Two Different Problems for Freedom: 1)The Problem of Sourcehood (Sober: “Distant Causation Argument”) 2)The Problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise (Sober:

Two Different Problems for Freedom:

1) The Problem of Sourcehood (Sober: “Distant Causation Argument”)

2) The Problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise(Sober: “Could-Not-Have-Done-Otherwise Argument”)

From Monday:

Beliefs +

Desires

Genes

Environment

Actions

TheProgram

TheProgrammers

Two different problems

The agent doesn’t control her own actions.

The real causes of action are in the distant past, which puts them outside the agent’s control.

The Problem of Sourcehood

For a action to be free, it must at least be possible to do more than one thing.

If there’s only one thing you can possibly do, then you don’t have freedom to choose among options.

The Problem of the Ability to Do Otherwise

The difference between them:

different reasons for incompatibilism

P1) Your beliefs and desires determine what your actions are.

P2) If your beliefs and desires determine

what your actions are, then

you have no ability to do otherwise.

P3) If you have no ability to do otherwise, then

you don’t act freely.

You don’t act freely.

P1) Your genes and environment

determine what your actions are. P2) Your genes and

environment are causes

outside your control. P3) If your actions are

determined by causes outside your control, then you don’t act

freely.


Even if your beliefs and desires do determine your actions, you can still act freely.

Hume’s Compatibilism:(Soft Determinism)

Freedom = ability to do otherwise if you desire otherwise.

Actions are determined by beliefs and desires, but they still count as free, because people are free to do whatever they want.

Hume’s Compatibilism:


Recall the problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise:

To have freedom, it must be possible to choose among options. If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no options.


Recall the problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise:

To have freedom, it must be possible to choose among options. If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no options.

Hume rejects this.It’s a misunderstanding of the concept of freedom to think a person’s own beliefs and desires can restrict her freedom. That’s all freedom is: being able to follow your desires.

P1) Your beliefs and desires determine your actions.

P2) If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no ability to do otherwise.

P3) If you have no ability to do otherwise, then you don’t act freely.



P1) Your beliefs and desires determine your actions.

P2) If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no ability to do otherwise.

P3) If you have no ability to do otherwise, then you don’t act freely.



Hume’s rejects this.

Hume defines freedom in terms of sourcehood, denying that it requires the ability to do otherwise.


Hume defines freedom in terms of sourcehood, denying that it requires the ability to do otherwise.

It’s sufficient for freedom that you get to do what you want. You don’t need the ability to do other than what your beliefs and desires specify.

Your actions are controlled by your own beliefs and desires, so you are the source. That’s enough by itself to make you free.


So Hume relies on the concept of sourcehood in offering a solution to the problem of the ability to do otherwise.


How, then, does he handle the problem of sourcehood?


How, then, does he handle the problem of sourcehood?

He doesn’t.

So Hume relies on the concept of sourcehood in offering a solution to the problem of the ability to do otherwise.

Beliefs +

Desires

Genes

Environment

Actions

TheAgent

The Problem of Sourcehood:The real causes of action lie outside the

agent.

Beliefs +

Desires

Genes

Environment

Actions

Hume only focuses on this threat to freedom...

Beliefs +

Desires

Genes

Environment

Actions

He doesn’t address these factors.

Genes

Environment

Beliefs +

DesiresActions

Even if you can do whatever you desire, if you don’t control your desires, you don’t control the actions they produce.

Objection from Compulsive Behavior:Compulsions are desires the agent doesn’t control.

So even if actions are caused by the agent’s desires, she still isn’t the source of her actions.

Even if you can do whatever you desire, if you don’t control your desires, you don’t control the actions they produce.

Steal, Steal,

Steal!!!

Genes

Environment

Theft

TheAgent

Kleptomania:

Steal, Steal,

Steal!!!

Genes

Environment

Theft

TheAgent

Since the kleptomaniac doesn’t control what her desires are, she doesn’t control the actions caused by those desires.

Here’s where Mill comes in...

“...human actions...are never (except in some cases of mania) ruled by any one motive with such absolute sway that there is no room for the influence of any other.”

Even in kleptomania there is “room for the influence” of the desire not to steal...

If a kleptomaniac has a desire to stop stealing, then she has two different desires, leading to different actions.

Stop Stealing

Don’t Steal

Steal, Steal,

Steal!!!Steal

Stop Stealing

Don’t Steal

Steal, Steal,

Steal!!!Steal

If these desires occur at the same time, leading to competing actions, then the compulsive desire wins the competition (by definition).

Stop Stealing

EnterTherapy

Steal, Steal,

Steal!!!Steal

But if the desires don’t lead to competing actions, then both can be pursued.

Desire:Stop

Stealing

Genes

Environment

Action:Enter

Therapy

Mill’s suggestionfor the kleptomaniac:

Desire:Stop

Stealing

Genes

Environment

Action:Enter

Therapy

You can at least “influence” your desires, even if you don’t have complete control over them.

Recall from Monday the notion of contributing factors...

You can at least “influence” your desires, even if you don’t have complete control over them.

Given past events and the laws of nature, everything that does happen must happen.No alternative futures are possible.

Determinism makes a possibility claim.

(FROM MONDAY)

Given past events and the laws of nature, everything that does happen must happen.No alternative futures are possible.

Determinism makes a possibility claim.This makes it something more than just a causal claim.

Compare:• A caused B• A caused B, and made B necessary.

(FROM MONDAY)

Sometimes causes are just contributing factors—they don’t make their results necessary.

Determinism makes a possibility claim.This makes it something more than just a causal claim.

Compare:• A caused B• A caused B, and made B necessary.

(FROM MONDAY)

In a book I’m reading, an important character drowns.

Two factors contribute to the drowning:1) A submarine torpedoes the boat2) A storm prevents the rescue operation

(FROM MONDAY)

The torpedoes cause the drowning, but they don’t make it necessary.

Without the storm, rescue was still possible.

In a book I’m reading, an important character drowns.

Two factors contribute to the drowning:1) A submarine torpedoes the boat2) A storm prevents the rescue operation

(FROM MONDAY)

“There are physical sequences which we call necessary, as death for want of food or air; there are others which, though as much cases of causation as the former, are not said to be necessary, as death from poison, which an antidote, or the use of the stomach-pump, will sometimes avert.”The poison in Mill’s example is equivalent to the torpedoes in my example. The antidote or stomach pump is equivalent to the rescue operation.

Mill:

Mill’s point is that human desires are always contributing factors—”influences.” They cause actions without making them necessary.

Thus, no particular desire determines what it causes.

For a kleptomaniac, the desire to steal is a strong contributing factor—strong enough to overpower competing desires.

Mill’s point is that human desires are always contributing factors—”influences.” They cause actions without making them necessary.

Thus, no desire determines what it causes.

Even strong, compulsive desires are still just contributing factors.


It’s at least possible for a kleptomaniac to interfere with the desire to steal (e.g., through therapy).


It’s at least possible for a kleptomaniac to interfere with the desire to steal (e.g., through therapy).

The desire to steal causes stealing without necessitating it (just as the torpedoes cause the drowning without necessitating it).

Where are we?

Where are we?

Hume responds to the Ability To Do Otherwise problem, only to fall victim to the problem of Sourcehood instead.

The problem for Hume is that being able to do whatever you want isn’t enough by itself to make you the source of your actions.

Mill adopts Hume’s definition of freedom, rejecting the requirement of an ability to do otherwise.

He then adds to Hume’s view a way of showing how people can still be the sources of their actions:

People can control their actions by taking control of their desires.

Where are we?

What do you think?

First, should we follow Hume and Mill in denying that freedom requires an ability to do otherwise?

Recall Locke’s locked room.

What do you think?

Next, should we accept Mill’s claim about how we become the sources of our actions?

Consult the model...

What do you think?

Does this make you the source of your actions?

Beliefs And

Desires

Genes

Environment

Actions

Beliefs And

Desires

Genes

Environment

Actions

In groups:What kinds of action could one be the source of?

List some examples of desires you would and would not have control over.

Would a libertarian be satisfied?

• For any particular action, to what extent is it really free?

• Does this give us freedom for the right kinds of action (freedom where it counts)?

In groups:Does Mill’s view give us enough freedom?

Here Mill has something interesting to say...

Would a libertarian be satisfied?

• For any particular action, to what extent is it really free?

• Does this give us freedom for the right kinds of action (freedom where it counts)?

In groups:Does Mill’s view give us enough freedom?

“And indeed, if we examine closely, we shall find that this feeling, of our being able to modify our own character if we wish, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious of. A person feels morally free who feels that his habits or histemptations are not his masters, but he theirs; who, even in yielding to them, knows thathe could resist...”

Mill:

For many, the importance of the question of free will is largely due to its implications for moral responsibility.

For many, the importance of the question of free will is largely due to its implications for moral responsibility.

Her Mill argues that Hume’s definition of freedom gives us free will where it counts—in ascribing moral responsibility...

Even if our actions are determined by our desires, the fact that we have (some) control over our desires shows that we have (some) control over our actions.

Thus, we can still be morally responsible.

Mill’s Basic Claim:

The Basic Concern About Moral Responsibility:

If1) We aren’t ultimately the source of our actions

or2) We couldn’t possibly do otherwise,

Then How can we be blamed for bad actions, or praised for good actions? How can anyone deserve to be punished or rewarded?

Causal responsibility concerns whether someone actually performed an action or not.

Ex: Solving a murder mystery

Moral responsibility concerns how we evaluate a someone who is causally responsible.

Moral Responsibility vs. Causal Responsibility

If you commit a murder, then you are causally responsible for an action that is wrong.

But are you morally responsible?



But are you morally responsible?What if someone else forced you to commit the murder at gunpoint?



But are you morally responsible?What if someone else forced you to commit the murder at gunpoint?

This wouldn’t affect your causal responsibility, but it would affect how people evaluate your action.

Would you deserve to be blamed and punished?


You feel horribly guilty, but still can’t stop yourself.

Suppose you are a kleptomaniac, and the wrong action is theft instead of murder.

You feel horribly guilty, but still can’t stop yourself.

Can we blame you?

Do you deserve to be punished?

Suppose you are a kleptomaniac, and the wrong action is theft instead of murder.

“And indeed, if we examine closely, we shall find that this feeling, of our being able to modify our own character if we wish, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious of. A person feels morally free who feels that his habits or histemptations are not his masters, but he theirs; who, even in yielding to them, knows thathe could resist...”

Consider Mill’s quote again:

According to Mill, is a kleptomaniac morally responsible for stealing?

On the surface, it looks like kleptomaniacs are not free: they are not masters of their temptations.

But Mill’s idea was to establish freedom through sourcehood, and this works for kleptomaniacs too:

even a kleptomaniac’s stealing is not necessitated by her desires. She has some control over her desires.

Because we can control our desires (to some degree), we can be morally responsible for the actions those desires lead to.

So a kleptomaniac should be blamed/punished to the extent that she can control her desires.

If a kleptomaniac wants to stop stealing, she can seek treatment...

Implications of Mill’s argument:

If treatment succeeds:She gains control over her desires (mastering her temptations).

She is now the source of her actionsShe now has moral responsibility

(she can be blamed/punished for stealing)



If treatment fails:She isn’t morally responsible, because she isn’t the source of her actions.






Are these the right conclusions?

If treatment fails:She isn’t morally responsible, because she isn’t the source of her actions.




People aren’t actually the source of most of their actions (though they could be, in principle).

I am not responsible for the desires that cause me not to steal.

My parents and grandparents are mostly the source of my non-stealing motives.

Yet if I steal something, I’m the one to blame, not my parents and grandparents.

Objection:

As compatibilists, Mill and Hume are trying to keep both determinism and free will.

Determinism Free Will Libertarianism

DeterminismHard

DeterminismFree Will

Determinism Free Will Compatibilism

In what sense do they keep determinism?

In what sense do they keep free will?


In what sense do they keep determinism?For actions to be otherwise, beliefs and desires must be otherwise. Given a complete set of beliefs and desires, you have no ability to do otherwise.

In what sense do they keep free will?People are free if:1) They follow their own desires2) They control what their desires are.


Note: Mill carefully separates causation from determination.

Desires cause actions without determining them, because determination would mean that the actions are necessary.

Mill’s insight:Only the whole mind can make an action necessary.

Determination requires all of the agent’s desires and beliefs at a given time.

No single desire determines anything.Individual desires are just contributing factors.

Mill keeps determinism by focusing on a property of the whole mind...

But he keeps free will by focusing on a property of parts of the mind—individual desires.

If individual desires interact in the right way, the agent gets to be the source of her actions. That’s enough for the agent to be free, even if her actions are determined by the whole state of her mind when she acts.

Mill’s Compatibilism, in Summary:

Documents

Two Different Problems for Freedom: 1)The Problem of Sourcehood (Sober: “Distant Causation Argument”) 2)The Problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise (Sober: