Ukraine Helicopter War

8/17/2019 Ukraine Helicopter War

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2/12 HELIOPS FRONTLINE 93

Ukraine’s army aviation

force saw an active

participation in the internal

conflict in Ukraine during 2014.

HeliOps Frontline looks at

the combat operations and the

lessons learned.

STORY BY ALE X MLADENOV AND KRAS SM IR GRO ZEV


3/1294 HELIOPS FRONTLINE

he bloody and protracted

internal conflict in Ukraine

has seen the struggle of

a once mighty Ukrainian military force

that has failed to modernize its Soviet-

era air power by failing to field modern

day/night sensors, self-protection aids

and precision-guided munitions.

A combination of poor and rigid

tactics, antiquated helicopters lack of

any modern self-protection aids are

cited as the main reasons for the losses

in the 2014 internal conflict. Five Mi-24s

and five Mi-8s were written-off in four

months in low-intensity combat, while

at least three additional Mi-24s and four

Mi-8s sustained combat damages that

required prolonged repair. Another Mi-8

was written-off in the combat zone due

to pilot error. All attack aircraft and

helicopters types involved in the wide-scale military operation against the pro-

Russian separatists in the easternmost

provinces of Ukraine – Lugansk and

Donetsk - have proved susceptible to

ground-to-air threats such as small

arms, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) or

man-portable air defence systems

(MANPADS).

The Kiev air power has also lacked

any adequate night-operating capability

on the ground and in the air. This in turn

prevented the Ukrainian Army Aviation

(UkAA) branch to launch effective

attacks at night. This, as it could be

guessed, gave a lot of freedom to the

pro-Russian separatists to undertake

their movements and regrouping at

night virtually unobstructed.

There were also no assault transport

helicopters with NVG-trained crews

capable to infiltrate and exfiltrate

special operations teams in insurgent-

controlled areas to interrupt the enemycommunications and supply channels,

while doing this at daylight proved to

be a too risky business. The lack of

NVG-capable helicopters has also made

it impossible for the Ukrainian forces

to conduct casualty evacuation and

resupply operations at night.

During almost five months of

asymmetrical warfare the old-fashioned

and cumbersome Ukrainian military

machine reportedly failed to suppress

the uprising of the pro-Russian

separatists. As a result, the militia forces

of the separatists became powerful

enough to repulse the Ukrainian

offensive and encircle the Ukrainian

troops in several pockets around

Lugansk and Donetsk, inflicting heavy

losses. In early September 2014 the

warring parties agreed a truce, with the

separatists managing to retain control

over their self-proclaimed Donetsk

and Lugansk people’s republics in the

easternmost part of the country, andthe situation remained unchanged by

early 2016.

HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

At the onset of hostilities the UkAA

had a fleet of about 60 Mi-24s but no

more than 20 of them were operable.

The branch also had a fleet of between

30 and 35 airworthy Mi-8MTs but only

19 of these have been noticed in use

inside the combat zone, in addition to

two National Guard of Ukraine’s (NGU)

aviation service and six Ukrainian Air

Force (UkAF) examples.

Maj Gen Valentin Pistruga, UkAA’s

CO, said in front of Ukrainian aviation

magazine, Aviatsia i Vremya, that the

service’s Mi-8MT tactical transport

helicopters have extensively been

involved in medical evacuation

(MEDEVAC), resupply and assault

party delivery/recovery missions. Their

deployment was mainly to ferry troopsand supplies into areas inaccessible for

ground transport, including right on

the forward line and sometimes into

T



was launched on 24 April. The Ukrainian

forces failed to wipe out the insurgent

checkpoints and have sustained loses of

military equipment, taken as war trophy

of the militants. All UkAA, UkAF and

NGU helicopters used in the operations

in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions

received rapid visual ID markings in the

form of two white-colored wide vertical

stripes on the tail boom; in fact, these

stripes were applied for the first time in

March during the height of the Crimea

crisis.

The UkAA used its helicopter

force in anger against the separatist

militia for the first time on 15 April,

supporting the ground forces offensive.

This involved an airborne assault with

Mi-8MT tactical transport helicopters

escorted by Mi-24s, aimed at takingcontrol of Kramatorsk airfield – it was a

combat zone largely controlled by pro-

Russian militants at the time. The initial

enemy rear areas when dispatched to

resupply besieged troops and evacuate

casualties in hot zones. The Mi-24 attack

force was involved in close air support

missions to support the offensive of the

Ukrainian ground forces and escort the

troop-carrying Mi-8s.

When speaking about aircrew

training, Maj Gen Pistruga has boasted

that all UkAA pilots who flew combat

missions in eastern Ukraine had in

excess of 1,000 flight hours under their

belts and were regarded as well-fit for

combat.

HIPS AND HINDS IN ACTION

The initial ground clashes with

exchange of fire around Slavyansk

and Kramatorsk took place between

17 and 20 April. Then the first massedlarge-scale ground assault against the

defensive positions set up by the pro-

Russian separatists around Slavyansk



Ukrainian air assault operation was a

success but insurgents soon began

taking measures to block helicopter

resupply operations in to the combat

zone. The first Ukrainian loss was

reported ten days later, on 25 April,

when an Mi-8MT, laden with munitions,

took a hit from sniper fire just before

take-off from Kramatorsk airfield with

rotors turning. There are different

accounts, some of them claiming that

the militants used an anti-tank guided

missile or an unguided rocket-propelled

grenade to destroy the Hip-H. The

helicopter crew of three managed

to escape from the burning machine

before it was consumed by fire.

The next series of UkAA combat

losses were sustained during a major

escalation of violence in the crisis – inthe second massed ground assault

launched against the city of Slavyansk

in the early morning hours on 2 May.

During the assault, the attackers

encountered a large number of die-

hard pockets of resistance at hardened

checkpoints and eventually failed to

penetrate insurgent defenses. Mi-8MT

helicopters were used once again

to deliver an airborne assault to the

strategically important Krachun-

Mogila Heights overlooking the city of

Slavyansk and its vicinity, with top cover

provided by pairs of Mi-24s. In this

battle, the pro-Russian militants for the

first time used 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)

man-portable air defence systems

(MANPADS). This proved to be a major

unpleasant surprise for the Ukrainian

helicopter aircrews, resulting in two

UkAA Mi-24Ps being shot down. These

Hind-Fs were involved in supporting

the ground push by performing showof force over Slavyansk. Five crewmen

were killed and only the weapon system

operator (WSO) of one of the Mi-24Ps



had managed to bail out and survived

albeit suffering wounds. Both Hind-Fs lost

on 2 May belonged to the 16th Aviation

Brigade (AvB) stationed at Brody, and

those crewmembers killed were among

the most experienced in the unit.

In addition to the Mi-24Ps, an Mi-8MT

flying near Slavyansk was seriously

damaged by small arms fire while

returning to the base after delivering

an assault party in to the combat zone.

It took no less than 20 hits when flying

over a highway with several militantcheckpoints. The damaged Hip-H made

a forced landing in the field and was

subsequently dismantled and transported

by truck to the helicopter repair facility

at Konotop, where it had been restored

to airworthy condition.

Another Mi-24P, this time

belonging to the 11th AvB stationed

at Tchernobaevka, sustained serious

combat damage three days later around

Slavyansk while trying to search and

destroy hardened checkpoints set-up

by the separatist militia just outside the

city. This time, the damage was caused

by hits from heavy-caliber machine gun

(HMG) fire, with the Hind-F losing bothhydraulic systems. The pilot had nothing

to do but to crash-land the machine in a

swampy area. The three crew members



were promptly recovered by an UkAA

Mi-8MT, and soon after the damaged

machine was destroyed by a Su-25

attack aircraft with 80mm rockets,

in order to prevent its capture by the

militants.

On May 13, the UkAA Mi-8MTs and

Mi-24s were called in action once again

- the transport helicopters conducted

a medevac mission at the site of an

ambush staged by the insurgents near

the village of Oktybarskoe, situated

some 11nm (20km) south of Kramatrosk.Two Hinds were seen providing top

cover to the medevac Mi-8MT and one

of these was a white painted Mi-24R.

It was a helicopter used before in a

peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone,

still wearing its ‘UN’ tittle on fuselage

sides but also adorned with dark

blue tail boom stripes introduced for

rapid visual ID in the combat zone.

Appearance of a helicopter with ‘UN’

titles on the battlefield caused a lot of

confusion and noise when it was seen

on video footage. That is why, shortly

afterwards all white UkAA Mi-24s and

Mi-8s received camouflage paint in

green and brown shades with light blueundersides. In addition the serials of all

helicopters involved in the ‘anti-terrorist

operation’ (ATO) were painted over,

UKAA’S COMBAT RECORD

In total, as Maj Gen Pistruga claimed, the UkAA has amassed more than 8,000 combat sorties,

most of these reported between 15 April and 5 September 2014. The total combat flight time

logged by the branch amounted to about 8,000 flight hours. During the most intense combat

operations in June, July and August - such as the battles of Slavyansk and Saur-Mogila height -

the Mi-8MT fleet was used for delivering many assault parties directory on the forward line and

providing subsequently resupply of ammunition. It also saw extensive use in the medevac role,

transporting wounded troops from the forward positions to the field hospitals in the rear areas. In

the busiest days, the Mi-8MT aircrews amassed up to six combat missions, flown mostly in daylight.

Among the most effective UkAA operations in the conflict, as Maj Gen Pistruga claimed, were

those to deliver assault parties directly on to the front line at Saur-Mogila height as well as an

assault party delivery and air attacks on the separatists occupying the new terminal at Donetsk

Airport which inflicted sensible losses on May 26.



replaced by the so-called ‘fake’ serials

applied on paper sheets on the cabin

windows.

DONETSK AIRPORT CLASH

One of the few occasions of effective

use of the Mi-24 in the conflict was the

clash at Donetsk Airport on 26 May. This

saw an airborne assault party delivered

by four Mi-8MTs, while at least two pairs

of Mi-24s mounted a series of attack

passes, unleashing rockets and cannon

rounds against the newly-built terminal

building occupied by militants from the

so-called Vostok battalion, inflicting

heavy casualties. The Ukrainian attack

jets and helicopters used the element of

surprise to heavily pound the terminal

building, featuring largely glass and

steel frame construction, which offered

little or no protection for the militants

who also lacked effective air defenceweapons. This allowed the UkAA Hinds

to strafe with impunity from close

distance.

All the aircraft flying low in the battle

zone dispersed flares all the time in

order to avoid heat-seeking MANPADS

and reported suppression of at least

one ZU-23 twin-barrel 23mm anti-

OUTSET OF THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE

The pro-Russian separatist movement in Ukraine’s easternmost two provinces began in March

2014, just after the annexation of Crimea peninsula by Russia and the inauguration of the interim

government in Kiev. In early April anti-government activists, eager their regions to follow the

example set by breakaway Crimea, proceeded with an occupation of the most important government

and security services headquarters in the large industrial cities of Donetsk and Lugansk. Then the

self-proclaimed Lugansk and Donetsk people’s republics voted for independence from Ukraine in

the first half of April 2014. The two non-recognized breakaway provinces (which later formed a loose

federation known as Novorossia) have immediately started to establish their own militia self—defence

forces, staffed by both volunteers coming from Russia and locals of Russian nationality. The overall

military aim of the anti-Kiev forces in the breakaway republics was to draw Russia more overtly into

the conflict (as was the case in Crimea), through wide-ranging military assistance, including direct

armed intervention or some sort of peacekeeping mission directed and managed by Moscow.

The situation in the breakaway provinces heated to a boiling point after a group of lightly armed

Russian volunteers led by Col (Ret) Igor Gyrkin-Strelkov (a former Federal Security Service officer

with a rich combat experience under his belt) had managed to establish control over the large city

of Slavyansk, some 51nm (95km) north of Donetsk on April 12. Two days later, members of the same

separatist group, reinforced by local volunteers, seized control over the nearby city of Kramatorsk.

In a prompt response to the escalation of the separatist movement in Lugansk and Donetsk

regions, the Ukrainian government declared the beginning of a wide-scale ‘anti-terrorist operation’

(ATO) on April 14. Its chief aim was to retake the urban centres in the easternmost provinces

controlled by the separatist militants, wiping out the self-proclaimed Lugansk and Donetsk people’

republics.



aircraft gun emplacement defending the

terminal. The insurgents are known to

have fired at least one MANPAD against

the attacking Su-25s and Mi-24P/

VPs but it missed its intended targets.

In this battle however, UkAA attack

helicopters were observed operating at

500 to 650ft (150 to 200m) altitude,

conducting long and shallow firingpasses which has rendered them easy

targets for small arms, MANPADS and

AAA. This way, the chief factor for

success of the air attacks during this

battle was the weak air defence of

Vostok battalion rather than the suitable

tactics and skilled crews.

LOSSES CONTINUE TO MOUNT

UkAA helicopters continued to be

used heavily for resupply of the forces

entrenched on the strategic Krachun-

Mogila height in May and June. From

there, Ukrainian spotters directed

artillery fire against separatist positions

around and inside and around the city

of Slavyansk. By mid-day on 29 May,

an NGU Mi-8MT conducting a routine

re-supply mission to Krachun-Mogila

was shot down on the return leg by

the insurgents using an Igla MANPAD.

The helicopter delivered supplies to theforward line in the vicinity of Slavyansk

and on the return flight it took on board

a special operations team headed by

Maj Gen Sergey Kulchitskiy, head of

NGU’s combat training department.

The helicopter was brought down when

it took an Igla hit soon after takeoff.

Upon impact with the ground, all ten

passengers and two crewmembers

perished. The co-pilot survived the

crash with bad wounds.

The period between 3 and 5 June

saw an Mi-24 fully destroyed and three

more examples suffering heavy damage

during another massed and ultimately

unsuccessful ground offensive against

Slavyansk. On 4 June The Mi-24P

had a bad crash landing after taking

combat damage from ground fire and

was rapidly consumed by fire but its

wounded pilot managed to escape,

dragging out from the cockpit the badly

wounded WSO. Three other Hinds,which crash-landed after taking hits in

this battle were successfully recovered

from the battle zone to be dispatched

for repair to the large helicopter

maintenance plant at Konotop.

The Ukrainian authorities initially

announced that only two Mi-24s

sustained heavy damage during the

battle for Slavyansk, and that their

crews survived the forced landings. One

of the three recovered Hips took hits by

23mm AAA while and the other two arebelieved to have been knocked out by

MANPADS. There is a reasonably good

amateur video footage recorded from

several miles away on 4 June showing

an Mi-24 hit and subsequent crash

landing. This unlucky Hind was flying a

racetrack pattern in a pair with another

Mi-24 and took the missile hit from

behind while flying straight and level

at a slow speed and at about 500ft

(150m) above terrain. The strickenHind-F began pumping flares only

after the detonation of the Igla missile

warhead next to the engine area and

continued doing so for some time even

after touching down the ground.

On June 24, another UkAA Mi-8MT

fell victim to an ambush set up by

a militant’s dedicated anti-air team,

exactly in the same area where Gen

Kulchitskiy’s helicopter had been

gunned down nearly a month before.

The doomed Hip-H took an Igla hit

just after take-off from Krachun-

Mogila Heights, and the impact with

ground killed all nine people on-board,

including the three crew members,

two special operations troops and four

security services operatives.

MODERN SELFPROTECTION

SYSTEMS IN SHORT SUPPLY

UkAA Hinds and Hips used in the

conflict were equipped with defensive

aids of 1980s-vintage, made of four to

six ASO-2V 32-round flare dispensers,

L-166V-1A Lipa IR jammer and EVU

exhaust-mixer boxes over exhaust

ducts for protection of heat-seeking

MANPADS. This kind of simple and

rather obsolete aids proved ill-suited

against new-generation MANPADS such

as the 9K38 Igla deployed in a massed

manner by the militants.

At the onset of the conflict, all Mi-24sand Mi-8MTs flew in the combat zone

without engine exhaust duct mixers that

suppress IR emissions and thus shorten



MANPADS lock-on range. Only after the

first series of painful losses in May and

June most of the rotorcraft operating

in the troubled regions received EVU

exhaust mixers. All Mi-8MTs also

sported makeshift additional protection

of their glazed cockpit, with a pack of

armored vests covering all downward

and sideward windows to prevent hitsfrom small-arms projectiles coming

from bellow and forward.

Maj Gen Pistruga claimed that the

lack of a clearly-defined front-line in

the restive regions was among the

chief factors that rendered impossible

the UkAA to deploy any more or

less suitable threat evasion tactics.

The helicopters flew their attack

and combat missions over own and

separatist-held territory remainingexposed to ground fire most of the

time throughout the mission. In such

conditions, helicopters took enemy

fire when flying over both territories

as there were anti-air teams of the

separatists operating within Ukrainian

rear areas and therefore the threat was

omnipresent. This anti-air tactic was

used to a great effect on June 24

when an UkAA Mi-8MT was brought

down by MANPADS near Slavyansk

immediately after take-off while flying

over territory supposedly controlled by

the Ukrainian forces.

At the same time Maj Gen Pistruga

acknowledged that the lack of effective

self-protection aids to counter the

separatist MANPADS threat was

among the chief issues encountered

by the UkAA throughout the entire

‘anti-terror’ operation. Despite the

promise of the Chief of the Ukrainian

Armed Forces General Staff for anurgent delivery of effective IR jammers,

given after the first helicopter loses

in early May, such deliveries never

materialized, presumably due to the

heavy procurement bureaucracy

plaguing Ukraine’s MoD. As it was,

only five sets of the combat-proven

Adros KT-01AV omnidirectional IR

jammer (manufactured by the local

company Andron based in Kiev) were

eventually taken on strength by the

UkAA for installation onto Mi-24s,

replacing the reportedly ineffective

Lipa. The KT-01AV is advertised as

being effective against man-portable

heat-seeking missiles, in combination

with flares and engine exhaust mixers.

These otherwise affordable anti-missile

systems, however, were donated to

the branch by Ukrainskiye Vertolety,

a commercial helicopter operator

which uses leased UkAA and MoI

helicopters for operations in support

of UN humanitarian and peacekeepingmissions in Africa. According to Maj

Gen Pistruga, the Adros KT-01AV IR

jammer alone could not be regarded as

a 100% effective solution for ensuring

protection from modern MANPADS.

Despite this assertion, he revealed that

there were two occasions when the

new jammer has protected the carrier

helicopters as separatist-fired missiles

are reported to have missed their

intended targets.The Mi-24 force involved in the

operation fired S-8 80mm rockets in

addition to 23mm and 30mm cannon

rounds, while Shturm-V (AT-6 Spiral)

anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs)

were employed on rare occasions

only, when point targets had to be hit.

Among the few known instances of

ATGM employment in the conflict was

an attack on May 5 mounted against a

makeshift armored and armed train of

the separatists in Donetsk region.

In July and August, UkAA Mi-8MTs

used for tactical transport and medevac

commenced operations with forward-

firing weapons for self-defense such

as B8M1 80mm rocket packs or GUV

gun-pods, containing a four-barrel

YaKB-12.7 machine guns and two four-

barrel 7.62mm GShG machine guns. In

addition, most Mi-8MTs were armed

with a cockpit-mounted and rear-

mounted 7.62mm machine-guns forself-defense.

By the end of the active phase

of the conflict, as Maj Gen Pistruga

claimed, the UkAA has received a

yet undisclosed number of upgraded

Mi-24PU-1 helicopters with improved

targeting and self-protection suite

(believed to be between one and three).

At that time, the service also had six

aircrews trained to fly the Mi-24PN-1

in night missions on NVGs; in addition,

there were several crews qualified for

NVG operations on modified Mi-8MTs.

These new capabilities however, were

never been used in anger during the


12/12

active phase of the conflict which

ended on September 5.

LAST SERIES OF LOSSES

Another peak of rotary-wing losses,

preassembly due to the more intense

combat operations during the counter-

offensive of the pro-Russian separatists,

was reported between August 7 and 20,

comprising no fewer than three Mi-8MTs

and one Mi-24VP.

The first Mi-8MT was brought down

on August 7 near Manuilovka in Donetsk

region by small arms fire while on a

casualty evacuation mission (in fact, no

wounded troops were transported and

only three crew members were onboardat the time of the shoot down). The

helicopter crash-landed on separatist-

held territory and was abandoned. The

second Hip-H was damaged from small

arms fire two days later; it suffered

projectile hits in one engine, cockpit and

cabin area and the co-pilot was badly

wounded. The damaged helicopter

with on engine inoperative landed on

territory controlled by own forces. Three

days later the badly wounded co-pilot

died in the hospital while the helicopter

was recovered and sent for repair to the

Konotop-based plant.

Another Mi-8MT was damaged

by small arms fire on August 18 near

Georgievka village and made an

emergency landing. The crewmembers

escaped intact and continued flying

combat missions on the next day.

Their new helicopter, however, was

immediately gunned down once again

while flying in the same area, and thistime the aircrew had less luck, surviving

the crash landing with serious wounds.

After the first series of painful

helicopter losses on 3-5 May that

included three Mi-24s and then on 3-4

June with another Hind brought down

and three more sustaining

heavy damage, the UkAA aircrews

adopted a set of improved survivability

measures. The Mi-24s commenced

flying at tree-top level, while firing

rockets and cannons at enemy targets

wherever possible outside the lethal

range of the MANPADS and 23mm

anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) operated

by the militants. This overtly cautious

combat employment tactics, as

could be expected, proved not so

effective, but the survivability rate

nevertheless improved.

During the most intense battles in

July and August, only one Mi-24 was

lost when flying in a hot zone saturated

with modern air defence weapons.

This ill-fated Mi-24VP was brought

down on August 20 in the vicinity of

Georgievka village in Lugansk region,

while attempting to attack separatist

positions; the pilot and WSO were

killed. The second Hind in the pair,

however, managed to escape from

the incoming missiles by descending

down to rooftop level in urban area.

On August 27, a Mi-8MT heavy laden

with troops and munitions crashed

on landing due to pilot error near the

village of Alanovka in Donetsk region.

It hit the ground hard turning on its port

side sustaining irreparable damages.

Two more Mi-8MTs were claimed

by the pro-Russian insurgents on

September 1 as hit by artillery fire

at their forward operating base atLitugino in Lugansk region, but this

information has never been confirmed

by Ukrainian sources. v

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Ukraine Helicopter War