Union and Defense Industrial Policy · De Vestel defines the defense economy as all of the economic dimensions of defense: “industrial, technological, budgetary and employment aspects,

paper 31The EuropeanUnion andDefenseIndustrial Policy

The European Union and Defense Industrial Policy

by Jocelyn Mawdsley

Work financially supported through the European Community’s Human Potential Programmeunder contract HPRN-CT-2000-0070

Published by©BICC, Bonn 2003Bonn International Center for ConversionDirector: Peter J. CrollAn der Elisabethkirche 25D-53113 BonnGermany Phone: +49-228-911960Fax: +49-228-241215

Table of contents

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 4

2. Constructing a Framework for Analysis 6

3. The Actors 8

3.1 The Firms 8

3.2 Nation States 14

3.3 The European Union as a Defense IndustrialPolicy-Maker 21

4. An Emerging European Defense Industrial Policy 25

References 30

About the AuthorJocelyn Mawdsley studied at Bradford University before gaining an MAand PhD from Newcastle University in Britain. She is currently based atthe Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) working as apost-doctoral research fellow on a European Union funded project‘Bridging the Accountability Gap in European Security and DefencePolicy’, which brings together a network of nine research institutionsacross Europe. Her most recent research has concentrated on thegrowing role of the European Union institutions in the formulation ofarmaments policy in Europe.

The European Union and Defence Industrial Policy

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1. Introduction

The establishment of the European Security and Defense policyand particularly the founding of the Rapid Reaction Force havedrawn policymakers’ attention to the European armamentsmarket1. Budget pressures coupled with increasing ambitions inthe security field has led the European Union institutions andmember states to consider how to maximize armaments co-operation but defense firms have also been actively calling forreforms to increase their competitiveness in the global armsmarket. Even the exemption of defense industry from the SingleMarket looks strange in 2003. Defense industrial policy isincreasingly playing a role in this debate as the need to tacklearmaments policy in a more European framework became clear.Is a European defense industrial policy emerging? Who or whatare the factors driving it? Are the developments moving in theright direction? This paper will attempt to answer these questionsby tracking the moves of the protagonists: the firms, the statesand the European institutions: in an attempt to map the emergingconsensus on European defense industrial policy. It will thencritically assess the emerging policy agreement.

It is though first necessary to recall why defense industrialpolicy is in its current state. The end of the Cold War marked aprofound break with the past. The European security architecturechanged beyond recognition; not only did the bipolar systemdissolve but a multitude of multilateral co-operative securityarrangements emerged culminating in the European Security andmany ways during the Cold War,

“The permanent confrontation, the imaginary waratmosphere in which the threat of the 'other'constituted a continuing source of legitimacy,froze the institutional structures of the post-warperiod long after they had ceased to serve theirpurposes.” (Kaldor, 1997:1)

The evolving new security structures, concepts and threatperceptions of the 21st century have taken so long to develop inpart because of this frozen institutional structure. Theadjustments, changes and cutbacks alongside the newopportunities were difficult for establishments deeply unused to

1 The author is grateful to Michael Brzoska, Hartmut Küchle, Herbert

Wulf and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder for their feedback on thispaper. Any remaining errors, generalizations or omissions are theauthor's responsibility.

The Endof theCold War

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change. One such monolith was the defense industrial sector.After all by the 1980s,

“…the military sector was the last remainingbastion of the Fordist2 era. The military-technological style, based on large platforms andthe intensive use of energy, was drawn from theexperience of mass warfare during World War II.Military resources were tightly controlled by thestate and the defense industrial sector remainedlargely national.” (Albrecht, Kaldor and Schméder,1998: 2)

Faced with spending cutbacks in their home markets and a slowdown in the global arms market following the end of the ColdWar, European firms were left stunned by the speed of Americandefense industrial restructuring. The European firms urgentlyneeded to adapt as well and begin to think transnationally. Cost-cutting in defense procurement and the rise of neo-liberalthinking in the 1980s had already left the firms thinking muchmore like normal firms albeit very dependent on the will of theirstate. However, when the national governments failed to actquickly enough to enable the process of European consolidation,the larger firms took the initiative and started to push the processthemselves. Their newly found independence was best shown byBritish Aerospace when, rather than merging with DASA andAerospatiale as the British government had wanted, it chose tobuy up GEC Marconi’s defense arm. The new Europeanchampion defense firms were more flexible and efficient and ableto adapt to survive in an increasingly competitive market. Theirthinking was no longer purely national, which challenged theirrelationship with ‘their’ government. However the consolidationwas patchy, while aerospace and defense electronics are nowdominated by BAe Systems, Thales and EADS, land industry orshipbuilding are still characterized by large numbers of medium-sized nationally based firms. Meanwhile, the nationalgovernments of the big arms producing countries (Britain,France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain) were keen to providesuitable market and regulatory conditions that would ensure thatthe government-industry link remained beneficial for both. Theytried to reassert their role, in setting the regulatory environment at 2 “Fordism was characterised by mass production, mass consumption

and massive state intervention in the economy and society. Inparticular, the revolutionary methods of serial production, associatedwith the name of Henry Ford, became the pace-setter for affluence.”(Albrecht, Kaldor and Schméder, 1998: 2)

Europeani-sation


6

the European level, through the Letter of Intent process that ledto the Framework Agreement on defense industrial restructuring.Smaller arms producing countries were left on the sidelines. Atthe same time the European Commission tried to carve out a rolefor itself too, calling for an EU regulated defense market, a claimthat grew stronger with the development of ESDP.

2. Constructing a Framework for Analysis

The last decade has seen major changes to the components ofEurope’s defense economy. It has been claimed by some thatdefense industry has become an industry like any other, that it hasbeen secularized or civilianized (Walker and Gummett, 1989). DeVestel (1995) identified four arguments in favor of thishypothesis. Firstly the internationalization of defense industrieshas meant some firms have moved away from operating in anational framework, equally neo-liberal economic policies haveimpacted to a greater or less extent on national defense marketsintroducing competition and freer markets and constraininggovernment ownership. It is also less clear where the boundarybetween civil and defense technology lies or which is benefitingfrom which. Finally he points out that post Cold War reductionsin European procurement budgets has removed the safety netfrom the environment the firms work in. An additional factormight also be the defense firms’ improved access to global capitalas they moved away from government ownership.

Others however would argue that defense firms are far from‘normal’ firms. Defense markets have both supply and demandsides. The demand side is heavily dominated (where majorweapons systems are concerned) by national governments in theirrole as purchaser of all goods required by their armed forces.Governments though are not just buyers; they regulate themarket. By using their power as primary customer, they determineall the major features of national defense industries such as size,structure, ownership, location, conduct and performance (Sandlerand Hartley, 1999). Equally, by restricting export opportunities(to avoid the dangers of arms proliferation) governments canmaintain their primary customer role. The size and structure ofthe European defense market historically has not been thereforedecided by market forces: the ability of governments to subsidizeor restrain the market counteracted or even ran counter to marketforces. Sen argues that there are various modes of stateintervention. Firstly, the state can intervene with direct subsidiesand tariffs. In this way unprofitable firms can be maintained ifthis is in the national interest. Secondly, the tactic of state

‘Normal’Firms?

Jocelyn Mawdsley

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ownership can be used. The era of the state-owned defense firmin Europe was only ending at the end of the twentieth century3,despite the privatization pressures of the neo-liberal economicconsensus. Equally, the French DGA is still much more than aprocurement agency and continues to have a major influence onFrench defense industry. Thirdly, preferential procurement clearlyplays a role. Most countries have traditionally, for reasons ofsecurity of supply, procured military equipment primarily fromnational manufacturers. Fourthly, there is a possibility ofdiscriminatory taxation to favor strategic industry. Fifthly, exportsubsidies can be used. In this way a country can help makenational programs more viable through economies of scale.Finally, state support of education and research to underpintechnological development is important (Sen, 1984: 87-9). All ofthese modes have been used by Western European states, atvarious times, to support and maintain their defense industrialsectors, although the degree of interventionism has altered overtime and between countries. It is important to realize that, even ina protected sector, wider beliefs about state-industry relationshipshave a visible impact. By the beginning of the 1990s, for example,as Walker and Gummett wrote,

“France and Britain provide the two poles, the onewith its interweaving of industry and state, theother trying, if not always succeeding, to maintaina distance between them.” (Walker and Gummett,1993: 24)

For a variety of political and economic reasons, Europeangovernments traditionally followed varying paths in theirrelationship with ‘their’ defense firms, (resulting in an incoherentEuropean market) but they still had the same role in determiningthe regulatory framework as legislators and in acting as primarycustomers for their firms. De Vestel defines the defense economyas all of the economic dimensions of defense: “industrial,technological, budgetary and employment aspects, and thetransactions between buyers and producers” (1995: 1). He favorsthough analyzing the political economy of defense, thus bringinganalysis of the state and its directorial or regulatory role into theequation4.

3 Although it should be remembered that historically state control of

defence technology is relatively new, dating from the middle of thenineteenth century.

4 Some scholars have defined the study of political economy as simplythe application of economic concepts and tools to politics notablythrough rational choice analysis (Frey, 1984). However this approach


8

“Public policy, whether it be industrial andtechnological or concerning security and defense,contributes in profoundly affecting thetechnological, industrial and social dimensions ofarmaments production.” (de Vestel, 1998: 197)

It would therefore seem necessary to understand the aims andconstraints informing the policy decisions of both states andfirms. For the European case though the institutions of theEuropean Union and the role they play must also be analyzed.

3. The Actors

3.1 The FirmsEuropean defense firms remained throughout the 1950s, 1960sand 1970s substantially apart from the process of Europeanintegration. Exempted from Single Market legislation, the firmsand their regulatory environment were both servants of andnourished by the Cold War. The experience of two world warshad made national security of supply of weapons a matter of greatimportance to European states and defense firms were regardedas national assets. Moreover, the industry's purpose and standingin the international economy of this time mirrored the unusuallyprogressive role played by military technological innovation inthat era. Entire new industries had been founded upon thedevelopments generated by the Cold War and the earlier twoworld wars (Walker and Gummett, 1993). Defense firms werefrequently state-owned and controlled and protected fromcompetition by generous subsidies.

While most of the changes that produced today’s defenseindustrial map happened during the 1990s, things were changingbefore then. The rising costs of defense equipment had alreadypushed both governments and firms to begin a nationalrationalization track. Hébert (2002) argues that the events of the1980s are key to understanding today’s European defenseindustrial map. In Britain at the start of the 1980s, Sir PaulLevene launched a privatization program for British defenseindustry: this meant major changes to the likes of Ferranti, British

does not seem to capture the power dynamics at work in thepolitical economy of defence. Aben, on the other hand, advocatesthe use of the tools of political science such as institutional analysisand theories of international relations as a fruitful methodologicalapproach to the political economy of defence (Aben, 1992: 15), thusmoving away from an emphasis on economic tools which wouldseem a more fruitful approach.

Changes inthe 1980s

Jocelyn Mawdsley

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Aerospace, Rolls Royce, Royal Dockyards and the RoyalOrdnance Factories to name just the more important firms.Meanwhile in Germany throughout the 1980s Dasa was acquiringsuch firms as Messerschmidt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), Dornier andFokker, ending by controlling about 60% of German defenseindustry. Hébert argues that these new entities followedincreasingly industrial or finance-led strategies thus abandoningthe concept of protected territory that had characterized theEuropean armaments sector thus far. Equally, the growing use ofcivilian technology changed the nature of defense industry.However, it is not clear how much this would have advanced,particularly in countries like France, where state ownership ofdefense industries remained popular, had the late 1980s and early1990s brought further pressure to bear on European countriesand their defense firms.

Between 1987 and 1997 world defense spending fell fromUS$1030 billion to US$675 billion (measured in 1993 US$), andthe highest reductions occurred between 1990 and 1993 (BICCfigures cited in Brömmelhörster, 2000:9). The end of thecommon threat rewrote the environment in which companies andprocurement agencies must work, and there was no longer apredictable setting. The special protected position given todefense industries by their national governments during the ColdWar became untenable. The peace dividend expected by thegeneral public meant that defense budgets were slashed by mostmajor military powers. As this happened at the same time as therewas a belief (subsequently changed) that the Revolution inMilitary Affairs meant that traditional equipment like tanks wouldno longer be needed, procurement budgets were especiallyaffected. In the United States, for instance, the militaryprocurement budget for the fiscal year 1996 hit its lowest point inreal terms since 1950 (Dowdy, 1997:89). In the past defense cutshad been addressed by greater arms exports but that marketshrank too, so existing firms had to fight ever more aggressivelyfor contracts. The removal of the rigidities in the internationalarms trade caused by the Cold War meant that American firmswere suddenly competing for contracts in markets that hadpreviously been left to European bidders. As well as this theWestern powers had to cope with and contain new types ofconflict, for example in Bosnia, which required new skills anddifferent equipment for the armed forces. This meant that whiledefense electronics, for example, expanded, traditional areas likeshipbuilding suffered disproportionately from the downturn inthe market.

Post Cold WarDefence Spending


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Much of the pressure on European firms came from the wayin which American firms reacted so quickly to the decliningmarkets by restructuring and rationalizing. The trend in the early1990s in the American defense industry was for firms to get eithertotally ‘in’ or totally ‘out’ of defense; there were a large number ofboth horizontal and vertical mergers, which led to greatereconomies of scale and lower unit costs. Contractors also tried tobuy into firms dealing in defense electronics, the only defensesector that was still growing. They did not do this entirely on theirown. Help was given by the Clinton administration, whichemployed a ‘stick and carrot’ approach. The Defense Secretary in1993, Les Aspin, argued that there was over-capacity in thedefense sector, and that the American government was preparedto watch some firms go out of business. In order to help pushmergers even more, they offered subsidies to cover merger costsand started a vigorous export drive, which was supported at alllevels. They also relaxed the anti-trust laws to allow mergers thatmay damage competition (Grant, 1997: 9-12). All this meant thatAmerica at least temporarily obtained a larger share of theshrinking cake in defense markets, as their firms were morecompetitive.

Despite all of this, the European defense industrial sceneremained remarkably constant until the end of 1997. Somecompanies like Siemens left the defense market and the practiceof buying up smaller firms to create national championscontinued (Brzoska, 2001). In December 1997, the British,French and German leaders issued a joint statement, calling onEuropean defense industry to formulate plans for restructuringthe industry so that it would be able to compete with Americanfirms. The emphasis was placed on the aerospace sector. This wasfollowed in July 1998 by a Letter of Intent which provided aframework for further work on security of supply, exportprocedures, research and technology and security of informationwhich was signed by the three along with Spain, Italy and Sweden.At this stage it was clear that the preferred restructuring optionwas a merger between BAe, Aérospatiale and DASA to form aEuropean Aerospace and Defense Company. Despite theEuropean leaders’ call for the creation of a European Aerospaceand Defense Company, the private shareholders in BritishAerospace and DASA were unimpressed by state involvement inthe French firms. They did not feel that commercial viabilitywould be allowed to take priority over the French government’sindustrial policy. Worried by BAe and DASA’s 1998 merger

AmericanRestructuring

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discussions5, the French government launched a three-prongedresponse. They announced that they would reduce their stake inAérospatiale to a minority holding, attempted to bargain byholding up the conversion of Airbus into a company and gotMatra to merge with Aérospatiale (rather more comprehensivelythan the original planned missile business merger had intended).Thomson-CSF was also finally privatized in June 1998 withDassault and Alcatel becoming shareholders and CSF acquiringAérospatiale’s satellite business. Despite this effort, the DASA-BAe talks continued. However rather than a merger between BAeand DASA as had been confidently expected, in January 1999 asurprise buy-out of the defense arm of GEC Marconi was agreedby British Aerospace. A furious DASA was left with little optionother than to merge with Aérospatiale-Matra and CASA of Spainto form EADS.

Consolidation in the European defense industry hasproduced therefore three dominant firms who are active in mostparts of the defense market: BAe Systems, European AeronauticDefense and Space Company (EADS) and Thales (formerlyThomson-CSF). The development and shape of these companiesthough varies. BAe Systems can be regarded as a massive‘national6 champion’, resulting from the merger of BritishAerospace and GEC Marconi. The British government in thiscase rather reluctantly acquiesced to the companies’ wish tomerge. EADS was consolidation at the European level as itresulted from the merger of Germany’s DASA, the FrenchAérospatiale Matra and Spain’s CASA following majorgovernment pressure for this merger. Finally, Thales has emergedfrom a more normal growth period as it acquired smallerbusinesses and integrated them into its core functions (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002). The ownership structure of European defenseindustry is extremely complicated, with numerous examples ofcross-shareholding and program- or segment-specific jointventures and consortia. The defense firms have internationalized,not only through international trade in armaments but also 5 Given the surprise 1998 Anglo-German announcement about Stock

Market co-operation and joint ventures it is understandable that theFrench were worried that something similar would happen in thedefence industrial sector.

6 Although the extent of both non-British shareholders and activity inUnited States caused Geoff Hoon (then Minister of Defence) toquestion controversially in 2002 whether BAe Systems was really aBritish firm any more. Confirmation in April 2003 that Bae Systemswas discussing a merger with Boeing would confirm this suspicion(Mesure, 2003).

EuropeanRestructuring


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through a proliferation of joint ventures in development andproduction, internationalized supply chains (especially due tooffset requirements) as well as the development of multinationalcorporations. It should however be noted that, while theaerospace sector as shown above is concentrated in the hands ofrelatively few players, this is not the case in all sectors, mostnotably the land systems industry or in naval shipbuilding. TheBritish land industry for example is still split between Alvis (partof Rolls Royce) and Royal Ordnance (part of BAe Systems), whiledespite efforts by the German government to increase co-operation Krauss Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall still competein Germany (Guay and Callum, 2002). Domestic concerns aboutjobs, a desire to maintain national capacities (particularly inshipbuilding) and some security concerns have prevented furtherconsolidation in these areas. There are though some signs that thebig three are acquiring firms in these sectors. Both Thales andBAe Systems own shipyards for instance. Equally, many of theEuropean arms producing countries continue to maintainuncompetitive national companies through offset and otherprotectionist strategies. There is a tendency to assume, particularlyafter the creation of EADS, that European defense industrialconsolidation had been successfully completed but this is in factnot the case.

Another area of divergence has been in contacts with theUnited States. While US firms enjoy far superior access to theEuropean market than is given in return there is a transatlanticdimension in the thinking of European firms. The extent towhich this exists though varies quite dramatically between theEuropean countries and is closely related to governmentprocurement policy and US government decisions on the degreeof access it will allow any given state (Schmitt, 2001). British firmsin particular have enjoyed relatively privileged access to the USmarket as the position of BAe Systems as the sixth biggest USdefense firm shows. There are also areas of components, HUDsand ejector seats, where UK has an independent capability insupplying the US. However, throughout Europe use of offsetwhen buying American defense goods ‘off-the-shelf’ or underlicensed production (and less frequently through collaborativeprojects) has enabled European firms to enter the supply chain oflarge US producers and to gain access to US technology. TheFrench government has traditionally chose autonomous orEuropean collaborative procurement and enjoys a more distantsecurity relationship with the US than many of its Europeanpartners, consequently French firms have considerably less accessto the US market. All of the big three firms want access to the US

Access to theAmericanMarket

DifferencesRemain

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market, given the size of the US defense procurement budget,and have developed strategies to gain access. However, theprivileged position that BAe Systems holds compared to EADSor Thales, especially following the Iraq crisis, and particularly if amerger with Boeing takes place as suggested by the media(Mersure, 2003) does cause friction. The problem of dealing withthe transatlantic armaments relationship is therefore a key issuefor firms in the context of any European defense industrial policy.

European defense firms continue to lobby actively forimproved conditions in the European defense market as they feelthere is much that needs changing. Increasingly, they areconcentrating their efforts on the EU level. The EuropeanCommission is often viewed as more sympathetic to defenseindustrial concerns than many member states. While the big firmslobby individually as well, the EU level defense industrial lobby isformally represented by two umbrella organizations EDIG(European Defense Industries Group) and AECMA (EuropeanAssociation of Aerospace Companies)7. EDIG was first formedin 1976 as a body responsive to the National ArmamentsDirectors (NADs) of the Independent European Program Group(IEPG) nations. The aim was that it should be a central focus ofEuropean defense industrial opinion. EDIG’s members are thenational defense industry associations of the member states of theWestern European Armaments Group (WEAG). During 1997,the defense industry associations of Austria, Finland and Swedenbecame involved in the work of EDIG as “observers” and sinceFebruary 1999 are full members of EDIG, Hungary andSwitzerland have also expressed interest in joining. Thegovernmental concentration on aerospace has though left EDIGrather sidelined in recent debates. AECMA founded in 1950, onthe other hand, which has the national aerospace associations aswell as large firms as its members, has been more fortunate. Itsrecipe for success may well be allowing the big firms a role inaddition to the representation given by national bodies. In 2003the two organizations had begun to explore co-operationstrategies leading to a potential merger and intend to set up a jointsecretariat8. The ease of access that EADS, Thales and BAeSystems especially, but also other defense firms, have to thedecision-making levels of the EU should also not beunderestimated. It has become increasingly clear that these three

7 There is also a small group representing marine industry; the

European Marine Equipment Council.8 See consecutive editions of the EDIG newsletter for details at

http://www.czech-aop.cz/bulletin.html.

Lobbying


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firms are substantially setting the agenda of defense industrialpolicy-making in Europe. Acting either individually or as a groupof three9 the companies have become ever more open in theirattempts to mould any emerging European defense industrialpolicy in a manner favorable to their interests. The stress laid bythe states on the creation of large prime contractors has meantthat the results enjoy better access to national and Europeandecision-making structures than their peers, thus forming animportant lobby group that is largely unopposed, and thisimbalance has impacted on policy.

3.2 Nation StatesThe EU member states share a concern about the globalizingtrends evident in the defense industrial system. For the largerarms producers, the chief concerns were that

“It is already evident that a ‘national’ defenseindustry identity has been irrevocably diluted bythe flow of outward and inward investment and bythe operation of an international supply chain.National governments must now respond to thechallenges posed by a globalizing defenseindustrial system where the demands of industrialefficiency and international trading are likely toconflict with issues such as security of supply,security clearances and controls over technologytransfer.” (Hayward, 1999: 1-2)

For smaller arms producers the concern was more that their firmswere not involved in this process sufficiently, and they wereworried about losing all influence in the construction of newdefense industrial strategies.

At the beginning of the 1990s there were substantialdifferences between the major European arms producers ondefense industrial policy. The French and British models could beseen as two ends of a continuum. The British governmentclaimed not to have a defense industrial policy at all,concentrating instead on obtaining maximum value for money indefense procurement. By this time they had also privatized theirmajor defense firms. The French on the other hand, had achievedan almost seamless interweaving of defense industry and state andmuch defense industry was still nationalized. There was therefore

9 See for example the ‘Joint Declaration of BAE Systems, EADS and

Thales: Time to Act’ of 28 April 2003:www.eads.net/xml/en/press/eads/20030428_joint.xml.

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little agreement of how defense industry should be managed. Therealization in the mid 1990s that the defense firms were settingthe agenda particularly regarding a response to Americanrestructuring and that this could have difficult consequences forstates forced a policy reconsideration. As Markusen (1999) warns,the possibility of global defense firms is very real. She envisages asituation where governments, in this case the Americangovernment, are forced to select weapons from what the firms areproducing rather than directing production. As Beecham, writingfrom a customer’s perspective, asks

“In an era in which Western democracies areunder great pressure from their electorates, howcan we have a voice in shaping the globalization ofthe defense industry, which is happening moreunder industrial and commercial drivers thanthrough any government policy?”(Beecham, 2001: 1)

The governments of the major arms producing European Unioncountries have therefore been keen to retain control of theregulatory environment in its new transnational format. Inessence, what this reconsideration has produced, is a shrinking ofthe scale of difference between the countries. They have alwayshad a common objective,

“...to maintain efficient, technologically dynamic,defense industries which are able to produceequipment that defense ministries wish to buy.”(Walker and Gummett, 1993: 29)

but agreement on the means to this end was lacking. As a moveaway from purely national firms seemed inevitable thegovernments though were no longer only considering how toachieve this objective nationally, but in order to avoid completedependence on the United States, at the European level. TheFrench government recognized that, if its firms were toparticipate in European mergers, they would have to beprivatized, as state control was unacceptable for British andGerman firms. As a result, the level of state involvement indefense industrial matters was decreased, and some state holdingsin defense firms sold off. The British government realized thatcontinuing to alienate their defense firms was counterproductive,if they were to retain any element of control over theinternationalization of the defense equipment business. Theydecided to increase state-defense industry links, and to takeaccount of defense industrial issues in procurement decisions. Atthe same time, both Britain and France moved away from the

Responding tothe ChangingFirms


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objective of autonomy in defense production, towards anacceptance of multinational projects for major weapons systems.On the surface therefore, there has been considerable policyconvergence during the late 1990s. Differences remain, but theyare more frequently questions of emphasis rather than deepideological differences. The British government, for example,likes to emphasize its willingness to collaborate with the UnitedStates; if that offers ‘smarter procurement’, but in practicedecisions have been increasingly in favor of European projects10.By the end of the 1990s there had been a rapprochement betweenthe major arms producers, which made progress on co-operationpossible particularly after successful co-operation on defenseprocurement had established OCCAR.

The Framework Agreement concerning Measures toFacilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the EuropeanDefense Industry signed in July 2000 by Britain, France,Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain is often seen as an example ofthe rapprochement between key European arms producing stateson defense industrial policy. The agreement creates a frameworkfor the six nations to co-operate on defense industrial issues. Theagreement was not just about creating an organizationalframework for discussion but included important agreements onprinciples and policy in six key areas:• Security of Supply: The nations are committed not to hinder

unnecessarily the supply of defense materials to the otherparticipants and to consult on any merger or acquisition ofdefense companies that may threaten security of supply.They are also committed to working together on providingsupplies from national stocks, priority and allocation ofsupplies, and reconstitution of supply facilities.

• Exports Procedures: The Agreement commits the nations toapply simplified export licensing arrangements to transfersmade between themselves whether as part of joint projectsor national purchases; and to develop lists of permittedexport destinations for jointly produced military goods on aproject-by-project consensual basis. This will not abrogatenational export controls or the EU Code of Conduct onArms Exports.

• Security of Classified Information: New simplified procedures willbe introduced for exchanges of classified information

10 See for example the 2000 decisions to purchase Meteor and the

A400M aircraft instead of American bids.

FrameworkAgreement

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between the countries and their defense industries that donot undermine the security of that information.

• Treatment of Technical Information: The Agreement commits thenations to harmonizing their contracting procedures for thedisclosure, transfer, use and ownership of technicalinformation to facilitate the restructuring and operation ofEuropean defense industry.

• Research and Technology: Co-ordination of joint activities will befostered.

• Harmonization of Military Requirements: Parties are committedto improving their co-operation in this area probably bystarting the process much earlier in the planning process(MoD, 2001).

Subsequently, negotiations have been carried out in all of theseareas to agree the administrative and technical details necessaryand in some cases have broadened to consider questions like theabolition of offset in transfers between the FrameworkAgreement countries11.

However, the agreement masks continuing areas ofdivergence between the key armaments producing countries.Firstly, the United States has successfully played ‘divide and rule’tactics over bilateral negotiations on ‘Declaration of Principles ondefense equipment and industrial co-operation’ with theFramework Agreement countries. The 2000 Declaration ofPrinciples signed by Britain and America for example aims toimprove co-operation on security of supply, market access,exports, handling of classified information, research andtechnology and military requirements. The declaration is alsovalued by British industry, which under the agreement should betreated in the US no less favorably than US companies are treatedin the UK. Similar agreements have been signed with Spain,Norway and the Netherlands, while talks are well advanced withItaly (Schmitt, 2002). In contrast, particularly in the post-Iraq warclimate, such agreements are far from being concluded withFrance and Germany. This means that the Framework Agreementcountries and ‘their’ firms are not in the same position vis-à-visthe US. Given the importance of the American defense market,this has caused resentment as has the participation of the UK, theNetherlands, Denmark, Italy and Norway in the US-led JointStrike Fighter program. Similarly, past patterns of procurementmean that the embeddedness or otherwise of national firms in US

11 Interviews with defence procurement officials in Britain and

Germany in summer 2002.

Relations withthe US


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supply chains and production deals means that some countriessee their defense industry as far more bound up with that of theUSA than others. This makes them more resistant to efforts tolegally protect European firms from American takeovers orinvolvement. Enlargement seems likely to increase the numbersof countries feeling this way given their procurement patterns,which in the 1990s were aimed at securing NATO membership.

Secondly, industry has been fairly critical of the FrameworkAgreement process, claiming that there are no real results and thatthey are not being sufficiently consulted. This is particularly trueof German firms, who complain that the process isinstitutionalizing their perceived disadvantages in comparison toother firms, because of lack of German government support fordefense industry. Moreover, the biggest arms producers Britain,France and Germany have all discovered flaws in their nationalarmaments strategies that have distracted them from pushing theFramework Agreement agenda forwards. Britain has been facedwith the difficulty of trying to operate a competitive procurementpolicy in an environment where there is essentially no longer anydomestic competition. In allowing THALES to take over Racal ithas recreated some level of competition but at the cost of publicdisagreements between the government and BAe Systems, whoargue that they should be given advantages as the remainingBritish firm in the market (Gow, 2003). France has found itdifficult to call for mergers in land and naval industries as its twomain firms in the sectors GIAT and DCN are doing so badly,that they are unlikely to be attractive partners (Schmitt, 2002).Meanwhile, the German government has begun to worry aboutthe loss of its influence along with key technologies in the falloutsurrounding the (short-lived) purchase of the HDW submarinefirm by an American investment fund, Equity One Partners.

The four OCCAR countries represent about 75% of theEU’s defense expenditure, and 80% of its procurement (RDT&Eincluded) spending. The six Framework Agreement countriesrepresent 90% of EU defense industrial capacity. It mighttherefore be supposed that the views of small member states areof little account. In fact after trying unsuccessfully to makeOCCAR a WEU institution12, the bigger producers simplyignored smaller ones13. However, the keenness of smaller defense

12 Smaller producers especially Greece and Belgium refused to accept

the end of juste retour.13 Although it should be noted that some co-operation is taking place

on armaments between smaller producers. Denmark, Finland,Norway and Sweden signed an agreement on Nordic armaments co-

ResidualProblems

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industries (particularly those like Greece with what could betermed a nascent defense industry) to protect their nationalcapacity from European rationalization, means that thecontinuation of juste retour, intra-European offset and otherprotectionist policies are still on the European arms co-operationagenda. This lack of consensus is still influencing the discussion atthe EU-15 level and has effectively prevented greater progresswithin the Western European Armaments Group (see Box 1).

Box 1: Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)

In 1976, the Defense Ministers of the European countries (exceptIceland) belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) established the Independent European Program Group(IEPG) as a forum for armaments co-operation. The IEPGthough managed little concrete achievement on co-operation.When WEU ministers met in Maastricht in December 1991 theyagreed that further examination of the possibilities of enhancedco-operation in the armaments sector, with the aim of creating aEuropean Armaments Agency, should take place. Subsequently,in December 1992 the IEPG members agreed to transfer thefunctions of the IEPG to the WEU. There were six basicprinciples for the transfer, of which the most important were:• All thirteen nations should be entitled to participate fully and

with the same rights and responsibilities in any Europeanarmaments co-operation forum.

• There should be a single European armaments co-operationforum.

• The National Armaments Directors of all thirteen nations,who are accountable to their respective Ministers ofDefense, should manage armaments co-operation in Europe.

• The existing links with NATO and the European DefenseIndustries Group (EDIG) should be maintained.

Since 1993 the WEU armaments co-operation group has beenknown as WEAG. In 2000 it was agreed that Austria, the CzechRepublic, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Sweden should joinWEAG as full members bringing the number of full members tonineteen. WEU Associate Partners (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,

operation in November 2000 aiming to reduce procurement and lifesupport costs for the participating nations and to optimise Nordicdefence industry. This agreement led to the acquisition of acommon Nordic Standard Helicopter, which is now in production.Equally, co-operation on a common submarine project continues.See www.defind.se/europaeng.htm.


20

Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) may if agreedparticipate in specific WEAG projects. WEAG states itsobjectives to be:• More efficient use of resources, through inter alia, increased

harmonization of requirements.• The opening up of national defense markets to cross-border

competition.• To strengthen the European defense technological and

industrial base.• Co-operation in research and development.WEAG carries out its work through three panels. Panel I ‘Co-operative Equipment Programs’ tries to identify opportunities forco-operative projects by comparing national equipmentreplacement schedules and following development in Europeansecurity policy such as the European Capability Action Plan(ECAP) process. Panel II ‘Research and Technology Co-operation’ currently spends approximately 100 million eurosannually on research and technology projects until recentlythrough the EUCLID program. In 2001 a new umbrellaMemorandum of Understanding ‘European Understandings forResearch Organization, Programs and Activities’ (EUROPA) wassigned. Panel III ‘Procedures and Economic Matters’ deals withdefense economics policy and arms co-operation procedures. Itconducts a dialogue with the European Commission and EDIGon these questions. The Western European ArmamentsOrganization (WEAO) was created by WEAG in 1997. Intendedto become the European Armaments Agency (EEA), it is asubsidiary body of the WEU and shares its legal personality, thusenabling it to issue contracts on behalf of its members. Unlikemany WEU functions it remains independent of the EU.Although an evolutionary process towards creating an EEA isunderway, lack of political consensus has slowed progress and theWEAO is currently acting only as a research cell.

To some extent the bigger states though have succeeded inchanging the agenda to focussing on a competitive market but aresidual strong role for the state. However, the lack of clearresults from the Framework Agreement working parties, a distinctlack of enthusiasm from industry who felt they are not sufficientlyconsulted, the failure to get smaller producing EU countries toshare their views and the initially rapid development of ESDPencouraged another regulatory player, the European Commission,to resume its efforts to gain competence in defense industrialpolicy. The emergence of ESDP has also led the other European

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Union institutions to consider their defense industrial policy roles.While technically it is for the national governments to establish anew European regulatory environment for defense industry, toreflect the changed realities, there is nothing to prevent theinvolvement of other players such as the Commission or evennon-regulatory players like the defense firms themselves.

3.3 The European Union as a Defense Industrial Policy-MakerThe European Commission has long aspired to a role in defenseindustrial policy regulation. Despite Article 29614 it has tried togain influence via Single Market legislation, competition policyand regional policy. It has some control of the specific field ofarmaments policy in four key ways:• The Commission administers the framework scheme of

research and development and some of these projects aredual-use15,

• Even if there is a defense dimension, it must give approvalfor major corporate mergers

• It gave funds to alleviate unemployment in areas affected byclosing defense bases or failing firms16 and

• It managed to set up in 1995 a largely license free regime forthe trade of dual-use goods within the EU (Taylor, 1997:132).

Equally, its industrial policy decisions have affected aerospace andnaval industry. It has though also (from the Delors Commissiononwards) tried to develop overall policies on defense industry.Briefly, in the early 1990s the European Commission lookedwedded to the idea of defense as a strategic trade17. However, 14 Defence industry is not covered by Single Market legislation and its

regulation remains the province of member states (Article 296Treaty of Amsterdam previously Article 223).

15 Although defence research is not currently officially funded by theCommission, there are many dual-use projects funded. TheCommission estimated in 1996 that a third of funded research wasdual-use.

16 This scheme was known as KONVER and ran from 1993 - 2000.Measures eligible for support included; advisory and businesssupport services to improve know-how and encouragediversification, job creation and vocational training schemes,redevelopment of military sites for civilian use, environmental andcommunity facility improvements and the promotion of tourism.

17 A strategic industry tends to be characterised by decreasing per-unitcosts reflecting economies of scale and learning, high technologyreflected in major and expensive R&D programmes, and providing


22

following great resistance by the member states to the idea ofallowing the Commission a role in defense industrial matters, theplan disappeared. The Commission’s next set of plans presentedin two communiqués in 1996/7 were considerably more freemarket orientated (Lovering, 1999: 353-5). Member states thoughstill showed little enthusiasm for the suggestions. Even the DG-Enterprise itself admits that progress on its 1999 Action Plan,which was a follow-up to the 1997 communiqué, wasdisappointing, amounting to little more than the commissioningof research projects (Liikanen, 2000). More recently, the spur ofthe development of ESDP has encouraged to Commission toagain try for an enhanced role in defense-industrial policy-making.In particular, the Commission has become a champion of the keyEuropean aerospace and defense companies, thus echoing itsearlier strategic industry approach. For Commissioner Liikanenespecially the primary goal is the establishment of a unifiedEuropean defense market, which will support the Europeandefense industrial base, which he regards as of crucial economicimportance. It is thought that he has been particularlysympathetic to industry’s agenda on this matter.

One example of this may suffice. When the EuropeanAdvisory Group on Aerospace, consisting of five EuropeanCommissioners18, the High Representative Javier Solana, twoMEPs and top-level representatives of the main Europeanaerospace firms, presented its review of aerospace policy in July2002, it met with some skepticism in national capitals. The mainrecommendations of the Report were nothing new to thosefollowing developments in European defense industrial andaerospace policy, but the way in which the report was developedwas. The report had two particular priorities: (1) Rapid progressin developing a more coherent European market in defenseequipment; and (2) Major improvement to the structure ofEuropean research and technology in civil aeronautics, defenseand space (STAR 21 European Advisory Group on Aerospace,

technological spillover into the wider economy. Examples mightinclude electronics or the nuclear industry. Competition is imperfectdue to the frequent presence of monopolies. They attractgovernment subsidy because of the assumed benefit of technologicalspillover and the desire that the country should have a share of themonopoly profits.

18 The involvement of so many Commissioners reflects the need forthe Commission to agree a common position on these matters.Mörth (2000) suggests those earlier attempts to gain competencefailed because of territorial battles on whether armaments policyshould be framed as a Single Market or a defence issue.

CommissionCommuniqués

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2002 – See Box 2). It was keen to underline that Europe may notbe able to fulfil its own policy ambitions under the CommonForeign and Security Policy if political commitments cannot bebacked up by European security and defense capabilities. Thereport emphasized the view that European civil and defenseaerospace were both complementary and interdependent and thatit needed considerable investment to match the Americancompetition. Such statements have commonly been found in thedeclarations of the European defense industrial lobbies and moreimportantly in those of the key defense firms. The decisionthough of the European Commissioners to identify themselves soopenly with the concerns of the major aerospace firms led tospeculation about the levels of access of such firms to thedecision-making table (de Defensa, 2002).

Box 2: STAR 21 Report

The STAR 21 Report’s main recommendations were:• Global markets: The report called for a level playing field

which allowed fair competition in world markets, therelaxation of "Buy American" rules, convergence in exportcontrol procedures on products with US components,reciprocal market access and international co-operationprograms to help build new trading relationships.

• Operating environment: Major increases in investment inaerospace research and development possibly backed by taxincentives. Measures should be taken to secure theavailability of a highly skilled and mobile workforce.

• Governance of civil aviation: The EU should become thepolicy-maker and regulator in all areas of civil aviation. Amaster plan for air traffic management should be developedunder the Single Sky initiative.

• Defense: The report called for the greatest efforts to build acoherent structure for defense and security equipment inEurope. Military requirements should be harmonized andprocurement budgets planned jointly. There should be morecoherent spending on defense research. Capability gapsidentified in the European Headline Goal should be bridged.Additional resources should be provided.

• Space: A consolidated European space policy with adequatefunding is needed to guarantee Europe’s independence andcompetitiveness in space. A fully Europe-based capability forsurveillance, reconnaissance and command/control shouldalso be developed.

STAR 21Report


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Subsequently, on 11 March 2003, the European Commissionreleased a communiqué about the industrial and market issues ofEuropean defense, which picks up on issues raised in their earlierreports. This missive was also in response to the EuropeanParliament’s April 2002 request for such a communiqué. TheCommission proposes action in seven areas; standardization,monitoring of defense-related industries, intra-communitytransfers, competition, procurement rules, export control of dual-use goods and research. The communiqué’s proposals are amixture of well-prepared definite proposals based on existingwork and vaguer, more political assertions sometimes based onless impressive evidence. Concretely, it plans to produce ahandbook cataloguing standards commonly used for defenseprocurement by the end of 2004 and launch a monitoring activityof defense-related industries. It will also assess the impact of asimplified European license system for intra-community transfersand controversially initiate a pilot project of defense researchrelated to aspects of the Petersberg tasks. Less concretely, theCommission intends to continue its reflections on the applicationof competition rules to the defense sector and work onoptimizing European defense procurement, with the aim ofcreating a single set of procurement rules. Interestingly it does notmention the years of substantial work already carried out byOCCAR on precisely this. It will also ask Member States to allowit to participate in the international dual-use export regimes toensure that firms are not damaged by more restrictive nationalregimes. Finally, the Commission wishes to pursue an EUDefense Equipment Framework, overseen by one or moreagencies, to pull together intergovernmental initiatives likeOCCAR and the Framework Agreement. Such a frameworkcould also use Community instruments to tackle issues like off-the-shelf procurement, security of supply and facilitatingEuropean defense trade. The European Commission does citecost efficiency of defense spending, ethics and fairness in thearms trade, security of supply and the need to respect MemberStates’ prerogatives as important considerations in its policyformulation. Its view however of an EU armaments policyappears to be principally based on maintaining a competitivedefense industrial base and obtaining better access for EUarmaments to third markets. Throughout the paper the primacyof defense industrial interests is clear, and the Commissionappears to underestimate the levels of difference there arebetween member states on these issues. There is also a tendencyto neglect the interests of sub-contractors in favor of primecontractors. The paper also takes questionable statements as

2003Communiqué

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given, for example that defense technology is a driver of civiliantechnological development. There is also an assumption thatEuropean and American defense industrial assets and contractscan be unbundled, which is not really the case. It is therefore a farfrom perfect contribution but one that is likely to form a focus ofdebate.

The other European institutions have been less active orproductive on questions of defense industrial policy. As outlinedearlier the lack of agreement at the EU-15 level has preventedaction in the Council of Ministers, although the POLARMworking group has discussed the issues. It had substantiallyignored previous Commission initiatives so at the time of writingit remains to be seen what the reaction to the Commission’s latestcommunication will be. However, as there now seems to begeneral agreement on the need for a procurement agency this mayprove a favorable moment for debate. Some of the Commission’ssuggestions though are likely to prove controversial as they movebeyond generalities into sensitive areas. Thus far Councilagreement has rested on generalities in this area. Similarly neitherthe European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, HumanRights, Common Security and Defense Policy nor the Committeeon Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy have reportedspecifically on defense industrial policy in the last five years,although vague homage has been paid to the importance of thedefense industrial base for ESDP in reports on Europeansecurity. It also should be pointed out that it was the EuropeanParliament who requested the most recent communication fromthe Commission. Additionally, the lobbying effort of the defensefirms is thought to have also had an effect on wider ESDPdebate. At least one MEP thought though that the lobbyingactivities of the defense firms were responsible in part for the lackof critical debate on ESDP19.

4. An Emerging European Defense Industrial Policy?

Analyzing the moves of the major protagonists shows that somestatements can be made about an emerging European defenseindustrial policy. Firstly, the restructuring of European nationalCold War-based defense industry has not resulted in a European

19 Elisabeth Schroedter MEP ‘Zivilmacht Europa? Konzepte und

Realitäten’, Speech at annual conference of the Arbeitsgemeinschaftfür Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in Iserlohn on 22 February2002.

Other EUInstitutions


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military-industrial complex20 or ‘Fortress Europe’, as theAmericans like to call it. Instead a complex web of economicgovernance hovering between the national, intergovernmentaland supranational authorities trying to regulate a divergingindustrial sector can be observed. Moreover, the driving ordirectorial role of the large firms in policy formulation can benoted at various points. The European political economy ofdefense can currently be characterized by relationships betweenthe key protagonists that are often conflictual and contradictory,and based on an uneasy compromise between preferences for aneo-liberal free market systems and a mercantilist ‘strategic trade’perspective. Moreover, the transatlantic issue has yet to be reallyaddressed in a meaningful way.

Notwithstanding the continuing disagreements, acompromise does seem to be emerging on the part of the keyactors that smaller players can probably be induced to accept inthe long run if not the short term. What then are the parametersof this compromise? In short, the consensus appears to rest onthe belief that maintaining European defense industrial capacity inthe shape of large prime contractors is key and that consolidationof the defense industrial sectors through mergers is the way toachieve this. There is an assumption that removing the barriers tointra-community trade will create a viable and competitiveEuropean defense market to allow such companies to thrive in away that will suit those procuring defense equipment, which willbe done collaboratively. There is also an assumption thatEuropean interests are definable and separable from Americanones. Agreement with all of these elements is far from universalbut any emerging policy is almost certain to keep theseparameters. Equally, even when rhetorical differences exist, oftenon matters of substance they disappear. France for example hasconsistently espoused a protected European defense industrywhereas Britain and Germany have emphasized value for money.However, when a much cheaper Canadian bid for the A400Mengine contract looked likely to succeed in May 2003, it was theBritish Trade and Industry Secretary, Patricia Hewitt, whopromised research funding to Rolls Royce thus allowing the 20 The use of the term military-industrial complex (MIC) is intended as

descriptive shorthand rather than agreement with C. Wright MillsMIC theory, which fails to produce a clear conceptual account of theinterrelationships and motives involved. See Slater and Nardin(1973), Lovering (1986) or Mawdsley (2002) for fuller explanationsof this point. Dunne (1995: 411) agrees arguing that, "There is noclear conceptualization of the MIC. Indeed the concept appears tobe most of value as a descriptive rather than an analytical concept."

A compromise?

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European bid to sink its price and win the contract (Done, 2003).In many ways, the political actors, be it member states or theCommission are trying to recreate the relationship that existednationally between defense firms and governments at a Europeanlevel. It is reasonable to ask particularly in the light of the A400Mengine contract decision of May 2003, whether this is actuallyaffordable. The three big defense firms are naturally supportive ofthis effort to establish a European market, even though they areall simultaneously trying to present themselves as global firms.However, there are problems with this consensus and that is thatit fails to take into account sufficiently the globalization oftechnology and the impact this has on defense and security.

Firstly, leaving aside the policy difficulties of a potential BAeSystems/Boeing merger, when we move beyond the primecontractor level of analysis it is clear that globalization is moreadvanced than many realize. This is however a contradictory andconfusing process. At the upper level of sub-systems supply, aconfusing array of joint ventures, cross-shareholding andmanagement companies masks an increasing concentration ofownership in the hands of relatively few companies21 ashorizontal mergers increasingly give the impression of quasi-monopoly provision. However, Hayward (2000) argues that theneed to insert leading-edge civilian technology into defensesystems is also hastening the globalization process, as is the needto cut development time for new systems and the growingtendency for cheaper off-the-shelf procurement further down thesupply chain. The Revolution in Military Affairs has vastlyincreased the importance of the civilian technology to defenseplatforms (Axelson and James, 2000). The firms that supply thesekey components (such as embedded software) are frequentlyglobal suppliers, thus leaving prime contractors and governmentsreliant on global firms with little incentive to abide by restrictivedefense contracting arrangements. Thus while governments orthe European Commission may worry about losing control overkey industrial assets (prime contractors and upper level sub-systems suppliers) and thus core technology, they have de factoalready chosen to lose control over the flow of defensetechnology because of these supply chain developments. This hasimportant implications as it alters the security environment inwhich the EU operates as it would mean that the militarysuperiority of the EU / NATO cannot be taken for granted.Ironically, it is precisely the transnational research environmentthought necessary to develop cutting-edge technologies (such as

21 See http://defence-data.com/ripley/pagerip1.htm for details.

The Realities ofGlobalisation


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for example nanotechnology) that makes the subsequent controlof any military spin-offs so difficult. It should however bestressed that possession of the technology does not equate to theability to integrate it into a weapons system.

This is precisely where choices made about defense affectsecurity and similarly about how choices made on the politicaleconomy of defense in Europe have a wider impact on itspolitical economy of security. If the EU accepts that theRevolution in Military Affairs technology is crucial to ESDP22,then this would impact on defense industrial policy. It wouldsuggest that arms export control regimes would need to beincreasingly nuanced to prevent the transfer of systemsintegration capabilities. Similarly, it would be more important forgovernments or the EU (depending on the scale and speed ofpolicy integration) to concentrate their limited budgetaryresources on protecting systems integration capabilities ratherthan platform (e.g. planes, ships) building capacities in anydefense industrial policy. This would though mean that prestigelarge platform projects might not be so important in the future –the systems inside the ship or plane would be more important,and so the platform itself could be procured wherever it is mostcost-effectively produced (not necessarily in the EU). This wouldbe politically very sensitive but needs at least to be considered.

Equally, the current ‘big is best’ consolidation frenzy mayprove to be misplaced. There is little evidence that even in thehigh spending American defense market that the mega-defencefirms are proving particularly profitable. Hayward (2002: 121)speculates that unbundling of these firms into smaller specialistentities may well take place as has taken place in comparableindustrial sectors like automobiles. This would also have wide-reaching industrial consequences as such an unbundling could(particularly for EADS) have the potential to renationalize somecapacities. Within EADS the reluctance to allow key technologicalcapacities to cross national borders can still be seen. Inconclusion, a consensus is emerging on European defenseindustrial policy. Whether it is affordable, too heavily influencedby the interests of three firms, or likely to provide the EU withthe military capacity it desires are all debatable questions.Crucially, though just as the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force

22 This is far from clear. Britain, France and to a lesser extent Germany

have begun to acquire these capacities. Other countries still see it aslargely irrelevant to their security plans.

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was criticized for being based on a plan for intervening in the lastrather than the next crisis, a defense industrial policy must becareful to deal with the realities of today rather than those ofearlier years.


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Documents

Union and Defense Industrial Policy · De Vestel defines the defense economy as all of the economic dimensions of defense: “industrial, technological, budgetary and employment aspects,