Two Rival Conceptions of Sôphrosunê

Alan Pichanick 1
Abstract: Many commentators still take the Delphic speech in the Charmides as Socrates’ (or Plato’s) opinion of sôphrosunê. This is a misreading. The speaker is Critias, a future tyrant, and close analysis reveals his conception of self-knowledge, as a godlike andself-certain wisdom, to be pervertedby histyrannical views.His conception of sôphrosunê must be distinguished from Socrates’ (‘knowledge of ignorance’), and while the former conception is refuted in the dialogue, the latter is not.
I
The Problem of the Charmides
In Plato’s Charmides2 Socrates conducts an inquiry with the young
Charmides and his guardian and cousin Critias, in order to find the elusive
quality, sôphrosunê. Its elusiveness appears clearly in the manifest failures to
define this virtue, a fate shared by other notions in the ‘early’ Platonic dia-
logues, such as the Euthyphro (piety), Laches (courage), and the possibly
inauthentic Theages (wisdom). But for us, sôphrosunê seems even more diffi-
cult to grasp from the outset. The word has a variety of meanings, referring to
‘wisdom, discretion, self-respect, moderation, chastity, temperance, pru-
dence’.3 We appear to be at a disadvantage, for we have no English word that
somehow ties all these concepts together. 4
To begin with, then, it is not immediately evident how we should even
translate sôphrosunê into English. Most translators render it as ‘moderation’
or ‘temperance’ or even ‘self-discipline’. A more literal translation of
sôphrosunê would be ‘sound-mindedness’. For ‘sôphrôn’ is the result of a
combination of two other Greek words, sôs and phrên.5 Sôs denotes safety,
soundness, or wholeness. Phrên can refer to one’s heart or spirit, but in this
context refers to the mind, as the seat of thought. One who possesses
POLIS. Vol. 22. No. 2, 2005
1 University Honors Program and Department of Philosophy, The George Washing- ton University, Rome Hall 453, 801 22nd St. NW, Washington, DC 20052. Email: [email protected]
2 I have used the translation, with my own revisions, of W.R.M. Lamb, Charmides (Harvard, 1986).
3 T.G. Tuckey, Plato’s Charmides (Amsterdam, 1968), p. 9. 4 See Plato’s Collected Dialogues, trans. and ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington

sôphrosunê would thus be sound-minded.6 Perhaps the best approach,
though, is to leave sôphrosunê untranslated, as I will do in what follows.
I will focus on the discussion between Critias and Socrates regarding the
message of the oracle at Delphi: ‘Know yourself.’ This is the only substantive
discussion in Plato of the oracle outside the Apology, and it is thus worth pay-
ing careful attention to it, if one is at all interested in the philosophy of Socra-
tes and those who in any way follow or depart from him. For though
sôphrosunê may be elusive, the dialogue makes it clear that it is deeply con-
nected, whatever its nature is, to the philosophical outlook of Socrates, tying
together his ethical and epistemological stances. The task of understanding
sôphrosunê is thus doubly important: not only will it give us a supremely
insightful glimpse into Socrates and his philosophical activity, it will also
yield a glimpse into ourselves, if its elusiveness is due, at least partly, to a
modern understanding of human nature that is alien to that of Socrates.
Yet the dialogue poses a perplexing problem. For though it presents a dis-
cussion of self-knowledge, and ties this directly to the notion of ‘knowledge
of what one does and does not know’, Socrates concludes at the end of the dia-
logue that this seemingly Socratic description of the telos of his own philo-
sophical enterprise seems to be neither possible nor beneficial. That is, by the
end of the dialogue Socrates and Critias appear to be at a loss to explain how
one can ‘know what one does and does not know’, and whether this will really
benefit us. Put simply, the strangeness of this Socratic dialogue resides in its
inability to explain Socrates himself. This in itself may be the reason for the
undeserved neglect of the dialogue, when compared to other Socratic explora-
tions of the virtues.7 There are basically two responses one can have if one
takes this problem of the dialogue seriously: either one accepts Socrates’
rejection of Socratic knowledge of ignorance as the right understanding of
sôphrosunê and accepts the consequences of such a rejection, or one dis-
misses this rejection by explaining that the Socratic ideal of knowledge of
ignorance is not in fact refuted in the dialogue. Those who follow the former
path make a reasonable argument for distinguishing between the views of
Socrates and Plato, and assert that Plato is using the dialogue to show the limi-
tations of Socratic method, limitations that must be overcome by Platonic
insights.8 Interestingly enough, those who are keen enough to draw this sharp
distinction between Socrates and Plato do not draw a sharp enough distinction
250 A. PICHANICK
6 T.G. West and G.S. West, Plato’s Charmides (Indianapolis, 1986), render the term as ‘sound-minded’ in their translation.
7 This neglect has lessened recently, but most commentators still seem to be missing some of the key elements of the dialogue which I will discuss in this article.

TWO RIVAL CONCEPTIONS OF SÔPHROSUNÊ 251
between Socrates and Critias, the interlocutor in whose mouth Plato first
places the words ‘self-knowledge’. But it is this distinction that is crucial to a
proper response to the problem of the Charmides.
In examining Critias’ speech about the Delphic oracle, we will see that the
dialogue brings into focus two distinct images of the nature of sôphrosunê.
There are two views, call them the Critian and the Socratic, which are in ten-
sion with, and even diametrically opposed to, one another. At the heart of the
conflict between these two views is a battle between the tyrant and the philos-
opher, and their corresponding tyrannical and philosophical visions of the
limits and possibilities of human beings.9 This is further confirmed, I will
argue, by the other extant discussion of the Delphic oracle in Plato’s Apology,
where Socrates describes his own response to the words of the oracle. In the
Charmides, Plato is presenting to us an engagement between Socrates and a
kind of anti-Socrates, and is asking us to choose whose life is best. When one
sees the distinction between the Socratic and Critian viewpoints, it becomes
evident that the Critian view is incoherent while the Socratic ideal of knowl-
edge of ignorance escapes refutation, even if it remains an ideal to be further
explored. Plato, rather than critiquing the limitations of Socrates’ method,
seems to be critiquing the flawed understanding of Socrates’ companions. In
the battle between the philosopher and the tyrant, the philosopher walks away
victorious, even if (or perhaps because) it is not victory that is his true
concern.
II
Sôphrosunê as Critian Self-Knowledge
At the middle of the dialogue Critias makes a remarkable claim, that
sôphrosunê is identical to self-knowledge. He has been led to make this claim
by Socrates’ elenchus, which revealed that Critias’ earlier picture of a
59–77, R.F. Stalley, ‘Sôphrosunê in the Charmides’, in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, ed. T. Robinson and L. Brisson (Sankt Augustin, 2000), pp. 265–77.
9 Critias and Charmides both turned out to be members of the ‘Thirty Tyrants’ who overthrewthe democracy.Critias’companionship with Socrates is also one of the factors leading to the claim that Socrates was the teacher of tyrants. The discussion of the Charmides thus takes place with these issues present in the background. AsI make clear, I believe the dialogue is a defence, rather than a critique, of Socrates. As should be clear by what follows, I am greatly indebted to the work of DavidLevine andTom Schmid for this insight. (See further, D. Levine, Plato’s Charmides [Ph.D. Dissertation, Pennsylva- nia State University, 1976]; and T. Schmid, Plato’s Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of

sôphrôn individual as one who ‘does good things’10 is in fact a picture of an
individual who is self-ignorant: though the person possessing sôphrosunê does good things, there are times when he is ignorant of the benefit of his
actions.11 This is significant, for the consequences are quite dire for Critias,
who is older and more experienced than the youthful Charmides. Not only
does it now look like he himself may not know what sôphrosunê is, but Socra-
tes’ response suggests that Critias may not know what his own good is. Socra-
tes subtly raises the possibility for Charmides and everyone else to hear that
Critias himself may not understand what really is ‘his own benefit’, and
thereby what is truly good. It seems that perhaps even the mature Critias is
ignorant of himself, that his self-knowledge is inadequate and superficial,
more shadowy than real.
The way has thus been paved for Critias’ longest speech, which stands at
the centre of the dialogue and unambiguously asserts the primacy of
self-knowledge. He has finally gotten a glimpse, though perhaps only a shad-
owy one, of what his account needs: he sees that Socrates is pointing to
self-knowledge, and thus is prompted to suggest it as a definition.12 Having
earlier appealed to Hesiod, he now abandons the poet, and calls up the Oracle
at Delphi as his authoritative witness:
For I would almost assert this to be sôphrosunê: knowing or recognizing oneself (to gignoskein heauton); and I go along with the one who put up a prescription of this sort in Delphi. For it seems to me that this inscription was put up as if it were a greeting ( prosrêsis) from the god to those coming in instead of ‘hail’ (chaire), as if ‘hail’ were not correct, and they must not exhort ( parakeleuesthai) one another to say this, but to say ‘be sôphrôn’. Thus the god addresses ( prosagoreuei) the ones coming into the temple dif- ferently than do human beings. Such was the thinking of the one who put up the inscription, it seems to me, and he asserts that the god always says to those coming in nothing but ‘be sôphrôn’. But he says it in a quite riddling way (ainigmatôdesteron), like a prophet (mantis). For ‘know yourself’ (gnôthi sauton) and ‘be sôphrôn’ are the same, as the inscription and I assert. But perhaps someone might consider (oiêtheiê) them to be different, which happened, it seems to me, to the ones laying down the later prescrip- tions, ‘Nothing too much’ (mêden agan) and ‘A pledge, and ruin is near’ (to enguê para d’ atê ). For they supposed ‘know yourself’ to be advice or
252 A. PICHANICK
10 163e. Critias entered the conversation to defend the notion that sôphrosunê was ‘doingof one’s own things’ (162c). When Socrates presses him foran explanationof this phrase, Critias claims that he means ‘the doing of good things’.
11 164c. Socrates gets Critias to admit that the doctor in treating his patient does not know whether his treatment will be beneficial or not. Socrates’ point is that the doctor knows how to cure the patient’s sickness, but he does not know whetheritisgood for the person to be healed. He thus seems to do good things without knowing they are good, at least according to Critias’ view. A similar argument can be seen in the Laches, 198d–199d.

counsel (sumboulên), not a greeting from the god to those coming in. And so, in order that they might put up (anatheien) counsels no less useful (chrêsimous), they wrote these and put them up.13
This is a complex and difficult speech the meaning of which is not readily
clear. But it will be seen that perhaps the biggest mistake in interpreting this
speech has been attributing its content to Plato or Socrates.14 In what follows I
hope to make clear that the view Critias is putting forward, consistent with
what he has heretofore presented, cannot be Socrates’ (or Plato’s) opinion,
but is rather a twisted perversion of it.
To begin with, we should note the traditional link between gnôthi sauton and sôphrosunê, which serves as the background for this move by Critias.
Briefly, the traditional view emphasized the restraining value of sôphrosunê:
living a sôphrôn life entailed shunning one’s hubris, containing one’s ambi-
tion, and having the self-knowledge to bring this about, i.e., knowing one’s own human limitations.15 But Critias’ own version will twist this conventional
view of sôphrosunê and self-knowledge. Rather than an exhortation to human
beings to recognize their human limits and not attempt to transcend them,
Critias’ view carries with it a doctrine of narcissistic self-benefit that will be
shown to be more and more radical as the dialogue progresses. What emerges
from this first speech are further suggestions that the self-knowledge Critias
values is neither compatible with sôphrosunê, nor is it Socratic. The concep-
tion Critias is here putting forward is essentially connected to the definitions
and account he has already presented, most notably that the good is defined by
what is his own, and he is attempting to defend his own self-interested views
in calling upon and departing from the Delphic oracle’s command to know
thyself.16
Critias begins by agreeing with the authoritative Oracle, and begins to
describe the intention of the person who put up the inscription. One expects to
hear an explanation of the words that are written in Delphi, but this is not
forthcoming from Critias. Rather, his first comment about the Delphic
inscription is that ‘Be sôphrôn’ is a greeting ( prosrêsis), and a more correct
greeting than ‘Hail!’ or ‘Rejoice!’ (chaire). The god thus greets humans com-
ing into the temple in a different way than human beings greet each other, and
13 164d–165a. 14 Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy, pp. 88–93, is especially guilty of this, which is
surprising since he agrees thatit is Critias’ conception of self-knowledge, and not Socra- tes’, that is refuted in the dialogue. As Schmid points out, Friedländer, Guthrie, and North also come close to the same error in their readings of the passage (Plato’s Charmides, p. 179, n. 32).
15 See Tuckey, Plato’s Charmides, pp. 9–10, 24; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dia- logue, p. 191.

Critias asserts that the god is really exhorting ( parakeleuesthai) human beings
to greet each other similarly.
This is strange. First of all, at a basic level, what does it mean to say that ‘Be
sôphrôn’ is a kind of greeting? Second, why is Critias talking about this par-
ticular ‘greeting’ from the Delphic oracle? For, even though there is the tradi-
tional link, the Delphic oracle does not mention sôphrosunê, but only
self-knowledge. As Critias continues, his speech takes up the latter question
first, and later the first question becomes his theme.
First, Critias claims that the inscription makes the connection between
sôphrosunê and self-knowledge in a riddling (ainigmatôdesteron) manner,
because it is done, after all, by a prophet (mantis). This is his answer to the lat-
ter question: the inscription does not say ‘Be sôphrôn’, but ‘gnôthi sauton’,
because these are the same and because it is written by a riddler. As Critias
continues explaining the ‘riddling’ manner of the oracle, the traditional link
between self-knowledge and sôphrosunê comes more into focus. For he men-
tions the two other inscriptions that were put up in Delphi: ‘Nothing too much
(mêden agan)’ and ‘A pledge, and ruin is near (to enguê para d’ atê)’.17 The
appearance of these inscriptions alongside ‘know yourself’ emphasizes the
traditional meaning that the Oracular inscription had. For the latter two
remind human beings to recognize their limits: their inability to understand,
predict, or rule all that is around them.18 Both emphasize the importance of
knowing one’s place, and not transcending it. ‘Know yourself’ thus carries
with it a corresponding meaning.
However, Critias now reveals that he is ready and willing to kick away the
ground on which the traditional link between sôphrosunê and self-knowledge
appeared to be standing, and assert his own correct understanding of the true
Delphic inscription. In this way he begins to answer our first question: what
does it mean to say that ‘Be sôphrôn’ is a kind of greeting?
Critias asserts that the latter dedicators misinterpreted ‘know yourself’ as
advice or counsel (sumboulên), rather than as a greeting. They consequently
erroneously decided to put up advice that was no less ‘useful (chrêsimous)’.
This is the sum of Critias’ response to our question, and though it is brief it
does provide some illumination, if one considers the contrast between what is
advice or counsel and what is a greeting. For instance, Levine claims that,
‘“Counsel” is above all prescriptive, value laden, advice. As such it proposes,
in the case of deficiency, a change in one’s own or another’s doing or think-
ing, in oneself and in one’s way of life’. 19
254 A. PICHANICK
17 165a. 18 ‘Nothing too much’ emphasizes the moderation required in our actions, while ‘A
pledge, and ruin is near’ indicates that promises only bring trouble to human beings, for mere mortals do not really know if they can keep them.
19 Levine, Plato’s Charmides, p. 175.

Seen in this light, it is clear that a greeting is unlike counsel in all these
ways. It is not value laden, prescriptive, or aiming at change in the other.
Advice such as ‘nothing too much’ holds one to a higher standard, but with
regards to a greeting this is just not so. A greeting such as ‘Hail!’ or ‘Rejoice!
(Chaire)’ seems to be value free, and imposes no view of what is good and bad
on the other.20 Thus self-knowledge or sôphrosunê are now only tenuously
connected to, if not wholly separated from, knowledge of the good. In addi-
tion to this, the content of a greeting seems to be a matter of pure convention.
Whether one says ‘Hail’ or ‘Cheers’ or ‘Ciao’ is a phenomenon that seems to
carry no significant content, philosophically speaking, and is dependent on
the customs in one’s community, customs that are human, all too human. It is
here that we further see Critias’ radical view come to light. For his words ulti-
mately bring the god down to a human level: he is rejecting the notion that the
‘superior’ god may be giving ‘mere humans’ advice, and is asserting that the
gods are really participating in a value-free practice that humans engage in
with one another.21
At the same time, however, Critias is asserting that few human beings have
actually understood this correctly, and that he himself is one of those who sees
into the mysteries, who is really at the level of the so-called ‘god’. True
self-knowledge and sôphrosunê are thus only in the domain of the elite: it
seems only the superior can be truly sound in mind.22 So at the same time that
Critias has brought the god down from the heavens, he has elevated himself
and others like him to the super-human. In sum, Critias’ description of the
greeting ‘know yourself’ thus seems to be tied up with three other beliefs:
1) Sôphrosunê is somehow ‘value-free’, for the greeting from the gods is not advice.
20 Interestingly, ‘chaire’ is connected to charmê (battle), which is at the root of Charmides’ own name (see Liddell, Scott, and Jones, s.v. chaire). Critias is here again trying desperately to save face by defending and praising the youth he is responsible for, not from good intentions, but like a pathologically narcissistic parent, or worse. It may seem that ‘rejoice!’ is not a value-free imperative, for rejoicing seems to be a good thing. Yet this would still be reading the word as advice, which Critias explicitly denies.
21 This hasbeen hinted at since thebeginningof Critias’ speech,with hisemphasis on the‘dedicator’ who‘put up’the inscriptions. Thehuman sourceof theinscription is high- lighted, while the intention of the god is only mentioned secondarily. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal,p. 179 n. 35, points out that Critiassays the inscription was putup ‘as if’ it were from the god, and (p.180, n. 36) that he repeatedly calls his account ‘his opinion (dokei moi)’. This not only emphasizes the human element of the speech, but stresses Critias’ vision of himself as a knower (cf. 165a, where Critias pairs the dedicator with himself; see Levine, Plato’s Charmides, p. 312, n. 25). Of course, as Schmid points out, calling it an opinion signals its ‘low epistemic status’ even if Critias is thereby trying to shield himself from refutation.

2) Sôphrosunê belongs only to the superior, godlike human beings who can decipher this riddle of the gods.
3) Finally, these superior, godlike human beings replace the gods themselves, for there is no longer any difference between the practices of human beings and gods.23
The picture yielded by these beliefs puts on display Critias’ doctrine of narcis-
sistic self-benefit. As Schmid sums it up, Critias’ views are the ‘amoral
human praise of self-certainty, not the divine moral counsel of self-restraint’.
Levine suggests that ‘“Know Thyself” becomes “be thyself”, “do your own
affairs” without restriction. It is the lion’s way: do what you want . . . without
regard to bad or good other than one’s own advantage . . . ’ 24
It is thus surprising that this passage has not aroused more suspicion. As I
mentioned above, commentators have identified, or come close to identify-
ing, the speech Critias makes here with Plato’s own opinion.25 In fact, Critias’
presentation, at the very least, forces the reader instead to ask the question: Is
Critias’ view of the Delphic oracle, and thereby of self-knowledge, really
identical to Socrates’ own view? And my argument implies that the answer to
this question must be a resounding no. Critias defines the good by what he is and what he does. When Critias first defended the notion of sôphrosunê as
‘doing one’s own things’, he made clear that all harmful things are the affairs
of others (ta blabera panta allotria),26 while only the beneficial things are
one’s own. It might be tempting to hear Critias as saying that the ‘good’ is his
guiding principle, and that what is one’s own is defined in reference to this
ideal. But precisely the reverse is true: throughout the dialogue Critias con-
firms that it is one’s own benefit, even though this is not clearly defined, that
is the standard for good and bad. Hyland compares Critias’ position to that of
Thrasymachus: ‘One is sôphrôn who does only that which is useful to oneself;
anything that is harmful is someone else’s business, and so sôphrosunê as
doing one’s own business is to be understood as doing only what is useful to
oneself.’27 But Socrates showed that this definition, ‘the doing of good
things’, failed as well insofar as it seemed that the sôphrôn individual could
256 A. PICHANICK
23 See Schmid, TheSocraticIdeal, pp.37–9; Levine, Plato’sCharmides,pp.175–7. 24 Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 38; Levine, Plato’s Charmides, p. 176. 25 The cause for this seems to be a projection of a ‘Socratic’ interpretation of ‘know
thyself’ into the anti-Socratic speech. For instance, Hyland makes the striking claim that Critias’ characterization of ‘know yourself’ as a greeting is ‘a well-chosen image for the kind of responsive openness to things which . . . [is] the interrogative stance of philosophy’ (The Virtue of Philosophy, p. 90). Levine,in his review of Hyland’s book, responds rightly:‘Critias is anything but open . . . [T]he conclusion of this part of the discussion is Critias’ exposure of his own deep-seated incapacity for such openness at 169c–d.’ See Levine, ‘The Tyranny of Scholarship’, Ancient Philosophy, 4 (1984), p. 69.
26 163c. 27 Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy, p. 83. Cf. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 34:

do good things without self-knowledge, i.e., without knowing his own things.
Socrates thus implied that Critias himself may not in fact know what is really
good for him. Perhaps Kant would describe the impasse this way: ‘doing
one’s own things without knowing the good is empty, while doing the good
without knowing one’s own things is blind .’28
The suggestion Socrates seems to be making throughout is that knowledge
of the self, qua human being, is somehow inseparable from knowledge of the
good. But how is self-knowledge related to knowledge of the good? This is the
question raised for those listening in on this conversation, while Critias either
misses or refuses to see it. Socrates will thus attempt to get clearer on the mat-
ter and in doing so he will show that Critias’ views of self-knowledge and the
good continue to be problematic, and it is these views that turn out to be inco-
herent by the end of the dialogue. This should not be surprising, for we have
already been led to believe that Critias supposes that self-knowledge is
value-free. Critias may believe that the essence of sôphrosunê is self-knowl-
edge, but his understanding of self-knowledge is so perverted, that ultimately
it will be impossible for him to relate self-knowledge to the good at all, which
is exactly what happens in the final interchange with Socrates.
III
Socrates’ Response in the Charmides
Socrates makes no comment about Critias’ description of the Delphic Oracle.
Instead, he begins his response to Critias with a remarkably brief question. He
says, ‘If knowing or recognizing (gignôskein) is what sôphrosunê is, then
clearly it is some science (epistêmê), and an epistêmê of something (tinos). Or
not?’29 Critias agrees immediately. But what does Critias believe he is affirm-
ing when he affirmatively answers Socrates’ question? Given what I have
already argued, we should suspect that Critias’ agreement stems from his
underlying beliefs about sôphrosunê and the good, beliefs that are tied up to
his narcissistic views.
But to see this more clearly, consider why Socrates is so insistent on getting
at the ‘of what?’ (tinos) regarding this epistêmê. Critias, in removing the
phrase ‘know yourself’ or ‘Be sôphrôn’ from the realm of advice or counsel,
has narrowed the notion of self-knowledge considerably. The action of know-
ing oneself, according to him, does not aim to bring about change at all – as
making or even doing what is beautiful; it rather focuses on the idea of procuring benefit for oneself and avoiding allharmas “alien” . . . Critiasidentifies the good with what ben- efits himself, in the sense of a calculating, narrow egoism.’
28 Cf.Kant’s commentaboutintuitions andconcepts:CritiqueofPureReason,B76. 29 165c. This is the first mention of epistêmê in theargument. This move from gnôsis

Levine says, it is paradoxically a ‘counsel-free exhortation’30 — and so the
question emerges: is such ‘knowledge’ really possible? If so, what is it for? 31
By first asking him ‘of what’ this knowledge is, Socrates is attempting to
show Critias that his answer to these questions will amount to an incoherent
mess.
One possible answer to the question, ‘What is the object of this epistêmê?’
would be the self or the soul. In fact, this seems to be what Critias is suggest-
ing when he first mentions ‘oneself’ at 165c.32 This is a pivotal moment in the
dialogue from which the conversation could take a quite different turn from
the one it actually does. For Socrates and Critias could at this point begin dis-
cussing more explicitly the nature of the self, and we would wind up with a
conversation similar to the one that occurs in Alcibiades I .33
But Critias chooses to respond to Socrates’ request for a ‘beautiful work’
by claiming that sôphrosunê is not like the other epistêmai: ‘while all other
epistêmai are of something else, but not of themselves, this one alone is an
epistêmê of all the others and of itself.’ 34 If we consider carefully what is
implied in this definition, then we will see that it rests on Critias’ narcissistic
doctrine. To possess an epistêmê which has all others and itself as its object, is
to have a knowledge that is both all-inclusive and reflexive. It has generality
and self-reference. If possible, the person who actually possessed this would
seem to know all there is to know. Sôphrosunê, as defined by Critias, seems to
be a divine wisdom. By now, it should not be surprising that Critias promotes
such a conception, for this is explicitly the message of his speech about the
Oracle.35 And the final culmination of this ‘divine wisdom’ is manifested
258 A. PICHANICK
30 Levine, Plato’s Charmides, p. 181. 31 These are preciselythe extended challenges Socrates puts to Critias in theconclud-
ing arguments of the dialogue. 32 See Levine, Plato’s Charmides, p. 181: ‘. . . then the further questioning would
center upon this “oneself”, what it is, or the question of the whole man’ (p. 181). Cf. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 44.
33 Annas claims that this does not happen in the Charmides because there is a confusion between self-knowledge and knowledge of knowledge. See her ‘Self-Knowledge in Early Plato’, in Platonic Investigations, ed. Dominic O’Meara (Washington, D. C., 1985), pp. 135–6. I do not think this is the whole story, and I argue that it is a mistake to suppose that the confusion here is Socrates’ (or Plato’s) as opposed to Critias’. The conversation about self-knowledge in the Charmides looks the way it does because it emerges in the context of discussing sôphrosunê, and because of Critias’ attempt to link self-knowledge withsôphrosunê, while having a flawed understanding of both. It maybe Socrates who takes the conversation in a certain direction, but Critias goes along with him and produces the conceptions that Annas calls ‘confused’.
34 166c. We should be wondering by now whether this doctrine too has its source in Socrates, and whether Critias’ understanding of it twists the original. Cf.Levine, Plato’s Charmides, p. 194 and Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 50.

when Socrates and Critias construct a city in which the ruler possessing
sôphrosunê has knowledge of all things past, present, and future.36 In sum,
this super-human capacity is the main element of Critias’ vision of ‘human’
excellence: Critias’ views of self-knowledge and the good are tied to his
desire to break his human bonds and be a god. It is clear by now that this view
is diametrically opposed to a traditional understanding of Critias’ authorita-
tive witness, the Delphic Oracle. I shall now argue that it is also incompatible
with the alternative Socrates endorses.
In response to Critias’ reflexive view, Socrates asks a small question of no
small import: ‘Therefore . . . [is] sôphrosunê also a knowledge (epistêmê) of
ignorance (anepistêmosunês), if indeed it is of knowledge (epistêmês)?’37
Socrates’ question here strongly echoes his description of his own famous
claim of knowledge of ignorance in the Apology.38 He thus finally prepares us
for a discussion of the two conceptions of sôphrosunê: the Critian and the
Socratic. And though Critias’ understanding of sôphrosunê will be shown to
be untenable, perhaps the Socratic view will escape refutation. 39
seller, occupations earlier degraded by Critias, but the one with the knowledge that somehow stands above all these others, and because of its reflexivity, needs nothing beyond itself. It is the ruling science that coordinates all others to serve its proper ends. This view combines the doctrine of self-interest with an all powerful knowledge. Far from coming out of nowhere, this is the logical outcome — the ultimate culmination — of the views that Critias has expressed so far (Cf. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 48.). Accordingly, the interpretations of both Stalley and Tuozzo may need to be tweaked. Stalley claims an epistêmê of knowledge in general is needed because it just is general (Cf. Ion 531a–533c) and because of the phenomenon of examining others. See R. Stalley, ‘Sôphrosunê in the Charmides’, in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, p. 271. Tuozzo’s explanation for why sôphrosunê knows itself and the other knowledge is that if we want to know if the other knowledges are beneficial, we need the one that is the standard forbenefit. See T. Tuozzo, ‘Greetings from Apollo: Charmides 164c–165b, Epistle III , andtheStructure ofthe Charmides’,in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, p. 305. Both these claims may be right, but neither explains why it is the Critian conception of a ruling science and not the Socratic conception of knowledge of ignorance which addresses these problems. That is, sôphrosunê will turn out to be vitally connected with the knowledgeof limitsin a waythatCritias’ definition, but not Socrates’, fails tobe. It is this vital Socratic connection that is the answer that Tuozzo and Stalley call for, or so I hope to argue.
36 See 173b–174a. 37 166e. 38 21d. This by itself suggests that knowledge of ignorance cannot be an impossible
paradox. Consistent with Socrates’ other uses in the Charmides, the passage inthe Apol- ogy does not mention epistêmê but eidenai. Accordingly, at 167a Socrates replaces anepistêmosunê with ha mê oiden.

Sôphrosunê as Socratic Self-Knowledge
Socrates’ addition of ‘knowledge of ignorance’ leads to a completely differ-
ent account of sôphrosunê. In his view, the sôphrôn individual is open to what
is beyond his limits, in that there is some kind of recognition of what is
beyond his knowledge. This calls for a very different orientation to the good,
for the knowledge of limits removes the individual from the centre of his
world. Rather than being elevated to the godlike, as Critias suggests, human
beings now properly stand in that in-between realm, the realm between beast
and god. Consequently, the good is not gobbled up by ‘one’s own things’, as
Critias would have it. For it is the neglect of the knowledge of ignorance, the
elevation of ourselves to the gods, that seems to carry with it a confusion
between one’s own and the good.40
In this connection, it is crucial to consider Socrates’ description of the Del-
phic Oracle in the Apology, which will further reveal how different the
Socratic understanding is from that of Critias. In the Apology, Socrates begins
his speech about the Delphic Oracle by suggesting that someone in the audi-
ence might rightly ask, ‘But Socrates, what is your occupation or task
( pragma)’? 41
Socrates raises this question after he has begun to debunk the slanders
against him that ultimately have brought him to trial. It is against this back-
ground that he calls upon the Oracle at Delphi as his authoritative witness. For
he uses the words of the oracle to explain the cause of his slandered
reputation:
What has caused my reputation (onoma) is nothing other than a certain kind of wisdom (sophian). What kind of wisdomis this? Perhaps it is human wisdom (anthropinê sophia). For perhaps I may be wise in this wisdom, while those whom I mentioned just noware wise in something greater than human wisdom, or I do not know what to say, for I do not understand it (epistamai).42
From the outset Socrates emphasizes that the difference between his own
‘wisdom’ and that claimed by those he examines is the difference between the
human and what is beyond the human. While his wisdom is confined to the
limits of human beings, theirs, if it is true ‘wisdom’, somehow transcends
these limits, a state of affairs that seems unintelligible. For as Socrates
260 A. PICHANICK
future. For Critias it seems there are no limits to this wisdom he calls sôphrosunê, a fact he does not realize will cause him trouble when he agrees to Socrates’ reintroduction of ignorance here, which already seems to be incompatible with Critias’ own image of sôphrosunê.
40 Cf. Levine, Plato’s Charmides, pp. 210–1, 215–6, 220–1, 224; Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, pp. 56–7.
41 Apology, 20c. 42 20d–20e.

interprets the Delphic oracle, the highest ‘wisdom’ human beings are capable
of achieving is defined by these limits and does not reach beyond them.
Socrates explains that Chaerephon, the manic but well-liked companion of
Socrates who also happens to be present for the discussion in the Charmides,
was the individual who found out from the Delphic Oracle that no one is wiser
than Socrates.43 Socrates’ response is one of utter incredulity. Echoing the
passages in the Charmides, he says that the god is riddling (ainittetai), for he
knows ( xunoida) that he is wise with respect to nothing either great or small.44
Socrates assumes the god told a riddle, for the only alternative is that he is
lying. This he says is impossible for him: whereas Critias seemed to suggest
that the god bestowed upon humans a ‘value free exhortation’, Socrates here
makes us wonder if this too might be absurd behaviour for the god.
Socrates was perplexed, in aporia, for a long time and then began an inves-
tigation that became his way of life, his well-known pragma. Going to people
who had a reputation for wisdom, he attempted to show that there must be
some human beings wiser than Socrates. But each time he did so he discov-
ered that what the god said was true. For though each person ‘appeared wise to
many people and especially himself, he was not’.45 Socrates describes the dif-
ference between himself and his interlocutors again in terms of his
recognition of limits:
So I withdrew and thought to myself, ‘I am wiser than this man, for it is likely that neither of us knows anything beautiful and good (kalon kagathon), but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, but I, when I do not know, do not think I do either. I seem then to be wiser than this man in just this little thing: that what I do not know (oida) I do not think I know either’.46
This image is in stark contrast to Critias’ picture of the Delphic oracle. Critias
concluded that the ideal human life was that of a self-certain knowledge of all
things past, present, and future, in the service of one’s own narrow desires and
interests. But this is precisely the knowledge a god would have, and it is
beyond the ken of human wisdom. Socrates confirms this in saying that the
result, probably, of his investigation is that ‘the god is wise and that his oracu-
lar response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing . . . and that
“This man among you, human beings, is wisest who, like Socrates, under-
stands (egnôken) that in truth he is worth nothing in respect to wisdom”’. 47
43 21a. Notonly is Chaerephon ‘present’ in both the Charmides and the Apology, but Socrates’ description of him as manikos (crazy) is interesting. Manikos seems to be the very opposite of sôphrôn.
44 21b. Critias also said the Oracle was a ‘riddle’, clearly invoking Socrates’ description here. But the meanings of the two riddles are not identical.
45 21c. 46 21d–e. 47 23b.

Socrates’ proclamations of ignorance thus, even if they are ironic, contain
what he thinks to be a significant insight into the human soul. The proper
understanding of human wisdom and its difference from the wisdom of the
gods leads one to the highest wisdom that mere human beings can reach. This
is the recognition of limits which seems to come out of Socrates’ small addi-
tion in the Charmides, ‘knowledge of ignorance’. Critias seeks however to
make sôphrosunê and human wisdom ‘something greater than it is’. 48 He
desires to replace the human wisdom that recognizes its very human limits
with the wisdom of the gods. In doing so, not only has he misunderstood the
nature and benefit of sôphrosunê, he has shown that his own self-knowledge
is an illusion, a fantasy. As Socrates implies, humans have Critian self-knowl-
edge only in their dreams.49 The waking reality of the tyrant’s view of
self-knowledge and the good is incoherent: the most divine wisdom is beyond
human reach. Critias’ doctrine is not only impious and hubristic, but must
ultimately be false, in its failure to recognize the essentially limited nature of
human beings. But while Critias’ vision dwindles into absurd fantasy, the
Socratic conception of sôphrosunê may be able to wake us from this tyranni-
cal nightmare. Socrates is showing us that it is in following his path, not
Critias’, that we will achieve authentic self-knowledge and true knowledge of
the good.
V
Conclusion
The two ideals on display thus seem to present opposed visions not only of the
nature of sôphrosunê, but of human nature and, ultimately, the best human
life. While the Critian standpoint transcends our human limits and in so doing
leads to an incoherent mess, the Socratic view starts from a proper under-
standing of human beings and thus escapes the refutation launched against the
Critian view. In this paper I have not shown the details of Socrates’ refutation,
but I have spelled out the discrete elements in each view, and how they are
diametrically opposed to one another. When one sees this one is left with
questions the dialogue raises (but does not answer) about the nature of the
Socratic conception of self-knowledge.
For though the speech in the Apology supplies helpful details to understand
the exchange in the Charmides, it remains somewhat unclear how to spell out
the nature of ‘knowledge of ignorance’: to begin with, ignorance is only a
lack, and so we are trying to define something negative.50 How is this to be
accomplished? And if we can spell out the nature of Socrates’ conception of
knowledge of ignorance, how do we relate it to Critias’ conception? As has
262 A. PICHANICK

become clear, the two images are incompatible with one another. Yet Critias
hinted that he has generated his view from what he takes to be Socrates’ own
teaching. If the Critian conception is a twisted perversion of the Socratic one,
how do we properly understand their deep connection? This question is in the
background as Socrates now issues challenges to Critias. To be brief: Socra-
tes’ argument in the remainder of the dialogue has three parts. First, he reveals
that Critias cannot demonstrate the possibility, or the likelihood, of a ‘knowl-
edge of itself and all other knowledges’. 51 Second, even if such a knowledge
does exist, Socrates shows Critias that it cannot give us knowledge of what we
do and do not know, but only knowledge that we do and do not know.52
Finally, Socrates gets Critias to admit that even if this knowledge could get
beyond ‘knowledge-that’ to ‘knowledge-what’, it would not thereby be
knowledge of the good.53 In sum, Critias’ view of sôphrosunê leads to the
troubling conclusion that it would be of no benefit to us. But I believe Socra-
tes’ own view (unlike that of Critias) survives these challenges, for they are
directed at Critias’ notion of the ruling science, not at the Socratic notion of
knowledge of ignorance. It is Critias’ peculiar mix of universality and
self-reference and his omission of the awareness of limits that leads to such
absurd results. If this is so, then the Socratic alternative will tie together
self-knowledge and knowledge of the good in a way that makes clear its
possibility and benefit to human beings.
This is the task that remains to be done for the careful observers, and it is
not an easy one. For the enigmatic nature of Socrates’ alternative clearly lends
itself to misunderstanding and misuse, as Critias himself has shown. But in
presenting this drama Plato has made those with a philosophical nature more
aware of the illusions and self-ignorance of the tyrant, lest we ever lose our
way. The stakes here are high, for by the end of the dialogue it becomes clear
that the conflict between the philosopher and the tyrant is tied to a broader ten-
sion – the tension between the practices of philosophy and politics, and
whether it is possible for the city to be guided by the wisdom of the philoso-
pher.54 Thus it is crucial to continue with the task or pragma of understanding
51 167b–170c. 52 170d. The problem Critias confronts is this: Someone with a knowledge of itself
andall other knowledges, if he examines anotherperson, will only be able to tell this: that this person knows something. But he will noteverbe able to say what it is that the person knows!This,of course, is patently absurd, and Critias’ conception of knowledge is therefore deeply flawed.
53 173e–174c. This argument brings the dialogue full circle, for Socrates had earlier showed Critias that hisnotion, ‘the doing of good things’ didnot includeself-knowledge. Now, Critias is forcedto seethat hisnotion of self-knowledge doesnot includethe good.

the philosopher’s authentic self-knowledge. I believe this remains a question for Plato in the Charmides and the later Platonic dialogues, and may even
require venturing into philosophical, political, and psychological territory
unexplored by Socrates himself, even if it must at the same time incorporate
Socrates’ insights into the limits and possibilities of human beings. 55
Alan Pichanick THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
264 A. PICHANICK
Plato in his ‘later’ dialogues, most notably in the Republic and the Laws. Cf. Notomi, ‘Critias and the Origin of Plato’s Political Philosophy’, pp. 248–9.

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Two Rival Conceptions of Sôphrosunê