Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May 2005 1 ‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead Centre for Operational

Unclassified

UnclassifiedUSJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE

17 May 2005 1

‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice

Rob Grossman-VermaasEBO Concept Lead

Centre for Operational Research and AnalysisDDA/CFEC

ISMOR, UK, Aug 05

UNCLASSIFIED

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17 May 2005 2

Life is really simple… but we insist on making it complicated - Confucius

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17 May 2005 3

Outline

1. EBO concept development2. EBO experimentation 3. EBO in practice4. Observations and Conclusions

The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein,

remain those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect,

any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada.

UNCLASSIFIED

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17 May 2005 4

The Six Flavours of EBO…

1. ‘EBO’ is a planning methodology that links strategy to operations…

2. ‘EBO’ is efficient ‘targeting’ and ‘shock and awe’…

3. EBO consider the application of all available sources of power…

4. EBO involve rapid, decisive operations and rapid dominance…

5. EBO require ‘knowledge’ principles for analysis and support…

6. EBO benefit from Systems of Systems analysis…

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17 May 2005 5

The Six Fallacies and Flaws of EBO…

1. The Air Force invented it…

2. EBO is too connected to strategy, or, not connected enough to strategy…

3. EBO derives from a position of strength, therefore, close combat is always wrong…

4. Relies on ‘ch’i’ rather than ‘cheng’ – • extraordinary vs. ordinary; • direct vs. indirect

5. We can predict cause and effect…

6. EBO is ‘old wine in new bottles’

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17 May 2005 6

There is an accepted understanding of EBO

The Seventh Fallacy or Flaw of EBO?

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An ‘Effect’

Clear statement for each Effect (written and understood):

•Identifies who or what is to be ‘influenced’, ‘affected’

•Suggests ‘nested’ or ‘environmental’ Effects

•Suggests the desired environmental state as a consequence of an action(s) - measures

•Is descriptively written (how and why)

•Includes a timeframe (days, weeks, months)

•Is assignable, measurable, achievable

UNCLASSIFIED

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17 May 2005 8

EBO : Conceptual Requirements

EBO incorporates:

• Complexity and cause and effect

• Systemic knowledge: environment dependencies/links/weaknesses

• Multiple levels of conflict

• Planning (EBP) process and capable organization

• Cognition and decision making in ‘real time’ – tools, models, assessment

• Adaptive environment (fluidity of system)

• Risk analysis, MOE/MOP and metrics over time and space

• Synchronization of actions aligned to capabilities over time and space

• Non-military and military planning and assessment construct

•Knowledge

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Assessment of the System(s)

Economic

Social and Cultural

Military

Physical

Scientificand Technical

Political

Legal, Ethicaland Moral

Vulnerabilities

Strengths

WeaknessesRelationships

Dependencies

System Understanding

Nat’l andInt’l Intelligence

OGDs

Private Industry

Defence

Academia

IGOs, NGOs

nodes +dependencies

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17 May 2005 10

A Complex Effects-based Environment

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EBO: the inter-agency perspective

• Cultural, social, economic, dependency, humanitarian, developmental issues critical to Effects-based concept

• Complex conflict environments favour ad hoc inter-agency command arrangements • Inter-agency coordination group should not formalize its organization, processes, roles • Consideration of development of inter-agency protocol or best practices • HQ consider including liaisons to NGOs, IGOs and vice versa (PACOM)– Inter-agency support is an integral ingredient for a functional Effects-based concept

•Relationships? Authority? Strategic vs. operational vs. tactical•Coordination? Direction? Advice?

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17 May 2005 12UNITSUNITS

OPCDR

CC

FCDROPS

TACT

STRAT

COALITION

D/MNIG

MNIG

NATIONSAGENCIES

& GOs

UNITSUNITSUNITS

ACTORS

HEADS ofMISSION

STAFF

CTFHQCOS

STAFFDep./CMNIG

co-ordinationauthority

IOs &NGOs

STAFF

Nations reps

National links

ACTORS

EMBASSIES& HoMs

MNIG board

co-ordinationauthority

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•Effects in Red are in process or not yet achieved

•Effects in Green are Achieved

Actions (MOPs)

Effect (MOE)

100%

100%

2S

1S3

1

2

3S

MMA1 categories.

Generic Trend Line MMA2 categories

EBO MOE/MOP Analysis

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Experimentation:MNE 4 (20 Feb-17 Mar 06)

Aim: To explore concepts and supporting tools for

Effects Based Operations (Knowledge, Planning,

Execution, Assessment) within a coalition

environment involving Stability Operations with

increasing levels of violence in order to assist the

development of future processes, organizations and

technologies at the Coalition Task Force (CTF)

level of command

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Multinational Experiment 4

MultinationalExperiment 4

Multinational (MN)Effects Based Operations

MultinationalInteragency Group

Knowledge Management

MN Effects Based OperationsConcept of Operations

Effects Based Tools

KnowledgeBase Development

Effects-based Plan

Tools

Implementing Procedures

Concept ofOperations

National Political-MilitaryPlan

Combined Task ForcePolitical-Military Plan

Combined Task ForceStrategic Guidance

Multinational Information Sharing

Technical Demo

Combined Task Force Intelligence Plan

Information Operations

Strategic Context

Combined Task Force Information Operations Plan

Intelligence








Other Participants

Intelligence Tiger Team

Lead

Effects Based Execution

Tiger Team Lead

OrganizationAnalysis

Lead

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17 May 2005 16

Knowledge Base(Development)

Effects-BasedPlanning

Effects-BasedExecution

Effects-BasedAssessment

Effects-BasedPlanning

Effects-BasedExecution

time

Effects-BasedAssessment

Relationships among the Four Components of EBO for MNE 4

T=0 T=1

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17 May 2005 17

EBA

QCE 1

EBE

PREPO1 PREPO2 IDI1

C&C2

C&C1

AAMOP2AAMOP1

MMA1 MMA2 MMA3EAMOE2EAMOE1

CA 1 CA 2

EBP

ESA 1ESA 1

ESA 2ESA 2

ESA 7ESA 7

ESA 5ESA 5

ESA 3ESA 3

ESA 8ESA 8

ESA 6ESA 6

ESA 4ESA 4

ESA 9ESA 9

ESA 10ESA 10

ESA 11ESA 11

RG 1RG 1 RG 2RG 2 RG 3RG 3

RG 4RG 4 RG 5RG 5SASU 1SASU 1

ED 1ED 1 ED 2ED 2 ED 3ED 3 ED 4ED 4 ADRM 1ADRM 1 ADRM 2ADRM 2 ADRM 3ADRM 3

SPR 1SPR 1 SPR 2SPR 2 SPR 3SPR 3

EBAP 1EBAP 1

EBAP 2EBAP 2 EBAP 4EBAP 4EBAP 3EBAP 3

QCE 2

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EBO in practice (CJTF 180)

•Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB)- synchronization of lethal and non-lethal effects- ‘targeting’ board (J2/J3) - Intelligence, Info Ops, Mil Ops provide assessments- quantitative and qualitative

•Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG)- weekly staff coordination- JEWG briefs JECB- Based on Commander’s Intent- Develops supporting effects

•Targeting Battle Rhythm- OPORD establishes 3 week battle rhythm resulting in weekly FRAGOs- Changes are incorporated into decision making process

= Results in production of (refined) Commander’s desired Effects

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17 May 2005 19

EBO in Practice:(Operation Iraqi Freedom)

• Finding: ‘Based on initial understanding of the enemy, integrated kinetic and non-kinetic actions and multiple, high-tempo lines of operation were unleashed to achieve enemy disintegration and regime collapse; when execution exceeded capacity to understand change, operations reverted from an effects to attrition focus’. Desired

Effects

Out-comes

Objectives

TasksAssess

Actions

MostMature,Routine

Maturing

LeastMatureLeast

Enabled

• Why it happened: – Difficulty gaining knowledge to identify appropriate effects, desired

actions, & cascading or 2d & 3d order effects. – Limited collection on non-kinetic actions, notably IO– Over focused on measures of performance, rather than measures of

effectiveness and merit– Insufficient interagency, joint and Service integration hindered execution

/ support of effects-based action• What should be done:

– Enhance C2 and C2I technology, procedures, & organizations to deal with war’s new character/conduct

– Create routine joint and function integration via training & organization; extend jointness to the lowest levels possible

– Inculcate EBO via world-class experiment & training venues

Source: US Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned

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17 May 2005 20

EBO in Practice (NATO ISAF)

•ISAF ‘targeting’ and assessment cycles - NO defined methodology

•PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC)•ESC Working Group (Indicators and MOEs)•MOEs on Security, Governance and Development

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EBO in Practice vs. Theory

•Little integration between CJ2, CJ3/7, CJ5, CJ9•Task over process vs. process-driven•Sporadic inter-agency coordination •Immature analysis techniques•Confusion over MOE and MOP•Military vs. non-military planning and assessment constructs

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17 May 2005 22

Observations and Conclusions

•Prescription vs. guidance

•Operational ‘redux’ (levels are archaic)

•Knowledge and technology

•Culture

•‘Inter-agency’ includes the military

•Doctrine vs. concepts

•Don’t break what isn’t broken

•Complexity + complicatedness = confusion…

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17 May 2005 23

Questions?

[email protected] 613 990 7436

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17 May 2005 24

Effects Based Operations

‘Operations designed to influence the long- or short-term state of a system through the achievement of desired physical or

psychological effects. Operational effects are sought to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of all

applicable instruments of hard and/or soft power. Desired effects, and the actions required to achieve them, are concurrently and adaptively planned, executed, assessed (and potentially altered)

within a complex and adaptive system’

CA working definition

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17 May 2005 25

21st Century Conflict: Towards an Effects-based Policy?

1945 to 1990 1991 to 2001 2002 to ?

•Linear System

•Limited Dimensions

•Sequential operations

•Reacting to Threats

•Attritional Forces

•Focus on Attack and Defence

•Single service focus

•Civilian vs Military

•Mass/Directed weapons

•Asymmetric System

•Increasing Dimensions

•Rapid reaction operations

•Coping with Threats

•Response Forces

•Focus on Outcomes/Exits

•Joint/Coalition Focus

•OOTW and Civ-Mil Ops

•Small/Light Weapons

•Complex Adaptive System

•Unlimited Dimensions

•Complex operations •Mitigating Threats

•Agile Forces

•Focus on Effects

•‘Collaborative’ Focus

•Inter-Agency Direction

•Advanced Technology and WME

Source: Robert Vermaas, Future Perfect: Effects Based Operations, Complexity and the Human Environment(Operational Research Note, Department of National Defence Canada, Ottawa, CA, 2004)

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EBO Relationships (UK JDCC)

A A

A

E E E E

A A A A

E E E E

A A

A

A A

Strategic Level

Operational Level

Tactical Level

A A A A

E E E

Obj

Obj

Obj

E E E

Obj

A A A

A

E E

As

Obj

E

A

Obj

E E

Obj

Strategic Aim

A

A

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Hierarchy of Effects

Physical

Systemic

Psychological UncertaintyScale

Low

Medium

High

Small

Medium

Large

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Example of Operational Objective: Establish freedom of movement in Qandahar region

R1

A1

N1

E1

N2

E2

N3

E3

Example of Effect¹: ISAF Force (R1) patrols (A1) ensure freedom of movement of relief convoys (E1) along Supply Route (N1)Example of Undesired Effect2, but Warlords ambush (A’1) open routes (N2) resulting in civilian casualties (E2) and animosity, leadingto negative press coverage (E3) in international news media (N3).

dT

A’1

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17 May 2005 29

CA EBO Experimentation

EBO (CA and multinational)a. C2 and inter-agency perspective (Strategic and Operational)b. Systems and Network Analysis concept and technologies as

enabler to EBO

•EBO Concept Development for Experimentation (DDA/CFEC)vs•EBO Concept Development thru Experimentation (USJFCOM; CFEC)•Feasibility Exploration vs. ‘Jumping on the Band Wagon’

UNCLASSIFIED

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Canadian EBO concept Campaign Plan

• Support optimization of existing CA/NATO operational planning process in light of emerging CA effects-based approach

• Provide functional solutions (based on experimentation) to support optimized CA planning processes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and modified CA command organizations (methodologies - analysis; risk; modelling;)

• Influence and learn from development of US/NATO multinational EBO processes, C2 organizations and technologies (inter-agency perspective; hard/soft power; long-term effects)

• Inform development of subsequent campaign plans to address later horizons (where should CF/DND focus in 2020?)

• Inform development of CF/DND doctrine based on concept development and experimentation of EBO

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17 May 2005 31

CA EBO Initiatives

• National Security Policy, 2004- Integrated 3D security approach

(Defence, Diplomacy, Development)• CDS Vision – ‘integrating effects’• Multinational concept and policy statements (US; UK)• Integrated Operating Concept (IOC), 2005 - EBO as an Integrating Concept

- DDA/ACD lead development of concept • Joint Force Development and Joint Vision, 2005

- Employment of Effects-based approach• Experimentation and Integration – CFEC - MNE series• CF/DND; FAC; CIDA; academia

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17 May 2005 32

MOE [%]

t

100

tRlead time lag time

tS tFplanned duration of effect

t1 t2 t3 t4

TH

xx

x

x

x

Trend line 2

Trend line 1

Ideal effect line

Effects Analysis by MOE

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17 May 2005 33

MOE = 65%

MOE = 40%

100 75 50 25 25 50 75 100

MOE1 [%] MOE4 [%]

Weighting of Multi-dimensional EBO MOE

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17 May 2005 34

EBO in practice (CJTF 180)

•Main ‘combat’ objective: ‘Deny terrorist operatives sanctuary and eliminate all foreign-sponsored Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin anti-Coalition forces’

(measurable) •Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) employed a method for synchronizing joint fires and effects•Model for military and non-military integration throughout CENTCOM – Joint Fires Element•Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) – with NGOs

Documents

Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May 2005 1 ‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead Centre for Operational