UK Cruelty Towards Asylum Seekers and What Should Be Done About It v 1 4 (2)

7/29/2019 UK Cruelty Towards Asylum Seekers and What Should Be Done About It v 1 4 (2)

1/27

1

An analysis of UK cruelty towards asylum seekers.Wyon Stansfeld, February 2013, (email: [email protected])

Introduction

This article is divided into three sections:

1. The case for thinking that the current UK response to asylum seekers is cruel.2. Analysis of some of the root causes of the cruelty, and factors that sustain it.3. Recommendations for ensuring a reduction in the cruelty.The main focus is on UK institutions and systems for managing asylum seekers particularly

the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), though

references are also made to the immigration courts, prevailing legislation with respect to

asylum seekers, subcontracted security firms running the asylum and deportation systemand the tabloid press.

The intention is not to be destructively pejorative but rather to understand and explore the

underlying roots of the problem in order to conclude with viable, constructive and ethically

preferable recommendations which should reduce levels of cruelty within the system

without making heavy demands on the public purse (and probably even saving money).

The word cruelty is used in its broadest sense of indifference to suffering rather than in

the more limited sub category oftaking pleasure in anothers suffering, or sadism, which

implies a more deliberate and conscious intention on the part of the perpetrator. Most of

the cruelty towards asylum seekers in the UK occurs unintentionally, unconsciously andthrough indifference. Although there are not infrequent examples of deliberate and

targeted sadistic attacks on asylum seekers for instance the violent assaults on them by

members of the general public, or in a few instances by staff at Immigration Removal

Centres (IRCs) and during the deportation process, these instances, though highly

reprehensible, form only a small part of the overall cruelty towards asylum seekers in the UK

and are not our main concern here primarily because they are more likely to be defined as

illegal, and therefore potentially manageable through a rigorous application of existing

legislation.

1. The case for thinking that the current UK response to asylum seekers is cruel.1.1The imprisonment of asylum seekers in IRCs without charge and for unspecified periods.In the UK people are routinely imprisoned simply for claiming asylum from persecution. People

held in this way are not advised how long they will be held for. Nor is there any absolute limit

to the amount of time they can be held for, or any requirement for imprisonment decisions to

be reviewed after a period of time.

The initial decision to detain an applicant is normally taken without a thorough assessment of

the nature of their asylum claim thus failing to adequately screen out those who are

particularly vulnerable to re-traumatisation through being imprisoned. For instance significantnumbers of torture victims or people who have been unlawfully imprisoned in their own


2/27

2

country end up being imprisoned.1

Confused and distressed, those imprisoned in this way

struggle to understand the complex asylum procedure in a stressful and sometimes hostile

environment. Many will at the same time be trying to cope with traumas experienced in their

home country prior to escape or during the process of escape.

Conditions within IRCs (which are prisons by another name) are widely recognised and welldocumented as being far from ideal. A series of unannounced Governmental inspections have

exposed significant systemic deficiencies and major on-going concerns about the standards of

care.2

Additionally there are not infrequent reports of riots, outbreaks of violence, escape

attempts, arson, suicides, bullying and unexplained deaths.3

The UK immigration detention estate is one of the largest in Europe with between 2,000 and

3,000 migrants held in detention at any given time (with the capacity having increased to 3,500

in June 2011). Only just over half of these detainees remain for less than two months, the rest

can stay considerably longer and between 5 and 10% are held for over a year. Of these cases

over half are asylum related cases:4

The detainment of asylum seekers in prison is particularly

cruel for those who have escaped or endured unlawful imprisonment in their own country.

1.2The administration of asylum applicationsThe consensus amongst those who have worked on behalf of UK asylum seekers for any

period of time is that the system here is unfit for purpose. It is grossly inefficient, under-

resourced, and lacking in transparency. It is commonplace for letters not to be answered or

lost without trace. A number of recent investigations into the UKBA confirm these

conclusions. In July 2012 the Home Affairs Committees report into the work of UKBA

(December 2011-March 2012) found a backlog of 276,460 outstanding immigration and

asylum cases which they described as totally unacceptable. In November 2012 a report byJohn Vine, Chief Inspector of Immigration reported that senior UK Border Agency officials

had misled parliament by wrongly claiming they had dealt with a backlog of asylum and

immigration claims5

when in fact the operation to deal with them was so inefficient and

1Rule 35 is supposed to prevent torture victims from being detained in this way but there are many

examples of it being inadequately applied eg:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-

news/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.html.

Another example is in the most recent independent inspection of Harmondsworth IRC where the

inspectors reported: Rule 35 reports and subsequent responses to detainees who may have been

the victims of torture or who were unfit to detain were often insufficient or formulaic and gave

limited assurance that the needs of individuals had been fully considered.

http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmipris/immigration-

removal-centre-inspections/harmondsworth/harmondsworth-2011.pdf2

See for instance:http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-

prisons/immigration-removal-centres3

At the time of writing an investigation is taking place into the as yet - unexplained death of a

detainee at Harmondsworth (one of 6 since 1989).http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-

news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-

8274514.html4

See:http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-uk.5

See:http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylum-

improvement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binary. Many claims by UKBA in this report were later disovered
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.htmlhttp://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/immigration-removal-centreshttp://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/immigration-removal-centreshttp://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/immigration-removal-centreshttp://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/immigration-removal-centreshttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-ukhttp://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-ukhttp://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylum-improvement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binaryhttp://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylum-improvement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binaryhttp://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylum-improvement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binaryhttp://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylum-improvement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binaryhttp://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylum-improvement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binaryhttp://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylum-improvement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binaryhttp://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-ukhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre-8274514.htmlhttp://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/immigration-removal-centreshttp://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/immigration-removal-centreshttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.html


3/27

3

poorly managed that at one point more than 150 boxes of mail, including correspondence

from applicants, lawyers and MPs, lay unopened in a room in Liverpool. At its peak this

included 100,000 items of post, including 14,800 unopened recorded delivery letters and

13,600 unopened first and second class letters containing crucial information and

documents about cases. All of this resulted of course in the asylum seekers concerned being

kept in limbo for an average of 7 years and in some cases for much longer6.

These inefficiencies and the huge waiting periods many asylum seekers endure heighten

their anxiety, and undermine their hope of ever securing justice and sanctuary. Applicants

are frequently blamed for UKBA errors and inefficiencies and have to suffer the

consequences of this. For instance if a letter is reported as not having been received by the

Home Office it is frequently presumed by the courts that it was never sent, whereas the

Home Office may well have mislaid or failed to attend to it. Applicants with valid claims give

up in despair of the process, a few commit suicide7

and many go underground as a result.

Many of those who get refugee status only achieve this after a prolonged and traumatic

process.

1.3Travesties of justiceThe right to seek asylum from persecution is a fundamental human right, enshrined in

Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights8

and set out in the 1951 UN

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the UK is a signatory. This is a

mechanism that has saved countless lives. Despite this the UKs application of the

convention is marred by injustice. Nearly 30% of the initial refusals of asylum are later

overturned by the courts each year indicating that there are serious systemic flaws in

decision-making by UKBA. For a full and often scathing analysis of the inadequate and

sometimes spurious arguments made by officials to justify so many of the initial decisions

against asylum seekers the reader is referred to the Mark Hendersons excellent 2003

Independent Law Practitioners publication.9

The appeal system that follows the initial decision is also stacked against the asylum seeker

applicants often struggle to find any or competent legal representation10

, and many end

to be manifestly untrue for example: We have completed reviewing the legacy of over 450,000

unconcluded asylum cases ahead of schedule6

Though current annual recording of Home Office statistics means it is very difficult to be derive

longitudinal statistics and average waiting periods could well be longer than seven years. The oldest

case the inspectors found in a sample of files had been waiting since June 1995 for a decision. The

author has also come across examples even older than this.7

Cohen J, Safe in our hands?: A study of Suicide and Self Harm in Asylum Seekers, J Forensic Leg

Med.2008 May;15(4):235-44. doi: 10.1016/j.jflm.2007.11.001. Epub 2008 Jan 28.8 Article 14(1): Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from

persecution.9Best Practice Guide to Asylum and Human Rights Appeals. 2003, Mark Henderson. Immigration Law

Practioners Association http://www.ein.org.uk/resources/fullBPG.pdf10

This is a situation that has been exacerbated by progressive changes in the criteria for allocating

legal aid to solicitors and their firms for asylum work. Additionally the combination of the fast

tracking system and limited solicitor availability means that many asylum seekers are unable to

secure legal advice within the limited time available to them.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22J%20Forensic%20Leg%20Med%20cohen%20j%20asylum&cmd=DetailsSearchhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22J%20Forensic%20Leg%20Med%20cohen%20j%20asylum&cmd=DetailsSearchhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22J%20Forensic%20Leg%20Med%20cohen%20j%20asylum&cmd=DetailsSearchhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22J%20Forensic%20Leg%20Med%20cohen%20j%20asylum&cmd=DetailsSearchhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22J%20Forensic%20Leg%20Med%20cohen%20j%20asylum&cmd=DetailsSearch


4/27

4

up in court without a lawyer or without even knowing their rights. Those under the fast

track system are frequently sent home without being afforded the opportunity to appeal in

this country.11

If and when an applicant eventually gets to court the integrity of arguments used within

court by the Home Office is often woefully inadequate (though frequently successful). Forinstance the wedge technique frequently used by the Home Office in which an apparent

inconsistency in an appellants case is then used to erroneously argue that since the

appellant has been found to be inaccurate/dishonest in one aspect of their application then

their whole application is thereby rendered unsafe. This fails to take into consideration

other explanations for an appellants inconsistency for instance confusion on account of

PTSD or inadequate understanding of the language (or poor or biased interpreters).

Common examples here are inconsistencies in the spelling of a surname or around dates of

birth. The first can be ascribed to translation difficulties across different alphabets and/or

illiteracy on the part of the applicant. The second to different cultural systems for recording

dates or the fact that in many countries dates of birth are not customarily remembered. Ihave seen both used as a basis for undermining a case.

The fact that a person may have deliberately lied in the misguided belief that that might

increase their chances of success does not mean that they did not have a persuasive case

without lying a fact that is rarely acknowledged in court.

Another argument frequently used by the Home Office is that if these things really

happened then why didnt the person report them earlier? This is particularly heinous in the

case of rape in which allowance is rarely given to the fact that the applicant may have

been too ashamed or embarrassed to admit such an event to a complete stranger on the

point of arrival.

It is also common for the Home Office to use spurious arguments to undermine apparently

high quality evidence. To give one example from my own experience: I successfully

smuggled out of Uganda a paper containing a wanted notice for a Ugandan politician whom

I knew in the UK who had escaped and was claiming asylum. The notice had been published

by the police in The Daily Monitor, one of Ugandas two leading newspapers. Pleased to

have tracked down this evidence I navely thought that it would be a lynch pin in the mans

case. However his reputable and effective solicitor advised that to present such evidence

might even be counter-productive. She said that the Home Office would say that the notice

was the result of a bribe to the paper (even though he was at the time already in Britain and

11This relates primarily to the so called white listed (sic) countries such as Serbia which the Home

Office have decided do not persecute but additionally a smaller number of appellants from a variety

of countries who are certified as having manifestly unfounded claims and returned without right of

appeal. This policy, though pragmatic, is prone to the objection that it allows no reliable mechanism

whereby Home Office assessments (of cases or countries) can be challenged. Affording people the

right to appeal from their home country may not protect them, or be possible, if they are in fact

justified in their claim for asylum because their persecution on return will compromise their

capacity to appeal. Moreover because no one has successfully appealed from a home country (at

least I have been unable to find any instances of this happening) this could be used as an

erroneous circular justification for saying that that country must be a safe and the policy thereby

justified.


5/27

5

very poor) and to give them the opportunity to make this allegation would risk

compromising his credibility. The fact that it would have been tantamount to suicide for the

Daily Monitor to be caught accepting such a bribe, thereby giving the countrys ruling

regime an excuse to disband them, was not, she said, an argument that could be usefully

made. It followed that similar allegations of bribery could be made about a warrant for the

mans arrest (also smuggled out of the country) and a letter and membership card from the

opposing political party that he was involved with. In this way much good evidence may

never reach the court, or will be rendered useless or worse if it does , and the Home Offices

stance on such evidence is challenged all too infrequently because of fears that producing

such evidence will undermine rather than substantiate an application. But having no

evidence is also, of course, a reason for a case to be dismissed. So it frequently becomes a

matter of damned if you do (provide evidence) and damned if you dont.12

The adjudication of a persons entitlement to asylum is one the most significant decisions to

be undertaken by of our judicial system since a mistaken verdict can result in execution,

torture or unfair imprisonment on the appellants return to their home country. The acid testfor discerning the justice of the system is to see if this has in fact occurred. Although the

fate of deported asylum seekers remains largely undocumented, a number of organisations

have compiled evidence that the human rights of refused asylum seekers are being violated

upon return. Deportees are often arrested, put in prison, and tortured. Some are charged

with treason; some disappear altogether. Often the very fact that they have claimed asylum

in another country is used to justify persecution on their return. Here are some examples of

deported asylum seekers being imprisoned, tortured or executed on return: Sri Lanka13

,

Iran14

, DRC15

, Uganda16

, Kenya17

, General18

. An official review of information on return

conditions in home countries19

though unable to get accurate information for a number of

significant countries with a likely risk of persecution nonetheless identified accurateinformation about risks in a number of other countries, for example: Algeria: risk of

execution or incarceration, China, risk of imprisonment or torture, Eritrea: arbitrary

detention, torture and death, Iran: imprisonment, Somalia high risk of sexual violence

12For more on perverse and unjust *asylum+ decisions arising from the culture of disbelief within

the Home Office see The Independent Asylum Commissions (IAC) Report 2008a and also Souter

2011. The IAC has further warned that some of the UKBAs targets regarding the number of returns

have led to a culture in which every application for asylum is viewed as a potential refusal. The

focus is on removal rather than on the provision of sanctuary to those in need (IAC 2008b: 15).

Confronted with disbelief and poor representation, genuine refugees are unable to put forward their

claims properly.13

http://rac-vic.org/?p=380; andhttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-halt-

deportation-flight-sri-lanka14

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rahim_Rostami15http://justicefirst.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/UNSAFE-RETURN-DECEMBER-5TH-2011.pdf16

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/6423617

http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Refugee-at-centre-of-deportation-saga-dies/-/1056/1647200/-

/mxrufm/-/index.html18

http://oxmofm.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Leana-and-Charlotte-FINAL.pdf19

Review of information on return conditions of origin for asylum seekers in the UK. Report

prepared for the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information Michael Collyer and Dulani

Kulasinghe
http://rac-vic.org/?p=380http://rac-vic.org/?p=380http://rac-vic.org/?p=380http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-halt-deportation-flight-sri-lankahttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-halt-deportation-flight-sri-lankahttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-halt-deportation-flight-sri-lankahttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-halt-deportation-flight-sri-lankahttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-halt-deportation-flight-sri-lankahttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-halt-deportation-flight-sri-lankahttp://rac-vic.org/?p=380


6/27

6

towards returned female asylum seekers. These are all countries to which refused asylum

seekers had been forcibly deported from the UK in 2009, at the time of the report.

1.4Destitution amongst asylum seekers.Despite the long periods they often have to wait for a decision asylum seekers are notallowed to work. The vast majority are also subject to no-choice dispersal around the UK

and forced to rely on very limited cash support from the state to try to meet their essential

living needs. Most live in poverty asylum support rates are less than 70% of income

support and inefficiency, delay and maladministration mean that many do not even

receive the meagre amount to which they are entitled. Numerous research reports by

charities show that children, women, older people, those with mental health needs, and

survivors of torture and sexual violence are among those living in destitution, vulnerable to

further abuse and exploitation.20

Because of this situation some asylum seekers seek

unofficial work or break the law out of desperation (e.g. with theft, prostitution etc). If

discovered this then undermines their application for asylum and can prejudice courts to

adjudicate against them.

1.5The treatment of refused asylum seekers.Many refused asylum seekers do not believe that they will be safe if returned to their home

country and remain in the UK without being deported21

. The precise number remaining in

this way is unknown but prior to the Legacy Cases Review was thought to be somewhere in

the range 155,000 to 283,00022

. Refused asylum seekers are not allowed to work and are

deprived of the rights of normal citizens including the usual statutory support safety nets,

thereby rendering them effectively stateless and powerless. The few that receive state

support (only about 5 per day) and housing23 (usually poor), can only get this if they are

prepared to agree in principle to be returned home something which many are afraid to

do. As a result large numbers of refused asylum seekers, including women and children,

become destitute and homelessness. Refused asylum seekers seeking emergency homeless

accommodation (night shelters etc.) are usually refused this as well because they are not

entitled to housing benefit.

The fact that they are not allowed to work means that many refused asylum seekers end up

working illegally, often in very exploitative conditions, or they are forced to earn money

through prostitution and begging. Refused asylum seekers have to sign regularly with UKBA

(often travelling long distances at their own expense to do so). This has the effect ofregularly re-sensitising their fear of deportation and contributes to many disappearing.

20See full list of research athttp://stillhumanstillhere.wordpress.com/resources/

21Most refused asylum seekers are not in fact deported. For instance only 13% were deported

between April 2011 and February 2012: http://www.workpermit.com/news/2012-12-13/uk-

immigration-watchdog-says-only-13-of-failed-asylum-seekers-deported22

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12356617.The figure should be significantly lower by now

although UKBA reporting on the matter has been subject to considerable criticism and probably

seriously overestimates the reduction.23

Those that are housed in this way under the NASS scheme have no say in where they are housed

(so are frequently cut off from diaspora support). They can also be re-housed at short notice at any

moment.
http://stillhumanstillhere.wordpress.com/resources/http://stillhumanstillhere.wordpress.com/resources/http://stillhumanstillhere.wordpress.com/resources/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12356617http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12356617http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12356617http://stillhumanstillhere.wordpress.com/resources/


7/27

7

1.6Practices around the deportation of refused asylum seekersRefused asylum seekers are frequently not given time to put their affairs in order, collect

their possessions or say goodbye to their loved ones in this country before they are forcibly

deported. Some are illegally gagged or injected with tranquilisers. Deportation methods are

frequently extremely violent and the use of racist language by contractors is commonplace.In 2008 a report by Medical Justice

24examined nearly 300 alleged assaults on asylum

deportees and led Dianne Abbot MP to comment that it was:

one of the most shocking reports about our immigration system that I have seen in 20 years

as a Member of Parliament. The report Outsourcing Abuse catalogues the frightening

state-sponsored violence that happens to asylum-seekers when they are being deported.

This report suggests a complete failure [by the Home Office] to investigate many of the

allegations This report is distressing and upsetting for anyone to read. But for Ministers it

is a damning verdict on their inability to inject even a shred of humanity into a flailing

immigration system.

Shocking as this report was to some MPs it did not however enable them to stop the

practice and two years later in 2010 Jimmy Mubenga was killed whilst being deported. Sadly

Jimmys case is by no means the only time death has occurred on account of deportation

from the UK (and for that matter other European countries).25

26

A year after Jimmys death in October 2011 the Guardian reported no improvement in

deportation techniques27

and Jimmys wife, five children and his wider family were advised

two years after his death in July 201228

that the Crown Prosecution Service had decided not

to prosecute. Violent deportation techniques are still in use because they are an inevitable

consequence of compulsory deportation. Despite denials from the UKBA, there are ongoingconcerns that guidelines against particular techniques are still being flouted,

29and another

case came to light only a few days before this article was completed (February 2013).30

1.7Incidental cruelty.

24http://www.medicaljustice.org.uk/content/view/411/88/

25http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-deaths-during-forced-deportation/ This includes the

account of a Jamaican woman being deported from the UK: In front of her 5-year-old son, they held

her down to stop her struggling and placed a body belt around her waist, bound her wrists to

handcuffs attached to a belt and tied her thighs and ankles with leather belts. They then wrapped 13feet of tape around her mouth to stop her screaming. She was taken to hospital in a coma from

which she never recovered (she died of brain damage caused by lack of oxygen). None of the officers

involved have been convicted or disciplined.26

Deaths have also been associated with many other aspects of the asylum system with the

Institute for race relations reporting 77 deaths on account of asylum and immigration

policies in the four years leading up to 2010. amongst the 7 reported of dying in IRC

custody was a Sudanese man found hanged after erroneously being told he was to be

deported. All as reported by Karen McVeigh in the Guardian Weekly 22/10/10.27

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/12/jimmy-mubenga-death-deportation28

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/20/jimmy-mubenga-case-charges-perverse29

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jan/26/deportation-techniques-mps-warn30

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21384435
http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-deaths-during-forced-deportation/http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-deaths-during-forced-deportation/http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-deaths-during-forced-deportation/http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-deaths-during-forced-deportation/


8/27

8

Sometimes the devil is in the detail. Those that work on behalf of asylum seekers encounter

myriad examples of incidental cruelty which whilst not illegal or a direct contravention of

human rights nonetheless causes extra suffering to asylum seekers and contributes to

making their experience in this country unpleasant. For the sake of brevity I have restricted

myself to four out of many examples from my own experience:

Asylum seeker who fled to this country in 2001 after being beaten, and tortured inZimbabwe. He was refused asylum and instructed to return voluntarily. Unconvinced that

this would be safe he stopped signing and worked for several years illegally. Finding that this

was unsustainable with great reluctance and trepidation he eventually reported himself to

UKBA and asked to be sent home, justifying it to himself as the lesser of two evils. It took

him some time to find the right official at the UKBA to make his request, but when he did he

was advised that they werent deporting people to Zimbabwe because it isnt safe there.

When he asked if that meant he could claim asylum, work or get benefits he was advised

that he couldnt because his case was exhausted.

A man with a strong case for making a fresh claim for asylum was advised that heneeded to personally bring his application to Liverpool. He could not afford the veryexpensive fare to Liverpool and asked if he could post the application, but was refused. He

enquired whether there was a purpose to the visit for instance would he be interviewed,

or fingerprinted, or anything of that nature, and was advised: no, all we will do is take the

letter from you.

Asylum seeker who, though living in Oxford, was asked to sign in London. When Iphoned to ask if arrangements for signing could be transferred to Oxford I was advised that

this never happened. When I quietly corrected the person advising her of other instances I

knew of in which applicants are allowed to sign in Oxford she said that the policy on this

had changed (not in fact true). I then asked if in that case the asylum seeker could apply tohave his expenses paid and she said No, but if he doesnt like it he can always return to

home. Following this I asked to speak to the case-workers manager who advised that the

man was in fact entitled to apply for expenses but that in order to do this he was required to

make a separate, unpaid for, trip to London in order to make the application in person for

future expenses to be paid.

Refused asylum seeker who had been living in Oxford for 10 years was advised, withthree days notice, that he and his son were to be moved to NASS accommodation in

Plymouth so that the flat they were in (provided by Social Services) could be used for

another purpose. No account was taken of the support network they had built up in Oxford

or the sons settled and happy attendance at school. The man and his son had insufficienttime to say goodbye to all their friends or to adequately pack the chattels that had been

acquired over 10 years (including a washing machine acquired with a charity grant). When

the van arrived to transport them to Plymouth the irritable driver refused to allow them to

take more than a two suitcases in total. They had no financial means, or remaining time, to

arrange to return for the rest of their belongings.

2. Analysis of some of the root causes of the cruelty, and factors that sustain it.2.1 The UK is by no means unique in its cruelty towards asylum seekers. There are manyparallels in the treatment of asylum seekers across the world and, as far as I am aware, cruel

components to the processing systems of every country to which they escape. Interestingly


9/27

9

also it seems that many countries have developed cultures for processing asylum seekers

that are remarkably similar in detail to that adopted by the UK. Another interesting

phenomena is that systems for processing asylum seekers frequently appear to mirror what

has happened to applicants up to the point that they claim asylum. The table on the next

page outlines some of these mirroring reflections.


10/27

10

2.2 Mirroring effect of the UK asylum process.

Situation in the home country Mirror in the UK

Many of those who become asylum seekers in the UK have

been imprisoned without charge and for indefinite periods.

Many asylum seekers are imprisoned without charge for indefinite

periods

During imprisonment it is hard or impossible for them to

access any or adequate legal assistance and they are not

automatically advised of their rights.

The same. For example although asylum applicants are allowed to

have legal representation in their critical first interview it isnt a

requirement that they are advised of this (and many arent). Many

asylum seekers are unable to access any or competent legal help.

Many asylum seekers have been arrested and interrogated

e.g. for their assumed political beliefs and activities.

Shortly after claiming asylum, asylum seekers asked a lot of questions

(To establish the basis on which they are claiming asylum and its

credibility). For instance if they claim to have fled because of

persecution for their political beliefs the questioning will include

detailed questions about their political activities in the country from

which they have escaped. In this way many asylum seekers are asked

very similar questions to those that they were being asked during

interrogation at home.

Those asylum seekers who have been imprisoned in their

home countries often find that the legislative context is

weighted against them with an implicit assumption of guilty

unless found innocent. There is a culture of disbelief.

The same

Many asylum seekers have been tortured prior to coming to

this country.

Apart from sporadic and unofficial physical violence asylum seekers

arent physically tortured but the mental anguish associated with

the asylum process should not be underestimated. I have lost count

of the number of times that asylum seekers have said to me that their

suffering in this country on account of the asylum process here has

been similar in effect to their experiences in their home country.

Once arrested many asylum seekers did not know how long

they would be held for or if they would be tortured or

punished or indeed if their period of incarceration would

culminate in execution.

Similar. Asylum seekers with a genuine fear of being punished

tortured or executed on their return have to wait in fear, for an

indefinite period, to see if this is going to happen. As such their

experience can be akin to being on death row.

The judicial systems of the home countries from whichmany asylum seekers originate frequently had a political

component e.g. justice was more likely to be stacked

against those coming from a particular ethnic, religious or

tribal or other category31

.

Similar. Although the British judicial system is meant to be separatefrom politics the administrative culture surrounding asylum seekers

inevitably has a political component. Most politicians are anxious not

to be perceived as being lax/nave with respect to asylum seekers

who are disadvantaged under the law compared to ordinary citizens.

Many asylum seekers have been imprisoned without having

committed a crime.

The same.32

Because of the ethnic, religious, tribal or other category to

which they belong many asylum seekers have been unable

to flourish in their countries of origin. For instance they

have been denied the right to vote, or to receive the same

benefits as other citizens or the right to particular sorts of

work or status. In short they found the system against them.

Same, and in some aspects worse. The category asylum seeker as we

have seen is distinctly disadvantageous. In particular they have no

right to work or vote. Refused asylum seekers have even fewer rights,

for instance they do not have a right to routine medical care. No other

group, even suspected terrorists33

, can be held indefinitely without

charge.

Many have been deliberately targeted for abuse in their

home country the extreme form of which is genocide.

Not as severe, but a similar process. Asylum seekers are prone to

being scapegoated picked out and blamed for everything.

Many asylum seekers risk their lives to reach the UK,

frequently at the expense of becoming separated from their

belongings, families and loved ones. The journey is often

traumatic. They dont know what awaits the other end and

any hopes they may have of finding some measure of safety

and protection are frequently frustrated after arrival.

The same. As we have seen enforced deportation from the UK is itself

potentially dangerous and the consequences of being returned home

can be fatal.

31Can include gender and sexual orientation.

32Many asylum seekers reach this country with perfectly legal and valid documentation. Others have to forge documents

in order to escape or have no documents. Whether this should constitute a crime in the context of claiming asylum is

controversial but it isnt in any case needed as a justification for their imprisonment.33See:http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.phpfor the temporal restrictions on terrorist detention

without charge.
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.phphttp://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.phphttp://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.phphttp://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.php


11/27

11

2.3 It is important not to stretch the mirroring analysis beyond credibility or usefulness. Its

inclusion here is partly because it is so often referred to by asylum seekers themselves, and

those trying to represent them. But the phenomena is nonetheless startling and instructive.

Together with the fact that so many countries around the world, just like the UK, have

developed inbuilt systemic cruelty in the processing of asylum claims, it suggests that there

is something intrinsic to the very fact of coming into contact with asylum seekers and

encountering and witnessing their claims that undermines the humanity and impartiality of

those responsible for processing them. On the face of it this is hard to understand. Asylum

seekers are arguably amongst those who have suffered most in the world and by our own

admission despite all the difficulties associated with applying for asylum a significant

number of them demonstrate genuine reasons for requesting sanctuary and help. Why then

is the system so manifestly cruel in the way that it responds to them?

2.4 I believe that the main answer to this is psychological. It is precisely because many

asylum seekers have suffered so much that the reactions to them become so systemically

entrenched in cruelty. There are essentially only two reactions we can make in the face ofgreat suffering. The first is to believe and engage with it, opening our hearts and relating to

it empathically and expansively. The second is to contract and defend against it.

2.5 The first (expansive) reaction is difficult and onerous. This is because the process of

opening up to anothers suffering is intrinsically painful. Empathy involves imagining

ourselves in someone elses skin and allowing ourselves to feel some of their pain. This is

painful34

. Moreover because we now understand and believe the person or persons

concerned we feel called upon to help them, and this too can be painful in its implications

because it might be at the expense of our own limited resources and peace of mind. Indeed

the more suffering that is witnessed, the more painful it is to empathically open ourselves to

it and the more likely we are to (unconsciously) take the second option of defending against

it. It is for this main reason that I believe that the cruelty of the system has developed as a

defence against the pain of those operating it. For the majority, who are not directly

involved with the asylum system, the defence against suffering primarily manifests as

denial, indifference and passivity towards asylum seekers. But for those operating the

system there is a danger that their defences against the suffering of asylum seekers become

distorted by the powerful and toxic psychological forces involved. In particular the gate

keepers to the system, the border guards, prison warders, Home Office prosecution lawyers,

judges, sub-contracted security and escort guards and UKBA processing staff are all at risk of

becoming (largely unconscious) accomplices in the generation and perpetration of the

suffering experienced by asylum seekers.

34Or more accurately, both the process of moving towards opening (to anothers suffering) and the

opening itself are painful though the latter has its compensations. Integral to moving towards

anothers suffering is the need to disarm ourselves of our defences and strategies for avoiding

suffering. This can be frightening because we are abandoning coping strategies and opening

ourselves up to the unknown. And as we do so it is common to recognise our own complicity in the

others suffering either through our actions or our passivity, and this can also bring with it

powerful feelings of guilt and shame. But the opening up itself, once we reach it, can also be

experienced as a cathartic exchange. Although we are now experiencing a small part of the others

pain by opening up to it we have also reduced our own (painful) feelings of alienation,

powerlessness, and separateness.


12/27

12

2.6 Quite why the manner of treatment of asylum seekers often mirrors persecutory

experiences in their home countries is a subtle and complex matter without a single

explanation. One reason is that genuine asylum seekers arrive with an acquired (rational

and experience based) distrust and fear of authority and of the machinations of the state.

This fear and typecasting then projects, through the process of transference, onto the new

personnel they encounter. In a sense they transfer the persecutor onto the new officials.

The officials, in so far as they are unaware of the psychological dynamic involved

(transference), are at risk of internalising the projection, being limited by it, or even acting it

out (counter-transference) thereby inadvertently becoming the persecutor or replicating

some of the structures of persecution. Another more obvious reason is that the

psychological defences (against opening to suffering) to which personnel in the receiving

country are prone are the very same defences of the personnel involved in the

incarceration, torture and interrogation of eventual asylum seekers in their home countries.

They too have developed a cocktail of defences against empathising with the suffering of

the people that they process. And the methods, systems and institutions that arise from

these defensive orientations are correspondingly similar. We will now look at some of thedetail of how these defensive strategies work both at an individual level and as embodied

within institutions. For the purposes of this analysis the focus here is primarily on how these

phenomena manifest in receiving countries (though in line with the explanation above many

of them are also transferable to an understanding of the processes involved in home

countries).

2.7 The contracting, defensive strategies that are adopted in order to avoid experiencing

anothers suffering can be characterised in terms of six Ds: disbelief, disassociation,

depersonalisation, disempowerment, distortion (of feelings), devalidation and defamation

as follows:

Disbelief This is where the suffering of genuine asylum seekers is avoided through

disbelieving them. It manifests as generalised prejudices: asylum seekers fabricate their

stories. They are just manipulating the system. They are really economic migrants. Their

stories are unbelievable it cant have been this bad, surely there was something else they

could have done. This is the culture of disbelief already referred to. Of course it is also

supported by the fact that it is sometimes right some asylum seekers are bogus. Some

exaggerate or embellish their stories in order to try and improve their chances of being

accepted.35

Some are purely economic migrants.36

The defence becomes problematic

however when it automatically generalises to cover genuine asylum seekers (the

phenomena of guilty until proved innocent).

35This is frequently (from the asylum seekers point of view) a disastrous strategy as the exposure of

a single lie can undermine a whole case (that was otherwise justifiable) see 1.3 abovethe wedge

technique. One way erode this phenomena would be to increase the access and availability for

asylum seekers of early, competent, legal advice in which, hopefully, they will be strongly advised

of the strategic advantage in sticking to the truth.36

Though this is somewhat complicated by the fact that persecutory regimes are usually also

associated with poor economic policies and the resultant poverty. And poverty itself can become a

method of persecution e.g. when certain groups within a country are denied the opportunity to

become prosperous. The denial of economic opportunity is not an easy basis on which to argue for

asylum, even though it can constitute a form of persecution.


13/27

13

Disassociation. This is theorientation of not taking personal responsibility, e.g.: I dont have

to think about these people because this isnt my problem. They arent from this country -

charity begins (and ends) at home. It isnt my concern that there is persecution in another

country. Someone else should take responsibility. This particular way of thinking may have

helped inform the 1990 Dublin Convention which developed the safe third country concept

allowing receiving countries to reject asylum claims if the applicant had already transited

through a safe country. Other ways of dissociating from the problem have been to keep

boats of would-be asylum seekers off shore (because as long as they dont enter the country

then responsibility doesnt have to be taken), or (as France and Australia have done) to

create special airport zones that are designated not to be part of a countrys territory for the

purposes of claiming asylum thus enabling the country to exempt itself from full

responsibility under the UN Convention.

Depersonalisation. Here the suffering of asylum seekers is avoided by the act of

depersonalising them. They become, as it were, numbers and categories to be processed

rather than individuals with unique and separately distinct suffering. It is frequently thedetail of suffering that makes it both believable and hard to let in and depersonalisation is

one method for keeping it at bay. An early analysis of this phenomena was undertaken by

Isabel Menzies Lyth in her seminal work Social Systems as a Defence against Anxiety,

196037

. Here she describes how the depersonalisation of both of staff and patients in the

hospital she was studying became an unconscious mechanism for coping with anxiety (and

suffering). For example nurses often talked about patients not by name, but by bed number

or by disease or diseased organ: the liver in bed 10, or the pneumonia in bed 15. The

nurses themselves viewed themselves as interchangeable something re-enforced through

the use of uniforms. Whilst of course the anxieties in looking after sick people in hospital are

inherently different from those associated with looking after asylum seekers in IRCs there isnonetheless considerable overlap. Both institutions are suffused with anxiety: the patients

are anxious about their health - with an ultimate fear of death. Genuine asylum seekers fear

deportation and whatever that might represent in many cases death.

By keeping themselves aloof and disinterested in the detailed stories of specific asylum

seekers those charged with looking after them can avoid opening up to the individual

instances of suffering. In this way asylum seekers come to be categorised by their countries

of origin, or the stage of their application process, rather than their individuality per se. And,

as with the nurses, the guards themselves can protect their anonymity through wearing a

uniform and through inter-changeability of their roles.38

Needless to say thedepersonalisation of asylum seekers also contributes to the suffering that they experience

(some examples of which are referred to above under 1.7: Incidental Cruelty. Another

example is the way in which asylum seekers are apparently dispersed around the UK

without any regard being given to their individual preferences to be settled close to known

diasporas from their country of origin, culture or religion.

37http://www.moderntimesworkplace.com/archives/ericsess/sessvol1/Lythp439.opd.pdf

38Similar processes of depersonalisation have been noted by many other psychological researchers

and are associated in particular with Total Institutions (of which IRCs are an example) a term coined

and defined by American sociologist Erving Goffman in his paper "On the Characteristics of Total

Institutions" 1957


14/27

14

Disempowerment This is where those charged with managing asylum seekers separate

themselves out from taking personal responsibility for any suffering that they are involved

in causing by believing (either consciously or unconsciously) that they have no choice and

are just following orders. The extraordinary capacity of people to do this was famously

demonstrated by Milgrams experiment39

in which he showed how most ordinary people

were prepared to inflict pain on others (or at least what they believed was pain) -

sometimes even when they believed that this would be fatal - simply because they were

being instructed to do so. The rationalisation of just following orders (though not allowed as

a defence during the Nuremberg trials) is a frequent justification given by those

administering torture and other forms of abuse. Another subtler version of this tendency

manifests when different players within the system defer responsibility to others. Thus civil

servants can blame the politicians/government they are just following orders. Politicians

often argue that the opinions of their voters have forced their hand. The opinions of voters

are arguably informed by the tabloid press and the tabloid press counters by arguing that it

is simply echoing popular opinion.

Distortion of feelings. Witnessing extreme forms of suffering in others can lead to a range

of different emotional responses. To the extent that these are sometimes unpalatable to

the witness they can then distort into other feelings.

For example guilt sometimes becomes distorted into anger. An example of this was given by

Bruno Bettleheim, survivor of the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps40

.

Bettleheim observed that the Nazi guards responsible for granting sick leave to camp

inmates would be less likely to oblige if the person making the plea displayed their

desperation and distress, whereas those making more dispassionate requests, even if they

were actually less ill, were much more likely to receive merciful treatment. Bettleheimreasoned that the stronger pleas aroused unpalatable feelings of guilt in the guards who

were therefore more likely to cope by belittling the justification of the persons claim and

becoming reactively angry and dismissive as a result.

Another pair of feelings that appear to couple up in this way are fear and aggression. An

example of this is when the guards responsible for running a penal establishment cope with

their fear that things might get out of control (e.g. through a prisoner uprising) by becoming

increasingly aggressive. Some light is thrown on this by Philip Zimbardos classic Stanford

Prison experiment41

in which 24 clinically sane individuals were randomly assigned to be

"prisoners" or "guards" in a mock dungeon located in the basement of the psychologybuilding at Stanford University. The planned two-week study into the psychology of prison

life ended after only six days due to emotional trauma being experienced by the participants

who quickly began acting out their roles, with "guards" becoming sadistic and "prisoners"

showing extreme passivity and depression.

One danger of feelings becoming distorted in these ways is that the process can regress into

a negative feedback loop: i.e. the increasing guilt and/or fear of the official translates into

39Stanley Milgram, 1963 and his seminal book: Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View.

40Bruno Bettleheim: The Informed Heart: A Study of the Psychological Consequences of Living Under

Extreme Fear and Terror, 1960.41

1971, See also his book: The Lucifer Effect, How good people turn evil, 2007


15/27

15

further merciless and/or aggressive acts which give rise to further and (increasingly justified)

feelings of guilt and fear.

Devalidation. Here the case for helping asylum seekers is devalidated by myths with respect to

the overall numbers and trends of people claiming asylum in the UK, the rigor with which they

are assessed and how all this compares to other countries. These myths are also frequently

perpetuated and built upon by the tabloid press. Here are some examples of myths (and their

refutations):

Myth Myth buster

Huge numbers of asylum seekers come to the

UK. 44% of Britons believe it is 100,000 per

annum or more.42

In 2011, only 17,380 asylum seekers came to

the UK of whom only 7,091 were granted

status

Numbers of asylum seekers arriving in the UK

are increasing dramatically year by year.

They have been decreasing since the early

1990s and 2011 saw a 14% reduction on theprevious year

43

Asylum seekers are the same as immigrants (or

are a huge proportion of total immigrants).

Asylum seekers are a tiny sub-category of all

immigrants currently less than 4%.

UK takes more than its fair share of refugees.

In a 2002 survey, 82% in the UK thought that

we had more than our fair share of asylum

applications44

and a MORI poll (also 2002)

found that on average the public believes that

the UK hosts nearly a quarter of the worlds

refugees and asylum seekers.

The vast majority of the worlds refugees

remain outside Europe less than 2% come

to the UK. Comparing the UK with Europe

shows we are average in terms of

numbers/member of our population and

below average if you take numbers/GDP45

The UK is too lenient in its processing of asylum

seekers and attracts them as a result. In a Mori

poll in 2000 80% of respondents agreed with

the statement that asylum seekers come to

Britain because they believe it to be a soft

touch

Not the case. The UK currently only gives

around 33% of all asylum seekers either

refugee status or humanitarian

protection/discretionary leave to remain. A

more precise refutation of this myth is

complex, but see reference46

The perpetration of these distortions is used as a rationalisation for not helping.

Defamation (also scapegoating). An exaggeration and development of the tendencies of

disbelief and depersonalisation already discussed. Asylum seekers become accused of stealing

42http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/archive/press/2011/april/20110418_refugeepoll.htm

43http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02654. Figures are not yet available for 201244

Source ESS Round 1, edition 6/.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at:

http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.45

Asylum Policy in the EU. The Case for Deeper Integration, 2012. Timothy Hatton.

http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_16_12.pdf46

But see Timothy Hatton: Seeking Asylum, Trends and Policies in the OECD, 2011,

http://www.cepr.org/pubs/books/cepr/Seeking_Asylum.pdffor a fuller analysis of this multi-faceted

subject.
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/archive/press/2011/april/20110418_refugeepoll.htmhttp://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/archive/press/2011/april/20110418_refugeepoll.htmhttp://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02654http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02654http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02654http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02654http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/archive/press/2011/april/20110418_refugeepoll.htm


16/27

16

jobs, benefits and housing,47

are perceived as being given unfairly prioritised access to services,

and are variously categorised as scroungers, greedy, lazy, unskilled, benefit frauders, criminals,

drug dealers and terrorists. The phrase Asylum Seeker acquires a connotation that is sharply

at odds with its true meaning with the distinction between asylum seeker, immigrant and even

terrorist becoming systematically blurred. It becomes a category/label about which it is

acceptable to express extreme forms of prejudice whilst at the same time avoiding overtly

racist language and the concomitant risk of censure.48

Alongside this in some sectors asylum

seekers become increasingly blamed for every problem and all societys ills, or in other words,

scapegoated.49

2.8 The factors examined in this section do not claim to be an exhaustive analysis of the factors

that cause or justify people in acting in a cruel way towards asylum seekers. Many of them

have been generalised over from other contexts by way of offering pointers towards an

explanation. There is a clearly a need for research specific to the treatment of asylum seekers. I

have also not clearly divided the factors between those that are situational and those that are

individual. The analysis therefore does not resolve the question of the prime aetiology inrespect of the cruelty towards asylum seekers (i.e. is it the result of the situations in which

ordinary individuals find themselves operating in, or individual personality traits and

predispositions that lead directly to unethical behaviour within the system?). This is because I

believe that the answer probably lies in a dialectic combination of the two. Certainly some

individuals may be drawn towards cruelty whatever their situational context and some

situational contexts are such that ordinary individuals find themselves acting in cruel ways.

Situational contexts also have a life of their own perhaps drawing initially on the indifferent

or cruel predispositions of a few founding individuals a culture of institutionalised cruelty can

become established and, once established, can be hard to shift because individuals working

within the institutions have become fixed in their ways. The debate amongst some socialpsychologists (situational vs individual) may therefore be somewhat arid in this context - and if

we wish to reduce cruelty towards asylum seekers it seems logical to address simultaneously

both aspects by improving both the calibre of personnel and the contexts in which they are

operating. How to do this effectively forms is covered next.

3. Recommendations for ensuring a reduction in the cruelty.It is beyond the scope of this short article to suggest more than a few broad

recommendations for reform or to conduct a thorough cost benefit analysis of the financial

47Though as we have seen they are not entitled to work, benefits received are significantly less than

for citizens and the accommodation they are given whilst seeking asylum is either secure (within

IRCs) or far from ideal (NASS accommodation). Even once they have obtained status asylum seekers,

contrary to popular belief, are not entitled to preferential treatment with respect to council housing

and indeed frequently become homeless when their NASS accommodation is withdrawn).48

Lewis, M (2005), Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes, Institute of Public Policy Research,

London: www.ippr.org.uk/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fasylum%5Ffull%2Epdf.49

A MORI survey of prejudice undertaken for Stonewall in 2003 found that almost two thirds of

people in England (64 per cent) could name at least one minority group towards whom they felt less

positive. Around one in three people felt less positive towards refugees and asylum seekers

(Stonewall, 2003).


17/27

17

implications of those recommendations. All the recommendations however have been made

with an eye to their viability in two respects:

A) In this time of recession they need to be financially possible: i.e. at no significant expenseto the tax payer and preferably a net cost saving

B) They need to be politically viable in the sense that they will be likely to have the broadsupport of the electorate and politicians unduly deterred by a fear of unpopularity

50.

The following recommendations are made:

Decisions around how many asylum seekers come to this country should be made at aEuropean level (3.1)

Only refused asylum seekers awaiting imminent deportation should be imprisoned. (3.2) All policies leading to destitution should be abandoned (3.3) Those managing asylum seekers should be properly recruited, trained, supported and

supervised. (3.4)

Radical reform of UKBA. (3.5) Politicians need to take courage and take the lead (3.6)3.1 Decisions around how many asylum seekers come to this country should be made ata European level.

In recent years there has been a vigorous debate about reforming asylum policies

at the international level and the need for international cooperation has been stressed by

almost all sides of the debate. The UNHCR made a proposal for reform in 2003 which was

rejected for multifarious reasons. However a new proposal which overcomes the

deficiencies of the UNHCR proposal was put forward by Hatton and Williamson, 200451.

They proposed a scheme that sets for each EU member a fixed contribution to the European

Refugee Fund (say, in proportion to the countrys GDP) and a resettlement quota (say, in

proportion to the population). For any EU member that took refugees in excess of its quota

there would be a per-refugee rebate. In this way the number of refugees that a country

accepted would be determined by its preferences for refugees and by the costs of resettling

them, rather than simply on the number who happen to apply to that country. It would also

mean that countries would be dis-incentivised from inappropriately raising the bar of proof

for successfully claiming asylum in order to reduce numbers accepted (since quotas would

now be allocated centrally).

Calculating the allocation of refugees on the basis of comparative population would leave

total numbers coming to the UK roughly unchanged under current circumstances52

thereby

improving the likelihood of the recommendation being acceptable to the general public.53

It

50 So, in this respect, although the author is not personally in favour of either the imprisonment or the

enforced deportations of refused asylum seekers it is recognised that this policy is unviable because it

would be too unpopular at the present time ever to get onto the statute books.51

Hatton and Williamson, 2004, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe.

http://www.nber.org/papers/w10680.pdf52

See reference 44 under Devalidation above.53

Interestingly also Hatton notes that despite the tendency for public opinion towards asylum to be

negative a surprisingly high proportion of voters would prefer to see immigration policies set at the


18/27

18

would have the added advantage, by taking the debate out of the domestic political arena,

of allaying concerns within the UK that we are taking more than our fair share of asylum

seekers (though, as we have seen, this isnt the case). Also European countries would lose

motivation to compete against each other by implementing increasingly draconian policies

in a race for the bottom designed to competitively deter asylum seekers. In this way

policies around the management of asylum seekers could be allowed to focus on ensuring

their fair and humane treatment.

3.2 Only refused asylum seekers awaiting imminent deportation should beimprisoned.

This should only include those for whom there is a clear, time limited (not more than four

weeks), and implementable plan around deportation. It would exclude those refused asylum

seekers for whom deportation isnt possible on account of a Home Office assessment that

their country of origin isnt safe to return to, or due to unresolved complications around a

home country refusing to accept someone back54

.

The humanitarian basis for seeking to reduce the imprisonment of asylum seekers in this

way has been outlined under 1.1 (i.e. cruelties intrinsic to, and associated with,

imprisonment). But for the policy to have a realistic chance of implementation it is

important also to address the arguments used to justify the imprisonment of asylum

seekers. These are now addressed separately:

a) Asylum seekers represent a threat to the community.The vast majority of asylum seekers do not of course represent a threat to the community.

The widespread and populist perception that they might is probably rooted in tabloid

rhetoric and confusions amongst the public as to what exactly an asylum seeker is and how

they are distinguished from other immigrants and indeed from terrorists. For instance

widespread use of labeling such as illegal or bogus in connection with asylum seekers has

perpetuated a notion that asylum seekers are intrinsically unlawful/criminal (rather than

recognising that for many the only way of escaping persecution to legitimately claim asylum

is through being smuggled and/or through the use of forged documents)55

. These

confusions also explain to some extent why detention centers currently appear to be

pitched more towards the containment of seriously violent or dangerous criminals than the

humane and sensitive holding of applicants for asylum until such a time as their requests for

sanctuary can be processed.

supra-national level. See Hatton, 2012, Asylum Policy in the EU: The Case for Deeper Integration,

http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_16_12.pdf54

Both of which grounds could arguably in any case be considered grounds for accepting that someone should

be given humanitarian protection or leave to remain. If this policy were introduced it would at a stroke reduce

the large number of refused asylum seekers who cannot be deported but nonetheless continue to reside in

this country without proper status, rights or permission to work.55

A point recognised by the Press Complaints Commission Guidance notes for the press on Refugees and

Asylum seekers (October 2003): there can be no such thing in law as an illegal asylum seeker. Also: Anasylum seeker can only become an illegal immigrant if he or she remains in the UK after having failed to

respond to a removal notice


19/27

19

The very small number of asylum seekers for whom there are proven grounds for fearing

that they might pose a risk (for instance through their involvement with terrorist groups,

serious criminal activity or intent etc.) would be most appropriately handled under

legislation and within institutions dealing with criminals and terrorists.

b) If it we dont lock up asylum seekers they will abscond/go underground.Most destination countries have a spectrum of alternatives to imprisoning asylum seekers.

Research into these alternatives suggests that they are, in fact, effective in ensuring that

asylum seekers do not disappear. For instance Field 200656

concludes:

For the worlds major destination States, existing evaluations of alternatives including

monitoring of appearance rates during unconditional release or unsupervised stay in the

communitysupport the position that asylum seekers very rarely need to be detained, or

indeed restricted in their movements, prior to a final rejection of their claim or prior to the

point at which their removal becomes a practical reality.

A study in New York57

of using the alternative of supervision and assistance of asylum

seekers within the community to detention found that:

Implementing such alternatives will result in more deportations of those whom the law

excludes, and less detentions of those permitted to remain in the US.

and concluded:

the case for communitysupervision as an alternative to detention (is) compelling. Usingcommunity supervision as a substitute for detention before final orders are made will

increase the efficiency of the expensive detention system and it will allow those who win

relief () to avoid the pains of detention altogether.

The research also found that supervising people in community did not compromise their

eventual attendance at court:

When the project began, practitioners, including judges and lawyers, insisted that no alien

would come to court if she knew that she would be detained if she lost. Not so.

There are of course also pragmatic reasons for not imprisoning all asylum seekers because

of fears that they will go underground. The UK currently imprisons around 2000 asylum

seekers (and refused asylum seekers) at any one time. This compares with a figure of

around 17,000 new applications for asylum each year and uncertain number of refused

56Field, O (2006), Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees,

UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series No 11, United Nations57

Stone 2000, Supervised release as an alternative to detention in removal procedings: some promisingresults,http://www.vera.org/pubs/supervised-release-alternative-detention-removal-proceedings-some-

promising-results


20/27

20

asylum seekers still at large post the UKBA legacy cases review58

. Clearly there need to be

some selective criteria for deciding who to imprison and the proposal resolves this dilemma

by selecting those for whom there is the highest likelihood of absconsion. i.e. the ones

who have lost their cases and for whom there is a plan of deportation. Using this criteria

would be more than viable within the present availability of detention facilities provided

there were sensible limits to maximum detention times.59.

c) If we dont lock up asylum seekers more people will be encouraged to apply forasylum in the UK.

Again the research evidence does not substantiate this theory. A paper by Timothy Hatton60

draws on extensive research and concludes that the number of asylum claims in a particular

country is much more likely to be influenced by policies around access to the country and

processing (e.g. likely success rates of applications) than by policies relating to the welfare

of asylum seekers. In other words prospective asylum seekers are most influenced by their

chances of eventually succeeding in claiming asylum in a particular country rather than onthe conditions in which they would be kept during the application process. More specifically

Hatton concludes the:

effect of relaxing harsh detention regimes is likely to be weak

The concern, in any case, is rendered irrelevant if levels of asylum are set at a European

rather than a national level, as recommended.

d) Being able to lock up asylum seekers is convenient for UKBA.UKBA convenience may be at the root of the policy but it hardly qualifies as justification for

this hugely expensive and, as we have seen, cruel practice. Detaining asylum seekers solely

for convenience also contravenes United Nations guidelines61

which state that the detention

of asylum seekers or other immigration clients should be a measure of last resort where no

other alternatives are available. It is the contention of this article that for the vast majority

of asylum seekers there are cheaper, more viable and more proportional alternatives.

Financial implications of changing the basis for imprisonment of asylum seekers

58UKBA would have us believe that the number of longer term refused asylum seekers falling into this

category should now be approaching zero, though their credibility has been greatly compromised by repeated

reviews which have found them to be far from transparent. See: http://themigrationist.net/2012/12/26/2012-

another-year-of-ups-and-downs-at-the-uk-border-agency/59

In the year ended June 2012, there were 5,374 enforced removals who had sought asylum at some stage.

http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-

asylum-research/immigration-q2-2012/removals-q2-2012. This number would easily be accommodated within

existing facilities of around 2000 at any one time and indeed would enable a reduction in these facilities. More

about the financial implications of this follows below.60

Timothy Hatton, Seeking Asylum, Trends and Policies in the OECD, 201161United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to

the detention of asylum seekers (1999), p 1.
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-asylum-research/immigration-q2-2012/removals-q2-2012http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-asylum-research/immigration-q2-2012/removals-q2-2012http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-asylum-research/immigration-q2-2012/removals-q2-2012http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-asylum-research/immigration-q2-2012/removals-q2-2012http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-asylum-research/immigration-q2-2012/removals-q2-2012


21/27

21

The financial implications of the recommendation are far reaching. The Home Office

generally does not publish figures on the financial costs of immigration detention. However

in 2007 following a request made under the Freedom of Information Act, they revealed that

in 2005/6 the weekly cost per detainee ranged from 511 (Lindholme IRC) to 1,344

(Colnbrook IRC). The cost of detaining someone in the DFT system in the now-closed

Oakington IRC cost 1,620 per week (ICAR 2007). Then on 4 February 2010, the UK

Government reported in Parliament that the average overall cost of one bed per dayin the

immigration detention estate is 120 (Hansard 2010).62

Using this figure we can calculate current annual costs of imprisoning 2000 refused and other

asylum seekers at over 87 million per year. Under the recommendation (assuming

deportees are held for an average of two weeks), this figure comes down to just under 11

million a saving of approximately 76 million per year. This figure would be offset by the

cost of keeping asylum seekers in the community but even allowing for this there would be a

saving of approximately 55 million63

.

3.3 All policies leading to destitution should be abandoned.In particular:

The policy of not allowing refused asylum seekers and asylum seekers to work.64 The policy of not giving asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers either anybenefits or benefits equal to those considered minimal to the survival of ordinary citizens.

Benefit entitlement should include the right to emergency housing (e.g. night shelters), and

all forms of medical care.

The humanitarian basis for these recommendations surely needs no justification in a modern,

civilised, and relatively very rich country. Against the objection that it would lead to

increased number of applications of asylum seekers to the UK is the research already noted

under 3.2 (c) above which suggests that the use of destitution and other policies that make

inroads into the welfare of asylum seekers is not significant in deterring them from applying

to the UK (whereas the likelihood of eventually being accepted is of relevance). Also, once

again, in the context of a European administration of asylum seekers this particular concern

would no longer be relevant.

To the objection that asylum seekers would take away jobs and other welfare provision thatwould otherwise go to British citizens one can counter by stressing the very small numbers

involved (around 17,000 per annum less than 0.03percentof the population). With respect

62This enables us to estimate the annual costs of particular IRCs. For example, since we know that Campsfield

House IRC usually operates at 90% capacity with 194 (of a possible 216) migrants detained there, we can

estimate that this particular IRC costs approximately 8,497,200 per year to run. See:

http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-uk63

Assuming an extra 1500 would be in the community. Extra welfare benefits would cost 4 m per annum

(assuming none of them would work which would offset this cost). Accommodation would cost around 14m

(25/day) per annum and supervision (one case worker to every 10 asylum seekers: 3m p.a. Total, around

21m p.a.64For some asylum seekers there are caveats to this rule but they are so hard to meet that few are ever

successful in applying for permission to work. It is therefore suggested that it becomes an automatic right.
http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-ukhttp://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-uk


22/27

22

to work it is noted that one of the popular objections to asylum seekers is that they are only

in the UK to scrounge off the state and not to make a contribution (so in this context

asylum seekers are in a bind they cannot transcend). Another option which might allay some

public concerns would be to barter a reduction in the overall number of immigrants by

reducing non-asylum immigrants allowed into the country.

There are also several other clear benefits to allowing asylum seekers, and refused asylum

seekers to work:

It would decrease their involvement by default in illegal work such as for examplework involving drug trafficking or prostitution. Reducing this would also represent savings to

the tax payer in the costs of policing and prosecuting.

In the absence of identity cards, National Insurance numbers are a very good way ofkeeping track of the whereabouts of both asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers within

the country.

By enabling asylum seekers to work from the point of their arrival in the UK theintegration process can begin immediately. This means that those that are eventually gain

refugee status may by that time already be significantly along the road to integration (in

contrast to the current situation in which the re-traumatisation of asylum seekers can

impede their eventual integration.

With respect to benefits it is expected that the increased taxation paid by asylum seekers in

work would offset the cost of extra benefits paid to them as a group. But a full analysis of this

conjecture is beyond the scope of this paper and would also need reliable up to date figures

as to the numbers of refused asylum seekers still at large without status (post the legacy

cases review).65 As with allowing them to work, the payment of benefits to refused asylumseekers would enable a track to be kept of their whereabouts. In this way the costly system

of requiring both asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers to sign could be withdrawn

(since they will either now be signing regularly for benefits, or be registered at a known work

location.)

It would be important in introducing this policy to allay public concerns around the

distribution of benefits by keeping the process around benefits for asylum seekers and

refused asylum seekers transparent and equal. They should be treated on exactly the same

basis as UK citizens and not receive preferential treatment (not that they currently do of

course though this is a popular concern).

3.4 Those managing asylum seekers should be properly recruited, trained, supportedand supervised.

As we have seen the management of asylum seekers is prone to being contaminated by

institutionalised cruelty. It is important to recognise that these cruelties frequently arise

because of the powerful situational forces involved rather than character deficiencies in the

staff. We need to recognise that the care of asylum seekers is a highly skilled task. Many

asylum seekers, particularly those who have received harsh treatment by police and the

65See note 56 above


23/27

23

military in their country of origin, though outwardly compliant, may also be nursing a fear,

suspicion and (less conscious) resentment of authority. They are likely also to be envious of

the freedoms and privileges enjoyed by staff. As we have seen these projections can be hard

to cope with by a workforce largely untrai

Documents

UK Cruelty Towards Asylum Seekers and What Should Be Done About It v 1 4 (2)