Understanding Policy Networks

Understanding Policy Networks:towards a Dialectical ApproachDavid MarshUniversity of Birmingham

Martin SmithUniversity of Sheffield

This article has two aims. First, we develop a dialectical model of the role that policy networks playin any explanation of policy outcomes. Our model is based upon a critique of existing approachesand emphasizes that the relationship between networks and outcomes is not a simple, uni-dimensional one. Rather, we argue that there are three interactive or dialectical relationships in-volved between: the structure of the network and the agents operating within them; the networkand the context within which it operates; and the network and the policy outcome. Second, weuse this model to help analyse and understand continuity and change in British agricultural policysince the 1930s. Obviously, one case is not sufficient to establish the utility of the model, but thecase does illustrate both that policy networks can, and do, affect policy outcomes and that, in orderto understand how that happens, we need to appreciate the role played by the three dialecticalrelationships highlighted in our model.

Discussions of policy networks are common in the analysis of public policy inBritain, Europe and the USA. Of course, there are major distinctions in theapproach to networks within this literature. So, whilst many agree on the utility of the concept, there is less agreement on the nature and role of networks. Inparticular, the German and the Dutch literature is much more ambitious, treatingnetworks as a new form of governance; in this sense as an alternative to marketsand hierarchies. In contrast, most British and American literature is narrower infocus, concentrating upon the role networks play in the development and imple-mentation of policy.1 Our approach here is firmly located in this latter literature.More specifically, in the context of this literature, we shall argue, contra Dowdingsclaim that analyses of policy networks have no theoretical basis,2 that there aredifferent approaches to policy networks which have different strengths and weak-nesses but which can be used to develop a more useful explanatory framework;what we shall call a dialectical approach.

The paper is divided into two main sections. The first section outlines our dialecticalapproach, building on brief critiques of the existing literature. The second sectionthen examines the development of the agricultural policy network in Britain sincethe 1930s to demonstrate some of the advantages of our approach.

Towards a Dialectical Model of Policy NetworksThere are four main existing approaches to the study of policy networks which, todifferent extents, see policy networks as a potentially useful explanatory variable:3

the rational choice approach; the personal interaction approach; formal network

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analysis; and the structural approach. We have analysed these approaches at somelength elsewhere;4 here we shall merely identify their strengths and weaknesses inorder to develop our own position. Our overall view is that, while each approachhas considerable strength, all fail to recognize that any attempt to use policy net-works as an explanatory variable involves three dialectical relationships between:structure and agency; network and context; and network and outcome.

However, first we need to be clearer about what we mean by a dialectical relation-ship, given that the term can be easily misunderstood. In our usage a dialecticalrelationship is an interactive relationship between two variables in which eachaffects the other in a continuing iterative process. The process is easily illustrated ifwe briefly consider the relationship between structure and agency. Any approachwhich stresses exclusively either structure or agency has severe limitations. It ismore adequate to see the relationship as dialectical, as involving what Hay termsa strategic learning process.5 Here, action is taken by an actor within a structuredcontext. The actor brings strategic knowledge to the structured context and boththat strategic knowledge and the structured context help shape the agents action.However, the process is one of almost constant iterations, as the action affects boththe actors strategic knowledge and the structured context, which then, in turn,shape, but of course do not determine, the agents future action.

Beyond Structure Versus Agency

All four existing approaches privilege either structure or agency. So, Dowdingsrational choice approach suggests that networks themselves cannot explain outcomes;rather outcomes are the result of the bargaining between agents in the networks.6

McPherson and Raabs anthropological approach7 sees networks as based onpersonal relationships between known and trusted individuals who share beliefsand a common culture. In contrast, Laumann and Knokes formal network analysisargues that it is the position and roles which actors perform which are crucial andthe relationships between these roles, not the individuals who occupy them, whichdefines the network.8 Marsh and Rhodess structural approach also emphasizes theimportance of the structural aspect of networks and downplays interpersonalrelations.9

Of course, all these authors are right to an extent. Structures matter, as Knoke andMarsh and Rhodes, emphasize, but it is agents who interpret these structures andtake decisions; so Dowding and McPherson and Raab are also right to stress the roleof agents. What we need of course is a model which recognizes the role of bothstructures and agents.

Networks as agents. We wish to emphasize two points: first, networks are struc-tures which constrain and facilitate agents; and second, the culture of a networkacts as a constraint and/or opportunity on/for its members. Policy networks arepolitical structures, although, of course, not unchanging structures. The relation-ships within the networks are structural because they: define the roles which actorsplay within networks; prescribe the issues which are discussed and how they aredealt with; have distinct sets of rules; and contain organizational imperatives, sothat, at least, there is a major pressure to maintain the network.

UNDERSTANDING POLICY NETWORKS 5

Networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures and particularforms of behaviour. They are organizations which shape attitudes and behaviour.Networks result from repeated behaviour and, consequently, they relieve decisionmakers of taking difficult decisions; they help routinize behaviour. They simplifythe policy process by limiting actions, problems and solutions. Networks define rolesand responses. In doing so they are not neutral, but, like other political institutionsand processes, they both reflect past power distributions and conflicts and shapepresent political outcomes. Thus, when a decision is made within a particularnetwork, it is not simply the result of a rational assessment of available options, asrational choice theorists like Dowding would suggest, but rather reflects past con-flicts and the culture and values of decision makers. As such, networks do affectpolicy outcomes but not in a simple way. They are the structuration of past con-flicts and present organizational power. By examining networks we are looking atthe institutionalization of power relations both within the network and within thebroader socio-economic and political context, a point we shall return to later.

In addition however, as McPherson and Raab emphasize, it is important to realizethat there is a strong cultural dimension to policy networks. Within tight networks,policy communities in the Marsh and Rhodes usage, there is a shared world view,a common culture, and this is, in effect, a structural constraint on the action ofnetwork members. As such, we need to understand how the culture of a networkpatterns behaviour, how it reproduces and how it changes.

The shape of the network also affects the range of problems and solutions whichare considered; the network plays an agenda-setting role. As an example, tightpolicy networks persist, in large part, because they are characterized by a large degreeof consensus, not necessarily on specific policy but rather on the policy agenda, theboundaries of acceptable policy. In addition, these shared values and ideology willprivilege certain policy outcomes.

Similarly, rules of the game within the network constrain who is included in the network and how participants act. They limit types of behaviour which areunacceptable. By defining the sort of behaviour which is acceptable they are againprivileging certain alternative outcomes. Those who do not abide by the rules arelikely to be excluded. Indeed, networks, like other organizations, are, in large part,the sum of past policy decisions and outcomes and this is likely to privilege certainalternative policy options.

The Role of Agents. Despite this, outcomes cannot be explained solely by refer-ence to the structure of the network; they are the result of the actions of stra-tegically calculating subjects. Three points are important here. First, the interests or preferences of members of a network may not be defined merely, or perhapseven mainly, in terms of that membership. For example, they may have, at leastpartially, contradictory interests as members of another network. Second, theconstraints on, or opportunities for, an agents action which result from networkstructures do not happen automatically; they depend on the agents discursiveconstruction of those constraints or opportunities. Third, network members haveskills which affect their capacity to use opportunities or negotiate constraints.

So, agents matter. It is agents who interpret and negotiate constraints or oppor-tunities. However, these agents are located within a structured context, which is

DAVID MARSH, MARTIN SMITH6

provided by both the network and the broader political and social-structural con-text within which the network operates and those contexts clearly affect the actorsresources. Most significantly, the agents do not control either aspect of that struc-tured context. At the same time, they do interpret that context and it is as mediatedthrough that interpretation that the structural context affects the strategic calcu-lations of the actors.

Overall, while networks are both structural and causal, we need to understandhow actors interpret these structures. Certainly, the causal processes involved arenot simply unilinear in the way that rational choice models suggest.

Agents Change Structures We need to acknowledge that network structures, andthe resource dependencies which they entail, are not fixed. What is more agentschoose policy options, bargain, argue and break up networks. So, agents can, and do,negotiate and renegotiate network structures. As such, any explanation of changemust emphasize the role of agents, while also acknowledging that the broadercontext within which the network operates affects the interests and actions ofnetwork members. Certainly, the relationship between the network and its contextis crucial for explaining change in both networks and outcomes and it is to that wenow turn.

Beyond Network Versus Context

When trying to explain network change, and consequent policy change, the existingliterature tends to stress either endogenous or exogenous factors. So, for example,Dowding suggests that any policy change will result from a change in the patternof resource dependencies within the network. In contrast, Marsh and Rhodes arguethat most network change results from exogenous factors; they focus on four,economic, ideological, political and knowledge-based.

Once again both of these approaches have limitations. Most importantly, thedistinction between exogenous and endogenous factors is difficult to sustain. Inorder to understand how networks affect outcomes, we also need to recognize thatthere is a dialectical relationship between the network and the broader contextwithin which it located. There are two different, but related, points here. First, policynetworks reflect exogenous structures; for example, class and gender structures.So, the structure of networks is likely to reflect the broader pattern of structuredinequality within society. Certainly, policy networks are structures which cannotbe treated as given; we need to explain their origin and a key part of doing this isshowing how they are inscribed with other structural divisions. At the same time,agents are located in various structural positions and, while membership of a policynetwork may give them structural privilege, other exogenous structural positions,for example based on class, gender or ethnicity, may be both more important gen-erally and reflected in network membership. Second, network structure, networkchange and the policy outcome may be partially explained by reference to factorsexogenous to the network, but these contextual factors are dialectically related tonetwork structure and network interaction. Certainly, if we argue that networksaffect policy outcomes and, thus, that changes in networks can result in policychange, then we also have to address the question: what leads to network change?


Many empirical studies of networks have highlighted change within the networksthey identified and attempted to explain those changes largely in relation to changesin the environment or the context within which the networks are located. As such,the change is usually explained in terms of factors exogenous to the network; asthe external environment changes it may affect the resources and interests of actorswithin a network. However, the extent and speed of change is clearly influencedby the networks capacity to mediate, and often minimize, the effect of such change.Networks are often faced by very strong external uncertainties and that does affectnetwork structure, network interactions and policy outcomes.10

As we said, Marsh and Rhodes emphasize four broad categories of change in thenetwork environment which may undermine the certainties and values withinparticular networks economic, ideological, political and knowledge-based.11

Political authority is perhaps the most important external constraint.12 If a minister,or particularly the Prime Minister, is prepared to bear the costs of breaking up apolicy community, he or she has the resources and the authority, although the cost of doing so may be high. Certainly, it is often argued that the Thatcher govern-ment successfully challenged existing policy networks, although at the cost ofsignificant implementation problems.13 As a specific example, in both health andeducation, it is clear that political goals and ideology affected both the membershipand policies of the network.14 The key point is that it is difficult, although far fromimpossible, for network members to ignore direct political pressure for change.

However, economic, ideological and knowledge-based change are also important.For example, in the case of nuclear power it is clear that technological advanceswere a crucial source of network change, while the shift to a more commercialethos by key actors and organizations in the network owed much to the deepeningeconomic recession in the early 1970s.15 Similarly, new knowledge about the re-lationship between smoking and health and concerning salmonella in eggs affectedrelationships within the respective networks.16 In addition, it must be recognizedthat these exogenous factors are related.

At the same time, Marsh and Rhodes fail to examine another important exogenousconstraint on networks: other networks. In a complex polity, the relationshipbetween networks is clearly crucial. In fact, there are at least two related problemshere. First, the context within which networks operate is composed, in part, ofother networks and this aspect of the context has a clear impact on the operationof the network, upon change in the network and upon policy outcomes. This pointis well reflected in Daugbjergs analysis of how the shape of, and the outcomesfrom, the agricultural policy networks in Sweden and Denmark were affected bythe rise of the environmental networks in the two countries.17 Second, the issue ofthe relationship between sectoral and sub-sectoral networks is particularly import-ant. Authors like Jordan et al., argue that networks only exist at the sub-sectorallevel.18 In contrast, Marsh and Rhodes argued that it is an empirical question whetherthere are networks at both levels. However, in our view, sectoral networks do existand, more importantly, provide a crucial aspect of the context within which sub-sectoral networks operate. Overall, it is evident that exogenous changes can affectthe resources, interests and relationships of the actors within networks. Changes inthese factors can produce tensions and conflicts which lead to either a breakdownin the network or the development of new policies.


However, these changes do not have an effect independent of the structure of, andinteractions within, the network. All such exogenous change is mediated throughthe understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, rules/norms and interpersonal relationships within the network. So, it is important to re-emphasize that any simple distinction between endogenous and exogenousfactors is misleading.19

Beyond Networks Versus Outcomes

All the existing literature concentrates upon the question of whether, and, if so, to what extent, networks affect policy outcomes. There is no recognition thatpolicy outcomes also affect the shape of the policy network directly, as well ashaving an effect on the structural position of certain interests in civil society andthe strategic learning of actors in the network. Certainly, there is not a unidirectionalcausal link between networks and outcomes.

Outcomes may affect networks in at least three ways. First, a particular policyoutcome may lead to a change in the membership of the network or to the balanceof resources within it. In this way, Conservative industrial relations policy in the1980s led in large part to the exclusion of trade union interests from the youthemployment policy network. In 1988, the Manpower Services Commission, onwhich the trade unions had a third of the membership, was abolished and replacedby a system of Training and Enterprise Councils (with Local Enterprise Companiesin Scotland) on which unions had very limited, if any, representation.20 Similarly,the changing Government policy on health, while it clearly did not lead to theexclusion of the doctors from any networks, nevertheless weakened their bargain-ing position within those networks.21

Second, policy outcomes may have an effect on the broader social structure whichweakens the position of a particular interest in relation to a given network. Thus,a whole series of economic policies, as well as industrial relations policy, weakenedthe position of trade unions in civil society, removed them from a series of interestgroups and virtually ended their role in the policy-making process.22

Third, policy outcomes can affect agents. Clearly, agents learn by experience. Ifcertain actions within a network fail to produce an outcome beneficial to an actorwithin the network and the organization he represents, or more broadly, to thenetwork as a whole, then that actor is likely to pursue other strategies and actions.As Hay emphasizes, strategic learning is obviously an important feature of politicalactivity.23

The Dialectical Model

We outline a dialectical model of policy networks in Figure 1. It highlights the threedialectical relations identified to date. More specifically, it acknowledges that:

The broader structural context affects both the network structure and theresources that actors have to utilize within the network.

The skill that an actor has to utilize in bargaining is a product of their innateskill and the learning process through which they go.


The network interaction and bargaining reflects a combination of the actorsresources, the actors skill, the network structure and the policy interaction.

The network structure is a reflection of the structural context, the actorsresources, the network interaction and the policy outcome.

The policy outcome reflects the interaction between the network structure andnetwork interaction.

Almost all the relationships are interactive or dialectical. This is reflected in the factthat the arrows are two-way.

The Agricultural Policy Network in Britain since the 1930sFive points need emphasizing before we examine our case study. First, and mostimportantly, we need to say something about the status of our model. In epi-stemological terms we are critical realists.24 This means that, unlike epistemologicalrelativists, we do believe in the possibility of developing a causal explanation ofpolicy outcomes. However, unlike epistemological positivists, like Dowding, we dobelieve that any such explanation must recognize that institutions, like networks,the cultures within networks and the resources and attitudes of network members


Figure 1: Policy Networks and Policy Outcomes: A Dialectical Approach

Structuralcontext

Innateskill

Actor'slearning

Actor'sresources

Actor'sskill

Networkstructure

Networkinteraction

Policyoutcome

Causal influence Feedback

are all, to an extent, socially or discursively constructed. As such, we see all the re-lationships, but particularly that between structure and agency, as dialectical. Thisalso means that we would never envisage a simple causal model which predictedthat a certain network structure, or a particular set of resource dependencies withina network, would lead to a particular policy outcome.

Second, we are not here offering such a complicated causal model. Our knowledgeof networks is far too limited to make such a thing possible. Rather, we are arguingthat any link between policy networks and policy outcomes is much morecomplicated than many have suggested. We have attempted to outline thecomplexities involved and identify the relationships which need to be consideredif any causal model is to be developed. Our model will stand or fall according towhether it has any utility for researchers using the policy network concept toanalyse policy making. It might be suggested that our model is too complex; thatwe sacrifice parsimony at the altar of explanatory power. In our view that is anempirical question; only further research will indicate if the model is too complexand whether a stripped down model can adequately explain outcomes.

Third, no single case study can illustrate most, let alone all, of the points made inour conceptual discussion. Rather, here we use an analysis of the development ofBritish agricultural policy since the 1930s to illustrate the broad utility of ourmodel. We have chosen agriculture because it is one which is well analysed; thismeans that not only is there ample empirical material available but also, if we canoffer a fuller understanding of the case than existing studies provide, it will suggestthat our model is worth pursuing by other researchers.

Fourth this means that the main aim of our case study is to show that in order fullyto understand agricultural policy in Britain since the 1930s we need to appreciatethe three dialectical relationships we have identified. Any analysis which con-centrates on either structure or agency, and/or either network or context and/oreither network or outcome is inadequate. Fifth, in order to establish not only that all these relationships are important, but also that they are dialectical, we needa temporal perspective. We cannot offer a snapshot of a network now, we need toexamine how it was formed and how it and policy outcomes have changed over time.

Overall, we contend that the dialectical approach adds to an understanding of thedevelopment of agricultural policy:

1. an appreciation of the way the formation of the network is affected by acombination of external factors and the decisions of agents;

2. an acknowledgement that policy outcomes are the product of the interactionbetween agents and structures, not merely the sum of the effect of structuresand agents;

3. the recognition that change in the network is the product of an interactionbetween context and networks;

4. an appreciation that outcomes affect the network.

We shall look at each of these contributions in turn, but first we need to providesome background to the case. The agricultural policy network has been analysed in


detail through the lens of a conventional network approach.25 Whilst this provideda corrective to the traditional pluralist accounts of agricultural policy making,26 itemphasized structure over the agent-centred aspects of the network and con-sequently it lacked a dialectical element. However, an analysis of the agriculturalcase through a dialectical approach helps the development of a deeper understand-ing of the mechanisms of the agricultural policy community.

Between at least 1945 and 1980 the agricultural policy community provides theparadigm case of a closed policy community. It had a restricted membership beingconfined largely to officials within the National Farmers Union (NFU) and theMinistry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)27 with occasional, and ad hoc,input from the Countryside Landowners Association (CLA), the National Union ofAgricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW) and MPs with agricultural interests.This network was supported by structures which were institutional and ideological(beliefs, values and cultures); there was a shared world view of the problems and solutions for agriculture. The institutional elements included the existence ofMAFF which provided an institutional base within Whitehall to defend the inter-ests of farmers. With MAFF the community had a single decision-making centrewith the authority to make agricultural policy. MAFF also conducted the AnnualReview of Agriculture which existed specifically as a body to review the economicsituation of agriculture (with the NFU). This review both excluded actors otherthan the producers from the policy-making process and enshrined into the policyprocedures the principle that agricultural prices should rise annually and that itwas beyond question that farming should be subsidized by the state.

After 1973 these domestic institutions were supplemented by EEC institutions.These include the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the Directorate General VI of the Commission. The EC reinforced the closed nature of agricultural policymaking by ensuring that policy was developed in a closed circuit of national agri-cultural ministries, various farmers organizations and the Commission which hadlittle if any contact with non-farm and environmental groups.

The Formation of the Network and the Relationship between Agents, Structures and Context

Before World War II the relationship between the National Farmers Union and theMinistry of Agriculture and Fisheries was limited and at best followed the patternof traditional pluralist interaction between farmers and the Ministry. Essentiallythe farmers and the state wanted different policies. The farmers wanted certainguaranteed prices in order to deal with the impact of the Depression whilst theBritish government was committed to a generally laissez-faire policy in order tomaintain a cheap food policy and to ensure a market for imperial goods. The onlyconcession the government made was to introduce temporary measures, such astariffs or price supports, to help farmers in certain difficult circumstances.

The formation of the network occurred within a particular context which affectedthe interests of the actors and the development of the network in a way thatshaped future policy decisions. It was essentially the demands of war which createdthe agricultural policy community. War meant that food production had to be


increased. The government could only achieve this end by including the farmers inthe policy process. However, the wartime arrangements were seen as essentiallytemporary. Government was prepared to provide support to farmers only for theduration of the war.

The context of the war and the need for increased production changed the relation-ships within the developing agricultural policy community. The war years were aperiod of continued habit forming as procedures of consultation became moreroutine. Practices were initiated as a result of war which became institutionalizedand habitualized; as such, they did not end with its termination and subsequentlystructured the future patterns of behaviour of actors within agricultural policy. Thecontext of the war increased the importance of both the Ministry of Agricultureand the National Farmers Union. The Ministry became a key department withinWhitehall and the NFUs support and approval became essential to the goal ofincreasing production.

The government wanted to expand as much as possible but not at all costs.28

However, the government was constrained by the need to retain the confidence ofthe farmers. Fresh in the collective memory of the NFU was the Betrayal of 1921,when wartime subsidies established for World War I were suddenly abandoned.Farmers had to be reassured that, if they increased production during the war, theywould not again be left overproducing without government support. In November1940, in response to dissatisfaction with present prices, the Minister of Agriculture,R. S. Hudson, announced the government would continue the system of fixedprices: for the duration of the hostilities and for at least one year thereafter.29

This pledge is significant. It indicates that at this stage the government was notcommitted to a long-term system of support for agriculture but more importantlyit was the first time that the government had considered price support after the warand so it made support in peacetime an acceptable option. In addition, the ministerannounced that prices were to be reviewed in the event of any substantial changesin costs, thus placing the government in a position of assuring that there was a linkbetween farmers costs and farmers prices. Despite these assurances, the Treasuryand other ministers were prepared to contest the farmers demands for a preciselink between costs and prices. The Ministry of Agriculture was arguing that thepricecost link should be mechanical and automatic, whilst the Treasury arguedthat there were wider economic and agricultural factors involved.

In 1942 and 1943 there were disputes over prices and in 1943 the prevalence ofthe Treasury view led to protests from farmers. The government was keen to pacifythe farmers, fearing a decline in production. As a consequence, the Minister ofAgriculture announced in 1944 that maximum production would have to continuewell after the war was finished. He also said that he wanted to consult with thefarmers over a better machinery for fixing prices and said that he would look at the possibility of a 4-year plan which would continue guaranteed prices until1947.30 This was again a significant choice, which, to some extent, isolated thenascent community from Treasury supervision; in future the Treasury would be unable to question the existence of support nor the link between costs and price.The structure was consciously constructed and through its institutionalization this decision had an important impact on future policy choices. Therefore, whilst


wartime agricultural policy can partly be explained by reference to the context ofthe war and the need to increase production, the actual form policy took, that islong-term price guarantees, was a consequence of actions within the network. It also reflected strategic learning by the NFU, who were not prepared to allowanother swift abandonment of wartime support. The farmers and the Ministry ofAgriculture pushed the Treasury for a link between costs and prices and for theguarantees to be retained after the war. Context and network interacted to producethe policy but only as mediated through the strategic choice of some actors, par-ticularly the NFU, to push for a particular policy. Neither the network nor the actorsand their choices can be understood independently; the network shaped choicesand choices reinforced and institutionalized the network.

At the same time, the agricultural policy network and its attendant policy were notinevitable. By extending the period of the guarantees and institutionalizing pricefixing through creating policy-making machinery, the government made pricesupport more acceptable. Moreover, by including the farmers in the policy-makingmachinery which was established, they could bias the new procedures towards thefarmers interests. The procedure established, later known as the Annual Review,resulted in the Ministry of Agriculture (and its sister departments in NorthernIreland and Scotland) and the NFU reviewing the economic conditions of agri-culture; subsequently, the government, in consultation with the farmers and in relation to expected demand, decided what prices would apply to crops in thefollowing year. After the first Review, markets and prices were assured for cattle,sheep and lambs up to 1948, and for cereals, potatoes and sugar beet up to 1947.More importantly, the context of the war had enabled the farmers to institution-alize their role in the policy-making process and within the agricultural policycommunity. Nevertheless, the governments stated aim continued to be to restorea more balanced agricultural policy after the war with production closer to pre-warlevels and a shift away from arable crops. The aim was not self-sufficiency inagriculture but a return to the traditional policy of importing from the cheapestsources abroad.31 However, two external events further institutionalized the highprice/high production policy.

First, a combination of the end of the war, which disrupted production and dis-located population, and a series of droughts led to a severe cereal and rice shortagethroughout the world. As a consequence, the government had rapidly to reversethe shift away from arable production. Second, with the rapid abandonment by the USA of Lend-Lease, Britain faced a severe shortage of dollars and, therefore,government saw increasing food production as a means of saving dollars. The resultwas a 100 million expansion programme. In 1947 the minister told farmers:Nothing less than maximum production of which the industry is capable willsuffice to meet the needs of the situation.32 The economic context ended anyargument over the need to increase production and the Treasury was prepared toprovide support for agriculture over the foreseeable future. According to oneTreasury official: the prospect of a dollar shortage has created the greatest oppor-tunity for British agriculture that has occurred in peacetime for a hundred years (W)e are now in the position where agriculture may be under fire for not expand-ing enough In these circumstances the time may come when certain advanceswhich have hitherto been regarded as visionary may become practical politics.33


The changing context created a situation which actors within the policy com-munity could use to further their interests. The external context changed theavailable choices within the network and this enabled the NFU further toinstitutionalize their position. The government, in the person of the Lord Presidentof the Council, wished to break the link between costs and prices. Following aspecial review in 1946, the farmers were unhappy that the government onlyconsidered increased labour costs. The NFU protested and, after consultation, thegovernment agreed both that a wider range of data would be collected and thata comparison with the income of other classes in the rural community would be made. Moreover, with the 1947 Agricultural Act the Annual Review wasenshrined in statute and farmers were effectively legislated increasing pricesupport and a place in the policy process. Thus, the closed policy communitydeveloped within a context of a food and a dollar shortage. At that particularmoment the policy of high support and high production was unchallenged.Consumers were short of food and the policy of guaranteed prices meant that itwas the taxpayer, rather than the consumer, who paid. Hence, the subsidy washidden. Likewise, the Treasury was prepared to support the policy because of itsapparent economic benefit.

If we analyse these developments from a dialectical perspective a number of inter-esting points emerge. The interests of the farmers, MAFF and government were notindependent or objective, rather they were constituted through the developmentof the policy community and its relationship to the external context. Perceptions ofwhat was possible in terms of policy changed dramatically between 1930 and 1947.In 1930 the farmers wanted some support and, at the same time, they wished tolimit the involvement of government. By 1947 farmers were demanding a com-prehensive and long-term policy which was guaranteed in law and involvedfarmers intimately in the development of policy. The transformation of theseinterests cannot be explained without reference to the interactions between boththe farmers and the external context and the farmers and government actors.There was a long process of strategic learning which involved the NFU firstlylearning the rules of the game as insiders interacting with government officials andsecondly learning what demands could be made within the changing externalcontext.

Two sets of actors, the NFU and MAFF, used the context of war to institutionalizethe privileges which they had obtained in the war. Other actors in government had little choice but to develop agricultural policy through MAFF and the NFU,thus unintentionally reinforcing the nature of the policy community. However,these new demands were only feasible, or even conceivable, within the context of the Treasurys changed perception of the world financial system. The Treasurycalculated that Britain could save dollars by producing more food. The assessmentthat it was cheaper to grow food at home rather than import it was by no meansunquestionable; for example, it might have saved more dollars to have importedfood and placed the extra resources into other import savers. The assessment was developed within the context of a policy community which was, on the onehand, able to deliver the policy by providing the state with the infrastructuralpower to develop agricultural policy and, on the other, prepared to push the argu-ment that Britain had to increase food production.


As such, there is a complex interaction between the interests of three sets of actors,the farmers, MAFF and the Treasury, to an extent representing the wider state, thepolicy community and the external conditions. There is no single causal relation-ship, with say the interest group activity of the farmers, or an economic crisis, lead-ing to agricultural policy. Rather, wartime agricultural policy affected the perceptionsof agents concerning how to deal with the post-war crises. This solution impactedback on the community which provided the institutional means through which todeliver the policy, reinforcing the belief that there was no alternative to agriculturalexpansion. Once it was accepted that this was the only viable policy, there was noneed to include other actors, such as consumers or even the Treasury, in furtherdiscussions of agricultural policy and hence, the boundaries of the community andthe processes of exclusion were further institutionalized. Once this institution-alization occurred it was very difficult to change perceptions of agricultural policy.A virtuous cycle developed in which beliefs in agricultural production reinforceda closed policy community which was then unable to consider alternatives. Thecombination of war and post-war crises structured the nature of agricultural policylong after those conditions which had shaped agricultural policy, and the structureand values of the policy community, had changed. The interests of the actors couldnot be separated from the context or the community. In an important sense, theydid not exist independently, but were shaped by the dialectics of exchange. Thismay make causality more complex but it helps us to understand the developmentof policy.

The most important point is that this policy, which was developed within thecontext of particular economic conditions, was created by human agency but thenformed the structure of agricultural policy making even when conditions changed.The network institutionalized a set of beliefs concerning agricultural expansionwhich then shaped the future direction of policy. It is also interesting to note howthe Treasury discursively constructed the future of agricultural policy; it saw agri-culture as a means of facilitating economic expansion.

Outcomes as a Product of Interactions between Agents and Structure

Hay emphasizes that networks are strategically selective and, whilst actors makechoices, they do so within a network that privileges particular outcomes.34 InBritain the policy outcomes between 1947 and 1980 were increased productionand increased prices for farmers. It could be argued that these were outcomeswhich resulted from the external conditions prevailing in Britain. However, theimportant point is that from the 1950s onwards the dollar shortage and balance ofpayments problems were greatly reduced and, indeed, it is arguable that an ex-pansionist agricultural policy contributed to increased imports through the use ofextra fuel, fertilizers and pesticides. A dialectical approach emphasizes how choicesmade concerning agricultural policy cannot be understood without examining howactors interacted with structures to produce outcomes.

Decisions were made within an institutional arena, the Annual Review, in whichfarmers and the Ministry of Agriculture had to consider the economic conditions ofagriculture and the extent to which prices should change accordingly. Actors


within the network believed that agricultural prices should be increased. Theircultural world was one in which the actors believed that agricultural productionshould be increased. The crucial point is that network structures, the external con-text and actors interacted to produce a particular view of agricultural policy whichboth reinforced the network and produced certain policy outcomes. Actors orgroups who held alternative policy views were excluded. Data on the economicconditions was provided by agricultural economists, the NFU and MAFF officials,all of whom were committed to increasing production.

Thus, to return to the notion of strategic learning, actors had to make decisionswithin a context structured by the Annual Review, past decisions on agriculturalpolicy and the perceived external economic situation. Within that context theymade choices about the nature of agricultural policy and, as they made decisionsto continue the policy, the structure of the network was reinforced. The networkwas the institutionalization of values and beliefs about the nature of agricultureand agricultural policy and these beliefs informed the decisions of actors within thenetwork. Thus, a shared view developed in the network; perceptions of agriculturecould not be separated from the nature of the network. Agricultural expansion was not a right policy; it was constructed as the only possible option within thecontext of the policy community and the perceived external constraints.

Perhaps this dialectical process can be best illustrated by examining the role of the Treasury. In the 1950s the Treasury was becoming concerned with the cost ofagricultural support35 and Treasury approval was necessary for any increase inagricultural expenditure. This concern was exacerbated when there were signs ofoverproduction in the late 1950s. However, the context within which decisions weremade remained the policy community and the widespread belief that increasingagricultural production was a mechanism for improving Britains balance of pay-ments. Even the hard-nosed Treasurys position was shaped by the existingcommunity. The Treasury failed to threaten the high production and high subsidypolicy because it could not undermine the balance of payments argument. InCabinet Committee the Minister argued against any drastic cuts invoking thestructures of the Agricultural Acts and the notion that it would undermine agriculturescontribution to the restoration of the national economy.36 Remarkably, despite con-trary economic evidence, the final position of the Chancellor, Harold Macmillan,seemed to be shaped by these beliefs. He argued in a memorandum to the Cabinetthat a stable and efficient agriculture is in the national interests and therefore heaccepted the need for increased production.37 Thus, the view of the Treasury wasclearly shaped by the structures of the policy community. This then impacted on thecontinuation of the high production policy. Policy outcomes were shaped by thepolicy process and the nature of the community. Without the structure of the policycommunity, it is difficult to see the Chancellor making the decisions that he did.

Change in the Network Involves an Interaction Between Context and Network

Since the 1980s there have been significant changes in agricultural policy and the agricultural network. However, the network has clearly mediated the nature of the change. With Britains accession to the European Community in 1973 the


structural context of agricultural policy changed greatly. Overproduction and therising costs of agricultural policy have made a set of values based on increasingprices and increasing production untenable. By 1984 most major products were in surplus and by 1986 the cost of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) meantthat the EC was, in principle, bankrupt. In addition, consumer groups, the environ-mental movement and an increasing number of international agriculturalproducers were pressuring the EC for a change in policy. A rational response to theproblems would have involved a radical reform of the CAP. However, any reformprocess could only occur through the agricultural policy community, nowexpanded to include elements of the EC and the agricultural interests in othermember states. As such, the response did not involve radical reform, but ratherdamage limitation. By controlling the reform process the community was able toensure that any changes in policy did not adversely affect the interests of thecommunity. The community accepted that prices and production would have to bereduced and that certain concessions would have to be made to environmentalinterests. However, the changes in policy only had a limited impact on the interestsof the community because it was the community that implemented reform.

The first major reforms of the CAP in 1988 had only a limited impact on agriculturalcosts and surpluses. The main features of the CAP were still in place, with producecontinuing to receive artificially high prices in order to maintain production. As anexample, the level of cereal production at which penalties came into play washigher than the level of cereal production at the time. Prices remained at doubleworld prices, the costs of export refunds remained high and production was wellabove demand.38 By 1991 the CAP budget had risen by a further 7.9 million ECU.Further pressure on the community for more radical reform came from GATT, theUSA and environmental and consumer groups. Such were the concerns in theinternational community over CAP reform that the GATT talks ground to a halt.The spectre of GATT collapsing had a salutary effect. As the majority of the nationswithin the EU are industrial nations they had a greater interest in maintaining freetrade than in agricultural subsidies. The combination of US and world-wide pres-sure caused cracks in the EC farm alliance and Germany moved to support theBritish and Dutch position which argued for some compromise on CAP reform.

As a consequence the EC Commission proposed a radical plan for the reform of theCAP. The plan, outlined by the Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry, involveda 35% cut in cereal prices, cuts of 15% for butter and beef and 10% for milk. Theseplans unleashed general hostility from the policy community. Despite Britainscontinual call for reform, the Minister of Agriculture, John Gummer, said the pro-posals for reform were preposterous and unacceptable. Nevertheless, the viewfrom GATT was that the cuts did not go far enough. Eventually, the Council ofAgricultural Ministers agreed on a reform plan which reduced prices for cereal by 29%, for beef and poultry by 15% and for dairy products by 5%. However, in compensation, 3 billion was to be made available over three years for farmers.In addition, farmers were to receive large subsidies for taking land out of productionin the set-aside programme. According to The Independent:

The basic apparatus of CAP remains. There will still be guaranteed prices, albeit at a lower level,with export subsidies and Community preference. The cost to the Community budget will be no


lower, and probably higher, in the short term. It is also far from certain that lowering cereal pricesand setting aside land will significantly reduce production.39

Despite the external pressure, the community managed to control the reformprocess and, thus, despite growing opposition to subsidies and increasing costs,the outcome of reform was a policy which continued to protect the interests ofthe community. The changing context placed pressure on the network andreconstituted its interest away from increasing production to preserving as muchas possible of existing policy. The community accepted that it had little choice butto reform CAP but it managed to control changes in a way that had the leastdamaging impact.

The actors within the network made a strategic calculation that they had to acceptreform. In doing so they were able, to some extent, to control the reform process;without the existence of the policy community such a response would have beenimpossible and the final reform package would have been very different. Of course,this is a counter-factual argument, but if we consider what happened during thesame period in the USA, it seems a plausible argument. In the USA where therewas also a closed policy community for much of the post-war period, it was muchless able to resist reform because there were structural weaknesses in the network.The community was made up of a number of farm organizations representingdifferent regions and products. In addition, there were a number of importantideological differences between the various farm groups. Consequently, whenfaced with increased external pressure because of changing economic circum-stances it was much more difficult for the community to retain a united front. Asa result, the new pressure resulted in conflicts of interest which split thecommunity, thus allowing the imposition of rapid and radical reform.40

Outcomes Affect Networks

A final dialectical relationship is between outcomes and networks. Policy outcomesfeed back into the community and, subsequently, affect the next set of outcomes.There are a number of examples of this in the agriculture case.

First, during World War II the NFU were not convinced of the governments sin-cerity in providing support and the government were concerned to retain the con-fidence of the farmers. As a consequence of farmer dissatisfaction the governmentmade the pledge discussed earlier. This commitment changed the basis of agri-cultural policy because it was the first time that the government was prepared toconsider a comprehensive system of price support outside of wartime and thus it changed the expectations of the farmers in terms of government policy.

Second, as we saw above, in 1947 the Treasury made a commitment to all-out ex-pansion in agriculture to ensure economic survival. This decision effectively passedpolicy making to the agricultural policy community ending any discussion ofalternative policies. The decision effectively froze, or institutionalized, the wartimedecision-making processes, thus ensuring that critics of the expansionist policywere excluded. This decision therefore had important long-term consequences. Formost of the post-war period alternative views on agricultural policy were excluded.The dominance of the policy community was ensured by Treasury legitimation.



Third, the decision to join the European Community effectively ensured that thepolicy community was isolated from control by national government. Once Britainjoined, agricultural policy decisions were made by a new policy community basedaround the Agricultural Commission which had good relations with both agri-cultural pressure groups and the Council of Agricultural Ministers which was madeup of the agricultural ministers of member states. This insulated agricultural policymaking from individual national governments and, more particularly, from nationalfinance ministers. Reform could only be imposed once there was agreementbetween national governments, but even then it was the policy community whichhad responsibility for developing and implementing the reforms. However, thatprocess of reform and the concomitant politicization of agricultural policy hasresulted in the community becoming more permeable, with new interests such as consumers, environmentalists and food retailers entering the policy process; thishas resulted in further politicization, less consensus and reforms of the CAP whichthe community have been less able to control.41

ConclusionThis article has had two aims. First, we have developed a dialectical model of therole that policy networks play in any explanation of policy outcomes. Our modelis based upon a critique of existing approaches and emphasizes that the relationshipbetween networks and outcomes is not a simple, unidimensional one. Rather, weargue that there are three interactive or dialectical relationships involved between:the structure of the network and the agents operating within them; the networkand the context within which it operates; and the network and the policy outcome.Second, we use this model to help analyse and understand continuity and changein British agricultural policy since the 1930s. Obviously, one case is not sufficientto establish the utility of the model, but, in our view, the case does illustrate boththat policy networks can, and do, affect policy outcomes and that, in order tounderstand how that happens, we need to appreciate the role played by the threedialectical relationships highlighted in our model.

(Accepted: 11 April 1999)

About the Authors

David Marsh, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University ofBirmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; e-mail: [email protected]

Martin Smith, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK; e-mail:[email protected]

Notes1 See D. Marsh, Comparing Policy Networks. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998, pp. 410.

2 A. McPherson and C. Raab, Governing Education. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988.

3 K. Dowding, Model or metaphor? A critical review of the policy network approach, Political Studies,43 (1995), 13658.

4 D. Marsh, The Development of the Policy Network Approach in Comparing Policy Networks.

5 C. Hay, Structure and Agency in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science.Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 189208.

6 Dowding, Model or metaphor?.

7 McPherson and Raab, Governing Education.

8 D. Knoke. Political Networks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 7.

9 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds), Policy Networks in British Government. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.

10 See the contributions to Marsh and Rhodes, Policy Networks.

11 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond Typology in Marshand Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 22968.

12 D. Judge, The Parliamentary State. London: Sage, 1993.

13 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, Implementing Thatcherite Policies. Buckingham: Open University Press,1992; J. Moon, Evaluating Thatcher: sceptical versus synthetic approaches, Politics, 14 (1994), 439.

14 G. Wistow, The Health Service in Marsh and Rhodes, Implementing Thatcherite Policies; K.-C. Hu, PolicyNetworks in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes (University of Sheffield, Unpublished Ph.D., 1995).

15 M. Saward, The Civil Nuclear Power Network in Marsh and Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 7599.

16 M. Read, Policy Networks and Issue Networks; the Politics of Smoking in Marsh and Rhodes, PolicyNetworks, pp. 12448; M. J. Smith, From policy community to issue networks: Salmonella in eggs andthe new politics of food, Public Administration, 69 (1991), 23555.

17 C. Daugbjerg, Similar Problems, Different Policies: Policy Network and Environmental Policy inDanish and Swedish Agriculture in Marsh, Comparing Policy Networks, pp. 7589; Smith, Salmonella ineggs; and W. Grant and A. MacNamara, When policy communities intersect: the case of agricultureand banking, Political Studies, 43 (1995), 50519.

18 G. Jordan et al., Characterising agricultural policy, Public Administration, 72 (1994), 50526.

19 R. Stones, Labour and International Finance in Marsh and Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 20025.

20 D. Marsh, Youth Employment Policy, 19701994: towards the Exclusion of Trade Unions in Marshand Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 16799.

21 Wistow, The Health Service.

22 D. Marsh, The New Politics of British Trade Unions. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992.

23 Hay, Structure and Agency.

24 For an outline of this position, see D. Marsh et al., Post-War British Politics in Perspective. Cambridge:Polity, 1999, ch. 1.

25 M. J. Smith, The Politics of Agricultural Policy Support: the Development of an Agricultural Policy Community.London: Dartmouth, 1990.

26 P. Self and H. Storing, The State and the Farmer. London: George Allen, 1962.

27 The Ministry concerned was the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries until 1955 when it became theMinistry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries: we have used the acronym MAFF for convenience.

28 NFU Record (October 1939).

29 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 367, c. 90.

30 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 397, cc. 7256.

31 MAF 53/171, Post-War Agricultural Policy (Memos, Correspondence etc.), 194346. London: Public RecordsOffice; CAB 127/170, Agricultural Policy. London: Public Record Office.

32 NFU Record (September 1947).

33 CAB 124/572, Cabinet Post-War Agricultural Policy. London: Public Record Office.

34 C. Hay, The Tangled Webs We Weave: The Discourse, Strategy and Practice of Networking in Marsh,Comparing Policy Networks, pp. 3351.

35 CAB 134/896, Committee on Food and Agriculture. London: Public Records Office.

36 CAB 134/896.

37 CAB 129/66, Cabinet Memoranda, 51100. London: Public Records Office.

38 House of Lords Committee on the European Communities, Farm Price Proposals 199091, HL 34Session 198990. London: HMSO, 1990.

39 The Independent (22 May 1992).

40 M. J. Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.

41 W. Grant, The Common Agricultural Policy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.


Documents

Understanding Policy Networks