Understanding Afghan Culture

Operational Pashtunwali

Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS) Department of National Security Affairs

Naval Postgraduate School

15 June 2009

Program for Culture & Conflict Studies at Naval Postgraduate School The Naval Postgraduate School’s Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS) supports the mission of Combined Joint Task Force Afghanistan commands and the International Security Assistance Force. CCS serves as a reference and provides a feedback/vetting loop for information operations products via our team of American and Afghan experts. The program provides detailed analyses of insurgent propaganda, narratives, and methods. Through field research and analysis, CCS provides a framework, and recommends methodology that utilizes culturally appropriate forms of communication in support of the mission. This paper on "Operational Pashtunwali" is a slight departure from our previous CCS papers. In response to innumerable requests, we have created a tactical product specifically for squad leaders, platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and company commanders that explains the culture of the Afghan south and how to use it in tactical operations. We hope this paper answers the requests, by explaining how the "code" of the Pashtun people can be used both for force protection and as an offensive force multiplier. While we believe senior officers, planners and information operators will also find valuable practical guidance here on understanding Pashtunwali and putting it to work at the operational level, this product is designed for the young men and women who go outside the wire every day to work with Afghans to get the mission done.

Culture & Conflict Studies Occasional Paper Series

CCS Occasional Paper Series seeks to further the education and discussion of issues pertaining to culture and conflict in South and Central Asia. CCS disseminates scholarly essays that attempt to contribute to the creation of a more stable environment in Afghanistan. These papers identify and discuss contemporary and interdisciplinary issues that affect US national security interests including politics, economics, ethnographic intelligence, culture, geostrategic interests, national and local development methods, regional and cooperative security, terrorism, and tribal relations. CCS papers are written by faculty and staff members of the Naval Postgraduate School, alumni, or by individual contributors. These papers are disseminated online and can be downloaded free of charge at www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

We invite comments and questions and ask that you send them to: Professor Thomas H. Johnson Naval Postgraduate School 1411 Cunningham Road, GL-319 Monterey, CA 93943 Email: thjohnso@nps.edu or ccsinfo@nps.edu Phone: 831-656-3190 No. 2, June 2009

Table of Contents

Title Page Introduction

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Defensive Pashtunwali 3

Offensive Pashtunwali 6

Conclusion 10

Glossary 11

Operationalizing Pashtunwali

Introduction U.S. personnel hear a lot about Pashtunwali. Most soldiers know from their training that the word means "the way of the Pashtun" people, and that it is a set of social values that determine how a Pashtun man will react and make decisions. Often lacking from training however is the operational linkage: How do you factor Pashtunwali into the planning process? And how do you use it on the street on a patrol? This short article is intended to provide guidance on how Pashtunwali can be translated into operational use. In military terms, for planning purposes, Pashtunwali could be split into two types of operational use: "defensive Pashtunwali" and "offensive Pashtunwali." "Defensive Pashtunwali" could be described as a form of force protection. It means

observing certain rules of behavior that will avoid angering the local men to the point where they want to set an IED or mortar your FOB to get some payback for being dishonored or insulted. In other words, avoiding negatives outcomes.

"Offensive Pashtunwali" is going a step farther, and using these cultural principles

proactively to achieve positive outcomes. The enemy is using Pashtunwali every day against us in effective ways -- but it is a two-edged sword, and we can use it, too.

Let's start at the beginning: What is Pashtunwali? Well, remember in the movie "Pirates of the Caribbean," how the characters talk about the "Pirate Code" all the time? When she's surrounded by pirates, the Elizabeth Swan character invokes the pirate right

of parlay (from the French word for "talk") from the pirate's code, and the pirates who capture her are bound to respect the request for a hearing with Captain Barbossa. Swan is full of romantic notions about the Pirate Code, until finally Captain Barbossa tells her, "it's really more like guidelines than a code," which then becomes one of the running jokes in the movie series. Well, Pashtunwali is like that. It's a code they live by, but it's like guidelines for behavior, rather than a strict set of inviolable rules. Unlike the Pirate Code, however, which turns out to be written down, Pashtunwali is not written down anywhere. In fact, some anthropologists say the British colonial

administrators who lived among the Pashtun for decades invented Pashtunwali. In one sense this is true -- in the sense that we are able to conceive of it and comprehend it as Americans. Because in reality, "it's a Pashtun thing" and there are real limits to how much or how well any of us can ever really think like a person from another, totally different, culture.

"It's really more like a set of guidelines...""It's really more like a set of guidelines...""It's really more like a set of guidelines..."

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Trying to explain Pashtunwali to a westerner is like trying to explain baseball to an alien from a planet with no sports. To really understand it, you have to grow up in it, and live it. All we can do is explain it with the language tools we have, but even the best explanation isn’t really Pashtunwali -- it's a description of Pashtunwali expressed in another language and another logic system. There is a saying in Japan about the Way of Zen, the form of meditation used to reach enlightenment by Zen Buddhists: "Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know." In other words, just by writing down something that is unwritten, or saying "it is this" about something that is unspoken, we are already on a slippery slope. Having said that, we'll take a stab at it. Pashtunwali is fundamentally about honor. We come from a culture of individual responsibility and individual rights, but the Pashtun are much more communal. The whole extended Pashtun family is one unit, like a platoon on a mission, where everybody's life depends on everybody else doing their jobs. If a Pashtun is dishonored in some way, he has to get revenge -- not necessarily on the individual who caused the dishonor, although that is best -- but on any member of that

individual's extended family. If you cause a Pashtun dishonor, he is going to get revenge. Not necessarily on you, but on any member of your tribe -- the "Americani tribe." As far as he's concerned, from his view of the world, all Americans are members of the same tribe. Although there is no direct translation of the word "honor" into Pashto as an abstract concept, the Pashto word nang is perhaps closest, meaning the set of obligations a man has to defend the sanctity of those elements of his life -- his land, his women, and his property -- which he is honor-bound to defend.

Revenge is usually translated as badal, although this actually means "exchange." For example, a badal

wedding is a type of wedding in which each family exchanges a bride to the other family. It also means "exchange" in the sense of "an eye for an eye," however.

Cross-cultural communication is always challenging

Revenge can take a long time. It's very common for a grandson to get revenge for some dishonor done to his grandfather 50 years ago. So what? So if you dishonor a Pashtun today, five or ten years from now, another American is going to be killed by some one from that man's clan to get revenge for what you did today. The reason is, Pashtuns live in closed village communities. The villages are like a single organism. Mostly you're born there, you live your whole life there, and you die there. It is very, very rare for an outsider not from the extended families already in a village to move to that village. (That's unlike much of America, where anybody can move anywhere there's a good job or a better lifestyle. ) A Pashtun's survival in his village in Afghanistan depends on his maintenance of a standard of honor -- being waykar, a man of honor. If you are an honorable man, and all the men from your extended family are honorable men, your family will be able to compete for good arranged marriages and good economic

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opportunities. If not, your family is done for. The single worst insult one Pashtun can call another -- the "MF bomb" in Pashto -- is dah' uz, "man of no honor." No family wants to marry their son or daughter into the family of a dah 'uz. In social, political, and economic terms in the village, you have to maintain your honor or become extinct.

Defensive Pashtunwali

During the Vietnam War, an American army officer (and later civilian official) named John Paul Vann famously noted that "we haven't been in Vietnam for nine years. We've been in Vietnam for one year nine times." While spending most of those nine years in country, Vann observed American units "reinventing the wheel" over and over again. In an analogous way, tours of duty in Afghanistan of one year or less have also often meant that units repeat the same learning process when it comes to Pashtunwali.

Lessons Learned sometimes go unlearned, and nowhere is this more true than in regard to the cultural lessons. Thus the learning process in regard to Pashtunwali by a typical unit in country might be simplified and generalized to run through five stages, something like this:

John Paul Vann in Vietnam

Come in tough, show the locals we're not going to take any guff, so don't mess with us.

Discover the frequency of attacks, IEDs and ambushes is increasing from the last 3-4 months of the previous unit's presence.

Begin to work with locals and respect the Pashtunwali factor.

Attack rates go down, quality of intel reporting goes up, security improves.

Rotate out of country, new unit comes in, starts over at stage 1. In other words, "Groundhog Day."

In planning and conducting operations, "Defensive Pashtunwali" is about breaking out of the Groundhog Day loop. It means avoiding all unnecessary behaviors which will dishonor Pashtuns from a unit's first day in country, because there's no reason to make extra enemies. On the next two pages are a simple set of "do's and don'ts" for "Defensive Pashtunwali." Teach your personnel these guidelines, and practice them yourself. Experience in Afghanistan has shown decisively that units which don't get trapped in the "Groundhog Day" loop, but instead come in "following the code" get hit less often and get better intel and cooperation than those that do. These "do's and don'ts" have been formatted so that they may be cut out and laminated back-to-back to produce a single, pocket-sized pass-out card for personnel in your unit.

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"DEFENSIVE PASHTUNWALI" ALL US PERSONNEL SHOULD DO THESE:

Verbally greet everyone you pass on the street with the words "Salaam Aleikum." (pronounced Sah-lahm Ah-LAY-kum.") It means "Peace unto you." It is considered rude and impolite to pass some one without greeting them. Whenever you see an older man, touch your heart with the flat of your right palm when making the verbal greeting. This is a sign of respect for elders. Always accept and drink tea if offered. Offering it to you is part of their honor code. Failure to drink it dishonors them. If embedded with Afghan forces, sleep with your head pointed toward Mecca (west) and your feet pointed away. A village is a collective home. When visiting a village, if tactical rules and considerations permit, it is best to stop the vehicles 30-40 meters outside the village, and wait for some one to come out and ask your business. Tell that person you would like to enter the village and meet with the elders. After a few minutes you will be invited into the village. When entering a meeting room, the Afghan men will take off their shoes. They will not expect you to take off your boots, as it is assumed you are a foreigner and do not have good manners. However, you will impress them if you do. They will be safe by the door with the other shoes. Do not refer to the enemy as "Taliban." Use of these negative terms instead: zaalem qaatelaan (cruel killers) khoon-kaaraan (people who spill blood) munaafiqeen (people who make false jihad or false statements)

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Offensive Pashtunwali The first section of this paper talked about "Defensive Pashtunwali," a term we invented to mean passive respect for the Pashtun culture deployed systematically as a force protection measure to keep you from offending the locals, and them getting revenge. However, it is possible to take Pashtunwali a step further, and turn it into an offensive force to be used against the enemy. This is about using the "code" to help you achieve your objectives. It begins in the planning process, and should be factored into every mission. "Offensive Pashtunwali" essentially has three components: 1. Correct language use by you and your interpreters at all times to dominate the verbal battle space and win the war of ideas. 2. Empower the Elders to re-establish the social order and strengthen the village. 3. Use of the Pashtunwali concept of ostracism to marginalize the enemy. We'll take these one at a time: 1. Correct language Use The first element of "Offensive Pashtunwali" is using the right language in verbal and visual communication. Words matter. Every day in every engagement with an Afghan, you are competing in the battle space of ideas. You want to be using words and phrases which diminish the enemy and do not enhance him. For example, you wouldn't want to refer to the enemy as "heroes" in talking to the locals! Calling the enemy Taliban in a sense does this. Taliban means "religious students," which is a very honorable thing to be. Calling them by this name legitimizes their claim of waging a jihad against the government and enhances their information messaging themes. Many rural villagers are confused when you tell them you're trying to protect the village against "religious students." They ask themselves, "what have the Americans got against religious students?" Instead of this confusing (and actually positive) term for the enemy, you should always use words which diminish him and portray him as the vicious killer he is. This is why the Afghan government always refers to enemy forces as "the enemies of Afghanistan." However, the real-world reality, out past where the dirt road ends in the Pashtun south and east, is that "Afghanistan" is pretty much an abstraction with little more than vague meaning to the locals. More importantly, it is not something they feel any real loyalty to. Few rural Pashtun peasants have any sense of national identity. Fewer still are willing to stake their lives, and if necessary die, for "Afghanistan." Their identity and their loyalty are local, normally encompassing no more than their extended family and their clan. So calling bad guys "enemies of Afghanistan" doesn't really hit home in the war of ideas that is counterinsurgency. If this becomes a war of ideas between mujahideen and "Afghanistan," the enemy will succeed. To win the IO battle, we need to make sure the message resonates in local terms, in locally vital ways. We need to present it for what it is, a power struggle between religiously-inspired warlords on one side and

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Pashtunwali, the traditional Pashtun way of life, on the other. As many scholars of Afghanistan, including the late, great Louis Dupree, have said, when there is a conflict of social values between Islam and Pashtunwali, Pashtunwali always wins. If the enemy is presenting himself as a force of Islam, which is hard to contradict with the tools we have, then the obvious conclusion is that we need to operationalize Pashtunwali as a counterweight to the enemy's jihad narrative. Think of it as mobilizing the local culture as a counter-jihad tool. This starts with language usage. We want to refer to the enemy in true terms that reflect the negative aspects which the people are already aware of. In other words, we will use Pashtunwali to re-frame the terms of the discussion. The enemy calls himself mujahideen or "holy warriors" as part of a broader effort to cast his struggle for national power as a religious war against infidels (you). This is enormously important to the outcome of the war, because it is every Muslim's obligation to support and assist a true jihad. Thus, we must work consistently with all the means at our disposal to cast the enemy as what he really is. These are some Pashto terms you should use consistently whenever referring to the enemy:

zaalem qaatelaan = cruel killers (plural) wajhoonkee = killers (plural) khoon-kaaraan = people who cause the spilling of blood (plural) munaafiqeen = people who make false jihad or false statements (plural) ghleh = people who steal (plural)

Note that the close alliteration of munaafiqeen with mujahideen in particular offers excellent IO possibilities. 2. Empower the Elders The second part of operationalizing "Offensive Pashtunwali" is doing our part to rebalance the local society. Rural southern and eastern Afghanistan is ruled by a "triangle of power." One side of the triangle is the elders of each village. A second side is comprised of the local religious authority, the mullah or mullahs of the village (the correct plural of mullah in Pashto is mullawan). The third side, historically always a tiny little short side, is made up of whatever government representation is present. Historically, when Afghanistan is stable and the wheels are on the train, the elders side of the triangle is longest and has most influence. This is the ancient tradition. The next longest side of the triangle is that of the religious leaders. They have an important role in guiding the village spiritually and ensuring that village decisions are in accordance with Islamic principles. Often the mullah serves as a neutral arbiter of disputes as well as an advisor to the council of elders, the jirga. (A jirga is sometimes and in some places known as a shura, but we prefer the term jirga. The word shura has religious connotations which emphasize the deciding power of religious authority, and the more secular term jirga is more in keeping with the elders being the longest side of the triangle).

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What has happened in the last 30 years is that the mullah side of the triangle in many parts of the south and east is now the longest. This deformation of traditional society is a legacy of the Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989, which was cast as a jihad and which was led primarily by religious leaders, and subsequently reinforced by the Taliban.

However, cultures and societies are inherently conservative and resistant to change. Given the right conditions, the traditional triangle shape will return. It is beyond our power to reshape the triangle ourselves, but we can encourage the process by (1) doing what we can to create the right conditions and (2) working actively to empower the elders. All mission planning in Afghanistan should be based on the principle of reinforcing the decisions of the elders at the local level. Every decision and action you take,

no matter how petty or small, should begin with getting the elders to decide it is right. This can be frustratingly slow. But this is how we will get the people on board for the defeat of the enemy. 3. Deploying Ostracism The first element of "Offensive Pashtunwali" is using the right language consistently to frame the war of ideas. The second element of "Offensive Pashtunwali" is shaping all operations and decisions to support and empower the decision-making of the tribal elders. The third element of "Offensive Pashtunwali" is to use the "code" itself against the enemy. The guiding principle for this is ostracism. In Pashto, the word for ostracism is Shah-rel. Ostracism basically means making some one or some group an outcast. It is a way of enforcing social norms of behavior which has been found all over the world, from the aborigines of Australia to the ancient Greeks. It is a central part of Pashtun social code as well, and it is part of the fabric of Pashtunwali. Ostracism is a powerful social weapon in closed tribal societies like the Pashtun. In America, if you manage to alienate your entire neighborhood, you can always move to a new one. This mobility is not really possible within a closed tribal group. There is a major compensating element of Pashtunwali which emphasizes personal freedom, but this is really a façade. Tribal Pashtun life is very conformist. All members of the tribe are expected to stay within their proper lanes of behavior. To enforce this, ostracism is a powerful mechanism. The basic operating principle here is that the enemy is operating outside the code, and we want to ostracize him. There is a spectrum of ostracism, from the very mild forms of teasing and making jokes about some one's inappropriate behavior (behavior which doesn't conform to what the community expects), all the way up to killing the person if they don't "shape up and fly right." The mildest form of ostracism is gentle teasing, or paighor. This is a form of reproof wrapped in humor meant to remind the man that he is near the edges of the envelope of acceptable speech or behavior. This sort of thing is often seen in the teasing

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of teenage boys in America, when one member of the group acts in a way which doesn't conform to what is considered "hip" or "cool." Perhaps the next mildest form is complaint, or gila, from the community. If a clan member's actions or behavior are irritating the clan, members of the community may try to alleviate the problem with gila. An example cited by anthropologist Niloufer Qasim Mahdi is that of a Pashtun man being rude to elders, which is unacceptable within Pashtunwali. In such a case, members of the community may approach the man's family members to do gila. The family members will then discuss the issue with the man, and put pressure on him to conform to the accepted standards of behavior. Certainly the behavior of the Taliban in general is rude to elders by removing their traditional authority, and we recommend mobilizing this factor together with the second element of "Offensive Pashtunwali," empowering the elders. Another aspect of ostracism is shunning. Shunning is the act of deliberately avoiding association with an individual. This practice is also known in America, where it is practiced among the Amish people of Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana. The Amish practice shunning when a member of the community is behaving inappropriately in the eyes of the elders. When a person is shunned, they basically become invisible to all other members, who do not "see" them or speak to them. This form of ostracism is also still practiced among some Pashtun tribes in remote rural areas, when a family decides to exclude an individual from social activity. Unlike the Amish, in Pashtun cases, the

shunning is not usually complete; the man might not be considered for marriage agreements, for example, but still participates economically in village life. This appears to be done on a family-by-family basis, rather than by an entire community. If a family makes this decision against some one they "have issues with," they cut off the social relationship with that person. This practice is called meRai- jhwandai neh kawel. (This is a complete sentence: MeRai means death/ funeral, jhwandai means mostly weddings and/or other festivities, neh is not and kawel is the verb “to do.”) In other words, they do not participate in each other's funerals or weddings, which is a dishonor for the families having the funerals or parties. The operational use of this would obviously be to encourage rural families to exclude those families in

a village who provide sons to the enemy from the village's social life, a powerful social tool to discourage enemy recruiting.

The Amish also practice shunning.

Going up the ladder of escalation is exile, or kashunda. Kashunda is practiced among some Pashtun tribes, including the Mohmands, and involves a person who has committed an act likely to provoke a reprisal being sent away from the tribe. This is a terrible punishment for a people who live as a collective organism and whose life support system is the tribe. The only cases in which it is likely to succeed in preventing badal from being taken by the offended clan or family, however, is if it is a part of a settlement imposed by a jirga. The operational use here is that it would be desirable to refer to all cases of detaining a male from a village for suspected enemy activity (such as bomb-making) as a type of kashunda. In other words, the person has committed acts which will adversely affect the whole village, therefore the person has been exiled to detention to protect the village. As we have noted, rural Pashtun culture operates on the principle of collective responsibility -- the whole village is collectively responsible for

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the action of each individual. They understand this. By casting a detention in terms of protecting the village from much greater collective punishment for the detainee's behavior (such as blowing up the whole village, which the British did frequently in such cases, and which the people fully understood on a cultural level), we put our actions (arrests) into concepts the villagers can understand (Pashtunwali). This is a much better approach than the incomprehensible legalese of arrest and detention, which rural Pashtuns simply don't understand. An arrest becomes an act of doing the village a favor: "If we didn't kashunda the man, we'd have to punish the whole village for what he did, and we like this village, because it's a good village, etc." Any infantry company commander who has had to face the angry or sullen reproaches of elders in a jirga regarding detained individuals will immediately see the value of this line of explanation. The last stage of ostracism short of killing is the burning out of a man's house, a common practice in Pashtun lands (and one which we resorted to at times in Vietnam), but one which obviously we are not going to employ in Afghanistan. However, this is not an uncommon punishment in Pashtun areas, and a village may decide to impose this punishment on families which support enemy activity. To take a totally hypothetical case of how a village might apply Pashtunwali to resolve a conflict with U.S. forces differently than we would normally process it, imagine three men from one village are arrested, and one is found to be the ringleader of an IED-manufacturing cell, while the other two are merely accomplices of low importance. U.S. forces would treat the three men as individuals. The village however would likely convene a jirga which resolved the fate of all three persons in one solution. Because confinement as a punishment is largely unknown to the Pashtun, a probable Pashtunwali-based settlement would allow for the release of all three men, allowing the two lesser men to return to their families and burning out the home of the third man. It's not Harvard law school, but under their hypothetical solution, no one in that village would support enemy activity again, while under our approach to punishment for IED bombers, village anger over detentions usually creates more IED bombers who want badal for the treatment of the original bad guys. Punishment that is culturally harmonious but still achieves our overall objectives can be far more effective than some (to them) bizarre alien justice system which simply alienates them to us.

Conclusion This paper has briefly outlined a conceptual approach for “operationalizing” Pashtunwali in both passive and active applications. It is not intended to be a comprehensive treatise

on a very complex subject, but rather to give the warfighter a roadmap for linking culture to operations. In the final analysis, Pashtunwali is a strict set of guidelines for behavior, and there is little latitude for personal idiosyncrasies. If an entire village has decided to support the enemy, these strategies will probably not work. If a village is on the fence, however, they will be productive if used consistently. Obviously, over-riding tactical considerations make it impossible to follow all these cultural recommendations all the time. But, like the “Pirate Code,” they can still provide a useful set of guidelines for

interaction with Afghan civilians in pursuit of mission objectives. The bottom line is, understanding and working with the local culture rather than against it by factoring Pashtunwali into planning, operations, and information products to the fullest extent

possible under your ROE will yield better outcomes.

An example of this kind of retribution was seen recently in Pakistan’s Dir district, as tribal elders sought out Taliban militants, “burning houses and killing at least 11 men” – Sabrina Tavernise and Irfan Ashraf, “Attacked, Pakistani Villagers Take on Taliban,” New York Times June 9, 2009.

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Glossary of Some Pashtunwali Terms Badal (revenge). Badal literally means "exchange." For example, a wedding in which two families exchange brides is a badal wedding. However, it also means exchange in the sense of "payback." Gila (complaint). If a man in a village has done something non-violent which has gotten him cross-wise with the values of the community, the offended party may approach the man's kin with gila, a complaint about the behavior. The man's kin will then approach him about his behavior to extract an apology. Jirga (decision process). A jirga is a process which is convened to resolve an important question. It is often thought of as a meeting of elders, but it is properly understood as a process, not a singular event. The meeting of elders itself is part of a decision-making process which may take a period of weeks or months. Melmastia (hospitality). Melmastia is one of the primary obligations of a Pashtun. He is required by his honor to offer rank-appropriate hospitality to all. This often takes the form of offering tea to visitors. Nanawatey (surrender). Nanawatey literally means "going in," when a weaker man surrenders to a more powerful man in exchange for mercy. It is the ultimate dishonor, but it is mandatory under the code to give it when asked, even to an enemy. Nang (honor). The highest personal value of a Pashtun. Temporary loss of honor triggers an automatic requirement for revenge. Nikat (good standing). Nikat is a very difficult concept to grasp. The word comes from the same root as the word for "grandfather." It assesses social ranking or standing within a community, based on individual genealogy and descent from the original clan ancestor. Paighor (taunt). Paighor is a relatively mild humorous taunt directed at a person's behavior to remind them that they are close to the edge or have gone beyond the edge of acceptable community behavior. Panah (asylum). Panah is the asylum or refuge offered to a man in need, which will include food, water, shelter and protection. Shah-rel (ostracism). Shah-rel encompasses a spectrum of remedies from the mild (gila) to the extreme (killing) to keep social behavior within acceptable norms in a village.