Turku stabbings on 18 August...FOREWORD On 19 October 2017, the Government appointed an investigation team pursuant to Section 32 of the Safety Investigation Act (525/2011) to investigate

Turkustabbingson18August2017

P2017-01

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FOREWORDOn19October2017,theGovernmentappointedaninvestigationteampursuanttoSection32oftheSafetyInvestigationAct(525/2011)toinvestigatethestabbingsthattookplaceinTurkuon18August2017,inwhichtwopeoplediedandeightwereinjured.TheinvestigationisofanexceptionalincidentasreferredtoinChapter5oftheSafetyInvestigationAct.TheinvestigationteamattachedtotheMinistryofJusticeisledbyChiefSafetyInvestigatorKaiValonenfromtheSafetyInvestigationAuthority.TheteamconsistsofMikaHatakka(PhDinPsychology),VesaLind(ChiefPhysician),MarjaNyrhinen(HeadCoordinatorofImmigra-tionAffairs),OlliRuohomäki(VisitingSeniorFellow),TarjaWiikinkoski(Director)andKariYlönen(MasterofPoliticalSciences).HeadofCommunicationsSakariLaurialacontributedtotheinvestigationintermsofcommunications.SometrikOyandOptifluenceOypreparedaso-cialmediaanalysisfortheinvestigationteamattheirrequest.Asafetyinvestigationestablishesthecourseofevents,causesandconsequencesaswellastherescueoperationsandactionsoftheauthorities.Causereferstothevariousunderlyingfac-torsoftheincidentandthedirectandindirectfactorsaffectingit.Anydeficienciesinregula-tionsandprovisionsonsafetyandtheauthoritiesareestablished,ifnecessary.

Theinvestigationreportincludesanaccountofthecourseofevents,thefactorsthatledtotheincident,theconsequencesoftheincidentandsafetyrecommendationstothecompetentau-thoritiesandotheractorsformeasuresthatarenecessarytoincreasepublicsafety,preventnewincidents,preventdamageandtoenhancetheefficiencyofrescueoperationsandotheractionsoftheauthorities.Thepartiesinvolvedintheincidentandtheauthoritiesinchargeofcontrolinthefieldoftheinvestigatedincidentweregivenopportunitiestogivestatementsonadraftinvestigationre-port.Thestatementsweretakenintoaccountinthefinalphaseoftheinvestigationreport.Thereisasummaryofthestatementsattheendofthereport.StatementsgivenbyprivatepersonsarenotpublishedinaccordancewiththeSafetyInvestigationAct.TheinvestigationreporthasbeentranslatedintoSwedishbySemantixOyandintoEnglishbyLingoneerOy.TheinvestigationreportandasummaryhavebeenpublishedontheSafetyInvestigationAu-thoritywebsiteatwww.sia.fi.

Investigationidentifier:P2017-01 Coverphoto:VideorecordingsInvestigationreport7/2018 takenforthe112TVseriesISBN:978-951-836-523-8(PDF)

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TABLEOFCONTENTSFOREWORD...........................................................................................................................................................................21 EVENTS..........................................................................................................................................................................6

1.1 Courseofevents...............................................................................................................................................61.2 Emergencyalertsandrescueactions.....................................................................................................7

1.2.1 Emergencyreportsandalerts..........................................................................................................71.2.2 Catchingtheperpetratorandemergencyfirstaid.................................................................81.2.3 Emergencymedicalservices.............................................................................................................91.2.4 TurkuUniversityHospital(TYKS)...............................................................................................121.2.5 Rescueservices.....................................................................................................................................131.2.6 Immediatefurtheractionsbythepolice..................................................................................141.2.7 GovernmentSituationCentre........................................................................................................161.2.8 FinnishImmigrationService..........................................................................................................171.2.9 CrisiscommunicationsoftheCityofTurku............................................................................171.2.10 Psychosocialsupport.........................................................................................................................181.2.11 Spiritualcare..........................................................................................................................................21

1.3 Consequences.................................................................................................................................................222 BACKGROUNDINFORMATION........................................................................................................................23

2.1 Surroundingsandconditions..................................................................................................................232.2 Peopleandorganisations..........................................................................................................................23

2.2.1 Perpetrator.............................................................................................................................................232.2.2 Receptioncentre..................................................................................................................................282.2.3 Religiouscommunities......................................................................................................................30

2.3 Preventiveactivitiesbytheauthoritiesandotheractors.........................................................312.3.1 MinistryoftheInterior.....................................................................................................................312.3.2 FinnishImmigrationServiceandadministrativecourt....................................................322.3.3 Thepolice................................................................................................................................................342.3.4 FinnishSecurityIntelligenceService.........................................................................................362.3.5 Asylumseekers’entryintoEuropeandmovementthere...............................................37

2.4 Organisationsinvolvedintheincidentandtheiroperationalreadiness...........................382.4.1 EmergencyResponseCentreAgency.........................................................................................382.4.2 Thepolice................................................................................................................................................412.4.3 Emergencymedicalservices..........................................................................................................412.4.4 Hospital.....................................................................................................................................................422.4.5 Rescueservices.....................................................................................................................................432.4.6 GovernmentSituationCentre,MinistryoftheInteriorandMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth..................................................................................................................................................44

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2.4.7 CityofTurku..........................................................................................................................................452.4.8 Psychosocialsupport.........................................................................................................................462.4.9 TheChurch..............................................................................................................................................47

2.5 Recordings........................................................................................................................................................472.6 Provisions,regulations,instructionsandotherdocuments....................................................47

2.6.1 Provisionsconnectedtoapplyingforandreceivingasylum..........................................472.6.2 PreventionobligationsofthepoliceandtheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceService. ......................................................................................................................................................................522.6.3 Provisionsontheactionsofstatemanagement...................................................................522.6.4 Provisionsonthedutiesofmunicipalities..............................................................................532.6.5 Terrorisminlegislation....................................................................................................................532.6.6 Managementofmulti-authoritycooperationsituations..................................................532.6.7 Psychosocialsupportandservices..............................................................................................54

2.7 Otherinvestigations....................................................................................................................................552.7.1 Specialstudyoncommunications...............................................................................................552.7.2 Crimeandproblemsatreceptioncentres...............................................................................572.7.3 TrendsofIslamistterrorinEurope............................................................................................592.7.4 Profilesofindividualactors............................................................................................................612.7.5 Thepathtoradicalisation................................................................................................................622.7.6 PreventionofterroristattacksinEurope................................................................................632.7.7 ObservationsonactionsbytheauthoritiesduringtheStockholmattack...............65

3 ANALYSIS...................................................................................................................................................................693.1 ArrivalinFinlandandasylumapplication.......................................................................................693.2 GettinginterestedinradicalIslamism................................................................................................703.3 Deeperradicalisation..................................................................................................................................713.4 Thestabbings..................................................................................................................................................713.5 Actionsbytheauthorities.........................................................................................................................72

4 CONCLUSIONS.........................................................................................................................................................755 SAFETYRECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................................................78

5.1 Processingtimesofasylumapplicationsandappeals................................................................785.2 Establishingtheidentityofasylumseekers.....................................................................................785.3 Opportunitiesofasylumseekers’immediatecircletoshareconcerns..............................795.4 Developmentoftheworkforthepreventionofradicalisation..............................................805.5 Managementofmulti-authoritysituations......................................................................................825.6 Warningthepopulation.............................................................................................................................835.7 DevelopmentoftheoperationsoftheGovernmentSituationCentre.................................835.8 Personaldataofindividualsinneedofpsychosocialsupport................................................84

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5.9 Implementedactions...................................................................................................................................85SOURCES..............................................................................................................................................................................87SUMMARYOFSTATEMENTSRECEIVEDONTHEDRAFTINVESTIGATIONREPORT...................90

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1 EVENTS

1.1 CourseofeventsInMay2016,aMoroccanmanarrivedinFinlandandappliedforasylum.HewasallocatedaplaceinsupportedhousingoftheTurkuReceptionCentreinPansio.Fromspring2017,hespentalotoftimeinKaarinaattheflatofhisfriend,afellowasylumseekerwhohadreceivedaresidencepermitandanassignedmunicipalityofresidence.OnthemorningofFriday,18August2017,hewroteamanifestoathisfriend’sflat,justifyinghisupcomingactwithJihadistideologyandgoals.ThemanifestoendedwitharequesttoprayforhimandforentryintoParadiseasamartyrandaconfessionoffaith.HetooktwokitchenknivesfromtheflatandcycledtoTurku.Atnoon,heattendedFridayprayersatamosqueinthecitycentre.Next,hecycledtoaparknexttoTurkuCathedral.There,ataround3pm,hereadhismanifestoaloudinArabic,recordingitonvideoonhismo-bilephone.TheperpetratorreleasedthemanifestovideoinaninstantmessengerserviceandtookabustotheTurkuBusStation.There,hesawamilitaryservicemananddecidedtostabhim.However,disruptionsoccurredandhegaveuptheidea.

ThemantookabustoTurkuMarketSquareandboughtanicecreamfromanicecreamstall.Inthemiddleofeatingtheicecream,hemovedtothesouthwestcornerofthesquareandle-thallystabbedawomanwhohadbeenstandingthere.Abystanderwhowitnessedthestab-bingwenttohelpher.Thestabber,whohadbeenmovingtowardsthecentreofthesquare,noticedthisandturnedbackafterafewsteps.Themanwhowashelpingthevictimstoppedthestabberfromapproachingbykickinghim.Thestabberturnedawaybutreturnedagain,stabbingthemanthatwashelpingandanotherwomanwhowasthere.Abystanderwhowit-nessedthestabbingmadethefirstemergencycallat4:02:11pm.SeveralotherbystanderswhosawtheincidentcalledtheEmergencyResponseServicessoonafterwards.Thestabbermovedtowardsthecentreofthesquare,stabbingamanwhotriedtostophim.Heattemptedtostabanotherman,whomanagedtoavoidbeinghit.Mostofthepeopleatthesquaredidnotnoticethatanythingunusualwashappeningandcon-tinuedtomakepurchasesatthestalls,forexample.Someofthepeoplewhonoticedtheeventsdidnotunderstandtheseriousnessofthesituationandstoppedtoobservethedevel-opingsituation.Someofthepeoplewhonoticeditstartedrunningaway.Closertothecentreofthesquare,thestabberfirstranpastawomanwithapramandthenturnedbackandstabbedthewoman.Thestabbercontinuedrunningtowardsthenortheastcornerofthesquare,stabbingawomanthere.AftercrossingtheintersectionofYliopis-tonkatuandKauppiaskatu,hestabbedtwowomenatthecorner.Oneofthewomendiedonherwaytothehospital.Someoftheyoungmenwhowitnessedtheincidentstartedrunningaftertheperpetrator.Oneofthebystandershadabaseballbatinhiscarandhandedittoamanwhowasrunningafterthestabber.Themenrunningafterthestabbertriedtowarnpeoplebyshouting.ThestabberranuphillalongKauppiaskatuandonwardalongMaariankatutowardsPuutoriSquare.ApolicepatrolturningfromBrahenkatutoMaariankatunoticedthestabbercomingfromtheoppositedirection.Thestabberstabbedawomanatthecorner.ThepolicepatrolmadeaUturnbacktoBrahenkatu.Thestabberattackedanotherwoman,stabbingherandholdingontoher.Thepolicepatrollefttheirvehicle.Apoliceofficergavethestabberorders

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andshothiminthelowerlimbatapproximately4:05:00pm.ThesecondpoliceofficerusedaTaser.Thestabberwasimmobilisedandthepolicepatroltookhimintocustody.

Figure1. EventsatTurkuMarketSquareanditsimmediatevicinityThestabber’srouteismarkedin

red.Thelocationsofthevictimsaremarkedwithredcircles.Thedeathsaremarkedinblack,injuredvictimsinwhiteandthepersonwhosurvivedtheattemptedstabbingun-harmedismarkedingreen.Approximatelythreeminutespassedfromthefirststabbingtostoppingtheman.Duringthistime,hemovedalmost500metres.(Aerialphoto:Orthoimagery©NationalLandSurveyofFinland1/2018.)

1.2 Emergencyalertsandrescueactions

1.2.1 EmergencyreportsandalertsTurkuEmergencyResponseCentreansweredthefirstemergencycallat4:02:15pm.Thecallwasansweredintwoseconds.Accordingtothecaller,awomanhadbeenstabbedattheMar-ketSquare,therewereatleasttwovictimsandtheperpetratorwasnolongernearby.TheEmergencyResponseCentregavetheassignmenttothepolicepatrolsintheTurkuregionthroughtheauthorities’telecommunicationsnetwork(VIRVE)at4:03:20pm.Threepolicepa-trolssignedofftheassignmentasreceivedwithinhalfaminute.

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TheEmergencyResponseCentre(ERC)alertedemergencymedicalservices(EMS)at4:03:41pm.ThealertwasreceivedbytheEMSfieldsupervisor(unitcodeEVS01),physicianunitFin-nhems20(FH20)andoneEMSunit,orambulance(EVS1121).Thefirstfouremergencycallsweremadealmostsimultaneously.Afterthat,therewasabreakofapproximately20seconds,afterwhichupto25callswerereceivedperminute.Overape-riodoffiveminutes,64callswerereceived,over50ofwhichwereconnectedtotheincident.In31ofthecalls,thecallerdisconnectedwhenthewaitgrewlongduetothecongestion.Asthenumberofvictimsincreased,theERCalertedtwomoreambulancesthatwerefreeandthenmoreambulancesassoonastheywerereleasedfrompreviousassignments.

TheERCgraduallygainedacleareroverallpictureofthesituation.Ageneralpictureoftheex-actlocationandnumberofvictimsdidnotformuntilapproximately10minutesafterthefirstemergencycallwasreceived.Itwasparticularlydifficulttogetanideaofthelocationofthevictimsbecauseseveralcallswerereceivedaboutthesamevictim,describingtheirlocationinslightlydifferentways.

Rescueservicesunitswerenotalertedbecause,accordingtothealertinstructionsissuedbythepolice,theyarenotalertedincaseofstabbingsunlessspecificallyrequestedbythepolice.

1.2.2 CatchingtheperpetratorandemergencyfirstaidTheERCpassedtothepolicedescriptionsgivenbythecallersandinformationaccordingtowhichthestabberwasrunninginthesquareandstabbingpassers-by.Thepolicefieldcom-mandpatrolclosesttotheMarketSquarewasabletoreachthesquare30secondsafterre-ceivingtheassignment.Thepatrolstoppedbythefirstvictimforonlyamomentandimmedi-atelycontinuedonaspeoplepointedinthedirectionthestabberwasheading.AsecondpatrolheardtheassignmentontheirwaytoanotherassignmentnearTurkuBusStation.Thepatrolinterruptedtheirassignment,starteddrivingtowardstheMarketSquareviaBrahenkatuandtooktheperpetratorintocustodywhentheyencounteredhim.ThegeneralcommanderoftheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentinstructedthepolicepatrolstostoptheperpetrator’sactionsthroughVIRVEradioconcurrentlywiththearrest.Someofthemenrunningaftertheperpetratorbehavedaggressively,andthepolicehadtoprotecttheperpetrator.Thesituationquicklycalmeddown.

Aroundtwentysecondsafterthearrest,thefieldcommandpatrolfollowingtheperpetratorarrivedfromthedirectionoftheMarketSquare.Soonafterwards,athirdpolicepatrolarrivedandwenttotheMarketSquare.Overthefollowingtenminutes,severalpolicepatrolsarrivedinthearea.Bystandersgaveemergencyfirstaidtothevictims.Oneofthevictimswashelpedindoors.AtPuutoriSquare,thestaffofanearbyprivatecliniccameouttohelpthevictims.Thepolicesafeguardedtheareawheretheeventstookplace,helpedprovideemergencyfirstaidandre-portedthelocationsofthevictimstotheERC.Thepolicealsogaveemergencyfirstaidtotheperpetrator.Soonaftertheperpetrator’sarrest,thepolicestartedtoformtheviewthattherewasproba-blyjustoneperpetrator.However,therewasnoabsolutecertainty.Theroleofthebystanderswhoranaftertheperpetratorwaspartlyunclear.ThefieldcommanderstayedatthePuutoriscenetomanagethesituationasthesituationcommanderandinstructedanotherpoliceof-ficertotaketheleadinfindingtheotherperpetrators,iftherewereany.Someofthepolicepatrolsstartedinvestigatingthesituationbypatrollingintheimmediatesurroundings.

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AtthesituationcentreoftheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartment,basedonthealertandtheradiotrafficintheearlystages,itwascleartothegeneralcommanderthatthiswasanex-traordinaryactofviolence.Thecontinuouscommunicationstrafficaboutthesituationde-mandedalloftheattentionofthecommandcentrestaff.

1.2.3 EmergencymedicalservicesEMSreceivedthealertat4:03:53pmwiththeassignmentcodeA032stabbing.Accordingtotheinitialinformation,onlyonepersonhadbeenstabbed.BecausethiswasanassignmentinthehighestriskcategoryA,EMSfieldcommandunitEVS01andphysicianunitFH20werealertedinadditiontoEMSunitEVS1211.Whenthealertarrived,EVS01andFH20wereonVähä-HeikkilänkatureturningtoTurkuUniversityHospital(TYKS)fromtheirpreviousassignment.TheERCinformedthemthatthereweretwostabbingvictimsandalertedasecondEMSunit.EVS01andFH20stoppedatabusstoponKaskenkatuandthestaffputonprotectivevests.TheunitscontinuedtowardstheMarketSquare.TheEMSfieldsupervisorinformedtheEMSoperatorsbyVIRVEradiothathewastakingtheleadinmanagingtheEMSandorderedarriv-ingunitstowearprotectivevests.ThesupervisordeclaredAurakatu1asthestagingarea,orpointofentry,fortheunitsandorderedotherunitstostayatadistanceof200metresoftheMarketSquare.ThefieldsupervisororderedbyVIRVEradiotheEMSunitstotransfertheirmessagecommu-nicationstothecooperationcallgroupofthepoliceandEMS.ContrarytotheexpectationsoftheEMS,thepolicefieldpatrolsdidnotstartusingthecallgroup.TheEMSfieldsupervisoralsomonitoredtwoothercallgroups,thecooperationcallgroupwiththeERCandtheinter-nalcallgroupoftheTurkuregionEMS.Becausethepolicewerenotinthecooperationcallgroup,intheearlystages,informationaboutthesituationdidnotpassdirectlybetweenthepoliceandEMSbutthroughtheERC.TheEMSfieldsupervisornotifiedtheemergencyclinicatTYKSofthestabbingassignmenthehadreceivedbyVIRVEradioatapproximately4:07pm.Immediatelyafterwards,theERCre-portedthatshotshadbeenfiredatthesite.EVS01andFH20werethefirstunitstoarriveatthestagingarea.ThefirstEMSunitreachedthestagingareaatapproximately4:08pm.Theunitsstoppedtowaitforinformationfromthepoliceaboutthesafetyofthesite,whichisthegeneralprocedureinordinarystabbings.TheERCfoundoutthattherewereatleast5–6victims.TheERCalertedthreemoreavailableEMSunits.TheERCinformedEMSofitsestimateofthenumberofvictimsatapproximately4:08pm.TheEMSfieldsupervisorindependentlyactivatedanambulancethatwasatTYKShandingoverapatienttocometothesite.TheEMSfieldsupervisorhaddifficultiesgettinganideaofthesafetysituationatthesitebe-causetherewasnodirectcontactbetweenthepoliceandEMS.Thefieldsupervisorknewthatpeoplehadbeenstabbedandshotsfired,butnoinformationaboutthenumberofvictimsorwhohadusedthefirearm.At4:08pm,theERCheardinpoliceradiotrafficthatthepolicehadusedthefirearmandstoppedtheperpetrator’sactions.Thepolicefieldcommanderrequestedseveralambulancestothesite.TheERCaskedthepolicewhetheritwassafeforambulancestocome,andthepo-liceconfirmedthatitwassafe.Atthesametime,theERCinformedtheEMSfieldsupervisorofseveralpatientsattheMarketSquareandPuutoriSquare.

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Atapproximately4:09pm,theERCinformedtheEMSthatoneperpetratorwasinpolicecus-todyandhadbeenshotbythepolice.Thepolicehadnoknowledgeorobservationsofotherperpetrators.TheEMSfieldsupervisorgaveanadvancenoticespecifyingthenumberofvic-timstoTYKSemergencyclinicatapproximately4:10pm,statingthattherewereatleastfivevictims.TheEMSfieldsupervisordecidedtowaitforpolicetogivepermissiontomovetothesite.TheERCgavethefieldsupervisormoreinformationaboutthelocationsofthevictimsandre-peatedthattheperpetratorwasinpolicecustody.Thefieldsupervisormovedtothefirstvic-timsinthenorthwestcornerofthesquareatapproximately4:11pm.Thefieldsupervisorre-questedaphysicianunitandEMSunittothesite.TheERCinformedallEMSunitsthatitwassafetogotothesquare.TheEMSfieldsupervisorestablishedacommandpostinthenorthwestcornerofthesquare.HeorderedtheEMSunitstoenterthroughthere.ThefieldsupervisororderedthephysicianofFH20,theHEMScrewmember1andtwoparamedicstogotriagepatientsintheMarketSquare.ThepoliceandtheERChadafairlyclearpictureofthelocationofthepatients,butthissituationpicturewasnotfullyconveyedtotheEMS.Thereweretwovictimsinthenorthwestcornerofthesquare,oneofwhowasbeingresusci-tatedbyaphysicianwhohappenedtobenearby.Apolicepatrolwaspresent.ThephysicianofFH20pronouncedthevictimdeadandtreatmentwasdiscontinued.Anothervictimwassit-tingonthecobblestones,bloodybutconscious.Hehadanincisedwoundontheleftsideofhisneck.EMSunitEVS1217assessedthepatient’sconditionanddecidedonimmediatetransport2.ThetransporttoTYKSstartedatapproximately4:20pm.

Itwasdifficulttospotthenextvictimsduetothelargecrowdandthemarketstalls.Someofthebystandersguidedtheparamedicstothevictims,buttheinformationprovidedbythepublicwaspartlyconflicting.Duetothelargecrowd,theEMSunitshaddifficultiesdrivingdi-rectlytothevictims.Manywererecordingthevictimswiththeircamerasandmobilephones.SomeofthemwereintheEMSpersonnel’swayandhadtobeorderedtomoveback.ThefieldsupervisororderedEMSunitEVS1219tostarttreatingthepatientinthenortheastcornerofthesquare.TheunitproceededtothecornerofKauppiaskatuandYliopistonkatuatapproximately4:15pm.Thevictimhadastabwoundinhershoulder,andtwobystanderswerehelpingher.Thepatient’slevelofconsciousnesshaddecreased,andherstatuswaspro-gressingtohypovolaemicshock.Apolicepatrolwasalsopresent.Afteraninitialassessment,itwasdecidedtoimmediatelytransportthevictimtoTYKS.Thetransportstartedatapproxi-mately4:17pm.

ThefieldsupervisororderedthenextEMSunitarrivingatthesite,EVS1213,tothesideclos-esttothesquareofahamburgerrestaurantontheeastsideofthesquare.Theunitreachedthevictimatapproximately4:15pm.Whentheunitarrived,thephysicianofFH20,theHEMScrewmemberandtwoparamedicswerealreadythere.Theairwayofthevictim,whohadlife-

1 HEMS=HelicopterEmergencyMedicalServices;aHEMScrewmemberisafirefighter,paramedicornursetrainedasa

helicopterflightassistant.2 Penetratingwoundstothetorsoandneckinvolveagreatriskofsevereinternalbleeding,whichcannotbemanagedout-

sideofahospital.Evenifthepatientseemstobeingoodcondition,theirstatusmaydeterioratesuddenly.Forthisreason,patientsaretransportedtoahospitalcapableofimmediatesurgicaltreatmentassoonaspossible(loadandgo).Insuchcases,thetreatmentprovidedbytheEMSisrestrictedtoimmediatelife-savingmeasures,minimisingthetimespentatthescene.

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threateningwounds,wassecured,andshereceivedanintraosseousaccessroute.Thetransportstartedatapproximately4:20pm.Whenthetransportofthepreviousvictimstarted,bystandersescortedtothephysicianofFH20avictimnearthetaxistationonthenorthsideofthesquare.Theslightlyinjuredvictimhadbeenstabbedinthechest.BecausethevictimwasingoodconditionandanEMSunitwasnotavailablefortransportatthetime,thephysicianaskedataxithatwasatthetaxistationtotakethevictimtoTYKS.ThefieldsupervisorhadreceivednoticefromtheERCthattherewasavictimindoorsinabankontheeastsideofthesquare.ThefieldsupervisororderedEMSunitEVS1218tomovetothebankdirectlyfromthestagingareaonAurakatu.Theunitreachedthevictimatapprox-imately4:15pm.Bystandershadhelpedthevictimindoorsfromthesquareandprovidedemergencyfirstaid.Thebankpersonnelhadlockedthedoors.Theslightlyinjuredvictimhadbeenstabbedintheshoulder.Thetransportstartedatapproximately4:25pm.ThefieldsupervisororderedEMSunitEVS1211,whichwasinthestagingarea,toprovidemedicalcaretoavictimbytheoutdoorcaféontheMarketSquare.Therewereseveralcafésinthesquare,andittookawhilebeforethevictimwasfound.Theunitreachedthevictimatap-proximately4:16pm.Theslightlyinjuredvictimhadbeenstabbedintheshoulderandwasconscious.Thewoundwasboundupandahaemostaticdressingwasapplied.Avascularac-cesswasalsoopened.Thetransportstartedatapproximately4:30pm.OncethevictimsattheMarketSquarewere,accordingtothefieldsupervisor’sunderstand-ing,allbeingtreated,heorderedfreeEMSunitstomovetoPuutoriSquare.EMSunitEVS5211receivedanalerttotheMarketSquareatapproximately4:13pm.ThefieldsupervisororderedtheunitdirectlytoPuutoriSquare,whereitreachedthevictimatapproxi-mately4:20pm.Theslightlyinjuredvictimhadseveralstabwoundsinthetorsoandalowerlimb.Thevictimwassittingontheground.Bystandershadalreadyboundupsomeofherwounds.Thetransportstartedatapproximately4:34pm.ThecrewofFH20arrivedatPuutoriSquareat4:22pm.Atthesametime,EMSunitEVS1221,whichhadbeenalertedat4:14pm,reachedthevictiminthesouthwestcornerofPuutoriSquare.Thevictim,whohadlife-threateninginjuries,hadbeenstabbedintheupperchestandneck.Thevictimwasconscious.Shehadreceivedemergencyfirstaidfromthepoliceandthestaffofanearbyprivateclinic.Thetransportstartedatapproximately4:26pm.EMSunitEVS1311hadbeenalertedtoPuutoriSquareat4:15pmandarrivedatapproxi-mately4:22pm.Theunitwasassignedtotreattheperpetratorofthestabbings.Thegunshotwoundinhislowerlimbcausedseriousbleeding,whichmighthavebeenlife-threateningwithoutemergencyfirstaid.Thepolicehadplacedatourniquetatthebaseoftheperpetra-tor’sthighsasemergencyfirstaid.ThephysicianFH20examinedtheperpetrator’scondition,andimmediatetransportwasdecidedon.Thetransportstartedatapproximately4:26pm.Apoliceofficerrodeonthetransport.

UnitsEVS01andFH20,whichstayedatthescene,checkedtheareaforanyotherpeopleinneedofhelp.Duringthesituation,theEMSregionalfieldsupervisorsoftheprovincecarriedoutprepared-nesstransfersclosertoTurku.ThepreparednesstransferssecuredtheoperationalreadinessofEMSinTurku.

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Atapproximately4:30pm,theEMSfieldsupervisorgavetheERCanorderinaccordancewiththedisasterproceduretoleavenon-urgentassignmentstowaituntiltheresourcesbecameavailable.

1.2.4 TurkuUniversityHospital(TYKS)TheemergencyclinicatTYKSreceivedthefirstinformationoftheincidentat4:06pmafteraneyewitnessoftheshootinginformedafriendwhoworkedthere.At4:07pm,theEMSfieldsu-pervisorinformedtheemergencyclinicthattherehadbeenastabbinginthecitycentre.Thetriagenursereportedtheshootingandstabbingtotheemergencyclinicfieldsupervisorandthechiefmedicalofficer.Thesurgicalback-upon-callphysicianwascalledbutwasinsurgeryandthusunabletocomeandleadthesituationattheemergencyclinic.Theprimaryon-callphysiciantooktheleadinmanagingthesituation.

Thehospitalwasinformedofthelargenumberofinjuredatapproximately4:10pmwhentheEMSfieldsupervisorinformedtheemergencyclinic’sA&Etriagenurse.Accordingtothein-formation,therewereatleastfivestabbingvictimsinthecitycentre.Thereadinessoftheemergencyclinicwasraisedbyinformingthestaffanddischargingpa-tientswhodidnotneedimmediatetreatment.Theclinicwasclosedtowalk-inpatients.Theemergencyclinicchiefphysicianandtraumaon-callphysicianwerecalledat4:15pm.Thechiefphysicianorderedtheemergencyclinicintodisasterreadinessandstartedtravellingtothehospital.Theorderfordisasterreadinesscausedtheemergencyclinictostartusingtheappropriateprocedure.Surgicalactivitieswerestoppedandtheoperatingroompreparedtoreceivepa-tientswithstabwounds.Emergencyclinicstaffwenttotheintensivecareunitandoperatingroomtoprovideinformationabouttheincident.Nursesfromtheintensivecareunitcametotheemergencyclinictoprovideassistance.Thechildren’semergencyclinicwastransferredentirelytothepaediatricoutpatientclinic.Securityguardsclosedthemaindoortotheemergencyclinicandstartedtocontrolentrytotheemergencyclinic.AtTYKS,thedecisiontoclosethedoorswasmadeintheearlystagesattheemergencyclinicchiefphysician’sorders.Normally,thedecisionismadebythechiefofsecurity.Guardswerepostedatthedoors,andnewarrivalshadtoshowthecontentsoftheirbagstothesecurityguards.Justbeforethestabbingbegan,theTYKSemergencyclinicwasexperiencingahighworkload.Theemergencyclinicchiefhadsubmittedarequestforovertimeworktothenursingstaffbe-causetherewasashortageoffournursesfromthenormalmanpowerpershift.Anormalnumberofphysicianswerepresent.Therewasahighworkloadinthetreatmentofpatientswithinternaldiseases,sotwoextraphysicianshadbeencalledin.Duetotheon-callshift,twoanaesthesiologists,anon-callphysicianingastroenterologicalsur-geryandanon-calltraumaphysicianwerealsopresent.Theoperatingroomwasreadytore-ceivetwopatientsalmostimmediatelyafterbeingnotified.TheanaesthesiologistsalertedmorestaffusingWhatsApp.Thestaffoftheemergencyclinicandintensivecareunitwerealertedusingtwootherinstantmessengerapplications.Moreadditionalpersonnelcameinbecauseofthealertsduringthefirsthourthanwasactuallyneeded.Thefirsttwovictimsarrivedattheemergencyclinicalmostsimultaneouslyatapproximately4:25pm.Therewasnotenoughtimetoperformalltheactionsconnectedtodisasterreadi-ness.Therewasnotimetotakethedisasteractioncardsintouse;instead,decisionsweremadebasedonexperienceandintuition.

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Thevictimwhoarrivedfirsthaddiedduringtransport.Attheemergencyclinic,shewaspro-nounceddeadafterbriefresuscitation.Thevictimwhoarrivedsecondhadlife-threateningin-juries.Afteremergencymeasures,thevictimwasmovedintotheoperatingroomforemer-gencysurgeryat4:46pm.

TheothersixvictimsencounteredbyEMSandtheperpetratorallarrivedattheemergencyclinicwithinthenext15minutes.Oneofthemwastransferredtoanoperatingroomforemer-gencysurgeryat4:52pm.Theperpetratorwasoperatedonabitlater.Threevictimsweremovedtotheoperatingroom’srecoveryroomafterbeingexamined.Threeweretreatedattheemergencyclinicanddischargedfromthere.Theperpetratorandthevictimswhounderwentemergencysurgeryweretreatedintheintensivecareunitaftertheiroperations.Thevictimswhowerenotdischargedfromtheemergencyclinicweretrans-ferredtoafollow-uptreatmentlocationapproximatelywithinanhouroftheirarrivalatthehospital.Oneslightlyinjuredvictimcametotheemergencyclinicindependentlyafter9pm.Hehadre-ceivedasliceintheshoulderattheMarketSquarebutleftbeforethearrivaloftheEMS.OnevictimdiedattheMarketSquareandwasnotbroughttothehospital.Allvictimswhowerebroughttothehospitalaliveweredischarged.Atleastoneincurredapermanenthandicap.

Duringthetreatmentofthepatientsandevenafterwards,thehospitalmaintainedanelevatedreadinesstoreceivemorepatientsandsecuritymeasureswereincreased.GuardpatrolswereincreasedandaccesstotheT2hospitalbuilding’s3entryrouteswascontrolled.Increasedse-curityattheentryroutesandtheemergencyclinicthroughoutthehospitalareacontinuedun-til1am.Thepolicestoodguardovertheperpetratorthroughouthishospitalstay.Thestrictsecuritymeasurescontinueduntiltheperpetratorwastransferredfromthehospitalthefol-lowingweek.Thehospitalstaff’ssenseofsecuritywasaffectedbythefactthatnobodyknewwhetherthereweremoreperpetratorsandwhethernewactscouldbeexpected.Itwasalsouncertainwhethersomeoneinvolvedmightbeamongthevictims.Thehospitalreceivedthreateningphonecallstowardsstaffandtheperpetrator.Thisincreasedthestaff’sfearandneedforse-curityguardsandcontrol.Twointernalinformationsessionswereorganisedattheemergencyclinicat5pmand7pm.Otherunitsofthehospitalwereinformedbybringingmessagestotheresponsiblepeopleinperson.Thehospitaldistrictdirectorprovidedinformationtothemediaandansweredap-proximately50telephonecallsperdayoverthecourseoftheweekend.TherewerecallsfromFinnishaswellasforeignmedia.Ahospital-widedisasteralertwasnotsentout.Thehospitaldistrict’sseniormanagementandthehospital’schiefofsecurityreceivednoticeoftheincidentthroughchannelsotherthanthehospital’sinternalalerts.Thehospital’smanagementgroupdidnotmeetonthedayofthein-cident,whichhinderedinternalandexternalinformationdistribution,amongotherthings.

1.2.5 RescueservicesRescueserviceswerenotalertedbecause,inaccordancewiththealertprocedure,theyarenotneededfornormalstabbingassignments.TwoEMSunitsdepartedfromTurkuMainFireStationtowardstheMarketSquareat4:04pm,butrescueservicesstaffarenotinformedofEMSalerts.

3 TheT2hospitalbuildingincludestheemergencyclinic,intensivecareunitandA&Eoperatingrooms.

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Theexecutivefireofficeronduty(P3)receivednoticeoftheeventsonhistelephonefromanacquaintanceapproximately5–10minutesafterthebeginningoftheevents.Theexecutivefireofficerondutybelievedittobeanormalstabbing.However,afterseeingseveralemer-gencyvehiclesheadingfortheMarketSquare,theexecutivefireofficerstartedtoinvestigatethematter.TheexecutivefireofficerhadtelephonecontactwiththeRescueDepartmenton-callchief(P2)andthepolicesituationcentre,duetowhichtheexecutivefireofficerwenttotheMarketSquaretoofferassistancefromrescueservicestotheEMSandthepolice.TheEMSfieldsupervisorandpolicefieldcommanderbothstatedthattheassistancewasnotneeded.However,thepoliceforensicinvestigationaskedtheRescueDepartmenttohelpcordonoffthearearelevantfortheinvestigation.Theexecutivefireofficerondutyorganisedthreeres-cueunitsfromthemainfirestation,whicharrivedattheMarketSquareat5pm.Thedutychiefimmediatelycalledthechiefofregionalrescueservices(P1),whohadalreadyheardoftheeventsontheradio.Thechiefofregionalrescueservicesnotifiedthemanage-mentoftheCityofTurkuand,at4:48pm,thedutychiefnotifiedthedutyofficeroftheMinis-tryoftheInteriorDepartmentforRescueServices,whohadalreadybeeninformedbytheNa-tionalPoliceBoarddutyofficeramomentearlier.ThedutychiefalsoinformedtheRescueDe-partmentmanagementwithWhatsAppgroupmessages,visitedtheMarketSquareand,ofhisowninitiative,relocatedtothepolicecommandcentretoserveasacontactpersonaround6pm.AttheMarketSquare,RescueDepartmentunitsassistedthepoliceforensicinvestigation,forexamplebymonitoringthecordoned-offarea,movingvehiclesforprivacyandbuildingotherstructuresforprivacy.Atfirst,thefirstdeceasedvictimwaskeptatthescene,covered,inor-dertosecuretheinvestigation.Curiouspeoplegatherednearbytowatchandtakevideoandphotos,sotheRescueDepartmentstaffaskedthemtomoveback.Thepeopledidnotsignifi-cantlyhinderoperationsbut,accordingtotheRescueDepartmentstaff,someofthepeopletakingphotosandvideosdidnotunderstandtheneedtorespectthedead.Somepeoplewereindignantatbeingaskedtomovefurtherbacktowaitfortheirbus.Oncetheforensicinvesti-gationwascomplete,therescueservicesunitswashedthebloodstainsoffthesurfaceofthesquare.ThereadinessoftherescueserviceswasraisedbyestablishingarescueservicescommandcentreattheTurkuMainFireStationat6pm.Thedutychief,whowasatthepolicesituationcentre,conveyedinformationtotherescueservicesandtoberecordedinthesituationjour-nal.Thereadinessoftherescueserviceswasbroughtdowntothenormallevelat9pm.ThedutychiefinformedthedutyofficeroftheMinistryoftheInteriorDepartmentforRescueSer-vicesat10:25pm.

1.2.6 ImmediatefurtheractionsbythepoliceAfterthevictimshadbeentakenaway,thepoliceoperationsattheMarketSquareandelse-whereinthecitycentrecontinuedwithadeterminationofpotentialotherperpetrators.Thesituationwasunclearforquitealongtime.Forexample,oneeyewitnesshadseenoneoftheindividualswhoranaftertheperpetratorwithablackbagthattheeyewitnessconsideredsus-picious.Thepoliceinvestigatedthematter,whichdidnotinvolveanythingunusual.Immediatelyaftertheincident,theEmergencyResponseCentrereceivedtelephonecallsthatstabbingsweretakingplaceatlargeshoppingcentres,MyllyandSkanssi,andattheTurkuRailwayStation,withpeoplehurt.TheERCconveyedtheassignmentstothepolice,whocheckedthelocations.However,nothingunusualwasobservedatthelocations.TheERCwassoonabletodoubtthetruthfulnessoftheinformationbecausetherewereonlysporadiccalls.

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TheERCalsoreceivedreportsofcarsthatmightbeinvolvedinthesituation.Later,itwasdis-coveredthatthecarshadnothingtodowiththeincident.Intheearlystages,alloftheattentionoftheSouthwestPoliceDepartmentsituationcentrestaffwasfocusedonthecommunicationsaboutthesituation.Atfirst,nobodyhadthetimetodocumentthecourseofeventsintothesystemavailabletoconveythesituationpicturetopo-licepatrolsandtherestofthepoliceorganisation,suchastheNationalPoliceBoard.Alittlelater,morestaffarrivedatthesituationcentre.ThesituationcentreinformedtheNationalPo-liceBoarddutyofficeroftheincidentat4:12pm.Thenationalpolicerapidresponseunitwasalertedtothescene.

ThefirstbulletinfromtheauthoritieswasreleasedbytheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDe-partmentat4:37pm.AccordingtotheTwittermessage,severalpeoplehadbeenstabbedinTurkucitycentre,andpeoplewereaskedtoavoidthecentre.Tenminuteslater,thepolicede-partmenttweetedagain.Themessagestatedthatthepolicehadshotasuspectedperpetrator,whowasnowinpolicecustody.

Investigationoftheincidentstartedquickly.Atfirst,theSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepart-mentwasresponsiblefortheinvestigation,buttheresponsibilitytransferredtotheNationalBureauofInvestigationatapproximately5pm.TheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentassistedintheinvestigation.Inconnectionwiththeinvestigation,thepolice,forexample,con-ductedhousesearchesinplaceswheretheperpetratorhadspenttimeandtookafewpeopleintocustody.At5:28pm,theSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmenttweetedthatitwaslookingformorepotentialperpetrators.ThemessagealsoadvisedpeopletoleaveTurkucitycentre.Thecitycentregrewsignificantlyquieter.ThepolicewasvisiblypresentinthecitycentrethroughoutFridayeveningandtheearlymorninghoursinordertoincreasethepeople’ssenseofsecu-rity.TheWestFinlandCoastGuardoftheFinnishBorderGuardwasinformedoftheincidentbythepoliceat4:23pm.Thegeneralcommanderofthecoastguardmovedtothecoastguardcommandcentreat4:29pm.Thereadinessofthecoastguardcrimepreventionunitwasraised,andthenumberofpatrolsinthePortofTurkuareawasincreased.At5:37pm,thepoliceverballyaskedthegeneralcommanderofthecoastguardforofficialas-sistanceforanassignmenttomaintainpublicorderinthePortofTurkuintermsofthearri-valsanddeparturesofpassengerships4.Thecoastguardfurtherraiseditsoperationalreadi-ness,forexamplebyincreasingthenumberofpatrolsintheportandbymakingreadinesstransfersinordertosecureitsstatutorymainduties.Thewrittenrequestforofficialassis-tancefromthepolicearrivedat5:53pm.Attherequestofthepolice,thegeneralcommanderofthecoastguardmovedtothepolicesituationcentreat6:30pm.At6:04pm,theSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentpostedonitsFacebookpageaboutthestabbing,mentioningthatthepolicewasprovidinginformationabouttheincidentonitsTwitteraccountandwebsite.TheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceServicereleaseditsfirstbulle-tinat6:08pm.TheSecurityIntelligenceServicestatedthatitwastakingpartininvestigatingtheevents.

4 AccordingtotheBorderGuardAct(578/2005),inindividualcases,attherequestofcommandingpoliceofficers,theBor-

derGuardmayperformtheurgentpoliceactionsnecessarytomaintainpublicorderandsecurityreferredtointhechap-terongeneralpowersofthePoliceActwhichthepoliceareunabletoperformwithoutdelay.Insuchcases,borderguardshavethepowersprescribedforpoliceofficersinthesaidchapter.

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TheNationalPoliceCommissionergaveastatementtoYle,theFinnishBroadcastingCom-pany,at6:28pm.Accordingtothecommissioner,itwastooearlytojudgewhethertheeventswerelinkedtoterrorism.Thecommissioneralsosaidthatthepolicewasincreasingsurveil-lanceandvisiblepatrolsthroughoutthecountrywithinthenext24hours.

ApolicepressconferencewasheldattheTurkuPoliceStationat7pm.Atfirst,informationwasprovidedbythePoliceChiefandDetectiveChiefInspectoroftheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartment,theDetectiveChiefInspectoroftheNationalBureauofInvestigation,theNationalPoliceCommissionerandtheMinisteroftheInterior.Later,theywerejoinedbytheTYKSemergencyclinicchiefphysicianand,finally,theMayorofTurku.Thepressconferencedescribedtheeventsandthebeginningoftheinvestigationandansweredvariousquestionsfromthepress.Theinformationprovidedaboutthenumberofvictimsduringtheconferencewasconflicting,andnobodywasabletogiveanunambiguousfigure.Somecountsincludedtheperpetratorwhileotherdidnot.Furthermore,thenumbersstatedbythehospitaldidnotincludethedeceasedvictimwhowasnotbroughttothehospital.Thefactthatoneinjuredpersononlysoughttreatmentlateintheeveningcontributedtothediscrepancyinthefinalnumberofinjured.Inthesocialmedia,peoplewonderedwhyanemergencywarningwasnotannounced.Thepo-licejustifiedthedecisioninaTwittermessagesentat8:30pm.Accordingtothemessage,thealertcameat4:02pm,theperpetratorwascaughtat4:05pm,andtherewasnotimeforanemergencywarning.At9:18pm,thepolicereleasedabulletinoutliningtheeventsoftheday.Thebulletinmen-tionedthattherewereeightvictims,twoofwhomdied.At1:27am,thepolicereleasedabul-letinspecifyingthatthevictimsincludedeightinjuredandtwodead.ThereadinessleveloftheFinnishBorderGuardwasreturnedtonormalafter9pm.Thepo-licereduceditsreadinessaround1am.Overthefollowingweek,thecoastguardprovidedof-ficialassistancetomaintainpublicorderaccordingtotherequestofthepolice.ThreecoastguardpatrolspatrolledthePortofTurkuandtherailwaystation,busstationandTurkuAir-portduringdaytime.

ThepoliceandtheFinnishBorderGuardincreasedtheirreadinesslevelonthenationallevel.

1.2.7 GovernmentSituationCentreTheGovernmentSituationCentre(VNTIKE)firstreceivednoticeofthestabbingsbytele-phoneat4:38pm.Afewminuteslater,thePrimeMinister’sOfficerequestedinformationabouttheincident,ofwhichtheyhadreceivedinitialinformationelsewhere.Aroundthesametime,anSMSarrivedtotheSituationCentrefromtheNationalPoliceBoarddutyofficer,stat-ingthatseveralpeoplehadbeenstabbedintheneckinTurkuandthepolicehadshotthesus-pectduringhisarrest.Otherpossibleperpetratorswerebeingsought.Atapproximately4:50pm,thecorrespondingsituationcentreinSwedentelephonedandre-questedmoreinformationabouttheincident.At4:51pm,theSituationCentregavethefirstmessageaboutthecasetotheministers,themanagementandpreparednessmanagementoftheministries,thecivilservicedepartmentsandgovernmentinstitutions.ThecontentofthemessagefollowedthecontentofthemessagereceivedfromtheNationalPoliceBoarddutyof-ficer10minutespreviously.After5pm,thePrimeMinistertweetedaboutthematter,statingforexamplethattheGovernmentwouldholdameetinglaterthatevening.

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AsecondSMStotheministersandmanagementoftheministriesregardingseveraldetailsconnectedtothestabbingswassentat6:06pm.At8:15pm,theSituationCentresentoutno-ticesoftheGovernmentmeetingandinformationconnected,forexample,tothesafetyoftheministers.TheSituationCentreprovidedasituationreportat9:15pmandagaininthemorn-ingat8am.Overthecourseoftheday,theSituationCentredistributedinformationviaSMS,forwardedanothernoticeofaGovernmentteleconferenceandinformedthecorrespondingsituationcentreinSweden.Atextmessagesentat11:54aminformedtheministersthattheactwasbeinginvestigatedasanoffencecommittedwithterroristintent.Intheafternoon,thepreparednessmanagementoftheministrieswasinformedthattherewasnoacuteneedtocallextrameetingsoftheministries’preparednessorganisations.Thelastsituationreportat4:30pmsharedmoredetailedinformationinaccordancewiththepressconferencesheldbytheNationalBureauofInvestigationandtheSecurityIntelligenceService.TheGovernmentmeetingconvenedbytheSituationCentrewasheldonthedayoftheinci-dentat7:50pm.TheGovernmentreleasedanannouncementtothevictims,theirfriendsandfamilyandtheFinnishpublicingeneral,condemningtheactandcommunicatingthatthesitu-ationwasundercontrol,forexample.Ameetingoftheheadsofpreparednesswasnotcon-vened.

1.2.8 FinnishImmigrationServiceTheSituationCentreoftheFinnishImmigrationService(Migri)assistedtheNationalBureauofInvestigationindeterminingtheperpetrator’sidentitybecauseitwasdiscoveredearlyonthathewasprobablyaresidentatareceptioncentre.ThepolicewasunabletoaccesstheUMAinformationsystemonaliensbecausethesystemwastemporarilydownformainte-nance.TheSituationCentrecalledinpeoplewhowereabletoretrievedatafromthesystemback-up.TheNationalBureauofInvestigationreceivedtheinformationitneededat5:41pm.

TheSituationCentrealsoinstructedreceptioncentresaroundFinlandtoincreasetheirsafetymeasures.Theincidentinspiredvariousfears,especiallyatunitswithminors.Nosignificantthreateningsituationsoccurredatreceptioncentres.TheSituationCentrewasondutythroughouttheweekend,producinginformationfortheneedsofthepolice.

1.2.9 CrisiscommunicationsoftheCityofTurkuTheDirectorofCommunicationreceivednoticeoftheincidentthroughthemediaandquicklyassembledacommunicationsteamcapableofcommunicatinginthreelanguages.IntensiveinformationdistributioncontinuedfromFridaytoSunday.TheCityofTurkuannouncedtheavailabilityofcrisissupportonitswebsiteandinthesocialmedia.Themost-readnewsitemreleasedbythecitywasaboutcrisisassistance.Inaccord-ancewiththecommunicationsprocedure,thecityfocusedonconveyingonlyconfirmedinfor-mationthathadbeenreceivedfromthepolice.OnMonday,aWilmamessagewassenttotheparentsofschoolchildren.Thewebsiteandsocialmediafunctionedwellduringthecrisis.Thecityhadanonlinecrisiscommunicationssystem,butitwasnotusedduringthesituation.Therewerealsodigitalnoticeboardsalongentryroutes,butnodirectcommunicationchannelwiththecompanymanagingtheboards.Thecity’scommunicationsstaffaskedtheircolleaguesinBarcelonaandStockholmforadviceabouthandlingthesituation.Initsmessage,thecitymanagementappealedtothecitizenstonotgiveintofear.Thecityalsoorganisedflagsathalfmast,thecastingofflowersintotheRiverAura,memorialilluminationofthebridgeandatreeofmemoriesatthesquare.These

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collectivememorialsformedacontinuumofmourningcommunicationsthatlastedforap-proximatelyamonth.

1.2.10 PsychosocialsupportTheemergencysocialservicesandcrisisteamsoftheCityofTurkulaunchedacutecrisisworkinthesameevening.Startingfromthefollowingday,theFinnishRedCross(FRC)volunteersandemergencyteamofpsychologistsandVantaaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServiceswerealsoinvolved.Long-termscrisisworkwashandledbytheCityofTurkupsychologistunitandsupplementedbytheFRCemergencyteamofpsychologistsand,partly,theTurkuandKaarinaParishUnion.Theorganisationsthatparticipatedintheactivitiesorganisedsupportfortheirownstaff.TheCityofTurkuEmergencySocialServicesreceivednoticeofthestabbingafter4:15pmfromtheEmergencyResponseCentre,theDirectoroftheWelfareDivisionandthepolicesitu-ationcentre.ApairofworkersfromtheemergencysocialservicesarrivedattheMarketSquareat4:45pmand,attherequestofthepolice,tookchargeofthebabyofoneofthestab-bingvictims.TheemergencysocialservicesdutyofficeraskedtheFRCtopreparetolaunchcrisissupport.TheemergencysocialservicesreceivedtheofficialassistancetheyrequestedfromVantaaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServices,whichhadbeenarrangedtohandlena-tionalassignmentsincaseofsuddenlyarisingsituations.ThedutyofficerattheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthauthorisedtheofficialassistance.Acrisiscentrewasopenedinconjunctionwiththecoordinatedaccidentandemergencyser-vicesatTYKSlessthananhourafterthestabbings.Thecoordinatedaccidentandemergencyserviceswereselectedasthelocationbecausethepolicehadrequestedthatpeopleavoidthecitycentre,soitjustthoughtthatpeoplewouldhesitatetocomeintothecitycentre.Thehos-pital’smentalhealthserviceswerealsocloseby.ThecrisiscentrewasstaffedwithemergencysocialservicesemployeesandvolunteersoftheFRC’smentalhealthsupportteam.Thecoor-dinatedaccidentandemergencyservicesguidedvictim’sfamilymembersandotherswhosoughthelptothecrisiscentre.Exceptforthenights,thecrisiscentreoperateduntil6pmonSunday,20August2017.Thecrisiscentrewasvisitedbyover40people.Theemergencysocialservicesimmediatelystartedpreparationstoopenacrisishelpline.Atfirst,therewasaproblembecausethecodeneededtoactivatethesystemwasmissing,buttheDivisionDirectorwasabletoobtainitfromthecity’sITservices.Thecrisishelplinewasopenedat6:30pm,whichwasannouncedonthecitywebsite.Thecrisishelplinefunctionedundertheprinciplethatifonelinewasbusy,thenextcalltransferredtothenextavailableem-ployee.

Emergencysocialservicesemployeesstaffedthetelephonesthroughthefirsteveningandnight.OnSaturdaymorning,volunteersoftheFRC’smentalhealthworkarrivedtohelp.Fromthenon,thecrisishelplinewasstaffedbyemergencysocialservicesemployeesduringofficehoursandatnight,andbyFRCvolunteersintheevenings.Duringthefirsteveningandnight,thecrisishelplinewasstaffedbyfourpeople.Theaveragecalldurationwas45minutes.Dur-ingitstwoweeksinoperation,thecrisishelplinereceivedover200contacts.Duringthecalls,aformwasusedtoassessthecaller’sexposuretopsychologicalstress.Callerswereadvisedtocontactthecrisiscentreatthehospital.Theformsweredeliveredtothecity’spsychologistunit,whichorganisedfurthersupport.Inadditiontotheemergencysocialservicescrisishelpline,callsrelatedtothestabbingswerealsoreceivedbythecrisishelplinesoftheFinnishAssociationforMentalHealthandtheChurch.TheFinnishAssociationforMentalHealthreceivedapproximately80suchcalls.The

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callersincludedeyewitnessesandindividualsforwhomtheeventshadtriggeredprevioustraumaorotherwisecauseddistress.ThenumberofcallstotheChurchhelplinedidnotin-crease,buttheircontentswerelargelyconnectedtothestabbings.TheservicehoursofthehelplineforboysofVäestöliitto,theFamilyFederationofFinland,wereextended,butitonlyreceivedafewcallsconnectedtothestabbings.Acooperationmeetingwasheldat9amonthemorningaftertheincidentwiththeaimofformulatingaplanforthepsychosocialsupportoftheinjuredvictimsinthehospitalandtheirfamilymembersandforthecontinuationofthecrisiscentreoperation.Inameetingbetweentheauthoritiesheldat11am,anacutecrisisworkplanwasdrawnupandtheorganisationofcrisisworkagreedon.ThemeetingswereattendedbyrepresentativesfromTurkuEmergencySocialServices,VantaaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServicesandtheFRCregionalofficeaswellastheleaderoftheFRC’semergencyteamofpsychologists.ThemeetingalsoincludedtheCityofTurku’sdirectorofpsychosocialservices,servicedirectoranddivisiondirectoraswellasthepersonresponsibleforcrisisworkatthehospitaldistrict.VantaaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServicesreportedtotheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth.Therewereproblemsinobtainingthenecessaryinformationforpsychosocialsupportbe-causetheinformationofthepeopleneedinghelp,meaningthefamilymembersofthevictims,wasnotreceivedfortheneedsofpsychosocialsupportuntilduringthefirsttwodaysfollow-ingtheincident.TheproblemswerecommunicatedtotheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthandtheNationalPoliceBoard.Thedelayinobtainingtheinformationwasproblematicbe-causecrisisworkmustbelaunchedassoonaspossible.Thepolicehadtheinformationofthefamilymembersofthedeceased.Thepoliceconsideredtherequestfortheinformationproblematicandrefusedtodisclosetheinformation.TheproblemwaswhetherthepolicecouldusethePopulationInformationSystemforsuchapur-poseandwhetheritwaspermissibletocontactpeopleinordertoprovidecrisissupportbasedoncontactinformationobtainedfromthepolice.Thepolicedecidedtoprovidethefam-ilymembersofthedeceasedwiththecontactinformationofthepartiesprovidingcrisissup-port.However,thefamilymembercontactpersonofthepoliceprovidedalistthatwasuseful.Itwasnotpossibletoobtaintheinformationofthefamilymembersofthehospitalisedvictimsbytelephone,socrisisworkersvisitedtheintensivecareunittoobtaintheinformation.

TheDirectoroftheWelfareDivisiondecidedalreadyonthedayoftheincidentthatanyoneneedingfurthersupportcouldbetreatedatthepsychologistunitoftheCityofTurkuregard-lessoftheirmunicipalityofresidence.Inadditiontothestaffofthepsychologistunit,theCityofTurkucrisisteamwasalsoattachedtotheactivities.Thegroupconsistedofcityemployeesaswellasretiredprofessionalsinthefieldandparishemployees.TheFRC’semergencyteamofpsychologistsalsomainlybaseditsoperationsatthecity’spsychologistunit,althoughsomeofthemoperatedintheFRC’sfacilities.TheCityofTurku’spsychologistunitreceived111requestsforcontactthroughthecrisishelpline,whichtooktwoandahalfweekstogothrough.Duringthefirstweek,thepsycholo-gistunitspent700workhoursoncrisiswork.Overthefirstweeks,therewere140telephoneconversations.Therewerealsogroupmeetingswithmarketsellersandthestaffofshopsnearthesquare.Allinall,therewascontactwithapproximately200people.ThemembersoftheFRC’semergencyteamofpsychologistsmetwithmembersoftheperpetrator’simmediatecir-cle.Thecity’scrisisteamhadcontactwiththeMoroccancommunity.Overtenpeopleneededlong-termsupport.Atfirst,therewasconfusionaboutenteringcrisisworkinteractionsintothesystem.Crisishelplineinteractionswereenteredinthesystem.However,someofthemembersofthecity’s

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crisisteamdidnotholdanoffice,whichmadeenteringinteractionsintothesystemdifficultduetothelackofaccessrights.Thisissuewassolvedbyformingteamswhereonepersonheldanofficeandhandledthedocumentation.Duetovaryingpractices,theFRC’semergencyteamofpsychologistsdidnotenterinteractionsintothesystematfirst.VantaaSocialandCri-sisEmergencyServicesrepeatedlyinstructedtoenterallinteractionsintothesystem.Insuchanextensivecasewithsuchlong-termconsequences,enteringinteractionsintothesystemisimportantforfurthermeasures.Thegreatneedforcrisisworkcausedproblemsforthenormaloperationsofthepsychologistunitprovidinglong-termsupport.Theoperationsrestedsolelyontheshouldersofthepsy-chologistunitandthecity’scrisisteameventhoughbasichealthcare,forexample,hadper-sonnelsuitedforthework.TheFRC’slocalheadofpreparednessreceivednoticeoftheincidentthroughthemediaandstartednetworksevenbeforethecontactfromemergencysocialservices.TheFRC’svolunteerdutyofficeralertedtheirownteam,whichcomprisesapproximately25peopleintheTurkuregion.Teamsfromneighbouringareaswerealsoalerted.Volunteerpatrolsstartedcirculat-ingintheMarketSquarethemorningafterthestabbing.Thepatrollingcontinuedforninedayswithatotalof120volunteers.Theirshiftsrangedfromtwototenhours.

Therewere2,000–2,500interactionsattheMarketSquare.Leafletsongettingthroughatrau-maticexperiencewerehandedout,2,000attheMarketSquareandapproximately1,500else-where,includingnearbyshops.Theinteractionsatthesquarevariedfromhandingoutaleaf-lettolongerconversations.Themostdistressedindividualswereadvisedtocallthecrisishelpline,andafewwerereferreddirectlytotheFRC’steamofpsychologists.

Inthefirsttwodaysafterthestabbing,aprivateclinicsituatednexttotheMarketSquare,healthservicescompanyMehiläinenOy,offeredcrisisassistanceatitsowninitiative,pro-videdbyoccupationalhealthpsychologists.Theactivitieswereannouncedonthecompanywebsite.Theactivitieswerefreeofchargealthoughbyappointment.Theservicewasusedbyover20people.ClientsofMehiläinen’soccupationalhealthservicesalsousedsomecrisisas-sistanceserviceswithintheframeworksoftheiragreements.Forthecrisissupportofemergencymedicalservicespersonnel,shiftchangewasscheduledearliersothatthecrewoftheunitsinvolvedinthesituationwereabletoattendaprocessingsessionlaterthatnightfrom7pmto9pm.ThesessionwasalsoattendedbytheEMSfieldsu-pervisor,thecrewofFH20andparamedicsfromtheRescueDepartmentandhospitaldistrict.Rescueservicesunitswerealsoabletoattendtheprocessingsessionfrom7pmto9pm.Thefollowingday,instructionsweregivenforadiscussionledbyprofessionals,whichwasat-tendedbyoneemployee.

Thepoliceorganisedaprocessingsessionforthepoliceofficersinvolvedintheoperationintheeveningofthedayoftheincident.Discussionswerealsoorganisedthefollowingday.AttheEmergencyResponseCentre,onememberoftheafter-careteamwascalledinear-lier.Thememberhadseparateconversationswitheachpersonwhowasonshiftduringorim-mediatelyaftertheincident.Nobodyfeltthattheyparticularlyneededafter-care.Basedonthefeedbackreceivedfromthepersonnel,occupationalhealthcareorganisedaprocessingses-sionalittleoveramonthaftertheincident.ProcessingsessionsforTYKSstaffstartedgraduallyoncethesituationcalmeddown.ThefirstjointfeedbacksessionforallstaffmembersinvolvedinthesituationwasheldonthefollowingTuesday.

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AprocessingsessionwasorganisedfortheemployeesofTurkuEmergencySocialServicesaftereachshift.TheFRCvolunteersalsohadaprocessingsessionaftereachshift.Otheractorsmightalsohaveaneedforcrisissupport.Itisknownthatatleastonesecurityguardcompanyorganisedaprocessingsessionforitspersonnel.

1.2.11 SpiritualcareThewelfaremanagerservingastheheadofpreparednessattheTurkuParishUnionwasin-formedoftheincidentbyafamilymemberatapproximately4:20pm.Themanagerstarteddistributinginformationabouttheincidentwithintheparishunionaccordingtotheemer-gencyplan.Theparishunionactivelycontactedthecathedralchapterofthearchdiocesetoagreeonpracticalactions.Theparishunionstartedtoorganisetheopeningofchurchesac-cordingtothestandardpractice.

ThespecialassistantsofthebishopsofthecathedralchapteroftheTurkuarchdiocesere-ceivednoticeoftheincidentthroughChurchcommunicationsat4:33pm.TheinformationwasforwardedtotheemergencypreparednessteamofthedioceseandtotheArchbishopandBishopofTurku,bothofwhomstatedthattheywereonstandby,waitingformoreinfor-mation.Inaccordancewiththeemergencyplan,preparationswerelaunchedforaprayertobeheldtheverysameevening.Therequestfromthepolicetoavoidthecitycentrecausedun-certaintyaboutthearrangements.At5:19pm,thefirstpostwaspublishedonthediocese’sFacebookpage,reachingover87,000people.ApostthatwaspublishedontheArchbishop’sFacebookpageafter7pmreachedover300,000people.Itwasdecidedtoholdthenon-denominationalprayerpreparedfortheca-thedralat9pm.Itwasannouncedinthesocialmediafrom8pmonwards.Thenon-denominationalprayerwasheldatthecathedralat9pm.Representativesofdif-ferentreligionswerepresent,andthePresidentoftheRepublic,threeministersandhighcommandofthepolicerepresentedthestateauthorities.Thereweremanymembersofthemediainthechurchtointerviewthebishops,forexample.Overtheweekend,thecathedralchapterdistributedinformationaboutthedifferenteventsorganisedbytheChurchinthesocialmediaandcoordinatedtheattendanceofthebishopsatevents.BothbishopsattendedthememorialheldattheMarketSquareonSundaymorning.

Churchcommunicationsfirstreceivednoticeoftheincidentfromthemediaat4:24pm.ThecommunicationsmanagerandonlinecommunicationsmanagerremainedattheChurchCoun-ciltomonitorthesituation.Crisiscommunicationsfollowedtheemergencyplan.Membersofthecrisiscommunicationsteamwereinformedoftheincidentwithagroupmessageat4:33pm.Althoughtherewasnodefiniteinformationyetaboutthenatureoftheincident,thefirstmessagesofconsolationwerepostedontheChurchTwitteraccountsoonafterwards.Overthecourseoftheevening,consolationcommunicationswerecarriedoutthroughvarioussocialmedia.TheTurkuCathe-dralChapterandtheparishunionweresupportedincommunicatingabouttheincidentor-ganisedattheTurkuCathedral.ThecontentsandmusicofthedevotionalsonYleRadio1thateveningandthefollowingmorningwereadjustedtobemoreappropriatefortheeventsoftheday.Thefollowingmorn-ing,theArchbishoptookpartinalivedevotionalbroadcastat7:50am.AnationalmomentofsilencecoordinatedwiththeGovernmentwasheldat10amonSundayatthebeginningofmass.

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Hospitalpriestsreceivednoticeoftheincidentthroughthetelephoneofthepriestondutyat4:23pm.Theinformationwascommunicatedtoalloff-dutypriests,threeofwhichreportedbeingavailable.Thefirstassignmentcameat6:40pmwhenthehospitalpriestondutywasrequestedtoleadaprocessingsession.Twoofthepriestsattendedtheprayeratthecathe-dral,readytospeakwithanyoneinneed.Throughtheevening,thepriestsspokewiththevic-tims’familymembersandhospitalstaff.ThehospitalpriestsorganisedfourstaffprocessingsessionsduringSaturdayandSunday,andthreethefollowingweek.Thehospitalpriestsassistedtraumatisedpatientswhocametotheemergencyclinic.

Accordingtotheobservationsoftheparishes,therewasnotmuchneedfordiscussionswithyouthworkers.However,therewasagreatneedtoprocessthematteratfacilitiesfortheelderly.Parishworkersalsovisitededucationalinstitutes.TheChurchhasaserviceunitforprovidinghelpthroughthetelephoneandInternet.Therewerenosignificantchangesinthetotalnumberofcallsandnoneedtochangetheactivitiesintoacrisishelplineorchat.However,thenumberofcallsclassifiedasbeingconnectedtoanationalcrisisincreasedsignificantlycomparedtothenormalsituation.

1.3 ConsequencesTwowomendiedofseriouswoundsfromthestabbings.Therewereeightinjuredwhoneededtreatment,twoofwhohadlife-threateninginjuries,onehadseriousinjuriesandfivehadmi-norinjuries.Theperpetratorincurredalife-threateninginjuryfromabulletshotbythepo-lice.

Thestabbingsweremostlytargetedatwomen;eightofthevictimswerewomen.Thereweretwomalevictims.Oneofthementriedtohelpthefirststabbingvictimandtheothertriedtostopthestabber.Thecaseshookcitizens’senseofsecurity.TheleadershipoftheCityofTurku,forexample,ap-pealedtothepeople,askingthemnottogiveintofear.Amongtheimmigrantcommunities,theincidentinspiredfearsofthreatsandnegativeattitudestowardsthem.Therewasagreatneedforpsychosocialsupport.Thisshowedasalargenumberofinterac-tionswhentheFRCvolunteerspatrolledattheMarketSquare.Concernedcitizensalsore-questedinformationfromsecuritycompanypatrolsinthefield,forexample.Thecrisishelp-linereceivedmanycalls,anddozensofpeoplevisitedthecrisiscentreatTurkuUniversityHospital.Agreatlabourinputwasalsoneededforlong-termsupport.Theincidentcausedapotentialsecuritythreatatreceptioncentres,thehospitalandtheca-thedral,ataminimum,andtheirsecurityarrangementswereincreased.Theneedforsecurityguardservicesatshopsandmeetingplacesincreased.Theeveningaftertheincident,these-curityguardcompanieswerenotabletofullymeetthisneed.

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2 BACKGROUNDINFORMATION

2.1 SurroundingsandconditionsWhenthestabbingstookplace,TurkuMarketSquarewascrowdedasusualonanormal,busyFridayafternooninsummer.Theweatherwasdryandcloudy,andthetemperaturewasap-proximately+20°C.TheMarketSquareisabustraffichub,sothereweremanycommutersonthemove.Therearemanyschoolsinthecitycentre,butschoolchildren’stripshomefromschoolweremostlyover.Themarketstallsandcaféswereopen.Therewerenoparticulareventsheldatthesquare.Nothingindicatedthecomingactofviolence,andtheeventsstartedunexpectedly.Reactionstotheensuingnoise,shoutsandactsofviolencevaried.Somepeopleturnedtowardstheac-tioninthebeliefthatsomethinginterestingwashappeningatthesquare.Othersranawayaf-terseeingactsofviolence.Therewereplentyofpeoplecapableofrationalactionpresent.Eyewitnessesofthestabbingsmighthavetroublebelievingtheireyes,butmanywereabletoquicklymakeanemergencycall.Agroupofyoungmenhadtheabilityandcouragetostartrunningaftertheperpetrator,tryingtowarnothersbyshoutingabouthim.Severalpeople,includingsecurityguards,hadtheabilitytohelpthevictimsbyprovidingfirstaid,forexample.Noneofthevictimswasleftalone.Citizensweresmartenoughtoguidethepolicepatrolintheperpetrator’stravellingdi-rectionandtodirectEMSunitstothevictims.Awarenessofthesituationdidnotpassthroughouttheentiresquare.Accordingtoobserva-tions,partsofthesquareseemedfairlycalm,withnoperceptiblepanic.Accordingtomanyobservations,consideringtheevents,thesituationwasperplexinglycalmeventhoughtherewereseveralpolicevehiclesandEMSunitsatthesquare.

2.2 Peopleandorganisations

2.2.1 PerpetratorWithinafewhours,itbecamecleartothepolicethatthestabbingsweredonebyoneperson.Hewasa22-year-oldMoroccanmalewhohadreceivedanegativeasylumdecisionandwhohadgivenafalsenameandagewhenheenteredFinland.Thepolicediscoveredtheperpetra-tor’sidentityfromtheperpetrator’sownaccountandawitnessaccount.Itwasconfirmedaweeklaterthroughaninformationrequestsentabroadbythepolice.Theinformationabouttheperpetratorispartlybasedonhisownaccount,anditisnotpossibletoverifyeverydetail.TheperpetratorwasborninMoroccoinOctober1994.Hehadabrokenfamily.Hisparentsdivorcedwhenhewas7yearsold,afterwhichhefirstlivedwithhisfatherandlaterwithhismother.Hehadtwostep-sisters.Theperpetratorattendedschoolandlearnedtoreadandwrite.Thefamilywasreligiousandtheperpetratorprayedandfollowedreligiouscustoms.How-ever,hisreligiousnesswanedduringhistimeatschool.Theperpetratorgrewestrangedfromhismotherduetohernewrelationship.Hisfather’sabilitytotakecareofthefamilywaspoor.Theperpetrator’sdeparturefromMoroccowasconnectedtofamilyissues,butalsothefactthat,accordingtohisownaccount,heparticipatedintheactivitiesofafootballhooliganultragang.Ultragangsarehierarchicalandviolentgangs.Theperpetratorreceivedhead

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woundsinafightwhicharestillvisibleonhisface.Theperpetratorjudgedthathewouldei-therdieinthegangorbekilledinrevengeifhetriedtoleavethegang.Thesereasonsmadehimthinkthatheneededsafetyelsewhere.TheperpetratorleftMoroccowithafriendonhisbirthdayinOctober2015.HefirstflewtoTurkeyandcontinuedtotravelinalittleoveraweekthroughGreece,Macedonia,Serbia,Cro-atiaandfinallytoGermany,possiblythroughItaly,SwitzerlandorAustria.TheperpetratorandhisfriendreportedasasylumseekersinGermanyinNovember2015.Theperpetratorusedhisrealidentity.InaccordancewiththeGermansystem,theyweredi-rectedtoareceptioncentretowaitforacalltocourt,wheretheactualasylumapplicationwouldbesubmitted.Theirfingerprintswouldnotbetakenuntilthatstage.ThecourtvisitdidnottakeplacebeforehisarrivaltoFinland.ThefriendsstayedindifferentpartsofGermanyforapproximatelysixmonths,althoughtheperpetratorspent2–3monthsinItalyaloneatonepoint.UponhisreturnfromItaly,hewasstoppedattheSwissborderinApril2016.HerequestedasyluminSwitzerland.However,hewithdrewtherequestthefollowingday,sayingthathewantedtocontinuetoGermanyandonwardtoFinland.Hisfingerprintshadalreadybeentakenbut,apparentlyduetothewith-drawal,theywerenotkeptinEurodac,theEUasylumfingerprintdatabase.

InGermany,theperpetratorgotintotroublewiththeauthorities,sohisfingerprintsweretakenandhisrealpassportstayedinthepossessionoftheauthorities.However,thefinger-printswerenotstoredintheEurodacdatabasebutratherelsewhere.Theissueswerenotse-riousenoughtotaketheperpetratorintocustody.However,heandhisfrienddecidedtoleave,fearingrefusalofentryandbeingreturnedtoMorocco.TheychoseFinlandastheircountryofdestination;thefriend,inparticular,hadagoodopinionofFinland.TheperpetratorprobablycametoFinlandthroughPoland,LithuaniaandEstonia,landinginHelsinki.InMay2016,thetwofriendsarrivedatareceptioncentreinPansio,Turkuwithan-otherMoroccanman.Thefollowingday,theperpetratorregisteredwiththeimmigrationpo-liceattheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentasanasylumseekerunderafalseidentity.TheperpetratorhasstatedthathegaveafalsenameandanagefouryearsyoungerthanhisactualagebecausehewantedtoenterFinnishbasiceducationandtomakeiteasiertogetasylum.HedidnotwanttogobacktoMorocco.Possiblytoavoidbeingreturnedtoothercountries,hedidnotwanttousethesamenamehehadusedinGermanyorothercountries.Hisfriendalsoregisteredatthesametimeunderafalsenameandage.InFinland,theperpetratorwasdirectedtoareceptioncentreinPansio,wherehelivedinsup-portedhousingintendedforminorsinaccordancewithhisreportedage.Hehadproblemswithmanagingthecleanlinessandupkeepofhislivingspace.Theperpetratorfailedtoper-formacompensatingworktaskorderedbecauseheneglectedtoclean,sohisreceptionallow-ancewasreduced.Theperpetratoralsoreactedtoasituationwherehesawthataninstructorhadarrangedtohaveanicemealwithanotherasylumseeker.Theperpetratordisruptedthesituationandbehavedpoorly.Inhiscircleoffriends,theperpetratorwassomethingofalead-ingfigure.Hewassometimesarrogantandarguedaboutcleaning,forexample.Anasylumseekerhassaidthattheperpetratorgotangryatthemafterseeingacrossonthem.Theper-petratoralsodisapprovedofotherasylumseekersdrinkingbeer.However,theperpetratorhimselfsmokedtobaccoandcannabis.Nevertheless,theperpetratorwasgenerallynotcon-sideredparticularlydifficult.InAugust2016,theperpetratorstartedpreparatoryeducationinaschoolinTurkuwiththeaimofapplyingforavocationalschool.Theinstructiontookplaceatanuppercomprehensive

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school.Theperpetrator’shealthwasexaminedasnormalandwasfoundtobegood.Hislan-guageskillsimprovedandhefoundfriendsamongotherimmigrants.Theperpetratorvisitedagym,playedfootballandbasketballandtookswimminglessons.Hewasactiveinsports.Atschool,therewereonlyafewdisciplinaryissues,andtheperpetratorwasclearlylikedamongfriendsandteachers.Therewerecommunicationsbetweentheschoolandreceptioncentre,forexampleabouttheperpetrator’sabilitytoconsiderothersincertainsituations.Theperpe-tratordidnotlikeitifsomethingwasavailabletoothers,andtooklossesinsportsveryhard,forexample.InSeptember2016,theperpetratorwantedtoseeapsychologist.Theideaprobablycamefromafriend’svisittoapsychologist.However,hechangedhismindaftermeetingwithaso-cialworkerandaphysician.Nothingalarmingwasrevealed.InNovember2016,theperpetratorreachedtheageofmajorityaccordingtotheagehehadreported,sohemovedtoliveatthereceptioncentre’sgrouphomewiththreeIraqimenandaSyrianman.Atthegrouphome,suspicionsaroseaboutmisuseofthefacilities,drugdealing,stealingandcausingharmtootherresidents.Aroundthesametime,anegativedecisiononhisasylumapplicationcamefromtheFinnishImmigrationService.TheperpetratorappealedthedecisiontotheAdministrativeCourt.Theperpetratorthoughtthathisdemonstratedde-siretostudywouldhelphimgetasylum;inreality,itmakesnodifference.Duetoproblemswithhislivingsituation,theperpetratorwasmovedtoliveinthereceptioncentre’smainbuildinginearlyMay2017.Soonafterwards,thefriendwhocametoFinlandwithhim,whowasstillregisteredasbeingaminor,receivedatemporaryresidencepermitandaflat.Theperpetratorstartedspendingtimeathisfriend’sflatinKaarina.

InJune2017,theperpetratorstartedstudyingFinnishonavoluntaryfive-weeksummercourseorganisedbytheChristianInstitute.Heinitiallymadeapositiveimpressionontheteachersthere.Hisstrongreactionstolosingatgameswerealsoevidentinthesummercourse.Atfirst,hisparticipationinthecoursewasfairlyregular.AtthebeginningofJuly,theperpetratordroppedoutofthecoursewithoutgivingareason.Insummer2017,hissportsactivitiesalsodecreased.Theperpetrator’sinterestinradicalIslamism,Jihadismandreligionfirstmanifestedclearlyinearly2017,butevenbeforethathehadexpressedstrictviewsonwhatisforbiddenforMuslims.Hepractisedreligionsporadically.TheperpetratorlistenedtotheQuranonlineandspoketoothersaboutIslamicState,orISIS5.Accordingtohisaccount,hewantedtofindoutwhetherISIShadagoodorbadcause.Theperpetrator’sfriends,whoheconsideredsecu-larised,didnotwanttohaveanythingtodowithISISideologyandconsideredviolenceobjec-tionable.Hisfriendsweredisturbedbythistalk.Theperpetratorvisitedtwodifferentmosquesirregularlyandalone.Hisfriendswerenotinterestedinattendingprayers.Asfarasisknown,itwasnotpossibletospeakoftheIslamicStateatthemosques.InJanuary2017,thethingstheperpetratorwassayingcausedenoughconcernthattheissuewasreportedtotheimmigrationpolice.ThereportstatedthattheperpetratorhadthreatenedtokillanasylumseekerthreetimesandthattheperpetratorspokeaboutISISandjoiningitandlistenedtoitsrecordings.Accordingtothereport,otherasylumseekershadstartedtobewaryoftheperpetratorandmanythoughtthatheappearedtohavebeenradicalised.Theper-petratorhadalsoaccusedotherasylumseekersofdoingbusinesswithunbelievers.ItwassaidthattheperpetratorwasusingafalseidentityandhadpossiblysolddrugswhileinItaly.

5 InEnglish,ISIS=IslamicStateinIraqandSyria;inArabic,Daesh=al-Dawlaal-Islamiyafial-Iraqwaal-Sham.

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TheimmigrationpoliceforwardedthereporttoalocalunitoftheSecurityIntelligenceSer-vice.Afewdayslater,theinformationreachedalocalunitofthenationalBureauofInvestiga-tion.Thetip-offdidnotleadtoanypracticalactionsintheseorganisationsoratthereceptioncentre.

Theperpetrator’sinteresttowardsISIShadincreasedafterhisnegativeasylumdecision.Ac-cordingtotheperpetrator,however,theinterestwasnotduetothenegativedecisionbutra-thercuriosityandhavingextratimeforsuchcontemplations.Thecontemplationsgrewstrongerinthespring,whichmanifestedin,forexample,theperpetrator’senthusiasminsharinghisthoughtswithothersandinterestinwatchingandlisteningtoISIS-themedrecord-ingsonline.Ramadan,theimportantmonthoffastingforMuslims,wasfrom26Mayto24June2017.Overthelast10daysofRamadan,theperpetratorstartedvisitingonemosquemoreregularly,of-tenspendinglongstretchesoftimeatthemosque’ssocialfacilities.Theendofthefastiscon-sideredespeciallyimportantintermsofreligion,sospendingtimeintensivelyatmosquesatthattimeisfairlytypical.ApersonwhoonlyattendsreligiouseventsduringRamadanisnotnecessarilyconsideredveryreligious.Theperpetratormostlykepttohimselfatreligiousevents,andthereligiousleadersactingattheeventsdidnot,accordingtotheiraccounts,no-ticeanythingunusualabouthisbehaviour.DuringRamadan,theperpetratormetaFinnishmanofforeignbackgroundwhohethoughtwasreligiousnearthemosque.Themanrepeatedlyvisitedthemosque,andwhilethere,hestayedquietandjustprayed.Themanspokewiththeperpetratorafewtimesand,asfarasisknown,hewastheonlyonewhosympathisedwiththeperpetrator’spositivethoughtsonISIS.Apparently,themanalsogaveadviceandshowedhimwebsitesandinstantmessengerserviceswherehecouldfindISISmaterials.Theyalsospokeofthemeaningfulnessofaterror-istattackinFinlandandmethods,suchasbombs.Accordingtotheperpetrator,hereceivedanswersfromthemanforhiscontemplationsthatstartedatthebeginningoftheyearregard-ingwhetherISISwaswrongorright.Aftertheconversations,theperpetratorbecamecon-vincedthatISISwasright.ThemanmayhavehadconnectionstoISIS.DuringRamadanandafterwards,thewatchingofvideosbecameadailyandaddictiveactiv-ityfortheperpetrator.Eventheperpetratorhimselffeltdistressedandoccasionallytriedtodisengagefromhisthoughts.Heintentionallybrokehismobilephonewiththismotivebutgotanewonefromthemanhehadmet.ThemanalsotriedtohelptheperpetratorgetajobandponderedongoingtofightinSyriawiththeperpetrator.Asfarasisknown,thecontactwiththemanendedaroundthreeweeksbeforethestabbings,asthemannolongerfullytrustedtheperpetrator.Thetrustwasreducedbytheperpetrator’scannabisuse.Therewasstillsomekindofanxietyanddesireforachangeinlifebecause,accordingtohisaccount,theper-petratorwasaggressiveandfeltaddictedtohismobilephone.Healsotriedtodeletethein-formationonhisnewphone.

Insummer2017,theperpetrator’sthoughtschangedtobelievingthattheWesterncountriestreatArabcountriespoorlyandthattheworldisagainstsharia,orIslamiclaw.HethoughtthatitwasrighttoavengetheattacksoninnocentMuslimsbyWesterncountries.WhenonepersondiesinSyria,onemustdieinFinland,forexample.TheperpetratorsaidthatheusedtothinkthattheterroristattackscarriedoutinEuropewereevilactsbut,insummer2017,thethoughtchangedafterheunderstoodthemattercorrectly.HisfriendshavesaidthattheperpetratordidnotlikehisthoughtsaboutproperIslambeingquestioned.Theperpetratordisapprovedofhisacquaintance’saffairswithnon-Islamicwomenandlisteningtomusiceventhoughhehimselfsmokedalotandusedcannabis.The

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perpetratoralsodisapprovedofpeoplewhoconvertedfromIslamtoChristianity.Theperpe-trator’sfriendswereafraidofhimbutdidnotreporttheirconcernstothereceptioncentreorauthorities,forexample.Hisfriendswerereluctanttolistentohistalk.Asfarasisknown,theperpetratorneverexpressedhisplanstocarryoutanyacteventhough,basedonhisownac-count,ithadalreadycrossedhismindduringRamadan.Towardstheendofthesummer,theperpetrator’sthoughtsrevolvedmoreandmorearoundISIS.Accordingtohisfriend,hebe-camegrim,didnotsleepatnight,spokemoreaggressivelyandhadbarelyanycontactwithotherpeople.TheperpetratorattendedFridayprayersandalsoacquiredaQuran.AtoneFri-dayprayer,hestronglycriticisedtheclothingwornbyapersonassistingintheceremony,whichfeaturedavisibleBritishflag.Accordingtotheperpetrator,thefirstthoughtsofaconcreteactcameafterhewatchedvid-eosofthebombingsofRaqqainSyria.Inthedaysprecedingtheact,theperpetratorkepttalk-ingtohisfriendsaboutISIS,showedthemvideosandsaidthattheactionsofISISwereright.Thedaybeforethestabbings,therewasaterroristattackinBarcelona,inwhichtheperpetra-torexpressedinteresttohisfriend.Thenightbeforetheact,hedecidedtocarryoutanattackandsentafarewellmessagetohisfriends.Heplannedtopurchaseaknifebut,duetotheriskofgettingcaught,hesettledforknifesthathecouldfindintheflat.Hisoriginalplanwastokillasoldierbecause,accordingtoISISpropaganda,soldiersaremoreresponsibleforwrongdoingsthanothers.TheperpetratorwantedtodemonstratethatISISalsohadpowerinotherpartsoftheworld.Hewasreadyandwillingtodieduringhisact.Themorningoftheact,theperpetratorwroteamanifesto,mostlybasedonthesermonsofradicalimamshehadlistenedtoonYouTube.Inthemanifesto,hejustifiedhisupcomingactwithJihadistideologyandgoals.ThemanifestoendedwitharequesttoprayforhimandforentryintoParadiseasamartyrandaconfessionoffaith.AfterFridayprayersatthemosque,hehadanaggressivediscussionwithastranger,speakingaboutanimamwhohasbeenlinkedwithterrorismandthejustificationofactsofterror,buttheothermandidnotsympathisewithhisviews.Theperpetratorreleasedhismanifestothroughaninstantmessengerservice,whichwasapparentlymeanttomotivatehimandpreventhimfrombackingout.Asecondob-jectivewastospreadinformationoftheattacktomembersoftheIslamicState.

Theperpetratorwasnotundertheinfluenceofintoxicantsduringhisact.Accordingtothementalexaminationconnectedtothetrial,theperpetratorwasofsoundmind.

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Figure2. Atimelineoftheperpetrator’sarrivaltoEurope(grey)andtheeventsinFinland(blue).

2.2.2 ReceptioncentreThroughouthisstayinFinland,theperpetratorwasregisteredattheTurkuReceptionCentreinPaimio.TurkuReceptionCentreisareceptioncentremaintainedbytheFRC’sSouthwestFinlanddistrict6,whichhadthreelocations:Halikko(200places),PansioinTurku(300places)andPunkalaidun(150places).ThePansiounitservesasatransitunitwhereasylumseekerswhohaveappliedforasylumwaitfortheirinterviewwiththeFinnishImmigrationService.Aftertheinterview,theymovetootherreceptioncentrestowaitfortheirresidencepermitdeci-sion.MostoftheresidentsaredirectedtoPansiobytheRaisioimmigrationpoliceoftheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartment.

ThePansiolocationincludesagrouphomewith14placesforunaccompaniedminorasylumseekersandsupportedhousingwith10places7forunderageasylumseekersneartheageofmajority.TheperpetratorfirstlivedinsupportedhousinginPansio.Hetransferredtotheadultsideafterturning18accordingtothebirthdatehehadreported.Childrenunder18

6 Receptioncentrereferstoaplacewherepersonsseekinginternationalprotectionandreceivingtemporaryprotectionare

housedandwhichorganisesreceptionservicesforpersonsseekinginternationalprotectionandreceivingtemporaryprotection.Grouphomesandsupportedhousingforchildrenarealsoreceptioncentres.

7 Childrenover16yearsoldwithoutaguardiancanbehousedinsupportedhousingifitisjustifiedfortheirdevelopmentandwell-being.

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yearsaresubjecttoacurfew,butthemovementofadultsisnotrestricted.Dutiesincludetak-ingcareoftheirownfoodandtakingturnscleaning.ThereceptionservicesatPansio8includedthesocialandhealthcareservicesspecifiedintheActontheReceptionofPersonsapplyingforInternationalProtectioninaccordancewiththesizingoftheFinnishImmigrationService.Socialandhealthcareservicesareprovidedandor-ganisedforapplicantsbyprivateandpublicserviceprovidersoutsidereceptioncentres.Be-causemanyalsoneedmentalhealthservices,thereceptioncentrehasanoutsourcedserviceagreementwithalocalmentalhealthassociation.ThefundingforoperationsandservicescomesfromtheFinnishImmigrationService.Adultasylumseekersarenotentitledtoalloftheservicesfundedbythemunicipality.Theirservicesareorganisedatthereceptioncentresandbyprivateandpublicserviceprovidersoutsidethecentres.Forexample,municipalitiesorganisespecialisedmedicalcare,maternityandchildhealthclinicservicesandschoolhealthcareservices.Mostdentalhealthcareser-vicesarealsoprovidedbymunicipalities.ThefundingforoperationsandservicescomesfromtheFinnishImmigrationService.Apersonisnotdesignatedamunicipalityuntiltheygetapositiveresidencepermitdecision.Thesituationisdifferentforminors;comprehensiveschool,forexample,isguaranteedforallcompulsoryschoolagechildrenregardlessoftheirresidencepermitoralackthereof.Publichealthcareservicesmeantforallnormalresidentsofthemunicipalityandchildwelfareservicesarealsoguaranteedforchildren.Underageasylumseekersareguaranteedtheopportunitytoattendpreparatorytrainingforcomprehensiveschoolorvocationaltraining.Asylumseekerswhoareover18yearsoldhaveaworkobligationtoparticipateinthegeneralchoresofthereceptioncentreandastudyobli-gationtoattendaFinnishlanguagecourse.Necessarysocialandhealthcareservicesareprovidedatthereceptioncentre.Residentsaresupportinvarioussituationsrequiringsocialservices.AlthoughthePaimiounitisprimar-ilyatransitunit,theneedsofapproximately300privateresidentsarealsohandledthere.Theinitialneedforsocialservicesisslightlydifferentfromthoseinprivateaccommodationdur-ingthewaitingstageorthosewhohavealreadyreceivedanegativedecision.Afterinitialhopefulnessandemploymentandsettlingplans,manybecomeapatheticandwaitforthede-cisionfairlypassively.

Receptioncentreshaveexperiencedthattherestrictionsoftheasylumprocessinthelifedur-ingthewaitingperiodmakeasylumseekerspassiveandinstitutionalised.Thesumsallocatedforrecreationalactivitiesaresmall,somanyhobbiesareorganisedonavolunteerbasis,in-cludingatPaimio.Thereisalsosomeprojectfundingavailable,whichisusedtomaintainem-poweringservicesaimedatpreventingmentalhealthissues.Despitethenumerousrecrea-tionalactivitiesplannedwiththehelpofpsychologists,theresidentsdonotalwayshavetheenergyorinteresttoparticipateaslongastheirasylumprocessisongoing.Mentalhealthservicesareincreasinglyneededbymanywhentheprocessdragson.InTurku,theservicesarepartlyoutsourcedfromalocalmentalhealthassociation.AprivateclinicselectedbytheFinnishImmigrationServiceisalsoavailable,especiallyforthosewhoneedmedicinaltreatment.Incaseofacutecrises,someasylumseekershavebeenhospitalisedandreturnedtothereceptioncentreafteraperiodoftreatment.Approximatelyone-halfof

8 Receptionservicesincludehousing,areceptionallowanceandspendingmoney,socialservices,healthcareservices,in-

terpreterandtranslationservicesaswellasexemplaryemploymentandeducationalactivities.Mealscanalsobeorgan-isedasreceptionservices.

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thosewhoreceiveanegativedecisionneedmentalhealthsupportwiththeirsituation.Clientsareusuallyreferredtomentalhealthservicesbysocialworkersandhealthcarestaff.Safety-relatedissuesarediscussedatstaffteammeetings,afterwhichappropriateactionistaken.However,thereisahighthresholdforinterveningwiththelifeandlifestyleofadults.Incidentsaremainlyrecordedinajournal-styleincidentlog.IncidentreportsofdisturbancesareonlyforwardedtotheFinnishImmigrationServiceforthemostnotableincidents.

2.2.3 ReligiouscommunitiesTurkuhasseveralmosquesthatservethecity’sMuslimpopulation.Theynotonlyprovideaplacetopractisereligionbutalsoimportantopportunitiesforsocialinteraction.Themostim-portantdayoftheweekisFriday,onwhichbelieversgatherforsharedFridayprayers.Inad-ditiontoprayers,thereisasermon,typicallyonaselectedpieceofIslamicdoctrine.Politicsissomethingthathasnoplaceinareligiousceremony.Itwouldalsobedifficultbecausemosquesareattendedbypeopleofdifferentnationalitiesandrepresentingdifferentreligioussects.ThesermonsandteachingsmayfocusonhowtolivelikeagoodMuslim.MosquesareespeciallyimportantduringRamadan,thesacredmonthoffasting,whenpeoplegathertosharemeals.AccordingtotherepresentativesoftheIslamiccommunitiesofTurku,themosquesareopentoeveryone.PeoplewhoarenotMuslimsarealsowelcometovisitthepremises.Duringtheinvestigation,twomosqueswerevisitedinordertolearnabouttheactivitiesandtheopinionsoftheadministrativerepresentativesonpossibilitiesofpreventingradicalisa-tion.Onthesecondvisit,informationwasreceivedabouttheactivitiesoftheIslamiccommu-nityofTurku.Theperpetratorwasknownatthesetwomosques,slightlybetteratthesmallerone.Atmosques,itiscustomarythatpeopleareleftinpeacetofocusonprayingiftheywish.

Inthebasicactivitiesofamosque,opportunitiestointervenein,forexample,radicalisationareconnectedtotheteachingsofIslamonhowtobeagoodMuslimandwhatisacceptedornotaccepted.Muslimswhovisitmosquesregularlyareusuallynotinthegroupatrisk.Schol-arsofIslamcanrecogniseextremistthinking,butitisdifficulttoinfluence,andthemethodsarefew.

Jihadistpropagandaiscleverlydesigned,skilfullyproducedandaddictive.ThepropagandatakesadvantageofQuranicverses,takesthemoutofcontextandinterpretstheminawaythatsuitsitsgoals.Muslimcommunitieslacktrainedpersonswhocouldhelpindividualsatriskofsocialexclusionorradicalisation.TheIslamiccommunityofTurkuhadarelativelyoptimisticviewofitspossibilitiesofprevent-ingradicalisation.ItisanorganisedcommunitythatworksonawiderscaletoimprovethelifeofMuslimsmorethanjustmaintainingamosque.Oneproblemthattheysawwasthelackoffaithinauthoritiesamongimmigrants,oftenduetothesituationintheircountryoforigin.Forthisreason,thecommunityhasdevelopedcooperationwiththepolice.AnotherproblemisthatanyproblemsobservedarenotreportedbecauseitisthoughttogiveabadimpressionofMuslims.Thecommunityfocusesonyoungpeople,inparticular.Youngpeoplewithoutapropereduca-tionorfamilysupportareespeciallyatrisk.ThecommunityhasestablishedateamtofocusonfamilyissuesandorganisesyouthworkonunderstandingIslam.Thecommunityhasalsoorganisedtrainingtodetectradicalisation.

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Ifapersonisnoticedwhosebehaviourorthoughtscauseconcern,theycanspeakwiththisperson,trytofindoutmoreandsharetheconcernwiththisperson’sparents.However,thelackofhumanresourcesisaproblem.

2.3 Preventiveactivitiesbytheauthoritiesandotheractors

2.3.1 MinistryoftheInteriorPreventionofradicalisationbytheMinistryoftheInteriorisbasedontheNationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisationandExtremismpublishedin20169.Thefirstdocumentofthisnaturewaspublishedin2012.The2016planstrivestomeetthenewchal-lengesandchangesthathavetakenplaceintheoperationalenvironment.TheaimisasafeandpleasantFinland–acountrywhoseinhabitantsshareasenseofbelongingandparticipateinthedevelopmentofsocietythroughnon-violentmeans.Theactionplanincludesseveralobjectivesconnectedtothepreventionofradicalisationandextremism,suchascoordinationbetweenauthoritiesandcooperationwithvariousorganisa-tions.Thesettingofobjectivesincludesseveralitemsonhowtocreatestructures,launchop-erations,advancetheworkandincreasecompetenceandexpertise.TheprogrammetakesintoaccountinternationalbestpracticesfromotherEuropeancountries.Partiesresponsibleforobjectiveshavebeendesignatedtoensurethatthemeasuresareim-plemented.Atseveralpoints,theresponsiblepartyistheMinisteroftheInterior,NationalPo-liceBoard,policedepartmentsandcities,suchasHelsinki,EspooandVantaa.Insomecases,theresponsiblepartyisanorganisation,suchasFinnChurchAidandreligiouscommunities.Civicorganisationsareconsideredasimportantserviceprovidersintheimplementationoftheactionplan.Furthermore,theitemsoftheactionplanreflecttheviewthatcivicorganisa-tionsaremoreapproachablethanauthorities.Theactionplandoesnotaddressfunding.Perhapsthemostimportantsub-goalsforthepreventionofradicalisationandextremismareconnectedtomulti-professionalAnchoractivitiesandRadinet(exit)activities.Anchoractivi-tiesforminorsareledbyauthoritiesandinvolvepoliceofficers,psychiatricnursesandrepre-sentativesfromsocialandyouthservices.Radinet(exit)activitiesarecoordinatedbythird-sectoractors,suchasVuolleSettlement,andAggredianti-violenceworkiscoordinatedbyHelsinkiMissio.TheReachOutprojectofthemediationnetworkofFinnChurchAidandotherreligiousandconventionalactssupportsthecooperationbetweentheFinnishauthorities,variousreligiouscommunitiesandorganisationstopreventviolentradicalisationandextremism.Thekeygoalofthecooperationistofindasupportmodelforfamilies,whicharethemostimportantfactorinthepreventionofradicalisation.TheReachOutprojectalsoparticipatesininternationalco-operationandsupportsthedisseminationofbestpracticesandexpertcooperation.TheprojectwaslaunchedinAugust2016withfindingfromanISF-PinstrumentoftheEuro-peanCommission’sInternalSecurityFund.ItisapartofFinland’sNationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisationandExtremism.Theprojectemploystwoprojectwork-ers.TheRadinetprojectofVuolleSettlementisdevelopinganational,organisation-basedExitoperatingmodelforindividualswhohavebeenradicalisedorareatriskofradicalisationand9 MinistryoftheInterior(2016)NationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisationandExtremism.4May

2016.MinistryoftheInteriorpublications17/2016.MinistryoftheInterior:Helsinki.

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wanttodisengagefromviolentextremistthinkingandactivities.Targetgroupsincludesup-portersoffaith-basedviolenceandviolentextremistgroups.Radinet(exit)isapartoftheExitworkgroupmaintainedbytheEuropeanCommission’sRadicalisationAwarenessNetwork10.Duringtheinitialphase,theExitmodelwasdevelopedforworkingwithfaith-basedviolentextremism.Duringthesecondphase,anExitoperatingmodelforclientworkwillalsobede-velopedforviolentextremismmotivatedwithpoliticsorideology.Thedevelopmentworkwaslaunchedinearly2016underRAY(currentlySTEA,theFundingCentreforSocialWelfareandHealthOrganisations)funding,anditisimplementedincooperationwiththeMinistryoftheInterior,anti-violenceorganisationsandotherorganisationsandpartners.Radinetisana-tionwideprojectwithtwofull-timeemployeesinOuluandHelsinki.AggrediisaHelsinkiMissioworkmethodestablishedin2006focusingontheperpetratorsofstreetviolence,alsofundedbySTEAfromgamingrevenue.Aggredimaintainsanddevelopsasystemforreachingpoorlymotivatedandhard-to-reachclientsandmakingthemaccessibletocare-relatedwork.

Aggrediisacare-relatedworkmethodthatfocuseson18–49-year-oldperpetratorsofactsofnon-domesticviolence.Theaimistoreduceorendviolentbehaviour.Aggrediprovidesop-portunitiestoprocessissuescausedbyviolenceonneutralsoil.

Organisationalactorsfaceaproblemoflong-termfundinginthepreventionofradicalisationanddevelopmentofoperations.Theimplementationoftheactionplananditsresultsaremonitoredbyamanagementgroupfeaturingkeyorganisations.Themanagementgroupapprovestheannualworkplan,whichdescribesindetailtheimplementation-relatedactionstobecarriedoutoverthecourseoftheyearandtheirschedule.Inordertosupporttheplan’simplementation,monitoringandreporting,theMinistryoftheInteriorhasappointedanationalcooperationgroupwithrepresentativesfromvariouslocalandnationalauthorities,organisationsandyouthorganisations,forexample.Thecooperationgroupmeetsregularlyonceeverytwomonthsandisakeyorganforimplementation-relatedcooperationandcoordination.Thecooperationgroupalsopreparesitemstobeprocessedbythemanagementgroup.Theannualreportforthe2016actionplanwaspublishedinSeptember201711.Accordingtotheannualreport,theshort-termobjectiveshavebeenachievedquitewell.Therewere36in-dividualpracticalactionsrecorded.Theirrealisationhasbeenassessedwithquantitativeandqualitativeindicatorsdependingonthecontentoftheaction.

2.3.2 FinnishImmigrationServiceandadministrativecourtAforeignercanapplyforandbegrantedasyluminFinlandiftheyhaveawell-foundedreasontofearpersecutionintheirhomecountry,forexampleduetotheirmembershipinaspecificsocialgroup.

Theymustinformthepoliceorbordercontrolauthorityofapplyingforasylumuponenteringthecountryorassoonaspossibleafterwards.Thepoliceorbordercontrolauthorityregisters

10 RadicalizationAwarenessNetwork,Exitworkinggroup.http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/net-

works/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit/index_en.htmWebsiteofanEUworkgroupforpreventionofviolentradicalisation.Accessed14December2017.

11 MinistryoftheInterior(2017)Annualreport–NationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisationandEx-tremism.MinistryoftheInteriorpublications23/2017.

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theapplication,whichisprocessedunderanasylumprocedure.Theregistrationinvolvestak-ingdownbasicinformationandfingerprintsandcarryingoutthenecessaryregisterchecks.TheapplicationistransferredtotheprocessingqueueoftheFinnishImmigrationService,andtheapplicantisdirectedtoareceptioncentretoliveandwait.

Theasylumseekeriscalledinforacombinedasylumhearingandinterview.Allinformationrelevantfortheapplicationisestablishedinonegoduringthecombinedevent.Thehearingestablishestheapplicant’sidentity,travelrouteandentryintotheterritory.Theinterviewes-tablishesthegroundsoftheapplication,meaningthereasonswhytheapplicantcannotreturntotheirhomecountry.TheImmigrationServicearrangesaninterpretertoattend.Theasylumseekerhastherighttouseanassistant.In2015,arecordnumberof32,000asylumseekersenteredFinland.EventhoughasignificantnumberofnewpersonnelwererecruitedintotheFinnishImmigrationServiceandtrained,theprocessingtimesofadultapplicantsstretchedfromfourmonthstoalmostninemonthsin2015–2016.Forminors,thetimesstretchedfromsixmonthstotenmonths,respectively.

Inasituationwhereanasylumseekerwhoregistersasaminorseemslikeanadult,contrarytotheirownstatement,forensicageestimationcanbecarriedout.However,theasylumseekerwillreceivealltheservicesintendedforminorsuntiltheresultoftheforensicageesti-mationisobtained.AgeestimationexaminationsaretypicallybasedonX-rayexaminationsofteethandhandbones.Theassessmentastowhethertocarryoutageestimationisbasedonsubjectiveinterpreta-tion.Thereceptioncentremayalso,basedonitsownassessment,reportanapplicantandtheirneedforforensicageestimationtotheirregionalImmigrationServiceasylumunit.

Forensicageestimationhasamarginoferrorof±2years.Forexample,iftheexaminationgivestheresultthatthepersonis19yearsold,itisinterpretedas17yearsold.Thetwo-yearmarginoferrorisintegratedintotheexamination,sotheImmigrationServicegetsananswerwhetherthepersonisprobablyoverorunder18years.Theexaminationitselfcostsapproxi-mately€200.Theresultofthe650ageexaminationscommissionedbytheFinnishImmigra-tionServicein2016and2017wasthatapproximately65%ofthesubjectsturnedouttobeadults.Theactualshareofadultsislargerduetothesaidmarginoferror.Thereisanethicalviewpointoncarryingoutforensicageestimations;takingX-rayswithoutaclearmedicalindicationcanbeconsideredethicallyquestionable.Theperpetratordidnotun-dergoageestimation.Theperpetratorappealedthenegativeasylumdecisionhereceivedtotheadministrativecourtwithinthe21dayappealperiod.Atthetimeofthestabbing,theappealhadbeeninpro-cessingforalmostninemonthsandwasstillongoing.

Itispartoftheprocessthattheappellantexpressesthegroundsfortheircomplaint,towhichtheImmigrationServiceisrequestedtogiveastatement.Theappellantistheninformedofthestatementandcangiveacounter-statement.TheadministrativecourtalsohasaccesstoallthedocumentsconnectedtothepreviousprocessingbytheImmigrationService.Oncethedocumentshavebeencompiled,theappealmustwaitforitsturn,whichisthemosttime-con-sumingpartoftheprocess.ThelargenumberofasylumseekerswhoarrivedinFinlandin2015firstcongestedtheFinn-ishImmigrationServiceand,in2016and2017,alsocongestedtheadministrativecourts.Pre-viously,allasylumdecisionappealswereprocessedattheHelsinkiAdministrativeCourt.However,inearly2017,appealsweredistributedtofouradministrativecourtstorelievethe

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congestion.Thestaffoftheadministrativecourtswasalsoincreased.In2016,60%ofthecasesatadministrativecourtswereasylumcases.Almostallrejectedasylumapplicationsareappealedtotheadministrativecourtand,inap-proximatelyhalfofthecases,decisionsoftheadministrativecourtareappealedtotheSu-premeAdministrativeCourtifgivenleavetoappeal.Theadministrativecourtonlycommentsontheappealanddoesnotmakenewdecisionsonresidencepermitsincasenewinformationemerges.Ifrelevantnewinformationemerges,theappealisreturnedtotheImmigrationSer-viceforanewprocessing.IftheImmigrationServiceconsidersthattheasylumapplicationisobviouslybaseless,itisprocessedunderexpeditedprocessingbytheImmigrationServiceandadministrativecourt.Insuchcases,theaverageprocessingtimeattheadministrativecourtin2017was3–4months.Undernormalprocessing,whichtheperpetratorhad,theaverageprocessingtimewasalittleundersixmonthsinearly2017andninemonthsinlate2017.Theprocessingtimecanprobablyreasonablybecutdownto4–5months.

Afterthedecisionoftheadministrativecourt,anynegativeasylumdecisionisenforceableandthepersoncanbedeportedunlesstheSupremeAdministrativeCourtprohibitsenforcement.However,deportationinvolvespracticalproblemsbecausemanycountriesrefusetoacceptdeportees.Asaresult,individualswhohavereceivedanegativeandfinaldecisionremaininFinland.Itisalsopossibletosubmitanewapplicationunderdifferentgrounds.FinlandandtheEUdonothaveofficialdeportationagreementswithMorocco.However,accordingtothepolice,recentlyithasbeenpossibletodeportindividualswithavaliddeportationdecisiontoMorocco.

Fromanasylumseeker’sperspective,theprocessingtimeoftheapplicationandappealcanbelong.Duringthewait,thereisuncertaintyaboutthefutureand,formany,thepotentialreturntotheirhomecountryisanunappealingoption.Theremaybeproblems,soprocessingthatisasquickaspossibleisappropriate.Ifthesafetyauthoritiesdiscoverasecuritythreatcon-nectedtoaperson,theymayasktheadministrativecourttomovetheircaseaheadinthepro-cessingqueue.Thereisnoestablishedprocedureonthematter.Ifnewmaterialsaresubmit-tedtotheadministrativecourtwiththerequest,theadministrativecourtcanonlyconsiderthematerialsbyhearingtheappellantinthecaseaboutthesubmittedmaterials.Theperson’spotentialsecuritythreatdoesnotaffectthemeetingsofthecriteriafornationalprotection.Asfortheperpetrator,noinformationaboutasecuritythreatwaspresentedbecausetheinvesti-gationofhisradicalisationdidnotgopasttheassessmentofanindividualtip-off.

2.3.3 ThepoliceThepoliceisresponsibleformaintainingpublicorderincooperationwithotherauthoritiesandlocalcommunitiesandresidents.Theperpetratorhaddealingswiththepolicetwicebeforetheincident.InMay2016,theSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentreceivedtheperpetrator’sasylumapplication.Inthiscontext,theperpetrator’spersonaldatawasenteredintoinformationsystemsintheformreportedbytheperpetrator,withouttraveldocuments.Theperpetrator’sfingerprintsweretakenandcomparedtotheEurodacdatabase.Hisfingerprintswerenotinthedatabase.Thepolicedirectedtheperpetratortoareceptioncentre.

AtthebeginningofDecember2016,theimmigrationpoliceinformedtheperpetratorofthenegativeasylumdecisionmadebytheImmigrationServiceinlateNovember.

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InJanuary2017,theimmigrationpoliceoftheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentre-ceivedatip-offabouttheperpetrator,butitdidnotleadtoanypracticalactions.Effortstopreventviolentradicalisationandextremismarecarriedoutasapartofpreventivepoliceactivitiesinthelocalpolice.Theeffortsaresupportedbymulti-professionalAnchorac-tivitiesandtheTUPAoperationoftheNationalBureauofInvestigation.SouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartment’sRADactivities12areapartofthecriminalin-vestigationandanalysisperformedbythepolice.Thepreventionoftargetedviolence,suchasattacksatschools,hasbeenatthecoreofRADactivities.Counterterrorismtargetindividualsatthelowendoftheriskscalehaverecentlybeentransferredtothelocalpolice.Targetindi-vidualsatthehighendoftheriskscalearemonitoredbytheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceSer-vice.Policedepartmentshavethepreconditionsforcarryingoutpreventiveworkbecausethepo-liceisacommonactorinthesafetyfieldandmeetsvariousgroupsatriskinitsdailywork.Theaimistorecogniseandunderstandthefactorsbehindtip-offsandwhethertheincidentinvolvesaclearchangeanddeviationinthelongterm.Theinformationconsistsoftinypiecesthatmustbeputtogethertoformabiggerpictureforconclusionsandactions.Furthermore,individualpoliceofficersmusthavecompetenceandtraininginunderstandingthebehaviourofpotentiallydangerousindividualsofforeignbackground.

Thetip-offabouttheperpetratordidnotreachthegrouppractisingRADactivities.Anchoractivitiesinvolvegoal-orientedcooperationamongmultipleauthorities,namelythepolice,thesocialservicesandhealthcareexperts.Thetargetgroupisminors.Theideabehindtheactivitiesisearlyinterventionincriminalbehaviour.Minorvictimsareanothertargetgroup.Ifapersonbecomesofageinthemiddleofaprocess,theircaseishandledandcom-pleted.RapidinterventionandcrisissupportplayanimportantroleinAnchoractivities.Thefocusisonexaminingtheclient’soverallsituationinlifeanddirectingthemtoappropriatehelpandsupport.Clientsaredirectedtobasicservicesandthethirdsectoronacase-by-casebasis.

In2016,therewere148minorsintheAnchoractivitiesinTurku,athirdofthemvictims.InTurku,thebiggestgroupsarethosewithproblemsrelatedtodomesticviolenceandunderageoffendersandvictims.Foryoungpeople,theirparentsandfamiliesarealsopartofthework.Typically,thereare1–10meetingswitheachclient.Theaimisnottohaveclientrelationshipslastforoverthreemonths.AnotheraimofAnchoractivitiesispreventionoftheactivitiesofviolentextremistmove-ments.CollaborationwiththeRADworkgroupofthepoliceispossible.Forthetimebeing,however,thereislittleexperienceofsuch.Personsovertheageof18aremostlynotinthetargetgroup,soinprincipletheperpetratorwouldnothavebeencoveredbyAnchoractivi-ties.Anchoractivitiesvarybetweenlocalities.Insomecities,suchasTurkuandHelsinki,theactiv-itieshavesufficientresourcesbut,inotherlocalities,therearefewerpreconditionsforcoop-erationamongmultipleauthorities.

12 ThenameRADisconnectedtoanearlierpilotprojectandisnolongerwidelyusedbytheNationalPoliceBoard.

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AmanualforAnchoractivitiesisbeingprepared.Itishopedtoclarifyissuesconnectedtorad-icalisation.Themanualisexpectedtoprovideactions,methodsandconcreteideasonwhattodoaroundthetheme.TheNationalBureauofInvestigationassistslocalpolicethroughtheTUPAfunction,whichinvolvescrimepreventionandcentralisedinformationexchangeconnectedtotheasylumpro-cess.Itsmissionistosecuresufficientaccesstoinformationandensuretimelyflowofinfor-mation.TheTUPAfunctioninvolvespersonnelfromthepolice,CustomsandBorderGuard13aswellastheFinnishImmigrationService.TheTUPAfunctiongathers,analysesandpassesonwardobservationsandinformationconnectedtoasylumseekersandtheasylumprocessinordertoachievethecrimepreventionobjectivesspecifiedaboveandtoupholdsafety.TheTUPAfunctionreviewsnewreportsaboutasylumapplicationsonadailybasis,analysesandlinksthemtopreviousinformationandassessestheneedforthepolicetoparticipateinasyluminterviews.TheTUPAfunctionassessesriskfactorsdiscoveredatreceptioncentresbasedoninformationreceivedfromtheImmigrationService,receptioncentrestaffandpar-ticularlyfrompolicepatrolsoncalls,drawingupmemorandumsaccordingtotherisklevelatthetime.Thekeygoalistorecogniseleadingfiguresamongtheresidentsofreceptioncentresaswellasnetworksandthreateningsituations.Thetip-offabouttheperpetratorendedupatalocalunitoftheNationalBureauofInvestiga-tionbutdidnotreachtheTUPAfunction.

2.3.4 FinnishSecurityIntelligenceServiceTheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceService,whichworksdirectlyundertheMinistryoftheInte-rior,strivestopreventterrorism-relatedactionsandcrimes.TheSecurityIntelligenceServicemaintainsalistofcounterterrorismtargetindividuals,preparesthreatassessmentsandim-provestheawarenessofpublicauthorities,forexample.TheSecurityIntelligenceServicehasthreeregionalofficesandfiveothersub-offices.TheregionalofficeforWesternFinlandisinTurku.On14June2017,theSecurityIntelligenceServiceannouncedhavingraisedtheterroristthreatassessmenttothesecondlevelofthefour-stepscale.Accordingtothethreatassess-ment,themostsignificantterroristthreatinFinlandwasstillposedbyindividualactorsorsmallgroupsmotivatedbyradicalIslamistpropagandaorterroristorganisationsencouragingthem.ThesepersonsarelikelytohaveeitherdirectorindirectlinkstoradicalIslamistnet-worksororganisations.Finland’sprofilewithintheradicalIslamistpropagandahasbecomestronger.FinlandisconsideredasaWesterncountry.

TheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentpassedonthetip-offitreceivedabouttheper-petratortotheTurkuregionaloffice.Thetip-offwaspreliminarilyprocessedbytheSecurityIntelligenceServiceandenteredintotheoperationalinformationsystem.Thenormalregistercheckswerecarriedoutduringtheentry.Thetip-offdidnotincludeinformationaboutanyplanningofaterroristattack,anditwasnotprioritisedoverotheroperativeactivities.

13 Thepolice,includingtheSecurityIntelligenceService,andCustomsandBorderGuardaresometimescollectivelyreferred

toasthePTRauthorities.

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2.3.5 Asylumseekers’entryintoEuropeandmovementthereManyofpeoplefromNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEasthavetriedandsucceededinenteringEurope.TheyareinfluencedbythepoorconditionsintheircountryoforiginandthegoodstandardoflivinginEurope.ThepressureismostlyfocusedonWesternEurope.

EntryintotheSchengenAreaiscontrolledbythebordercontrolauthoritiesoftheSchengenassociatedcountriessupportedbyFrontex,theEuropeanBorderandCoastGuardAgency.Thecontroldoesnotworkproperly,sopeoplehavebeenabletoenterEuropethroughvari-ousroutes,bypassingthecontrol.Thenumberspeakedin2015;over32,000peoplecameallthewaytoFinlandtoapplyforasylum.TheperpetratorenteredEuropeviaTurkeyinlate2015.Sincethen,theinfluxofpeoplehasdecreased,partlyduetoanagreementbetweentheEUandTurkey.Functioningsmugglingroutesstillexist.Insomecountries,thearrivalsareap-parentlywidelyusedforcheapillegallabour,whichmaylessentheinterestinmonitoringthearrivals.ForMoroccans,theproblemisthatalmost65%ofMoroccanyouthhavebeenunemployedforatleastayear,andthechronicunemploymentamongyoungpeoplehasnotshownanysignsofimprovement.TheMoroccansocietyisplaguedbydeterioratinglivingconditions,economicdifficultiesandthelackofcivillibertiesanddemocracy.ManyyoungpeoplebelievethattheironlychanceofgettingaheadinlifeistogotoEurope.ManyendupinSpaindoingdifferentkindsoftemporarywork,especiallyinagriculture.OtherscontinueontoFranceandGer-many.Formany,atriptoEuropemeansyearsofwanderingfromoneplaceorcountrytoan-other.14StartingfromFebruary2017,SwedenhashadanagreementwithMoroccothatthefinger-printsofMoroccanscouldbesenttotheMoroccanauthoritiesforidentification.Withinayear,thishasmadeitpossibletoconfirmtheidentityof343Moroccans.230ofthemhadap-pliedforasylumasaminor,butonly15ofthem(6.5%)actuallyturnedouttobeminors.Alltold,283individualsorover82%hadliedabouttheiridentity.ThekeyprincipleoftheEU’sDublinRegulationisthatasylumseekersareregisteredandtheirasylumcaseisprocessedinthecountrywheretheyfirstentertheEU.OtherEUmemberstatescanthusreturntheirasylumcasetobeprocessedinthiscountryofentry.Thearrange-mentdoesnotworkwellbecause,inmanyplaces,peoplearenotregisteredorfingerprintsarenottakeneventhoughitwouldbeaneffectivewaytoidentifyindividuals.Itsfailureisap-parentlyduetotheneedforanduseofcheapandillegallabourandthefactthatthenumberorarrivalshasattimesbeensolargeastobeimpossibletohandle.TheperpetratorarrivedfromTurkeytoGreece,wherehisfingerprintswerenotenteredintotheEurodacregister.FromGreece,hetravelledthroughafewothercountriesuntilhearrivedinGermany.

TheGermanimmigrationauthorityistheFederalOfficeforMigrationandRefugees(BAMF)15.Asylumseekersusuallyreporttostateauthoritiesattheborder.Itisalsopossibletoreportinlandbycontactingasecurityauthority,suchasthepolice,animmigrationauthor-ityorareceptioncentre.Theauthoritiesdirecttheapplicanttothenearestpossiblereceptioncentre.Fingerprintsarenottakenatthisstage.

14 Juntunen,M.(2017)Marokon-tutkijannäkökulmiaTurunterrori-iskuun(‘ViewsofaMoroccoresearcherontheTurku

terroristattack’).Lähi-itäNYT(MiddleEastNOW),ablogbytheFinnishInstituteintheMiddleEast.https://lahi-itanyt.fi/nyt/marokon-tutkijan-nakokulmia-turun-terrori-iskuun/.Accessed20February2018.

15 BundesamtfürMigrationundFlüchtlingeinGerman.

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AllindividualswhoapplyforasyluminGermanyareregistered,thoughnotuntilthenextstageatPIKstations16.Thewaitforregistrationmaybelong.Duringregistration,personaldataiscollectedandfingerprintstaken.Asylumseekersreceiveaproofofarrivalsothattheycanprovethattheyhaveregistered.TheproofofarrivalentitlesthemtoresideinGermanyandreceiveincomesupportandgivesthemtheopportunitytoliveinareceptioncentreandreceivehealthcareservicesandfood.InGermany,thefingerprintstakenfromasylumseekersarecomparedtothenationalfinger-printdatabaseofforeigners17andtheFederalPolicefingerprintdatabaseinordertoestablishanypreviousapplicationsandotherrecords.ThefingerprintsarealsocomparedtotheEuro-peanEurodacfingerprintdatabasetoestablishwhethertheapplicant’sasylumprocessistheresponsibilityofanotherEUmemberstatebasedontheDublinRegulation.Onceanasylumapplicationhasbeenreceivedandtheregistrationandbackgroundcheckarecomplete,theapplicantgetsaproofofresidencepermittoreplacetheproofofarrival.Itservesaspersonalidentificationindealingswithpublicauthoritiesandprovesthattheappli-cantisinGermanylegally.Theresidencepermitisonlyvalidintheareaofthereceptionofficehandlingtheasylumseeker’spermitprocess.TheperpetratorvisitedItalyandSwitzerlandwhileapparentlybeingregisteredaslivingataGermanreceptioncentre.In2016,Germanyhadsomanyasylumseekersthattheprocesswascongested.Therefore,theperpetratorapparentlywasnotcalledinorregisteredasanasylumseekerduringallthattime.Duringtheregistration,hisfingerprintswouldhavebeentakenfortheEurodacdatabase,whichwouldhavemadeitpossibletoidentifyhiminFinland,forexam-ple.

Peoplewho,basedontheinitialinformation,havepoorpreconditionsforgettingasyluminGermanyliveatareceptioncentreuntilanegativedecisionisissued.Thisincludesindividualsarrivingfromcountriesthatareconsideredassafe,forexample.Duringthistime,theyarenotentitledtoworkandtheirmovementoutsidetheirappointedareaisrestricted.If,basedontheinitialinformation,thepersonhasgoodchancesofgettingasyluminGermany,thehousingrestrictionscanberemovedaftertheyhavelivedinGermanyforthreemonths.Atthediscretionoftheauthorities,theycanalsomoveintoprivateaccommodation.Thecompulsoryasyluminterview,wheretheasylumseekerisinterviewedabouttheirneedforinternationalprotectionandotherrelevantfactors,isconclusiveforthefinaldecision.TheinterviewcanalsoincludearepresentativefromUNHCRandaminor’sdesignatedsupportperson.Thedecisiononaresidencepermitoritsrejectionismadebasedoninformationobtainedfromtheinterview,thedocumentspresentedandthebackgroundchecksconductedbytheauthorities.Anegativedecisioncanbeappealedtothecourt.

2.4 Organisationsinvolvedintheincidentandtheiroperationalreadiness

2.4.1 EmergencyResponseCentreAgencyTheemergencycallsaboutthestabbingwereansweredbytheTurkuEmergencyResponseCentre(ERC),whichhandlestheprovincesofSouthwestFinland,Kanta-HämeandPäijät-Häme.ThepurposeoftheERCistoalerttothescene,basedonitsriskassessment,unitsof

16 PersonalisierungsinfrastrukturkomponenteinGerman,PersonalisationInfrastructureComponent.17 Ausländerzentralregister(AZR)inGerman,theCentralRegisterofForeigners.

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thepolice,emergencymedicalservices(EMS)andtherescueservices,forexample,andtosupportthemduringtheassignment.Thissupportinvolvesconveyingnotices,messagecentredutiesandinitiatingmeasurestowarnthepopulation.ThealertingisalwaysdoneaccordingtothestandinginstructionsprovidedtotheERCbythevariousauthorities.Incaseofastab-bingassignment,thestandinginstructionwastoalertthepoliceandEMSunits.Atthetimeoftheincident,theERChadanormalshiftstaffof16people.Theshiftsupervisorandtwootherswerenotansweringemergencycallsbutonassignmentmonitoringduties,oneonpoliceassignmentsandtheotheronEMSassignments.Someofthestaffwereonbreakwhenthesituationstarted.TheERCcontinuedwiththesamemanpowertotheendoftheshift,althoughonepersonstartedtheirnightshiftearlierthannormalduetotheincident.

Figure3. EmergencycallstoTurkuERCduringeachminutefrom4:00pmto4:15pm.Thecallsan-

sweredbytheERCaremarkedinblueandthecallsdisconnectedbythecallerareinred.(Materials:TurkuEmergencyResponseCentre,Figure:investigationteam)

Beforethestabbingsat4:00–4:01pmandfiveminutesafterthestabbingsbeganat4:07–4:29pm,theERCreceivedfewerthantwoemergencycallsperminuteonaverage.Thetypicalre-sponsetimeofsuchcallswaslessthan5seconds.Overthefirstfiveminutesafterthestab-bingsbeganat4:02–4:06pm,over64callscame,approximately50ofwhichwereconnectedtothestabbings.Duringthattime,theERChadtimetoanswer33calls,andin31casesthecallerdisconnectedbeforetheERCmanagedtoanswer.Thenumberofcalls,includingunan-sweredcalls,ispresentedinFigure3.ThetimesanddurationsofindividualcallsareshowninFigure4.Whenthefirstcallaboutthestabbingscame,atleastthreeoperatorswerebusyhandlingpre-viousemergencycalls.Startingfromtheeighthcall,approximately30secondsafterthefirstcall,thewaittimestartedtoextend.Thewaittimenormalisedapproximatelyfiveminuteslater.ThelongestwaittimeforcallsansweredbytheERCwastwominutes.Atmost,approxi-mately25callswereinqueueapproximately1.5minutesafterthefirstemergencycall.

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TheoverviewofthesituationwascreatedusingtheELSinformationsystemusedbytheERC,whichautomaticallysuggestsapotentialoverlappingassignmentbasedonthelocation.Thesystemworkedeveninsuchasmallgeographicalareabecausetherewerenootherongoingassignmentsinthearea.

Figure4. Thewaittime(blue)andcallduration(red)ofcallsmadetotheTurkuEmergencyResponse

Centreaftertheincidentbegan.Theanalysisincludes70callsthatarrivedwithin8minutesofthefirstemergencycall.(Materials:TurkuEmergencyResponseCentre,Figure:investiga-tionteam)

Emergencyresponsecentreshavetheabilityandalsodutytoconveymessagesbetweenau-thorities,ifnecessary.Inthiscase,theERCconveyedmessagesfromthepolicetotheEMSintheearlystagesbecausethetwoauthoritieswerenotinthejointVIRVEcallgroup.TheERCdidnothaveactivesocialmediamonitoring,soitslatersituationpicturewasmainlybasedonmonitoringthecommunicationsbetweentheauthorities.

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2.4.2 ThepoliceSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartmentisoneof11policedepartmentsinMainlandFinland.ItsoperatingareacoverstheregionsofSouthwestFinlandandSatakunta.Thepolicedepart-menthasa24/7situationcentre.Operativefieldoperationsaredirectedbyageneralcom-manderwhoisoneofthecommandingofficers.ThegeneralcommanderisatthesituationcentreinTurkuonweekdaysandweekends.FromSundaynighttoFridaymorningintheeve-ningsandatnight,generalcommandishandledbythecommandcentreinHelsinki.Thelocalpolicefieldcommanderisresponsiblefortheoperativecommandoffieldactivitiesintheareaunderthegeneralcommander’ssupervision.Inmajorsituations,asituationorgan-isationisquicklyestablishedsothatthesituationcommandercanfocusonhandlingthesitua-tion.Insuchcases,themanagementofotherconcurrentassignmentsishandledseparately.Thepoliceisanationaloperator,anditshighestoperativecommandistheNationalPoliceBoard.Thehighcommandhasstandbyarrangementstohelpitreceiveinformationofanysit-uationsthatrequireactions,includingonthenationalscale.TheNationalBureauofInvestiga-tionisalsopreparedtotakechargeofinvestigationofseriouscrimesinaccordancewithaspecificdistributionoflabour.Theflowofinformationwithinthepoliceorganisationfunc-tionedwelleventhoughtherewasnotimetousetheblogintendedforconveyingacontinu-oussituationpicture.ThepatrolsinTurkucitycentrehadgoodcapabilitiestostoptheperpetrator.Aftertheperpe-tratorwascaptured,thesituationwasstillunclear,sothepolicehadtoensurethroughmanyfairlyforcefulmeansthattherewerenootherperpetratorsandthattheactwouldnotcon-tinueelsewhere.TheNationalBureauofInvestigationcametosupporttheSouthwesternFin-landPoliceDepartmentandtookchargeoftheinvestigation.ThestabbingwasandisgenerallyconsideredprimarilyasapoliceassignmenteventhoughatleasttheEmergencyResponseCentre,emergencymedicalservicesandpsychosocialsupportstartedhandlingstatutoryurgentassignmentsconcurrently.Therescueservicesalsojoinedtheassignment.Intheearlystages,theotherauthoritieshadexpectationsthatthepolicewouldgivethemfurtherinstructions.Insuchsituations,weoftenspeakofgeneralcommand,whichisneededtocoordinateactionsbytheauthorities.However,therearenootherprovi-sionsoflawontheprimaryauthorityinchargeorgeneralcommandthantheprovisionsonaccidentsintheRescueAct.TheFinnishBorderGuardhastheauthorityandreadinesstoassistthepolicewiththesuper-visionofpublicorderandsafety.ThepoliceandBorderGuardhadgoodcooperationarrange-ments.

2.4.3 EmergencymedicalservicesTheemergencymedicalservices(EMS)oftheSouthwestFinlandHospitalDistrictarear-rangedaccordingtoamulti-providermodel.ThehospitaldistrictprovidesfieldsupervisionactivitiesandthephysiciansfortheFinnhems20physicianunit18.TheSouthwestFinlandRescueDepartmentandprivatemedicaltransportcompaniesprovideEMSwithbasicandad-vancedlifesupportforthehospitaldistrict.

18 FinnhemsOyisanationaladministrativeunitforhelicopteremergencymedicalservices.Itisownedinequalsharesby

thefiveFinnishhospitaldistrictswithuniversityhospitals.Finnhemsputsouttendersforhelicopteroperatorsandsignscontractswiththem,monitorscompliancewiththequalityandsafetycriteriaforbasesandisinchargeoftheadministra-tionofbaseservices.

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TheFinnhems20physician-staffedhelicopteroperatesaroundtheclockonimmediatestandby.ItsprimaryoperatingareaisSouthwestFinland.Thestaffmovearoundbyhelicopterandbygroundvehicledependingontheplaceandweather.TheunitissituatedinKärsämäkinearTurkuAirport.

ThehospitaldistrictisdividedintoEMSareas.TheTurkuEMSareabordersonPaimioandMarttilaintheeast,ParainenandNauvointhesouthandMaskuinthenorth.TheadvancedandbasicEMSoftheTurkuEMSareaandthesurroundingcitiesisprovidedbytheSouthwestFinlandRescueDepartment.TheTurkuEMSareahasafieldsupervisionunitand15advancedlifesupportEMSunitsonimmediatestandbyaroundtheclock.Therearealsothreeadvancedlifesupportunitswithshorterstandbyhours.IntheTurkuarea,therearefiveadvancedlifesupportunitsaroundtheclockandtwoindaytimeandintheevenings.OneofthesetwounitsoperatesaroundtheclockonFridaysandSaturdays.FouroftheunitsarebasedatTurkuCentralFireStation,twoatJaaniFireStationinEastTurkuandoneatKärsämäkiFireStationneartheairport.

OtherEMSareasinSalo,LoimaaandUusikaupunkihavetheirownfieldsupervisors,whoaresubordinatetothefieldsupervisoroftheTurkuarea.Thefieldsupervisor’sunitsareunitsthattransportpatientsintheseareas.Intotal,theseareashaveeightadvancedlifesupportunitsthatoperatearoundtheclockandfiveunitswithshorteroperatinghours.Ifneeded,alltheunitsintheregioncanbeusedanywherewithintheregionandalsobecalledacrossre-gionalborders,ifnecessary.Atthetimeoftheincident,thefieldsupervisionunit,physicianunitandthreeEMSunitswereavailableinTurku.MoreEMSunitswerefreedupfairlyquicklyastheygottheirpatientstoaplaceoftreatment.Onacase-by-casebasis,theassignmentsofEMSunitscanbeinterruptedorexchangeddependingontheriskassessment.Thiswasnotdoneinthiscase;unitswereaddedtothestabbingassignmentastheybecameavailable.Atthetimeoftheincident,theEMSloadwasnormal.TheSouthwestFinlandHospitalDistricthasissuedahealthcaredisasterprocedurefortheERC.Accordingtotheprocedure,adisasterisanincidentthatisestimatedtohaveover10pa-tients.ThethresholdforapplyingthedisasterprocedurewasnotexceededattheERC,soitdidnotalertEMSunitsaccordingtotheprocedureorcarryoutotheractionsspecifiedintheprocedure.

2.4.4 HospitalTurkuUniversityHospital(TYKS)operatesasafacilityprovidingacutecareinallofSouth-westFinland.Theemergencycliniccomprisescoordinatedaccidentandemergencyservicesofbasichealthcareandspecialisedmedicalcare.Allon-callspecialistsneededfortreatingin-juriescausedinviolentsituationsareavailable,eitheratthehospitalortobecalledin.Thehospitalhadfairlygoodcapabilitiesatthetimeoftheincident.Alittleearlier,theemer-gencyclinichadcalledinmorestaffduetocongestion,ashiftchangewasunderwayandthedayshiftofotherunits,includingphysicians,hadonlyjustlefttheworkplace.Itwaspossibletogetadditionalresourcestherequickly.Thebiggestproblemintermsofsufficientfacilitiesandmedicalstaffwasthenear-simultane-ousarrivalofseveralpatientswithstabwoundstotheemergencyclinic.Theemergencyclinichasalimitednumberofpatientplacesandstaffintendedforintensivecareuntiladditional

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personnelarecalledin.Now,carestafffromtheintensivecareunitcametohelptheemer-gencyclinic,anditwaspossibletogetthemosturgentpatientsonwardquickly,whichallevi-atedthesituation.Itwasonlypossibletodocumenttheprogressionofthesituationinparts.TheTYKSdisasterplanhadbeenupdatedinlate2016,butitsimplementationamongthestaffwasstillpartlyincompleteandithadnotbeendrilled.Theplanisbasedonactivitycards,whichserveasunit-specificandactor-specificguidelinesforlaunchingandmanagingactivi-ties.Theessentialcareunitsinadisastercausedbyviolencearethemanagementbodiesatvariouslevels,emergencyclinic,surgery,anaesthesia,medicalimaging,laboratoryandinten-sivecare.Thepurposeoftheactivitycardsistoserveaschecklistsforthemanagement,phy-siciansandthenursesmanagingthesituation,andtodirectmanagementfunctionssuchastopreventself-directionofmanagementandactivities.Therewasnotimetousethecards.Thedisasterplansforthehospitalandemergencymedicalservicesweredrawnupundertheassumptionthat,atthebeginningofthesituation,thereis30–90minutestogetorganisedhoweverrequiredfortheactivitiesbeforethearrivalofthelargestinfluxofpatientsorthebe-forethepressuretoreleaseinformationbegins.Theplansincludeoperatingproceduresforalertingpersonnel,command,maintenanceofthesituationpicture,useofresources,docu-mentation,themessagingsystem,communicationsandcrisissupport.

Thehospitalisanopeninstitutionwhichpeopleneedinghelpmustbeabletoaccesssmoothlyandwithoutdelays.Thehospitalisadifficultlocationintermsofthesecurityofpeopleandthepremises.Opennessalsomeansthatitisafairlyeasytargetifonewantstohurtothers.Keepingthehospitalasasafeplacetoworkrequiresagoodsecurityguardsystem,effectiveaccesscontrolandthepossibilityofclosingaccessroutesveryquicklyandinatargetedway.Theclosingofaccessrouteswasdoneattheemergencyclinicbutnotthroughouttheentirehospital.Atlargefacilities,suchasTYKS,itmaybepossibletoaccesstheemergencyclinicifonecanenteranotherpartofthebuildingandisabletonavigateit.Afterwards,therestrictionofmovementraiseddiscussionsaboutauthority.Despitethere-strictions,peoplewereunderstandingandletthestaffcareforthevictimsinpeace.Itmaybenecessarytodefinepowersandtheiruseatasufficientlylowlevelinordertofacilitatesuffi-cientlyquickreactiontosituations.Theproblematthehospitalisthatthosewhoneedcaremusthaveaccesstocare,butitcanbedifficultforsecurityguardstotellthemapartfromthosewithothermotivations.Forthisrea-son,theseentrypointsalsoneedtohavemedicalstafftoassesstheneedfortreatmentofthepeopletryingtoenter.AtTYKS,itwasnoticeablethatthesuspectedterroristattackcausedmoreworryandfearamongthestaffthananordinaryactofviolence.Thoseworkingatthehospitalalsohadtoconsiderthatthesuspectedperpetratormightbeamongtheinjuredandplanningtohurtoth-ersatthehospital.Insuchasituation,thepoliceisunabletoperformasecuritycheckofallthevictimsatthesceneoratthehospital,sothehospitalmustprepareforthepossibilitythatapatientiscarryingitemssuitedtocausingharm.

2.4.5 RescueservicesTheoperatingareaoftheSouthwestFinlandRescueDepartmentistheregionofSouthwestFinland.ThemainfirestationoftherescuedepartmentisinTurkucitycentre,800metresfromtheMarketSquare.ThenextclosesttothecentrearethefirestationsofJaani,Artukainen,Kärsämäki,LietoandKaarina.Therescuedepartmenthasatotalofnine24/7firestationsandthreefirestationsthatarestaffedinthedaytime.

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Atthetimeoftheincident,therewere31peopleonshiftintheTurkuregion,readytoleavewithaminute’swarning,includingsixexecutivefireofficers,sixfireforemenand23firefight-ers.Allhadsufficientfirstresponseskillsforencounteringemergencypatients,andhalfalsohadqualificationstoserveasamemberofabasiclifesupportmedicaltransportunit.Therewerefiveback-upEMSunitsatthefirestation,whichcouldhavebeenstaffedwithpersonnelcapableofprovidingbasiclifesupport.Allrescueunitshadsufficientequipmentforencoun-teringemergencypatients.TheTurkuregionhadapproximately60contractvolunteerfirefightersreadytogooutwithafive-minutewarning.Inpractice,allofthemhadsufficientfirst-aidskillsforencounteringemergencypatients.Therefore,therescueserviceshadsignificantcapabilitiestoassistEMSwithunitscapableofemergencyfirstaidandfirst-aidactivities.Theyincludedimmediate-responserescueunitsandback-upambulancespossiblystaffedwithrescuestaff.

2.4.6 GovernmentSituationCentre,MinistryoftheInteriorandMinistryofSocialAf-fairsandHealth

TheGovernmentSituationCentreisresponsibleforcreatingacross-administrativesitua-tionpicturefortheneedsofthestatemanagementandvariousadministrativesectors.ThesituationpictureconsistsofinformationthatisprovidedtotheSituationCentreoracquiredindependently.ThehumanresourcesaresmallduringnormalhoursanddonotfacilitateworkuptostandarduntiltheSituationCentreisreinforcedwithasufficientnumberofex-pertscalledinandallthenecessaryconnectionsareachieved.

Atthetimeoftheincident,therewasonesituationpicturedutyofficerpresentattheSituationCentre,whostartedsupplementingtheSituationCentrestaffimmediatelyafterreceivingno-ticeoftheincident.TheSituationCentrestaffincludesasituationpicturecoordinator,ana-lystsandadutyofficer.Outsideofficehours,themandateoftheMinistryoftheInteriorcomprisesthedesignateddutyofficersoftherescuedivision,policedivision,BorderGuardstaffandNationalPoliceBoard.Insituationsinvolvingseveraldivisions,thesituationpictureiscompiledbythedivi-sionwiththeprimaryresponsibilityforhandlingthesituation.Ifnecessary,theministry’ssit-uationcentre,whichcreatesandmaintainstheministry’sjointsituationpicture,canalsobestaffed.Therefore,theministrydoesnotmaintainacontinuoussituationpicturearoundtheclock.Thesituationpictureproducedbytheministryisdistributedtotheadministrativesec-torsandauthoritiesconnectedtomanagementthesituation.SignificantcasesarereportedtotheGovernmentSituationCentre,whichisresponsibleforinformingmembersoftheGovern-ment,forexample.Duringtheincident,thesituationcentreoftheMinistryoftheInteriorwasnotused,andmessagestotheGovernmentSituationCentremainlycamefromtheNationalPoliceBoardandthedutyofficeroftheministry’srescuedivision.HavingthepolicedivisiononstandbyinmainlyforcertaindifferenttypesofsituationsthantheTurkustabbing.TheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthhasdutyofficersaroundtheclock.Whenthedutyofficerreceivesinformation,theyhavethecapabilitytoassignVaasaSocialandCrisisEmer-gencyServicestosupportthelocalauthorities.Thedutyofficercandirectsocialandhealthcareactorstoraisethereadinesslevelonanationallevel.Thedutyofficerreceivesinfor-mationfromtheirdivisionandtheGovernmentSituationCentre,towhichtheyalsopassin-formation.Thedutyofficerinformstheministrymanagement,launchesnecessaryactionsand,ifneeded,callsinexpertstosupportthemanagementoftheabnormalsituation.

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2.4.7 CityofTurkuTheCityofTurkuhasanemergencyplandescribingproceduresfordisruptionsofnormalconditionsandforemergencyconditions.Thegeneralsectionoftheplandescribestheprinci-plesofoperationsandthedistributionoflabouronagenerallevel,andthedivision-specificsectionprovidesmoredetailscontents.TheWelfareDivisionemergencyplandescribesproceduresforlaunchingpsychosocialsup-port.Thealertdiagramsandproceduresareclear.WhentheemergencysocialservicesdutyofficerreceivesanalertfromtheERC,theymustprepareasituationpicture.Incaseofadisas-ter,thesituationisimmediatelyreportedtotheemergencysocialservicessupervisor.Thein-formationisalsopassedtotheFRCdistrictheadofpreparednessandmentalhealthsupportactors.TheWelfareDivisionhassixfour-personcrisisteamsforacutecrisiswork.Thealerttoacti-vatethegroupsincaseofamajoraccidentorsimilardisastermaycomefromhealthorrescueauthorities.First,thedirectorofpsychosocialrehabilitationortheirdeputyisalerted.Iftheon-callcrisisteamreceivedthealertdirectlyfromarescueauthority,itlaunchesactioninde-pendentlyaccordingtoitsinstructionsandalsoimmediatelycontactsthedirectorofpsycho-socialrehabilitation.ActivatedcrisisteamsaresituatedatWelfareDivisionofficesorrescuepersonnelrestingareasonacase-by-casebasis.Thepsychologistunithadbeengivenresponsibilityfortheprovisionoflong-termsupport,andtheutilisationofwiderresources,suchasotherhealthcareunits,hadnotbeenplanned.Itwaspossibletoacquiretraumatherapyasanoutsourcedservice.TheSouthwestFinlandHos-pitalDistrictplaysaminorroleinlong-termcrisiswork.

Thecity’scrisiscommunicationsproceduredescribesthecrisiscommunicationsorder,basicprinciplesofcrisiscommunicationsandthedivisionofresponsibilitybetweenotherau-thorities,volunteerorganisationsandthecity.Theproceduregivesconcreteinstructionsforcommunications,givingstatementsandorganisingpressconferences.Theinstructionsstressthattheinformationreleasedtothepublicmustbebasedoninformationthathasbeencon-firmedbytheauthorities.Theactionplansfordifferentdivisionsalsoincludeaprocedureforcrisiscommunications.AccordingtothecrisiscommunicationsprocedureoftheCityofTurku,incaseofaserioussit-uation,theEmergencyResponseCentreorRescueDepartmentmaysendagroupSMStothecity’smanagementteam.ThepolicemayalsosendagroupSMStoapredeterminedgroup.Ifnecessary,theriskmanagementdirectorconvenesthemanagementteaminaccordancewiththemayor’sinstructions.Theriskmanagementdirectorhastheauthoritytolaunchtheac-tionsandcrisiscommunicationsnecessitatedbythecrisis.Crisiscommunicationsismanagedbythedirectorofcommunications.TheEducationDivision’ssafetyprocedureincludesacrisisplanthatalsoaddressestheor-ganisationofpsychosocialsupport.TheEducationDivisionhasapreparednessteamap-pointedbythedivisiondirector.Theteamisresponsibleforpreparednessforabnormalsitua-tions,operationalpolicies,thecrisiscommunicationsprocedureandtheplanningandprepar-ednessforcrisisrecovery.Theplandescribesthearrangementsforlaunchingandprovidingpsychosocialsupportforschoolchildrenandschoolstaff.Theregionalpublictransport(Föli)doesnothaveaspecialplanforeventslikethestab-bing.Sincetheincident,thecity’spublictransportauthoritieshaveconsideredthematter,andregionalpublictransportstaffhavebeeninstructedtosendamessagedirectlytodrivers’fare

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collectiondeviceincaseofanyemergencysituations.Insomecases,itcouldbenecessarytoquicklystoporredirectpublictransport.Theemergencyplanoftheurbanconstructionserviceareadoesnotincludeinstructionsforsituationsexactlylikethestabbing.However,proceduresforkeepingCCTVrecordings,forexample,havebeenagreedonwiththepolice.Inthistypeofsituation,thedoorsofschoolsandday-carecentreswouldbelocked.Maintenancehasalsoacquiredheavy-dutyequipmenttousefortrafficcontroltoprotectpublicevents.

2.4.8 PsychosocialsupportAccordingtothegeneralsectionoftheCityofTurkuemergencyplan,thesocialandhealthcareauthoritiesandfacilitiesinthedivisionareresponsiblefororganisingemergencymedi-calservicesandpsychosocialsupportservices.TheWelfareDivisionemergencyplande-scribesthealertarrangementsofemergencysocialservicesforlaunchingpsychosocialsup-portandproceduresconnectedtocommissioningthecity’scrisisteams.TurkuEmergencySocialServiceswasresponsibleforacutecrisissupport.TheemergencysocialserviceswereresponsiblefororganisingcrisisemergencysupportforthecoordinatedaccidentandemergencyservicesatTurkuUniversityHospitalandforthecrisishelpline.Intheevenings,volunteersfromtheFRC’smentalhealthsupporthelpedstaffthecrisishelpline.Theworkwasmanagedwiththeresourcesavailable,butitwasamajorstrain.TheCityofTurku’spsychologistunitwasresponsibleforlong-termcrisissupport.Rightfromthestart,thecity’scrisisteamwasrecruitedforthework.Thecrisisteamincludespsy-chologistsaswellashealthcarepersonnel,Churchemployeesandpersonswhohaveretiredfromsimilarpositions.TheFRC’semergencyteamofpsychologistssupplementedthiswork.Thecrisissupportkeptthepsychologistunitbusyforalongtime,causingotherworktopileup.

TheFRC’smentalhealthsupportgroupintheTurkuregionhasapproximately25members,whowerealertedbasedonacontractbetweentheCityofTurkuandtheFRCdistrict.Mentalhealthsupportgroupsfromthesurroundingareaandneighbouringcitiesalsocontributedtotheactivities.VolunteerspatrolledtheMarketSquareandstaffedthecrisishelpline.BytheendofAugust,approximately120volunteershadcontributed,amountingtoapproximately1,000person-hours.TheFRC’semergencyteamofpsychologistswasresponsibleforprofessionalworkbasedonacontractbetweentheCityofTurkuandtheFRCforthisindividualsituation.TheyservedatCrisisEmergencySupport,thepsychologistunitandpartlyintheFRCfacilitiesand,intheearlystages,werepartlyresponsibleforacutecrisissupport,alsosupplementingtheworkofthecity’spsychologistunitinlong-termcrisiswork.Theywerealsoresponsibleforthepro-cessingsessionsforFRCvolunteers.AccordingtotheFRC,itwasunusualthatthesituationdidnotfollowthenormalpatternofhelpneeds.Usually,theneedisthegreatestimmediatelyaftertheincidentandthendecreasesgradually.Inthiscase,therewasagreatneedimmediatelyafterwards,thenitsloweddown,andthenincreasedagain,lastingforalongtime.Forsuchcases,thereshouldbeabetterread-inesstoactivateextensivehumanresourcesquickly.VantaaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServicesisanationaloperatorinpsychosocialsupportdesignatedbytheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthreferredtointheHealthCareAct.TheSocialandCrisisEmergencyServiceshavethecapabilitiestosupportthemanagementofpsy-

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chosocialsupportandtoprovideexpertassistance,therebysupportinglocalauthorities.Van-taaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServicesreceivesituation-specificassignmentsfromthemin-istry.Therewasoneassignmentin2015,sixin2016andninein2017.TheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthhasadutyofficerwiththeauthoritytogiveas-signmentstoVantaaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServices.Theministrycoversthecostsin-curredbytheassignment.

2.4.9 TheChurchTheparticipationoftheEvangelicalLutheranChurchinthemanagementofcrisissituationsislaiddownintheChurchAct19,accordingtowhichparishesmustbepreparedtoprovidespiritualcareincrisissituations.Incrisissituations,theChurchhasactivitiesonthreelevels.Parishesandparishunionsareresponsibleforthelocalimplementationofspiritualcare,forexamplebyorganisinggriefservicesandopportunitiesfordiscussion.Thecathedralchapterofthediocesesupportstheactivitiesoftheparishes,forexamplebyhandingdiocese-levelcommunicationsandagreeingontheroleofthebishop.TheChurchCouncilisresponsiblefornationaloperations.Churchcommunications,whichisontheChurchCouncil,hasthecapabilitiestoassistdioceses,parishunionsandparishesincrisiscommunications.Churchcrisiscommunicationscanreachalargenumberofpeople.TheoperativedivisionoftheChurchCouncildecidesontheinitiationofnationalcrisisassistance.TheChurchCouncilagreesontheorganisationofservicesontheradioandtelevision.Incrisissituations,theChurchhastheabilitytogiveauthoritativerepresentationofstateau-thoritiestheopportunitytoattend.ThevisibleroleoftheChurchinbringingtogetherdiffer-entgroupsisagoodfitforFinnishsociety.

2.5 RecordingsTheinvestigationteamhashadaccesstotheERC’semergencycallsrecordingsandthecom-municationstrafficrecordingsfromthecallgroupsrecordedbytheauthorities’telecommuni-cationsnetwork.Alsoavailablehavebeenasecuritycamerarecordingthatisapartofthepre-trialinvestigationmaterials,avideoofareconstructioncreatedbythepoliceandvideorecordingsshotforaTVseries.

2.6 Provisions,regulations,instructionsandotherdocuments

2.6.1 ProvisionsconnectedtoapplyingforandreceivingasylumAccordingtotheAliensAct20,aliensresidinginthecountrycanbegrantedasylumiftheyre-sideoutsidetheirhomecountryowingtoawell-foundedfearpersecutionforreasonsofmem-bershipinaparticularsocialgroup,forexample.Theymustalso,becauseofthisfear,beun-willingtoavailthemselvesoftheprotectionofthatcountry,inwhichcasetheyareconsideredtobeinneedofinternationalprotection.Asylumreferstoaresidencepermitgrantedtoaref-ugeeinanasylumprocedure.TheAliensActhelps,foritspart,intheimplementationoftheprinciplesoftheConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugeesandtheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.

19 1054/199320 301/2004.Bytheendof2017,71amendmentshavebeenmadetotheAct,23ofthemin2015–2017.

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Anapplicationforinternationalprotectionmustbesubmittedtothepoliceorbordercontrolauthorityuponenteringthecountryorassoonaspossibleafterwards.Thepoliceorbordercontrolauthoritymustregistertheapplicationwithoutdelay.Theapplicationisprocessedinanasylumprocedure.

AccordingtotheAct,theauthoritythatreceivedtheasylumapplicationmustrecordthebasicinformation,takefingerprintsandcarryoutthenecessaryregisterchecks.TheapplicationistransferredtotheprocessingqueueoftheFinnishImmigrationServiceandtheapplicantisdirectedtoareceptioncentre,wheretheywaittobecalledinforanasyluminterview.TheImmigrationService21establishestheapplicant’sidentity,travelrouteandentryintotheterritoryaswellas,orally,theinformationneededtodeterminethestateresponsibleforpro-cessingtheasylumapplication.Duringtheestablishmentoftheasylumseeker’sidentity,thepersonalinformationoftheirfamilymembersandotherrelativesiscollected.TheImmigrationServicecarriesoutanasyluminterview,inwhichtheapplicant’sgroundsofhavingexperiencedpersecution,violationsoftheirrightsorthreatsthereofintheirhomecountryorcountryofpermanentresidenceareestablishedorally.Inanindividualcasere-gardinginternationalprotection,authoritiesmustnotobtaininformationinawaythatwouldallowthepersecutortogaininformationaboutit.

Applicationsforinternationalprotectionareprocessedunderanormalorexpeditedpro-cessing.Expeditedprocessingcanbeusediftheapplicationisobviouslybaseless.Thepreconditionsforgrantingaresidencepermitareassessedindividuallyforeachappli-cant,takingintoaccounttheiraccountsoftheircircumstancesandcurrentinformationob-tainedfromvarioussourcesaboutconditionsinthecountry.Theauthoritiesmustdecidethecaseintheapplicant’sfavourbasedontheiraccountiftheyhave,wherepossible,cooperatedwiththeinvestigationoftheircaseandiftheauthoritiesareconvincedoftheplausibilityoftheapplicationintermsoftheneedforinternationalprotection.Foreignerswhoreceiveasy-luminFinlandgetrefugeestatus.Iftheapplicationisrejected,adecisionisusuallymadeatthesametimeregardingtheirre-fusalofentryordeportation.Therehasnotbeenatimelimitforapplicationprocessing,butatimelimitofsixmonthswillenterintoforceinJuly2018.Anapplicationcanbeconsideredasobviouslybaselessif,forexample,theapplicant’sappar-entaimistoabusetheasylumprocedure,iftheyonlysubmittedanapplicationtodelaytheenforcementoftheirdeportationdecisionoriftheycamefromasafecountryoforigintowhichtheycanbereturned.TheImmigrationServicemakesthedecisiononrefusalofentryofforeignerswhoapplyforaresidencepermitbasedoninternationalprotection22.Anapplicationcanberejectedwithoutinvestigationiftheapplicantcamefromasafecountryofrefugetowhichtheycanbereturned.Decisionsonrefusalofentryordeportationspecifyaperiodof7–30dayswithinwhichtheycanleavethecountryvoluntarily.Aperiodforvoluntaryreturnisnotspecifiedif,forexample,

21 Amendment501/2016totheAliensActtransferredthedutiesdescribedinthissectiontotheImmigrationServiceon1

March2016.Untilthen,thedutiesbelongedtothepolice.22 Refusalofentrymeansremovingfromthecountryaforeignerwhoenteredthecountrywithoutaresidencepermitifthey

havenotbeengrantedaresidencepermitsinceenteringthecountry.Theremovalfromthecountryofaforeignerwhohasbeengrantedaresidencepermitisdeportation.Refusalofentrymeansadeportationprocedureduringwhichtherecipientofthedecisiononrefusalofentryordeportationeitherleavesthecountryvoluntarilyorisremovedfromthecountry.

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thereisaflightrisk,thepersonisconsideredadangertopublicorderorsafety,theirresi-dencepermitapplicationwasrejectedduetocircumventionofentryrulesoradecisionhasbeenmadetodismisstheapplicationforprotectionortouseexpeditedprocessing.CasesconnectedtointernationalprotectionforadecisionoftheImmigrationServiceinanasylumprocedurecanbeappealedtotheadministrativecourt.Theappealmustbesubmittedwithin21daysofreceivingnoticeofthedecision.Thecompetentadministrativecourtincasesconnectedtointernationalprotectionisdeter-minedbasedonthelocationoftheImmigrationServiceasylumunitthatmadethedecision.Fordecisionsmadeinthewesternareaoftheasylumunit,thecompetentadministrativecourtisTurkuAdministrativeCourt.23Decisionsoftheadministrativecourtmayonlybeap-pealedtotheSupremeAdministrativeCourtiftheSupremeAdministrativeCourtgrantsleavetoappeal.Theasylumseekercansubmitasubsequentapplicationafterreceivingafinaldecisiontotheirpreviousapplication.Asubsequentapplicationthatdoesnotcontainanynewgroundsthataffectthedecisioninthecasecanbedismissed.Iftheforeignerinquestionhasappliedforaresidencepermitongroundsofinternationalpro-tection,decisionsonrefusalofentryoftheImmigrationServicecannotbeenforceduntilthecasehasbeenfinallyresolved.IfleavetoappealisrequiredfromtheSupremeAdministrativeCourtinthecase,anappealdoesnotpreventenforcementunlessdecreedotherwisebytheSupremeAdministrativeCourt.However,ifthedecisiononrefusalofentrywasmadeunderexpeditedprocessingduetodis-missaloftheapplicationortheapplicationbeingconsideredobviouslybaseless,thedecisioncan,undercertaincircumstances,beenforcedevenbeforeafinaldecision.Thesubmissionofasecondsubsequentapplicationdoesnotpreventtheenforcementofafi-naldecisiononrefusalofentrymadebasedonthefirstsubsequentapplication.Asylumisnotgrantedif,forexample,thereisawell-foundedreasontosuspectthattheappli-canthascommittedaseriousnon-politicalcrimeoutsideofFinlandbeforeenteringFinland.

Askingaboutidentity,ageandotherinformationaboutthecountryoforiginisregulatedbytheConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees24,theDirectiveoncommonproceduresforgrantingandwithdrawinginternationalprotection25andtheAliensAct.Accordingtothem,informationaboutapplicantscannotbedisclosedtoapartysuspectedofpersecutingthemorcausingthemseriousharm.TheEURegulation26ontheestablishmentoftheEurodacfingerprintregistermakesprovi-sionsforadatabaseaimedatindividualisingtheidentitiesofasylumseekers.Theprovisionsonstoringandusingthedataarefairlyclear-cut.AccordingtotheRegulation,fingerprintsaretakenfortheEurodacsystemfromallthepeoplewhoillegallycrossaborderiftheyareatleast14yearsold.Theycannotrefusetogivetheirfingerprints.

23 Previously,allappealsregardinginternationalprotectionwereprocessedatHelsinkiAdministrativeCourt.Duetothe

increaseinthenumberofappeals,theprocessingofappealswasspreadoverseveraladministrativecourts.Thechangeenteredintoforceon1February2017underamendment17/2017totheAliensAct.

24 77/196825 2013/32/EU26 603/2013

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Ifapersonappliesforasyluminacountryotherthanthecountrywheretheirfingerprintswerefirsttaken,theycanusuallybesentbacktothefirstcountryinaccordancewiththeDub-linRegulation.Thefingerprintsarestoredfor18monthsandthendeleted.Onlythefinger-printdataandtheperson’ssexisstoredinthedatabaseandnot,forexample,theirname,photo,dateofbirthornationality.Thedataisalsodeletedifthey,forexample,aregrantedaresidencepermit.TheEurodacdatabaseismanagedbytheEuropeanAgencyfortheOperationalManagementoflarge-scaleITSystemsintheAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJustice(eu-LISA).Thedatacanonlybeusedforstrictlyspecifiedpurposes.

AccordingtotheAliensAct,thecasesofminorasylumseekersmustbeprocessedwithur-gency.Effortmustbemadewithoutdelaytotracetheparentsofunaccompaniedminorsorsomeotherpersonresponsiblefortheiractualguardianship.Decision-makingconnectedtominorsmustpayspecialattentiontothebestinterestofthechildandfactorsconnectedtotheirhealthanddevelopment.

Aforensicexaminationcanbecarriedouttoestablishtheageofforeignersapplyingforaresi-dencepermitifthereisobviouscausetodoubttheveracityoftheinformationtheyhavepro-videdabouttheirage.Carryingouttheexaminationissubjecttothewrittenconsentoftheex-aminationsubjectandtheirlegalrepresentative.Refusingtheexaminationwithoutavalidreasonresultsinthepersonbeingtreatedasanadult.Refusingtheexaminationcannotbethesolegroundsforrejectionofanapplicationforinternationalprotection.Applicationssubmittedbyanunaccompaniedminorcanberesolvedunderexpeditedpro-cessingonlyiftheapplicantcomesfromasafecountryoforigintowhichtheycanbere-turned.AccordingtotheActontheReceptionofPersonsapplyingforInternationalProtection27,un-accompaniedminorsmustbeplacedinagrouphome.Childrenover16yearswithoutaguardiancanbehousedinsupportedhousingifitisjustifiedfortheirdevelopmentandwell-being.Fullmaintenancecanbeorganisedatgrouphomesandsupportedhousing.

ArepresentativemustbeimmediatelyappointedtoachildapplyingforprotectionifthechildisinFinlandwithoutaparent/guardianoranotherlegalrepresentative.Theapplicationforappointingarepresentativeissubmittedbythereceptioncentre.Therepresentativeisap-pointedbythedistrictcourt.Therepresentativeexercisesthepowerofaparent/guardiantospeakforthechildinmattersconnectedtothechild’spersonandassets.Therepresentative’sdutiesdonotincludethechild’sdailycare,educationorothertending.Intwoofitsdecisions28,theSupremeAdministrativeCourthasconsideredtheactionsoftheFinnishImmigrationServicetoestablishtheguardianofaminorasinsufficientandover-turnedtheadministrativecourtdecisionstoreturnthem.TheFinnishImmigrationServicewasunabletoverifythepossibilityofasafereturn.Incaseoftheperpetrator,theapplicantwasaskeddirectlyabouthisparents,andtheFinnishImmigrationServicedidnottrytocon-tactthemdirectlyorthroughtheauthorities.IfthematterhadbeenenquiredfromMorocco,thefalsenameandagereportedbytheapplicantmighthavebeenrevealed.

27 746/201128 DecisionsoftheSupremeAdministrativeCourtKHO2017:172andKHO2017:173,10November2017

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Apersonwhomisleadsapublicauthoritybygivingafalsenameorotherwiseprovidingfalseormisleadinginformationontheiridentityshall,accordingtotheCriminalCodeofFin-land29,besentencedforgivingfalseidentifyinginformationtoafineortoimprisonmentforatmostsixmonths.

AccordingtotheAliensAct,refugeestatusgainedbyapplyingforasylumiscancellediftheap-plicanthas,whenapplyingforprotection,knowinglygivenfalseinformationwhichhasaf-fectedtheoutcomeofthedecisionoriftheapplicanthasconcealedafactthatwouldhaveaf-fectedtheoutcomeofthedecision.TheRegisterofAliensisaregisterofpersonswhichismaintainedandusedforthepro-cessing,decision-makingandcontrolofmattersrelatingtoentryintoFinland,departurefromFinland,andresidenceofaliensinthecountryforensuringthesecurityofthestateandforcarryingoutbasicandextensivesecurityinvestigationsasreferredtointheActonSecurityInvestigations.Theregistercanbeusedtostoreandcollectdataaboutpersonswhohaveap-pliedforinternationalprotection.

AccordingtotheActontheReceptionofPersonsapplyingforInternationalProtection30,receptioncentrereferstoaplacewherepersonsseekinginternationalprotectionandreceiv-ingtemporaryprotectionarehousedandwhichorganisesreceptionservicesforpersonsseekinginternationalprotectionandreceivingtemporaryprotection.Grouphomesandsup-portedhousingforchildrenarealsoreceptioncentres.Thestatecoversthecostsoftheactivities.TheFinnishImmigrationServicecoversthecostofestablishingandmaintainingreceptioncentresandhotspotsandremuneratestheserviceproviderfortheorganisationofreceptionservices.

Receptionservicesareorganisedbythereceptioncentrewhichregistersthepersonapplyingforinternationalprotectionortemporaryprotectionasaclient.Receptionservicesincludehousing,receptionallowanceandspendingmoney,socialservices,healthcareservices,inter-preterandtranslationservicesaswellasexemplaryemploymentandeducationalactivities,aslaiddowninthischapter.Mealscanalsobeorganisedasreceptionservices.

Personsapplyingforprotectionaregrantedareceptionallowancetosecurethenecessarysubsistenceforaworthwhileexistenceandtopromoteindependence.Thebasiccomponentofthereceptionallowancecoversclothingcosts,minorhealthcarecosts,thecostoflocalpub-lictransportandpersonalmobilephoneandsimilarcostsaswellasfoodcostsifthereceptioncentredoesnotservemeals.Thebasiccomponentofthemonthlyreceptionallowanceofapersonlivingaloneis€290.Thereceptionallowanceisgrantedbythereceptioncentreuponapplication.Exemplaryemploymentandeducationalactivitiesmustbeorganisedatreceptioncentrestopromotetheindependenceofpersonsseekingprotection.Ifaresidentatareceptioncentrerepeatedlywithoutawell-foundedreasonrefusestoparticipateintheirassignedexemplaryemploymentandeducationalactivities,thereceptionallowancepaidtothemcanbereducedbyupto20percentforuptotwomonths.

29 39/1889;Chapter16isaboutoffencesagainstthepublicauthorities.30 746/2011

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2.6.2 PreventionobligationsofthepoliceandtheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceServiceThePoliceAct31statesthatthedutiesofthepoliceincludemaintenancepublicorderandse-curityandcrimeprevention.Thepoliceworkincooperationwithotherpublicauthoritiesandwithcommunitiesandresidentsinordertomaintainsecurity.Thepoliceshallseektomain-tainpublicorderandsecuritythroughadvice,requestsandorders.ThedutiesoftheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceServicearelaiddowninthePoliceAdministra-tionAct32.ThedutyoftheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceServiceistoprevent,accordingtotheguidanceoftheMinistryoftheInterior,anyplansandcrimesthatcouldendangerthesystemofgovernment,lawandorderortheinternalorexternalsecurityofthenationandtoinvesti-gatesuchcrimes.Itmustalsomaintainandimprovethegeneralpreparednesstopreventac-tivitiesthatendangernationalsafety.TheMinistryoftheInteriorgivesorderstotheNationalPoliceBoardafterhearinginmoredetailthesubjectgroupstobeinvestigatedbytheSecurityIntelligenceServiceanddecides,afterhearingtheNationalPoliceBoardinmoredetail,ifnec-essary,onthecooperationandcoordinationbetweentheSecurityIntelligenceServiceandotherpoliceunitsaswellastheirmutualinvestigationarrangements.

2.6.3 ProvisionsontheactionsofstatemanagementTheGovernmentSituationCentreissubjecttotheActontheGovernmentSituationCentre33.AccordingtotheAct,theSituationCentreexiststosupportthedecision-makingandactivitiesofthePresidentoftheRepublicandtheGovernment.TheSituationCentreisatthePrimeMin-ister’sOffice.Itsdutyistocompileandanalyseinformationaboutthesecuritysituationandanydisruptionsandthreatsthereofthatendangerimportantsocialfunctions.Theinformationisusedtoprepareasituationpicture,andinformationisdistributedtothePresidentoftheRepublic,Governmentandotherpublicauthorities.TheSituationCentre’srighttoreceivein-formationislaiddownintheAct.

AccordingtothejustificationsoftheActontheGovernmentSituationCentre34,becausetheextensiveeffectsofincidentsextendtothemandatesofseveraladministrativesectors,thisrequirestheabilitytocompileanddistributeacross-administrativeandcoordinatedsituationpicture.TheflowofinformationfromtheSituationCentretothecompetentauthoritymustalsobeensured.ThecompetentauthoritymanagesoperativeactivitiesandisresponsiblefortheminaccordancewiththedivisionofmandatesspecifiedintheGovernmentRulesofProce-dure35.ThepurposeoftheActwastoclarifytheexchangeofinformationbetweentheminis-triesandtheGovernmentSituationCentreaswellastoremoveobstaclesintheflowofinfor-mationbetweenthecompetentauthoritiesandtheSituationCentre.TheSituationCentreisresponsibleforalertingtheGovernment,ministerialcommittees,per-manentsecretaries,headsofpreparednessandtheGovernmentofficialsrequiredforthedeci-sion-makingrequiredbytheregulationsandconveningthemforsessions,meetingsanddis-cussionsheldatunusualhoursduetoanincident,crisissituationoranotherreason.

Thepermanentcooperationbodiesofthecooperationbetweentheministries–theperma-nentsecretaries’meetingandthemeetingoftheheadsofpreparedness–arelaiddownintheGovernmentRulesofProcedure.Duringincidents,themeetingoftheheadsofpreparednessservesasanimportantsupportformanagement.Themeetingoftheheadsofpreparedness31 872/201132 110/199233 300/201734 HE261/2016vp35 262/2003

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strivestodiscoverthepotentialofallpublicauthoritiestosupporttheadministrativesectorwiththeleadonresolvingthecrisisinquestion.TheGovernmentchiefofsecurityservesasthechairpersonofthemeetingoftheheadsofpreparedness.TheRulesofProcedurealsodescribethedutyofcoordinationofcommunicationsofthePrimeMinister’sOfficeandthegeneralintegrationoftheGovernment’sjointsituationpicture,pre-paredness,safetyandincidentmanagement.TherearenoprovisionsoflawontheGovernment’scrisismanagementmodel.However,itwasapprovedinaGovernmentResolutiononSecuringtheFunctionsVitaltoSocietyin2006andlaterrepeatedincorrespondingSecurityStrategiesforSocietyin2010and2017.ItwasalsodescribedintheGovernmentResolutiononComprehensiveSecurityin2012.

2.6.4 ProvisionsonthedutiesofmunicipalitiesMunicipalitiesaregovernedundertheprincipleslaiddownintheLocalGovernmentAct36alsoincrisissituations.

2.6.5 TerrorisminlegislationTheperpetratorwaschargedontwocountsofmurderwithterroristintent37andeightcountsofattemptedmurder.ProvisionsoncrimescommittedwithterroristintentwereaddedtotheCriminalCodeofFinlandin2003.38TheActwasamendedduetoaFrameworkDecisionoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion39.Accordingtothedecision,eachMemberStatemusttakethenecessarymeasurestoensurethatoffencescommittedwithterroristintentarepunishablebyeffective,proportionateanddissuasivecriminalpenalties,whichmayentailextradition.Theoffencesmustbepunishablebycustodialsentencesheavierthanthoseimposableundernationallawforsuchoffencesintheabsenceofterroristintent.40

Theprovisionsoflawconnectedtoterrorismarecurrentlybeingsupplementedandamended.TheneedforamendmentsisconnectedtotheDirectiveoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof15March2017oncombatingterrorism41.TheDirectivealsoimposesre-quirementsontheassistanceprovidedtovictimsandtheirfamilymembers.Forexample,theservicesmustbeconfidential,freeofchargeandeasilyaccessibletoallvictimsofterrorism.

2.6.6 Managementofmulti-authoritycooperationsituationsPublicauthoritieseachmanagetheoperativeactivitiesintheirmandateindependentlyandaccordingtotheirspecificlegislation.Thelawgoesnotcurrentlyincludeaconceptofgeneralcommand,savefortheRescueAct42.TheRescueActappliestoaccidentsthatinvolverescueactivitiesandtheparticipationofotherauthorities.Inothersituations,thecompetentauthori-

36 365/199537 AccordingtotheCriminalCodeofFinland(39/1889),anoffenderhasterroristintentifitishisorherintentto,forexam-

ple,causeseriousfearamongthepopulation.38 ActamendingtheCriminalCodeofFinland17/200339 FrameworkDecision2002/475/JHA,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FI/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F047540 Exceptionsaremadeforcaseswherethesentencesimposablearealreadythemaximumpossiblesentencesunderna-

tionallaw.InFinland,thesentenceformurderisalifesentence,whichisthemaximumpossiblesentenceaccordingtoFinnishlaw.Thesentenceformurderwithterroristintentisthesamelifesentence.

41 2017/541/EU42 379/2011

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tiesresolvetheirmutualjurisdictionrelationsonacase-by-casebasis.Thepolicehasbeenus-ingtheconceptofageneralcommanderininternalusage.Thepolicehaveaspecialprocedureforunusualsituations,whichdoesnotincludemuchoncooperationbetweenauthorities.Inrescueoperations,theofficerinoverallchargeofthesituationisresponsibleformaintain-ingthesituationpictureandforcoordinatingtheoperations.Unitsfromdifferentsectorsworkunderthedirectionoftheirowncommandinsuchawayasto,inoverallterms,combatthroughthemeasurestheytaketheconsequencesoftheaccidentorthesituationinaneffec-tivemanner.Tosupportmanagement,theremustbeasharedunderstandingofthesituation:situationawareness.Theauthoritywiththemosttododuringtheincidentusuallyhasthebestsitua-tionawareness.Incaseofanongoingcrimesituationsuchasthestabbing,thepoliceusuallyhasthebestsituationawareness.Therefore,itisnaturalthatthepolicedistributestheinfor-mationneededbyotherauthoritiesandtheotherauthoritiesalsorequestinformation,ifnec-essary.Inanycase,eachauthoritytakescareofitsownduties,takingtheneedsoftheotherauthoritiesintoaccount.Cooperationisneededduringrapidsituationsandsoonafterwards,whenthefocusshiftstowards,forexample,multi-authoritycommunicationsandpsychosocialsupport.

Managementtakesplaceatseverallevels,suchasatthescene,thecommandcentresofvari-ousauthoritiesandthecentralmanagementofsectors,suchastheNationalPoliceBoardortheministriesaswellasstatemanagementlevel.Cooperationandsharingofinformationaboutthesituationisneededatalloftheselevels.Cooperationatvariouslevelsis,bynature,normalcooperationbetweenauthorities,andtherearenospecificprovisionsoflawaboutit.

2.6.7 PsychosocialsupportandservicesPsychosocialsupportanditsorganisationislaiddownintheHealthCareActandtheSocialWelfareAct43.Accordingtotheacts,necessarypsychosocialsupportforindividualsandfami-liesorganisedbymunicipalitiesisapartofthementalhealthworkcarriedouttopromotethehealthandwell-beingofresidents.Theworkisaimedatstrengtheningthefactorsthathelptomaintainthementalhealthofindividualsandthecommunityandatreducingandeliminatingfactorsthatstandtocompromisementalhealth.

Mentalhealthworkalsoincludesthecoordinationofpsychosocialsupportfortheindividualandcommunityinsuddenlyarisingupsettingsituations.Emergencymedicalservicesmustre-ferpatients,relativesofpatientsandotherindividualsinvolvedinincidentstopsychosocialsupportservices.Psychosocialsupportmustbeprovidedurgentlytoeveryoneregardlessoftheirplaceofresidence,andemergencysocialservicesmustbeorganisedaroundtheclocktoensureurgentandessentialaid.AccordingtotheSocialWelfareAct,emergencysocialser-vicesmustbeorganisedinsuchawayastofacilitatecontactwithservicearoundtheclockandtheprovisionofurgentsocialservices,suchastemporaryhousingarrangements.

Accordingtotheguidelines44oftheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth,theaimofpsychoso-cialsupportistoreducethesocialandhealthissuescausedtotheindividualandsocietybya

43 1326/2010and1301/2014.Psychosocialsupportandservicesreferstoallactivitiesorganisedtolimittheconsequences

ofadisasteroranotherunusualsituationonpeopleandtopreventandmitigatetheconsequencesofthementalstresscausedbytheincident.

44 MinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth(2009)Traumaattistentilanteidenpsykososiaalinentukijapalvelut(‘Psychosocialsupportandservicesfortraumaticsituations’).PublicationsoftheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth2009:16MinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth:Helsinki.

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stressfulincident.Psychosocialsupportandservicescanbedividedintomentalhealthsup-port,socialworkandservices,andthesupportprovidedbytheEvangelicalLutheranChurchandotherreligiouscommunities.Psychosocialsupportandservicesareusedtosupportpeo-ple’snormalrecovery.Timelysupportintheearlystagesisaimedat,forexample,preventingthedevelopmentofactualmentaldisorders,suchaspost-traumaticstressdisorder(PTSD).TheOccupationalSafetyandHealthAct45providesontheresponsibilitytoorganisethetreat-mentofwork-relatedhealthproblemscausedbyaccidentsandviolentsituationsatworkorcausedbytheworkload.

2.7 Otherinvestigations

2.7.1 SpecialstudyoncommunicationsTheinvestigationteamcommissionedaspecialstudyoneventsinthesocialmediafollowingthestabbings.Thestudyfocusedonsocialmediadiscussionsandcoverageabouttheincident,startingfromthetimeoftheincidentandendingsevendayslater.Thefocusofthestudywasoncommunicationsfrompublicauthoritiesandpoliticiansthataffectedcitizens’senseofse-curityandthecivildialoguearoundthesubject.

Therawdataofthestudyincludedover60,000socialmediamessages,amountingtoover2.2millionwordsintotal.Thedatawasobtainedusingvarioussearchtermsandsearchtermcombinationsinsocialmediaservices46,discussionforums,blogsandcommentsonnewsme-diawebsites.Themostpopulartopicsweremappedusingtopicmodelling,whichinvolvedreviewingallofthemessagesandidentifyingstatisticallyillustrativecontentcategories.Amessagecanbelongtoseveraltopicsatthesametime,buttheanalysisalwayspickedthestrongesttopicofeachmessage,suchastheattack,politiciansandthegovernment,thevictimandtheincidentorhateandfear.Ofallofthesocialmediaservices,discussionforums,TwitterandFacebookcontainedthemostmessages.ThemonitoringresultsonFacebookwasaffectedbythefactthatonlythemessagesofpublicprofileswereincludedinthestudy.Thesamplingwasalsoimperfectinotherways,suchasthefactthatmostmessagesondiscussionforumsarepostedanony-mously.Quantitatively,Google+andPinterestweremarginalplatforms.TheYouTubevideosraisedwideinterest,butitwasnotpossibletoidentifythevideos.Theywereprobablyvideosshotbycitizensduringtheattackandimmediatelyafterwards,suchasthewidespreadvideoofpeoplechasingtheattackerinTurkucitycentre.Amongnewsmedia,thesharednewsitemsofTurunSanomatfocusedthemostontheinci-dentandvictims.ThesharednewsitemsofYle,Iltasanomat,HelsinginSanomat,IltalehtiandMTVmostlyfocusedonthepolice.MV-lehti,whichwasanexceptionalongsidethemain-streammediathatattractedthemostattention,mostlyfocusedonpoliticiansandthegovern-ment.Amongthesocialmediaplatforms,onTwitterpeoplediscussedmostlyaboutpoliceactivities,onFacebookandblogsaboutthecausesofterrorism,ondiscussionforumsaboutthemedia,andinnewscommentsonnewsmediawebsitesaboutasylumseekers.OnYouTube,hateandfearmanifestedasthemostnoteworthytopics.

45 1383/200146 Twitter,Facebook,Instagram,Youtube,Google+,Pinterest

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Thesocialmediafocusedthemostontheauthoritiesandmedia.Outofallofthemessagesfromindividualpoliticians,themostattentionwasgainedinorderbythePrimeMinister,President,MinisteroftheInteriorandoneimmigration-criticalpartyleader.ThemostsharednewsitemsofthemainstreammediawereinorderbyYle,Iltasanomat,Il-talehti,HelsinginSanomat,TurunSanomatandMTV.Ylenewsitemsweresharedthemostbyanoverwhelmingmargin,andshareswerealsootherwisemostlyfocusedonthefirstfourmainstreammedia.MV-lehtiwastheseventhafterMTV.Thesamepersoncouldhavesharedthesamelinkorsourceseveraltimes,whichmayaffectsomeoftheresults.ItisnoteworthythatwiththeexceptionofanewsitembyTurunSanomat,thesharednewsitemswerenotreal-timesituationbulletins.

Figure5. Thenumberofmessagesanalysedinthestudyintwo-hourintervalsoversevendays.

Theintensityofthemessageswasatitshighestimmediatelyaftertheincident.Thefollowingday,theintensitypeakedmomentarilyalmostashighastheeveningofthedayoftheincident.OnMonday,thetotalnumberofmessageswasalmostashighasonSunday,butotherwisethediurnalvariationanddownwardtrendinthenumberofmessageswereunsurprising.Atfirst,discussionwassparkedbythetweetpublishedbythepoliceat4:37pm,asthefirstinformationabouttheincident.Duringthefirstthreehours,thesocialmediawerefilledwithsharednewsitems,buttheyalsofeaturedvideomaterialssharedthroughstreamingservicesandmessagesfromthepolice.Inthefirstfewhours,topicsprogressedquicklytowardswidersituationassessmentsuntilthepoliceputacheckonpresentingassessmentsofthesituationtooearlyon.NewsitemsbasedoninterviewsoftheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartment,NationalPoliceCommissioner,TurunSanomatand,amongpoliticians,oneimmigration-criti-calpartyleaderweresharedmanytimes.Duringthefirstthreehours,thedominanttopicsweretheattackanditsanalysis.Duringthesecondhour,thetopicsoftheperpetratorandvictimsjoinedthediscussion.Duringthethirdhour,variousstrongemotionsgainedcontrolofthediscussion.Peoplebothspreadhateandfearandaskedothersnottospreadthem.Forexample,anYlenewsitemwherepeoplewereaskednottospreadhateinsocialmediabecameoneofthemostsharednewsitems.

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Thedayaftertheincident,discussioncontinuedalmostasintenselyasthenightbefore.Al-mostallmediareportedontheevents.Thenewsitemsofthemainstreammedia,suchasYle,HelsinginSanomatandTurunSanomat,wereintheleadofthemostshared.Whennewinfor-mationabouttheincidentwasnotimmediatelyavailable,themediaspacefilledwithinter-viewsofindividualswhohadbeenatthesceneandhelpedthevictims.Theinformationre-leasedbytheauthoritiesthattheeventswerebeinginvestigatedasoffencescommittedwithterroristintentsparkedspiriteddiscussion.Duringthefirst24hours,themostimportanttop-icsweretheattackandthevictims.Therewasalsoalotofdiscussionabouttheperpetrator,fearandhate.Thepoliceandterrorismwerealsohighonthelistintermsofinterest.

Throughoutthemonitoring,inadditiontothemainstreammedia,themostsharednewslinkincludedvideosatstreamingservices,MV-lehtinewsitemsandnewsitemsfrominternationalmedia.Foramoment,thethreemostsharednewsitemswerebyYle.Theoverallsocialmediadiscussionfollowedthe‘pattern’ofaconventionalsuddenlyaris-ingcrisisintermsofcoverageandhandling.Atfirst,thefocuswasontheincidentitselfanditsanalysis,afterwhichthetopicsstartedtoexpandandmeander.Overthecourseofthemonitoringperiod,thethreetopicsthatinspiredthemostdiscussionwerethepolice,fearandhateaswellasthemedia.Topicsconnectedtothelegislation,asylumseekers,youngpeopleandmentalhealthproblemsaswellasinternationalterrorismemergedindiscussionimmediatelyamongtopicsthatfilledthenewstopicsbutwanedmorequickly.Theattack,thevictimsandtheperpetratorsparkeddiscussionmostlyatthebeginningofthemonitoringperiod.ThemostretweetedtweetsincludedtweetsbytheSouthwesternFinlandPoliceDepartment,anewsitemfromtheFinnishNewsAgencySTTandtweetsfromtheMin-isteroftheInterior.Fakenewsordisinformationdidnotplayaproportionallysignificantroleinthestudy.How-ever,itmustbenotedthatMV-lehtiwasamongthetenmostsharedcontents.Generally,audi-encesfollowed,handled,linkedforwardandraisedasdiscussiontopicsnewsitemsfromtheconventionalmainstreammedia,inadditiontowhichthecontentsfrompublicauthorities,es-peciallythepolice,wereamongthetopicsthatraisedthemostdiscussion.Linkstosocialme-diapostsandvideosfromthescenewerealsosharedtosomeextent.Atthebeginningoftheevents,inparticular,theauthorities,suchasthepolice,utilisedsocialmediaandespeciallyTwitterandFacebooktoasignificantextent.Overthefirstthreehours,thepolicehadastrongpresenceinsocialmediaandinformedthecitizensaboutthesocialmediaplatformsitwasusing.Inatimeofcrisis,thegreatmajorityofthepublicseemstoturntonewscontentsfromtheconventionalmediaandcommunicationsfrompublicauthorities.Theimpactoftheattackonthecitizens’senseofsecurityshowedinthesocialmediastudy.Hateandfear,spreadingthemaswellasattemptstopreventthemfromspreadingallstoodout.

2.7.2 CrimeandproblemsatreceptioncentresAccordingtopolicestatistics,in2017,asylumseekerswerecomplainantsin1,866crimesandsuspectsin2,690crimes.Asylumseekerswerecomplainantsin774assaultoffencesofvari-ousdegreesandsuspectsin655assaultoffences.Asawhole,assaults,thefts,pettytheftsandillegalthreatswerethemosttypicalcrimesforbothcomplainantsandsuspects.Asylumseek-ersweresuspectsin19countsofaggravatedassault.The2017statisticsdonotincludehomi-cidesotherthantheTurkustabbings.

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Crimesagainstpropertybyasylumseekersincreasedin2017comparedto2016,butcrimesagainstlifeandhealthdecreased.In2015,asylumseekersweresuspectsinlessthanhalfofthenumberofcrimesof2016and2017.Thepoliceestimatesthat,asawhole,crimescommit-tedbyasylumseekerswillincreasein2018.Moroccansarenotofteninthesestatisticsasper-petratorsofcrimes.Ofthetypicalasylumseekercountries,onlySomaliaandIraqmakethetop10countriesoforiginofpersonswhocommitcrimes.AccordingtoViolentextremisminFinland–situationoverview47,almost100offencessus-pectedofbeingconnectedwithviolentextremismtookplacein2017.Halfofthemwerecon-nectedtoright-wingextremism,one-thirdtoreligiouslymotivatedextremism,andtheresttoleft-wingextremism.Religiouslymotivatedactsweretypicallyillegalthreatsandassaults.Byfar,themostactssuspectedofbeingconnectedtoreligiouslymotivatedextremismwererec-ordedinSouthwestFinland.Accordingtotheoverview,anincreasehasbeennotedincasesrelatedtoradicalIslamistterrorismthathaveexceededthethresholdofpreliminaryenquiry,criminalinvestigationandthebringingofcharges.SomecrimeslinkedtoIslamareconnectedtoconflictsbetweenSunniandShiaMuslimsandbetweenradicalIslamistsandIslamistswithmoderateviews.Theoverviewdividespotentialperpetratorsofterroristcrimesintotwogroups.Thefirstgroupiscomprisedofindividualswithastrongideologicalcommitmentwhoconsidervio-lencejustified.Thesecondgroupcomprisesindividualswhohavealooseideologicalcommit-mentandforwhothethresholdofusingviolencehasbecomelower.Fortheseindividuals,or-ganisationssuchasISISmayprovidejustificationforviolentbehaviour.AccordingtoareportoftheCriminalSanctionsAgency48,byJanuary2018,112personscon-nectedtoviolentradicalismhadbeenidentifiedinFinnishprisons.InJanuary2018,overhalfofthemremainedinprisonoronsupervisedparole.Theobservationswereconnectedtorad-icalIslamismin76casesandtoright-wingextremismin28cases.Accordingtothereport,mostoftheactsofterrorinEuropeinrecentyearshavebeencommittedbyradicalisedfor-merconvicts.

TheMinistryofJusticehasinvestigatedtheexperiencesofreceptioncentrestaffmembersre-gardingthesafetyatreceptioncentres49.Thestaffmembersfeltthatworkingatareceptioncentrewasatleastfairlysafe.Typicalthreatsituationsincludedthethrowingofitemsandbreakingoffixtures,verbalthreatsandothermentalviolence.Actualphysicalviolenceorbe-ingthreatenedwithaweaponisrare,althoughapproximately10%oftherespondentsre-portedhavingexperiencedthem.Inthesurvey,thestaffalsoassessedthecausesofdisruptivebehaviourandcriminalactivities.Thebiggestcauseswereconsideredtobeinactivityandlackofactivitiesaswellasconcernforfamilymembersinthecountryoforigin.Thereceptionofanegativedecisionwasthoughttocauseproblembehaviour,althoughnotasmuchasthereasonsspecifiedhereinabove.ReceptioncentressubmitincidentreportstotheFinnishImmigrationService.Duringasam-plemonthin2017,76reportswerereceivedwithinthemonth.Theamountcorrespondswith47 MinistryoftheInterior(2018)ViolentextremisminFinland–situationoverview1/2018.Threatassessmentofviolentex-

tremisminFinlandin2017andtrends.WomenandchildreninradicalIslamistterroristorganisationsunderspecialreview.MinistryoftheInteriorpublications17/2018.

48 CriminalSanctionsAgency(2018)Etelä-Suomenrikosseuraamusalueenprojektiväkivaltaisenekstremisminjaradikalisoi-tumisentunnistamiseksi(‘ProjecttoidentifyviolentextremismandradicalisationintheCriminalSanctionsRegionofSouthernFinland’).CriminalSanctionsAgencyreport28February2018.

49 Piispa,M.,Sambou,S.&Alanko,M.(2017)Turvallisuudenkokemuksetvastaanottokeskuksissa(‘Experiencesofsafetyatreceptioncentres’).Thestaff’sviewsofthesafetyofreceptioncentresinasafetysurveyinMay2016.MinistryofJusticepublications2017:1.MinistryofJustice:Helsinki.

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themonthlytotalaroundthetime.Ofthese,around30wereviolentsituations,includingself-harm.Thereweresignificantlyfewerthreateningsituationstowardsthestaff.Inthelongterm,approximatelyaquarterofthereportswerethreatsconnectedtoself-harm.Onlyap-proximately4%ofreportswereconnectedtoanegativeasylumdecision,andtherewasasimilarshareofreportslinkedtohateconnectedtoreligion.Asylumseekers’uncertaintyaboutgettingaresidencepermitandtherighttostayinthecountryandthedurationoftheasylumprocessarespecialriskfactorsafterentryintotheter-ritory.Factorsaftertheentryintotheterritory,suchaslackofsocialsupport,difficultyinad-justing,theasylumprocess,lonelinessandunemploymentmakeasylumseekerssusceptibletodepressionandanxietyAnuncertainsituationinlifefullofchallengesandrestrictionsre-ducesagency,ortheabilityandopportunitytoaffectthecourseofone’slife.Insuchsitua-tions,itbecomesdifficulttomaintainapositiveidentity.50Alackofagencyreducesthepossibilitiesofactinginaccordancewithself-imposedgoalsandfindingwaystoachievethosegoals.Thepersonactsinwaysthatdonotmeettheirexpecta-tionsorunderstanding.Theyalsodonotdothingsthattheyexpectorwouldliketobedoing,ordothingsthattheydonotwantorwishtodo.Theirabilitytoself-regulatefeelingsandbe-haviourdecreases.50

Itistypicalforayoungperson’sasylumprocessthattheirthoughtsrevolvearoundthefuturedecision,andlifeisfelttoconsistofwaiting.Lifesortofstops,andlivingismanagementofun-certainty.51

2.7.3 TrendsofIslamistterrorinEuropeRecently,Europe52hasseenseveralterroristattackscommittedbyviolentJihadists.5354Vuonna2016islamistisenterrorisminuhreinakuoli135ihmistäjasiihenliittyenpidätettiin718henkilöä.In2016and2017,mostoftheterroristattacksinEuropeoccurredinFrance,Belgium,GreatBritainandGermany.In2017,therewerealsoattacksinSweden,SpainandFinland.Perpetratorshaveincludednetworkedgroupsaswellasindividualactors.Terroristattacksareaimedatkillingandinjuringasmanyrandomlyselectedpeopleaspossible.55Spreadingterrorandfearisanotherkeygoal.Jihadistshavejustifiedtheiractionswiththeirinterpreta-tionsoftheIslamicfaith.Attackshavebeenbothcarefullyplannedandspontaneous.SomeJihadistshavereceivedin-structionsfromtheleadersoftheIslamicState(ISIS),whileothershavebeeninspiredbythe50 Snellman,O.,Seikkula,J.,Wahlström,J.&Kurri,K.(2014)Specialfeaturesofmentalhealthandpsychologicalproblemsof

adultasylumseekersandrefugees.JournalofSocialMedicine.(51):203–222.51 Onodera,H.(2017)Thediversityofwaitingintheeverydaylivesofyoungasylumseekers.InV.Honkasalo,K.Maiche,H.

Onodera,M.Peltola&L.Suurpää(eds):Youngpeopleinreceptioncentres.FinnishYouthResearchNetwork:FinnishYouthResearchNetworkElectronicPublications120.

52 AccordingtotheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM;WorldMigrationReport2018)mostoftheterroristat-tacksworldwidearecommittedoutsideofWesternCountries.ThreeofthetencountriesthathavesufferedthemostfromterrorismareSyria,AfghanistanandSomalia,whichalsoproduceoverone-halfoftherefugeeflowsworldwide.Inthiscontext,however,itisrelevanttoanalysetheactsofterrorthathavetakenplaceinEurope.

53 Jihad(striving,struggling)canbedividedintotwodivergentinterpretations.The‘inner’orgreaterJihadreferstoanin-nerstruggletobeabetterpersonandstrivingtofollowIslamaccordingtotheexampleoftheprophetMuhammad.The‘lesser’Jihadislinkedtoaholywaronunbelievers.

54 EUROPOL(2017)EuropeanUnionTerrorismSituationandTrendReport.https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017.Accessed14December2017.

55 Merin,O.etal.(2017)TerroristStabbings–DistinctiveCharacteristicsandHowtoPrepareforThem.TheJournalofEmer-gencyMedicine.(53)4:451–457.

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messageofISIS.Inaspeechon22September2014,aSyrianISISspokesman,AbuMuhammadal-Adnani,urgedaJihadagainstunbelievers(kuffar)everywhere.56Theperpetratorsofter-roristattackshaveusedawiderangeofweapons.Thearsenalofweaponshasincludedauto-maticrifles,explosives,knives,axesandvehicles.

Targetshavetypicallyincludedboth‘hard’and‘soft’targets.Theformerincludethepoliceandsoldiers.Thelatterincludechurchesandsynagoguesaswellascrowdsatmarketplaces,concertsandcitycentres.Choosingtotargetlargecrowdsisaimedatcausingwidespreadde-struction.Atsofttargets,victimsareeasiertokill,theelementofsurpriseismaximisedandattacksarealmostimpossibletopreparefor.Sometargets57areselectedwiththeaimofat-tractingglobalattention.However,itseemsthattheuseoffairlyprimitivemethods,suchasedgedweaponsandvehicles,andattacksonsofttargetsinEuropeareheretostay.58TheprofileoftheperpetratorsofIslamistterroristattacksinEuropehasincludedasylumseekersandothersfromoutsideEuropeaswellasEUcitizenswhohavelivedinEuropeforalongtimeoraredescendantsofearlierimmigrants59.

ISIShasalsotakenadvantageoftheimmigrationfromtheconflictareasintheMiddleEasttoEurope,infiltratingterroristsamongthestreamofrefugeesandmigrants.TheParisattackin2015isanexampleofthis.

AccordingtotheIOM,researchgenerallyhighlightsthreeconditionsthatallowforradicalisa-tiontotakeroot.Theyarepooreducation,especiallywherethegapisfilledbyextremistreli-giousindoctrination,alackofworkorothermeaningfuldailyactivities,andtheabsenceoffreedomofmovement.Handlingtheseissuescanreducetheriskofradicalisation.59TerroristgroupstakeadvantageofthesocioeconomicproblemsofimmigrantswithMuslimbackgroundsintheirrecruitmentworkandwhenurgingindividualsinterestedinJihadismtocommitterroristattacks60.SpreadingpropagandahasbeenapartoftheoperatingprinciplesofISIS.Initspublications61,ISISstatesreasonswhythewaronunbelieversisjustified.Thearticlesandtextsalmostalwayscontaindirect,quotesfromtheQurantakenoutofcontextthatserveasjustificationsforviolence.

JihadistmaterialbyISIScanbefoundontheInternetquiteeasily.Amaq,asupposednewsoutletlinkedtoISIS,servesasadistributorforitspropaganda.ThedarknetandsocialmediacontainclosedgroupswhereJihadistshavediscussionsandthroughwhichtheyalsorecruitnewmembers.Face-to-faceconversationsbetweenJihadistslivinginEuropeandindividualsinterestedinJihadismarealsofairlytypical.Theymayalsotakeplaceincloseddiscussioncir-clesthatriseuparoundmosquesknownforradicalIslamism.MostofsuchmosqueshavehadfundingconnectionswithPersianGulfnations.Afterthefirstmeetings,apersonwhoisinter-estedinJihadismmaybespurredtostartfollowinginfluencersofopinionwhospreadtheradicalmessage.Individualswhoaresusceptibletoinfluencemaybetold,forexample,thattheWestisatwaragainstIslamandthattheWestsupportstheMiddleEasterndictatorswhooppresshuman

56 Muhlberger,W.&Ruohomäki,O.(2017)MiddleEasternterrorinflux:MosulafterDaesh,DaeshafterRaqqa.FIIABriefing

Paper212,TheFinnishInstituteofInternationalAffairs.57 Forexample,ZaventemAirportandMaalbeekMetroStationinBrussels.58 Schuurman,B.etal.(2017)LoneActorTerroristAttackPlanningandPreparation:AData-DrivenAnalysis.JournalofFo-

rensicSciences.(1):1–10.59 Accordingtothe2018reportoftheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM),themajorityoftheterroristattacksin

theUnitedStatesandEuropewere‘home-grown’.60 Roy,O.(2017)JihadandDeath:TheGlobalAppealofIslamicState.HurstandCompany:London.61 E.g.RumiyahandDabiqalongwithInspire.

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rightsinordertokeeptheIslamicworldunderheel.Oncethepersonstartsgettinginterestedinthistypeofrhetoricandhasswallowedthestory,sotospeak,theystartdiscussingthatsomethingmustbedone.Thediscussionmayincludeideasofheroismandrevenge.AsthepersonbecomessaturatedwithIslamisthatespeechandlistenstovariousreligioussongspraisingJihad(nasheed),theymaystarthatingthevaluesoftheWesternworldandthosewhorepresentit.Now,theymaynotbefarfromcrossingthethresholdtocommittinganactofviolence.ISIS,inparticular,specialisesincultivatingrhetoricagainstWesternvalues.Popu-listright-wingextremistanti-immigrationmovementsinEuropehavegivenaddedimpetustotheISISpropagandaabouttheWestbeingatwaragainstIslam.

Exchangeofinformationmostlytakesplaceonclosedmessagingplatformsinthesocialmedia(WhatsApp,TelegramandSignal).ForeignfightersreturningfromSyriaandIraqstrengthenJihadistnetworksthathaveen-trenchedthemselvesinEurope.Womenandminorsalsoplayrolesinterroristattacksthatarenotlimitedtosupport.Forexample,itiseasierforfemaleJihadiststooperatewithoutget-tingcaughtforplanningattacks.AccordingtoEuropeansecurityagencies,JihadistactivitiesinEuropeareincreasing.Itisesti-matedthatthereareatleast400–500hardcoreJihadistsinEuropewithbattleexperiencefromthefrontsinIraqandSyria.TheywillconstituteasignificantthreattosafetyinEuropefarintothefuture.

2.7.4 ProfilesofindividualactorsThedepartmentresponsiblefordomesticsecurity62intheUnitedstatesrecentlycommis-sionedastudy63abouttheprofilesofindividualactors64.Basedonthestudy,itcanbecon-cludedthatthereisnosinglegeneralprofileofanindividualactor.ThestudywasbasedonextensivedataofterroristswithbothIslamistandright-wingextremistbackgrounds.

Attackersincludedsingleandmarried,uneducatedandhighlyeducatedpeople.Somewereunemployedandothershadjobs.Somehadacriminalbackground,othersdidnot.Somehadmentalhealthproblemsandothershadnohealthproblemswhatsoever.Theirpathstocom-mittingaterroristattackvariedgreatly.Accordingtothestudy,inmostcases,otherpeoplehadknowledgeoftheperpetrators’ideo-logicalinclinations,worldviewandthoughtsofcommittinganactofviolence.Indeed,familymembers,friends,fellowstudentsandco-workersplayanimportantroleineffortstopreventaviolentattackbybringingtheinformationtotheauthorities.Theremaynotbeanindividualbehaviouralmodelbasedonwhichapotentialactofviolencecouldbeidentified.Inlightofthestudy,itseemsthatlife-shakingevents,suchasunemploy-ment,financialdifficulties,experiencesofdiscriminationorinjustice,changesinrelationshipsandreligiousconversionincaseofIslammayhavetriggeredtheperpetratortoact.Severalperpetratorsalsohadatendencytosociallyisolatethemselves.Ontheotherhand,thesameindividualsalsonetworkedwithlike-mindedpeople.Perpetratorswhoisolatethem-selvesfromothersconstituteaparticularthreatbecauseitismoredifficulttoobtaininfor-mationabouttheirthinkingandactionsforuseinthecreationofforecasts.

62 DepartmentforHomelandSecurity63 Gill,P.et.al.(2014)Bombingalone:tracingthemotivationsandantecedentbehaviorsoflone-actorterrorists.Journalof

ForensicSciences.59(2):425–435.64 Insomecontexts,individualactorsarereferredtoaslonewolves.

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However,itappearsthatseveralindividualactorshavenetworksofcontactsfromwhichtheygetinspiration,instructionsandadvice.Thenetworksofcontactsmayinvolvephysicalinter-actionsortakeplaceinthevirtualworld.Asaresult,traditionalhumanintelligencegathering(HUMINT)andmonitoringofmessagesareimportantinpreventingpotentialactsofterror.

Terroristattacksbyindividualactorsarerarelycompletelyspontaneous.Instead,theyareprecededbyachainofeventsthatinvolvesinternalisationofradicalideology,violentfanta-sies,acquisitionofthetoolsneededforaterroristattackandtraining.Ifinformationisob-tainedofthese,attemptscanbemadetopreventtheact.Ontheotherhand,thereisproofthateventhoughtheterroristattackitselfisrarelyspontaneous,thetimebetweentheplanandactionmaybeshort.Eventhoughterroristswithdifferentbackgroundshavedifferentprofiles,itisapparentthatIslamistterroristsareunitedbytheiryoungage,abuseofvirtualrealityinthelearningpro-cessandseekingapprovalfromterroristleaderswhotheyidolise.Terroristswithright-wingextremistbackgroundsareunitedbyunemployment,loweducationlevelsandinformingtheirsocialnetworkoftheactofterror.Terrorismresearchalsoindicatesthatalthoughthereisnosingledeterminingfactorforaperson’smotivationtocommitanactofterror,veryoftenthelackofadirectionorpurposeinlifeplaysakeyrole.65Contrarytowhatthesensationalistmediasuggest,terroristsarenotnecessarilysadistsorpsychopaths.Themajorityareordinarypeoplewho,accordingtothesocial-psychologicalrulesofgroupdynamics,aredriventodosomethingevilforacausetheybelievetobenobleandjust.

2.7.5 ThepathtoradicalisationThepathtoradicalisationgoesthroughmostlythesamesocial-psychologicalprocesses.ThefollowingcharacterisationislinkedtotheworldofIslamistterror,inparticular.66

Duringstage1,therecruitersstrivetoisolatethepotentialvictimfromtheirsocialenviron-ment.Therhetoric,mostofteninthevirtualworld,strivestoconvincethemthattheworldinwhichthepotentialvictimlivesisalie.ThevictimstartslookingforinformationonYouTube,clicksvariousInternetlinksandendsupinavirtualworldcontainingaradicalmessage.Atthisstage,thevictimmayabandontheiroldfriendsandseeknetworksofnew,like-mindedpeople.Duringstage2,therecruitersusuallysuggesttothevictimthatIslamoffersananswertotheirquestions.Theygettheexperienceofnowbelongingtoaselectgroupthatpossessesthetruth.Thevictimchangestheiridentitytobettercorrespondwiththebehaviouralmodeloftheirreferencegroup.Thisincludeschangesinthemodeofspeechand,insomecases,changesinexternalcharacteristics,suchasmodeofdressandformengrowingabeardintheSalafiststyle67.Duringstage3,theindoctrinatedvictimstrivestoisolatethemselvesspirituallyfromtheout-sideworldandmostoftenreferstonon-Muslimsasunbelievers(kuffar).Theoutsideworldisaworldoflies,andinteractionwithitmustberestrictedoratleasttreatedwithhostility.Thereisaverystrongunderlyingthemeof‘usvsthem’.

65 Specialreport:Thepsychologyofterrorism.ScientificAmerican.March25,2016.Themedissue.66 Bouzar,D.(2016)Rescuemission:FreeingyoungrecruitsfromthegripofISIS.ScientificAmerican,March25:1–13.67 SalafismisamovementwithinSunniIslamwithatendencytointerpretthesacredtextsofIslaminaconservativeand

strictfashion.Salafistswearalongbeardbutusuallynomoustache.

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Duringstage4ofradicalisation,dehumanisationentersthepicture.Everyonewhodoesnotfollowthevictim’spathiswrong,andnon-Muslimunbelieversareespeciallywrong.Accord-ingtothiswayofthinking,killingthemisnotacrime.BeheadingsandotherbarbaricactscommittedbyIslamistterroristorganisationssuchasISISareapartofthedehumanisation,whichinpartcontributestothetwistedunderstandingofhumanityoftheradicalisedperson.

2.7.6 PreventionofterroristattacksinEuropeInSweden,NorwayandDenmark68,actionplanstopreventradicalisationarepartlyorfullytheresponsibilityoftheministriesoftheinterior.Eachcountrystrivestoensurecooperationbetweenpublicauthorities.Anotherfeaturecommontoallofthemisthatthepreventionofviolentradicalisationandextremismisnotthesoleresponsibilityofsecurityauthorities,suchasthepolice,intelligenceandprisonauthorities.Thewayofthinkingofthewelfaresocietyisreflectedinthecomprehensiveapproachtotheproblem.Healthcare,childwelfare,socialservicesandyouthservicesaretypicalauthoritiesinvolved.Educationandculturecontributeaswell.Thecivicsocietyanditsorganisationsareinvolvedinthework,althoughrolesvaryfromcountrytocountry.Often,personsatriskofradicalisa-tionaresuspiciousofthemotivesofpublicauthorities.InFinland,theroleoforganisationsthatarebasedonreligionisemphasised.Theyhavecredibilityandcompetenceinreligiousinterpretation.Theyaremorecapablethanauthoritiesofworkingasagroupthatinjectsintothediscussionitsowninterpretationthatiscontrarytoradicalisationandextremismfromitsownreligiousstartingpoints.CoordinationamongandbetweendifferentactorsisbeingdevelopedinallNordiccountries,butitsclosenessandlevelsvary.AllNordiccountriesbelievethatradicalisationandextremism–theextremeright,theex-tremeleftandIslamists–aresocialproblemsthatcanbeprevented.Theybelieveintheim-portanceofearlyintervention.Underthecircumstances,thishighlightsinterventionintheproblemsofvulnerablegroupsandespeciallychildrenandyoungpeople.TheNordiccoun-triesalsoemphasisethatpropagandaandhatespeechmustbeaddressedsothattheidealsofdemocracyandthewelfarestatecanworkinpractice.AllNordiccountriesalsosharetheleadingprinciplethattheymustincreaseunderstandingandcompetenceinissuesconnectedtothecomplexofproblemsofradicalisationandextrem-ismanddevelopmethodsandtoolsthroughwhichpermanentsolutionscanbefound.InFranceandBelgium6970andGreatBritain71,thegovernmenthasreviewedtheterroristat-tackscommittedinrecentyearsandreleasedrecommendationsforactionstoaddressthephenomenon.

Belgiumamendedsomelawsafterthe2016terroristattacks.Anewchapteronterrorismwasaddedtothecriminalcode.Travellingabroadforterroristactivitieswascriminalised.68 Ramboll(2017)EffortstoPreventExtremismintheNordicCountries.http://uim.dk/publikationer/efforts-to-prevent-

extremism-in-the-nordic-countries.Accessed8January2018.69 Kellner,A.M.(ed.)(2017)DemocracyandTerrorism–ExperiencesinCopingwithTerrorAttacks,DemocracyandTer-

rorism–Experiences:CaseStudiesfromBelgium,France,IsraelandNorway.InternationalPolicyAnalysis.http://li-brary.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/13552-20171023.pdf.Accessed14December2017.

70 Stiftung,F.E.&ChambredesReprésentantsdeBelgique,EnquêteParlementaire(2017).AreportoftheBelgianparlia-mentontheactsofterroratBrusselsAirportandMaalbeekMetroStation.15juin2017,Chargéed’examinerlescircon-stancesquiontconduitauxattentatsterroristesdu22mars2016dansl’aéroportdeBruxelles-NationaletdanslastationdemétroMaelbeekàBruxelles,ycomprisl’évolutionetlagestiondelaluttecontreleradicalismetlamenaceterroriste.

71 IntelligenceandSecurityCommitteeofParliament(2018)AnnualReport2016–2017.http://isc.independ-ent.gov.uk/committee-reports/annual-reports.Accessed14December2017.

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Newtoolswereaddedforterrorism-relatedinvestigation,includingtelephonetapping.ItmadeitpossibletowithdrawtheBelgiancitizenshipofdualcitizensandtemporarilyvoidpersonalidentificationdocuments.Theothermeasuresareconnectedtotheorganisationoftheworkagainstterrorism.Belgiumhasappointedanationalsecuritycounciltocoordinateintelligenceandsafetypolicyandpri-oritiesforsecurityservices.Thecouncilischairedbytheprimeminister.Thecouncilisalsoresponsibleformattersconnectedtothefundingofterrorism.Thelawallows,forexample,thefreezingofassetsofindividualsguiltyoffundingterrorism.ThemonitoringofforeignfighterslivinginBelgiumisbeingenhancedonamunicipallevel.Mayorshavebeenaskedtoestablishlocalcellsforintegralsecurity.Theactionplanofanationalworkgrouponradicali-sationincludesadministrativeandjudicialtoolsforthepreventionofradicalisation.Radicali-sationpreventionworkinprisonsisunderthesupervisionoftheFrenchMinistryofJustice.Thecounter-terrorismworkalsoinvolvesconcreteactions,suchastheincreaseofthesecu-ritybudgetbyMEUR400,developmentofpoliceworkwithborderinspectionposts,adoptionofnewtechnologies,suchastheexpansionofvoicerecognitionandtelephonetapping,exten-sionofadministrativearrestsfrom24to72hours,expansionofhomesearchestoaroundtheclock,endingoftheanonymityofprepaidtelephonecards,closingofunofficialmosquesthatspreadJihadism,closingofwebsitesthatspreadhatespeechandexpansionoftheCCTVnet-work.Francehasalsoinvestedinthedevelopmentoflegislationconnectedtothepreventionofter-rorismsincetheParisterroristattackin2015.Francehasorderedanadministrativetravelbanonindividualswhohavebecomeradicalisedabroadandimposedstrictpunishmentsfortheidealisationofterrorismandincitementtoactsofterror.Frenchlawalsofacilitatesad-ministrativeactionsforclosingwebsitesthatidealiseactsofterror.Authoritiescanalsoexam-inecloudservicesandcaptureconversationsatonlinediscussionplatforms.Thecounter-ter-rorismworkalsoinvolvesalargenumberoftoolsthatutiliseinformationtechnology.TheFrenchpolicehasgainedseveraltoolsforthepreventionofactionsthatthreatenpublicsafetybysuspiciouspersons.Forexample,thepolicehastherighttoremovesuspiciousandthreateningpersonsfromspecificareasinFrance.Thisalsoincludesputtingsuspiciousper-sonsonhousearrest.Thepolicecansearchandexaminesuspiciouspersons.

AftertheterroristattacksinFrance,thepublicauthoritieshaveinvestedinincreasingthere-sourcesandcompetenceofbothmilitaryandcivilsecurityauthorities.Asadetail,letusnotethecreationofanewNationalGuard(laGardeNationale)inOctober2016.Thisforcecom-prisedofvolunteerreservistsaimstocontributetoimprovingthesecurityofthecountryandcitizens.Theunderlyingideaisfreeingsoldiersinactiveservicefromthetaskofguardingsen-sitivepublicbuildings.Thetargetstrengthof85,000peopleisdividedbetweentheFrenchMinistryofDefence,Gendarmerieandthepolice.France’scounterterrorismworkextendspastthecountry’sborders.FrancehasinvestedinthefightagainstterrorisminMaliandSyria,inparticular.InNovember2015,Francealsoacti-vatedArticle42(7)oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionaboutmutualdefence72,duetowhichseveralEUmemberstatesparticipatedintheoperationsinMaliwithadditionalresources.

72 Article42(7)oftheoftheTreatyonEuropeanUnion:IfaMemberStateisthevictimofarmedaggressiononitsterritory,

theotherMemberStatesshallhavetowardsitanobligationofaidandassistancebyallthemeansintheirpower,inac-cordancewithArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter.ThisshallnotprejudicethespecificcharacterofthesecurityanddefencepolicyofcertainMemberStates.

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GreatBritainhasalsoexperiencedseveralterroristattacksinrecentyears.AccordingtoarecentreportbytheIntelligenceandSecurityCommitteeofParliamentofGreatBritain,itisnotrealistictoassumethatallterroristattackscanbeprevented.ThesecurityauthoritiesofGreatBritainbelievethatitisparticularlyhardtodisrupt‘lonewolf’attacks

Despitethis,thesecurityauthoritiesinGreatBritainhavesoughttolearnfromthemanyat-tacksthathavetakenplaceinthecountry.Forexample,thecapacity,capabilityandreadinessofthepoliceforarmedinterventionshasbeenimproved.Thisisamajorchangefrombefore;theuseofweaponsinlawenforcementhasplayedaminorroleinthetraditionofBritishpo-liceoperations.

Thepoliceinvestsinprotectivepatroloperationsinplaceswheremanypeoplearegathered.Thereisgreaterinvestmentthanbeforeinthesafetyplansoflargepublicmassgatherings.Thevulnerabilityofcriticalsocialinfrastructureismitigatedandcooperationwithprivatesectorenhanced.Thecountryhas170terrorismpreventionexperts,whoadviseprivatesec-toractorsonhowtobetterprepareforthreatsituationsthroughsafetyplans,operatingmod-elsandtemporaryandpermanentphysicalbarriers.LikeFrance,GreatBritainisapplyingameasurefromcounter-terrorismlaw(TerrorismPre-ventionandInvestigationMeasuresregime)basedonwhichpotentiallydangerousindividualscanbeplaced200milesfromtheirhomeand/orsocialnetwork.Theunderlyingideaistobreaknetworksandcellsdedicatedtoterroristactivities.TheEuropeanParliamentestablishedaspecialcommitteeinautumn2017todeterminewhysomanyterroristattackshavebeencommittedinEuropeinrecentyears.73Thecommit-teestarteditsworkinSeptember2017.Itsmandateistodeterminewhatwentwrongafterattacksarecommitted.Thecommitteehasheardvariousrepresentatives,theCommission,theCounter-TerrorismCoordinator(CTC)andtheEUIntelligenceandSituationCentre(INTCEN).Thecommitteehasalsomadevisitstomemberstates,EuropolandEurojust,forex-ample.Thecommitteetermwilllastuntiltheendof2018,anditwillpublishafinalreportwithconclusionsandpossiblerecommendations.

2.7.7 ObservationsonactionsbytheauthoritiesduringtheStockholmattackOnFriday,7Aprilatapproximately3pm,aterroristattacktookplaceinStockholmcitycen-treasamandrovealorryintoacrowdinapedestrianstreet.Fivepeopledied.Severalau-thoritiespreparedreportsontheincident7475,analysingtheactionsbytheauthoritiesandproposingimprovements.TheeventsinStockholmandtheactionsandproblemsoftheau-thoritieshadsomesignificantsimilaritieswiththeTurkuattack.TheattacktookplaceonabusyFridayinStockholmcitycentreonDrottningsgatan,oneofthecity’smajorpedestrianandshoppingstreets.Theattackwascarriedoutbydrivingalorry,whichhadbeenhijackedmomentsearlier,intoacrowd.Theattackerfledthescene.Whenthepolicereceivednoticeoftheattack,policecommandimmediatelystartedsuspect-ingaterroristattackbasedonpreviousexperienceandsimilarattacksthathadtakenplacein

73 EuropeanParliament(2017)Settingupaspecialcommitteeonterrorism,itsresponsibilities,numericalstrengthand

termofoffice.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0307+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.Accessed14December2017.

74 ReportofStockholmrescueservicesontheStockholmattack.Erfarenheterefterden7aprilSSBF:sbehovavutveckladförmågavidenterrorhändelse.https://www.storstockholm.brand.se/globalassets/dokument/ovrigt/170621_storstock-holms-brandforsvars-erfarenhetsrapport-efter-terrordadet-7-april.pdf.

75 ReportofStockholmPoliceontheStockholmattack.UtvärderingavdennationellasärskildahändelsenNimo.https://po-lisen.se/siteassets/dokument/utvarderingar/utvardering-av-attentatet-i-stockholm-7-april-2017.pdf.

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Europe.Plentyofpoliceresourceswerealertedtothescene.Therescueservicesandemer-gencymedicalserviceswerealsoalertedtothescene.Atfirst,thesituationpicturewasun-clearaswasthethreatscenarioastowhethertherewereotherattackscomingandwhetherthevehicleitselfinvolvedotherriskfactors,suchasexplosives.Therescueservicesthoughtthattheywerecomingtohandleatrafficaccidentanddidnotrealisethetruenatureofthein-cidentuntiltheyarrivedtothescene.Intheearlystages,bystandersatthesceneplayedanimportantroleinhelpingthevictimsbeforetheauthoritiesarrived.Thehelpersalsoincludedsecurityguardsandoff-dutypoliceofficers.Stafffromanearbymedicalclinicalsocameouttohelpwiththevictims’treatmentandstatedthattheywerepreparedtoreceiveslightlyinjuredvictims,ifnecessary.Thefirstpoliceofficersreachedthescenequicklyafterthealert.Therewasnotimetotakeheavyweaponryortacticalgearwiththematfirst.Policespecialunitsalsoreachedthescenequickly.Otherauthoritiesarrivedalittleafterthefirstpoliceunits.Immediatelyaftertheincident,therewasawarenessoftheriskthatthenextattackcouldbetargetedattheauthoritiesarrivingatthescene.However,thisdidnotpreventtheauthoritiesfromacting.InEurope,inrecentyears,sofartherehavebeennosecondaryattacksonauthor-itiesarrivingtohandlethesituation,buttheriskisobvious.

Therewerevisiblyarmedplain-clothespoliceofficerswithoutvisiblepoliceidentificationpresentatthescene,whichcausedconfusionandpossiblyfearamongbystanders.Therewasalsoapossibilitythattheuniformedpoliceofficersmighthaveusedforceagainsttheuniden-tifiablepoliceofficers.Thepoliceestablishedacommandlocationinthecitycentre.Thesituationcommandersoftherescueservicesandemergencymedicalserviceswerenotatthepolicecommandlocationbutinsteadsupervisedtheirowncrewsclosertothescene.Twojointmeetingsoftheauthori-tieswereheldatthepolicecommandlocation,buttherewerenopermanentrepresentativesfromrescueservicesandemergencymedicalservicesatthecommandlocation.Furthermore,thevariousauthoritiesdidnothaveajointgeneralcommand;instead,eachoperatedwithintheframeworkoftheirownmanagementsystemasparallelorganisations.Thelackofajointcommandoftheauthoritiesmadeitmoredifficultforthedifferentauthori-tiestoformajointsituationpicture.Therewasuncertaintyatthecommandlocationaboutthenumberofvictims.Thepolicealsodidnotsharealloftheinformationatitsdisposalwiththeotherauthoritiesinotherwaysbecausetheperpetratorwasmissingandtheycouldnotdiscloseactionstargetedattheperpetratortothoseoutsidethepoliceorganisation.Theauthorities’digitaltelecommunicationsnetworkusedinSwedenwascriticisedbyallac-torsduetocongestionandinappropriatecallgroupstructure.Therewereproblemswithget-tingvitalmessagesthrough,bothbetweenauthoritiesandinauthorities’internalcommunica-tions.Rumoursofothersimilarincidentsstartedcirculatingsoonaftertheincident,whichrequiredresourcestoinvestigate.Thearmedforcestookpartinsecuringcriticaltargets.Theresourcesweresufficientforalltheauthorities.Emergencymedicalservicesandrescueserviceswereabletooperateeffectivelyandthevictimsweretransportedtotreatmentrela-tivelyquicklyconsideringthenatureoftheirinjuries.Plentyofoff-dutypoliceofficerscameintowork,andsomehadtobesenthomeinordertoensurethecontinuityofoperationsthefol-lowingday.Workmotivationinthepoliceorganisationwashighthroughouttheinitialstage.

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Emergencymedicalservicesandrescueservicesoperatedwiththestaffatworkatthescene.Morestaffwerealertedtohospitals.TheSwedishpoliceannouncedanationaldisastersituationwithinthepoliceorganisation.Thiswasnotdonebyanyotherauthorities.

TheperpetratorwasarrestedinasuburbinNorthernStockholmthatevening.ThepolicehadreleasedinthemediaanimageoftheperpetratorcapturedfromCCTVfootage.Theperpetra-torwaslocatedbasedonatip-offfromamemberofthepublic,andthearrestwascarriedoutbyanordinarypolicepatrolinvestigatingthetip-off.Therewerenootherattacksandtheve-hicleuseddidnotinvolvefactorscausingadditionaldanger.Later,itwasfoundoutthattheperpetratorsympathisedwithISISideology.Suggestionsforimprovementwereproposedinlargenumbersinthereportssubmittedaf-tertheattack.Alloftheauthoritiesemphasisedtheneedforsufficientdrillingofdemandingassignmentsinvolvingmultipleauthoritiesinfuture.Anotherjointdevelopmenttargetwasimprovingthestructureandreliabilityoftheauthorities’telecommunicationsnetwork.Theimportanceofsharingthesituationpicturewasemphasised,buttheneedforajointcommandorganthatwouldserveunderthegeneralcommandoftheresponsibleauthoritywasbarelymentioned.Althoughajointgeneralcommandorganwasnotwantedfor,allinvolvedsawaneedtofurtherdeveloptechnologicalinformationdistributiontoolsandsolutionstosupportthesituationpicture.Cooperationshouldalsobebettersynchronised.Thepolicecalledattentiontotheneedtohavesufficientprotectiveequipmentandarmatureatallpoliceunitssothatthefirstunittoencountertheperpetratorwouldhavethebestcapa-bilitiespossibletostoptheact.Plentyofpoliceofficerscametoworkvoluntarily,whichcausedaneedtoplanthedistributionoftheworkforceandensurecontinuityinfuturesitua-tionsthroughbetterplanning.Itwasverynoteworthythatalthoughpolicespecialunitsreachedthesceneapproximately15minutesaftertheattack,itisverylikelythatinterroristattacks,policeoperationsduringtheinitialstagewillbebasedonthecompetenceandfunctionalcapacityofordinarypolicepa-trols.Forthisreason,itwasconsiderednecessarytoimprovethecapabilityofordinarypolicepatrolstorespondtoattacks.Fromthepoliceperspective,itwouldbeimportanttocreatevariousmodelsforwarningpeo-ple,allofwhichshouldbeused.Toreducetheriskofanewattackin,forexample,publictransport,thereshouldbecapabilitiestoquicklystoptrafficintheincidentarea.Restoringthepublicsenseofsecurityaftertheincidentasquicklyaspossiblewasconsid-eredimportantandtheroleofthepolicethereinvital.Themostimportantdutywouldbetoincreasethevisibilityofthepoliceinthecityandatpublicevents.Thepoliceshouldbeeasilyapproachableandabletocommunicatereliablyandeffectivelywiththepublicandmediarightfromthebeginning.Wearinguniformsandpossiblyvisibleweaponscouldalsocreateasenseofsecurity.Animprovedsenseofsecuritywasconsideredtopromotethesociety’sre-coveryfromtheincidentandpreventconflicts,forexamplebetweenpopulationgroups.Thehealthservicesobservedaneedforbetterplanning.ThehealthservicesactorsintheStockholmareahadthreedifferentdisasterplans,whichshouldbeharmonised.Performancelevelrequirementsshouldbedefinedforhospitalsforthemanagementofabnormalsitua-tions.Itshouldalsobeplannedhowtoaddprivateclinicsprovidingtreatmentinthecityintosituationsasresources.Itwasdifficulttomanagepatientregistrationatthehospitalduetothelargeinfluxofpatients,whichwasconsideredtoneedimprovement.

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Theemergencymedicalservicessystemoperatedundertheleadershipofthesituationcom-mandatthescene.Theproposalfordevelopmentmentionedwasthedevelopmentofthemanagementsystemforemergencymedicalservicesinsuchamannerastohaveahighergeneralcommandorganinthebackgroundoffieldactivities.Thiscouldimprovetheflowofinformationbetweenemergencymedicalservicesandthehospital,whichmustimproveinquality.Crisissupportwasalsosubjecttosuggestionsforimprovement.Crisissupportmustbelaunchedquickly.Inadditiontothefactthatpersonsdirectlyinvolvedinattacksmayneedcrisissupport,groupsthatwerenotpresentbutstillneedcrisissupportalsoneedtoberecog-nised.Crisissupportshouldbeplannedinadvanceanddrilled.Crisissupportplansshouldbein-cludedinotherhealthcareplans,andthevariousactorsshouldcollaborateontheplanning.Duringamajorsituation,hospitalsshouldcooperateonthecoordinationofcrisissupport.Culturalfactorsshouldbeconsideredbetterbecausedifferentpopulationgroupsandactorsexperiencecrisissupportdifferently.TheCityofStockholm’soperationalassessment76paidattentionto,forexample,thelaunch-ingoftheactivitiesofthecity’scrisismanagementgroupanditsworkmethods.Thecoopera-tionbetweenthecityandregionalactorswasobservedtohaveneedforimprovement.Thecity’sexternalandinternalcommunications,organisationofcrisisassistanceandsupportfunctionsconnectedtotheoperationsofthecrisisorganisationalsohadroomforimprove-ment.

76 ReportoftheCityofStockholm,assessmentofactionsaftertheterroristattack.UtvärderingavhanteringeniStockholms

stadavterrordådeticentralaStockholmden7april2017.August2017https://insynsverige.se/documen-tHandler.ashx?did=1912835.

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3 ANALYSIS

Figure6. Accimapdiagramdrawnupbytheinvestigationteam.

3.1 ArrivalinFinlandandasylumapplicationAccordingtohisownaccount,theperpetratorleftMoroccoduetoabadfamilysituationandtodisengagefromaviolentgang.HetravelledtoFinlandthroughseveralEuropeancountries.Duringhisjourney,hespenttimeinGermanyandItaly.InGermany,heregisteredasanasy-lumseeker,buttheprocessdidnotgetsofaralongthathisfingerprintswouldhavebeentaken,andthushisfingerprintswerenotstoredintheEurodacsystem.Theperpetrator’sfin-gerprintswereapparentlytakenduringavisittoSwitzerlandbutbecausehewithdrewtheasylumapplicationhehadsubmittedthere,hisfingerprintswerenotstoredinEurodac.InGermany,theperpetratorgotintodifficultiesand,apparentlyduetopositiveimpressionslinkedtoFinland,decidedtogotoFinland.Asawhole,itseemsthattheEuropeanasylumap-plicationsystem,whichisbasedontheDublinRegulation,anditsfingerprintdatabasearenotworkingasintended.ManypeoplefromNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEasthavetriedandsucceededinenteringEu-rope.Amongthemareindividualssusceptibletoradicalisation.AfterenteringtheSchengenArea,itiseasytomovefromcountrytocountry.ReasonsfortryingtoreachEuropeincludedrivingfactors,suchasacrisisorunsafecircumstancesandpooreconomicsituationinthecountryoforigin.Attractionfactors,ontheotherhand,includethesafetyofmanyEuropeanstatesandexpectationsofahigherstandardofliving.

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TheperpetratorappliedforasyluminFinlandunderafalsenameandage.Minorsaremorelikelytobegrantedaresidencepermitthanadults.Theyalsohavebetteropportunitiestoac-cesseducation.Usinghisrealinformation,theperpetrator’sasylumapplicationmighthavebeenfoundtobeobviouslybaselessandprocessedunderexpeditedprocessing.Inthatcase,theapplicantmightnothavedevelopedunrealisticexpectationsaboutasylum.Removalfromthecountrycouldalsohavebeendonemorequickly.Itisfairlyeasytoapplyforasylumunderafalsenameandage,andtheauthoritiesdonotuseallthemethodsavailablefortheestablishmentofidentity.Forensicageestimationisnotusedforeveryonewhomayhavemisrepresentedtheirage.Theinformationisalsonotverifiedwiththestatedcountryoforigin.Thisistoshieldtheasylumseekerandtheirfamilyfromanypersecutionbythecountryoforigin.Inpractice,onecanstayinFinlandforalongtimebyapplyingforasylum.InMarch2018,forexample,processingtimesintheapplicationprocesswiththeappealperiodwereapproxi-mately18months.Almosteveryonewhoreceivesanegativedecisiongoesontoappealtotheadministrativecourt.Theprocessingtimesgrewlongerduetothemassinfluxofasylumseek-ersin2015and2016.Longprocessingtimesanduncertaintyarekeyfactorsthatimpairthewell-beingofasylumseekers.Livingunderafalseidentityisalsostressful.

Theasylumsystemwascreatedtoprotectpeopleinneedofinternationalprotection.Asylumseekersoftenarrivewithoutidentificationpapersduetothesituationoftheircountryoforigin.Athoroughinvestigationofanasylumseeker’sbackgroundrequiresalotofeffort.Thesystemcanalsobeuseddishonestly.

3.2 GettinginterestedinradicalIslamismAsearlyasautumn2016,theperpetratorvoicedstrictinterpretationsofwhatkindofbehav-iourisappropriateforMuslims.Attheturnof2016and2017,theperpetrator’sinterestinradicalIslamismincreased.Thiscausedsuchconcernamonghisimmediatecirclethatatip-offwassenttothepoliceaboutthreatsandradicalisation.

Thelongwait,idleness,uncertainfutureandcrushedplansmakepeoplesusceptibletoprob-lembehaviour.Studiesonthewell-beingofasylumseekershaveshownthatwaitingandun-certaintyaboutthefuturearekeyfactorscausingmentalhealthproblems.Theuncertainsitu-ationcanleadtoasortoflossofagencysuchthatthepersonisnolongerthesubjectoftheirownlife.Oncetheexperienceofcontroloftheirownlifeandself-esteemstarttofade,thereisariskoffindingthewrongkindofcontentandpurposefortheirlife.Astressfulsituationinlifecombinedwiththerightpersonalitytraitsledtoaninterestinviolentradicalismandtherebyfixatedthoughtsand,finally,theact.

ApersoninterestedinradicalIslamismcaneasilyfindskilfullyproducedradicalIslamistpropagandaonline.Terroristorganisationsencourageandmotivatesusceptibleindividualsonlineandthroughpersonalinteractionstocarryoutterroristattacks.Thetip-offinJanuary2017didnotleadtomakingcontactwiththepersonwhosentthetip-offormakingcontactwiththeperpetratororanyotherpracticalactions,althoughtheinfor-mationwasprocessedattheNationalBureauofInvestigationandtheFinnishSecurityIntelli-genceServiceaswellasthelocalpolice.Atthetime,thepolicedidnothaveauniformnation-widemethodforprocessingtip-offs,andthedistributionoflabourinthesemattersbetweendifferentpoliceorganisationswasunderdeveloped.Apparently,eachactorassumedthatthe

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issuewasminororbeinghandledbyanotheractor.Thepersonwhosentthetip-offalsoas-sumedthatsomethingwasbeingdoneorhadbeendoneaboutthematter.Thepoliceusuallydonotprovidefeedbacktopersonswhosendtip-offs,sotheymaygetthisimpression.

3.3 DeeperradicalisationThroughspring2017,theperpetratorspokemoreandmoreaboutISIStootherasylumseek-ersandwaseagertodiscussmattersoffaithuntilhisfriendsgrewuncomfortable.Inearlysummer,duringRamadan,theperpetratorstartedtoattendprayersmoreactively.Ataroundthesametime,theperpetratormetapersonwhoinstructedhiminusingaclosedinstantmes-sengerservicethatcontainedradicalIslamistmaterials.Theperpetratorstoppedbeinginter-estedineverydaymatters,studyingor,forexample,sports.Theperpetratorisolatedhimselffromfriendstosomeextent.Theperpetrator’sclosestfriendobservedaclearchangeinhimandwasworriedabouthim.Thesituationwasmadeworsebythefactthattheperpetratorwasstayingbyhimselfathisfriend’semptyflatandonlyvisitedthereceptioncentretocollecthisallowanceandtodohismandatorychores.Itistypicalofthebackgroundofpersonswhocommitanactofterroralonethattheirbehav-iourchangesfairlyquicklyandtheirimmediatecircleobserveworryingsigns.Theproblemisthatasylumseekersoftendistrusttheauthoritiesandtherearenofunctioninglow-thresholdchannelsavailableforsubmittingobservations.Incaseofapersonplanninganactofviolencealone,theobservationsoftheirimmediatecirclearevaluable.Theymustbelistenedto,theymustbeaddressedandappropriateactorsmustbefoundtosolvethem.Currently,theproblemsconnectedtoradicalisationaretoooftenreferredtothepoliceeventhoughradicalisationisnotacriminalcaseassuch.Thepolicehaslimitedpowersandproce-duresinthingsthatarenotcriminalcases.Thepolicemaynothaveproperconnectionsorprocedurestodirectindividualstoanotherservice,suchashealthcare,socialservicesorthird-sectorservices.SuchpossibilityexistsinAnchoractivities,butusuallyAnchoractivitiesonlyinvolvecaseswhereaminorhasalreadycommittedacrimeorbeenavictimofacrime.

Finlandhasastrategiclevelprogrammeforthepreventionofviolentradicalisationandex-tremism.Theimplementationoftheprogrammeishinderedbythefactthatthepreventiveactivitiesareproject-oriented,under-resourcedanddisjointed.Atthemoment,alotofexpec-tationshavebeenpiledonAnchoractivitiesregardingthepreventionofviolentextremism.Inpractice,Anchoractivitiescurrentlyonlytargetminors,andtheactivitiesarenotproperlyim-plementedinallpartsofFinland.Manyindividualsatriskofradicalisationareexcludedduetotheirage.Furthermore,asylumseekersareordinarilynotcoveredbymunicipalservices.Afeworganisationscarryoutimportantanti-radicalisationwork.However,theactivitiesareproject-oriented,thehumanresourcesarelimitedandtheactivitiesareonlylocalandnotwellknown.MuslimreligiouscommunitiesandotherMuslimcommunitieshavepotentialfortheidentifi-cationandguidanceofproblemindividuals.However,theproblemisthattheactivitiesarebasedonvolunteerlabourandlacktrainedstaff.Itisimportanttogetcommunitiestocommittotheactivities.

3.4 ThestabbingsTheperpetratoractedaloneandchoseamethodthatdoesnotrequireanyparticularprepara-tionorequipment.Suchindividualattacksonsofttargetsusingeverydayimplementsaredif-ficulttoprevent,especiallywhentheperpetratoristypicallyreadytodie.Thishighlightsthe

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importanceofearlyidentificationofpotentiallydangerousindividualsandinterventionintheirdevelopment.ThesituationatTurkuMarketSquareanditsvicinitydemonstratedthatbystanderscanmiti-gatetheconsequencesofanattackbyinfluencingtheperpetratorandprovidingemergencyfirstaid.However,thisinvolvesrisk.Despitetherisks,theactivitiesofbystandersarevitalbe-causeofficialinterventionmaytakesometime.Bystandersplayedakeyrolebymakingemer-gencycalls,whichallowedtheEmergencyResponseCentretoconveyasituationpicturetothepoliceandemergencymedicalservices.Peoplewithspecialskillsorexperienceareare-sourceinsuchsituations.

3.5 ActionsbytheauthoritiesTheeyewitnessesquicklymadeemergencycalls,andtheERCalertedthepolice.Thesituationwaschallenging.ThereweremanyemergencycallsbuttheERCwasabletoformapictureoftheeventsandvictims.Thepolicehadresourcesinthecitycentrearea.Theperpetratorwasdetectedquicklyandthepolicewereabletostophimveryquicklyanddeftly,whichpre-ventedadditionalvictims.Theactionswereinaccordancewiththeoperatingmodelsthepo-licehavedevelopedanddrilledforinrecentyears.Thedevelopmentworkhasbeensuccess-ful.However,thepolicecannotbeexpectedtoalwaysmanagetostopactsofviolencethisquickly.Endingwithinafewminutes,thesituationdidnotcauseaneedtoissueanemergencywarning.Ittakesapproximatelyhalfanhourtoissueanemergencywarning.Emergencymedicalserviceswerealertedquickly.TherewasasmalldelayingettingtothepatientsbecausetheEMSstoppedtowaitforinformationfromthepoliceconfirmingthattheareawassecure.Therewasaslightadditionaldelayduetothefactthatinformationwascon-veyedtotheEMSthroughtheEmergencyResponseCentre.Theuseofjointcallgroupswouldhavemadeforafasterflowofinformation.However,thedelaydidnotcompromisethetreat-mentofthevictims.AdirectspeechconnectionbetweenthepoliceandEMSwouldhavehelpedtheEMSfieldsu-pervisortogetinformationearlieraboutthelocationofthevictimsandaroughclassificationinto,forexample,thewalkingandnon-walking.ResourcescouldhavebeenallocatedearlierforthetreatmentofthevictimswiththeworstinjuriesatPuutoriSquare.Inthiscase,thetreatmentorderwasdictatedbyhowtheparamedicsprogressedtowardsPuutoriSquare.Noharmwascaused.Fromamedicalviewpoint,allofthevictimsandtheperpetratorreceivedthetreatmenttheyneededinduecourse.Thenatureoftheincidentdifferedfromtheconven-tionalideaofamajoraccidentinwhichthepatientsareusuallywithinalimitedarea.Inawidespreadincident,informationaboutthesituationpictureisneededassoonaspossible,whichismadepossiblewithagreed-onoperatingmodelsandtoolsandinstructionsthatsup-portthem.Thegenerallyagreed-onprincipleisthat,dependingonthesituation,theauthoritywiththemostcentraldutiesinhandlingthesituationservesasthegeneralcommander.Inthiscase,itwasthepolice.Theotherauthoritiesexpectedthepolicetotakethemmoreintoaccountandprovidemoreleadership.Anotherviewpointisthateachauthorityhasitsownstatutorydu-tieswhichitmustindependentlyperformassoonaspossible.Allauthoritiesmustactivelycontacteachotherwhentheyneedinformationorassistance.Correspondingly,authoritiesmustknowtheneedsoftheotherauthorities,takethemintoaccountintheiractivitiesanddistributenecessaryinformation.Therescueserviceswerenotalertedfortheassignmentbecausetheyarenotamongtheau-thoritiestobealertedforcasesofstabbing.However,therescueservicesindependentlycame

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tothesceneandprovidedassistancetothepoliceforensicinvestigation.Therewouldhavebeenopportunitiestoutilisetherescueservicesevenmore.Inthiscase,therewasnogreatneedforsuch,butinmoremajorsituations,theremustbeabilitytoutilisetheresourcesoftherescueservices.

Basedontheinvestigationofthestabbingcaseandsomeprevioussituations,theauthoritiesdonothavequitethesameviewsofactivitiesmulti-authoritysituationsorenoughinfor-mationabouttheduties,needsandcapabilitiesofotherauthorities.TurkuUniversityHospitalhandledthetreatmentofthepatientswell,andallthepatientsre-ceivedthemedicalcaretheyneeded.Victimsstartedarrivingapproximately15minutesafterthepreliminaryinformationarrived,whichwasfairlyquicklyfortheraisingofthereadinesslevel.Thehospital’semergencyclinichadnothadthetimetoperformalloftheplannedac-tions.Thesituationwasunusualinthatthehospital’ssecurityarrangementshadtobein-creasedquickly.Becausetheincidentwasasuspectedterroristattack,itcausedmoreworryandfearamongthestaffthananordinaryactofviolence.Somedangerandthreatsalsore-sultedfromhavingthesuspectatthehospital.Thehospitalwouldhavepreferredtoreceivemoreinformationaboutthesituationdirectlyfromthepolice.Ahospital-widedisasteralertwasnotsentout,whichaffectedthealertingofthetopmanage-mentandsecuritymanagementaswellas,primarily,communications.Ifthesituationhadex-panded,therecouldhavebeendeficienciesintheallocationofresources,contactwiththeneighbouringhospitaldistricts,contactswiththestateadministrationandmaintenanceofthehospitaldistrict’sgeneralsituationpicture.Disasterreadinesshadbeendevelopedrecentlybut,inthesuddensituation,therewasnotimetostartusingthemostrecentactivitycards.Thedocumentationofthesituationwasincomplete.EmergencySocialServiceswereabletolaunchacrisiscentreandopencrisishelplinesquickly.OfficialassistancewasreceivedfromVantaaSocialandCrisisEmergencyServices,forexampleintheformofguidancewithhandlingthepracticalarrangements.Theassistancewasvaluable.TheFRCwasabletolaunchvolunteeractivitiesquicklyattherequestoftheauthori-ties.TheCityofTurkudecidedtohandletheacutepsychosocialsupportofeveryoneinneed,regardlessoftheirmunicipalityofresidence.Itwasagooddecision.Aproblemwasobservedinobtainingthecontactinformationofthevictimsandtheirrela-tives.Itturnedoutthatthereisnolegislationthatwouldallowthedisclosureofsuchinfor-mation,sothepolicedidnotdiscloseit.Aftertheacutephase,crisissupportwasmainlyprovidedbythepsychologistunitoftheCityofTurku.Theworkloadwassogreatthattheunitbecamecongestedanditsnormalworkwasdisrupted.Theemergencyplanofthecity’sWelfareDivisioncomprehensivelycoversthelaunchingandimplementationoftheacutephase.Inthissituation,alargenumberofpeopleneededlong-termpsychiatricsupport,whichoverloadedthepsychologistunit.Theemer-gencyplandidnotaddresspsychosocialsupportinthisrespect.

TheincidentresultedinactionsandaneedforinformationinseveralorganisationsuptoandincludingtheGovernment.Localandnationalauthoritieshandledoperativeduties,buttherewasalsoaneedforstatementsfrompoliticalleadership.Therewerenationalimpactsonmanyadministrativesectors,whichinturnrequiredaflowofinformationbetweenthesec-torsatthelocalandministrylevel.Inamorewidescaleandextendedsituation,thereproba-blywouldhavebeenaneedformoreexchangeofthesituationpictureandnationwideac-tions.Inthatcase,thedutiesoftheGovernmentSituationCentreandthemeetingoftheheadsofpreparednessaswellasflowofinformationbetweentheministrieswouldhavebeenmore

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importantthantheywerenow.Thedifferentministriesneedinformationinordertocoordi-nateactionsintheirownadministrativesector.Examplesincludeincreasesthereadinesslevelofhospitalsnationwide,instructingschoolsforthenextschooldayordecisionsonfor-eignpolicy.

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4 CONCLUSIONSTheconclusionsincludethecausesoftheincident.Causereferstothevariousunderlyingfac-torsoftheincidentandthedirectandindirectfactorsaffectingit.

1. ManypeoplearetryingtoenterEuropeduetounsafeconditionsandpovertyintheircountriesoforiginand,asanattractionfactor,thehighstandardoflivinginWesterncoun-tries.Accordingtohisownaccount,theperpetratorleftMoroccoduetoabadfamilysitua-tionandthethreatcausedbyaviolentgangoffootballhooligans.Hehadnotbeenparticu-larlyradicalisedanddidnotbelongtoanynetworkswhenheleftMoroccoorarrivedinFinland.

Conclusion:CountriesinNorthernAfricaandtheMiddleEastofferagrowthplat-formforJihadistthinking.Accordingtocrimestatistics,onlyasmallfractionofthepeoplewhoendupinFinlandhavebeenseriouslyradicalised.Asylumseekersarenotaparticularproblemfromtheviewpointofviolentcrime,buttheyincludeindi-vidualssusceptibletoradicalisation.

2. TheperpetratorwasabletoeasilymakehiswayfromMoroccoviaTurkeytoGreeceandtheSchengenArea.HevisitedmanycountriesandspentthelongesttimeinGermany.There,heregisteredasanasylumseekerandapparentlywasregisteredaslivingatare-ceptioncentreforapproximatelysixmonths.HisfingerprintswerenotstoredintheEuro-dacdatabaseuntilhereachedFinland.

Conclusion:Theasylumseekingsystem,whichisbasedontheDublinRegulationandEurodacdatabase,isnotworkingasintended.ItispossibletomovefreelyintheSchengenAreaand,lackingfingerprints,apersoncanusedifferentidentitiesindifferentcountries.Thesystemcanbeabusedforalongtime.

3. TheperpetratorappliedforasyluminFinlandasapersonyoungerthanhisactualage,asaminor,andunderafalsename.Forensicageestimationwasdoneandnoenquiriesweremadetohiscountryoforigin.Hisasylumapplicationasanadultcouldpossiblyhavebeenconsideredasobviouslybaselessandprocessedunderexpeditedprocessing.

Conclusion:Itappearstobeeasytouseafalsenameandage,andnoteverymethodavailableisbeingusedtoverifypersonaldata.Theinterpretationhasbeenthatinformationcannotberequestedfromthecountryoforiginevenwhenthethreatisnotposedbythestateorpublicauthoritiesofthecountryoforigin.Con-vincingotherstobelieveyourliesgivesrisetounrealisticexpectationsforthefu-ture.Itisstressfultoliveunderafalseidentity.

4. Anuncertainandstressfulsituationinlifemakespeoplesusceptibletomaintainingtheiridentitythroughundesirablemeans.TheperpetratorstartedtobecomeradicalisedbywatchingeasilyaccessibleradicalIslamistpropaganda.Later,hereceivedsympathyandsupportfromaFinnishmanwithaforeignbackground.Hispathtoradicalisationwasusual.

Conclusion:Longasylumprocesseswhich,completewiththeirappealperiods,of-tenlastapproximately18months,createastressfulsituationinlifethatmakespeoplesusceptibletomentalhealthproblemsandproblembehaviour.Thesituationismadeworsebygraduallycrushedexpectationsandlivingalie.RadicalIslamismiseasytoclingtobecausetherecruitmentispurposefulandgoal-oriented.

5. Membersoftheperpetrator’simmediatecirclewereworriedabouthimandsomeevenfearedhimbutonlyonepersonsentatip-offtotheauthorities.Thetip-offwasprocessed

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inthelocalpolice,NationalBureauofInvestigationandtheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceServicebutdidnotleadtoanypracticalactions.

Conclusion:Theproceduresofpoliceorganisationsforhandlingtip-offswereun-developed.Itisdifficulttoobtaininformationaboutindividualswhobecomeradi-calisedalone,sotheraretip-offsmustbeaddressed.

6. Theperpetrator’sradicalisationgrewmoreintense,andhisimmediatecirclesawagreatchangeinhim.However,nobodyreportedittotheauthoritiesorotheractors.

Conclusion:Thereisnolow-thresholdchannelinFinlandforreportingconcernsconnectedtoradicalisation.Allinall,thehandlingofconcernsandpreventiveworkisdisjointedandunder-resourced.Intheearlystagesofradicalisation,thebesthelpispersonaldiscussion.Manyconcernsareoverwhelminglyleftforthepolicetohan-dleeventhoughthemostappropriatehelpcouldbeprovidedbysocialandhealthcareservices,receptioncentres,organisationsandreligiouscommunities.Therearenouniformoperatingmodelsforhelpingindividualswhoarebecomingradicalisedanddirectingthemtoanappropriateactorforhelp.

7. Theperpetratorendedupcarryingouttheactasinstructedbythepropaganda,usingeve-rydayimplementsandtargetingordinarypeople.Hisinitialplanwastoattacksoldiers:inpractice,militaryservicemen.Theperpetratorwasreadytodieattheendofhisact.By-standersstartedtheinterventionwiththestabber’sactions,andthepolicestoppedtheactthreeminutesafteritstarted.Thesituationwasoverquickly,soanemergencywarningwasnotissued.

Conclusion:Suchactionsbyindividualsaredifficulttopreventunlessinterventionispossibleintheearlystagesofradicalisation.Inrecentyears,thepolicehavegreatlyimprovedtheirfunctionalcapacitytodealwithmassmurdersituations.However,itisnotrealistictoexpectthatsimilarsituationscanalwaysbestoppedsoquickly.Thereisnoquickwaytowarnpeople.

8. Thepoliceandemergencymedicalserviceswerealertedtothescenequickly.Intheearlystages,thepolicewereinarushanddidnotstartusingthejointcallgroupsoftheauthori-ties.TheEMSstoppedtowaitforconfirmationthattheareawassafe,whichitreceivedaf-teramomentthroughtheERC.ThiscausedaslightdelayintheEMSunitsreachingthevictims.Therescuedepartmentisnotalertedtostabbingassignmentsbutcametothesceneindependently.Allofthevictimsreceivedthehelptheyneeded.

Conclusion:Differentpublicauthoritieshavedifferentviewsofthemanagementmethodsandprinciplesofmulti-authoritysituations.Differentauthoritiesmaynotknoweachother’sneeds,operatingmethodsandtheresourcesavailabletothem.Bettercooperationwouldimprovethepossibilitiesofsuccessfullyhandlingevenmorelarge-scalesituationsthanthisone.

9. Therewasagreatneedforpsychosocialsupport,whichwaslaunchedquickly.TheCityofTurkuquicklydecidedtoshoulderresponsibilityforallpsychosocialsupport.Therewereproblemswithobtainingthecontactinformationofthevictimsandtheirrelatives.

Conclusion:Therearenoprovisionsoflawastohowpartiesprovidingpsychoso-cialsupportcouldobtainthecontactinformationofthepeopleneedingsupportfromthepoliceorhealthcare.

10. Theincidentresultedinactionsandaneedforinformationinseveralorganisations.TheincidentwasmostlyconcernedwiththemandateoftheMinistryoftheInteriorbutalso

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intersectedwiththemandatesoftheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth,thePrimeMin-ister’sOfficeandsomeofthepoliticalleadership.TherewerewidespreadindirecteffectsinFinlandandalsoabroad.Therewaslittleflowofinformationbetweentheadministra-tivesectors.Ameetingoftheheadsofpreparednesswasnotconvened,buttheGovern-mentassembled.

Conclusion:KeygovernmentactorshavedutyofficerarrangementsandtheGov-ernmentSituationCentreoperatesbetweentheadministrativesectors.Thefor-mationofasituationpictureattheGovernmentSituationCentreandthedistribu-tionofinformationtothevariousadministrativesectorsisnotsmooth.

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5 SAFETYRECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 ProcessingtimesofasylumapplicationsandappealsTheperpetratorwasanasylumseeker.Despitetheirtroubledorigins,therehasbeenlittlecrimeamongthemthatwasindicativeofradicalisation.However,thecomersincludeindivid-ualswhohavealreadybecomeradicalisedorareatriskofradicalisation.Therearealsomanyapplicantswhodonotmeetthepreconditionsforreceivingasylum.Theperpetratorhadreceivedanegativedecisionandwasawaitingadecisiononhisappealfromtheadministrativecourt.Accordingtotheinvestigation,hewasnotradicaliseduntilaf-terhearrivedinFinland.Contributingfactorsincludedhispersonalitytraits,ISISpropaganda,overayear’swaitanduncertaintyaboutthefuture.Alossofself-esteemleavesroomforget-tinginterestedinradicalIslamism,forexample.Theuncertainwaitingperiodandgraduallycrushedunrealisticexpectationsmakepeoplesusceptibletomentalhealthproblemsandproblembehaviour.RegisteringasanasylumseekermeansbeingabletostayinFinlandlegallyawaitingafinaldecisionforapproximately18monthsonaverage.Theprocessingtimeofanormalapplica-tionissixmonthsonaverage,andtheprocessingtimeofanappealisapproximatelyayear.Almosteveryoneappealsanegativedecision.Theinvestigationteamrecommendsthefollowing:

Inmanycases,anegativedecisionreceivedquicklymaybebetterfortheapplicantthanalonguncertainsituation.AdjustmentandintegrationaredifficultduringthewaitbecausethereisnocertainlyofestablishingalifeinFinland.

Whenexpeditedprocessingattheadministrativecourtisbasedonasecuritythreat,thefair-nessofthelegalproceedingsmustbeconsideredinsofarthattheadministrativecourtisnotprovidedinformationthatcouldaffectthedecisionontheappealsubmitted.

Therearealsoproblemswithhowfinalnegativedecisionsareimplemented,orthepersonsreturnedtotheircountryoforigin.Itisalsopossibletosubmitnewasylumapplicationsonnewgrounds77.Inthisinvestigation,however,attentionisdrawntothewaitingperiodmain-tainingunrealisticexpectations,whichisdetrimentalforpeople.

5.2 EstablishingtheidentityofasylumseekersUponarrivinginFinland,theperpetratorreportedafalsenameandage,whichtheauthoritiesdidnotfindoutuntilafterthestabbings.Theissueinvolvesseveralproblems.

77 AccordingtotheFinnishImmigrationService,theDirectiveoncommonproceduresforgrantingandwithdrawinginter-

nationalprotection(2013/32/EU)provideswideropportunitiesforpreventingabusethanFinnishnationallegislation,butnotallofthearticlesonfurtherapplicationshavebeenenforcedinFinland.

TheFinnishImmigrationServiceandMinistryofJusticeshouldensurethroughresourceallocationandotherdirectionthattheaveragetotalprocessingtimeofasylumdecisionsandtheirappealstotheadministrativecourtsissignificantlyshortenedfromthecur-rent18monthsonaverage.Expeditedprocessingshouldbeusedwhenpermittedunderlaw.Furthermore,processingmustbeexpeditedifasecurityauthorityconsiderstheap-plicantasasecuritythreat.[2018-S24]

79

Ifthelieshadbeendiscovered,theasylumapplicationwouldhavebeenmorebaselessandtheopportunitiesforusingexpeditedprocessingwouldhaveincreased.Hislong-termlegalstayinFinlandcouldmaybehavebeenprevented.Liesareindicativeoftheasylumapplica-tionalsobeingfraudulentinotherrespects.Whenliesseemtowork,itcreatesfalseexpecta-tions.Havingone’sexpectationscrushedafteralongwaitisdetrimental.Itishardtoliveanduseservicesunderafalseidentity,andthereisnoeasyreturntoyourrealidentity.Thesituationincreasesthestresscausedbyotheruncertaintyandmakespeoplesusceptibletoproblems,suchasseekingmeaningfortheirlifefromradicalIslamistideology.Theinvestigationteamrecommendsthefollowing:

AccordingtotheConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees,theDirectiveoncommonpro-ceduresforgrantingandwithdrawinginternationalprotection78andtheAliensAct,infor-mationaboutapplicantscannotbedisclosedtoapartysuspectedofpersecutingthemorcaus-ingthemseriousharm.Iftheapplicant’shomecountryisnotsuspectedofpersecutingtheap-plicantorcausingseriousharmtothemortheirrelatives,theinternationalconventionsdonotseemtopreventenquiriesaboutidentityfromthehomecountry.Asforminorasylumseekers,thereisalsoanobligationtoimmediatelystarttracingtheirparentsorotherguardi-ans.Insuchcases,itisaquestionofestablishingthechild’sbestinterest,butafalseidentityandagemayalsoberevealedinthesamecontext.

Ifafalseidentityisrevealedatsomecontextlateron,itshouldbereportedtothepoliceinor-dertodeterminecriminalliabilityandtoinvestigatehowtheliesaffectedtheasylumprocess.

5.3 Opportunitiesofasylumseekers’immediatecircletoshareconcernsTheperpetrator’simmediatecirclehadoversixmonthsofobservationsandconcernabouttheperpetrator’sexcessiveinteresttowardsradicalIslamismandISISpropaganda.Asfarasisknown,justonepersoneversympathisedwiththeperpetrator’sthoughts.Manyothersweretiredofthethingstheperpetratorwassayingandwereoccasionallyconcerned.Onlyonetip-offwassenttothepolicebecausetheproblemswereapparentlynotconsideredseriousenoughand,ontheotherhand,asylumseekersoftenhavelittlefaithinthepolice.Contactingthepoliceisalsoavoidedforfearofone’sownproblemsbeingrevealed.Ifaperson’sactionsorbehaviourareseentoconstituteaclearthreat,thenaturalpartytocontactisthepolice.However,apersonwhograduallybecomesradicalisedmayshowsignsthattheirimmediatecirclecaneasilyobserveevenbeforeaconcretethreat.Insuchcases,theappropriatepartytocontactisnotthepolicebutratherthestaffofthereceptioncentre,schoolorreligiouscommunity.Still,theyoftenlacktheexpertisetohandlethematterordonotconsiderittobetheirduty.

78 2013/32/EU

TheFinnishImmigrationServiceshoulddevelopitsoperatingmethodsinsuchawayastoutiliseallreasonablyavailablemethodstoestablishtheidentityandageofasylumseekers.Themethodsinclude,forexample,specialexaminationofthematterduringtheasyluminterview,utilisationofforensicageestimateandrequestinginformationfromtheapplicant’shomecountryifthethreattowardstheapplicantisnotduetothestate.[2018-S25]

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Inpractice,individualswhoarebecomingradicalisedbuthavenotyetcommittedcrimescanonlybeidentifiedbytheirimmediatecircleineverydaycontexts.Asylumseekersareoneofthekeygroupswhosemembersincludeindividualsatriskofradicalisation.Atthesametime,theyaremostlyoutsidethescopeofthenormalservicesforresidentsofthemunicipality.Itwouldbeimportanttogivetheimmediatecircleofasylumseekerslow-thresholdopportuni-tiestoexpressconcernandaskforadvice.Theinvestigationteamrecommendsthefollowing:

Manycountrieshavedifferentkindsofservicesthatcanbecontactedwithsimilarissues.Forexample,since2012,Germanyhasofferedaservicethatpeoplecancontactwhentheyob-serveanindividualatriskofradicalisation79.GreatBritainalsohasmanydifferentchannelsforgettinghelp.InasmallcountrylikeFinland,aseparatechannelforcontactsaboutradicali-sationmaynotbenecessary,andinsteadtheservicecouldbecombinedwiththevariousneedsofasylumseekers.Thispossiblynationwideservicecouldalsobebuiltonasimilarex-istingservice.OneexampleistheTajuamut(‘Understandme’)operatingmodel,whichwasdevelopedforoutreachyouthworkbasedonaDutchmodel80.Theservicemustbeavailablebytelephone,e-mail,websitesandthesocialmedia.

5.4 DevelopmentoftheworkforthepreventionofradicalisationFinlandhasaNationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisationandExtremism,whichintroducesthepartiesactivelyworkingonthematter.KeyactorsincludetheNationalPoliceBoard,policedepartments,theNationalBureauofInvestigationandtheFinnishSecu-rityIntelligenceService.Afeworganisationshavebeenactivelyinvolvedinthepracticalworkwithpeopleatriskofradicalisationorsufferingfromviolence.Workconnectedtoseriousthreatsofterrorism,suchasinternationalintelligenceorthehan-dlingoftargetindividuals,wasnotaddressedinthisinvestigationbecausetheperpetratorwasnotknowntohavepreviouslycommittedanycrimes,didnotbelongtoanynetworksandwasnotatargetindividualwhomthepoliceortheSecurityIntelligenceServicewouldhaveactedon.Itwasessentialtodeterminewhatkindofpreventiveworktheactorsarecurrentlycapableofwithindividualswhoareinexactlythesametypeofsituationastheperpetrator.

79 OnlineandtelephoneservicemaintainedbytheGermanFederalOfficeforMigrationandRefugeesforreportingobserva-

tionsconnectedtoradicalisation.http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Beratung/beratung-node.html.Accessed22March2018.

80 WebsiteoftheDutchorganisationCPIforhelpingyoungpeople.www.publiekeinnovatie.nl/en/initiatives/multisignaal/.Accessed22March2018.

TheMinistryoftheInteriorshouldensurethatacounsellingserviceisestablishedintheFinnishImmigrationServiceorathird-sectoractor,whichcouldbecontactedforanyquestionsorconcernsconnectedtoasylumseekers.Theservicemustbefamiliarwiththecooperatingparties,suchasthepolice,religiouscommunitiesandvariouspartiesofferinghelp,aswellasgiveadviceandalwaysdirectissuesandindividualstotheap-propriateplace.Theserviceshouldbemarketedinmanyways,forexampleatreceptioncentres,religiouscommunities,ontheInternetandduringmeetingswithasylumseek-ers.[2018-S26]

81

Inorderforthepolicedepartments,theNationalBureauofInvestigationandtheSecurityIn-telligenceServicetohavechancesofinterveningintheactionsofanindividual,theremustbeconcreteinformation.Inthecaseunderinvestigation,inpractice,theonlyconcreteinfor-mationobtainedinadvancewasthetip-offreceivedinJanuary2017.Inthatsituation,preven-tiondidnotworkeventhoughtheinformationwenttothreedifferentorganisations.Sincethen,theoperatingmethodshaveimproved.Nevertheless,itstillappearsthatthepreventiveworkoftheaforementionedorganisationsdoesnotformaclearentityintermsoftheworkdoneclosetothepeople.Alotofinformationiscollectedbut,forexample,Anchoractivitiesandtheworkdonewithreligiouscommunitiesvariesbetweenpolicedepartments.Theresourcesoftheorganisationscapableofhelpingarelimitedandtheiractivitiesonlylocal.Theopportunitiesprovidedbyorganisationsandreli-giouscommunitiesarenotwellknown.Muslimcommunitiesandreligiousleaders,inparticu-lar,playanimportantroleintherecognitionofindividualsattractedtomilitantinterpreta-tionsoffaiththatemphasiseviolence.Thethresholdforaddressingthematterwiththeindi-vidualinquestionanddirectingthemtoservicesshouldbelow.Workdoneclosetothepeopleandcommunitieswouldhelpspotproblemsandinterveneinthemearlyandeffectively.Thereisnootherwaytofindandguideindividualswhobecomeradicalisedalone,liketheperpetrator,otherthantoseizeonthefewtip-offsthatmaybeob-tainedfromthemandtheirimmediatecircleTheinvestigationteamrecommendsthefollowing:

OrganisationsmentionedintheNationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisa-tionandExtremismincludeHelsinkiMissio,VuolleSettlementandFinnChurchAid.Allofthemhavethecapabilitytodealwithindividualsatriskofradicalisationandhelpthemoutofadifficultsituation.

Theinvestigationteamrecommendsthefollowing:

Cooperationbetweendifferentactorsmayrequiredevelopmentofprovisionsontheflowofinformation.

TheMinistryoftheInteriorshoulddeterminewiththeMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthhowtoorganisethefundinganddirectionoftheorganisationsnecessaryforthepreventionofradicalisationandensurethattheactivitiesarelong-termandnationwide.Theservicesprovidedbyorganisationsmustbeproperlybroughttotheattentionofpublicauthoritiesandotheractorssothatindividualswhoneedhelpcanbeguidedtoappropriateassistance.[2018-S27]

TheNationalPoliceBoardandtheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceServicemustagreeonclearoperatingmodelsforthepreventionofradicalisationthatincludeenoughobserva-tionandbuildingoftrustclosetopeopleandcommunitiesaswellastheabilitytohelpindividualswhohavejuststartedonthepathtoradicalisationintimeandbringthemwithinthescopeofappropriateservices(suchashealthcare,socialservicesandorgani-sations).[2018-S28]

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5.5 Managementofmulti-authoritysituationsDuringtheinvestigation,itwasdiscoveredthattherearesomefairlydivergentviewsamongauthoritiesaboutthemanagementofmulti-authoritysituations.Ingeneral,itisconsideredthat,dependingonthesituation,eachsituationcanbefoundtohaveaprimaryauthoritythatmusttakeresponsibilityforgeneralcommandofthesituation81.The‘primaryauthority’perspectivedescribedaboveandtheprincipleofgeneralcommandbasedthereonareonlyreferredtoinlawintheRescueActregardingrescueoperationsduetoaccidents.Inurgentsituations,eachauthorityembarksontheurgentdutiesinitsownman-dateaccordingtothespecificinstructionsofitsfield,takingthesafetyfactorsrequiredbythesituationintoaccount.Multi-authoritysituationsrequireclosecooperationandfunctioningmutualcommunications.Allactorsmustbeactive,understandtheoverallsituation,shareinformationaboutthesitua-tionandconsiderthedutiesandneedsoftheotherauthorities.Insuddenlyarisingsituations,themostimportantactorsareusuallytheEmergencyResponseCentre,police,rescueser-vices,emergencymedicalservicesandpsychosocialsupport.Theymustallbeabletojointhesituationwithoutdelaytoperformtheirdutiesandreceivetheinformationtheyneed.Intheinvestigatedstabbingsandsomeprevioussituations82,someoftheactorshavestoppedtowaitforanotherauthoritytoprovideastronggeneralcommand,whichneverrealised.InTurku,adelaywascausedwhentheemergencymedicalservicesstoppedtowaitforreliableinformationaboutthearea’ssafetysituation,whichitdidnotreceiverightaway.Rescuede-partmentunitswereutilisedaftertherescuedepartmentoffereditssupport.Jointcommuni-cationsorpressconferenceoftheauthoritieswerenotcoordinated.Informationwasnotex-changedaboutthevictims,whichledtomisunderstandingsintheinformationreleasedaboutthenumberofvictims.Psychosocialsupportwasleftontheoutsideanddidnotreceivetheinformationitneededaboutthevictimsandtheirrelativessmoothly.Ajointcommandposi-tionwasnotconvenedatthesceneorelsewhere.Thejointcallgroupsformultipleauthoritieswerenotused.Thisdidnotcauseessentialharm,butimprovementsareneededinordertosuccessfullyhandlemorecomplexsituations.

81 Thepolicealsousetheterm‘generalcommand’withtheinternaldefinitionithaswithinthepolice.82 MinistryofJustice(2009)Jokelankoulusurmat7.11.2007(‘Jokelaschoolkillingson7November2007’).Investigationcom-

mitteereport,Publication2009/2.MinistryofJustice:Helsinki.MinistryofJustice(2010)Kauhajoenkoulusurmat23.9.2008(‘Kauhajokischoolkillingson23September2008’).Investiga-tioncommitteereport,Publication11/2010.MinistryofJustice:Helsinki.SafetyInvestigationAuthority(2009)EntryoftreatedwastewaterintothedrinkingwaternetworkinNokiaon28–30No-vember2007.InvestigationreportB2/2007Y.SafetyInvestigationAuthority(2014)EnvironmentalaccidentattheTalvivaaramineinNovember2012.InvestigationreportY2012-03.SafetyInvestigationAuthority(2015)AircraftaccidentresultinginthedeathofeightskydiversatJämijärvion20April2014.InvestigationreportL2014-02.

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5.6 WarningthepopulationThepolicecaughttheperpetratorthreeminutesafterthestabbingsstarted.Assuch,therewasnotimeorneedtoissueanemergencywarning.Admittedly,thesituationwasunclearforsometimebecausetherewasnocertaintyastowhethertherewereseveralperpetratorsorwhethertheattackhadbeenplannedsuchthatsomethingmorewasgoingon.Forthisreason,thepolicepostedamessagetoavoidTurkucitycentre.Themediarepeatedthemessageandthecitycentregrewquiet.Emergencywarningsissuedonthetelevisionandradioarenotsuitedtosucharapidsitua-tion.Ittakesapproximatelyhalfanhourtoissueawarning.Inadditiontoemergencywarn-ings,itisalsopossibletousegeneraldangersignalsissuedusingfixedpublicwarningsirensor,insparselypopulatedareas,soundtrucks.Itisusedonlyrarelyandtheremaybeathresh-oldtoitsquickutilisation.Thespeakersofsoundtruckscanalsobeusedtogivespokenin-structions.


5.7 DevelopmentoftheoperationsoftheGovernmentSituationCentreDuringmajoraccidents,terroristattacksandothersimilarseriousincidents,thestateman-agementneedstocommunicatetothecitizens,assesstheimpactoftheincidentonfuturede-cisionsand,insomecases,directresourcestorecoveryfromtheincident.Theremayalsobeeffectsonforeignpolicy.Amongthestatemanagement,thePresidentoftheRepublic,PrimeMinisterandMinisteroftheInteriorwerethequickesttoreacttotheTurkustabbings.How-ever,themanagementandhandlingofacutesituationsisthedutyofthecompetentauthori-ties.Iftheactionsofseveraladministrativesectorsareneededatanationaloreveninternationallevel,anextraordinarymeetingoftheheadsofpreparednessoftheministriescanbecon-vened.Themeetingoftheheadsofpreparednesscoordinatesthecollaborationbetweentheministriesand,ifnecessary,preparesmattersforthepermanentsecretaries’meetings.

TheMinistryoftheInteriorandtheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthshouldharmo-nisethemanagementandcommunicationsmethodsofmulti-authoritysituationssothatthenecessaryauthoritiescanjoininandareactivelyincludedinallsuddenlyarisingmajorincidents.KeyactorsincludetheEmergencyResponseCentre,police,rescueser-vices,emergencymedicalservicesandsocialservices(includingpsychosocialsupport).[2018-S29]

TheMinistryoftheInteriorandtheEmergencyResponseCentreAgencyshoulddevelopnewoperatingmodelsforwarningthepopulationquickly.Itwouldbeeffectivetocon-veywarningstomobilephonesviaSMSandapplications(suchasthe112Suomiappli-cation).Theadvantageofasmartphoneapplicationwouldbethepossibilityofusingaloudwarningfeaturinglightsandvibration,multilingualismandclearinstructions.[2018-S30]

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InthecaseoftheTurkustabbings,ameetingoftheheadsofpreparednesswasnotconsiderednecessaryeventhough,atfirst,therewasnocertaintythatthesituationwasover.Ameetingmighthavebeenneededifthesituationcontinuedtobeunclearorif,forexample,therewasaneedtoraisethepreparednesslevelofhospitals,thepolice,bordercontrol,rescueservicesandemergencymedicalservicesatanationallevel.Therecouldalsohavebeenwidespreadeffectson,forexample,schools,receptioncentresorreligiouscommunities.Theadministra-tivesectorsfunctionindependentlybut,incaseofawidescalesituation,ajointviewofthesit-uationproducesbetterresults.Intheactivationofthestatemanagement,headsofpreparednessandministries,itisvitaltoensurethattheGovernmentSituationCentregetsaccesstothenecessaryinformationsothatitcandistributeittosupportdecision-makingandactions.Theinvestigationteamrecommendsthefollowing:

5.8 PersonaldataofindividualsinneedofpsychosocialsupportThepartieslaunchingpsychosocialsupporthaddifficultieswithgettinginformationabouttheidentitiesofthevictimsandtheirrelatives.Theinformationwasneededinordertobeabletoprovidehelpassoonaspossible.Itisvitaltoprovidehelpquickly,andthepeopleprovidinghelpshouldalsogettodotheirworksmoothly.Itemergedthatthelawdoesnotcontainanyprovisionsthatwouldallowthepolicetodiscloseinformationaboutindividualsinneedofsupport.


ImplementationoftherecommendationisalsonecessaryduetotheDirectiveoncombatingterrorism83.AccordingtotheDirective,theremustbeemotionalandpsychologicalsupportforthevictimsofterrorism.Suchmechanismsorprotocolsmustenvisagethecoordinationofrelevantauthoritiestobeabletoprovideacomprehensiveresponsetotheneedsofvictimsandtheirfamilymembersimmediatelyafteraterroristattackandforaslongasnecessary.

83 2017/541/EU,Article24(2–4).Thelaws,regulationsandadministrativeprovisionsnecessarytocomplywiththisDi-

rectivemustbebroughtintoforceby8September2018.

TheGovernmentSituationCentreshouldagreewiththeadministrativesectorsonhowinformationaboutsituationspassessmoothlyandwithoutdelaysfromtheadministrativesectorsandtheirsubordinateofficestotheGovernmentSituationCentretobedistributedtothestatemanagementandthedifferentadministrativesectors.TheaimistobeabletolaunchtheactionsoftheGovernmentandthenecessaryadministrativesectorswithoutdelay.[2018-S31]

TheMinistryoftheInteriorandtheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthshouldprepareprovisionsbasedonwhichthepoliceandhealthcaremust,incaseofaccidentsandviolentcrimes,discloseinformationabouttheidentityofthevictimsandtheirnearrelativesfortheneedsofpsychosocialsupport.[2018-S32]

85

VictimsofterrorismwhoareresidentsofotherEUmemberstatesmusthaveaccesstoinfor-mationregardingtheirrights,supportservicesandcompensationschemes.EnforcementoftheDirectiverequiresplanning,coordination,updatingofemergencyplans,drillsandinclusionofthethirdsector,suchasVictimSupportFinland84intheplanningaswellascommunicationtothevariousactorsabouttheoperatingprinciples.

5.9 ImplementedactionsOverthecourseoftheinvestigation,theinvestigationteamhasbecomeawareofthefollowingmostessentialactionsimplementedafterthestabbings,whichwereaimedatpreventingsimi-larincidentsormitigatingthedamage:TheMinistryoftheInteriorhaslaunchedanumberofactionsaimedatharmonisingthetip-offhandlingprocessacrossthepoliceorganisationsandincreasingtheeffectivenessofactionsresultingfromtip-offs.Theministryismonitoringtherealisationoftheactions.TheMinistryoftheInteriorhasalsoappointedaRajapinta(‘Interface’)project,whichaimstoimprovethehandlingofobservationsconnectedtoradicalisation.TheNationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisationandExtremismincludesaplanforestablishingaHelplinesupportserviceforfamiliesandtheimmediatecircle.ThepoliceandSecurityIntelligenceServicehavebeendevelopingaprocessconnectedtothehandlingoftip-offs.Theyareusingajointmodelfortherecordingoftip-offs,initialac-tionsandassessment.Thedivisionoflabourbetweenthelocalpolice,theNationalBureauofInvestigationandtheSecurityIntelligenceServiceinregardtopotentiallydangerousindivid-ualshasalsobeenclarifiedinthemonthsfollowingthetip-offabouttheperpetrator.

TheNationalPoliceBoardhaspaidattentiontothehandlingoftip-offsconnectedtoradicali-sationandreactiontotheminordertoensurelocaloperationsintheresultagreementsofpo-licedepartments.AmendmentsoflawhaveenteredintoforceinthemandateoftheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth,strengtheningthecooperationbetweenhealthcareandemergencysocialser-vicesandclarifyingtheobligationstoprovidepsychosocialsupport.IntheadministrativesectoroftheMinistryofJustice,humanresourcesfortheprocessingofasylumcaseshavebeenincreasedatadministrativecourts.

TheFinnishImmigrationServicehasimprovedtheestablishmentofidentitybyrecruitingexpertsfortheasylumunitwhowillfocusonthattask.Furthermore,acooperationdevelop-mentprojecthasbeenlaunchedbetweentheimmigrationandsecurityauthoritiesoftheFinn-ishImmigrationServiceandtheNationalPoliceBoard.Theprojectfocusesontheestablish-mentofapplicants’identityandbackgroundthroughamulti-authoritymodelaswellastheanalysisofrightstoobtaininformation.Aharmonisedmulti-authorityalerthasbeenplannedandpreparedfortheauthoritiestakingpartinemergencyresponsecentreactivitiesincaseofincidentsofmassviolence.TheEmergencyResponseCentreAgencyisgettinganewinformationsystemthatenablesthere-directionofcallstootheremergencyresponsecentresincaseofcongestion.

On11December2017,acommandcentrecapableofintroducingsolutionsfortheflowofin-formationandformationofthesituationpicturestartedoperationsattheEmergencyRe-sponseCentreAgency.Theemergencywarningsystemisimprovingthankstotheauthority84 VictimSupportFinland(RIKU)isasupportserviceforvictimsofcrimesmaintainedbyseveralorganisations.

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bulletinfeaturealreadyorderedforthe112Suomiapplication.ThenewcommandcentreoftheEmergencyResponseCentreAgencyalsohasthecapabilitytowarnthepopulationthroughseveralchannels.TurkuUniversityHospital(TYKS)hasupdateditsplansinseveralways.Systemsforalert-ingthestaffarebeingdeveloped.Decision-makingaboutdisastersituationstatushasbeenshiftedtoalowerorganisationallevelthanbefore.Cooperationwiththepolicehasbeenin-creased,forexamplebyhavingfieldpatrolstourhospitalfacilities.Asituationjournalapplica-tionisbeingintroducedtoimprovedocumentationandtheflowofinformation.TheCityofTurkuhasimprovedpersonnelalertsystemsandcreatedacrisiscommunica-tionschecklist,crisisnewstemplateandready-to-usecrisiscommunicationstemplatesfortheInternet.Thecityhaslaunchedtheconstructionofcrisissupportprocessesinordertoclarifytheroles.Analysisofthestabbingincidenthasclarifiedtheitemstobeimproved.

Helsinki,14June2018

KaiValonen MikaHatakka VesaLund

MarjaNyrhinen OlliRuohomäki TarjaWiikinkoski

KariYlönen

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CriminalSanctionsAgency(2018)Etelä-Suomenrikosseuraamusalueenprojektiväkivaltaisenekstrem-isminjaradikalisoitumisentunnistamiseksi(‘Projecttoidentifyviolentextremismandradical-isationintheCriminalSanctionsRegionofSouthernFinland’).CriminalSanctionsAgencyre-port28February2018.

Roy,O.(2017)JihadandDeath:TheGlobalAppealofIslamicState.HurstandCompany:London.OnlineandtelephoneservicemaintainedbytheGermanFederalOfficeforMigrationandRefugeesfor

reportingobservationsconnectedtoradicalisation.http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Beratung/beratung-node.html.Accessed22March2018.

Schuurman,B.etal.(2017)LoneActorTerroristAttackPlanningandPreparation:AData-DrivenAnal-ysis.JournalofForensicSciences.(1):1–10.

MinistryoftheInterior(2016)NationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadicalisationandEx-tremism.4May2016.MinistryoftheInteriorpublications15/2016.MinistryoftheInterior:Helsinki.

MinistryoftheInterior(2017)Annualreport–NationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadi-calisationandExtremism.MinistryoftheInteriorpublications23/2017.

MinistryoftheInterior(2018)ViolentextremisminFinland–situationoverview1/2018.Threatassess-mentofviolentextremisminFinlandin2017andtrends.WomenandchildreninradicalIslam-istterroristorganisationsunderspecialreview.MinistryoftheInteriorpublications13/2018.

MinistryoftheInterior(2015)Yleisjohtajuuttamoniviranomaistilanteissaselvittäneentyöryhmänlop-puraportti(‘Finalreportfromaworkinggroupanalysinggeneralleadershipinmulti-author-itysituations’).Report10December2014.MinistryoftheInteriorpublications1/2015.Min-istryoftheInterior:Helsinki.

Snellman,O.,Seikkula,J.,Wahlström,J.&Kurri,K.(2014)Specialfeaturesofmentalhealthandpsycho-logicalproblemsofadultasylumseekersandrefugees.JournalofSocialMedicine.(51):203–222.

MinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth(2009)Traumaattistentilanteidenpsykososiaalinentukijapalvelut(‘Psychosocialsupportandservicesfortraumaticsituations’).PublicationsoftheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth2009:16MinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth:Helsinki.

Specialreport:Thepsychologyofterrorism.ScientificAmerican.March25,2016.Themedissue.Stiftung,F.E.&ChambredesReprésentantsdeBelgique,EnquêteParlementaire(2017).Areportof

theBelgianparliamentontheactsofterroratBrusselsAirportandMaalbeekMetroStation.15juin2017,Chargéed’examinerlescirconstancesquiontconduitauxattentatsterroristesdu22mars2016dansl’aéroportdeBruxelles-NationaletdanslastationdemétroMaelbeekàBruxelles,ycomprisl’évolutionetlagestiondelaluttecontreleradicalismetlamenaceter-roriste.

Ed.(2016)BeyondFear:ThePsychologyofTerrorism(CoverStory).ScientificAmerican.(27)3:32–33.

ReportoftheCityofStockholm,assessmentofactionsaftertheterroristattack.Utvärderingavhante-ringeniStockholmsstadavterrordådeticentralaStockholmden7april2017.August2017https://insynsverige.se/documentHandler.ashx?did=1912835.

ReportofStockholmrescueservicesontheStockholmattack.Erfarenheterefterden7aprilSSBF:sbe-hovavutveckladförmågavidenterrorhändelse.https://www.storstockholm.brand.se/glo-balassets/dokument/ovrigt/170621_storstockholms-brandforsvars-erfarenhetsrapport-ef-ter-terrordadet-7-april.pdf.

ReportofStockholmPoliceontheStockholmattack.Utvärderingavdennationellasärskildahändel-senNimo.https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/utvarderingar/utvardering-av-attentatet-i-stockholm-7-april-2017.pdf.

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Tähti,A.,Gürsoy,M.&Svedström-Oristo,A.-L.(2017)Oikeuslääketieteellisettutkimuksetturvapaikan-hakijoideniänselvittämiseksiSuomessa(‘ForensicageassessmentofasylumseekersinFin-land’).FinnishDentalJournal,(XXIV)13:46–48.

Investigationmaterials1) Pre-trialinvestigationmaterials2) Hearings3) Weatherdata4) Summaryofpolicecommunicationactions5) Policeproceduresconnectedtosituationcommand,communicationsandpreventiveactivities6) TheFinnishImmigrationService’sinformationontheperpetrator7) FinnishImmigrationServiceprocedures8) Informationonthevictimsofthestabbingandtheirtreatment9) Servicestandarddecisionforemergencymedicalservices10) TYKSdisasterprocedure,alertpracticesandinformationonsafetyarrangements11) Informationonterroristattacksthathavetakenplaceabroadandtheirprevention12) SituationjournalsofthedutyofficersoftheNationalPoliceBoard,GovernmentSituationCentre,

theMinistryoftheInteriorDepartmentforRescueServicesandtheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth

13) Reportsonpsychosocialsupport14) EmergencyResponseCentrerecordings15) Videorecordingsforthe112TVshow16) RescueDepartmentsituationjournal17) Informationontheresourcesofadministrativecourtsandappealprocessingtimes18) Specialstudyoncommunications19) Videorecordingsofpressconferences20) Informationoncrimescommittedbyasylumseekersandotherissues21) InformationontheactivitiesandpreparationsoftheChurch22) ActionsoftheFinnishBorderGuard23) FinalreportoftheReachOutproject24) EmergencyplanoftheCityofTurku25) Accountoftheprivatecliniconcrisiswork26) Informationontheactivitiesofsecuritycompanies27) Therescueservices’alertandaccidentwrite-ups

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SUMMARYOFCOMMENTSONTHEDRAFTINVESTIGATIONREPORTThedraftinvestigationreportwascirculatedforstatementsattheMinistryoftheInterior(rescuedivision,policedivisionandimmigrationdivision),theMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealth,MinistryofJustice,PrimeMinister’sOffice(SituationCentre),NationalPoliceBoard,SecurityIntelligenceService,FinnishImmigrationService,EmergencyResponseCentreAgency,CityofTurkuandtheSouthwestFinlandHospitalDistrict.Relativesofthepeoplewhodiedinthestabbings,theinjuredvictimsandtheperpetratorwerealsogiventheopportunitytogivestatements.TheMinistryoftheInteriorproposesspecificationstoseveraldetailsoftheinvestigationreportandhighlightsthefactthattheNationalActionPlanforthePreventionofViolentRadi-calisationandExtremismincludesanactionforestablishingaHelplinesupportservice.Therehavenotbeenenoughresourcesbuttheestablishmentofthechannelisstillverytopical.Asforthecounsellingserviceforasylumseekers,theministrystatesthattheactivitieswouldrequireextensiveresources,whicharecurrentlyimpossiblefreeup.Theserviceshouldalsonotoverlapwiththeexistingfeedbackandenquirychannels.Concreteconcernsaboutradical-isation,ontheotherhand,shouldbereferreddirectlytothepolice.TheMinistryoftheInte-riorisinfavourofallocatingfundinginthebudgetfororganisationsthatsupporttheworkofpublicauthorities.Asforthemanagementofmulti-authoritysituations,theministrystatesthatthenecessaryprocedureexistsbutthedrillingvariesandshouldbeincreased.Asfortheuseofthecommu-nicationsnetwork’sjointcallgroups,theresponsiblepartyistheMinistryofFinance,whichisalsoresponsible,foritspart,forlegislationonemergencywarnings.Emergencywarningshaveroomforimprovementinregardtosituationswherethereismoretime.AccordingtotheMinistryoftheInterior,theroledivisionduringincidentsbetweenlocalau-thorities,thedutyofficersofministries,themeetingoftheheadsofpreparednessandtheGovernmentSituationCentrewasblurredinthedraftinvestigationreport.TheMinistryoftheInteriordescribestheroledivisionandpresentsanaccordantproposalforarecommendationontheissueandthegroundsfortherecommendation.TheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthtakesnoticeinitsstatementofthefactthattheauthorities’telecommunicationsnetwork(VIRVE)isverysignificantduringvarioustypesofincidents.FurtherdevelopmentisneededfortheoperativeVIRVEcallgrouparchitectureofthepolice,rescueservicesandsocialandhealthcareaswellasitsutilisation.Therealisationshouldbedirectedandmonitoredatanationallevel,forexampleinasteeringgroupandmainusergroupfortheauthorities’telecommunicationsnetworkmanagedbytheMinistryofFi-nance.Accordingtotheministry,theopportunitiescreatedbydigitalisationforvariousman-agementsystemsshouldbetakenintoaccountinthedevelopmentoftheauthorities’fieldandgeneralcommand.

Accordingtotheministry,thedraftinvestigationreportdoeswellindefiningthechallengesinthepreventionofviolentradicalisationinFinland.Cooperationbetweenauthoritiesandwithorganisationsneedstobedevelopedandexpanded.Atthemoment,thepreventiveworkdoesnotformacoherentwhole.Theministryconcursthatthepreventiveworkishinderedbyitsproject-orientation,disjointednatureandlackofresources.Anchoractivitiesonlytargetmi-nors,andtheactivitiesarenotproperlyimplementedatanationallevel.TheMinistryofSocialAffairsandHealthconsiderscooperationwithorganisationsasex-tremelyimportant.Therefore,grassroots-levelorganisationsshouldbeengagedintheactivi-ties.Muslimcommunitiesalsohavepotentialfortheidentificationandguidanceofproblem

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individuals.Workdoneclosetothepeopleandcommunitieswouldhelpspotproblemsandinterveneinthemearlyandeffectively.Theministryconsidersitimportantthattheimmedi-atecirclehasachannelandopportunitytosharetheirconcernsinaccordancewiththerec-ommendationpresentedinthedraftinvestigationreport.Furthermore,theministrypresentssuggestionsforimprovementsonseveraldetails.TheMinistryofJusticestatesthattheback-logofappealssubmittedtotheadministrativecourtswillbedealtwithbytheendof2018andthat,withthechangesthathavebeenmade,therearestrongresourcesfortheprocessingofasylumcases.Anincreasedneedfororalhearingshassloweddowndecisions.Theministrynotesthatsomeofthedecisionsareen-forceableduringtheadministrativecourtprocessing,sotheprocessingdoesnotdelayen-forcement.TheMinistryofJusticeseestotheresourcingoftheadministrativecourts,butitisnotpossibletoorganiseotherguidanceforindependentcourts.Forexample,theauthorityhandlingtheenforcementmaycalltheadministrativecourtandexpediteanindividualcaseforreasonsconnectedtoenforcement.Ifitiswantedtomakeitpossibletoexpediteacaseonthegroundsofsecuritythreats,itcanbelegislated,ifnecessary.TheministrypaysattentiontotheenforcementoftheDirectiveoncombatingterrorismandespeciallyimprovingthesituationofvictims.Therequirementsoffree-of-chargeservices,long-termafter-care,financing,uniformqualityandtheabilitytoserveforeignersorFinnishvictimsreturningtoFinlandareissuesthatwillprobablyrequireclarificationandanalysis.Furthermore,variousactors’awarenessofVictimSupportFinland(RIKU)shouldbeincreasedandvictimsupportservicesshouldbeaddedtothenational,regionalandlocalemergencyplansanddrills.Theremaybeaneedforawebsitedescribingthesupportservices.Thepossi-bilityofutilisingtheGovernmentSituationCentreforcoordinationisanotherideathatneedsdeliberation.Accordingtotheministry,threerecommendationsofthedraftinvestigationre-portcanbeusedtosupporttheenforcementoftheDirectiveoncombatingterrorism.ThePrimeMinister’sOfficestatesthatthedraftinvestigationreportgivesanaccurateviewofthesituationandhasnocommentsonthematter.

AccordingtotheNationalPoliceBoard,thedraftinvestigationreportanalysesthingsinafairlycomprehensiveanddetailedmanner.Theconclusionaremostlyconsistentwiththeun-derstandingofthepoliceoftheevents.TheNationalPoliceBoardpresentsseveraldetailedobservationsfortheconsiderationoftheinvestigationteam.Thepracticehasbeenthatparamedicsdonotenterspecificdwellingsalonebutinsteadwaitforthepolicetoinformthemthatitissafe.Thisoperatingmodelisoutofthequestioninpub-licplaces.Insuddenlyarisingsituations,policepatrolsoperatein“dailyoperation”callgroups.Inarapidsituation,theswitchingofcallgroupscompromisesthejointsituationpic-tureofthepatrols.Therefore,usingtheEmergencyResponseCentreasacommunicationscentreuntilthesituationisundercontrolistherightcourseofaction.Authoritiestransfertothejointcallgroupsbasedonaninvitationalcallgroup.Inthiscase,aninvitationwasnotsenttothepolice,andthepolicedidnotsendinvitations,either.TheNationalPoliceBoardhighlightsthefactthatthetip-offabouttheperpetratorwastakenunderassessmentbutaneedforfurtheractionswasnotrecognisedbasedontheassessment.TheNationalPoliceBoardhasnotedthenecessityoftheactionsthathavebeenandarestillbeingdonetoimprovethehandlingoftip-offs.

Forthemostpart,thesafetyrecommendationsareadvisable.Asforthecounsellingserviceforasylumseekers,theNationalPoliceBoardstatesthatresourceandlanguageissuesmustbesufficientlyconsidered.Inradicalisationpreventionwork,legislationmustmakeitpossible

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formainlyhealthcareandtheMinistryofForeignAffairstodiscloseinformationoftheirowninitiative.TheNationalPoliceBoarddoesnotconsidertherecommendationonthemanagementmulti-authoritysituationscompletelyrealistic.Inrapidsituations,itisunrealistictoimmediatelyhave“strong”generalcommandwithallparties.Themostimportantthingisthateachactorfulfilsitsfundamentaldutiesbyreactingquicklyandoperatingaseffectivelyaspossible.Thearrivaltothesceneofvoluntaryresourcesthatarelesssignificantforresolvingthesituationmay,undercertaincircumstances,evendisruptpre-plannedproceduresandcomplicateman-agement.

TheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceServicecallsattentiontothesectionsofthedraftinvesti-gationreportwhichstatethatthetip-offabouttheperpetratorreceivedbythepolicedidnotleadtoactions.TheSecurityIntelligenceServiceremindsthatthetip-offwaspreliminarilyprocessedandassessedattheSecurityIntelligenceServiceaccordingtothenormalprocessandenteredintotheSecurityIntelligenceService’sinformationsystem,andnormalregistercheckswerecarriedout.Thetip-offwasinterpretedasnotreflectingaconcreteriskofater-roristattack,thoughpossiblyindicatingaconnectiontoISIL(=ISIS).Forthisreason,itwasrecordedintheincidentdocumentthatinterviewswouldbeconductedinthecasetoacquiremoredetailedinformation.However,atthisjuncture,therewasseentobenoreasontoele-vatethetip-offpasttherestofthetip-offqueueandongoingoperativeactivities.TheSecurityIntelligenceServicemustconstantlyprioritiseitsoperations.Internationalinformationex-changehasincreasedenormously,andtheSecurityIntelligenceService’sownintelligencegatheringalsoproducesagreatdealofinformation.Tip-offsareonlyonepartofthewhole.

Initsstatement,theFinnishImmigrationServicepresentscorrectionsandobservationsonseveraldetails.TheFinnishImmigrationServiceclarifiesthatasylumprocedureisamatterofadministrativeprocedure,whichdoesnotinvolvespecialpowersofinvestigation.Oralhear-ingoftheindividualisthekeymethodofinvestigation.Asfortherecommendationforquickprocessingofapplications,theFinnishImmigrationSer-vicestatesthatdecisionsonapplicationsforinternationalprotectionaremadewithinthelim-itsoftheresourcesavailableandthecircumstanceswithoutdelayyetwithoutcompromisingcarefulindividualassessment.Expeditedprocessingcanbeusedwhencertainpreconditionsprovidedinlawaremet,whichrequiresindividualassessment.Basedonthedraftinvestiga-tionreport,itisnotclearunderwhichgroundstheperpetrator’sapplicationwouldhavebeenconsideredasobviouslybaselessifhisadultstatushadbeenestablished.Efforthasbeenmadetoincreasetheeffectivenessofestablishingtheidentityofasylumseek-ers.Initsinterpretation,theFinnishImmigrationServicehasexercisedcautionandheldthatitcannotrequestinformationaboutasylumseekersfromthepublicauthoritiesoftheirhomecountry.Eveniftheapplicantisnotasubjectofinteresttothepublicauthoritiesoftheirhomecountry,itisdifficulttopredicthowthepublicauthoritieswouldreacttosuchenquiriesandwheretheinformationabouttheapplicantwouldendup.Theapplicant’ssituation,groundsforasylumandpersecutormayalsochange.Knowledgeoftheenquirytothepublicauthori-tiesoftheirhomecountrycouldalsodamagetheapplicant’sfaithinFinnishauthorities.Itisunclearhowitcouldbeensuredthatrequestinginformationwillnotcauseharmtotheappli-cantandtheirfamilymembers.

Asfortherecommendationonacounsellingserviceforasylumseekers,theFinnishImmigra-tionServicestatesthatsuchactivitiesarenotitsstatutoryduty.Organisingtheactivitieswouldrequirebothhumanandfinancialresources.

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TheEmergencyResponseCentreAgencyexpressesinitsstatementthattheinvestigationreportisextensiveandalsoincludesunusuallyextensiveinternationalbackground.Thecourseofeventshasbeenanalysedindetail,andtheactionstheyspurredinthevariousau-thoritieshavebeentakenintoaccount.TheEmergencyResponseCentreAgencycommentsandspecifiesseveralexpressionsusedinthedraftinvestigationreport.Thearrivalofemergencymedicalservicestothescenewasdelayed,presumablymostlyduetoabreakdownintheflowofinformation,sotheprocedureshouldbespecifiedinregardtosuchsituations.TheEmergencyResponseCentrehaddifficultieswithcreatingasituationpic-turebecausetherewaslittlecommunicationsbetweentheauthoritiesfromthesituationcen-tretotheEmergencyResponseCentreandtheEmergencyResponseCentredidnotconductactivemonitoringofthesocialmedia.Underthecircumstances,itwouldhavebeenuselesstoissueanemergencywarning.Thesocialmediashoweditsstrength.Intheinitialsituationoftheincident,therescueservicesdidnothaveaclearrole.Intermsofmanagement,theuncontrolledarrivaltothesceneofanexternalauthoritycoulddisrupttheactivitiesofanotherauthoritythatisperformingitsstatutoryduties.Theviewoftheinvesti-gationteamthattheauthoritiesdidnothavequitethesameviewsaboutthemanagementofmulti-authoritysituationsorenoughinformationabouttheduties,needsandcapabilitiesoftheotherauthorities,ispartlycorrect.TheEmergencyResponseCentreAgencyconcurswiththesafetyrecommendationsofthein-vestigationteam.InordertodeveloptheactivitiesoftheGovernmentSituationCentre,theremustbeaclearobligationtodiscloseinformation.Thecompetentauthoritymustimmediatelyassesstheinformationtobesent,anditmustbesimpleandfasttotransfertheinformation.ItisnoteworthythattheGovernmentSituationCentrehasmoreextensiverightstoobtaininfor-mationthan,forexample,thedeputiesofvariousdepartmentsoftheMinistryoftheInterior.Moreover,theministriesdonothaveanactualroleinregardtooperativesituationsthatareinthemandateofvariousauthorities.TheCityofTurkustatesthatthestatementsofthecity’sactorsheardduringtheinvestiga-tionhavebeentakenintoaccountwellintheinvestigationandthattherecommendationsofthedraftinvestigationreportaregoodandwell-founded.Thecityproposescorrectionstothreedetailsofthedraftreport.Thecityalsodescribesactionsthroughwhichthecrisissup-portprocesshasbeendeveloped.Effortismadetopreventsimilarincidentsthroughcoopera-tionbetweenauthoritiesonthepreventionofviolentradicalisation.TheactionsincludeAn-chorcooperationwiththepoliceandcooperationbetweenauthoritiesinintegrationandinworkingwithimmigrantcommunities.TheSouthwestFinlandHospitalDistrictstatesthatthenatureoftheincidentdeviatedfromtheconventionalunderstandingofadisaster,whichisoftenthoughttoinvolvealargenumberofpatientsinasmallarea.Intheearlystagesoftheincident,thenumberofpatientsandtheirlocationwasunknown.Assuch,theonlyoptionopentotheEMSstaffwastopro-ceedinthecrowdandprovideemergencyfirstaidtothepatientstheyfound,justasshouldbedoneduringpatientclassification.However,therewasnoneedforactualclassificationbe-causethenecessarytransportcouldbearrangedforeachpatienttoahospitalthatwaswithinafewminutes’drive,roughlyinaccordancewiththerateofprogressoftheemergencymedi-calservices.Accordingtotheviewofthehospitaldistrict,thereisaneedforoperatingmodelsthatarebettersuitedtosituationswhereitisimpossibletodeterminethescopeoftheoperat-ingarea,thelocationsandnumberofthepatientsandthethreatsintheworkenvironmentinthecourseoftheassignment.

Documents

Turku stabbings on 18 August...FOREWORD On 19 October 2017, the Government appointed an investigation team pursuant to Section 32 of the Safety Investigation Act (525/2011) to investigate