TURKISH-SYRIAN RELATIONS IN THE TIME OFFAISAL (1918-20) *

Sina AKŞİN

Husain, Sharif of Mecca, on the strength of an agree-ment with the British, embodied in the so-called MacMahoncorrespondence, revolted against the Gttoman governmenton June lA, 1916, in the middle of the Great war. Readingthe Memoirs of his son, King Abdullah, one is frequentlyreminded by the writer that the quarrel of the Hashimiteswas not with the Gttoman state but with the Committee ofUnion and Progress (CUp).l Specifically, Abdullah's quarrelis, on the one hand, with the CUP's policies of Turkishnationalism which tried to exclude the Arabs and/or toTurkicize them, and, on the other hand, with the policy ofreducing the power of feudalism from the Suıtan down tothe the local Sheikh (in other words, democratization).(One important issue closely related to the latter was mo-dernization: the Hashimites, for instance, were opposed tothe completion of the Hijaz railwayJ How far Abdullahwas sincere in his protestations of loyalty to the Ottomanstate, we cannot know for certain. What is clear is that theCUP was an instrument of Turkish nationalism and that,at least for some time, it did try to follow a policy of Turki-ncation which aroused reactions not onlyamong Arabs, butalso among other Moslem peoples, most notably the Alba-nians.

The British had promised Husain to uphold Arab inde-pendence in the Arabic speaking lands of Asia. Mersin,

* Paper presented at the 2nd Conference on Turkish-Arab Relations,TripoJİ, 13-18 December 1982.

1 Abdullah, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan (New York,Philosophical Library , 1950).

2 TIIE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XX

İskenderun, the Lebanon, and the Am'İrates on the PersianGulf and the Indian Ocean were specifically excluded.Later, the British went on to make the Sykes-Picot agree-ment with the French which provided for 1) an internatio-nal administration in Palestine, 2) the possibility of director indirect British administration or control in the Vila-yets of Baghdad and Basra, and 3) the division of theregion to the north of Arabia and outside the Medi-terranean coastline and the two Vilayets into respectivezones of influence. it is clear that the Sykes-Picot agree-ment was contrary to the agreement with Sharif Husain.In the face of such a contradiction, it was to be expec-ted that Britain would have to prefer the claim of itsmajor ally France to that of its much more minor ally Hu-sain. However, the British, thanks to a superior bargai-ning position vis it vis France, tried to go back on theSykes-Picot agreement. So-called Arab independence un-der British hegemony was preferable to sharing Arab landswith France. This British attempt to go back on the Sykes-Ilicot agreemeiıt lasted until September 15, 1919, when theBritish agreed to evacuate Syria and Cilicia and to let theFrench occupy Cilicia and the coastal regions of Syria tothe west of the Sykes-Picot line. Thereupon, the Frenchoccupied Maraş, Ayıntap at the end of October, and Urfaon the first day of November. Though the British wereevacuating the region, they were in fa ct leaving behindimportant forces of resistance. This was, on the one hand,the force of Turkish nationalism, and, on the other hand,the force of Syrian nationalism, led by their close friend andally, Faisal. The Anglo-French agreement signified thatthe British government, after important modifications res-pecting Mosul and Palestine, seemed to have finally acquies-ced in the application of the Sykes-Picot agrement. I sayseemed, because though this was the official policy atWhitehall, on the scene of action, the behaviour of Britishofficials continued to give encouragement to Faisal. Thissituation continued with various ups and downs until theFrench ultimatum (July H, 1920) and the battle of KhanMaisalun (July 24, 1920) which forced Faisal and many ofhis supporters to abandon Syria. The aim of this paper is

1980-1981 i TURKlSH-SYRIAN RELA TIONS 3

to describe some of the contacts established between Syriaand Turkey during the period between the Armistice ofMudros (October 30, 1918) and the battle of Khan Maisalun.Husain, his sons and their foIlowers had risen aginst theattornan state in order to create an independent Arab state.When it b€came clear that the Entente was preparing toimpose its own role in the form of the mandMe system af terhaving cut up the whole region in smaIl pieces, many Arabs,including Faıisal him seIf, began to think of cooperatingwith the Turks in a common struggle for independence andterritorial integrity.

Probably the earliest contact took place on November3, 1918. A British delegation headed by a Brtish generalwas in Katma, at the headquarters of the 7. attornan Armyto discuss matters relating to the application of the armis-tice. Nuri Said was a member of the British delegation,presumably representing Faisal. Nuri Said, himself a for-mer attornan oificer, gave to Major Ömer Halis, his clas s-mate from the attornan War College and a member ofthe attoman delegation, a secret letter. This letter, purpor-tedly written without the knowledge of the British, was tobe transmitted to İzzet Pa.şa, the attornan Grand Vizier,and called for a Moslem federation embracing Arabs andTurks. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, who was at that time commanderat Katma and from whose memoirs we learn of the incident,dismissed the affair as a British ploy. Cebesoy does nottelI us whose signature the letter bore.2

Later contacts came in the second half of 1919. Accor-ding to a British document, areport dated July 24, 1919,Faisal and the attornan Sultan, Vahdettin, were engagedin negotiations. The intermediary was the former Mutasar-nf of Kerek (probably Kerak in Jordan) Essad Bey, a mem-ber of the CUP, who communicated with Cemal Paşa,commander in Konya. Cemal, who came to İstanbul, wassaid to be bearing an autograph letter from Faisal to theSuıtan, assuring him of his devotion and fidelity. Cemal

~ A.F. Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatıraları (İst.., Vatan Neşriyatı,1953), pp. 28-9.

4 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK iVOL. XX

apparently personalIy handed the letter to the Sultan. Anot-her agent confirmed this information. On July 21, theSultan conferred with the cabinet about this letter and areply was prepared. Cemal Paşa was to carry the replyand was given secret instructions.3

There is no information whatsoever in Turkish sourcesto confirm the contents of this report. We only know thatCemal did leave Konya on le~ve on the ıst of July 1919tocome to IstanbuL.However, the Sultan and his governmentcould not view him with much favour because they knewthat he had joined Mustafa Kemal's resistance movement.4

Cemal was accordingly dismissed from his command andremained in IstanbuL.

A good part of the elements in this report reappearagain in a document in the French archives.5 William Yale,who worked with the American King-Crane Commissionwhich made a tour of investigation in the Middle East,got hold of the text of a Turkish-Syrian agreement whichhe reported on September 15, 1919.The agreement itself,consisting of 9 articles, is purported to have been signedby Faisal and Mustafa Kemal, made in two copies andexchanged in Aleppo on June 16, 1919,through the goodoffices of Essad Bey, Mutasamf of Kerek (art. 9). Article1 declared that the two contracting parties, the Turkishand the noble Arab nations, viewed with regret the divisionin the Moslem world and considered it their sacred dutyto end this division and ensure the cooperation of the twonations in order to defend the religion and the fatherland.At that moment when the independence of the Turks wasin danger because foreigners wanted to partition Iraq,Palestine, Syria and contiguous areas, they had decided toproclaim holy war following the Conference of Paris (art.2). In order to achieve this aim, the two parti es declaredthey would never recognize the partition of the TurkishEmpire and Arabia and its occupation by foreigners (art.

3 Publie Reeord Office (PROl, FO 37114233, 117548.4 G. Jaesehke. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolojisi (Ank., m, 1970).

p. 48; K. Atatürk, Nutuk (Ank., TİTE, 1960), pp. 48-9.5 Mini:;tere des Affaires Etrangeres (MAEI, Levant, vol. 142, pp. 145-7

1980-1981 ı n..ı:~KISH-SYRIAN RELA TIONS 5

3). On condition that Arabia would remain bound to theOttoman Empire and that she would be loyal to the Calip-hate, the Ottoman government would recognize the for-matian of a government in the regions of Hijaz, Medina,Iraq, Palestine, Damascus, Beirut, Aleppo under the sove-reignty of "Cherif Hussein Pacha". The details of thisarrangement were to be fixed later by an alliance (art. 4).In the territories und er the occupation of the Sharifianarmy, the name of the Sultan would again be mentioned inthe hutba (art. 5). In order to start the holy war and toensure the uniOn of Turks, the Sharif would issue a proc-lamation concerning the attitude taken by foreignersagainst Islam. To prepare the holy war, he would on the onehand call on the sheikhs and chiefs aiıd make allianceswith them, and on the other, he would form organizations!ike those in Anatolia. The forces thus prepared would beabsolutely prepared to start the holy war when the signalwas given (art. 6). The Sharif would aid the national forcesof Anatolia to the greatest possible extent and both partiesundertook to aid each other in offense and defence untilthe realization of the projected aims (art. 7). The Sharifwould inforın of this agreement not only the Moslems ofHijaz, but alsa Imam Yahya, Sayid Idris, the Moslems ofTripali, Bingazi, Morocco, Tunisia, AIgeria, India and dohis utmost to win them over to a general mavement (art. 8) .

This agreement is also mentioned in a British report. °However, there is no evidence of it whatsoever in Turkishsources, thus bringing to mind the likelihood of it5 spu-riousness. This probability can alsa be deduced from thefact that on the 16th of June 1919, Mustafa Kemal was asyet in no pasition to speak, let alone sign a document, onbehaIf of anybody else. Not only does this date precede theCongresses of Erzurum (July 23) and Sivas (September 4)where leagues for the defense of rights were formed, but itis alsobefore he had formed with five other senior officersa secret military group at Amasya on June 20-22. The reac-tion that Kazım Karabekir, militarily the most powerfulgeneral in this military group, was to show later to much

6 PRo.. Fo. 371/4215. 2404 (p. 399). 6/10/1919.

6 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK iVOL. XX

more limited contacts with Syrian nationalists is alsa proofof the fact that such far-reaching engagements as thoseembodied in the agreement would not have gone unnoticed.We are thus forced to coclude that the document in questionwas invented, either by Turkish and/or Arab nationalists.'The former case is much more likely, because the agree-ment refers to the independence of the Turks withoutmentioning the Ar8ibs (art. 2), to the ''Turkish'' rather thanto the Attornan Empire (art. 3), and to Sharif Husain as"Pacha" rat'1.er than King (art. 4). The aim in concoctingsuch a docu ",ent would be to try to make the Ententepowers fear the consequences of driving the Turks andthe Arabs to extremities.8

Later, with the Anglo-French agreement of September15, 1919, real contacts began. The replacement of Britishtroops by French troops was one of the major blows toArab illusions. The Syrians could view British occupationwith less misgiving because, after all, the British Annycould be considered an ally of the ShaMfian forees. France,on the other hand, had for long entertained colonial ambi-tions in Syria, so that there could be no mistaking thesignificance of a Frenchoccupation long after the war hadended. Rising discontent in Syria was reported in a longtelegram (16/17 October 1919) of Cevdet Bey, commanderat Diyarbakır, to Mustafa KemaL.He reported that theSyrians were a-gainst any kind of foreign protectorate anddesired the independence of aLLArab lands under theSharif. However, Cevdet thought that such a scheme wasnot realizable and called for a confederation under the

7 French intelligence sources too, did not take the M. Kemal-Faisalagreement seriously. MAE, vol. 91, p. 116.

B Various intelligence reports about a Pan-Islamic congress inSıvas alsa tend to give the impression of spuriousness. One instanceis areport (20/11/19191 that a delegation from Hussein was about toarrive at Sıvas (as well as delegations from Azerbaijan and Afganis-tan!. MAE, vol. 91, pp. 161-4. Another (17/9/1919) was about the par-ticipation at the same congress of six Syrians and the decision takenby that body to revolt against foreign occupation. MAE, vol. 142,p. 176.A third report was about the presence of Azemzade Hussein Pashaas representative of Syria at Sıvas. PRO, FO 371/4162, 17468 (2/1/1920).

1980-1981i TURKISH-SYRIAN RELAnONS 7

Caliph which would comprise different Arab countries.These countries would each be represented by a crescenton the flag of the confederation.9

According to a secret British report by agent "H" datedOctober 24. 1919.Azemzade Yusuf was expected in Istanbultogether with Jamal Naser, ex-governor of Hauran. toconduct negotiations with the Ottoman government. ThePorte was to be represented by Cemal Paşa. Minister ofWar, and İzzet Paşa, former Premier.10 So far. I am notaware of any confirmation of this report.

on the 15th of December, 1919, Lieutenant ColonelShakir Nimet, a former Ottoman staff officer who wasat the head of the national resistance organization inAleppo. telegraphed Mustafa Kemal. calling for closeTurkish-Syrian miIitary cooperation and Syrian indepen-dence (Palestine included) with same form of link withthe Caliphate or with both the Caliphate and the Sultanate.lI

9 Atatürk. vol. III, p. 1104 (doc. 156c). Cevdet himseli was ofArab origin.

10 FO 371/4160, 151996. Azemzade Yusuf should be Yusuf el-Azma,Faisal's defence minister. E. Kedourie, England and the Middle East(London, Bowes, 1956), p. 171.

ii Sahir ÜzeL, Gaziantep Sav~ının İç Yüzü (Ank., 1952), pp. 103-4.on page 103 the date is given as 15 January 1919. On the next pagethe date of the telegram is 15 December ımd the date of receipt 19December. it seems rather certain that the latter date is correct.Jaeschke's date of 15 November appears to be a mistake (p. 76). Nimetsays that thanks to his efforts two patriotic organizations have be enformed in Aleppo, one being secret, the other open. Their aim wasthe expulsion of foreigners and cooperation with Turkish patriots.Nimet proposed that he should be given the command of the NationalForces at Mar~, Ayıntap and Kilis, and maintained that if he weresuccessful in repulsing the French invasion, the nationalorganizationsin Syria would join the national movement in Turkey. Nimet wantedto know what sort of future Turkish nationalists envisaged for Syria,and whether they had any foreign support (if so, whose support?).He proposed to come to Pazarcık (Mar~) in 15 days to await instruc-tions. Üzel maintains that Nimet was not sincere and that despite thesending of three secret delegations inviting him (upon instructionsfrom Mustafa Kemall, he did not come. But he also says that he didnot receive an answer to his telegrams adressed to Kemal. Gökbilgingives the text of a telegram to Kemal signed with a code name, which

8 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XX

Anather contact of local significance was a letter bythe Sheikh of the Sharnar tribe, Mesh'al, written to theOttornan authorities (dated December 21, 1919) assertingthat the people of Dair al-Zor wanted Ottornan rule andnot the rule of unbelievers (either British or Freneh),that this was a sentirnent shared by Aleppo and Darnascustoo, and that with same help from the Ottornan anny, theycould easily throw out the British.12

According to a British intelligence report of January9, 1920, the Ottornan government was sending Zeki Bey,naval officer, and Colonel Mahmud Bey to Mecca for talksthere.13 Again, i am not aware of a source that confinnsthe existence of this rnission.

On February 4, 1920,the Ottornan cabinet discussed aletter written on behalf of a "serious body" of Moslern and

he thinks was sent by Nimet. T. Gökbilgin, Milli Mücadele BaşlarkenlAnk., İş Bankası Y., 1965), vol. II, pp. 3E.3-4. Robeck, the British HighCommissioner in IstanbuL, reported on 18 November 1919 that M. Ke-mal was seeking an agreement with the Arabs. Documents on BritishForeign Policy, 1919-1939,First Series (ed, E.L. Woodward and R. But!er).vol. IV lLondon. HMSO, 1952). p. 895.

12 Gökbilgin. vol. II, pp. 389-92. Anather pro-Ottoman tribal chiefwas Ajemi Pasha from Iraq. Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telsraf ve Beyanna-meleri, IV (Ank., TİTE Y., 1964), p .. 38.

13 FO 371/4162. 174171. The same report states that it was unders-toad that the Arabic newspaper Erden was subsidized by M. Kemaland that the Sultan objected to this subsidy on the grounds that itspayment dishonoured the CaIiphate in Arab eyes. In one of the reso-lutions of the Representative Committee of the Association for theDefense of Rights of AnatoIia and Rumeli (the organizationformed and led by Mustafa KemaIl dated II December 1919. mentianis made of a Lieutenant Zeki. ApparentIy he came to Istanbul as thedelegate of a Syrian organization eaIled the Turcophile CommitteelTürk Muhibbi Komitesi) headed by Yahya Hayati Bey. The resolutianstates that the Representative Committee had no contacts with theSyrian organization, that direct talks with the French were contraryto their interests and that the policy to be foııowed would be thecreatian of an indepedent Arab govemment with which union couldlater be achieved in a confederation. B.S. Baykal, Heyet-i TemsiliyeKararları lAnk., TTK Y., 1974), p. 75. One wonders the connection, ifany, between the Turcophile Committee and the "serious body ofnotables" mentioned below.

.~."

:,' .'.,,'

1980-1981 i TURKISH-SYRIAN RELATIO~S 9

non-Moslem notables.14 This letter, secretly brought to theOttoman Consulate in Zürich by two Syrians, complainedof the unjust treatment of the French and the British inthe areas under their occupation which threatened todestroy the national and economic life of the country. Theytherefore called for a return to Ottoman rule under a re-gime of complete internal autonomy. A General Assemblyelected by the people, would elect for a period of fiveyears an administrator bearing the title of Governor--Ge-neral or any other appropriate title. His office would beconfirmed by the CaIiph. Local revenues, including postaland customs revenues, would be locally spent, but Syriawould pay a yearly tax to the Ottoman government.Militarily and "in other respects" -presumably, in foreignrelations- Syria would depend on the Ottoman government.The letter asked that the Ottoman representatives at thePeace Conference propose this settıement, and that, ifthere should be any hesitation as to Syrian opinion, thatan international commission should organize a plebiscitein Syria. From the repubIican principle embodied in theproposal, one can guess, probably with a high degree ofcertainty, that the proposal emanated from anti-SharifianSyrian cireles. it is difficult to imagine that Faisal couldhave accepted the principle of eleetion. The roundaboutand very secret way of communicating the document cana.lso be considered an indication in this directian. TheOttoman cabinet cosidered the proposal to be in conformitywith Ottoman interests and instructed the Foreign Ministryto act accordingIy.

We now come to military contacts and military coope-ration between Turkeyand Syria. in conformity with theAnglo-French agreement of September 15, 1919, at thebeginning of November, the British started to withdrawfrom Cilicia and Syria. In Cilicia they were replaced byFrench troops. Because the French were undersroad tohave come to stay, and also because they tolerated, whenthey did not actually encourage, Armenian terrorism,armed resistance soon began, especially in Maraş, Urfa,

14 Başbakanlık Arşivi, MecIis-i Vükela Mazbataları, vol. 218.

10 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XX

Adana and Ayıntap. This resistance was the work of militiagroups, the so-called National Forees. The National Forceshad the unofficial but direct support both of the nationalmovement led by Mustafa Kemal and of the Gttoman go-vernments of Ali Rıza Paşa and Salih Paşa. In this bloodystuggle, the support of Syrian nationalists was of vitalimportance. Faisal and the Syrian nationalists, having beenabandoned to the mercy of France by the Anglo-Frenchagreement, were in favour of supporting the struggle ofthe Turks, and later themselves actively engaged in thesame sturggle which culminated in the tragic defeat atKhan Maisalun.

Yasin al-Hashimi, who was in close relations with theTurks, was arrested on November 22, 1919 and interned inPalestine.15 A circular by Mustafa Kemal, dated January24, 1920, reported that there were 6670 French and Arme-nian troops in CiHcia. The Arab government, on the otherhand, had a division centered around Aleppo and Müsli-miye. In the vilayet of Aleppo, a nationalorganization had.been created with the firın intention of not abandoning theOttoman commonwealth, come what may. The divisioncommander, Lieutenant-Colonel Emin Beyand the Directorof Police at Aleppo, Staff Lieutenant-Colonel Shakir NimetBey belonged to the nationalorganization. They had beensent a cipher to be able to correspond directly with theTurkish authorities. In the face of French occupation, a"national action" would probably be necessary. In this case,the national forces of Aleppo, af ter securing the directionsof İskenderun, Latakiah, Dörtyol and Homs, would formthree strong detachments to advance, each one, in thedirection of Ceyhan, Islahiye, and Ayıntap. i;; In this samemonth of January, we learn that the railway betweenAleppo and İskenderun was damaged to hamper Frenchtroop movements.17

15 Kedourie, pp. 170-1.According to a report by a "Moslem agent"who vİsited Ankara, a deputation from Yasin Pasha had come there,calling for assistance to drive the French out of Syria. FO 371/5043,E. 1357/3/44.

16 Atatürk'ün Tamim ...• p. 169-71.17 Kedourie, p. 171.

1980-1981ı TURKISH-SYRIAN RELATIONS 11

On November 29, 1919, Maraş had revolted againstFrench occupation. This bloOOy struggle ended with theevacuation and retreat of the French on February 12, 1920.Three days later, Mustafa Kemal sent a circular where hestressed the importance of Islahiye, both as apoint ofaccess to Maraş and as apoint öf contact with the NationalForces of Aleppo and Damascus who had many timescalled for comman action. He then repeated for ShakirNimet Bey, the instructions he had sent already to thechiefs of the Aleppo NationalOrganization, the GeneralAssembly of Ottoman Forces Defending Syria and Palestine(in Damascus), the Cairo Volunteer Division, the Amman(?)Circassian Division (Shefik Bey). In these instructions,Mustafa Kemal asserts that the proposition to secure,through united actian, the independence of Syria, Iraqand Turkeyand form a confederation or same other formof union later to be decided upon, had been accepted anddetailed instructions had been sent. However, no answerhaving been received, it was deemed necessary to repeatthese in summary: to defend Damascus with the forces inHauran, DamasetiS and Baalbek at the Zeydani (?) pass;to threaten the enemy's actian towards the interior, fromSaida and Beirut, with the forces at Amman (?) Marjaioun;to foment insurrections in Beirut and Tripoli, thus preven-ting the advance of the enemy towards the interior; theforces at Homs to defend Homs in the direction of Tripoliwhile at the same time aiding Zeydani (?). These opera-tionsdepended on the degree of preparation. However,the Turkish forces having started their own operation toeliminate the French and Armenian occupation forcesinterposed between the Turkish and Arab nations, theimmediate following actian by the Aleppo-Hama forces wasconsidered necessary: these forees, after securing Hamaand Aleppo in the directian of Latakiah and İskenderun,should move their major forces in the directian of Islahiyeand their secondary forces in the directian of Ayıntap-Os-maniye, thus encireling the enemy.18

18 Atatürk'ün Tamim ...• pp. 201-3. General Kazım Karabekir. whocommanded the strongest Army Corps at the time. objected strongly tothis circular in a telegram dated February 22, 1920. He thought that

12 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK iVOL. XX

In March, Maulud Mukhlis, Commander in Da.ir al-Zor,sent an emissary to the Turkish commander in Mardin,who sent him 100 eases of light arms and 500 artilleryshells. A plan was made to help the Turks by resistingFrench troops and destroying bridges and communicationsbetween Syria and Turkey. In June 1920, the loeal autho-rities in Homs and Baalbek stopped the dispatch of armsto the French troops in the north. The government of Da-mascus approved these measures, but under pressure fromGeneral Gouraud, was forced to eountermand them. Atthis time, Yusuf el-Azma, Faisal's defence minister, wentto the Turkish border and proposed military cooperationwith Turkey.ı9 it is probable that this visit is related to the

it was improper for their organization, the Association for the Defenceof Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli, to make commitments that only agovernment was entitled to make, and especially at a time when ademocratic parliament was functioning. Secondly, he thought that thisaction was outside the "national deeision", and that all action shouldbe confined to the purpose of the Arabs securing their own indepen-dence. Thirdly, the sending of written instructions, and the eirculationof this telegram down to the divisional level, was imprudent andincreased the risk of its faliing in French hands, which, would be anunfortunate and compromising eventuality. Mustafa Kemal's answerwas sent the next day. He thought that the policy of cooperatingwith the Arabs was likely to force the French to compromise. CertainFrench overtures, like those of Picot and Admiral Le Bon wereindications in this sense. As to contacts with the Arabs, the governmentitself had started them and had charged İsmet Bey with this duty.The instructions sent to Syria had been prepared by İsmet himself.The possibility of their falling in French hands had been considereda useful eventuality. Lastly, the "National Pact" (Misak-ı Milli) of theAssembly had not excluded territories outside the armistice line, norhad the government declared Arab territories to be outside the na-tional boundaries. K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz (İst., Türkiye Y.,19GO) , pp. 478-81.

ı9 Kedourie, p .. 171. This same scurce quotes Sati' al-Husri whoexplains that Syrian action provicled Turks with valuable help (pp.171-2). According to Ph. David (Un Gouvernement Arabe aDamas,Paris, 1923), Faisal, finding himself squeezed between the French and"his turbulent officers", proposed in May to Gouraud to extend mili.tary aid against the Turks if certain territories under French occupa-tion were added to the Sharifian zone. But apparently this was "avain and useless activity" because the French were losing patience,and anyway, Faisal was not in the position to be able to persuade his

1980-1981 i

" '.,. ~.

TURKISH-SYRIAN RELATIONS 13,

Turkish-Arab agreeınent for cooperation which was signedin Kilis on July 3, 1920 (described below) .20

The French invasion of Syria in Julyand the ensuingflight of Faisal tenninated the period under discussion: italso put an end to Syrian-Turkish cooperation. This coope-ra tion might have continued with a Syrian undergroundresistance movement. However, France had for some timeaIready started moving in the direction of a major changeof policy which consisted of the renunciation of its claimsin territory that was being daimed by the Turkish nationalmovement. This renunciation was to be consecrated by theFranco-Turkish agreement of October 20, 1921. The changeof French policy made Turkish-Syrian cooperation verydifficult and was inaugurated, at least partly, to secure

followers in this sense. In Kedourie, p. 172. I don't know if this infor.mation is confirmed by other sources.

20 Cebesoy mentions a Yusuf Pasha, originally a staff major in theOttoman Army, as head of the nationalorganization of Damascus.Various form s of cooperation were effected through him. He died.fighting against the French. Cebesoy, pp. 255.6. This Yusuf Pasha maybe Yusuf al.Azma. Üzel gives the text of the secret agreement whichwas signed at the conclusion of a conference held at the yillage ofKefergani in Kilis, between Polat Bey. commander of the Kilis NationalForces and the Inspector of Gendarmerie Jamil Lutfi Bey, representingYasin Pasha, his brother the Syrian General Director of Police, StaffUeut. Col. Taha Bey, and Iraq and its Congress I?). Jamil Bey calledfor an alliance in every domain and for the creation of an extraor-dinary war council composed of 9 representatives representing Syria,Iraq and Turkey, with full powers for the conduct of war against thecommon enemy, to be waged until their expulsion. He also called formilitary and financia! aid from Turkey to its two Arab neighbours.In the agreement it was decided that the necessity for the creation ofsuch a body would be referred to the Grand National Assembly lart. 1).The Syrian government would be urged to provide the Kilis NationalForces with 2 mountain cannons and 4 machine guns (art. 2). Militaryinformation, bandits and traitors would be exchanged (art. 3, 4. 6).French and Armenian military transportation was to be disrupted (art.5). The National Forces were to be allowed to buy munitions in Syria(art. 7). The rest of the agreement was about the coordination ofSyrian and Turkish activity. Üzel tells us that arter this agreement.mobile groups commanded by pen,ons such as İbrahim Henana, NejibUveyt, Asım were formed in Syria. He also mentions as prominentfighters, ÖZdemir, Bedri Ibearded). Bedri (of Damascus), Major Mah.mut Bey. Üzel, pp. 99-102.

14 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VüL.XX

this aim. This is not the place to deseribe and analyze atlength France's change of policy. However, it might beuseful to consider three documents to show how the Frenchwere thinking.

The first document is a telegram (dated February 10,1920) by Premier Millerand to Gouraud, High Commissionerin Beirut, where he outlined French policy vis-a-vis Syriaand Turkey. In Syria, an "entente loyale" with FaisaI wascalled for, on condition that he cooperate fully and that heexercise complete authority over the Arabs. If these con-ditions were not fulfilled, France would be authorized totake the "indispensable" measures for the maintenance oforder. The question was more delicate and riskyas regardsTurkish nationalism. However, Mustafa Kemal did not havemany troops at his disposal and would not take a directlyhostile attitude because of the war-weariness of the popu-lation and the risk of facing more severe peace terms. Hisgame seemed to be to pose a threat without actually takingapositian of enmity. However, he tolerated or could notprevent the activity of bands which complicated Gouraud'stask. The means for sending reinforcements were beingexamined, but demobilisation made it necessary to seekpolitical measures to diminish the risks in the region. Thesewould be to make it known to Kemal and Ottoman nationa-lism that France was prepared to defend the maintenanceof the Turks in İstanbul and the integrity of the OttomanEmpire (except for Arab Iands which had aIready be enrenounced by the Turks, and an independent Armeniacomprising of Russian Armenia and the shores of LakeVan). As to Cilicia and the towns along the Arab zoneuntil Diyarbakır, according to Millerand, France wouldseek a formula of nominal Turkish suzerainty under Frenchcontrol, reinforced by most precise guarantees for minori-ties.21

The second document is a telegram dated February18, 1920, from Gouraud to the French Foreign Ministry.He reports a conversation he had with Nuri Said, af terhis last conversation with Faisal. He writes that according

21 MAE, vol. 169, pp. 261-4.

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1980-1981 i TURKISH-SYRIAN RELATIONS 15

to the Sharifian view, French difficulties in the regionwere the result of deliberate British preparation. Gou-raud is inelined to believe this and he Cİtes a British ordergiven at the time when the French were replacing Britishtroops which forbade their rear-guards from interveningin case fighting broke out immediately af ter evacuation.He alsa mentions instructions signed by Yasin Pasha datedOctober 3, where, more than two months before the de-parture of British troaps, he gave orders to form bandsunder the directian of Sharifian officers. According toGouraud, if troubles occurred in Syria right at the momentwhen Faisal wanted to influence French policy, this wasdue to preparation beforehand and because of the British.The British had not renounced this policyand their insis-tence, in spite of his very firm answer, on returning YasinPasha to Damascus was an indi ca tion of this. Faisal andhis supporters had been long aware of the British intere5tin extending an Arab curtain between the coast and theroad to India'. Nuri Said insisted that Faisal was nowready to change his policy in favour of France. Franceshould support the creation of an undivided Sharifin state,ineluding Hijaz, Mesopotamia and Syria.22

The third document is alsa a telegram by Gouraud,dated March 15, 1920. Here he voices a certain anxiety asto developments once the peace terms were made known.His opinion was that the "settıement" of the Arab question,which would require important forces, could only beachieved when the difficulties in the north were solved,thus permitting the massing of 15 batallions in Syria. Thesituation would be "very different" if both problems hadto be faced simuıtaneously. He announced that he hadaıready telegraphed the Ministry of War for an extra di-visian in order to tide over the difficult period betweenthe diselosure of the peace treaty and its acceptance bythe country.23

22 MAE, vol. 92, pp. 79-81.23 MAE, vol. 143, pp. 76-80. Soan af ter the Turkish success at

Pozantı (May 25, 1920), an armistice between Turkeyand Francewent into effect on May 30. The French occupation of Zonguldak onJune 18, 1920 ended the armistice" See Jaeschke, pp. lOS, 108.

16 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK IVOL. XX

These documents indicate the two problems which theFrench faced. Trying to dominate both Cilicia and Syriameant taking on two enemies at a time, with all the extraeffort and bloodshed that this involved. For France, whichwas worn out by the Great War, this would have been avery difficult and unpopular decision to take. on the otherhand, France was engaged in a keen but underhand rivalrywith England. England, using Greece as its satellite, wasdecided to weaken Turkey as much as possible. France, tofrustrate these British plans and because it had majoreconomic and financial interests in Turkey, in the longrun decided to side with nationalist Turkey. AIso, and notmentioned by Gouraud, antagonizing Turkey would meandriving Turkey into closer relations with the Soviet Union,which France at that time abhorred. These can be conside-red the major motives of the French change of policy.

In conclusion, one can say that despite many attempts,Turkish-Syrian cooperation in the period under discussiondid not reach significant proportions. The reasons for thiscan be summarized as follows. First of all, the Frenchchange of attitude vis-a-vis Turkey can be mentioned,Secondly, the Syrians had not yet had enough time toproperly evaluate Westem imperialism. Perhaps a signifi-cant proportion were inclined to believe that, in the lastanalysis, the West would act in favour of Arab aspirations.The hesitations shown by Syrian national ists in the faceof the impending French invasion in July 1920,might beconsidered an indication in this respect.24 A third factor

24 According to the account in Kedourie, Faisal accepted Gouraud'sfirst ultimatum on July the 18th. He then revoked the Syrian Congress,which was inclined to resist, and began to disband the army. WhenGouraud sought a more complete acceptance of his ultimatum, Faisalaccepted this too (20thJ. But when he saw that this was not stoppingthe French invasion, he proclaimed his decision to fight (21s0. Thenhe hesitated and asked for further negotiations, but this "provedfruitless". Under such circumstances, defeat (24thJ was inescapable.Kedourie, p. 173. According to Üzel, Syrian nationalists assembled amilitia force of about 65000 men in the Aleppo area. Prctending anagreement had been reached with the French, this force was disbandedon the 22nd. The next day the French occupied Aleppo withoutencountering any resistance. Üzel, p. 102.

Hl80-1981 i TURKISH-SYRIAN RELATIüNS 17

wruch comes to mind, is a reluctance on the Turkish side,after having faced for two years Husain's revolt, to believethat Syrian cooperation could be very serious. The beha-viour of Ali Fuat Cebesoy, described above, is a case inpoint.. The most important of the three factors seems tobe the first, taken in conjunction with Turkish weaknessand exhaustion. There were those who believed, both inTurkeyand Syria, in a return of Arab lands to Ottomanrole, with provisions for a confederative or federal admi-nistration.25However, in view of French and British impe-rial ambitions, this was a mere illusion. Sooner or later,Turkish nationalists realized this. They also realized thatsubstantial Turkish independence, that is to sayan indepe-dence including the economic domain, could only be attai-ned at the price of completely renouncing all ties with Arabcountries. The price, at that time, of renewing ties withArab countries would be to accept some form of Westerntutelage, which was a solution they abhorred.

25 It is interesting to note that though there seemed to be a certainsentiment to restore political union between Turkeyand Syria on bothsides, this did not generally aim at a return of the status quo ante.Rather, a confederative or federative type of union was envisaged. Inthis context, one can mention three further instances of this attitude.on üctober 21, 1918 cıo days before the armistice of Mudros), MustafaKemal sent a telegram which contained a proposition by Faisal madeto the Govemor of Syria, Tahsin Bey. According to this proposition,an armistice was to be concluded between Turkeyand Syria. Turkeywas to recognize Syrian independence and the Sultan was to appoint aviceroy (naibüssultan) there. Kemal, being of the opinion thatSyrian independence was a foregone conclusion, had authorized Mer-sinli Cemal Paşa to cond uct ncgotiations on this basis. The govemment,however, thus made aware of this initiative, put an end to it. H. Bayur,Atatürk (Ank., Güven B., 1970). pp. 189-90. A second instance is SultanVahdettin's secret peace plan which he presented to the British onMarch 30, 1919, according to which a large degree of autonomy wasto be granted to Arab lands. S. Akşin, İstanbul Hül,ümetleri ve MilliMücadele (İst., Cem Y., 1976), pp. 233-4. A third example is Kemal'sinsistence on the acceptance of the principle of Arab independenceat a meeting of the Representative Committe of the Association forthe Defence of Rights on November 22, 1919. U. İğdemir, Heyet-iTemsiliye Tutanaklan (Ank., TTK Y., 1975). p. 88.