UNDP ISP Review - wlv.ac.uk First IS Review Report Fin… · UNDP / DFID ISP End-of-cycle Review i UNDP / DFID Institutional Strategy Paper END OF CYCLE REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF

UNDP / DFID Institutional Strategy Paper End of Cycle Review

January 2004

Mike Carter Mary Surridge Patricia Daniel

Tag (Mary) McEntegart Philip Dearden

Centre for International Development and Training

Centre for International Development and Training University of Wolverhampton Telford Campus Telford TF2 9NT [email protected] www.wlv.ac.uk/cidt Tel: (0)1902 323219

mailto:[email protected]

Disclaimer This review was financed by the Department for International Development. The views and recommendations within this report are those of the consultant, and DFID is not responsible for, or bound to the recommendations made. Acknowledgements We are very grateful to all the people interviewed during the course of this review for giving of their time and experience. We particularly thank Yvonne Helle, UNDP, and Sheila Round, UNCD, who helped with the logistics of visits and meetings and answered our many irritating questions.

UNDP / DFID ISP End-of-cycle Review

ACRONYMS

ADR Assessment of Development Results BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery BL Bilateral BRSP Bureau of Resources and Strategic Partnerships BS Balanced Scorecard BWIs Bretton Woods Institutions CAP / CSP Country Assistance Plan (formerly Country Strategy Paper) CCA Common Country Assessment CDF Comprehensive Development Framework CHAD Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Dept CO Country Office CP Country Programme CPR Crisis Prevention and Recovery DAC Development Assistance Committee DER Development Effectiveness Report DPA Dept of Political Affairs EB Executive Board ECHO Humanitarian Aid Office of the European Commission EO Evaluation Office ERD Emergency Response Division ERP Enterprise Resource Planning Ex-Comm Executive Committee agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP) GA General Assembly H&S Harmonisation & Simplification HDR Human Development Report IDA International Development Association ID(AD) International Division (Advisory Department) IDEAS International Development Evaluation Association IFIs International Finance Institutions IS(P) Institutional Strategy (Paper) LIC Low Income Country MC Millennium Campaign MDG Millennium Development Goal MIC Middle Income Country ML Multilateral MMB Mark Malloch Brown, UNDP Administrator MOPAN Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network MP Millennium Project MSP Millennium Support Programme MYFF Multi Year Funding Framework OED Operations Evaluation Department OCHA Office for the Co-ordination (Communication) of Humanitarian Affairs PRISM Performance Reporting Information System for Management PRS(P) Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper) RAP Regional Assistance Plan RBM Results Based Management RC(S) Resident Co-ordinator (System)


RDBs Regional Development Banks ROAR Results Oriented Annual Report RR Resident Representative SG Secretary General SRF Strategic Results Framework SURF Sub-regional Resource Facility TA Technical Assistance TCPR Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review TTF Thematic Trust Fund UKMIS UK Mission in New York UNCD UN and Commonwealth Department UNCT UN Country Team UNDAF UN Development Assistance Framework UNDFP UN Development Funds and Programme UNDG(O) UN Development Group (Office) UNFPA UN Population Fund UNOPS UN Office for Procurement Services UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women UNICEF UN Children’s Fund Utstein Group Governments of Germany, the Netherlands and Norway WB World Bank WEOG Western Europe and Other Governments group WFP World Food Programme


CONTENTS

ACRONYMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS…………………………………..i 1 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................1 2 METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................................1 3 BACKGROUND AND BASELINE..............................................................................................2 4 MANDATE, FOCUS AND EMERGING STRENGTHS...............................................................4

BOX 1 EVOLVING MANDATE .......................................................................................................................... 4 BOX 2 EVOLVING GOALS................................................................................................................................ 5

5 RESULTS BASED MANAGEMENT AND REFORM.................................................................7 BOX 3 EXAMPLES OF RE-PROFILING IN THE COUNTRY OFFICES............................................................ 9 BOX 4 OPERATIONAL MODEL OF INTERRELATED FUNCTIONS AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL.................. 10

6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION ................................................................................10 7 CO-ORDINATION, MDGS AND POVERTY.............................................................................12

BOX 5 DATA ON THE RC ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 2001 - JUNE 2003 ....................................................... 13 BOX 6 THE ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002 & 2003 ............................................................ 16

8 ALIGNMENT.............................................................................................................................16 9 GOVERNANCE ........................................................................................................................17 10 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY (CPR).....................................................................19 11 CONSENSUS AMONG LIKE-MINDED PARTNERS...............................................................22 12 SUPPORT AT COUNTRY LEVEL............................................................................................23

BOX 7 REFERENCE TO UNDP IN CSPS AND CAPS ................................................................................... 24 13 IS AN ISP VALID AND USEFUL?............................................................................................25 14 WAS IT THE RIGHT STRATEGY AND PROCESS?...............................................................25 15 WAS IT THE RIGHT SCALE AND TYPE OF FUNDING?.......................................................26

BOX 8 DFID’S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP................................................................................. 26 BOX 9 TOTAL CORE AND NON-CORE RESOURCES TO UNDP................................................................. 26

ANNEX 1: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED ....................................................................................28 ANNEX 2: ETHIOPIA COUNTRY VISIT: SUMMARY..........................................................................32 ANNEX 3: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS..............................................................................................35 ANNEX 4: TERMS OF REFERENCE ..................................................................................................37 ANNEX 5: CHANGE IMPACT REVIEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE ISP PERIOD...............................39


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UNDP / DFID Institutional Strategy Paper END OF CYCLE REVIEW

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction and Methodology (Section 1 & 2) The purpose of this paper is to present key findings, issues and lessons from the End-of-Cycle Review of the partnership between UNDP and DFID set out in the Institutional Strategy Paper (ISP) ‘Working in Partnership with UNDP’ published in November 2000. The study was carried out between September – December 2003 through review of key documents, semi-structured interviews and visits to London, New York, Ethiopia, India, Bolivia, China and Guatemala. Background and baseline (Section 3) The ISP period started soon after the arrival of Mark Malloch Brown as UNDP Administrator. DFID was concerned about UNDP’s lack of focus and effectiveness. ISP objectives fitted within the new Administrator’s framework but the process by which the ISP was derived did not provide the best foundation for the partnership. Focus, Results Based Management (RBM) and Reform (Section 4, 5 & 6) Declining core and increasing non-core resources were in part responsible in the late 90s for broadening rather than sharpening UNDP’s focus. Its mandate was amorphous and all-embracing; its comparative advantage became increasingly unclear as others, notably the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), moved into the ‘softer’ areas of social and human development. Country programmes were unstrategic with many fragmented microprojects and limited influence at policy level. Support services to Country Offices (COs) were highly centralised. a) Focus (Section 4 & 5) Findings:

• UNDP’s mandate and scope have been clarified with each Multi Year Funding Framework (MYFF). The number of strategic programme goals and ‘service lines’ has decreased significantly giving a considerably sharper focus to structure, capacity and portfolio.

• Programmes at country level have all undergone review as part of the reprofiling process with a marked shift upstream to more policy and advocacy work, a significant reduction in programme areas and withdrawal from unstrategic projects. UNDP strongly defends the need to maintain a base of transformational projects.

• UNDP has been impressively responsive in carving niche, in particular in ‘guardianship’ of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Democratic Governance and Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

• Concerns about focus and niche roles of different partners remain at global and country levels and are under dialogue internally, within UN Country Teams and through the UN Development Group (UNDG).

b) Results Based Management (RBM), Reform and Evaluation (Section 5 & 6) Findings:

• Most respondents including those in DFID acknowledge the depth, pace and progress of reform in UNDP over the last 3 years.

• An integrated set of RBM and evaluation tools has been developed, tested and are now in place centred on the Strategic Results Framework (SRF). Ineffective tools have been abandoned and others developed; ownership of these tools and processes is strong. A second generation of tools is evolving to address issues of


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attribution and development effectiveness; the revised assessment framework seeks to develop corporate benchmarks for substantive areas of UNDP work.

• Numerous surveys set up by UNDP (e.g. the staff survey, the product and services survey, the independent partnership survey) all show positive trends.

• The reprofiling of all offices in HQ and country has been a major step to matching policy and competencies with mandate and local needs; the process continues. Over a quarter of HQ posts have been reduced with many policy and support posts decentralised to the nine sub-regional resource facilities (SURFs).

• UNDP has had a reputation for producing ‘triumphant’, uncritical reports; we found that analysis and self-criticism are improving.

Co-ordination, MDGs and Alignment (Section 7 & 8) UNDP plays a key role in global and country level co-ordination and UN reform; the Administrator convenes the UNDG and UNDP provides the secretariat for the UNDG Office. UNDP administers the Resident Co-ordinator (RC) system at country level, the lynchpin potentially for UN and wider donor co-ordination and for UN engagement in Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) or similar processes. Findings:

• Co-ordination and reform issues have moved forward significantly under the auspices of the UNDG; progress is fragile and caution is needed in influencing the pace of further change.

• The RC Assessment system has had a marked effect on the composition of the RC cadre and on the performance of UNDP and co-ordination at country level. Some two-thirds of current RCs were not RCs four years ago; increasingly they are from other UN agencies or outside the UN.

• Co-ordination at country level is mixed and strongly relates in part to the quality of the RC and the length of time they have been in place. The RC system remains underfunded, short-staffed and lacks support from headquarters.

• Collaboration among UN agencies at country level is improving with more UN houses, consolidation of services and shared representation. But inter-agency rivalries continue and competition for donor resources acts as disincentive. Lack of co-ordination and duplication are commonplace. The ‘multiple hats’ worn by RCs present problems.

• UNDP has consolidated its role as global guardian of the MDGs, in advocacy, in supporting countries in linkages between MDGs and PRSPs, and in monitoring and reporting. Formalisation of roles and relationship with the World Bank has been a very significant step forward with collaboration at global and country levels ‘policy, not option’.

• Engagement in PRS processes is patchy; weaknesses are acknowledged and are being addressed.

• It is too soon to assess the impact of both the Millennium Campaign and Millennium Project.

• Human Development Reports and National MDG Reports continue to be an important part of UNDP work and influence. Recent Arab HDR reports have been particularly well received.

• Earlier generations of Common Country Assessment (CCA) and UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) have a chequered history. Revised guidelines promoted by UNDG place emphasis on alignment with PRSs, on timing with national planning cycles and on the UNDAF Results Matrix currently being piloted.

• Whilst recognising the importance of co-ordination and harmonisation within the UN Country Team, the transaction costs can be so high that it is at the expense of linkages with government, IFIs, bilaterals and civil society.

• The incentives system is not currently sufficient to encourage people to take the UNDAF seriously raising issues beyond revamping guidelines to include the


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governance and funding of the UN system, the plethora of separate agencies, each with their own individual country programmes, managed by independent executive boards through agency specific processes.

Governance (Section 9) UNDP claim for comparative advantage in specific areas of governance is justified, areas and contexts often too sensitive and difficult for bilaterals to engage in directly. But ‘blue flag’ strengths of legitimacy and neutrality can in some contexts be weaknesses, manifest in avoidance of the sensitive and reluctance to adopt strong policy positions in relation with government. Findings:

• From a limited baseline UNDP has made progress during the ISP period in establishing a theoretical framework, producing practice notes, relocating some specialist staff to regions, improving support systems to country offices and setting up the governance e-network.

• Support to COs from HQ, the Oslo Governance Centre and SURFs is generally reported as timely and effective; but UNDP staff acknowledge the weakness at country level.

Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) (Section 10) CPR work has moved centre stage in the strategy of UNDP with the upgrading in 2001 of the Emergency Response Division (ERD) to the Bureau for CPR, headed by an Assistant Administrator and with an approximately eight-fold increase in staff; an expansion initially largely funded from non-core DFID resources. Findings:

• BCPR has made impressive demonstrable and tangible progress. • Priority has initially been the development of capacity at global level; in HQ, the

Geneva Office and regions. There is widespread acknowledgement of a marked improvement in technical capacity of staff. Capacity is however spread thinly.

• Bureau services are in demand. Events have driven the agenda and a period of consolidation is now planned. Issues and concerns are recognised and are being addressed; concerns that BCPR is overstretching itself; that its donor base is narrow; that it may be creating demand and raising expectations that it then cannot substantively meet; that it is focusing on conflict at the expense of other forms of crisis; that it needs to focus more upstream, implementing itself less and supporting COs more.

• BCPR has recently been able to, in part, reverse its dependency on non-core funding with Executive Board’s approval of 15 additional core posts and 7% of core budget for BCPR.

• DFID heavy investment in BCPR is suspect in terms of sustainable institutional development. Some feel it has grown strangely large. It was a high-risk strategy that appears to be paying off; risk could have been mitigated at least through seeking multiple donor support.

• The degree to which UNDP’s shift in focus is sustainably supported across the UN, e.g. with the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA), is uncertain; further clarification of roles, coherence of policy and harmonisation of systems is acknowledged as necessary.

Consensus among like-minded-partners (Section 11) Seeking consensus aims to identify common positions, avoid duplication of effort, share tasks and reduce transaction costs. Findings:

• DFID has sought consensus at the corporate level but it needs to be clearer as to the objectives and risks of so doing.


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• The Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) is an example of collaboration; a group of 8 Western Europe and Other Government (WEOG) bilateral donors seeking to establish joint mechanisms for measuring multilateral (ML) performance (not yet of UNDP). MOPAN needs to involve MLs more and complement in-house partner systems.

• Seeking consensus has its pitfalls. Seeking consensus with some, infers that you are not seeking consensus with, or at least to include, others.

Support at country level (Section 12) Findings:

• UK (DFID and/or embassies) has channelled non-core funding through UNDP in at least 65 countries during the ISP period. This fact is at odds with sometimes less than favourable comments made of UNDP COs.

• UNDP or indeed any part of the UN does not figure in many CAPs/CSPs. • Early in the ISP period, DFID identified seven priority countries where there were

existing or potential areas of collaboration with UNDP at country level. Such has been the turnover of staff both in DFID COs and UNCD that the scheme has had limited success. UNCD has not had the resources to provide the services and management needed.

• DFID has been slow to recognise and applaud progress. • The imminent move of UNCD to East Kilbride is of considerable concern; continuity

in partnership is precious. Is an ISP valid and useful? (Section 13) An ISP and the associated partnership can be high in transaction costs for all and viewed as a vehicle by which a donor seeks in effect to bypass the Executive Board. Or it can be viewed as a valid and useful means for transparent sharing of interests, expertise and reporting. Findings:

• The UK was the first donor country to develop an ISP or similar with UNDP; others have followed suit. DFID has found it useful in providing a forum for in-depth dialogue.

• The Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships (BRSP) now supports similar collaboration with over 10 bilateral donors. Though the transaction costs are high, BRSP values these partnerships highly and wants them to continue.

• G77 representatives cautiously accept the validity and usefulness of ISPs, so long as they remain within the MYFF and are developed through a transparent process.

• WEOG representatives were supportive of the ISP, and generally admiring of DFID’s approach, input and effort.

• Some form of multilateral IS carries the risk of being perceived as donors clubbing together to influence beyond normal voting rights.

The right strategy and process? (Section 14) Findings:

• There were no problems with the content of the ISP. The process by which it was developed was DFID-driven and lacked transparency.

• Despite this, most informants suggest the strategy was essentially the right one. The right scale and type of funding? (Section 15) Findings:

• DFID’s contribution, both core and non-core has increased substantially; core contribution now stands at 8% of UNDP total core funds.


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• UNDP faces a number of constraints to achieving its target of $1billion core funding annually. Core funds are voluntary rather than assessed and as such constitute a system of residual, unprotected funding.

• DFID is seen as a ‘marker’ by other donors; future decisions on funding allocation carry weight beyond the funds themselves.

• UNDP has shown that it can reform and it has delivered on its objectives, most observers say beyond expectations. A considerable degree of confidence and trust has been built in the partnership. DFID needs UNDP in many fields to achieve its own objectives, not least in countries where DFID has limited or no presence and in UN reform and co-ordination.

Concluding Recommendations for DFID

• RBM systems in UNDP are robust and progressively developing and improving; DFID should therefore place more confidence in those systems and, by extension, in the organisation as a whole (see 5.6).

• The UK should be the first G7 country to develop its own MDG report (see 7.17). • DFID has sought consensus with like-minded partners at the corporate level but it

needs to be clearer as to the objectives and risks of so doing (see 11.4). • A future IS should outline how the DFID IS team in UNCD can best advocate,

communicate, influence and support within DFID especially Regional Divisions and Country Offices (see 12.2).

• International Division needs to put in place measures that will ensure continuity during the move of UNCD to East Kilbride (see 12.6).

• A future IS should remain bilateral; developed through a transparent process involving wide consultation and including a performance framework, all measures set out in the new DFID IS Guidance (see 13.4 & 14.2).

• The case is strong for an increase in DFID’s overall allocation to UNDP and a significant increase in its core-proportion (see 15.5).

• Key focus of a future IS should shift from HQ to country offices. Priorities to explore we suggest are UN reform and UNDP’s role within the UN / international development architecture, strengthening UNDP performance at the country level (including engagement in PRS, MDG and similar processes), Crisis Prevention and Recovery and Governance. All these are priorities within the new MYFF(see 15.6).


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UNDP / DFID Institutional Strategy Paper End of Cycle Review

PART I: INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND

1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 UNDP is a key partner for DFID. In common with other UN agencies it arguably has global reach, neutrality, legitimacy and standard setting capability. UNDP plays a central role within the UN Development Group (UNDG) in the promotion of greater coherence and complementarity of effort in development activities across the UN stage. As manager and funder of the resident co-ordinator system UNDP leads the UN team at country level. The DFID / UNDP partnership is based on a shared view of UNDP’s role in advocacy for poverty eradication and human development; ‘guardianship’ of the Millennium Development Goals; capacity building in policy and governance; and contributing to the international community’s prevention of and response to crisis. DFID’s financial support to UNDP over the period 2000-2002 totals approximately £205 million, of which £109 million was in the form of core resources.

1.2 The purpose of this paper is to present key findings, issues and lessons from the End-of-Cycle Review of the partnership between UNDP and DFID set out in the Institutional Strategy Paper (ISP) ‘Working in Partnership with UNDP’ published in November 2000.

1.3 The Terms of Reference for this study are attached in Annex 4. The TORs require the team:

to assess progress towards the achievement of the 10 specific objectives set out in the UNDP ISP;

to analyse the extent to which progress towards the ISP objectives has contributed to improvements in the impact of UNDP’s work in its core mandate areas;

to identify key lessons and challenges from the assessment, and wider changes and developments both inside and outside the UN, relevant to the formulation of the next DFID-UNDP institutional partnership.

2 METHODOLOGY 2.1 An earlier Approach Paper (17th September 2003) set out the objectives, methodology, key issues and programme for the review. The ISP did not include a framework of UNDP performance targets or measures of DFID’s performance in implementing the ISP. Reporting and dialogue during the ISP period has been on the basis of annual action plans agreed between UNCD and UNDP. The Review Team developed a performance framework around the 10 ISP objectives to establish a baseline and performance measures. The framework was circulated to UNCD, UNDP and the UK Mission to the UN (UKMIS) and amended (see Annex 5); framework indicators were used essentially as a checklist in data collection and analysis in terms of:

• developmental effectiveness - changes that represent the contribution of UNDP to the global development effort and MDGs

• organisational effectiveness - changes within UNDP for it to effectively deliver that contribution

• effectiveness of DFID’s partnership - indicators and evidence of DFID’s contribution through its partnership with UNDP to those changes.

2.2 The main instruments used for data collection were document review, semi-structured interviews, telephone interviews and field visits. The possible use of some form of


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questionnaire survey was discussed in the Approach Paper. The team concluded early in the process not to use this as an instrument for several reasons; we were not convinced that the response rate would be high enough; UNDP asked us if possible to avoid (for workload and duplication reasons) sending questionnaires to their country offices; we also came to the early conclusion that UNDP’s internal RBM systems were sufficiently robust for us to rely in part on them.

2.3 The document review has been extensive. Key documents are listed in Annex 3.

2.4 Semi-structured and phone interviews were conducted with key individuals or small groups of 2 or 3. In all, 88 people were consulted. Most interviews were, with permission, recorded and later transcribed / synthesised. A full list of persons consulted is given in Annex 1; key informants included:

• In UK, current and former DFID staff within International Division (ID), UNCD, CHAD, Evaluation Department and regional and country programme desks

• In New York, staff within UNDP and UNDGO; UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP; UKMIS; G77 representatives; Western Europe and Other Governments (WEOG) representatives

• Key informants from other UN agencies. 2.5 A series of field visits was made to assess UNDP operations and partnerships at the country level. One comprehensive visit to Ethiopia involved two review team members for 6 working days, allowing for extensive discussions with staff in DFID, UNDP and other UN agencies, government and civil society. Five shorter visits, to India, China, Bolivia, Guatemala and Nepal, were made by team members in the course of other DFID/FCO work; they extended their visits by 1 or 2 days to interview DFID and UNDP staff. The Bolivia and Guatemala visits were particularly useful; more time was available allowing for discussions with a broader cross-section of informants. In addition, useful interviews were held with current Heads of DFID Offices in Indonesia and Peru.

3 BACKGROUND AND BASELINE 3.1 Memories are short and individuals move on; so it is important to reflect back to the start of the ISP period, November 2000. In spite of significant efforts during the 90s to reform, UNDP’s core funding continued to decline; income increasingly became non-core, perversely driving UNDP to broaden its scope rather than sharpen its vision. Its mandate was amorphous, all embracing and unclear; lofty intentions were difficult to translate into meaningful actions. Its comparative advantage became increasingly unclear as others, notably the BWIs and RDBs, moved into the ‘softer’ intervention areas of social and human development, the very ground and rationale on which the UN development bodies had been established. Attempts to shift UNDP programme orientation upstream raised questions about its ability to compete on the policy high ground and meet the challenges of the new MYFF and Business Plan.

3.2 UNDP was far from unresponsive during the late 90s. Many reforms were undertaken during this period including restructuring of HQ and management processes, adoption of M&E systems, development of the CCA and UNDAF process, MYFF planning and much else besides. Yet still core funding declined from $1200m in 1992, $848m in 1996 to $630m in 2000, considerably below levels UNDP management considered necessary for minimum ‘critical mass’. Staff morale ebbed with reform fatigue and disagreement as to the best way forward.

“Our lack of focus and clarity was really shocking. In the late 90s the Executive Board (EB) asked us for a focus paper. The paper submitted was so vague they then asked for a focus within the focus.”

Senior Adviser, UNDP


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3.3 From 1997 on, the UK was always ‘very proactive and heavy on UNDP reform’ engaging with other donors in pushing the results based management (RBM) agenda. Nevertheless DFID’s confidence in UNDP’s ability to undergo serious reform was not strong.

3.4 In mid-1999, Mark Malloch Brown (MMB) joined as the new Administrator with a clear message for change, setting in place a Transition Team that reported to the Executive Board in January 2000. Difficult negotiations within and outside EB followed in 2000 as MMB sought to build ownership and commitment for the new vision. While other donors were mobilising behind MMB, the UK remained sceptical; trust and confidence that UNDP could reform on the lines proposed, were in short measure.

3.5 At this point, DFID sought to enter into the ISP process. In essence the ISP appears to have been DFID-constructed and taken to UNDP for approval. Since the ISP objectives did not stray outside the MYFF, UNDP had no problems with content. But in terms of process and relationship dynamics, it was very different from the approach adopted by other donors with UNDP or indeed, the approach DFID adopted with other UN agencies such as UNIFEM.


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PART II: FINDINGS RELATED TO THE 10 ISP OBJECTIVES The ISP objectives are re-ordered here roughly on a continuum from organisational effectiveness to development effectiveness.

4 MANDATE, FOCUS AND EMERGING STRENGTHS ISP Objective 4: We will encourage UNDP to further refine its mandate. We will encourage UNDP to build on the emerging strengths; and to cease to operate in all sectors in all countries and to withdraw from activities where it does not have comparative advantage.

Policy and strategy frameworks 4.1 UNDP’s mandate and scope have been redefined with each MYFF. Box 1 and Box 2 show respectively how the mandate and the corporate Strategic Results Framework (SRF) have evolved in recent years. A three-tier SRF in MYFF I has been simplified to a two-tier system in MYFF II; the number of ‘service lines’ has reduced from 45 to 30 suggesting a sharper focus to policy, capacity and portfolio. That in itself does not necessarily mean that UNDP has refined its mandate. Goals and service lines in MYFF II are expressed in broad general terms and are open to wide interpretation; it is fully possible for the corporate level structure to change comprehensively, with little or no impact at country level other than a reshuffling of programme activities to fit the new framework. The first two goals alone, Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty and Fostering democratic governance, could together include almost any development activity.

Box 1 Evolving Mandate Mandate 2000 UNDP's mandate is to help countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable human development by assisting them to build their capacity to design and carry out development programmes in poverty eradication, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods, the empowerment of women and the protection and regeneration of the environment, giving first priority to poverty eradication.

‘Mandate’ 20031 UNDP is the UN's global development network, advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. We are on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and our wide range of partners.

World leaders have pledged to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, including the overarching goal of cutting poverty in half by 2015. UNDP's network links and co-ordinates global and national efforts to reach these Goals. Our focus is helping countries build and share solutions to the challenges of:

• Democratic Governance • Poverty Reduction • Crisis Prevention and Recovery • Energy and Environment • Information and Communications Technology • HIV/AIDS

UNDP helps developing countries attract and use aid effectively. In all our activities, we encourage the protection of human rights and the empowerment of women.

4.2 Findings suggest, however, that UNDP has indeed considerably refined its mandate; messages and practice have been clear and consistent in this respect. MYFF I itself was a move to redefine strategy and focus intent, with withdrawal from areas such as education, health (except HIV/AIDS, where its focus is on assisting governments govern their response), forestry, sanitation, transport and fisheries. The MYFF II SRF was significantly 1 This ‘mandate’ though widely used as a vision statement by UNDP, has not been formally approved by Executive Board.


Box 2 Evolving Goals MYFF I 2000-2003

Three-tier; 6 Goals, 14 sub-goals (further divided into 45 strategic areas of support (not shown here))

MYFF II 2004-2007 Two-tier; 5 Goals & 30 service lines

1. Creation of an enabling environment for sustainable human development

1.1 National, regional and global dialogue and cooperation that widens development choices for sustainable and equitable growth

1.2 Strengthened capacity of key governance institutions 1.3 Increased social cohesion based on participatory local

governance and stronger local communities and institutions

1.4 An efficient and accountable public sector

1. Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty

1.1 MDG country reporting and poverty monitoring 1.2 Pro-poor policy reform to achieve MDG targets 1.3 Local Poverty initiatives, including microfinance 1.4 Globalization benefiting the poor 1.5 Private-sector development 1.6 Gender mainstreaming 1.7 Civil Society empowerment 1.8 Making ICTD work for the poor

2. Economic and social policies and strategies focused on the reduction of poverty

2.1 Human and income poverty addressed in national policy frameworks

2.2 The asset base of the poor expanded and protected (human, physical and financial)

2. Fostering democratic governance 2.1 Advocacy and support to dialogue for democratic

governance 2.2 Parliamentary development 2.3 Electoral systems and processes 2.4 Justice and human rights 2.5 E-governance and access to information 2.6 Decentralisation, local governance and urban /rural

development 2.7 Public administration reform and anti-corruption

3. Environmentally sustainable development to reduce human poverty 3.1 Sustainable environmental management and energy

development to improve the livelihoods and security of the poor

3.2 Regional and global instruments for environmental sustainable development that benefit the poor

3. Managing energy and environment for sustainable development 3.1 Frameworks and strategies for sustainable development 3.2 Effective water governance 3.3 Access to sustainable energy services 3.4 Sustainable land management to combat desertification

and land degradation 3.5 Conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 3.6 National / sectoral policy and planning to control

emissions of ozone depleting substances and persistent organic pollutants

4. Advancement in the status of women and gender equality

4.1 Gender equality in the decision-making process at all levels

4.2 Advancement of women through the implementation of global commitments

4. Supporting crisis prevention and recovery 4.1 Conflict prevention and peace building 4.2 Recovery 4.3 Small arms reduction, disarmament and demobilization 4.4 Mine action 4.5 Natural disaster reduction 4.6 Special initiatives for countries in transition

5. Special development situations 5.1 Reduced risk of disasters in programme countries 5.2 Conflict prevention, peace-building and sustainable

recovery and transition in countries emerging from crisis

5. Responding to HIV/AIDS 5.1 Leadership and capacity development in address

HIV/AIDS 5.2 Development planning, implementation and HIV/AIDS

responses 5.3 Advocacy and communication to address HIV/AIDS

6. UNDP support to the United Nations 6.1 Accelerated progress on the global agenda for

development (including follow-up to global conferences) 6.2 Increasingly collaborative, efficient and effective

operational activities for development

influenced by country demand and followed a lengthy priorities identification process carried out by all country offices with host governments and other development partners. The rationale for adopted goals and service lines is analysed within the MYFF II in terms of country demand, linkages with the Millennium Development Goals

“Even the 5 goals are perhaps too wide; but they need to be, because contexts are so different. Some areas I reckon are mandatory and if we just do those things, we’ll be doing well: supporting the poverty planning and monitoring process, likewise national development management, governance (as related to the management of national resources) and civil society participation in the decision-making process. And you need to have just a couple of projects that are strategic, very politically popular and guaranteeyou access to the people you need to see.”

Former Resident Co-ordinator

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“UNDP’s definition of its poverty and MDG role is so wide that, at the programmatic level, it still has a tendency to spread itself across a number of sectors, and in some cases into sectors in which other UN agencies have much more institutional capacity and comparative advantage.”

UNICEF Office Director

(MDGs) and the perceived comparative strengths of UNDP. 4.3 The adoption of these SRF roles and goals has in part helped to lay to rest long-standing differences within the UN family of mission overlap and creep. Dialogue under the auspices of UNDG has gone some way to address these differences. Concerns remain, perceived and real, at global and country levels and the dialogue will continue. Some degree of overlap is inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing. Where it surfaces particularly is at country level, in the functioning of the UN Country Team (UNCT), the multiple hats worn by the Resident Co-ordinator (RC) and the mobilization of resources (see section 7.12).

4.4 UNDP faces an uphill struggle in communicating its focus and clearer identity when compared say with UNICEF – children, or UNFPA – maternal health. It lacks a clear consistency globally and at the national level. Its work in policy reform, governance, capacity building and CPR ‘does not fit neatly into the main areas of political, humanitarian or finance departments.’

4.5 UNDP has been impressively responsive and strategic during the last 3 years as and when circumstances and political will have changed, in identifying niche, shifting focus and rapidly establishing capacity and visibility. This is reflected in the new SRF, in particular in ‘guardianship’ of the MDGs (see sections 7 & 8), Democratic Governance (section 9) and Crisis Prevention and Recovery (section10).

4.6 Thematic Trust Funds (TTFs) were established around the SRF practice areas in effect as a lightly ear-marked non-core funding. TTFs mobilized some $63 million ear-marked only to broad objective areas to support catalytic work at country level, and reduced, at least to some degree, the dependency of COs on chasing highly conditional and thus constricting funds.

The shift upstream 4.7 MYFF II also signalled a marked shift upstream into policy and advocacy areas. All offices have undertaken reprofiling to align policy (and competencies (see 5.7)) behind this shift and the MYFF themes, resulting in significant withdrawal in programme areas (28% according to the 2002 ROAR). The pace of this adjustment at CO level has depended clearly on where programmes fitted within the MYFF, reprofiling, CCA / UNDAF and other cycles; but three years is time enough to withdraw from unstrategic activities. Generally in the COs visited this is happening; but the pace and progress varies. In Ethiopia the CO has rapidly expanded its governance programme and is withdrawing from health (except HIV/AIDS) and education; the value of UNDP’s programme and role in co-ordination is widely recognised by government and other donors. In India, the programme was acknowledged in the Country Review 2002 as being unfocussed with a multiplicity of objectives, programmes (10) and sub-programmes (94); UNDP India is not held in high regard by others in the development community in terms of its programme, its strategic positioning or its wider co-ordination role; realignment is being addressed as a key priority of the newly appointed Resident Representative (RR).

4.8 UNDP strongly defends the need to maintain a base of transformational projects, those that are innovative, visible,

“UNDP needs a portfolio of projects that give knowledge, trust, visibility, lessons etc. To think you can give policy advice without this sort of base, is not credible.”

WB Representative


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“UNDP has made tremendous progress under MMB. They made significant reforms that have impacted on the quality of their work. They were courageous in pushing through some of the reforms that they did”.

DFID Head of country office

politically popular, learn lessons, show early success and keep staff in touch with reality. Most representatives of programme countries interviewed made it clear to the review team that they want UNDP to continue to undertake downstream projects; indeed some resent the pace and scope of the shift upstream and question the legitimacy of UNDP’s involvement upstream. This resentment is disturbing and should not be ignored by UNDP management and donors alike. Some of UNDP’s stakeholders are not fully persuaded of the argument for the move upstream; likewise some other stakeholders are not clear of the rationale and criteria for retaining a nexus of activities downstream.

Knowledge management architecture 4.9 Various systems have been set up to capture and disseminate knowledge within and beyond UNDP around the MYFF themes:

• Codification of corporate and staff experience and knowledge • SRF theme practice networks • Extensive policy guidance notes for CO management • The Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) framework, a financial and text reporting

repository, developed and tested by several agencies and due for rollout January 2004 (see 6.2).

DFID’s contribution? 4.10 DFID’s core funds, general influence and participation in Executive Board have all supported the direction and pace of change in this area, but essentially it would have happened anyway; no specific technical assistance or non-core funding have been given.

5 RESULTS BASED MANAGEMENT AND REFORM ISP Objective 3: We will support the Administrator’s efforts to transform UNDP into a more effective and efficient organisation, through strengthening its ability to measure its results and performance; and reducing the number of projects that it supports.

RBM 5.1 Informants including those in DFID almost universally acknowledged the depth, pace and progress of reform in UNDP over the last 3 years; central to this reform process has been the move to results based management (RBM) in 1998 and its development and internalising thereafter. The multitude of related documents make interesting reading; they indicate drive and strong analysis, a willingness to review, test, adapt and where appropriate reject. Even more important is, we found, a degree of ownership across the organisation (for example indicated by take-up and compliance and the comments of field staff) that others would envy.

5.2 UNDP has overhauled its RBM framework and processes during the last 3 years. They have grappled, as have we all, with issues of shifting focus from deliverables to outcomes and impacts, and of attribution and contribution ultimately to the MDGs through strategic partnerships. In 2001 an array of tools and procedures was abandoned in response in particular to feedback from country offices of high reporting transaction costs. A simplified and integrated set of RBM and evaluation tools has now been developed and tested and are in place centred on the MYFF II SRF. DFID’s support in much of this is acknowledged and appreciated. A further generation of tools is evolving (again with DFID


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”UNDP is without doubt the leader in the RBM field. Direction and support has come from the top; it has gone through distinct phases of testing different systems for effectiveness and burden and modifying and simplifying the overambitious. UNDP has secured huge buy-in across the organisation.”

DFID Institutional Advisor

support) to address issues of attribution and development effectiveness; the revised assessment framework seeks to develop corporate benchmarks for substantive areas of UNDP work.

5.3 UNDP has set up three-tier performance assessment and tracking system that feeds into the two main instruments for reporting to the Executive Board, the Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) and the MYFF Report 2;

a. outcome evaluations at programme level; whether, why and how outcome indicators have changed and the degree to which UNDP, in partnership with others, has contributed to this change

b. a select number each year of country level impact assessments (Assessment of Development Results (ADRs)); an independent quality assurance and lesson learning evaluation snapshot of UNDP’s added value, relevance, strategic positioning and overall impact in country; methodologies in which “UNDP leads DFID and probably all others in this field” (DFID former Head of Division)

c. the Development Effectiveness Report (DER) at corporate level; an assessment, with some degree of independence, of UNDP performance in and contribution to the overall development progress.

5.4 Feeding in turn into this system, are a number of tools including:

• the annual results and competency assessment for staff and managers, involving self -, peer-, and supervisor-review

• the HQ Products and Services Survey by which all field staff annually provide feedback to HQ and Sub-Regional Facilities

• the Global Staff Survey; an annual instrument for all staff to provide feedback on measures including confidence in the Administrator, pride and optimism in the organisation and job satisfaction

• the annual Independent Partnership Survey of external partners in the field; extended to more than 2500 partners in all the countries of the UNDP network

• the Balanced Scorecard (BS); introduced in 2000, the annual BS seeks to align the whole organisation to its strategy and provide a succinct baseline and history performance reading using a limited number of measures against six parameters; Programme Country Perception, Resources, Policy, Partnerships, Performance and People. Country offices and HQ service departments have their own BS based on a single set of measures against which targets are set and performance is assessed. Data sources for the Scorecard include direct quantitative measures from accounts, and department and country office report statistics; others are qualitative supplied by the Partnership Survey.

5.5 So what then is the quality of these tools, processes and reports? How valid are the comments that UNDP is ‘strong on narrative, weak on hard analysis’ (DFID Governance Adviser) or ‘superb at triumphant reports’ (Office Director of a UN agency)? Our own observations are supported by many informants in and outside DFID specialising in performance assessment and management in bilateral and multilateral agencies; that UNDP probably leads the field in institutionalising RBM and evaluation within the UN system and beyond, including DFID. It has much 2 UNDP 2003, Development Effectiveness Report, November, New York


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experience and expertise to offer in the field. Yes, you can find many ‘triumphant reports’ weak on analysis in UNDP as in most organisations (DFID included); UNDP needs to temper its use of hyperbole. Nevertheless, our view is that analysis and self-review are considerably stronger now than they were 3 years ago. A study for example of country reports (ADRs) from the first in India in 2001 to recent in Bulgaria in 2003, shows a clear improving trend in process, rigour and addressing of key issues. Two recent documents, the Evaluation of UNDP’s Engagement in PRSP Processes and the Development Effectiveness Report 2003, are strong on analysis and by no means self-congratulatory.

Confidence in in-house systems 5.6 If RBM systems are robust and progressively developing and improving, then partners and particularly donors, can and should place more confidence in those systems and, by extension, in the organisation as a whole. The analogy of the appropriateness of budget support instruments in a bilateral relationship is useful; the more confidence there is in the host systems and processes for strategic planning, operations and performance assessment, the stronger the justification for reducing earmarking and conditionality, for not setting up parallel structures and for using the host performance assessment systems and outputs.

Box 3 Examples of re-profiling in the country offices The Guatemala Country Office Implementation of the re-profiling exercise in 2001 resulted in major change. The process was moved forward by the then new Administrator, together with the focus on results-based management planning, the change in approach towards more flexible, participatory and demand-led programming and the shift in emphasis from administrative to technical support. This required new job descriptions and person profiles (e.g. negotiator, team leader), different skills and field experience. New job specifications were developed and everyone had to apply for their own (or another) job. The selection process included personality tests matched to specific posts, written and multiple-choice tests (for example, testing knowledge on the peace accords). The outcome of the process? 15 out of the 60 staff lost their jobs (‘more could have gone if we had been able to find staff to replace them’) and most of the middle management posts changed. The programme is now more SRF-focused, client-oriented, accountable, results-based and linked towards MDGs). Team members report a more shared vision. According to the Director of the Programme, the staff are moving in the right direction but further reform is still needed to meet targets. The Bolivia Country Office The Bolivia CO undertook a similar process in 2001-02. One respondent, a former employee of UNDP, reported that the reprofiling exercise was “carried out in an unstrategic way; the clear-out of staff was so drastic that much experience, expertise and organisational memory was lost in the process”. A former employee may not be the most objective person to comment. The Bolivia CO acknowledges the initial difficulties but feels they came through the exercise more aligned with the Business Plan and significantly strengthened. The Ethiopia Country Office A survey of staff skills and time spent was conducted. All staff were involved in the management, and hence ownership, of the process. The RC did not rush to fill vacant posts; rather waited until context and needs were clearer, in time bringing in new personnel until there was sufficient critical mass of pro-change staff, keen to work in the new structure and results-based framework. The project portfolio has been significantly reduced. Current staff testify to the ‘energising and empowering effects of the new focus’. Other donors indicate that the CO is now seen as a more efficient and streamlined office.


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Reprofiling and Reform 5.7 All offices at headquarters, regional and country levels have during the last three years undertaken reprofiling to align policy and competencies behind MYFF themes with considerable effects on programmes, structure and staff employment and deployment (see Box 3). Over 25% of HQ posts were reduced by the end of 2001 with many policy and support posts decentralised to the nine sub-regional resource facilities (SURFs). Reprofiling is a regular rather than one-off change process.

Box 4 Operational model of interrelated functions at the country level 5.8 Country offices serve three main interrelated functions (see Box 4). In Bolivia, the UNDP CO provides administration support services to government in, amongst other things, health insurance and passports charging 3.5% for the service. There may be valid reasons for this being part of the portfolio; for example that income from so doing supports core activities, and that government requests such services because it views UNDP’s project administration and implementation capacity as efficient and transparent, because the projects are sensitive with high risks or history of corruption and because the projects are urgent, requiring fast implementation which the government at the time feels it lacks the capacity to ensure. In Peru, the DFID Head of Office acknowledges the inconsistency, on the one hand, in wanting UNDP to be focused and strategic and, on the other, in employing them locally for administrative services for several projects ‘because they are cheap and they’ve done it quite well.’ In all circumstances some questions need to be asked e.g.:

• Does the service support core functions; or does it detract? • Are core resources in fact subsidising these services and undercutting other potential

providers? • What capacity building strategy is agreed to ensure that proper project management and

administration skills are created within the national institutions? • What exit strategy and timeframe is agreed? Several DFID staff in more than one country independently commented to the effect that “UNDP hire well qualified national staff who are not managed sufficiently strongly or sufficiently protected to be objective in their work. They are not good at getting consultants to deliver and there are sometimes personal interests in relation to particular consultants and institutions.” DFID’s contribution? 5.9 DFID has been the single largest financial contributor to UNDP’s reform process involving reprofiling, decentralisation and the independent assessment process for Resident Co-ordinators (see 7.5). DFID has also provided some TA in this area. Again, RBM and reform would have happened without DFID’s contribution, but DFID’s input has without doubt speeded and supported the process.

6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION ISP Objective 5: We will stand ready to help UNDP to develop better project design, implementation and monitoring processes. We will provide support to strengthen UNDP’s evaluation capacity and participate in joint evaluations with UNDP and other donors.

Policy and Advisory Services

Development support services

Support to the RC system


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Simplification and harmonisation 6.1 The 2001 Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) was the impetus for the 4 Executive Committee (ex-comm) agencies3 under the auspices of UNDG to harmonise the programme cycle and simplify CCA and UNDAF and programme preparation and approval processes. Several participants in the exercise emphasised its value in shared learning. It has ‘helped tremendously in understanding each other better’ and ‘has brought us much closer together’. Standardized processes, tools and formats have been developed, tested and agreed under the UNDAF for project approval and reporting, programme frameworks and resource matrices, RBM, and monitoring and evaluation including joint outcome evaluations. UNDAFs using the new processes were prepared, with individual agency components approved by their respective Boards for 5 countries in 2003 and 15 in 2004; 41 are in preparation for 2005. Adoption of these processes is now mandatory for ex-comm agencies, discretionary for specialised agencies. UNICEF informants suggested that the harmonised programming processes are more akin to their own previous model; and that for UNDP they represent a substantial institutional change.

Evaluation 6.2 The UNDP Evaluation Office (EO) has played an important role in the development of RBM and learning tools, systems and culture within UNDP; in particular outcome evaluation, country review ADRs, and the corporate Development Effectiveness Report (see 5.3). Two recent self-critical in-house EO evaluations, the Evaluation of UNDP’s Engagement in PRSP Processes and the Assessment of the MDG Reports are indicative of the organisation learning lessons and addressing weaknesses. It has also facilitated some change in pockets elsewhere within the UN system and beyond, with the potential for more and wider influence in the future. Specific areas of contribution include:

• corporate level development effectiveness; work with DFID International Division Advisory Department (IDAD) in establishing benchmarks for multilateral effectiveness

• chairing the UN Evaluation Group which has carried out joint evaluations that feed back into UNDAF guidelines

• key evaluations e.g. of National MDG Reports with revision of guidelines and recommendations beyond UNDP for others especially within the UN country team

• work with the WB, Dutch and others in IDEAS (International Development Evaluation Association) set up to support evaluation capacity in the South and to promote S-N collaboration; South-focused and run by Southern evaluators

• UNDP’s performance data repository system ERP (see 4.9); an inter-agency effort developed with and to be implemented by UNOPS, UNICEF, UNFPA and UNHCR

• the establishment of EVANET with DFID support, UNDP’s evaluation network, open to and used by others.

6.3 Several informants within UNDP suggested that the EO needs more independence and that the next step may be for much of its role to be performed more centrally within the UNDGO.

DFID’s Contribution? 6.4 ISP objective 5 is in two parts. In the first, DFID has indeed stood ready to help in design, implementation and monitoring processes but in general help has not been sought nor given. There have not for example been links with the DFID Office Instructions team in Performance and Effectiveness Department (or its predecessor). Progress in this area has occurred without DFID’s involvement; fine. Design problems at project level were probably not viewed as the issue. Priority, when this ISP objective was developed, lay more in the fragmentation of UNDP programmes, the lack of coherence and strategy (internally and

3 UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP


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across the UN effort) and too many small TA activities with limited impact; not so much that they were poorly designed or implemented

6.5 DFID’s contribution is strongly acknowledged in the area of evaluation. DFID has contributed to the evaluation trust fund (£0.95m committed) to provide seed funds for evaluation work. There has been a productive partnership through joint workshops, collaboration between staff and co-learning between the UNDP Evaluation Office and DFID’s Evaluation Department that both sides have valued; a “bilateral that has had considerable influence on our work”; “their support has been a vote of confidence”, “ they do work we believe in”.

7 CO-ORDINATION, MDGS AND POVERTY ISP Objective 1: To encourage UNDP to develop specific proposals as to how best it can strengthen its co-ordination role with the UN system, so as to focus the International Development Targets; and to give as much priority to its role in improving the international processes as to its programme delivery. ISP Objective 6:

We will encourage UNDP to continue to give weight to the 2015 poverty elimination target.

7.1 The degree to which ISP Objective 1 sounds dated is an indication of how much has changed in the last 3 years. The IDTs have evolved into the MDGs. Does UNDP give as much priority to its role in improving international processes as to its programme delivery? Yes, without doubt.

7.2 Complementarity of development partners at the country level is essential in (sic) country-led processes like PRSPs. Schizophrenic inputs, even if sound in themselves, can still constitute a tower of Babel. Ideally, governments co-ordinate; but the onus remains on all partners to cohere. The UN system, and UNDP in particular, has a strong role in co-ordination at multiple levels stemming from its neutrality and close relationship with government. The Administrator convenes the UNDG; and UNDP provides the secretariat for the UNDG Office. UNDP administers the Resident Co-ordinator system at country level and potentially can provide the main fulcrum for wider donor co-ordination.

7.3 Full membership of UNDG has expanded to 25 organisations plus five including the World Bank in an observer capacity. The reform agenda has moved “so far, so fast relative to the pace of change before, largely because of a combination of the leadership of MMB and the SG, and also partnerships where donors have pushed on the same reform issues through the various fora of the TCPR, individual agency boards and inter agency groups.” Still the pace and direction of that change may not be as fast and focused as some donors would wish but they need to acknowledge firstly how far it indeed has come in the last 3 years and secondly the fragility of that reform and of the diverse support on which it depends. If the leadership pushes faster and further than partners are prepared to go then support may collapse.

7.4 Nevertheless, sustained pressure has worked and parts of the system have no longer been able to deny that reform is needed. Take the harmonisation and simplification (H&S) agenda for example (see 6.1); some were denying it was on the agenda; now they cannot deny, are responding and on board. In addition to the H&S efforts, all ex-comm agencies collaborate at regional level. Regional teams meet to discuss region-specific issues and to develop regional work plans vis-à-vis in particular the provision of co-ordinated support to country offices, technical assistance and oversight.


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“The RC Assessment process is as concrete and tangible a reform as you can get. When you are subjecting your imperial pro-consuls who’ve been out there for 20 years to a competency test, you’re really drawing lines about what you are expecting them to do.”

UNDP Director of Bureau

“The RC Assessment has been extraordinary. Can you see DFID doing that?”

DFID Senior Adviser

A different viewpoint: We received little comment other than positive about the fairness and impact of the RC assessment system. The sole exception was a senior manager in a UN humanitarian agency. “I have my doubts about (the assessment system). Some of the people we know are the weakest as managers come out in the first tier; some of the most effective fail. The assessment may assess your capacity more as a co-ordinator than a doer and achiever. If you complete your one-hour simulation exercise in 20 minutes, you’re perceived as someone who doesn’t want buy-in, who pushes too fast. It fosters a ‘UN excessive politeness syndrome’ with RCs who are good co-ordinators and elegant diplomats, rather than achievers. If we send someone as a candidate and they fail, we normally conclude the system has failed, not the person. If we‘ve known them for over 20 years, we know their weaknesses and strengths. For political and other reasons RCs still get put in countries despite the reservations expressed by some agencies. There is a tendency for successful candidates from humanitarian agencies, presumably on the obvious grounds of experience and strengths, to be posted to countries in crisis. We’d like to be known other than as good truck drivers who like working in difficult conditions. If our staff know they are always going to be posted to difficult situations, it puts them off applying.”

Senior Manager, UN humanitarian agency

Resident Co-ordinators and the Assessment Centre 7.5 The resident co-ordinator system is the lynchpin of field co-ordination. The independent Resident Co-co-ordinator Assessment Centre has been used to test new candidates, since 1998 and from 2002 for serving RCs as they move post. Major concerns surfaced in the review of the first phase of the scheme; in particular that it favoured Western modes and was not gender and culturally sensitive. Representatives of the ex-comm agencies worked closely on re-design. The scheme appears to have had a very considerable, some say dramatic, positive effect on the organisation and on co-ordination at country level. Some two-thirds of current RCs were not RCs four years ago. Though the current overall pass rate is 74.5 % this does not account for high levels of self de-selection. The average age is now 10 years younger. Many are from other UN agencies or from outside the UN altogether (respectively 31% and 9% from 2001 – June 2003). “The whole attitude is now so totally different; take peer review, now everyone acknowledges that peers are not necessarily at the same grade.” If the RC assessment system has been as successful as many informants say, is there value in extending the system or variants thereof to other cadres within the organisation?

Box 5 Data on the RC Assessment System 2001 - June 2003 Total number of candidates assessed: 173 (54 women, 119 men) Overall pass rate: 74.5% Total number of UNDP staff candidates: 93 (pass rate 78.2%), Total number from other UN agencies: 63 (pass rate 59.5%) Total number of external candidates: 17 (pass rate 65.9%)


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“UNDP has played a very important role in encouraging donor harmonisation and pooled funding; this makes our planning for PRSP implementation so much easier.”

Senior Economist, MOFED, Ethiopia

Co-ordination at country level 7.6 The success of UNDP co-ordination at country level (both of the UN agencies and the wider donor community) is patchy and relates significantly in part to the quality of the RC and the length of time they have been in place. Significant steps have been made in the functional co-ordination of UN agencies at country level but inter-agency rivalries continue and competition for donor resources acts as disincentive. Lack of co-ordination and duplication are commonplace.

7.7 In Ethiopia the RC plays a strong role in co-ordination and commands respect within the UNCT, donors and government. The UNDAF was completed in October 2001. The RC played a leading role in establishing the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) which UNDP co-chairs with the WB in support of the PRSP. UNDP also takes a lead role on MDGs, which are integrated into the PRSP and is working directly with government to develop a joint approach on MDGs, through a government/donor taskforce. The national MDG report was published in April 2002. Pooled donor funding has been set up and managed by UNDP to support the work of the DAG, the PRSP process and the MDG Taskforce. UNDP has moved forward the harmonisation process, at the request of government, to streamline donor assistance and procedures.

7.8 In Bolivia, UNDP’s UN co-ordination has been active with completion of the CCA in June 2000 and the latest UNDAF in March 2002; the UNCT and government published the second national MDG report in March 2002. Wider donor co-ordination by UNDP ‘has been limited,…. spasmodic’. UNDP has not strongly and systematically taken the initiative; links with the Ministry of Finance have been weak and the IFIs and bilaterals have tended to lead. They have been strong in some areas; reconciliation between political parties (see 9.6); and support to the national dialogue for the first PRSP though this had ‘little impact on the PRSP itself because of the weak link between the participation process and the PRSP document.’

Coherence of UN presence 7.9 Collaboration among agencies is improving. Common premises have clear potential benefits in facilitating closer interaction among staff of UN agencies, in promoting a more unified presence at country level, in enabling sharing of support services and in reducing administrative costs. 52 UN houses have now been established with 27 further planned; though what qualifies as a ‘UN house’ varies; it does not mean that all UN entities in-country are necessarily on-board.

7.10 Various models are under discussion and/or being trialled for consolidating services and for supporting smaller agencies through representation in-country. Mechanisms for cross-agency cost-recovery are being explored. Back-office functions such as banking are an obvious service area that UNDP could be providing.

7.11 UNDP acknowledge (DE Report 2003) that “the UN system, led by the SG and the UNDP Administrator, has to place even greater emphasis on coordinating the activities of different UN agencies.… The RCs are given their considerable convening power as a neutral partner, and …..are in a unique position to support dialogue mechanisms. For them to do so, the UN country system needs to be substantially upgraded and professionalized.”

“I was shocked when I went to the recent Consultative Group meeting on Bolivia in Paris. There are 9 UN agencies here in La Paz, most work out of separate offices. Five sent representatives to Paris; two made no statement from beginning to end, they did not open their mouths. It was such a waste of money; a real jolly.”

DFID Head of Office


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Enhanced staffing has been provided (with DFID support) to larger country RC units. The RC system remains “underfunded and short-staffed especially in smaller countries;….. it lacks adequate support from headquarters”.

7.12 But is UNDP ‘a neutral partner’? Within the wider development community, perhaps; but within the UN system informants often suggest otherwise. The ‘multiple hats’ worn by RCs, the position of UNDP as manager of the RC system and chair of UNDG presents problems within country teams. For UNCT meetings, both the RC and Deputy Res. Rep. typically will attend, the former as team co-ordinator, the latter as UNDP representative; teams often rotate the chair, so the RC does not necessarily chair. Such measures clearly help but jealousies remain vis-à-vis the perceived advantage UNDP has at project level where mandates overlap. We are not in a position to recommend measures to address this; the problem may decline of itself as there are more non-UNDP RCs in post (though while RC they in effect become employees of UNDP) and as UN reform progresses with clarification of mandates and possible rationalisation. We asked many informants (inside and outside UNDP) whether the whole RC system should be managed independently of UNDP and the answer was generally negative. We remain uncertain; there are arguments both ways with regard to global and country level co-ordination, for UNDG and the RC system to be more independent of UNDP.

MDG ‘guardianship’, PRSP/MDG linkages and strategic partnership with the Bank 7.13 UNDP has been very successful firstly in strategically consolidating its role as global ‘guardian’ (‘campaign manager and scorekeeper’, appointed by the SG) of the MDGs, in establishing the MDGs primarily as advocacy tools, in supporting countries in linkages between MDGs and PRSPs, and in monitoring and reporting. And secondly in formalising its role and relationship with the World Bank. For the WB President Jim Wolfensohn to address the UNDP RCs as he did at their October 2003 retreat and to say that for WB and UNDP COs to work closely together is ‘policy, not option’, signifies a radical change that would not have been thought possible two years ago. A formal two-page letter issued jointly by the WB and UNDG in May 2003 clarified the relationship between the MDGs and PRSPs. Before there wasn’t even agreement on ends, now at least there is a common agenda; debate on means is expected, but goals are shared. These are very significant changes in the co-ordination scene.

7.14 Findings from our limited visits concur with those of the EO’s recent report on the Evaluation of UNDP’s Engagement in PRSP Processes. The report portrayed a mixed picture at country level of generally weak linkages between poverty diagnosis and PR policies, a lack of clarity of respective roles of UNDP, the UNCT and BWIs, poorly synchronised schedules, limited participation by government line ministries, and a patchy capacity and competence in COs to engage in policy dialogue and to broaden the focus beyond macro-economic issues. A management response to the report has been agreed and is being implemented.

The Millennium Campaign (MC) and Millennium Project (MP) 7.15 It is too soon to assess the impact of both the MC and MP. The Campaign has started implementing strategy globally with national campaigns in 40+ countries. With the basic infrastructure in place, the Project has shifted to primary research in seven case study countries; an interim report is due in June 2004. The Sachs costings for meeting the MDGs are awaited with interest.

Human Development and MDG Reports 7.16 UNDP continues to publish its influential Human Development Report (HDR) and to facilitate Regional and National HDRs (over 450 in the last decade). It is also supporting National MDG Reports (produced in over 50 countries so far with more imminent) which are effective in advocacy, awareness raising, benchmark setting, policy formulation and capacity


“Thebecaa crawhenanyw

“Thebecoworkgettin

building. The degree to which these are country owned and led varies but this is an acknowledged issue and the trend is in the right direction.

Box 6 The Arab Human Development Report 2002 & 2003 DFIDs Middle East and North Africa Dept offered the Arab Human Development Report as an example of UNDP using its comparative advantage to good effect. The impact and timeliness of the report were emphasised. It has been widely acclaimed within the region and beyond; its ownership has remained very much regional. It challenges in a way that would not have been possible for other agencies and does not shy away from challenging issues of gender, human rights and governance. 7.17 That LICs and MICs are expected to regularly put themselves under the microscope and HICs not, is seen by some as an irritation. The Swedes and Danes are apparently preparing national MDG reports. The UK should be the first G7 country to develop its own MDG report. The data is there, reported in other forms; the exercise would be straightforward, the output useful in itself and it would send a clear signal that the UK is prepared to do what is asked of others.

DFID’s contribution? 7.18 The contribution of DFID’s considerable earmarked funding is widely acknowledged; for example for the Millennium Trust Fund (£3.5m committed over three years), country co-ordination and the development and operation of RC assessment centre (£2.5m), and the MDG Leadership Fund (£0.286m). The scale and depth of the progress in these areas would not have happened without this support. Just as important has been the driving, challenge and lobbying roles played by DFID. DFID also during the IDA13 negotiations took a line supdifferentiation of roles in relation to the Bank.

8 ALIGNMENT ISP Objective 2: To encourage UNDP to work closely with otherStrategies and the Comprehensive Developmenimplementation of national strategies for sustainabetween the different country-level planning framew

8.1 The CCA and UNDAF have a chequered history and reputation. UNDP’s own Partnership Survey in 2001 revealed that UNDP was not perceived as effective in integrating into government systems; few informants expressed a positive opinion about the timeliness of response by UNDP and flexibility was not seen as a strength.

8.2 The CCA and UNDAF processes have evolved painfully. Non-UN informants’ comments about the UNDAF

“Of course the money’s been important, but much more important has been the lobbying, driving role that DFID has played; this has been vital. The preparedness of DFID to take up these issues in London, in the GA, on the agency boards and then at country level and back again has been very significant; that circle is very important.”

UNDP Director of Bureau

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UNDAF was a complete flop in Nepal use it was running parallel to the PRSP, zy idea to have a separate framework there was a national one emerging ay.”

DFID Senior Manager, Nepal

re’s a danger with the UNDAF that it mes inward looking. Yes they need to together but not at the expense of g out and working with others.”

DFID Head of Office

porting the UN, arguing for a clearer

donors in pursuit of Poverty Reduction t Framework approach; to promote the ble development; and to seek coherence orks.


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were often adverse; most referred to a previous generation of UNDAFs; that they are ‘toothless’, ‘involve huge transaction costs’ and ‘add little or no value’. Criticism is not restricted to beyond the UN. But they nevertheless are key potential tools for stimulating coherence and co-ordination within the UN and beyond. Revised guidelines promoted by UNDG place emphasis on alignment with PRSs, on timing with the national planning cycle and on the UNDAF Results Matrix currently being piloted. The logical extension is perhaps a move towards a single UN-wide development programme and a UDAF, a Unified Development Assistance Framework involving all donors.

8.3 Several informants commented that the jury was still out on the effectiveness and influence of the CCA and UNDAF and their influence on PRSP processes. Some felt that there had been too much emphasis on harmonisation within the UN system, with energies spent on ‘making the formats and reports look the same’ rather than the more fundamental issues of synchrony and alignment with the national priorities and PRS processes. It helps if UNDP is coordinating with UNIDO, but it is of little consequence if the UN as a whole is seen to have little power and importance or UNDP is not engaging in key dialogue with government, IFIs, bilaterals and civil society.

8.4 Some agencies HQ and field staff question the transaction costs of the UNDAF. The RC system depends heavily on the goodwill of country team members. The incentives system is not currently sufficient to encourage people to take the UNDAF seriously both at country level and globally. There is room for some important breaking with the past; going beyond revamping guidelines, to the purpose and form of the CCA and UNDAF themselves, the governance and funding of the UN system, the plethora of separate agencies, each with their own individual country programmes, managed by independent executive boards through agency specific processes. Why for example as a more obvious and immediate measure, doesn’t UNICEF have the same Board as UNDP/UNFPA?

DFID’s contribution? 8.5 As per 7.18.

9 GOVERNANCE ISP Objective 7: We will work with UNDP to help it to identify its comparative advantage in governance, to work more effectively with others and to strengthen its in-house governance expertise; and to learn from each other’s experience.

9.1 The Ministerial meeting of September 2000 immediately following the Millennium Summit endorsed the strategic vision of UNDP and the essentially governance thrust of its Administrator’s reform. Hindsight belittles the change, but prior to the Millennium Declaration such was the sensitivity of the term ‘governance’, it was barely in UNDP vocabulary. The first MYFF Goal 1 spoke rather of the ‘Creation of an enabling environment

“All our country directors complain that the CCA/UNDAF is for us such a heavy mechanism. In many countries we have only a couple of projects and yet we have to spend an incredible amount of time going through the whole exercise where we’ve only got say one school feeding programme. We’d do better investing that time just working with UNESCO or UNICEF and getting on with it.” Senior Manager, UN humanitarian agency

“Just when the 9 or 10 agencies (i.e. us country directors - each a primadonna) are working together, in the natural course of events, someone is transferred and the successor appears and opens it up again. As a newcomer they’ve no organisational commitment to what the predecessor had agreed. So it drags on and on.”

UNDP Resident Co-ordinator


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“In 3 years we have become the governance organisation of the UN. That was courageous when governance was still a dangerous word and democratic governance even more so; now it is part of the everyday lexicon.”

UNDP Head of Bureau

for sustainable human development’. During the early days of MYFF I, the euphemism was replaced not just by governance but by ‘democratic governance’. What resistance there was to the change was sited in New York rather than in programme countries, where demand for UNDP support and services in this field has risen rapidly.

9.2 The second MYFF outlines the key areas within democratic governance for which support is sought and for which UNDP claims some comparative advantage; advocacy and support to dialogue, parliamentary development, electoral reform, justice and human rights, access to information, decentralisation and public administration reform and anti-corruption. Governance is now the SRF goal with the highest concentration of UNDP activities and programme expenditure.

9.3 In many areas and contexts UNDP has a clear niche in democratic governance, a neutrality and legitimacy to question, challenge and address the effectiveness and integrity of the government machine, in issues that may be too sensitive and difficult for IFIs or bilaterals to engage in directly. On the other hand perceived ‘blue flag’ strengths of legitimacy and neutrality can in some contexts be weaknesses, manifest in avoidance of the sensitive and reluctance to adopt strong policy positions in relation with government.

9.4 Has the Governance goal been used to ‘dump’ treasured but unfocused activities from the previous MYFF? The answer is probably no. The main candidate is Information Communication and Technology which disappeared as a practice area from MYFF I and has resurfaced as ‘e-governance’; but the rationale is there in terms of access to information, transparency, open government and public disclosure.

9.5 Capacity and competence are not built overnight. From a limited baseline UNDP has made progress during the ISP period in clarifying what it means by governance, establishing a theoretical framework, producing practice notes, relocating some specialist staff to SURFs, improving support systems to country offices and setting up a governance e-network. Staff in the field particularly value the governance e-network; with about 500 members inside and outside UNDP, it operates as a ‘powerful forum for debate and information. Who knows anything about …? Who else has a project on …? Who knows the best consultants for …? Answers come from co-practitioners; not just from the advisory support team.’

9.6 Reports from the field in relation to UNDP effectiveness in governance were mixed. In Bolivia, UNDP locally was recognised as having carved a technical niche around the role of political parties and the State in development. The RC ‘played well to his strengths’ of being Latin American himself and generally using UNDP’s legitimacy in ‘engaging in political issues in a way impossible for IFIs or bilaterals.’ Elections were not going to happen until disputes between political parties were resolved. He set up a reconciliation process and forum to dialogue for party leaders at loggerheads. They have managed a DFID funded project in electoral reform ‘reasonably well’.

9.7 In Indonesia where UNDP is involved in a multi-donor (including DFID) governance partnership, UNDP’s input was considered ‘very weak’; the UNDP CO acknowledges this weakness and plans are in place to provide a UK/Dutch funded governance adviser for the partnership.

9.8 In Ethiopia governance is the largest single UNDP programme, taking up 50% of the budget. There is no specialist adviser in-office but TA is provided, through support from the SURF and consultants, on a wide range of government activities: judicial reform, civil service


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reform, parliamentary reform and civil society development. There is some disagreement in the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) about their collective position with government on democratisation and human rights issues. UNDP, among others, feels that much has been achieved by getting these issues on to the agenda; others disagree and seek greater pressure and conditionality.

9.9 Emphasis over the next few years needs to focus more at country level, not just the advisory core. Support to COs from HQ, the Oslo Governance Centre (set up in 2002) and SURFs is generally reported as timely and effective; but UNDP staff acknowledge the weakness at country level. Typically, staff in a CO handling governance projects are not likely to be governance specialists; they will either be rotational international staff (Junior Professional Officers, few in number) or, more likely, national officers. They might have some governance background but were probably recruited broadly. Recent reprofiling may have allowed for more targeted recruitment of national officers. Addressing this will need multiple approaches; quantity, in terms of a review of budget allocation, positioning of staff and donor core and non-core allocations; quality, in terms of more systematic assessment and recruitment processes and priorities and training of current staff.

9.10 Some of these needs are shared with other donors’ country programmes, DFID included, and could be addressed together. Training, virtual or reality, of generalist country level staff could make a real difference. The training would not need to be high level; more orientation, lessons, case studies of good practice, contacts, where to find the best institutions in particular fields, the best literature etc. Recent Belgian-funded research and training at CO level in parliamentary systems has provided a useful small-scale model.

9.11 In conclusion, scepticism as regards UNDP capacity in governance was completely understandable 3-4 years ago but things have moved on. It is still an imperfect organisation, but there has been measured and visible progress in the quality of people, performance and engagement globally and in many countries. The fact that that general scepticism remains, irritates and a more balanced response is sought.

DFID’s contribution? 9.12 DFID’s contribution has been limited. It has not supported the Thematic Trust Fund for this MYFF goal. Informal contact and more formal event-based collaboration with DFID staff has been ‘very valuable’. It has not led to big institutional cooperation but some co-ordinated effort has happened on a number of fronts. A challenge throughout has been the constant change in both organisations over the last 3 years such that staff find it difficult to keep track of who is where and what the latest structures, priorities and perceptions are. A more systematic communication and strategic collaboration is needed for opportunities and issues high on respective agendas that would advance better with joint effort

9.13 Entry points for engagement with DFID at country level are not always straightforward. For example, some areas like governance are not conducive to budget support instruments and in some countries there is perceived to be limited openness to multilateralism in the governance agenda.

10 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY (CPR) ISP Objective 8: We will work with UNDP to identify its comparative advantages in the crisis and post-conflict area.

10.1 The pace of change in CPR within UNDP over the last 3 years has been such that momentum itself is a challenge. CPR work has moved centre stage in the strategy and objectives of UNDP. Approval from the EB was given to upgrade in November 2001 the


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“Generally the quality of staff in BCPR is very good. That their profile has increased is reflected in the fact that they have literally 100s of applicants for posts. ERD was not a popular place to work; BCPR certainly is. That’s indicative of growing reputation.” DFID Head of country office

previous ‘small but effective’ Emergency Response Division (ERD) to the Bureau for CPR, headed by an Assistant Administrator and with an approximately eight-fold increase in staff; an expansion initially largely funded from non-core DFID resources. The degree to which this shift in focus is sustainably supported across the UN, e.g. with OCHA and DPA, is uncertain; further clarification of roles, coherence of policy and harmonisation of systems is acknowledged as necessary. The case internally within UNDP for the shift and concomitant reprioritisation in resourcing appears to have been won at corporate level with mainstreaming throughout the SRF; less so perhaps at country level. Issues such as small arms, mine action, disaster recovery and conflict resolution are not necessarily seen as traditional development.

10.2 Priority for the bureau has been the development of capacity at global level; in HQ, the Geneva Office and regions. We found widespread acknowledgement of a marked improvement in technical capacity of staff. ‘They have some real experts now on certain issues.’ Capacity is spread thinly, however, and the Bureau may sometimes be a little too grandiose in its ambitions compared with its capacity to meet those ambitions.

10.3 Bureau services are in demand; some 65 COs feature CPR activities in their programme, 15 in depth. Events have in part driven the agenda with conflict related crises taking ‘too much precedence’. In a number of high profile situations and where the Bureau has provided heavy support to the CO in managing affairs, BCPR has shown it can operate quickly and innovatively through strategic partnerships on the ground. The rapid setting up and disbursement of the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund is cited as an example; variants of the model are being used also in Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Iraq. UNDP’s ability to raise and spend funds fast in a post-conflict situation has been recognised by BWIs and bilateral donors. This has led to new and unexpected roles and partnerships emerging for example with the WB. In Iraq UNDP/BCPR, as chair of the UNDG, is coordinating with the WB the Joint Needs Assessment for Iraq involving 13 UN agencies and others. ‘For the first time, the international response will be grounded on a real assessment of needs rather than just on what you think donors are going to give.’ In Liberia, UNDP has been similarly involved under BCPR leadership.

10.4 Areas of comparative advantage claimed by UNDP can work against its effort, in particular BCPR effort. Two examples:

• Proximity to, and de-linking, from the state. In Nepal, the UNDP CO has been “slow to engage in CPR issues. BCPR encouraged them to take conflict prevention into account in their governance programme, but planning and implementation were superficial. They wanted to bury their heads in the sand, wait till it passed so they could get on with ‘real’ development.” (Review mission member).

• Multiple roles in country. “In Africa in conflict situations we keep bumping up against UNDP’s contradictory roles of a) coordinating the system, as the interface between the international community and the transitional government/group in power and b) being sucked into the quest to get funds through implementing projects.” (DFID Senior Adviser).

10.5 Issues and concerns are recognised and are being addressed:

• that BCPR may be overstretching itself by creating demand and raising expectations it then cannot substantively meet. Consolidation is ongoing around focus countries


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with an emphasis on the development of strategic frameworks for programming, jointly developed by BCPR, CO and the relevant regional bureau.

• that it focuses on conflict at the expense of other forms of crisis; disaster reduction especially has a low profile (not just in UNDP, internationally). BCPR has good people but is this being picked up and communicated to Regional Bureaux and COs? The launch of a global report prepared by BCPR on Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development scheduled for February 2004, is evidence of growing policy attention to this sector.

• that capacity at country level is, in general, weak. As with governance, time is a remedy as recruitment and experience build; more emphasis on strategic training of CO staff through regional CPR workshops organized by BCPR will be of value and Virtual Development Academy training in the conflict field is now available.

• that BCPR needs to focus more upstream, implementing less itself and supporting COs more. Success for BCPR as with CHAD may be better indicated by the CO having a project say in small arms, rather than BCPR itself going in and running the project.

• that BCPR’s donor base is narrow and sustainability weak. The donor base is growing with 24 countries now investing. Multi-year flexible support (earmarked only thematically) through the CPR TTF from UK, Norway, German, Italy and the Netherlands increased 280% (from $8.2m to $22.8m) between 2001 and 2002. Earmarked funding in response to crises in the international spotlight still constitutes the main resource base; overall TTF income in 2002 was $119 million. Responding to crises with less media and political attention remains a challenge. BCPR has recently been able to, in part, reverse its dependency on non-core funding. UNDP Executive Board approved 15 additional core posts for BCPR and 7% of core budget to CPR technical support and oversight.

• the funding gap immediately post-conflict whilst missions are being planned and waiting perhaps for a donor funding conference. New guidelines developed by BCPR for assigning core funding are expected to help address this challenge.

• the need to mainstream into regular COs activities such as the CCA. In collaboration with UNDG new guidelines have been developed for input to the CCA and UNDAF process.

• the need for further partnership building especially with DPA and OCHA; exactly what BCPR’s comparative advantage is, remains unclear to some. The dialogue continues. And, again under UNDG, mechanisms are being developed for recovery and reconstruction needs assessment, strategic planning and nation building. Plans are in hand for placing an officer in 10-14 countries (with an initial pilot phase of 6) for supporting co-ordination, planning and transition activities.

10.6 After the frenetic pace of the last 3 years, BCPR now plans a period of consolidation. Possible indicators of successful consolidation include reflection of progress, a clearer idea of what their comparative advantage is, a strategic plan, and a step back from doing things and rather being TA and policy support to others doing, particularly the COs.

10.7 As with other aspects of this ISP, we need to remember the starting point and the distance travelled. BCPR has made impressive demonstrable and tangible progress.

DFID’s contribution? 10.8 Changes within UNDP in this area, more than in any other, reflect the contribution of DFID’s heavy investment. Most donors prefer to see their funds going directly to crisis countries; DFID took a different approach to support capacity building. The partnership between BCPR and CHAD has been very close, to the extent that CHAD staff participated in the recruitment process of BCPR technical experts.


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10.9 This investment in BCPR is suspect in terms of sustainable institutional development. The sheer size is an issue; some feel BCPR has grown strangely large relative to other parts of the organisation and that its role has been distorted as a consequence. That much of DFID support has been for staffing costs, left BCPR vulnerable to the whims of a single donor. It was a high-risk strategy that appears to be paying off; risk could have been mitigated by presenting a more gradual case to the Executive Board or at least by seeking multiple donor support. G77 representatives see it as an example of a single donor driving their agenda, of bilateralising a multilateral. With the Board’s recent approval of additional BCPR posts and resource allocation from core funds; with the growing non-core support from other donors; and if the percentage of posts funded by DFID and DFID’s percentage contribution to BCPR’s overall budget both continue to decrease, this will all help to ensure sustainability. It could however be used to vindicate the G77 position.

10.10 DFID funding to BCPR has hitherto been earmarked, conditional, linked to specific teams and workplans, and subject to regular reporting and reviews. DFID currently is moving towards multi-year funding with much less earmarking and reporting.

11 CONSENSUS AMONG LIKE-MINDED PARTNERS ISP Objective 9: We will seek to encourage a consensus among like-minded partners in support of these approaches.

11.1 The ISP is unclear, perhaps deliberately, as to who DFID’s like-minded partners are. On the one hand it refers to working ‘with other EB members from both donor and programme countries to develop consensus’; on the other hand it says that ‘among donors, we shall give particular emphasis to working with the Utstein group4’. Why seek consensus with like-minded partners? The ISP suggests ‘in support of changes needed to increase UNDP effectiveness.’ Identifying common positions, avoiding duplication of effort, sharing tasks and reducing transaction costs for all parties are further laudable reasons for seeking consensus. But seeking consensus with some, infers that you are not seeking consensus with, or at least to include, others. As an objective, it does have its pitfalls.

11.2 DFID/UNCD has indeed sought consensus at corporate level. UNCD and UKMIS have met regularly with representatives from the Western Europe and Other Governments group (WEOG) to share policy and tasks. For example, the Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) is a group of 8 WEOG bilateral donors who have met since 2002 to establish joint mechanisms for measuring ML performance. Several donors had previously operated their own surveys with their embassy and development agency staff as the main informants. Process and tools (questionnaires) have been developed and are currently being tested (though not as yet on UNDP). We are not clear as to the rationale for MOPAN. Donors need to assess the impact of their contributions, financial and otherwise, but as a general principle in partnership this is best done through strengthening internal systems rather than setting up parallel external ones. DFID has indeed been doing this through collaboration with UNDP in the Multilateral Effectiveness work being carried out by IDAD. The UNDP partnership survey was set up in part for a 4 The Utstein Group – the Governments of Germany, Netherlands and Norway.

“The partnership with DFID has been the mainstay for BCPR. DFID was not driving the policy; its interests coincided with a prior internal policy paper presented to the Board….. Their intellectual partnership has been so helpful…… They have been very progressive in seeing the need to build the capacity in UNDP, in OCHA and in DPA; it was courageous and it has paid off.”

UNDP Head of Bureau


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similar purpose and it is ironic that the bilaterals are the poorest respondents (they also as one group of stakeholders in UNDP score them the lowest – but that is another matter). UNDP is apparently the only multilateral to operate a similar survey and then to share the findings publicly. So there may well be justification for MOPAN but it needs to complement in-house partner systems. Seeking consensus can hurt partners if they are trying to provide the processes and data donors want and they are then ignored.

11.3 A second example has been the Vision and Options for Change for the International Development Architecture work carried out by DFID International Division. DFID clearly needs to have internal think tanks to think ‘blue sky’ and hone policy. Who it does this with and how it then shares the output is important. In this case it was shared with others in the WEOG group but not with UNDP, who nevertheless received a copy through other channels. Again, partners are sensitive and seeking consensus is a delicate objective.

11.4 In conclusion, DFID has sought consensus at the corporate level but it needs to be clearer as to the objectives and risks of so doing. Whether it has at country level is covered in the next section.

12 SUPPORT AT COUNTRY LEVEL ISP Objective 10: We will selectively support this Strategy’s objectives at a country level

Priority countries 12.1 In the early days of the ISP, UNCD invited DFID COs to identify whether this or another UN agency ISP, related strongly to their context and priorities; where there were existing or potential areas of collaboration with UNDP at country level. Seven priority countries were subsequently identified; Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Nepal, China, India, Bolivia, Brazil. We visited four of these countries, and in only one (Bolivia) did informant DFID staff know theirs was a priority country. We may not, of course, have been talking to the right people; it does nevertheless suggest that communication of and support for the ISP could have been better. Within a 3 year period there is clearly a substantial turn-over of staff. Designated contact positions (as opposed to persons) are needed, with services offered by UNCD, regular contact made and feedback sought.

UNCD resources 12.2 UNCD has not had the resources needed to provide these services and manage the partnership effectively. ‘Many ISs will need to include structured and focused partnerships with other parts of DFID, including country offices, to deliver the IS objectives ....’ (DFID Institutional Strategy Guidance). We suggest a future IS with UNDP should outline how the DFID IS team in UNCD can best advocate, communicate, influence and support within DFID especially Regional Divisions and Country Offices. How can it best:

• Involve in IS development? • Launch, circulate and communicate the IS? • Input into RAP and CAP development and annual planning? • Sustain communication and support to policy, regional and country offices?

The resources for doing this need to be considered against likely gains. DFID partnership at country level 12.3 We recognise that RAPs and CAPs are needs-, field-, PRS-driven, not driven from the centre and that UNCD faces a challenge in seeking to influence the RAP and CAP cycles. There is a mismatch. DFID country staff are often not flattering about UNDP; and yet the UK (DFID and/or embassies) has channelled non-core funding through UNDP in at least 65


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countries during the ISP period. Mention of UNDP in CS/APs is the exception rather than the rule (see Box 7).

Box 7 Reference to UNDP in CSPs and CAPs A quick word search was carried out of 20 current CSPs, CAPs and draft CAPS available on the DFID website.

► Three (Bolivia, China and Indonesia) of six priority country CS/APs mentioned UNDP (Sierra Leone not available)

► Four (Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia) of 14 other ‘big spenders’ mentioned UNDP

► Ten of the 20 CS/APs mentioned the UN or any UN agency. 12.4 The view that ‘bilateral is king’ was heard from several DFID staff. It suggests that bilaterals, DFID included, are reluctant to let go conditionality approaches to aid. There is also a lack of awareness or recognition of the impact of UNDP reform on performance or a constructive engagement at country strategy level for all to improve and learn. DFID has a strong Bank orientation; the inference seems to be that if you are pro-Bank, you must be anti-UN, which is odd. We share UNDP’s concern that the attitudes of many DFID staff towards the UN system are based on scant, anecdotal evidence, often dated.

Engagement 12.5 DFID has been slow to recognise and applaud progress during the lifetime of this ISP. This has especially been the case over the last 12 months, during which time UNDP has found that DFID has largely disengaged. This may have simply been due to changes in staff and reorganisation on DFID’s side; or reticence as the end-of-cycle neared and decisions about future commitments approached.

UNCD’s move to East Kilbride 12.6 We are very concerned about the imminent move of UNCD to East Kilbride and the implications of a substantial turnover of staff and interlocutors. Continuity in partnership is precious.


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PART III: CONCLUDING ISSUES

13 IS AN ISP VALID AND USEFUL? 13.1 The UK was the first donor country to develop an ISP or similar with UNDP. Other donors have followed suit with plans of various forms. Collectively the ISPs have been useful to the Administrator for presenting a case to the EB that prior policy areas (such as CPR, RBM and evaluation) have broad support. For the Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships (BRSP), the transaction costs in their dealings with donors are very high. BRSP now reports to and has annual meetings with more than ten bilaterals. Through such dialogue it asserts it can explore specific issues in greater depth than through the Board. UNDP has taken the ISP very seriously, has found it very useful and has used it effectively to its advantage. It wants to continue separate IS-like processes with individual donors.

13.2 There is a case for arguing that, through an IS and the ensuing dialogue, the bilateral seeks to by-pass the Executive Board. This case was made by some G77 representatives met. They acknowledged however that, as programme countries, they have their own, though clearly very different, partnership, dialogue and plan with UNDP; also that donors have particular responsibilities for accountability of taxpayers’ money. ISs are valid they suggest so long as they remain within the MYFF and are developed through a transparent process.

13.3 WEOG representatives were supportive of the ISP, of DFID’s approach and generally admiring of input, effort and influence. Logic would suggest that forming like-minded groups would help to multilateralise these bilateral processes. The next generation of IS should, again logic suggests, be more multilateral in its development and in the kind of monitoring and reporting systems put in place; they should not be just bilateral. Several reasons were given by WEOG informants why this may not be the case, and why bilateral ISs should continue:

a) donors are obliged to account to their taxpayers, the inference being that this merits a special two-way relationship b) donors and UNDP value the two-way dialogue c) lots of like-minded partner consensus can be perceived by others as threatening, as ganging-up and even more forcefully driving a donor agenda.

13.4 We are not persuaded by reason a). We suggest however that b) and c) make a strong case for a new bilateral IS. UNDP have themselves said they want one; they value the challenge function, the professional sharing, the in-depth dialogue and the influence that it can help bring to specific pressure points, in a way that is not always possible in the Executive Board forum. A multi-donor IS runs the risk, perceived and real, of donors ganging up, of joining forces to influence beyond EB voting rights and of jeopardising relations with other key partners.

14 WAS IT THE RIGHT STRATEGY AND PROCESS? 14.1 As was mentioned in section 3, the ISP was essentially DFID-constructed and taken to UNDP for approval. Since the ISP objectives were all part of the first MYFF and since DFID was not asking UNDP to do anything it itself was not planning to do, UNDP had no problems with content. But process and relationship dynamics were poor. Application of the new DFID IS Guidance will help considerably in the framing of a future IS, with early discussion with UNDP on the appropriate process and inclusion of a performance framework. Communication and consultation we suggest should be wider than last time, in particular involving G77 representatives and DFID Regional Divisions.


14.2 Was it the right strategy? In spite of the problems with the initial process, most informants (in UNDP, in DFID and WEOG) suggest the strategy was essentially the right one. The ISP touched specific entry points and helped address areas of priority to both UNDP and DFID.

15 WAS IT THE RIGHT SCALE AND TYPE OF FUN15.1 DFID’s financial contribution to UNDP in recent yeperiod 2000-2002 core and non-core contributions have£32m respectively, an average total of £68m, comparecore contributions have risen in dollar terms by over 900given during the ISP period for example to reform, coufunds such as BCPR. The use of TTFs as a form contribution appears to have been valid and effective contribution has also increased, by 49%, and now stanfunds.

Box 8 DFID’s financial contribution to UNDP 1997 2000 – 2 Total Core Non-

core Total C

US$m 43.9 38.8 5.1 109.4 5Pounds equiv. £m 30.6 27.0 3.6 68.0 3 15.2 Total core and non-core resources to UNDP aresources reached a trough in 2000 with a gradual u(estimated); this in part reflects changes in foreign excDuring the late 90s, donors switched funding from cohave continued to grow past the upturn in core giving. Tof donor funding could imply a desire to increase morglobal programmes. Some non-core allocation has beethematically and has lead to COs chasing resources atalso makes budget management more difficult and Predictability of funding has deteriorated and UNDP aresources to develop and maintain a ‘critical mass’ ofdependent on fewer donors providing a disproportionateG7 country in Europe that pays a fair share (UNDP sugg

Box 9 Total core and non-core resources to UNDP5 (US$ millions) 1997 1999 2000 Total UNDP core 761 681 634

Total UNDP non-core7 1,500 1,834 1,857 2

15.3 UNDP faces a number of constraints to achievinannually. Core funds are voluntary rather than assessedresidual, unprotected funding. So where a donor coagencies like UNDP receiving voluntary support have t

5 Adapted from Worthy, K et al (2003). UN Agencies Financing. DFID 6 Source Bruce Jenks; estimate as of 1 July 2003 7 Calculated from Total Income – core funding

“They have taken this ISP much more seriously than we have.” “This was one of our better ISPs; the paper itself and the influence it has had.”

DFID Head of Division

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DING? ars is summarised in Box 8. For the annually averaged about £36m and d to a total of £30.6 in 1997. Non-%, reflecting the earmarked support

ntry level co-ordination and thematic of non-core, yet loosely earmarked during this ISP period. DFID’s core ds at some 8% of UNDP total core

002 average Change +/-% ore Non-

core Total Core Non-

core 7.9 51.5 +149.2 +49.2 +901.0 6.0 32.0

re given in Box 9. Declining core pturn since, more marked in 2003 hange and in part donor behaviour. re to non-core; non-core resources he growth in the non-core proportion e direct influence over country and n highly restricted geographically or the expense sometimes of focus. It in particular the staffing of COs. rgue they no longer have the core

staff in COs. Funding has become share. Arguably the UK is the only est an arbitrary level $1 per capita).

2001 2002 2003

652 663 7676

,095 2,298 n/a

g its target of $1billion core funding and as such constitute a system of

untry faces an economic downturn, o carry the full burden of cuts. Also


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UNDP usually has no domestic base in home ministries for securing funding or political support; particularly as it focuses more on upstream policy and advocacy work.

15.4 DFID should not underestimate the degree to which it is seen as a ‘marker’ by other donors. UNDP needs DFID on board, not least because where DFID goes others may follow. This is certainly the case should DFID decrease its funding and core-proportion; it may apply should it increase. DFID is reluctant to be seen to reward retrospectively, rather it prefers to invest in an agency framework and business plan for the future. Nevertheless reform and effective performance in the past build confidence in the future. By the same token were DFID, for whatever reason (e.g. change in policy vis-à-vis the international development architecture), not to increase funding at least above zero-growth following a period of progress would have repercussions on staff morale (reformers would lose credibility and influence) and other donors may use it as a reason not to increase or maintain their own contributions.

15.5 The case is strong for an increase in DFID’s overall allocation to UNDP and a significant increase in its core-proportion. We conclude (and several informants within UNDP made the same point) that the high proportion of non-core funds in the current ISP period has arguably been justified; DFID has used its support with varying degrees of earmarking to good effect. But UNDP has shown that it can reform and it has delivered on its objectives, most observers say beyond expectations. DFID needs UNDP in many fields to achieve its own objectives, not least in countries where DFID has limited or no presence and in UN reform and co-ordination. A considerable degree of confidence and trust has been built in UNDP and in the partnership; this being the case, the crux of future strategy should take the form of core investment in the MYFF.

15.6 Key focus of a future IS we suggest should shift from HQ to country offices. Aside from rationale and systems for core investment in the MYFF, priority areas of mutual interest, influence, expertise, and potential co-learning we suggest are:

• UN reform and UNDP’s role within the UN / international development architecture • Strengthening UNDP performance at the country level (including engagement in

PRS, MDG and similar processes) • Crisis Prevention and Recovery • Governance

Rather than DFID wrestling with its own policy in isolation or with like-minded partners, it should discuss its position, the options and constraints with others, in UNDP, UNDG and across the UN system. All the above are priorities also for UNDP in its new MYFF and DFID should build on the partnership and trust built over the last three years.

Annex 1: List of Persons Consulted

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ANNEX 1: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED8 NEW YORK UNDP Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships (BRSP) Mr Bruce Jenks, Director, BRSP Ms Nicola Harrington, Director, Division for Resources Mobilisation (DRM) Mr Turhan Saleh, Director, MDG Unit Mr Mourad Wahba, Director, Division for UN Affairs Ms Yvonne Helle, Resources Mobilization Adviser Mr Stéphane Vigié, Deputy Director, DRM Bureau for Development Policy Mr Terry McKinley, Policy Adviser, Socio-economic Development Group Ms Jennifer Topping, Senior Adviser Governance, Institutional Development Group Mr David Kim, Programme Manager, HIV/AIDS Group (interviewed in Ethiopia) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) Ms Julia Taft, Director, BCPR Ms Ameera Haq, Associate Director Ms Sam Barnes, Chief, Strategic Planning Unit Bureau of Management (BoM) Mr Nicholas Rosselini, Chief of Directorate Evaluation Office (EO) Ms Fadzai Gwaradzimba, Senior Evaluation Adviser Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC) Mr Neal Walker, Co-ordinator, LA Oversight and Support Centre Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (RBEC) Ms Gulden Turkoz-Cosslett, Senior Programme Manager and Cluster Head Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) Ms Mary Symmonds, Country Programme Adviser, SADC and Indian Ocean Cluster Operations Support Group (OSG) Ms Elena Tischenko, Programme Specialist Human Development Report Office Ms Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Director UN Development Group (UNDG) Ms Sally Fegan-Wyles, Director UNDG World Bank Mr Eduardo Doryan, Special World Bank Representative to the UN, NY Missions to the UN Mr James Kariuki, First Secretary, UK Mr Phil Evans, Social Development Adviser, UK Mr Alexander Alimov, Second Secretary, Russian Federation 8 * Telephone interview


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Mr Azanaw Abreha, Development Secretary, Ethiopia Ms Norma Taylor Roberts, Deputy Permanent Representative, Jamaica Mr Bhagwant Bishnoi, Counsellor, India Ms Kjersti Rodsmoen, Counsellor, Economic and Social Affairs, Norway Mr Frank Fass-Metz, Counsellor, Development Affairs, Germany Mr Geert Vansintjan, First Secretary, Belgium Mr Pelle Enarsson, First Secretary, Sweden Ms Kitty van der Heijden, First Secretary, Netherlands UNICEF Ms. Cecilia Lotse*, Director of the Program Funding Office Ms. Anupama Rao-Singh*, Deputy Director of Programs Ms Isabel Maria Crowley*, Senior Program Funding Officer ROME WFP Mr Jean-Jacques Graisse*, Deputy Executive Director (Operations Department), WFP UK DFID Mr Tony Williams, Head UN and Commonwealth Department Kr Kenny Dick, Deputy Head UNCD Ms Sheila Round, Manager, International Relations (UNDP & UNIFEM), UNCD Ms Rachel Turner, Head of International Division Advisory Department (IDAD) Ms Alison Scott*, Senior Social Development Adviser Adviser, IDAD Ms Sandra Pepera, Senior Governance Adviser, IDAD Mr Bernard Harbourne*, Senior Conflicts Adviser, Africa Great Lakes and Horn Department Mr Michael Mosselmans, Head, CHAD, (Former Head of UNCD) Ms Fenella Frost, Adviser, Disaster Reduction, CHAD Operations Team Ms Claire Hickson, Governance Adviser, CHAD Mr Toby Sexton, ECAD; formerly of Global Issues and Institutions team, CHAD Mr John Wearing, Global Issues and Institutions team, CHAD Mr Gerry Duffy, Head of Western Asia Department Dr Colin Kirk*, Head of Evaluation Department Mr Jonathan Lingham, Deputy Head of MENAD Mr Tony Faint – Retired Former Director, International Division, DFID Mr Bill Kilby*, Programme Manager, Africa Great Lakes and Horn Department FCO John Pearson, UN Dept, FCO INDIA UNDP Dr Maxine Olsen, UNDP Resident Representative, UN Res Co-ordinator Mr Harsh Singh, Assistant Res Rep, Chief Programme and Resource Co-ordination Mr Dennis Lazarus, Deputy Res Rep, Operations DFID India Mr Alex Kremer, Programme Manager, National Team Ms Anna Lake, Deputy Programme Manager, National Team Ms Liz Burgess, Programme Manager


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BOLIVIA UNDP Mr Alfredo Marty, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative, Mr Gonzalo Calderón, Chief Programme Officer DFID Bolivia Mr Sam Bickersteth, Head of Office, DFID Bolivia Mr Oscar Antezana, Economics Adviser Mr Erick Zeballos, Private Sector and Rural Livelihoods Adviser Ms Ana Elio, Office Manager Ms Rosalind Eyben*, Researcher, IDS, Sussex; Former Head of Office, BFID Bolivia PERU DFID Peru Mr Mark Lewis, Head of Office, DFID Peru Mr Carlos Santiso, Governance Adviser INDONESIA DFID Indonesia Ms Sarah Richards*, Head of Office, Indonesia (Formerly Senior Adviser CHAD) NEPAL UNDP Roger Khane - Resident Representative Alessandra Tissot - Deputy Representative (Programme) DFID Nepal Alex Harper - DFID Deputy Head of Programme Peter Neil – DFID Livelihoods Adviser Frances Harper- DFID Statistics Adviser GUATEMALA UNDP Ms Barbara Pesce-Monteiro, UNDP Resident Representative, Guatemala CHINA UNDP Macleod Nyirongo: UNDP Deputy Resident Representative DFID China Chris Athayde: DFID Deputy Head of Desk Fiona McConnon: DFID former Head of Field Office, Beijing Sue Milner: DFID Education Adviser Eric Woods: DFID temporary Education Adviser (maternity cover) Local Officials involved in UNDP/DFID Project Li Hanrong: UNDP Project manager for UNDP Distance Learning project, Gansu .Province Lu Sheng Lin: Director to Education bureau, Tianzhu County


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Dang Xiao Chao: Distance Learning Specialist, North West ‘Normal’ University for Teacher Education, Lanzhou

Yan Deng Yun, Director Tianzhu Normal School (Teacher training College Staff of Tianzhu Normal School Headteacher and staff of Hua Zang Township School Headteacher and staff of Shi Men Township School ETHIOPIA UNDP Mr Samuel Nyambi, UNDP Resident Representative, UN Res Coordinator Ms Nileema Noble, Deputy Res Rep Ms Vinetta Robinson, Senior Economic Advisor Ms Kristin Seljeglot, Economic Adviser Ms Daniela Zampini, Economic Adviser, Recovery programme and PPP Mr Jamshed Kazi, Governance Adviser Mr Getachew Assamenew, Programme Manager for Food Security and Recovery Ms Janette Moritz, PRSP Coordinator Mr James Prudhomme, Mine Action Coordinator UN Family Mr Paul Hebert Head of Unit, OCHA Deputy Representative, UNESCO Ms Georgia Shaver, WFP Representative and Country Director Dr. Monique Rakotomalala, Representative, UNFPA Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Government of Ethiopia Mr Fisseha Aberra, Multilateral Head Mr Admassu Nebebe, UN Team Head Mr Getachew Adem, Macro-Economy Policy Head DFID and British Government Amb. Myles Wickstead, British Ambassador Mr Peter Kerby, Head of DFID Office Ms Melkamnesh Alemu, Food Security Advisor Mr Kalayou Gabreselassie, Capacity Building Advisor Ms Hazel Bines, Education Adviser Other Bi And Multi-Lateral Donors Mr René van Nes, EC Economic Adviser Ms Antoinette Gosses, Head of Development Cooperation, Netherlands Embassy Ms Karen Kronlid, Socio-Economic Advisor, Sweden Embassy Mr Alex Kyei, IMF Resident Representative Mr John Jackson, Counsellor, Canada Embassy Civil Society Mr Fekade Tsegaye, Co-ordinator, Christian Relief and Development Association

Annex 2: Ethiopia Country Visit Summary

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ANNEX 2: ETHIOPIA COUNTRY VISIT: SUMMARY Introduction There is evidence of radical change in UNDP’s internal and external operations over the past 2 years. We have highlighted emerging issues not as criticisms but as observations of what are normal ‘problems’ arising as part of the process of change, which may need to be taken into account in replicating a similar process elsewhere. 1. Co-ordination and Poverty Reduction Objectives 1, 2 and 6 The Res Rep plays a key rôle in co-ordination and he commands the respect of both donors and government. He is Resident Co-ordinator for 26 UN agencies and Head of Humanitarian Assistance. Additionally he has played a leading rôle in establishing the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) which is organised around DBS and other instruments, in support of the PRSP. UNDP co-chairs the DAG with the World Bank. UNDP also takes a lead rôle on MDGs, which are integrated into the PRSP (long-term) and is working directly with government to develop a joint approach on MDGs, through a donor/government taskforce. Pooled funding has been set up to support the work of the DAG, the PRSP process and the MDG Taskforce. This includes: funding the DAG Secretariat; support for civil society involvement in the PRSP process; support for monitoring and evaluation; research for the recent MDG report and planned HD report; and capacity building for government, especially to support public sector reform. UNDP has moved forward the harmonisation process, at the request of government, to streamline donor assistance and procedures. Key issues: It is widely recognised that the personal qualities of the Res Rep, especially his

relationship with government, are fundamental to his success in the co-ordinating rôle. He has been in post for 5 years and there is general concern that progress will be impaired when he leaves in 2004, although the high-level dialogue architecture has been established.

There are high transaction costs for donors in the transition towards harmonisation:

pooled funding for support activities; employment of staff; and time dedicated by high-level representatives at weekly DAG meetings as well as thematic working groups.

Some UN agencies question the legitimacy of UNDP to play so many rôles, there is still

some competitiveness around rôles and resources within the UN family and some suspicion about UNDP motives in co-ordination.

Similarly, within the DAG, there are differences of opinion about strategy and tactics.

Some donors see the UNDP focus on consensus among donors, as well as maintaining good relationships with government, comes at the expense of certain principles. DFID has challenged where UNDP has not been seen to be strong enough.

2. Organisation Effectiveness Objectives 3, 4, 5, The Res Rep took seriously the re-organisation of the country team and streamlining the country programme, even before the re-profiling exercise. He strategised to keep people on board as well as create opprtunities for new staff. UNDP has radically reduced its traditional portfolio of projects and established new programmes in governance and recovery, with a focus on moving upstream. They are also a flagship for UNDP’s global HIV/AIDs strategy, which involves a multi-stakeholder, bottom-up approach: pilot successes are being adopted for upscaling by government. ROAR is operating effectively: all staff complete an annual review which clearly shows how their own performance targets contribute to the MYFF. The


33

country programme will be reviewed by an international team in 2004. Staff are favourably oriented to performance-based management; they testify to the ‘energising and empowering’ effects of the new focus and to the development of UNDP as a ‘learning organisation’ (especially through increased internet exchange). There are more opportunities for national staff to upgrade their qualifications and move into higher posts. Other donors testify that UNDP is now seen as a much more efficient and streamlined organisation. Key issues: UNDP Ethiopia have been pro-active in response to changes in the wider agenda: they

have taken and interpreted messages for change from headquarters and international dialogue, and embraced the opportunity to move upstream.

While UNDP staff are highly committed and enthusiastic, streamlining and the results-

based focus has implications in terms of staff workload, with high levels of responsibility and the pressure to perform in new areas of work.

3. Governance Objective 7 Governance is now the largest single UNDP programme in Ethiopia, taking up 50% of the budget. The Programme Manager is not a governance expert but technical assistance is provided through consultants in a wide range of activities: judicial reform, civil service reform, parliamentary reform and support for civil society development. Democratisation and Governance are included in the PRSP/SDPRP with a focus on 3 areas: decentralisation, justice system reform and urban management. There is disagreement in the DAG about how far to push the government on democratisation and human rights issues. DFID and UNDP have collaborated on support for civil society to be engaged in formulation, implementation and M&E of the PRSP. This has included: setting up a donor working group; a CSO taskforce; a Challenge Fund for direct grants to strengthen CSO capacity; and providing technical support through the Ministry of Capacity Building. UNDP have developed good relationships with the leading pastoralist (I)NGO. Key issues: Civil society perceives that international donors have not come out forcefully enough in

support of CSO involvement at high level in policy and technical committees, or in CSO legislation, nor is there any institutionalised relationship with donors or government. In this respect, the UNDP focus on engaging government seems to have excluded civil society, to a certain extent.

Governance is probably the most hotly debated topic in the DAG and there are concerns

about the speed of decentralisation and the government’s capacity to implement this effectively.

4. Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Objective 8 UNDP is playing a key rôle in co-ordinating humanitarian aid and promoting an integrated approach which links relief with longer-term plans for development in areas affected by emergencies. With support from DFID, it has run a pilot Recovery Programme in Somali Region, bringing together local government, NGOs, UN agencies and civil society (particularly pastoralist leaders). They have developed a holistic response to the management of resettlement in order to provide the required infrastructure, services and opportunities for longer-term livelihoods of IDPs, a model which will now be upscaled to other emerging regions. Mandated by donor concern over the government’s emphasis on too-rapid resettlement, UNDP has also worked with government to establish the Food Security Coalition; there is now a strategy paper proposing longer-term solutions, including


34

agricultural growth; diversification; and health services, which are to be integrated into the PRSP. Key issues: While supporting the Food Security Coalition, donors, including DFID, are also pursuing

bilateral interventions in this area. DFID has secondees to WFP, EC and WB, to support M&E of food security projects.

The Head of the WFP does not recognise the legitimacy of the Res Rep to lead this

initiative. This may partly stem from the fact that the WFP HQ agenda is to increase the number of recipients of food aid in contrast to the UNDP approach, which is to reduce the number!

5. Partnership with DFID in-country Objective 10 There is a close working relationship between UNDP/DFID, particularly at the leadership level, in moving forward key processes. DFID has initiated and seed-funded a number of key strategic mechanisms to support UNDP, as well as working directly with government to support their development of the SDPRP. DFID also works closely with WB and EC and is generally recognised as a key player in change and reform, although DFID does not ‘fly its own flag’. The ISP provides a good entry point into discussing difficult issues at country level with UNDP, as it specifies an official DFID position. Key issues: As the DFID office grows in capacity, and has more direct influence with government,

there is some envy among other donors. Some perceive that DFID has an obligation to share information, ‘be more transparent about what it is doing’. The fact that initiatives have actually been moved forward with DFID’s support, without DFID claiming credit for them, has a potentially negative aspect.

Despite adhering to the spirit of the ISP in practice, there is no mention of partnership

with UNDP in the CAP and there is no direct contact between UNCD and DFID in-country. Suggestions from the country office for the next IS are to include indicators relating to: ♦ a small number of clear activities to be undertaken in-country ♦ how UNCD and country office work together towards country objectives

Annex 3: List of key documents

35

ANNEX 3: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS

• The ISP, annual action plans and reports • Annual ISP Review reports • UNDP MYFFs and Business Plans • Annual Addresses by the Administrator to the Executive Board • UNDP Regional Bureaux plans, Cooperation Frameworks and country programme

review reports • UNDP. RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles. Policy paper • UNDP. Managing for Results: Strategic focus and integration of RBM into

programming instruments and management practices. Policy paper • UNDP. Managing for Results: Monitoring and Evaluation in UNDP. Evaluation Office

paper • UNDP. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluations. EO paper • UNDP. Assessment of Development Results. EO paper • UNDP. The Resident Co-ordinator Assessment Centre. Policy paper • UNDP. UNDP knowledge services. Policy paper • UNDP. Partners in Human Development: UNDP and Civil Society Organisations • UNDP. UNDP Advocacy Results. Review paper • UNDP (2003). Evaluation of UNDP’s Engagement in PRSP Processes. EO paper • UNDP. Aiming for the MDGs: A perspective Policy paper • UNDP (2003). Parliamentary Development. Governance Practice Note • UNDP. Annual Balanced Scorecard Reports • UNDP (2003) Human Development Report • UNDP (2002) Arab Human Development Report • UNDP ROARs and other performance and lesson learning reports • Annual UNDG Year-end reports on Results Oriented UNDG Priorities • UNDP. Assessment reports of in-country projects • UNDP. Assessment of Development Results reports for India, Sudan, Bulgaria • UNDP. Development Effectiveness Report 20001 and 2003 • UNDP (2002). Progress on the MDGs; Bolivia 2002 • UNDP (2003). Report on the Assessment of the MDG Reports • DFID Directors Delivery Plans for International and Regional Divisions • Priority country CSPs, CAPs and review reports (All CAPS / CSPs word searched;

see Box 7) • PRISM reports of projects and programmes undertaken with UNDP • Reports from DFID field visits • Background papers for DFID’s internal review of ML partnerships including funding • DFID Multilateral effectiveness papers • DFID (2003). Vision and Options for change for the ID architecture by Intl Div • DFID (2003). UN Agencies Financing Report commissioned by UNCD • Swedish MoFA (2000). Mobilising Support and Resources for the UNFPs by • Swedish MoFA. Swedish Strategy Framework: Working in Partnership with UNDP,

UNFPA and UNICEF’ • CDF Evaluation Steering Committee. Toward Country-led Development: a multi-

partner evaluation of the CDF • Donor Presentation on the implications of PRSP for Development Assistance, March

2002, Ethiopia • Strategic Challenges in Ethiopia: Donor Coordination, PRSP Process,

Harmonisation, Financing for Development

Annex 3: List of key documents

36

• UNDP (2001).Transforming the UNDP Ethiopia Country Office: Change and Reprofiling Process

• Focus on Ethiopia, Newsletter from the UN Country Team, 3rd October 2003 • Memorandum of understanding between the Government of Ethiopia and donors

concerning donor support to PRSP preparation in Ethiopia, UNDP Direct Execution • Annual Report 2002, Donor Support to the PRSP Preparation in Ethiopia • Development Assistance Group (2002) Joint Partner Review of the Ethiopian

Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme. 5th September 2002 • Phase II Donor Support to the SDPRP Implementation Process in Ethiopia, January

2003 • Geda A. and Weeks J.(2002). Evaluation of UNDP’s rôle in the PRSP process in

EthiopiaUNDP. Evaluation Office, October 2002 • Mechanisms for Enhanced Government-Donor Dialogue in Ethiopia • UNDP Project ETH/02/002 Recovery Strategy for Ethiopia, Status Report. June 2003 • DAG Technical Working Groups (2003). Consolidated Thematic Review Note on the

PRSP/DBS Policy Matrix. 17th October 2003 • Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Nations Development Programme regarding a contribution towards donor support to the PRSP preparation in Ethiopia, 5th March 2002

• DFID, 2003. Ethiopia: Country Assistance Plan, • MOFED (2002) Development and Poverty Profile of Ethiopia. Welfare Monitoring

Unit, March 2002 • EPPD / MOFED (2003). Ethiopia: Framework of Goals, Actions, Outputs and Targets

for World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit. Government of Ethiopia, September 2003

• Government of Ethiopia (2002). Partnership for Enhanced Aid Delivery. December 2002

• UNDP (2003). Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Prospects for Ethiopia. UNDP, October 2003

• Robinson V. (2003) Millennium Development Goals: What do MDGs mean to the UN System

• Key Elements of a Strategic Framework for DAG Support to Civil Society Engagement in the SDPRP, DAG, October 2002

• Global Compact Ethiopia, Issue 1, October 2003 • UNDP (2003). Voices of Change, Voices of Action. Transforming the response to

HIV/AIDS. An Ethiopian experience • UNS Guatemala (2003). En Acción, Año 1 Número 5 • UNS Guatemala. Un Agenda para el Desarrollo Humano, 2003 Informe Nacional de

Desarrollo Humano, Guatemala • Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction Targets in Latin America, UNDP, ECLAC,

IPEA • UNS Guatemala (2003). Metas del Milenio. Informe del Avance de Guatemala

Annex 4: Terms of Reference

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ANNEX 4: TERMS OF REFERENCE DFID’S DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP WITH UNDP: ASSESSING PROGRESS, DEFINING CHALLENGES AND ESTABLISHING FUTURE PRIORITIES Introduction 1. Following a wide-ranging consultation process with other donors, civil society and UNDP, DFID published its Institutional Strategy Paper (ISP) ” Working in Partnership with UNDP” in November 2000. The four-year ISP provides a framework of 10 objectives (Annex A) designed to improve the impact of UNDP’s work in its core mandate areas and strengthen the DFID-UNDP partnership.

2. In support of the ISP, DFID has so far contributed £37 million per annum over 3 years (ending in 2003) to UNDP’s core resources. These resources are over and above £x [will be available soon] million non-core resources provided by DFID’s bilateral programmes. DFID would now like to commission an independent assessment of the impact of the ISP in contributing to UNDP’s work and improving its effectiveness. The outcome will help to inform discussions with UNDP on how best DFID and UNDP can work together to further strengthen the partnership in the years ahead.

Objectives 3. The assessment will have the following objectives:

To assess progress towards the achievement of the 10 specific objectives set out in the UNDP ISP and at Annex A;

To analyse the extent to which progress towards the ISP objectives has contributed to improvements in the impact of UNDP’s work in its core mandate areas;

To identify key lessons and challenges from the assessment, and wider changes and developments both inside and outside the UN, relevant to the formulation of the next DFID-UNDP institutional partnership.

Outputs 4. The main output of the assessment will be a report, including a report (of not more than 7000 words) including an executive summary covering key findings and recommendations. A draft of the report will be discussed at a joint meeting of the consultant/s, DFID and UNDP. The final report will be used as a resource in discussions between DFID and UNDP in taking stock of the current ISP and preparing the way for the next phase of the partnership.

Scope of work 5. The assessment will be undertaken over a three-month period. It will be done through a review of key documents, interviews with key informants, and workshop sessions with UNDP, DFID, and other stakeholders in New York and London. A series of short visits will be made to up to three countries, two in Africa and one in Asia, to assess UNDP operations and partnerships on the ground.

6. Use will also be made of assessments of UN and UNDP performance and effectiveness being undertaken by others. These should include: the country reviews being conducted through the like-minded donor group’s MOPAN (Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network) initiative; reports of DFID field visits; UN reporting associated with the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) process; UNDP Governing Board reports; and UNDP’s own performance reporting and lesson learning exercises. Account will also be taken of background papers prepared for DFID’s internal review of multilateral partnerships, including of funding flows.

7. In addition to UNDP and DFID staff, consultations will be held with key informants from other UN agencies (including UNICEF, UNFPA, and WFP), the UN Development Group

Annex 4: Terms of Reference

38

Office (UNDGO), selected New York representatives of donor and G77 countries, and government officials and donor representatives at the country level.

8. The UN Secretary-General’s reform agenda (including the development and implementation of the CCA/UNDAF framework and its links to nationally owned Poverty Reduction Strategies), and the adoption following the 2000 UN Millennium Summit of the Millennium Development Goals, provide important elements of the context for the assessment. Account should be taken of the impact of these processes and commitments on UNDP’s policy and practice during the period covered by the ISP. Account should also be taken of the extent to which the ISP has contributed to improvements in the quality of the DFID-UNDP relationship and to greater mutual understanding and convergence of interests between the two partners.

9. DFID will provide to the consultant/s a background and issues note prior to the commencement of the assessment exercise setting out specific questions and concerns and details of the evolution of the DFID-UNDP partnership.

The assessment team 10. The assessment team will consist of consultant/s, with experience between them, or individually, covering institutional and organisational development, human rights-based approaches to development, and knowledge of UN development organisations, including their governance mechanisms. The consultant/s must possess excellent facilitation and participatory assessment skills. Knowledge of UNDP would be highly desirable. The team will report to the Programme Manager in DFID’s UN and Commonwealth Department with responsibility for the DFID-UNDP partnership.

Time-frame DFID and UNDP would like to aim to begin a process of consultation on the new IS and the way forward in early 2004 based around the outcomes of the assessment

Annex 5: Change Impact Review Framework

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ANNEX 5: CHANGE IMPACT REVIEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE ISP PERIOD

Specific Objective in ISP

Indicators of change beyond UNDP Indicators of change within UNDP Indicators of UNDP/DFID partnership contribution

1.To encourage UNDP to develop specific proposals as to how best it can strengthen its co-ordination role with the UN system, so as to focus the International Development Targets; and to give as much priority to its role in improving the international processes as to its programme delivery.

UN system better co-ordinated by strengthened UNDP. Co-ordination role of UNDP acknowledged. UN system and development community as a whole facilitated by UNDP to align globally with IDTs /MDGs. UNDP’s comparative advantage becoming widely recognised. Growing political will and moves towards consensus on redefined roles of UN agencies, BWIs and RDBs, bilaterals and others. Co-ordination of policy and capacity of UNDP partners

Administrator indicates adoption of strengthened role. Shift in UNDP strategy, as reflected in MYFF and reports etc, to adopt co-ordination role of UN system. Allocation of funds by Board to co-ordination activities. Co-ordination role of UNDP strengthened. Clarification of UNDP comparative advantage reflected in policy and strategy. Consistent messages in this respect and adherence thereto. Withdrawal of UNDP from some programme delivery areas. Resident Co-co-ordinator assessment system in place and effective.

Acknowledgement of DFID’s proactive role in bilateral talks and Executive

Board. Effect of DFID within donor group in influencing and supporting adoption of co-ordination role. Success of DFID’s project to strengthen focus of UNDAF on IDTs, poverty and PRSs. TC inputs agreed and implemented. Uptake of findings into roles of UN agencies. Feedback from DFID priority country offices on progress in-country. UNDP collaboration in drafting some DFID TSPs. Support to establishment of RC assessment system recognised.

2. To encourage UNDP to work closely with other donors in pursuit of Poverty Reduction Strategies and the Comprehensive

UN system and development community as a whole facilitated by UNDP to support PRS and CDF processes. NSSDs developed that acknowledge the key role of UNDP.

Agreement on the centrality of PRS and subordination of CCA / UNDAF to PRSs. Uptake of UNDAF guidelines to strengthen PRSs. HQ and Country level UNDP

Recognition of DFID’s influence and position in senior level dialogue.

DFID’s TC support in drawing up guidelines to strengthen PRSs recognised. Priority countries selected and DFID


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Development Framework approach; to promote the implementation of national strategies for sustainable development; and to seek coherence between the different country-level planning frameworks.

Coherence between country level planning frameworks. More UN specialist agencies endorse UNDAF approach and relationship to PRSs.

statements, objectives and effort clearly endorse these approaches. Recognition in-country and from DFID country offices/desks of UNDP engagement and role in PRSs.

engaged in DFID/UNDP activities. Feedback from UNDP country programmes and other partners of DFID’s support in PRSs. Effective engagement by DFID in the poverty environment initiative.

3. We will support the Administrator’s efforts to transform UNDP into a more effective and efficient organisation, through strengthening its ability to measure its results and performance; and reducing the number of projects that it supports.

UNDP acknowledged as more efficient and effective in general and in RBM and performance assessment in particular. UNDP influence and expertise in RBM shared within the UN system and beyond.

MYFF approved by Board reflects reform plans including RBM. UNDP reports indicate progress with reform initiatives. Reprofiling of all UNDP offices in HQ and country programmes completed. ROAR operating as an effective RBM system. Rigorous analysis and reporting in ROAR and other documents. Performance data being used in management and policy development. Consolidation of UNDP programme and reduced project portfolio. Priority country teams report more effective performance and reduction in number

Recognition of DFID’s support in UNTC project and launch of RBM system throughout UNDP and of EvD’s support in ROAR. MYFF reflects DFID ISP objectives. Uptake of any DFID TC inputs. Performance reports held in PRISM provide an assessment of DFID’s projects and programmes undertaken with UNDP. Perceptions held by UNDP and partner officers favourable towards DFID and its implementation of partnership.


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of projects. UNDP providing TA and other support in RBM.

4. We will encourage UNDP to further refine its mandate. We will encourage UNDP to build on the emerging strengths; and to cease to operate in all sectors in all countries and to withdraw from activities where it does not have comparative advantage.

UNDP’s comparative advantage becoming widely recognised. Co-ordination of policy and capacity of UNDP partners. Trauma-free transition as others as needed take up activities hitherto done by UNDP.

UNDP announces narrowing of focus. Clarification of UNDP comparative advantage reflected in MYFF policy and strategy. Consistent messages in this respect and adherence. Withdrawal from areas of no comparative advantage. UNDP activities discontinued in education, forestry, health (except HIV/AIDS?), nutrition, sustainable livelihoods, transport etc. Reform and structuring not critically disruptive.

Uptake of DFID TC inputs. Feedback from DFID country desks/offices on their influence in donor dialogue. Feedback from other donors of DFID’s influence in country level dialogue. Cessation of DFID (and other donor) non-core funding for activities not within UNDP emerging strengths.

5. We will stand ready to help UNDP to develop better project design, implementation and monitoring processes. We will provide support to strengthen UNDP’s evaluation capacity and participate in joint evaluations with UNDP and other

Sharing of good practice across UN system and beyond co-ordinated by UNDP. DAC work on donor harmonisation broadened through UNDP. Joint evaluations with UNDP participation and/or lead.

Effective revision and dissemination of procedures. Staff development opportunities available. Effective training in place in processes and procedures. Effective action planning and appraisal systems.

Sharing of good practice between UNDP and DFID at global and country level. TC inputs agreed, carried out and outputs implemented. Joint UNDP / EvD activites on RBM. DFID-led Multilateral Effectiveness Assessment exercise valued. Joint evaluations undertaken e.g. with Utstein partners and UNDP e.g. Dutch-led study on basic education;


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donors. German-led study on decentralisation.

6. We will encourage UNDP to continue to give weight to the 2015 poverty elimination target.

UNDP role in coordinating the UN system in the drive for poverty elimination acknowledged.

Major UNDP policy statements emphasise poverty elimination. UNDP policy and operations maintain poverty focus. Mechanisms in place to challenge focus as activities move upstream. Staff development opportunities available. Effective poverty training in place.

As 1.

7. We will work with UNDP to help it to identify its comparative advantage in governance, to work more effectively with others and to strengthen its in-house governance expertise; and to learn from each other’s experience.

UNDP’s role, effectiveness and strengthened capacity in governance acknowledged.

UNDP redefines its concept of governance and recruits and deploys expertise at HQ, regional and national programme levels.

Regular contact between UNDP and GD and relevant regional departments. UNDP inclusion in CSPs/CAPs and other ISPs/ISs. UNDP and DFID work together with LICs and other development agencies on governance issues including knowledge generation and programme implementation.

8. We will work with UNDP to identify its comparative advantages in the crisis and post-

UNDP’s role, effectiveness and strengthened capacity in crisis and post-conflict issues acknowledged.

UNDP articulates its comparative advantage in conflict and humanitarian situations. Strengthened capacity in conflict assessment and planning, and

Regular contact between UNDP/BCPR, CHAD, MOD, UKMIS and relevant regional departments. Inclusion of UNDP in CSPs/CAPs and other ISPs/ISs.


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conflict area. disaster reduction and recovery in HQ and regions.

DFID’s considerable resourcing recognised as strengthening, sustainable and not causing imbalance within UNDP.

9. We will seek to encourage a consensus among like-minded partners in support of these approaches.

Endorsement of ISP priorities from officials in LICs. Endorsement of ISP priorities from Utstein, WEOG groups and others. Consensus, coherence and harmonisation among donors in policy development, planning, funding etc. Harmonised IS planning by donors and alignment with UNDP budget cycle.

UNDP proactive in requiring harmonised approach from donors in their institutional strategy planning. Increase in funding to UNDP. Increased proportion as core funding.

Wide distribution of ISP and reference to ISP within UNDP and partner group. Selective country-level dialogue as appropriate. Favourable reactions to ISP. Favourable reflection on ISP implementation progress.

10. We will selectively support this Strategy’s objectives at a country level.

Other donors recognise UNDP’s comparative advantage and strengths at country level. Withdrawal and/or realignment of donors from areas within the comparative advantage of UNDP. Confidence in UNDP’s effectiveness leading to increase in donor core funding.

UNDP’s status enhanced and comparative advantage used to the full at country level. Reform and withdrawal at county level from areas not within comparative advantage not disruptive. Effective allocation of funding within UNDP; HQ/Country programme; MIC/LIC

Priority countries selected where strengthened links with UNDP would be fruitful. In-country dialogue and closer links with UNDP. Inclusion of UNDP in CSPs/CAPs and other ISPs/ISs. Increased non-core funding allocated for UNDP initiatives. Perceptions held within DFID HQ and country offices / desks favourable towards UNDP, and the UN system and multilaterals in general.


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Regular exchange of information between UNCD and priority country desks. Withdrawal of DFID from areas not within the comparative advantage of UNDP.

Documents

UNDP ISP Review - wlv.ac.uk First IS Review Report Fin… · UNDP / DFID ISP End-of-cycle Review i UNDP / DFID Institutional Strategy Paper END OF CYCLE REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF