Ukraine from Elections to Elections: building political culture through conflict.CERES – P. Jacyk Program for the Study of UkraineUniversity of Toronto, Ontario, CanadaOctober 15, 2007

Mychailo Wynnyckyj Ph.D.Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, UkraineDep’t of Sociology & Kyiv-Mohyla Business School

Summary abstract Mass participant values matter less to stability than elite

consensus on their own rule framework Ukraine’s elite is currently deciding “who/how will decide?”.

Other questions (e.g. language, land ownership, NATO, subsidies for newborns, etc.) are noise

How do we interpret “Rule of Law”? (Article 8)

Elite consensus-building is a strategic activity not a tactical one – actions based on pursuit of tactical interests lead to a breakdown in strategic (institutional) consensus. Constitutional Court & Central Election Commission composition Precedent of 150 deputies resigning from Rada

Stability depends more on elites

Stable democratic political systems require a participant polity

(Almond & Verba’s Civic Culture) Prior to 2004, Ukraine’s prospects looked grim (Miller, Reissinger, Hesli)

After Orange Revolution, civic culture seemed to have “arrived”…

Stability requires elite consensus as to the institutional

framework for contestation between competing interests; rule

framework must engender compliance, and be considered

legitimate (Przeworkski, Higley, Lane). Post-Orange period: building a rule-framework

Tension between tactical positioning and strategic intent

Stages of elite consensus: 3 questions Who are we?

Consensus as to the definition of our community (nation?) Formal markers (symbols, language, capital, flag, anthem)

How do we make decisions? Who decides? Rules of the game of politics Mechanisms of power and conflict resolution

How will we live? What is legitimate/revolutionary? Field of policy contestation, wealth distribution Model of state’s role in the economy

Community System Policy

Consensus building – starting point 26.03.06 – Parliamentary elections.

Party of Regions 32.14%

Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 22.29%

Our Ukraine 13.95%

Socialist Party 5.69%

Communist Party 3.66%

03.04.06 – Yushchenko article in the Wall Street Journal calling for a

“Pact of National Unity” to be signed by all parliamentary parties

25.04.06 – Luhansk obl-rada passes a resolution that proclaims Russian

as a “regional language” (worthy of protection under the European

Regional Language Charter)

“Blind faith” in strategic consensus 26.04.06 – Official election results published (5 days after announcement) –

new Rada must gather within 30 days & coalition must be formed 30 days

after that.

11.07.06 – After 80 days of coalition talks between Our Ukraine and BYuT,

the Verkhovna Rada elects Oleksander Moroz as Speaker; Socialists switch

sides, and officially sign “Anti-Crisis Coalition” agreement with the Party of

Regions and the CPU.

03.08.06 – After a month of negotiations between Our Ukraine and the

“Anti-Crisis Coalition”, the “Universal of National Unity” is signed by the

leaders of all Parliamentary parties except BYuT. Yushchenko officially

proposes the candidacy of Yanukovych for the post of Prime Minister and

negotiations continue on full inclusion of Our Ukraine into the coalition.

Yushchenko – Consensus-builder 2005 – period of Yushchenko recovery from poisoning

2006 – attempt to build consensual rule framework peaks with “Universal” One language, NATO & EU, energy security

Economic reform – especially land privatization

Things fall apart…

14.09.06 – Yanukovych in Brussels: Ukraine is not ready to join NATO.

21.09.06 – The Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers rejects 7 Presidential Decrees

as invalid in what became known as the “Countersigning scandal”.

19.10.06 – A rayon-level court rules compulsory dubbing of films into Ukrainian to

be illegal – no appeals from the Yanukovych government.

During subsequent months, meetings between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko

become more frequent: tactical alliance between the two leaders

Tactical interests destroy consensus-building strategy

20.03.07 – A. Kinakh and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs

defect from Our Ukraine to the coalition; Kinakh appointed Minister of the

Economy; Yushchenko’s Foreign Affairs Ministry candidate Ohryzko not

confirmed by Parliament; Lutsenko’s apartment raided by police; Deputy

Chechetov (Regions) declares that the Coalition will have 300 deputies

soon.

23.03.07 – Kovtunenko and a group of BYuT deputies defect from the

opposition to join the Coalition

02.04.07 – Presidential Decree dissolving Parliament and calling pre-term

elections for May 27 signed. The Cabinet of Ministers and Parliament both

call an emergency late night session – both reject the decree as “illegal” (“ne

zakonniy” and refuse to obey it.

Article 8 of the Constitution (“verkhovenstvo prava”): “rule of statute” vs. “rule of right”

Decree 1 (May 27 elections): Article 90 not mentioned Basis is Article 8 – “rights of voters hijacked” says the “garant”

Decree 2: (June 24 elections): Article 82 justification – 30 days after Kovtunenko defection which made

the Coalition illegitimate Realism (protection of “rights”) – election impossible: deadlock in CEC

Decree 3: (elections in 120 days): Justification based on “agreement between parties” – no legal basis

Decree 4: (September 30 elections): Ideal “legal” justification – Article 82 and 90 requirements fulfilled

Wanted: Consensus on Strategy! Tactical political battles are constructive only if there exists

agreement on the strategic “rules of the game”.

Formal rules require codification – adoption of laws

(constitutional amendments) requires consensus

During the Sept 30 elections, 3 differing visions of Ukraine’s

political & economic development were elaborated (though

not necessarily articulated): Our Ukraine: Rule-based politics and economy

ByUT: State-led (personified leader) transformation

Party of Regions: Big-Business-State cooperation

Japan/Taiwan

Singapore

South Korea

Comparative Models:

While the politicians decide on rules… The economy is growing! (no thanks to politicians)

Ukraine is currently 29th world largest economy (not including up to 50%

of GDP that is in the shadow) 8-10% GDP growth forecast for next 3 years

Inflation jumped in Aug/Sept 2006 to 13%

10% of Ukrainian families have bought a NEW car during the past 3 years 300 thousand new cars sold in 2005, 400 thousand in 2006

2007 forecast – over 550 thousand

Dominance of newly created (entrepreneurial) businesses over former state sector – reduction of “state-capture” Ukraine is becoming an innovation based economy

Software outsourcing & specialized/custom manufacturing

Key immediate question for Ukraine:“Who will make decisions and how?” Verkhovna Rada VI – will the session open?

Precedent of 150 deputies (Article 82 vs. 90) Constitutional Court must decide but cannot

New Constitution? Power ministries – Min. of Interior (Pres vs. PM) Power in the regions – appointment of governors

Balance of powers problem Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers, and President (where judiciary?) Cabinet of Ministers Law & “imperative mandate”

Coalition building with an eye towards the 2009 Pres election: Our Ukraine – Regions coalition (247) benefits Tymoshenko BYuT- Our Ukraine (228 seats) (with Lytvyn 248) - benefits Yanukovych Broad coalition (max. 403, but realistically 300) benefits Yushchenko

Sept 30 election results:

Regions: 34.37% (175 seats)

BYuT: 30.71% (156 seats)

OU – PSD: 14.15% (72 seats)

Communist: 5.39% (27 seats)

Lytvyn: 3.96% (20 seats)

Looking beyond Sept 30: Ukraine can become “Taiwan”, “Singapore” or “South Korea”

NB: From an economic standpoint, all three models look pretty good!

Personally, I find the “Taiwan” model most attractive:

State & FIG’s cooperate in resource sector (state-capture & oligarchy)

SME’s flourish in shadow economy with little interference or aid from state

Politics becomes de-personalized (though not necessarily “democratic”)

To make it happen: Akhmetov, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko must agree to think strategically rather

than tactically (collect 300 seats from split parties).

If the “ideal scenario” does not occur, Ukraine is likely to mimic the “fruitful instability”

(Aslund) of the Baltics with governments changing yearly.

Institutional consensus requires political maturity (de-personalized political leadership, strategic

vision) – a scarce commodity among Ukraine’s elites.