran

within the Moroccan Islamist movements, which couldendanger the very foundations of the Hashemite Kingdom.


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4

Taking over the

IsraeliPalestinian conflict

There is another consequence to the catastrophic handlingof September 11

thby the Bush administration: the growing

hold of Iran on the Palestinian question.

After the September 11 attacks, the United States ordered

Saudi Arabia to stop funding the Hamas, the Palestinianultranationalist and Islamist movement created in 1987 thatdenies Israel the right to exist. To survive, the Hamas thenturned towards Iran, which, lets face it, was exactly wantthey wanted.


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Today, although the connection is not exactly comparableto the one with Hezbollah, Hamas has clearly become amovement not only funded by Tehran, but also subjugatedto its interests.

A fortunate chain of circumstances September 11thattacks and short-sighted American analysis thereforeenabled this apparently impossible coupling between aSunni Palestinian movement, Hamas, and the Shiatheocracy of Irans Islamist regime. In fact, todaysdetermining influence of Irans Islamist regime on Hamasis a mere materialisation of Khomeinis expressed will, assoon as he accessed power, to pre-empt the Palestinian

problem.

It is obviously not a coincidence if Yasser Arafat was thefirst foreign dignitary received in Tehran, with pomp andcircumstance, after the Islamist Revolution it is even saidthat this was the only time Khomeini was glimpsed smilingin public. Khomeini had understood that the Palestiniancause would be his Trojan horse to conquer the Muslim

world. While the Palestinian question was livedexclusively, for decades,


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Taking over the IsraeliPalestinian conflict

as an Arab affair, Iran now is, and all the more since YasserArafat died, at the heart of the problem. It is, in a way,Historys finest political hold-up: Iran, Persian and mostlyShia, has become the championof a cause uprising mainly

the Arab world, which is practically all Sunni. This is whythe Islamist regime leading my country today will neveraccept peace between Israel and the Palestinians: this woulddeprive it of the ideological issues it uses to maintain itshold on the region.

The Americans have actually understood this.

The accession to the White House of Barack Obama gavethe signal of a significant inflection of US diplomacy in theIsraeliPalestinian conflict. This was plain to see in May,when Benjamin Netanyahu visited Washington.

With his undisputable legitimacy, President Obama firmlypointed out that America now intended to continue backingtheir historical Israeli allyprovided a Palestinian State iscreated. The American initiative is in a way a


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revival of Saudi Arabia and Moroccos peace plan, initiatedafter September 11

th, that was never completed.

Facing the threat of Ahmadinejads nuclear Iran and his

growing influence in the region, America and the Arabworld wish to get rid of the Palestinian obstacle first,hoping to weaken the Islamist regime, if not destabilise it.But despite the outward and true will of all Arab leaders,despite the support from most Palestinian and Israeli publicopinions and despite the US means of pressure, theinfluence and personality of President Obama, Tehran willstrive to sabotage this plan, for should it succeed, it wouldbe the downfall of the Islamist regime.

Although I do understand the reasons why President Obamamade this choice, I am still firmly convinced that we mustfirst deal with the Ahmadinejad threat, for the key tosolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict

a prelude to reconstruction throughout the region lieswithin my country.


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The early days of a dictator

In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected for the firsttime President of the Islamic Republic of Iran toeveryones surprise as the western media put it.

In fact, the man who was nicknamed the Supreme Leaders

dogsbody demonstrated throughout his first term of officethat he had a political vision of his own, and was able toconcentrate more powers than any other president had donebefore. But naturally, his whole politics were supported byAli Khomeini, the Supreme Leader, chosen for this dignitytwenty years before, after Khomeini died, after he relieved


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his first designated heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri,considered too soft with the opposition. Khamenei wasKhomeinis closest confidante and shared the same veryradical opinions and expansionist vision of the IslamistRevolution. For the past twenty years, the Supreme Leader

has only respected and continued the heritage of theregimes founding father. Ahmadinejad showed that he wasno longer a mere loyal executor: he now boldly leads thecountrys foreign policy towards the Islamic imperialismwished by Khomeini.

And besides, Ahmadinejad, younger than Khamenei andless austere, is better at summoning the masses. And time

has perfectly shaped his discourse. Western press is theonly one to see his recent allocution at the UN conferenceagainst racism in Durban as a provocation. On thecontrary, Ahmadinejad was simply sending yet anothercrystal clear message to his usual targets: all those who feeldeprived, oppressed, underclass, and exiled from inside ontheir own territory A message that, among Muslims, isable to transcend traditional


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dissensions between the Shia and Sunni, but also resoundsfar beyond the Muslim world. This is how Ahmadinejadwas recognised, during the four years of his first office, asthe unquestioned and unquestionable leader of the Muslim

world, while incarnating Khomeinis plan and ideals.

In these conditions, could Khamenei, theSupreme Leader,object to his re-election?

In a way, the influence acquired by Ahmadinejad within theMuslim world is a consequence of the fall of the BerlinWall. Communism represented, obviously wrongly, for thelost and deprived populations hope for change, a light in thedarkness of injustice sometimes created by liberaleconomy. As soon as communism thankfullydisappeared, this alternative to the capitalist model was notreplaced. The weak populations were orphaned.Ahmadinejad with his radical Islamism rushed into the breach. He took advantage of these populationsfrustrations, who felt somewhat anti-American andanti-Western.


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The present economic crisis, because it is unusuallywidespread, is the final and providential stepping stonefor spreading his venomous message. The Stock MarketCrash of 1929 took three or four years to pervade throughthe real economy and create the Great Depression, which

helped Nazism rise in Germany devastated by rampantinflation and bitter about the Versailles Treaty. This time,the financial networks and economies are so globalised thatthe contamination only took several months, after LehmanBrothers went bankrupt, to devastate economy around theworld.

All the countries in the world and all the economic sectors

were affected with unprecedented violence.

But in 1929, Nazism was not a government force. In 2009,radical Islamism, the ideology of Ahmadinejad, already haspowerful State machinery.

And it has been serving for thirty years a reasoned andimplacable expansionism policy. This is why, in myopinion, we are both in 1929 and 1938. Except that shouldthe world climate turn to worse, the strength of


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the Islamist ideology will not only be transmitted to 70million German-speakers like Nazism did, but to hundredsof millions of Muslims in the Near and Middle East, and to part of the Muslim populations of rich countriesGermany, Great Britain, France for the rising poverty,

due to the economic crisis, will surely concentrate first onthese badly integrated populations, making them even morereceptive to a radical discourse.

The situation is therefore highly explosive. And neverbefore were the conditions so very concrete for the Islamistexpansionism of Ahmadinejad to gather largely the fruits ofthe policy initiated thirty years ago by Khomeini. But for

Iran to become a reference regional authority as wished byAhmadinejad, and a serious threat for the rest of the world,he still needs an unquestionable argument. He still needsthe bomb.


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6

The bomb, the ultimate

bayonet

All the governments in the world rely on the force ofbayonets, explained Khomeini in his books. With this, hemeans that a strong power must rely on an operationalarmy. In this respect, Irans regular army is the largest inthe region, behind Tzahal. Counting the land and air forces,navy, anti-aircraft defence, the Pasdaran and their manyelite units, the Iranian army can call up some 750,000 men(without even counting the million reservists).


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As a comparison, the French army employs a little less than350,000 people, including civilian staff.

However, as we saw with the Hamas and Hezbollah,Islamist Iran not only has an impressive conventional army,it also perfectly masters asymmetrical war, or guerrilla.This is unique for a State of its size. Neither Israel or theUnited States, or even any other great nation, is at presentable to control asymmetrical war, and this incapacity now isa weakness in modern conflicts. This proved true during the2006 Lebanon War, operations against Hamas, and inPakistan and Afghanistan today.

However, Ahmadinejad wants more: the nuclear arsenal.This is my countrys long-lasting dream.

Indeed, the bases of the Iranian nuclear programme do notdate back to the Islamic Revolution.

It all started in fact in the late 1950s, under the Shahsreign. There was the Cold War. Iran at the time wasconsidered by the United States as a stable regime amicable


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The bomb, the ultimate bayonet

towards the West, and both countries signed a civil nuclearcooperation programme in 1957. Two years later, Tehranopened its Nuclear Research Centre with much pomp. It boasted a 5-megawatt reactor supplied by Washington.During the 1970s, Iran started developing a full

electronuclear system on its territory. In 1974, the Shah believed that oil was too precious to be unnecessarilyburnt andwas well aware that it is much more profitablewhen exported. He therefore planned to implement 23nuclear plants in his country by 2000. At the same time, heinvested one billion dollars in the Eurodif consortiummanaged by France to acquire enriched uranium. Hispurpose was to completely control the atoms cycle. Did the

Shah already want the bomb at the time? It is quite possible, and several people in Europe and the UnitedStates were fretting already.

But everything suddenly changed in 1979 with the IslamicRevolution, for the danger was instantly seen as thedevastating use the new regime could have of the bomb, ifthey managed to control the nuclear chain reaction. TheUnited States suddenly withdrew


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their support to the Iranian nuclear programme. So didFrance. They also refused to pay back the billion dollarsthat the Shah provided to Eurodif. A tug-of-war betweenFrance and Iran shed blood for several years; everyoneremembers the attacks on Paris in 1985-1986. An agreed

compensation between both countries eventually ended thestruggle.

Irans nuclear programme was at a standstill for five years,then re-activated in 1984 during the

Iraq-Iran War. This time, they had official help from Russiaand backing from the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb,

as well as the North-Korean regime. In February 2003, theIranian regime officially announced that they had started auranium enrichment programme on their territory. Fromthat date, there was nothing to stop the Islamist regime inpursuing its aggressive intentions.

At the end of 2008, the IAEA (International Atomic EnergyAgency) tried to warn the world about the quick and preoccupying progress of the Iranian enrichment

programme. This programme we all know has no civilfinality, bluntly declared


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The bomb, the ultimate bayonet

Nicolas Sarkozy on 15 January 2009 when expressing hisNew Years wishes to the diplomacy.

The threat is therefore well known. Then what couldexplain the fatality and powerless behaviour of Westernleaders, leading us strait to disaster?


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7

The risk of world upheaval

Everyone remembers that at first the atomic bomb was thedeterrent weaponpar excellence. This was during the ColdWar, when both superpowers would eye one other withtheir respective arsenals. At the time, as neither nation waspart of the very select nuclear power club, neither claimedthe bomb as an offensive weapon. This would alas not bethe case, should my country soon possess the bomb. For

there is no way we could delude ourselves on the intentionsof the


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Islamist regime: in the hands of Ahmadinejad, the bombwould not only be a deterrent, but a weapon of conquest.

Israel is all too aware of this. In this country, theunthinkable is an everyday reality: while most of theWestern world considers the dramatic Holocaust thathappened seventy years ago as an unacceptable accident inHistory that will never happen again, the Israeli areconvinced, on the contrary, that it could very well happenagain. At all costs, they will never risk letting anythingseriously endanger the existence of their country and people. However, for the first time in their history, theynow consider that a possible Iranian atomic bomb may

threaten their future. In these conditions, they will not thinkabout the cost human, political, historical ofdeciding to attack my country. Their imperative survivalwill prevail over all other considerations.

As sanctions against Iran are ineffective, we will have noother choice than attack Iran to end its nuclear process,declared Ehud


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Olmert in June 2008. And he further declared: To put aneffective end to it.

Shortly after coming into office, President Barack Obamadeclared that he was against air strikes on Iranian nuclearfacilities. But whatever the US may think, if Ahmadinejadsays he has the bomb, or if Israel comes to believe that Iranis about to have it, I am convinced that Tzahal will launch amassive attack on my countrys nuclear sites howevercomplex and delicate this operation may be. Withoutwarning the Americans, or only once the aircraft have liftedoff. What will happen thereof?

For Ahmadinejad, these bombings will be a sort ofgodsend. Within the Muslim world, an Israeli attackwould indeed be considered as an unacceptableprovocation. Popular upheavals, more or less spontaneous,will take place in several Near and Middle Easterncountries. Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Dubai, Qatar, Bahrainand even in the oil-producing regions of Saudi Arabia,along its eastern coasts, where the


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population, 75% Shia (only 20% in all Saudi Arabia), is thepoorest of the country.

At the same time, Hezbollah and Hamas will obviouslyreturn to the grindstone, in Lebanon and Palestinianterritories, with their crushing rocket attacks, considerablyharder than in 2006.

As for Ahmadinejad, he will shoot back with surface-to-airmissiles installed and buried in the south of the country, anda few ultra fast speedboats to torpedo the super tankers thattransit through the Strait of Hormuz every day. When thestrait is blocked, most of the oil supply to the West will be

threatened.

And besides, the oil and gas fields of the Gulf monarchieswould probably be bombed. Furthermore, Ahmadinejadwas so bold as to imply the threat during the riots thatfollowed the fixed elections of June12

th: should these

monarchies conform to the western position, and interferein


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Iranian affairs, he openly assured that there would bereprisals.

America and Europe will have no other choice than reactforcefully to unblock the strait and, therefore, declare waron Iran. The Muslim world would only become moreindignant.

The dormant terrorist cells in France, Great Britain,Germany, etc. would awaken and attack. The world wouldgo ablaze, to the sole benefit of the Iranian Islamist regime.

Although Israel has the resources to shell the nuclear sites

in my country, no army can invade and defeat Iran. All themore that, may I remind, Iran is the only major power tocontrol conventional war as well as asymmetrical war.

Indeed, if war generalises, I am convinced that a Westerncoalition would eventually win. There is no questioning that point, but against how many sacrifices? Unlike in Iraqwhere 100,000 or 200,000 men were needed, there would be 1 million or more. Victory, albeit certain, would takeyears. Comparatively, it was


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much easier to overthrow the Nazi regime limited to asingle man, power, and nation. Over the thirty years sincethe Islamists have taken over my country, they have hadenough time, as we have seen, to weave their expansionistweb throughout the region.


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for despite what the American administration believe, thereare no moderate Taliban. The only solution remains tofight, and it is up to the local authorities today Afghaniand Pakistani, tomorrow Iranian to do it.

Another reason is, even supposing certain Pakistaniprovinces come under Taliban influence, the larger part ofthe Pakistani army is preserved from radical Islamistbeliefs. In any case, should the Taliban spread alarmingly,the Pakistani army has with help from the United Statesand probably their leadership neutralisation orredeployment resources for nuclear warheads.

Lastly, as a final recourse, the American special forces based in the Indian Ocean and US submarines fitted withcruise missiles would be ready to operate and destroy anydanger.

If things go that far, the Muslim world would raise noprotest, unlike if Israel attacks Iran.

Indeed, Pakistan was built on a religion and not on anestablished nation, and is as such a time bomb. The countrycould seriously


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Long-term vision

break up, and this must be prevented at all costs. But wemust first eradicate the threat of the Islamist regime thatholds my country, not only for regional and world peace,but also for the very foundations of our civilisation.

We, Iranian, think in years, if not centuries. You,Westerners, in months or, at best, terms of office. This isthe whole difference. While Obama said: This is what I shall do in the six coming months, the Iranian regimethought fifteen or twenty years. Although Ben Laden is ahit man himself, with a very instantaneous vision of time,the Iranian Islamists have a very long-term vision.

They want to build an empire, with vassal regimes at theircommand. This empire would encompass all the Gulfcountries, all the way to the Mediterranean, includingEgypt, and even beyond, therefore closing Israel in, andwiping it off the map. And for the first time such a largeempire would be created without annexation or war, justwith the backing of local forces bound to its cause.


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Whenever possible, its allies will take over in the polls(Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestinian territories). As for the rest,submission to Tehran will come about with insurrections,upheavals or revolutions. In the meanwhile, the IranianIslamist regime weaves its web in every one of these

countries, with a diabolical and very sophisticated,multi-level infiltration strategy.

Firstly, in banks and companies under Iranian control,operating in very different sectors, and employingthousands of people in each country. Approximately thirtywere counted in Egypt, about a hundred in Lebanon, andeven more in some countries in the Gulf. Remember that

my country is rich: if the Islamist regime still maintainsmost of the Iranian population in poverty, it uses itspetrodollars to fund its expansionist policy.

Secondly, in associations and charity foundations funded byIran, which provide social, medical, or university backingwhen local governments fail to.


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Long-term vision

The third level is cultural: the training of its staff, includinglanguages (Persian, Arabic or English) and Koranic andtraditional philosophies, or controlling the media.

The forth level, and not the least, is the various branches ofHezbollah active in the region I have already mentionedthe prepared attacks recently failed in Egypt that were blamed on Hezbollah. Anyway, Hezbollah is not only theextraterritorial paramilitary force of the Iranian regime inthe Near and Middle East: its tentacles have spread muchfurther, all the way to South America, as I will explainlater.

Besides, the Iranian Islamist regime develops a subtlestrategy to seize the regions energy channels.

It already has virtually full control over Basra, the only seaaccess and main export route for Iraqi oil. The hold of theIranian regime on the Shia south of Iraq, that producessome 2 million barrels per day most of the countrysproduction is plain to see for everyone.


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But this is not enough. The regime of Ahmadinejad wantsall Iraq, the annexation of its whole production capacityand, with that, 65% of world oil deposits under the PersianGulf coasts. He also wants the Strait of Hormuz, wheresome 17 million barrels of petrol transit every day. He has

his sights set on the international gas pipeline plan to carrygas from Central Asia to Pakistan via Iran or Herat(Afghanistan) under Iranian control; and on the future pipeline connecting the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf,while nowadays most of the latters petrol is exportedthrough the pipeline that travels under Georgia and Turkeyto the Mediterranean.

According to experts, Caspian Sea exports could represent by 2020 as much as 5 million barrels per day, instead ofsome 1 million today.

4

Today, Syria is the only objective ally of the IranianIslamist regime in the Near and Middle East, with noimperialist motive,


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Long-term vision

as was Italy for Nazi Germany before World War II.Incidentally, President Sarkozy was very right to try andseparate Syria from Iran, a policy continued by Obamasadministration, hoping to cut connection between theIranian regime and Damascus. As for all the other countries

of the region, and mainly those in the Gulf, for fear of the power of the Iranian regime, they refrain from doinganything that could be construed as hostile towards them.Consequently, the region is more or less under Iraniandomination, despite the American armed forces in Iraq andseveral countries of the Gulf.

But Iran also has other relays in the world.


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9

Fiendish allies

Between the Islamist regime and the North Korea, the

honeymoon has been lasting for over twenty years.

Specifically since 1985, when Iran, in the middle of warwith Iraq, turned to Pyongyang for their missiles, copied

from the famous soviet Scuds in North Korea.

From that date, Korea is notoriously one of Irans majormissile suppliers. But the collaboration between the twocountries, commercial at first, progressively changed and

became an inspired partnership.

For North Korea, like Iran, wants the bomb. And

Pyongyang and Tehran are prepared to

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pool their technicians and capital to get it.

In this race for the bomb, North Korea is now in the lead.On 9 October 2006, they announced that they hadcompleted a first underground test. In fact all the experts,Chinese and American included, believe that this test failed.Still, the announcement was unanimously frowned upon allover the world except in Iran, where the States

television made a eulogistic coverage. Less than threeyears later, on 25 May this year, North Korea made anothertest, this time a success. Kim Jong-ils regime became theworlds 9

thnuclear state.

Bad as it may be nuclear proliferation is obviously adanger for the planet this news must however notovershadow the Iranian threat, infinitely more dangerous.For North Korea, the worlds most self-sustaining countryhas no imperialistic intentions. The regime is desperate, amilitary dictatorship at the end of its rope, lingering on in acollapsing economy, for which the nuclear weapon is thelast chance of survival against its South Korean neighbour.

This is, therefore,

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incomparable with Ahmadinejads strategy of conquest.

4

However, possessing the bomb is not enough.

You must also be able to reach a target; that falls within the ballistics competence. This is why all the internationalmilitary experts are convinced that Iran and North Koreaare working together, since the early 2000s, on a long-haulmissile plan; a total infringement to the decisions of the UNSecurity Council. Early in the spring of 2009,international tension went up a notch when North Korea again announced its intention to shortly proceed tofiring a rocket, to send a communications satellite inorbit. Nobody doubted that the said rocket was in fact adisguised missile. And the Japanese press said that somefifteen Iranian technicians had arrived in Pyongyang, with aletter from Ahmadinejad. In the end, regardless of the

unanimous hostility,

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even from China, North Korea fired the rocket on Sunday5

thApril. Pyongyang cried victory, but, like the nuclear

test of October 2006, Pentagon experts claimed anotherfailure. Nevertheless, the initiative was once againuniversally condemned, except by Islamist Iran, who,through diplomatic spokesman Hassan Ghashghavi,declared that North Korea had every right to launch itsrocket. Several weeks later, Iran then announced the

firing of a long-haul missile (over 2,000 kilometres)

4

Another strategic honeymoon has developed since 2005between Iran and Venezuela.

So much so that outgoing and provoking Hugo Chavezeven refers to Ahmadinejad as his brother, whom heobviously thoroughly congratulated for his re-election.Both men fiercely hate the United States. And everyone isaware that they share mutual interests. On 27 April 2008,

both presidents declared that they


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Fiendish allies

had decided, after a long telephone conversation, to taketheir cooperation further. Just about one month later, inJune 2008, it was heard that emissaries from both countrieswere working on a common development bank plan.On 3 April 2009, the said bank was officially opened.

No one was surprised that it was based in Tehran. Onceagain, the petrodollars are very handy. Islamist Iran will provide capital and technicians to support Venezuelandevelopment plans. In exchange, Chavez opens up to Iranhis uranium mines, so necessary to the Islamist regimesnuclear programme.

These mines do not officially exist. They are in fact anopen secret. Venezuelas uranium resources are estimatedto be some 50,000 tonnes. According to the Americansecret services, two illegal extraction sites are already openunder innocent disguises: one plant producing bicycles and producing motorcycles. When confronted by theAmerican intelligence services, Chavez simply


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dodged the accusations: The worlds first atomicbicycles!, he joked.

On 30 April 2009, the Iranian Minister of Defence visitedCaracas for the first time with the regimes dignitary elite.At the end of his trip, during which he spoke to hisVenezuelan counterpart, and also with President Chavez, both countries publicly declared that this time they would

develop their military alliance


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10

Dormant networks

In 1992, and again in 1994, Buenos Aires was bombed.The target was the Jewish community South Americaslargest with over 200,000 Jews living in Argentina. Thefirst attack reached Israels embassy, the second, buildingsof an Israeli mutual company. Both attacks killed overone hundred people, and injured hundreds. The

investigations floundered miserably. Until October 2006,twelve years after the second attack, when the Argentineangovernment officially accused Hezbollah and Iran oforganising them. Since, no progress has been made,


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and no convict was sent prison. But these events provethe existence throughout the world, and especially in majorWestern democracies, of dormant terrorist networksworking for Tehran. And they would suddenly awakenshould Israel attack Iran.

Sometimes these networks, all led by Hezbollah emissaries,are simply covered by Iranian embassies. Others areformed in lawless enclaves. This is case of theheadquarters of organised crime in the so-called TripleFrontier along the junction of Paraguay, Argentina, andBrazil. The Triple Frontier is an Arab enclave in LatinAmerica: indeed the region hosts migrants from the Nearand Middle East since the early 1980s especiallyLebanese radical Shia exiled during the civil war. Many

of them have invested the main local economy the drugtrade, and continuous reports from American intelligenceservices reveal that part of narcotrafficking profits go tofund


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Dormant networks

Hezbollah activities. Incidentally, it is said that the party of

God, under Iranian command, has implemented there a

significant support base should its positions in the Near and

Middle East be threatened.


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11

The Gate of Tears

And now the most recent development of the expansionismof Ahmadinejads regime is not the least. Various westernsources indeed affirm that there are, since December 2008,Iranian military forces and equipment in the port of Assab.

This Eritrean port is on the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb theGate of Tears. The general public does not really know ofthis strait, but it is very important strategically, as itcommands the entrance to (or exit from) the Red Sea in theGulf of Aden via the Suez Canal. Tens of oil tankers andcargoes go through the Strait every day,


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with 25% petrol and 10% maritime world trade.Significant oil reserves were discovered these past years inNigeria, Sudan, Gabon, Guinea American oil companiesare therefore very active in this part of Africa, and analready sizeable amount of Americas oil consumptioncomes from this region, and transits through the Strait deBab-el-Mandeb.

Ahmadinejads Pasdaran arrived in Eritrea under thepretence of renovating the local refinery, closed since 1997 because it was outdated. By way of petroleum tools, theyactually unloaded military equipment in the port of Assab mainly medium range ground-to-air missiles. Thislocation is useful to Tehran in various ways.

It is an outlying station to bombard Israel and even SaudiArabia. It is also useful to counter the stronghold ofDjibouti, a French garrison and moorings for the American Navy that could host, should there be war in the region,significant American and NATO armed forces.


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The Gate of Tears

But, by controlling the port of Assab, Ahmadinejad wantsfirst and foremost to block the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Ihave already explained that the Strait of Hormuz would beone of Tehrans priority targets should Israel attack theirnuclear sites. By doing likewise with the Strait ofBab-el-Mandeb, Iran would therefore be able to blockvirtually all oil supplies to America and the West. Andthen the strait would really be a Gate of Tears. And thisnew latent offensive of the Islamist regime proves, if needstill be, that Tehran is indeed preparing for war.

Besides, the inauguration on May 26th

in Abu Dhabi, byPresident Nicolas Sarkozy, of a French permanent military base said the same. This base was named Peace Camp,

wishful thinking maybe? Concerned about Iranianhegemony, the United Arab Emirates had asked for this base, the first tangible move from France since itsreintegration in NATO. Should there be war in the region,it could be a logistical support for the free worlds forces.


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4

I could give many more examples, take the demonstration

further, but are all the details really necessary? I believethat I have clearly demonstrated in the first section, theexpansionist design of the dictatorial regime that occupiesmy country. This will, as mentioned, has progressedsignificantly in recent years, and even more these lastmonths. This could surely create an impression ofimpunity.

One thing is certain: Ahmadinejad will never turn back.And he will not give away a single millimetre of gainedground, before the final conquest. For him, the Americanadministrations negotiations, although their diplomacy hashigh hopes, and despite the legitimacy and credit ofPresident Obama, will only be a good time-gaining device.

And if the Israeli do not dare go against the wishes of

President Obama, and therefore refrain from bombardingIran, then the world will begin another bipolar era. Onone side, the United States of America, and their allies inthe democratic world;


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The Gate of Tears

on the other side, the imperialist Islamist regime ofAhmadinejad, that will soon control all the Near andMiddle East.

This bipolarity will degenerate sooner or later into alarge-scale armed conflict.

The dilemma is therefore insoluble. We can either stopthe despotic regime of Ahmadinejad from becoming anuclear power, with endless and unfruitful negotiations; oron the contrary let Israel launch air strikes on my country:

in both cases, there will be war.

This is why the only true hope of avoiding the worst is tochange this regime from the inside.


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PART II

Workings of the Iranian

society


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1

Aftermath of the Revolution

of 1906

The very long history of my country was marked, inmodern days, by an event that some call an epicreminiscent for the Iranian people of immense hope, andalso deep suffering. I obviously mean the ConstitutionalRevolution of 1906. The events of 1979 can only beunderstood in the light of 1906, for the Revolution of 1979

was a finishing stroke after the Revolution of 1906.


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At the turn of the 20th

century, Iran was an absolutemonarchy with age-old traditions, a still very archaiccountry ruled with an iron hand by a monarch who knew noopposition. But a liberal fringe (in the democratic sense)grew among the wealthy and intellectual bourgeoisie.Several representatives travelled to Europe France, Italy,England, and brought back the republican ideals thatgradually gained these countries.

These knowledgeable elite instilled throughout my countrya demand for reform, soon relayed by the people,dissatisfied by injustice and inequality in the country.They were backed by the Shia clergy, who took the side ofthe deprived.

There were upheavals in 1905 that the monarch tried toquash in a bloodbath. But soon, popular mobilisation wastoo strong. And the troops refused to open fire against thethousands of people who took refuge in mosques. Afterseveral months, the sovereign had no other choice than togive in and accept the revolutionaries demands to adopt aLiberal Constitution.

Iran then became the first Muslim country and the firstcountry in the region, fifteen years before Ataturks


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Aftermath of the Revolution of 1906

Turkey to adopt a democratic Constitution, ratifying the principles of free opinion and social justice. ThisConstitution was written by an elite group of liberals andintellectuals, including the great grandfather of one of myaunts. Henceforth, as stipulated in this organic text, thesovereign was to share his power with a Parliament freely

elected by the people, a legitimate representative of theirrights. This Parliament, for example, fought the Englishtakeover of the oil discovered in my country in 1908.Furthermore, in the wake of this liberalisation, Iranianwomen started an emancipation movement placing them atthe forefront of modernity in the Muslim world.

Our countrys reminiscence of this Revolution of 1906 isthat of immense pride. But also the bitter taste of failure.In 1921, Reza Shah, at a time when the West had theirsights on Iranian oil, seized power with a military coupdtat and founded the Pahlavi dynasty: his son, the lastShah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, succeeded to him in 1941.

Ten years of reign started for the new sovereign, whoreigned without ruling, as the Parliament


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Aftermath of the Revolution of 1906

oil-related resources. And lastly, the active position of theclergy, particularly their exiled leader, Khomeini, whoclearly backed the deprived as did their predecessors in1906.

Had the Shah heard the liberal call for greater democracy intime, I stand convinced that nothing that happenedafterwards would have occurred. The pressures, in 1977,of the American administration for a greater application ofhuman rights compelled the sovereign, unwilling todisplease his main ally, to release several hundreds of political prisoners. His opponents saw this as a sign thatthe time had come to intensify their fight. The liberals,religious, Toudeh party communists, Peoples Mujahideen,Marxists, etc., all gathered in a single objective coalition

that came down to the motto that Khomeini repeatedconstantly from his exile: The Shah must go. With the peoples massive support, the movement bolted andRevolution triumphed. But nobody foresaw at the timethat the religious would rush in and seize it. Once again,the ideals of 1906 were ridiculed.


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2

A people crushing machine

When in September 1978 it became obvious, after thesinister Black Friday during which the Shahs troopsfired at the protesters, that the Revolution was inevitable, Iwas 18 years old. I therefore had a live experience of theevents. And despite the connection of my family myfather in particular with the reigning family, I understoodthe populations fierce desire for change that emanated

greater every day from the protest marches. I understood,but did not take part in the movement.


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radio at 7 a.m., and listen to the list of the days deathsentences, fearing to hear my fathers name. It was hell,one of the worst times of my life, and yet I knew that it wasmy personal price to pay for the welfare of the masses.The grief of knowing that my father was in prison, and thatI could not even visit him, outshone my vision of nationalhappiness. During the weeks that followed the Shahsdeparture, I could feel this happiness, sense it, but could not join in. This happiness was not bleak: chadors had not yetappeared and no bearded men imposed their terror. It wasthe happiness of the whole nation, including most of theregimes former supporters.

But as I accepted this Revolution, without being part of it,

and sensed that there would be no place for me in the newregime, because of my past, I decided to leave. This wasin September 1979.


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I have already told the story1 of how, on the day before mydeparture, I still tried to visit my father, whom I had notseen in nine months. On that day, in the courtyard of Evinprison, near Tehran, where I had been waiting since dawn, Iwas confronted to an unbearably violent scene. A mother,

who had been denied by the Pasdaran the right to see herdeath-sentenced son, threw her chador to the ground and,driven insane by grief, literally pulled her hair out under ourvery eyes. I would have never thought that hair could bepulled out in that way, one fistful after the other. Soon herhead was a bloody mass, and the many Pasdaran who hadrushed up were enjoying the scene.

I was eventually luckier than the poor lady: I was able tosee my father and embrace him. But the memories ofthose few highly emotional minutes spent with him and thescene I that witnessed earlier remain inextricable. Thirtyyears later, they still haunt me. For at that moment

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1. Amir Jahanchahi, Vaincre le III Totalitarisme , Ramsaye

(2001).

92


I knew that the Revolution was straying from its democratic path, and that it would become an inhumane peoplecrushing machine.

This is why I believe that the abandonment by the Shah ofhis country is unforgivable.

This revolution is not democratic, he said before hisdestitution, It is Marxist and Islamist. Two scenariosare possible: either it was a manoeuvre to try and save histhrone, or with his knowledge of the country and the forcesin presence he was able to foresee before everyoneelse what was going to happen. One cannot but noticethat his prediction became true. In these conditions, even

in an ailing condition (which we did not know at the time),he had no right to abandon his country under the pressure ofthe West. That is the whole difference between a politicalman and a statesman. The statesman, when convinced to


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having been able to help that lady until the day theregime would crumble.

Since then, I have accepted no other nationality, eitherFrench (my country of refuge) or English (my country ofresidence). I still am a political refugee and will remainthat way until I return to Iran. But I was young then, 19years old when I arrived in Paris, and I needed to build mylife.

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I knew that before being able to serve my country usefully Ihad to first build my personal life. What I did not know,of course, is that the regime would produce a dictator ofAhmadinejads calibre.


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mullahs power. It took less than two years to lock thecountry. Disillusionment of the younger population, angerof women, and bitterness of the deprived who consideredthemselves tricked divorce between the Islamist powerand Iranian society was consummated since long. Duringthe summer of 1999, the twentieth anniversary of theRevolution was even celebrated in the streets of Tehranwith massive protests of students against the government.

How is it then possible that this detested regime,symbolised today by Ahmadinejad, has not yet fallen?

The first opposition that formed outside the country, in the

wake of the Revolution, was mainly royalist andreactionary.

Led by the first emigrants, it started too soon, against thewill of the people who then massively supported the newregime, which had not yet been seized by the mullahs.This opposition thought that the army had remainedloyalist, and would have backed a coup dtat. Littledid they know of Iran. All along our great history twothousand five hundred years!, the Iranian administrationand army which are


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Pre-June 12th, 2009: why oppositions failed

incidentally our future strength always proved to be

legitimists. When in 1953 the Shah was driven away byMossadegh, the army and administration went along withhim. When the Shah returned several days later, with thesupport of the CIA, the army and administration also turnedin his favour. This occurred again in 1979, I witnessed itwith my very eyes: the army, television, though managedby a cousin of the empress, administration all decided toserve the new regime overnight. Even the Imperial Guardcould not resist. The same scenario will be played again

tomorrow: when the imperialist Islamist regime ruling thecountry today will fall at last, the government machinerywill immediately join, for the sake of legitimism, thedemocrats ranks.

To the pioneering royalist and reactionary opponents weresoon added other forms of foreign opposition, impulsed bythe scale of the Iranian diaspora formed in a few years I

shall come back to that later, who all dreamt of strategiesto overthrow the new regime, without always knowing whatto replace it with.


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Pre-June 12th, 2009: why oppositions failed

who opened several windows of freedom in his first term ofoffice. The country had just been at war; the people hadpaid an outrageous price to save their borders, and were not prepared for a revolution to overthrow the government.Once again, those who fought the regime from abroadconsumed their energy in vain and lost any possible creditin the eyes of the Iranians that could have been useful later.

Succeeding to Rafsanjani in 1997, Mohammad Khatamiaroused genuine hope for change. Religious Khatamiwould have been Irans Gorbachev. At one time, we didthink that he would manage to separate political andreligious affairs within the regime. Unfortunately,Khatami proved not to be the right man for the job.

When, in July 1999, the students made massive streetprotests, it was a sign that the people were maybe ready tomake the regime change. Khatami should have jumped tothe occasion and claimed the populations support againstthe Pasdaran and Leader of the Revolution.

But he did not. As I have already mentioned, the Shahsattitude towards the upheavals threatening his throne


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was unforgivable. How, in these conditions, could weforgive Khatami, who personified the hopes of Iranspeople, for failing in imposing democracy?


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4

Divisions within the very

regime

I have mentioned, in the first part, how the first election ofAhmadinejad, who had always been a background figure inthe Islamic regime, had surprised the West. He was

indeed a very insignificant man at first sight but thenagain, so was Hitler. His surprise election came aboutwhen the regime was ready to conquer the region. Asproved earlier, his expansionist strategy and decision to getthe bomb were by far pre-existent to his first election. Bybringing


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Ahmadinejad to the foreground, the regime thought theyhad found the man who could, incarnating the expansionistdesire of the Islamic Republic, be a fuse. Their main viewwas to buy time in the race for the bomb. With PresidentObama offering to hold talks on one side and on the otherthreatens sanctions, if talks do not make any significantprogress before the end of 2009, the fuse could have beenuseful. The Supreme Leader could have curbed thehard-line regime by preventing Ahmadinejads re-electionand preferring Mousavi, also an Islamist, but far morepresentable for the West. In the meanwhile, theclandestine centrifuges would have gone on turning toenrich uranium. The coup dtat of Ahmadinejad isobviously an affront to the President of Americas

outstretched hand policy. It is a bad omen for thenegotiations that America would want to start, andespecially announces the imminence of war.

Irans people must now not only face the stranglehold ofthe regime on their


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Divisions within the very regime

individual rights, but also the seizure of oil money for the benefit of a small few, trampling of human rights and allthe other unbearable and unacceptable injustices he is guiltyof. As it is now clear to see that this dictatorial regime ison the warpath and nothing like the conflict that opposedmy country to Iraq for eight years the time has come togo beyond old divisions between partisans and opponentsof the Islamic Republic. Our country has just lived thepainful, but alas predictable, experience that neither its willfor change, or massive mobilisation, or enthusiastic youth,or even public backing from several VIPs, even religious,were enough to steer the regime a single inch away from itstyrannical and expansionist intrigues.

Now that the people are aware that the expression of theirwill in the ballot boxes has failed, they must organise thelargest possible coalition of all those who do not want warin the region, a war that will impact the whole planet. Acoalition to rally the Iranian people, Iranian diaspora

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throughout the world, governments of greater powers, allArab countries the first concerned along with Israel byAhmadinejads imperialism, and all those who within thevery regime fear that the hard-line behaviour of the leaders

may bring them all down in the end. These people exist,and there are more than we can imagine. They are in thehigher spheres of the army, administration, wealthiestbazaar merchants, and even the Pasdaran.

There are especially, within the Shia inner circles, religiousdignitaries convinced that Irans regime is, in the long haul,dangerous for Islam. The West probably imagines that

mosques Iran are always full since the Revolution of 1979.It is the exact reverse. Today, places of worship in mycountry are deserted. Religion is no longer in the peoplesgood graces, so to speak, since it rules the countrys politics. Even in the holy city of Qom, traditionally moreconservative and traditionalist than Tehran, there is agrowing disaffection of the population, and especially theyounger, with religious matters.


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Divisions within the very regime

So, these people do exist in the regime, and are even in the

highest spheres of power. But the conditions in whichthey can reveal themselves and especially take action do notexist yet.

This is why these privileged protesters will not move aslong as they do not sense that they can leave their cover.And they are more useful in their positions than in prison,where they are likely to be sent by Ahmadinejad if theytake action too soon. So that they can successfullyuncover, there must be more street protests, and fiercer thanafter the announcement of the tyrants fixed re-election.


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People are suppressed, not

resigned

Mass unemployment among the youth, rampant inflation,widespread corruption, prostitution and drug addiction dueto poverty, growing insecurity this is the day-to-day

burden of the people of one of the regions richestcountries, boasting 2,500 years of culture and civilisation.During the great student protests of 1999, divorce wasalready consummated between Iranian society and itsIslamist leaders, but the divide is still growing.

Except an infinitely small proportion who still support the


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regime the very few who still gain direct profit,Iranians have since long been aware of the failure of political Islamism. Almost 10% of the population of Iranlives today with less than 2 dollars per day. This is all themore scandalous for a country that is the worlds 4th oilexporter and had in 2007 over $26 billion trade surplus.In fact, the regime only redistributes its petrodollars in theleast proportion through a subsidised economy. As for therest, the money goes into the pockets of several thousandsof freeloaders. Not to mention, of course, the enormousamounts engulfed in the costly nuclear military programme,and imperialist plan distributing funds to Hezbollah andHamas.

But this system has reached its limits with rock-bottom oil prices that fell in six months from $150 per barrel to lessthan $50. In 2008, inflation was officially 30%, butactually closer to 50%, and seems to have gone yet furtherdown to 60% in the first quarter of 2009. As forunemployment, considerably minimised by official figures,it


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reaches 30% of workers, and more important, astronomicalproportions amongst the youth.

But although the Islamists economic results are disastrous,and the regime can no longer lean on the middle classes and

the underprivileged that had supported the Revolution of1979, the Iranians, despite their resentment anddisappointment, have not yet taken collective action. Forone reason, repression remains fierce. And especiallybecause the growing fringe of the population that aspires tochange has no political organisation. Due to ever-presentcensorship, there is no movement today to lead Iran to theGates of Liberty. And there is no leader able tostructurally and enduringly mobilise peoples rebellion.

Mousavi simply followed the spontaneous movement in thestreets. He never was leader of this movement.

He could have been, the day Khamenei made the fixedre-election of Ahmadinejad official, by asking the people torebel against the regime. But he did not. At thatmoment, Mousavi missed his rendezvous with History. At best he will be remembered and his wife maybe even

more so


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as one of the leading personalities of the movement in the

summer of 2009.

Moreover, with the information that I have, I can supposethat Ahmadinejad did not actually perform a coup dtat inthe ballot boxes, but a regular coup dtat. And from then,Khamenei was under his influence, not to say control.

Details are irrelevant. From the moment the Guide made

the cheating official, Ahmadinejad and Khamenei weretwo of a kind, as people put it.

In these conditions, to make a mass rebellion possible, aresistance organisation must be structured. It wouldsupport and oversee the peoples rebellion, especially itsmost active players: the youth and women, who still hope tolift their heads high, despite thirty years of bullying, as

shown by their brave behaviour during the protests thatfollowed the fixed re-election of Ahmadinejad.


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My countrys population in 1979 was a mere 40 million,against nearly 70 million today, with 10 million universitygraduates and 2.5 million more students. Most

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of the Iranians have therefore not seen the Shahs regime,and the youth in particular have only lived under strictIslamic control. How much longer will they accept such alocked and repressive political system, depriving them ofthe simple joys of life: listening to music, meeting up with boy and girl friends, and prevents them from livingcarefree lives? For now, they seem resigned, indulging inprivate in the free behaviours that are forbidden in public.But I am convinced that the time has come to let them rip,all the more that economic recession burdens futureprospects a little more every day.

Although the memory of the fierce repression of the student protests of 1999 was still alive after the elections of June

2009, the youth of my country demonstrated its maturityand will to bring the people in. If tomorrow they perceivefrom abroad the encouraging signs that they did not receivein June, then we will win.


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6

A powerful and responsive

diaspora

The Iranian diaspora is todays second-ranking in size andpower, after the Jewish one, and was certainly the fastest toform. Only a few years! According

Documents

Union for 2nd Republic of Iran - (c) Jahanchahi