Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
I
TURKISH-SAUDI RELATIONS: FROM A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
IN THE PERIOD FROM 2003 UNTIL 2013
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
BY
AMR MOHAMED HASSAN
ELLITHY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SEPTEMBER 2015
II
III
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli ALTUNIŞIK
Director
I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Master of Science
Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür
Head of the Department
This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli ALTUNIŞIK
Supervisor
Examining Committee Members
Assist. Prof. Dr. Gokhan BACIK (Ipek University, IR)
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli ALTUNIŞIK (METU, IR)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya GÖÇER AKDER (METU, MES)
IV
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and
presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also
declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and
referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.
Name, Last Name: Amr Mohamed Hassan Ellithy
Signature:
V
ABSTRACT
TURKISH-SAUDI RELATIONS: FROM A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
IN THE PERIOD FROM 2003 UNTIL 2013
Ellithy, Amr Mohamed Hassan
MA, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli ALTUNIŞIK
September 2015, 179 Pages
The thesis aims to understand how the relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia
evolved in the 2000s, through applying the regional level of analysis. It looks at
interaction between these two regional powers in the Middle East after the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab uprisings in 2011 in a comparative way
through examining the regional contexts created after these events and how the
foreign policy of Turkey and Saudi Arabia reacted to these contexts. The thesis tries
to figure out how the regional relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which
ranges between regional cooperation and regional competition, affected the
political, economic and military relations between Ankara and Riyadh through the
period of study between 2003 until 2013. The thesis argues that the regional context
had impacted the Turkish-Saudi relations positively after the US invasion of Iraq
and negatively during the Arab uprisings and mainly in the Egyptian uprising in
2013. The thesis uses the Regional Security Complex Theory, Securitization and
De-Securitization in order to understand the regional interaction between Turkey
and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.
Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Saudi foreign policy, the Middle East and the
Arab Spring.
VI
ÖZ
BÖLGESEL PERSPEKTİFTEN 2003-2013 DÖNEMİNDE TÜRKİYE-SUUDİ
ARABİSTAN İLİŞKİLERİ
Ellithy, Amr Mohamed Hassan
MA, Department of International Relations
Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli ALTUNIŞIK
Eylül 2015, 179 Sayfa
Bu çalışmada Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan arasındaki ilişkilerin 2000’li yıllarda nasıl
bir değişim sürecinden geçtiği bölgesel bir analiz çerçevesinde incelemektedir.
ABD’nin 2003 yılındaki Irak işgali ve 2011 yılında patlak veren Arap Baharı’nın
ardından oluşan bölgesel bağlamları ve bu bağlamların Türkiye ve Suudi
Arabistan’ın dış politikalarında ne tür karşılıklar bulduğu karşılaştırmalı olarak
incelenerek, iki bölgesel gücün arasında Ortadoğu bölgesinde meydana gelen
etkileşimler irdelenmektedir. Çalışmada, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan arasında
bölgesel işbirliğiyle bölgesel rekabet arasında değişim gösteren çeşitli bölgesel
ilişkilerin, 2003-2013 yılları arasında, Ankara ve Riyad’ın siyasi, ekonomik ve
askeri ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediği araştırılmaktadır. ABD’nin Irak işgalinin Türk-
Suudi ilişkilerini olumlu yönde etkilediği ancak 2013 yılındaki Mısır ayaklanmaları
başta olmak üzere Arap Baharı’nın bu ilişkiler üzerinde olumsuz bir etki yarattığı
savunulmaktadır. Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın Ortadoğu’daki bölgesel
etkileşimini kavramak için Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi’nin yanı sıra
güvenlikleştirme ve güvenlikdışılaştırma kavramları da kullanılmaktadır.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Türk dış politikası, Suudi dış politikası, Ortadoğu ve Arap
Baharı.
VII
TABLE OF CONTENT
PLAGIARISM ......................................................................................................... III
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. IV
ÖZ ............................................................................................................................. V
TABLE OF CONTENT ........................................................................................... VI
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................. VIII
CHAPTERS
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Literature Review on Turkish-Saudi Relations ............................................... .4
1.2 Historical Background of the Turkish-Saudi Relations.................................... 9
1.3 The Regional Level of Analysis ..................................................................... 12
1.4 Regional Security Complex Theory, Securitization and De-Securitization ... 16
2.THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX AFTER THE US INVASION OF
IRAQ IN 2003 AND TURKISH-SAUDI RELATIONS ......................................... 25
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 25
2.2 The Regional Security Complex after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 ......... 26
2.2.1 The major transformations in the regional landscape after the US invasion
of Iraq ................................................................................................................ 26
2.2.2 The rise of the Iranian influence in Iraq .................................................. 28
2.2.3 The rise of (Shi’a-Sunni-Kurdish) sub-state identities in Iraq ................. 30
2.2.4 The Saudi Policy towards the region and Iraq ......................................... 35
2.2.5 The Turkish Policy towards the region and Iraq ...................................... 41
2.3 The Regional Security Complex in Lebanon ................................................. 50
2.3.1The spill over of the Iraqi effect to Lebanon ............................................ 50
2.3.2 The rise of the Iranian influence in Lebanon ........................................... 52
2.3.3 The rise of Shi’a sub-state identity in Lebanon ....................................... 54
2.3.4 The Saudi Policy towards Lebanon ......................................................... 56
2.3.5 The Turkish Policy towards Lebanon ...................................................... 58
2.4 Implications of RSCs in Iraq and Lebanon on Turkish Saudi Relations ........ 59
2.4.1 Changes in Regional Role Perceptions of Turkey and Saudi Arabia ...... 59
VIII
2.4.2 Turkish-Saudi Political Relations ............................................................ 61
2.4.3 Turkish-Saudi Economic Relations ......................................................... 68
2.4.4 Turkish-Saudi Military Relations ............................................................. 72
2.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 74
3.THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS IN
2011 AND TURKISH-SAUDI RELATIONS ......................................................... 76
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 76
3.2 The Regional Security Complex after the Arab Uprisings in 2011 and
Egyptian Uprisings ............................................................................................... 77
3.2.1 The Major Transformations in the Regional Landscape after the Arab
Spring ................................................................................................................ 77
3.2.2 The Fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt ....................................................... 80
3.2.3 The Rise and Fall of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt ................................ 82
3.2.4. The Saudi Policy towards the Arab Spring and Egyptian Uprisings ...... 86
3.2.5. The Turkish Policy towards the Arab Spring and Egyptian Uprisings ... 92
3.3 The Regional Security Complex of the Syrian Uprising .............................. 100
3.3.1 The Survival of Assad’s Government .................................................... 100
3.3.2 Contrasts and Divisions within the Political and Military Opposition .. 103
3.3.3 The Saudi Policy towards the Syrian Uprising ...................................... 106
3.3.4 The Turkish Policy towards the Syrian Uprising ................................... 109
3.4 Implications of RSCs in the Egyptian and Syrian Uprisings on Turkish Saudi
Relations ............................................................................................................. 113
3.4.1. Changes in Regional Role Perceptions of Turkey and Saudi Arabia ... 113
3.4.2. Turkish-Saudi Political Relations ......................................................... 115
3.4.3. Turkish-Saudi Economic Relations ...................................................... 117
3.4.4 Turkish-Saudi Military Relations ........................................................... 118
3.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 118
4.CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 120
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
APPENDICIES
Appendix A Turkish Summary ............................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
Appendix B TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU .. Error! Bookmark not defined.
IX
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURES
Figure 1 New Political Complex in Iraq after 2003………………..……………… 31
Figure 2 TurkStat: Turkish Exports to Saudi Arabia in USD Thousand (from 2001
- 2013)………………………….…………………………………………………..69
Figure 3 TUIK: Trade Volume between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in USD Billion
(from 2001-2013)………………………………………………..………………... 69
Figure 4 TurkStat: Turkish Exports to Saudi Arabia in USD Thousand (from 2011-
until 2013) ………………………………………………………….……...…….. 117
Figure 5 TUIK: Trade Volume between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in USD Billion
(from 2011-until 2013)……………………………………..….....……………….118
X
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Turkey and Saudi Arabia are considered as two important regional powers in the
region of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is the second after Norway in having the
largest foreign currency reserves. It is the second global producer of crude oil after
Russia and act as a swing producer capable of determining the global price of oil. It
is also an influential actor in Arab politics and Muslim world politics owing to its
financial capabilities, its leadership position in the Arabian Peninsula and its
leverage on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), League of Arab States and the
Organization of Islamic Council (OIC). On the other hand, Turkey is a member in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a candidate member to the
European Union (EU). It has a diversified economy with Gross Domestic Product
estimated by USD 800 billion and big population around 75 million. Turkey has
been an active player in the Middle East politics during the cold war and after, in
addition to other regions like Middle Asia, Middle and East Europe owing to its
strategic location.
Since the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia in 1932, the relations between the two countries are highly responsive to the
regional outcomes in the Middle East and how each country approaches to these
outcomes. The bilateral relations respond (positively or negatively) to the meta-
events that takes place in the Middle East politics affecting both countries and the
approach each country adapts in dealing with it. The thesis argues that the regional
meta-events in the Middle East and the way each country deal with them have an
impact on Turkish-Saudi bilateral relations. The Turkish-Saudi relations started to
enter in a new era in 2003 after the US invasion of Iraq and the rise of a pro-Islamic
Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in Turkey with its new approach to
2
the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. The implications of the war on Iraq in
2003 (will be defined as the Iraqi effect in the thesis) either on Iraq or other Middle
Eastern countries has brought the national and regional interests of Ankara and
Riyadh closer in a way that helped both countries to discover their potentials for
boosting their bilateral relations. After 2003, the profile of the relations between the
two countries achieved historical records in the number of high level visitations,
number of bilateral agreements, the trade balance, size of investment, arms sales
and more important the improvement of the perception of Turkey in Saudi Arabia
and the perception of Saudi Arabia in Turkey.
Conversely, the popular uprisings in different Arab countries in 2011 left a negative
impact on the Turkish-Saudi relations, as both countries followed different
approaches to the uprisings and their regional interests were not similar in all cases.
Turkey supported the uprisings as it perceived the uprising would lead to a
harmonic relation between Arab societies and their new rulers and as a step towards
ensuring regional peace and security, while Saudi Arabia considered the uprisings
would lead to chaos and instability for a long time. The difference between their
approaches and their regional ambitions of were highly clear in the course of events
in Egypt either during the anti-Mubarak uprising in 2011 or the political change
took place in July 2013. The Turkish-Saudi relations had lost the momentum that it
gained after the US invasion of Iraq, the high level official visitations became low,
the trade balance did not achieve high records similar to the previous period,
political relations deteriorated as Saudi Arabia lobbied against Turkey in the
elections of the United Nations Security Council in 2014.
The thesis examines how the outcomes of the regional meta-events and the
responses of each country to these events play a role in Turkish-Saudi bilateral
relations under the regional impact of the war on Iraq in 2003 and the Arab
uprisings in 2011 on the political, economic and military levels.
The introductory chapter includes a literature review on Turkish-Saudi relations, a
historical background on the Turkish-Saudi relations, the regional level of analysis,
theories and concepts that will be applied in the study. The second chapter examines
the outcomes of the US invasion of Iraq on the Iraqi political scene, the rise of
3
Iran’s influence, the weak reaction of the Arab regional system and the
empowerment of sub-state actors (Shi’a-Sunni-Kurds). It examines also the spill
over of these outcomes on other Middle East countries like Lebanon which was
highly responsive to the Iraqi effect as it witnessed the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian strife
in the events of May 2008, the empowerment of non-state actors Hizballah and the
noticeable rise of Iran in the Lebanese internal affairs. The chapter also illustrates
how Turkey and Saudi Arabia reacted to the situation in Iraq and Lebanon and how
this new regional environment created a ground for boosting their bilateral relations.
Finally the third chapter throws the light upon the geopolitical consequences of the
Arab uprisings on the region and how Turkey and Saudi Arabia perceived this
meta-event in a different way and restored to different tools in dealing with it. Then
it paraphrases the course of the Egyptian uprising and the Syrian uprising and how
both Turkey and Saudi Arabia reacted to them. Finally it clarifies how the Turkish-
Saudi bilateral relations get negatively affected in this period of time and how the
media in each country perceived the other.
The methodology used in collecting data on the research topic relied on official
statements by Turkish and Saudi governmental institutions, official declarations by
head of state in each country, Foreign Ministers and other officials, reports by
business associations and companies in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The author
reviewed the media coverage in Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the relations between
the two countries and their policies towards the regional issues in the Middle East.
The author also conducted a field research during a visit to Saudi Arabia in May
2015 in order to make interviews with Saudi journalists, ex-diplomats, Saudi
academicians and businessmen who are interested in the Turkish-Saudi relations.
The thesis focuses on the regional level of analysis in order to find out how the
relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia have evolved in the 2000s. The thesis
uses the Regional Security Complex Theory as a theoretical framework to
understand the regional interaction between Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the
overlapping in their regional and national interests during the period of study in
addition to using conceptual frameworks like Securitization and De-securitization
4
which proved its suitability in interpreting how Saudi Arabia and Turkey securitized
the regional outcomes of the war on Iraq in 2003 and the Arab uprisings in 2011.
The main research question of the thesis is: what is the impact of regional outcomes
in the Middle East on the Turkish-Saudi relations in the period from 2003 until
2013?
1.1 Literature Review on Turkish-Saudi Relations:
The literature on Turkey-Saudi relations is rather limited. In Turkish literature, there
is more interest in explaining the evolution of the relations between Turkey and
Saudi Arabia through writings that focused on the shift in the Turkish foreign policy
in the 1960s and 1970s and approaching the Muslim countries. Other bodies of
Turkish literature, mainly Op-eds and investigative reports in Turkish newspaper,
address the Turkish-Saudi relations from the perspective of the rise of political
islamists in the Turkish political scene, the rise of Islamic finance in the Turkish
economy in 1980s and the relations between Turkish islamists and other countries
like Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Turkish secular newspaper Cumhuriyet published
several reports in 1990s by a famous investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu on the
political economy of the Turkish-Saudi relations during 1980s and this journalist
wrote a book called “Rabıta” on this issue1. In 2000s, the Turkish-Saudi relations
found its place in the literature that studies relations between Turkey and the Middle
East under the rule of AKP. While in the Saudi literature, the interest of studying
Turkish-Saudi relations is present rather in the writings that focus on Saudi Arabia
and the Middle East during the 1991 Gulf war and after the US invasion of Iraq in
2003.
For the period of the study, the role of Iran and the impact of the rise of Iranian
influence on rapprochement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia is one of the main
issues that were discussed in the Turkish and Saudi literature. Sinem Cengiz, in her
Master thesis entitled “Turkish-Saudi relations within the context of internal and
1 Mumcu, Uğur. Rabıta, Tekin Yayınevi, Istanbul, 1997.
5
regional dynamics during the 1990s and the 2000s”2, considered the domestic,
regional and international factors on Turkish-Saudi relations during the 1990s and
2000s. Cengiz concluded that the balance of power in the region which leans toward
Iran was an important factor in the development of the relations between Turkey
and Saudi Arabia. She found out that the problematic issues in the Middle East,
such as the Palestinian issue, Syrian conflict, Iranian nuclear threat and instability in
Iraq pushes the two countries towards each other’s. However Cengiz’s argument
about the role of Iran in Turkish-Saudi relations could not explain the deterioration
in the relations during the Arab uprisings which took place simultaneously while
Iran was still rising regionally. In other words, Iran continued to rise regionally and
this did not force Turkey and Saudi Arabia to mend their ideological differences
which appeared during the Egyptian political change in July 3rd 2013 and after.
Another issue was the regional balance of power in the Middle East which was
considered by Cengiz as a potential area for cooperation between Turkey and Saudi
Arabia, turned to a field of competition between them. During the Arab uprisings,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia were in a regional rivalry as Turkey was seen as a pillar in
a regional alliance composed of Qatar, Egypt (under rule of Muslim Brotherhood)
and Hamas in Gaza, while Saudi Arabia continued to favour a policy that prolongs
the regional status quo and ensuring the stability of the GCC regimes, Jordan and
Morocco and it was suspicious from the regional rise of the Muslim Brothers. Not
only that, but also the removal of the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi from
power has revealed clearly how Saudi Arabia was provoked by the Turkish regional
role and its high profile cooperation with Muslim Brotherhood.
Contrary, another article written by Meliha Benli Altunisik titled “Bitter
Frenemies”3 pointed out the difference between the Turkish and Saudi perspectives
2 Cengiz, Sinem. ““Turkish-Saudi relations within the context of internal and regional dynamics
during the 1990s and the 2000s”, Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey,
March 2015.
3 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Bitter Frenemies The Not-Quite-Alliance Between Saudi Arabia And
Turkey”, Foreign Policy, May 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2012-05-
15/bitter-frenemies .
6
towards the rise of Iran in the region and how the two countries want different
things in the region and they try to get them differently. The article addressed the
issue of Iran’s rise from a different perspective; she argues that “Turkey wanted to
counter balance Iranian power in the region through soft balancing. Specifically,
Ankara would undermine Tehran's influence in Palestinian politics and its
dominance in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria by getting closer to those states itself”, while
“Saudi Arabia, in the eve of the US invasion of Iraq, began building alliances with
states that shared its outlook, a "Sunni axis," so to speak, to combat the "Shia arc",
like allying with Egypt and Jordan and it wanted to include Turkey. She also
mentioned about the different tracks followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the
developments of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, by highlighting the
strife between their positions and the differences in their priorities even in Syria.
Altunisik ended the article by saying that the opportunities for rapprochement
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia arise from time to time, but still there are hard
limitations to their relationship owing to their different approaches and priorities.
The article paraphrased the impact of the Iranian rise in the Turkish-Saudi relations,
however it could not predict that the different approaches of Turkey and Saudi
Arabia in dealing with the Arab uprisings would leave an impact on the bilateral
relations after the political change occurred in Egypt in July 2013, since the article
was written in May 2013.
The discrepancy between the priorities and the perspectives of Turkey and Saudi
Arabia was studied by Crystal A Ennis and Bessma Momani in their article entitled
“Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi
foreign policy strategies”4. They sort out the evolution of the foreign policies of
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, their activities, their motivations and challenges to their
involvement in the region. They argue that the Arab spring was a moment when the
Arab world caught up with the Turkish experience and that the Turkish model
represents an alternative to the dominant political tendencies in the region, namely
4 Ennis, Crystal A and Moman, Bessma. “Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab
Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi foreign policy strategiest”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, Issue 6,
2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/01436597.2013.802503#.Ve6y7hGeDGc .
7
Rentierism (like: Saudi Arabia), Radical Islamism (like: Iran) and political
authoritarianism (like: Egypt). In the article, a comparison between the Turkish
approach and the Saudi approach to the course of events after 2011 shows that
Turkey has adopted a principled stance towards the developments in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya and Syria unlike Saudi Arabia which followed the security view point
inasmuch as securing the regime stability of the GCC countries and in light of its
regional rivalry with Iran. However the article did not address the impact of this
distinctness on the bilateral relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Although
the article discusses clearly the divergence between the policies which reaches the
level of conflictual; the article did not frame out areas of regional between the two
countries.
Also there are several op-eds written by Turkish and Arab journalists talking about
possible political alliance between Turkey and Saudi Arabia during the Arab
uprisings in face of Iran like Sinan Ülgen’s article entitled “Turkey could form an
alliance with Gulf states”5 in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. Ülgen mentioned that having the
same goal in Syria during the uprising and adopting policies that seek regional
stability against the Iranian policies in the region are main motives behind the rise
of an alliance between Turkey and the Gulf. In addition to that, he says that the
other regional countries need the economic capabilities of both Turkey and GCC
countries and that the restrained US policy under US president Barack Obama
indulges the rise of such alliance. Another Op-ed written by a Turkish scholar,
Bülent Aras, in Al-Arabiya website entitled: “Time to go it alone: Saudi Arabia,
UAE and Turkey”6. He argued that the USA is going to pack up and leave from the
Middle East politics and that the regional countries would go to form alliances in
order to secure their interests upon the US withdrawal from the regional politics. He
5 Ulgen, Sinan. “Turkey could form an alliance with Gulf states”, Al-Sharq Al-Awsaat, January
2014, http://english.aawsat.com/2014/01/article55327539/debate-turkey-could-form-an-alliance-
with-the-Gulf-states .
6 Aras, Bulent. “Time to go it alone: Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey”, Al-Arabiya, January 2014,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/01/15/Time-to-go-it-alone-in-the-
Middle-East-Saudi-Arabia-UAE-and-Turkey.html .
8
proposed forming an alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and UAE since their
individual policies would not lead to success and the three countries have the
potential to offer something positive to the region’s development trajectory and
secure their own interests. However Aras and Ülgen do not touch the idea that UAE
and Saudi Arabia are approaching Iran in a way different than Turkey, and these
different approaches restricts any alliance could rise between Turkey, Saudi Arabia
and UAE. Also Aras and Ülgen do not provide an argument for Turkey and UAE to
deal with the issue of Muslim Brothers; as Turkey insists on including them, while
the UAE looks at them as a direct threat on the UAE’s national security. Finally,
Aras has referred to the issue of the US withdrawal from the region without giving a
description to the way the USA is going to deal with its interests after its
withdrawal and in case of the USA not withdrawing, he did not mention the nature
of relations that can take place between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and UAE.
The literature on the Turkish-Saudi relations in the period of study discusses the
impact of the political change took place in Turkey in 2002 and in Saudi Arabia in
2005 on the evolution of Turkish-Saudi relations. In his paper entitled “Turkish-
Saudi Relations: How Ideological Differences Surpassed Mutual Interests”7 Al-
Shammari argues that the steps taken by the AKP government in changing Turkey’s
orientation to other destinations beside the west was similar to the newly adopted
Saudi foreign policy that sought also diversifying orientations towards the new
rising regions in the world. The newly adopted foreign policies of Turkey and Saudi
Arabia have contributed to further development of bilateral relations which was not
on a high profile owing to the differences in the political systems and ideologies.
Al-Shammari says that the two countries have put their mutual interests above their
ideological and political differences, and their bilateral relations developed in a
noticeable way. Conversely, both countries started to put ideological differences
back on the track during the Arab uprisings as he refers to the different perspective
of each country toward the uprisings Turkey adapted a civilizational perspective
7 Al-Shammari, Abdullah. “Turkish-Saudi Relations: How Ideological Differences Surpassed
Mutual Interests”, unpublished paper.
9
that criticizes the basic foundations of the Arab ruling regimes, describes them as
inherits from the colonial period who gained their legacy from symbolic,
nationalistic and ideological actions not from the wide participation of the people
and that these regimes were trying to apply the western political virtues without
paying attention to the cultural value systems of the Muslim societies. On the other
hand, Saudi Arabia adopted a security perspective while watching the fall down of
its allying regimes that it was relying on them in its regional plans after the US
withdrawal from Iraq and in facing the Iranian expansionist policies in Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon and Yemen. He ends his paper by saying that the Arab Spring was a real
examination for the Turkish-Saudi relations which ended the momentum of the
Turkish-Saudi relations started from mid-2005 until the end of 2010.
There are also reports published by Turkish Think Tanks on the amplification of the
Turkish-Saudi relations under the rule of AKP government in Turkey. Muhittin
Ataman wrote two descriptive analytical reports on the evolution of the Turkish-
Saudi political, economic and cultural relations in 20098 and 20129. He reasoned the
development of the bilateral relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia firstly to
the political change took place in Turkey through the rise of AKP into power and
the different approach it followed in dealing with the Arab world, and secondly to
the regional developments in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine where the stances of
Turkey and Saudi Arabia were close to each other’s.
1.2 Historical Background of the Turkish-Saudi Relations:
The differences between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the political systems and state-
society relations have shaped the perceptions of the governments in each country
towards each other’s. Turkey is a secular state which formulates its public policies
8 Ataman, Muhittin. “Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan İlişkileri: Temkinli İlişkilerden Çok-Tarafli
Birlikteliğe”, ORSAM, September 2009,
http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/2009912_muhittin.sonints.pdf
9 Ataman, Muhittin. “Turkish-Saudi Arabian Relations During the Arab Uprisings: Towards a
Strategic Partnership?”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2012,
http://file.insightturkey.com/files/pdf/insight_turkey_vol_14_no_4_2012_ataman.pdf .
10
on non-religious principles, while a country like Saudi Arabia acquires its
legitimacy (domestically, regionally and internationally) from being a Muslim
country that hosts the Holy mosque and applies Sharia law in the political,
economic and social ]life10. Owing to differences in foreign policy, ideology,
political systems, no effort exerted for developing the bilateral relations between
Turkey and Saudi Arabia until mid-1960s11.
In the 1970s, the relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia started to be activated
as a result of events that took place in that period. Turkey endorsed a different
orientation in its foreign policy amid at getting wide international support to its
standpoint on the Cyprus issue. It looked for approaching Muslim countries,
became a member in the OIC in 1969 and established official relations with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 197512. In response to these
developments, Saudi Arabia reacted positively and did not oppose Turkey’s military
intervention in Cyprus 1974. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was one of the main
destinations sought by the Turkish migrants in 1970s and 1980s to take part in the
infrastructure projects in different cities of the kingdom which attracted Turkish
workers (estimated number of Turkish migrants to Saudi Arabia reached 130,000
migrants) and Turkish construction companies13.
The changes in Turkish foreign policy proceeded by the domestic changes and rise
of Islamic-based political figures in mid 1980s had encouraged Saudi Arabia to
10 Ataman, Muhittin. “Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan Ilişkileri: Temkinli Ilişkilerden Çok-Tarafli
Birlikteliğe”, Ortadogu Analiz, Vol. 1, No 9, September 2009, P.75,
http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/2009912_muhittin.sonints.pdf .
11 “Turkish-Saudi Relatioship: From Partnership to Tension”, Rawabet Center for Research and
Strategic Studies, January 2015, http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/2707.
12 Arakan, Mahmut Bali. “Turkey and the OIC: 1984-1992”, The Turkish Yearbook of International
Relations, Vol. XXIII, Ankara University, 1993, P.102 .
13 Unan, Elif. “Microeconomic Determinants Of Turkish Workers Remittances: Survey Results For
France-Turkey”, Paper presented to a conference on Inequalities and development in the
Mediterranean countries, Galatasaray University, Istanbul, May 2009, http://gdri.dreem.free.fr/wp-
content/g3-1unan-dreem-1.pdf .
11
invest in the Turkish market. In 1980s, upon the endorsement of the economic
liberalization agenda by Turgut Özal’s government in Turkey, Saudi Islamic banks
started to flourish in the Turkish economy, many Islamic NGOs were established in
Turkey and Saudi Arabia developed economic ties with the pro-Islamic Turkish
businessmen and politicians (widely known in Turkey by the followers of Milli
Görüş)14. In 1985, three big Saudi Islamic financial institutions like: Albaraka Turk
Özel Finans, Faisal Finans (owned by Prince Mohamed Al-Faisal Al-Saud) and
Family Finans were opened in Turkey15. Saudi Arabia developed financial
partnerships with the main figures of the Anavatan Party (ANAP) or those political
figures known for their pro-Islamic orientation through these financial institutions.
Korkut Özal (the brother of president Turgut Özal) and Eymen Topbas were in the
founding committee of the Albaraka Turk Özal Finans, while Prince Mohamed Al-
Faisal chose Salih Özcan and Tevfik Paksu to establish Faisal Finans. Moreover the
Turkish media claimed that Faisal Finance and Albaraka Turk were active in
organizing and sponsoring a great many social, cultural, and political activities and
being in partnerships with other religious foundations like Islamic Insurance
Institution (Islami Tekaful Kurumu and World Muslim League in Turkey, which is
known for its donations, developing relations with Muslim Brotherhood figures like
Muhammed Qutb “a brother of the Muslim Brotherhood’s intellectual Sayyid
Qutb”, organizing conferences and youth camps, constructing mosques and building
Islamic centers inside and outside Turkey, funding pro-Islamic Magazine like: Hilal
and Darul Malul Islami in addition to funding the paper expenses of more than 50
publishing companies, newspapers, and magazines known for their Islamic
activities16.
14 Koni, Hakan, “Saudi Influence on Islamic Institutions in Turkey Beginning in the 1970s”, Middle
East Journal, Vol. 66, No 1, Winter 2012, http://yoksis.bilkent.edu.tr/pdf/files/5945.pdf.
15 Uras, Gungor. “Katılım Bankaları (Faizsiz Bankacılık) Finans Sisteminin Bir Parçası Oldu”,
Milliyet, May 2011, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/katilim-bankalari-faizsiz-bankacilik-finans-
sisteminin-bir-parcasi-oldu/ekonomi/ekonomiyazardetay/19.05.2011/1392052/default.htm .
16 Koni, Hakan, Op.Cit.
12
During the Gulf War in 1991, both countries were on the same side of the
international coalition led by the USA against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Saudi
Arabia helped Turkey financially through loans in order to overcome the bad
repercussions of the war on the Turkish economy17. However the relations
witnessed a cooling at the end of 1990s as a result of the deterioration of Turkish-
Syrian relations over Syria’s support to the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) and the
dissidence on the usage of the Euphrates river. Saudi Arabia lobbied against
Turkey’s request for a loan from the World Bank to finance building dams on the
Euphrates River which goes from Turkey to Syria18. However these activities later
was halted down, Saudi investors sold their shares in these banks during 1990s
when new secular governments came to power in Turkey and changed their foreign
policy orientation19..
1.3 The Regional Level of Analysis:
The phenomenon of the cold war between the United States and Soviet Union had
its own effect on the international relations between states and the discipline of
International Relations as well. During the cold war, the super powers were highly
involved in many regional, inter-state conflicts and proxy wars, as they see these
conflicts a part of their global conflict. Conflicts around the globe were seen as a
part of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their
ideological differences. The cold war’s influence on the discipline of International
Relations was high, as the International level of analysis and its systematic
approach had an overlay on the regional, national and individual levels of analysis.
17 “Turkish-Saudi Relations: The Reality and The Future”, Fiker Center for Studies, April 2015,
http://www.fikercenter.com/ar/p/news/view/5537f36adf1e7 .
18 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Bitter Frenemies The Not-Quite-Alliance Between Saudi Arabia And
Turkey”, Foreign Policy, May 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2012-05-
15/bitter-frenemies .
19 “Faysal Finans'ı "Prens" sattı”, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/10/12/ekonomi/eko01.html.
13
In the 1990s and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the cold war’s effect on
internationalizing local and regional conflict has come to an end. Scholars started
not to look at the regional and local conflicts from the perspective of the bi-polar
global conflict between the western bloc (led by the US) and the eastern bloc (led
by the ex-Soviet Union). While some worked on developing the theories used by
the international level of analysis to fit in the new unipolar international system.
Other scholars started to revise the old workings on regionalism written in the end
of 1950s and 1960s in order to develop new approaches that can explain regional
conflict and cooperation, security on the regional level and interactions between
states in certain region which continued to live conflicts even after the end of the
cold war20.
The prioritization of the regional level of analysis existed during the cold war;
however it was not prominent owing to the overlay of the international level of
analysis. Leonard Binder has developed the concept of ‘Subordinate International
System’ to question the overemphasis of the bipolarity in international relations on
studying the Middle East. His objective was to bridge the gap between area studies
that explore foreign policies on socio-historical contextual bases and International
Relations in which its generalizations are based on ideal models, on the Middle
Eastern Studies. Binder argues that “It is erroneous to look upon the Middle East as
being in the "middle" between the United States and the Soviet Union.”. He adds
that, “If bipolarity is a useful term in describing certain contemporary aspects of
international politics, it is inadequate to describe either relations within the Middle
East or between the major powers of the bi- polar system and this subordinate
system. And that the Middle Eastern states will more likely feel compelled to act in
20 Thompson, William. “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Proposition
Inventory”, International Studies Quarterly, 17, 1, March 1973. See also, Binder, Leonard. “The
Middle East as a Subordinate International System”, World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958. And
Zartman, William. “Political Science”, in Leonard Binder (ed.), The Study of the Middle East,
Research and Scholarship in the Humanities and the Social Sciences, John Wiley, New York &
London, 1977. And Cantori, Louis J. and Spiegel, Steven L. The International Politics of Regions,
Prentice-Hall, California, 1970. And Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and
Economic Forces 1950-1957, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. And Lindberg, Leon N. and
Scheingold, Stuart A. (eds), Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971.
14
terms of their own complex system so as to preserve their individual positions
within the Middle Eastern structure”21. He has utilized this concept in
understanding interactions between Arab countries, Arab countries and non-Arab
countries (Turkey, Iran and Israel). Such concept, Subordinate International System,
was utilized later by other scholars to study different regions like West Europe,
South East Asia, West Africa and Latin America beside the Middle East22.
Different Schools of International Relations, mainly those who belong to the post-
positivist schools or named as “The Fourth Wave of International Relations
Theories”, has contributed, through their ideas, concepts, analogies, in
understanding how events take place on the regional level. Barry Buzan utilized the
concepts of securitization and de-securitization of the Copenhagen school in his
“Regional Security Complex Theory”23. Mohammad Ayoob used the perspective of
the English school and its concepts of Regional Society and Regional Community.
Others tried to develop approaches in which their objective was not to discuss
philosophical debates between schools of International Relations, but to better
understand the emergence and variation of regional security orders like David A.
Lake and Patrick M. Morgan24. In their book, “Regional Orders”, David Lake and
Patrick Morgan’s objective is to understand different regional security orders in
different regions, the main factors playing role in these orders and to identify when
and how great powers, like the United States, can best contribute to regional
21 Binder, Leonard. “The Middle East as a Subordinate International System”, World Politics, Vol.
10, Issue 03, April 1958, P. 427. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009495 .
22 Cantori, Louis J. and Spiegel, Steven L., “International Regions: A Comparative Approach to
Five Subordinate Systems”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4, Special Issue on
International Subsystems, December 1969, pp. 361-380,
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3013600?sid=21104899128981&uid=4&uid=2&uid=373919
2
23 Buzan, Barry, and Waever, Ole. Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security,
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
24 Lake, David A. (ed.) and Morgan, Patrick M. (ed.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New
World, Penn State University Press, 1977.
15
stability. They put some primary arguments that prove that “the regional level
stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and
as a level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security studies”.
Firstly Lake and Morgan argue that “regions are now more salient features of
international politics”. The regions after the cold war have become the rising venue
of conflicts and cooperation in comparing with the past. Regional conflicts, fuelled
by individual, national and regional factors, are to stay at the regional level since the
great powers’ ability to intervene in these conflicts has diminished and their interest
in supporting local and regional conflicts has declined. Unresolved conflicts and
enemy relationships that existed during the cold war and continued to exist after the
cold war (Such as: Arab Israeli conflict, Iranian-Arab confrontation and internal
Arab cold war) has proved that the management of regional conflicts will be driven
largely by regional considerations and must be undertaken by the states belonging
to the region25.
Secondly Lake and Morgan also argue that, “the end of the cold war has opened
possibilities for more cooperative regional orders” by saying that ultimately the
responsibilities now fall on local states to manage their own conflicts. They give
examples on Arab countries and Israel’s decision to enter in a peace process after
having devastating wars since 1948, the African Union’s steps toward collective
security and the eastern and western European countries’ integration in the
European Union. Although managing regional conflicts and achieving cooperative
frameworks has witnessed success and failure models in the Middle East, the
reasons behind it are regional. The Middle East has witnessed attempts to form
different sub-regional cooperative orders for different regional reasons, some of
them succeeded until now (like Gulf Cooperation Council), some of them are not
active (like Arab Maghreb Union), some appeared and disappeared (like the United
Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria, the United Arab States between Egypt,
25 Ayoob, Mohammed. “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the
Construction of Regional Order”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53:3, 1999.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00049919993845#.Ve7EqxGeDGc .
16
Syria and Yemen and Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan) and other cooperative
arrangements between Arab countries and non-Arab countries who were perceived
by Arab countries as anti-Arab politics during the cold war like Turkey.
Finally, Lake and Morgan argue that the academic outcome of studying the regional
politics is expected to be high. Studying regions will drive scholars to develop
theories that can incorporate regional relations. Theories, analogies and concepts
based on the analysis of great power politics cannot be applied on the regional level
without revision. Also, politics of regions are not necessarily unique, as argued by
Thompson, “The study of regional subsystems presents an opportunity for the
integration of the findings of area specialists and international relations scholars.
Both groups presumably have something to offer each other. A mutual exchange
could only benefit our current understanding of world political behaviour”26.
Therefore a new challenge and opportunity is open now for analysts and scholars to
develop comparative study between regions, to develop new general theories for
regional relations or to adjust the current ones used for global powers (alliances,
balance of power, deterrence, etc.) to fit in different regional contexts and to work
on developing conceptual frameworks that can address political developments on
the regional level.
1.4 Regional Security Complex Theory, Securitization and De-Securitization:
One of the results of introducing the sub-field of security studies to the regional
level of analysis is the theory of Regional Security Complex (RSC) presented by
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) has
appeared as a reaction of the Copenhagen School of International Relations to the
overstress on the global level and the national level of security analysis during the
cold war. Its objective is to ensure that the local and regional factors are given their
proper weight in security analysis.
26 Thompson, William R. “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional
Inventory”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, 1973, P.91.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013464 .
17
With its constructivist roots that are mostly driven from the ideas of Alexander
Wendt27, RSCT makes use of the Role Perception, Amity and Enmity among units
of the regional system, Region’s Construction, History, Culture, Actors and the
Anarchy of the international system, in understanding Security interactions on the
regional level. It does not question the main concepts presented by other traditional
theories of International Relations (i.e: Realism and Liberalism). It applies some of
the concepts of these theories on the regional level like: Balance of power, Polarity
of the regional system, Alliances, Deterrence, Rivalry, etc. RSC is not a theory by
the positivist understanding of theories presented by scholars of International
Relations during the cold war, as Buzan argues; it is an approach that aims to
analyse and explain the security problems within any region28.
A regional security complex is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns
link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be
considered apart from one another’29. In this definition, Buzan highlighted the
importance of having an interaction between the units of the system as a crucial
basic in forming a security complex in a region. The presence of security relations
and the existence of interdependence between regional states are necessary for the
production of a regional security complex. In another position that emphasizes the
role of interaction, Lake and Morgan defines Regional Security Complex as a set of
states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a
distinct geographic area. In such complex, the members are so interrelated in terms
of their security, that actions by any member have a major impact on the others30.
27 Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power
Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2., Spring 1992, pp. 391-425,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents .
28 Buzan, Barry. “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, International
Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621945 .
29 Buzan, Barry. People, States, And Fear: The National Security Problem In International
Relations, University of North Carolina Press, 1983, P. 106. 30 Lake and Morgan, Op.Cit., P.12.
18
RSCT identifies recognition as a criterion which is essential for the production of a
regional security complex. This element is highly emphasized by all scholars
working on the regional level of analysis, whether their focus was on security
studies or political economy or else. There are two kinds of recognition in which
their presence is crucial for the production of a regional security complex or a
region; the internal recognition or self-consciousness and the external recognition.
In the internal recognition, the member units in a regional system have the
consciousness that they constitute a region and that they perceive themselves and
others as being in a particular security complex31. Constructivist theories treat
regions as socially created entities that take on meaning and importance because
states perceive themselves as they co-habit a common area and share a common
future32. Regions are what states make of it33. Internal and external recognition
appear to be the product of common sense. The political actors of a regional
subsystem are bound to be aware of the sub-systemic distinctiveness of their region
and its existence34. Also the external actors recognize the subsystem as a distinctive
theatre of operation.
Through that, countries that perceive themselves to be in a region under some
conditions might cooperate more easily and under other conditions might conflict in
areas of disagreements. The regional self-identification plays a role in raising
political stakes between member units of the regional system in areas of
disagreement35.
31 Buzan, Barry. “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis”, in Buzan, Barry and Gowher Rizvi
(ed.), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Power, London, Macmillan, 1986.
32 Lake and Morgan, Op.Cit. P.12.
33 Wendt, Alexander. Op.Cit.
34 Thompson, William R. The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional
Inventory, Op.Cit. P.97.
35 Lake and Morgan, Op.Cit, P.48.
19
Later Buzan and Wæver worked on developing this definition to shed the state-
centric focus from it and to deal with the new rising non-traditional security threats.
They defined RSC as ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-
securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’ 36. This new
development on the definition of RSCT shed the light on the securitization vs de-
securitization process and its importance in the production of a regional security
complex.
Securitization and De-securitisation found its place in the definition of RSC in
Buzan Book 1998 where he was trying to figure out the new non-traditional security
threats rose after the end of the cold war. Securitization is the intersubjective
establishment of an existential threat, which demands urgent and immediate
attention, as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat37. The
main argument of the ST is that security is a (illocutionary) speech act and security
being done by uttering something as a threat. The securitising actor claims that he
has the right to take extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the referent
object. Therefore, the issue would be transferred from the normal politics sphere
into the ‘emergency’ politics sphere. However, not everything can become a
security issue, there are three steps for a having a successful securitization. The first
is identification of existential threats; second, presence of an emergency action; and
third, effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules38. To present an issue
as an existential threat is to say that: ‘If we do not tackle this problem, everything
else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it
in our own way)’39. The first step towards a successful securitization is called a
36 Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, Wilde, Jaap de. Security: A New Framework of Analysis, Lynne
Rienner Publisher, 1998, P. 201.
37 Ibid, pp.24-25. And see also: Wæver, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in Ronnie D.
Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, Columbia University Press, 1995. p. 51.
38 Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, Wilde, Jaap de., Op.Cit, P.6.
39 Ibid, P.24.
20
securitizing move. Securitization is largely based on power and capability and
therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat40.
The geographical factor comes to be a necessary element in the production of a
regional security complex. The RSC should have a geographical location where the
security relationships exist and that the member units participate profoundly in
those relationships. In that geographical area, the member units see their security as
much closely bound to actions and security practice of other units in this
theatre41.The physical adjacency tends to produce more security interaction among
neighbours than among countries in different complexes. The impact of
geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the
military, political, societal, and environmental sectors42.
The presence of geography is a crucial factor in the production of a security
complex but there is an internal debate on either to include global powers in the
complexes that is geographically far from them or not. This issue looks important in
discussing the involvement of the United States in the Middle East security
complex. Lake and Morgan argued that great powers can be included in some
regional security complexes, despite being not geographically included in the
complex, when their interests are threaten directly. According to them, the United
States is present in the many security theatres (Europe, Middle East, East Asia)
because its interests are bound up with the security practice of either the member
units of the regional system or other actors from outside the system. On the other
hand, Buzan does not approve the including the United States in the European
security complex or the Middle East security complex for many reasons43. Firstly, it
40 Taureck, Rita. “Securitization theory and securitization studies”, Journal of International
Relations and Development, 2006, P.2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800072 .
41 Ibid, P.31.
42 Buzan, Barry, and Waever, Ole. Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security,
Op.Cit.
43 Ibid.
21
destroys the concept of geographical proximity that is crucial and essential in
constructing a region or a regional security complex. Secondly, introducing the
super powers’ policies to the regional security complex would destroy the
distinction between the international level of analysis and the regional level of
analysis. Thirdly, Buzan puts many limitations on including the global factors and
global power roles in the regional analysis. As he affirms in different positions in
his book that the regional and local factors have their considerable weight in
security analysis versus the global ones. Buzan’s objective from the RSCT is to
prove the independency of the regional level from the global level and that the
factors of on the regional level are quite enough to understand security relations
between member units. Unlike the Morgan and Lake, in which their objective is to
provide an approach of analysing security in the post-cold war times, not to
emphasize the clear-cut independency of the regional level from the global level.
On this point, the thesis emphasizes on the necessity of studying the regional
interactions and the foreign policies of the regional states through a partial
independent perspective from the superpower’s grand strategy in any regional
entity; as the regional countries develop their policies as a kind of interaction to
other regional countries’ actions not to the super powers’ actions in the first degree,
however the thesis cannot negate the influence of the super power policies on the
Middle East and the US became a regional actor after 2003 Iraq invasion.
The internal debate on the issue of geography, within the RSCT, has found another
ground in how to divide the map of the world into different regional security
complexes. Buzan stresses on the necessity of dividing the world map into certain
complexes based upon factors of culture, history, traditional conflicts, etc. Thus he
came out with the world map divided into the Middle East Security complex,
Middle Asia security complex, East Asia security complex, South Asia security
complex and the Sub-Saharan Africa security complex. On the other side, Lake and
Morgan are more tolerant to the geographical proximity issue, and they left a room
for interaction between these different complexes, as they name it ‘grey areas’.
They argue that Identified complexes will overlap or vary somewhat, with issues,
events, and related perceptions of what actors and analysts deem to be relevant
externalities. And that perceptions and self-consciousness can make for a security
22
complex. Therefore, Identification will always be problematic and these divisions
are not guaranteed to match up.
This debate is related to the topic of the thesis in the issue of whether or not to
locate Turkey in the Middle East Security Complex. Buzan argues that Turkey is
not a member either in the Middle East security complex, or in the east European
security complex, or the Middle Asian security complex. He gives it the concept of
an ‘Insulator State’ like Afghanistan and Burma, as it is not totally belonging
culturally or politically dependent on any of these complexes. Specifically in the
Middle East, Buzan sees Turkey’s engagement in the Middle East as a new
development but he stresses more on the westernistic preference of Turkey’s
politics and its traditional enmity with Iran, Syria and Iraq. In other words, its
security interests are not deeply rooted in the region except the water issue (with
Syria and Iraq) and the Kurdish issue. Therefore he argues that, Turkey seems likely
to remain an insulator between the Middle East and European RSCs, but probably a
considerably more engaged one than during the Cold War, with ambitions of
playing a role as ‘regional’ great power within the loose European super complex
and the Middle East. Buzan admits that Turkey is challenging the concept of
insulator state, but he says that it is normal for insulator states to challenge their
position through a more active foreign policy than the ones traditionally adopted by
insulators. He puts one condition in which Turkey can be treated as a pole in any of
the RSCs of the Balkans, Middle East or Middle Asia. If Turkey became powerful
enough to break the borders of these complexes and to bring them together into a
coherent strategic arena, trigger such a coalescence of its neighbours who are
located in different complexes, then we can deal with Turkey as a pole in one of
these complexes not just an insulator.
On the other hand, a strong wave of literature has appeared in late 2000s discussing
more the role of Turkey in the Middle East Security Complex, as a rising pole. This
literature argues that Turkey’s political and economic interests are getting Turkey
more interdependent on the other countries in the Middle East security complex.
Beyond the water issue and the Kurdish issue, Turkey’s less successful attempts to
gain the European Union’s membership has made Turkey more open politically and
23
economically to the Middle East. Turkey found in the markets of the Middle
Eastern countries a good saviour from the bad effects of the global world crisis in
2007-2008. This literature has witnessed a new rise during the 2011 Arab uprisings,
by arguing that Turkey’s model of merging Islam and Democracy and its economic
improvement can be a guiding model for the Arab countries in the post revolution
times. And this openness gives her wide political and economic interests in the
region. Such waves of literature are critical on defining Turkey as an insulator, and
they sought revisiting the concept of insulating state on Turkey44. Other literature
argue that Turkey’s engagement in the Middle East get worse by getting involved in
sectarian conflicts during Arab uprisings time and over engagement in the domestic
politics of key Arab states. But it still can play a role in the uncertain future of the
region if it carried on its political and economic improvements45.
The thesis considers with Turkey as an active actor in the Middle East Security
Complex owing to the big threats that arise in the region to its national, economic
and strategic interests, according to the Turkish decision makers. Besides that, the
securitization of the new regional environment after the US invasion of Iraq and the
Arab uprisings forced Turkey to adopt an active regional diplomatic, political and
economic role under the rule of AKP governments in Turkey.
The thesis takes advantage of the Regional Security Complex in apprehending how
Turkey and Saudi Arabia recognize each other as important actors in the region and
how they interacted after the US invasion of Iraq 2003 and during the Arab
uprisings in 2011. The thesis utilizes also the concepts of Securitization and De-
Securitization in understanding how Turkey and Saudi Arabia securitized regional
issues differently in a way that led to a difference in their regional behaviours
44 Barrinha, Andre. “The Ambitious Insulator: Revisiting Turkey's Position in Regional Security
Complex Theory”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.799353#.VKFPSV4AAA .
45 Onis, Ziya. “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a
Turbulent Middle East”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.868392?src=recsys#.VKFPsF4AAA .
24
towards the developments in Iraq after 2003, Lebanon after 2006, Egypt after 2011
and Syria after 2011.
25
CHAPTER 2
THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX AFTER THE US
INVASION OF IRAQ IN 2003 AND TURKISH-SAUDI
RELATIONS
2.1 Introduction:
This chapter intends to figure out the main features of the new regional security
complex created in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003 mainly the rise of the Iranian
influence in Iraq, the rise of Sunni/Shi’a/Kurdish identities over the Iraqi national
identity, the loss of balance of power by the Arab order and the increased fragility
of the Arab Regional System, as a traditional regional system in the Middle East.
These features have carried a body of threats for both Turkey and Saudi Arabia
where they shared common threats and pushed their regional stances closer.
However, owing to their different perceptions, their different agendas towards the
RSC in Iraq, they did not follow the same policy line all the time.
In the second section, the chapter explains the spill over of the features of the new
security complex in Iraq and its outcomes to other Middle East countries like
Lebanon and how these features acted on the national and strategic interests of
Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this case, the stances and the behaviour of both
countries were different but not conflicting as Turkey maintained its neutral stand
towards all domestic and regional actors in Lebanon.
The third section presents how the developments in the region (mainly in Iraq and
Lebanon) played a role in changing the perception of the Turkish regional role in
Saudi Arabia and the perception of the Saudi regional role in Turkey in a way that
contributed positively to the Turkish-Saudi bilateral relations on the political,
economic and military levels. Despite the dissemblance between the Turkish and
26
Saudi regional policy lines in the region, the high positive perceptions of each
country’s regional role increased the political will of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to
develop their relations since 2003 until 2011.
2.2 The Regional Security Complex after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003:
2.2.1 The major transformations in the regional landscape after the US
invasion of Iraq:
The traditional Middle East regional system since the Second World War had been
dominated by competition and rivalries mainly between multiple Arab powers
(Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia), while non-Arab regional powers were present
but not influential as Arab regional powers in the regional complexes. After the US
invasion of Iraq, the fundamental regional balance of power started to shift from the
side of the Arab regional powers to the side of non-Arab regional powers in a new
regional environment. Iraq was acting as a buffer zone against Iran, which started to
follow an expansionist policy in the Arab world and the Gulf since 197946. Iraq
served as a bulwark to Iran and with its military and economic power it balanced
Iran’s largely naval and ideological sources of power47. Iraq’s defeat being the
strongest Arab state that borders Iran and ruled by Saddam Hussein fought nearly
eight years with it (1980-1988), had left a psychological effect in the Arab world
that they are subjected to the expansionist ambitions of Iran. In defiance with
Turkey, owing to the rise of AKP government to power and its openness toward the
Arab countries, different forms of cooperative interaction between Turkey and the
Arab countries on different regional issues like the Iraqi issue, Lebanese issue and
Palestinian issue was high and noticeable.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had acted on the Arab Regional System and its
performance by expressing the fragility of its main actors, the insufficiency of the
46 Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, Robert Guffey, The Iraq Effect:
the Middle East after the Iraq War, Rand Corporation, 2010, P. 17.
47 Flynt Leverett, “How much does Iraq matter to Iran”,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/influence.html.
27
Arab states and the League of Arab States in facing foreign interventionist policies
of great powers (like US) and regional powers (like Iran and Turkey) in the Arab
internal affairs and the inability to take common actions within or outside the Arab
League to deter these interventions. That is to say the US invasion of Iraq marked
the shift towards a new Middle East based on US dominance48. The responses of the
Arab states to this event, in their separate national foreign policies, refer to their
acceptance of the de-facto situation created in the region, their cohabitation with the
situation and later echoed in their interaction with non-Arab countries like Turkey
(most of Arab countries) or Iran (mainly Syria). While the League of Arab States
failed to hold an urgent summit to discuss the US invasion dissimilar to the
preceding events like 1967 war and Palestinian Intifada in 1988 and 2001 in
compatible with the charter of the league which obliges Arab member states to
convene meanwhile the Arab National Security comes under threat 49.
The regional landscape was influenced by the spill over of the new features that
appeared in the Iraqi political scene like the rise of the Iranian influence and its
spread to Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. Iran started to extend its influence and its
presence in these countries in a way that serves its interests and works for its
regional foreign policy. Tehran appeared as an important actor in Iraq after 2003, in
Lebanon during the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006 and Hizballah’s invasion of
Beirut in 2008 and in Palestine during the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2009.
The rise of sub-state identities (Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish) over the national
identities and the appearance of non-state actors who are representing these
identities in the political scene in different countries as influential political actors
are considered from the new themes of the regional landscape created after the US
invasion of Iraq. In Iraq, the Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish groups were politically and
48 Salem, Paul. “The Middle East: Evolution of A Broken Regional Order”, Carnegie Papers No. 9,
June 2008, http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/07/30/middle-east-evolution-of-broken-regional-
order .
49 Youssef, Ahmed. “Arab Regional System”, Cairo University, 2012, Lecture. For further
explanation on the weak response of Arab states see also: Salem, Paul, Ibid.
28
militarily empowered in a way that enhanced their competition over the Iraqi
political process. In Lebanon, the noticeable ascent of Hizballah in the Lebanese
political scene symbolizes the spill over of the Iraqi effect and the rise of non-state
actor representing the Shi’a identity of Lebanon. Hizballah appeared as an
empowered non-state actor over the Lebanese state by kidnapping two Israeli
soldiers in 2006, entering in a war against Israel without coordination with the
Lebanese government, expanding the welfare system in the South Lebanon (highly
inhabited by Shi’a Lebanese) and invading Beirut in 2008.
2.2.2 The rise of the Iranian influence in Iraq:
The shift of the regional balance of power toward Iran was the main striking feature
of this new security complex created in Iraq for the Arab countries. Iran was the
country that benefited from the American war in Iraq most. The demise of a stable
Iraqi state and the rise of Shi’a dominated governments with strong ties to Iran gave
an impression that Iraq had quitted the Arab line and its decisions had become
under the hegemony of Iran50.
Iran found its vital interest in what happened to Iraq since the US invasion in 2003
and utilized its capacity to exercise an influence on the situation on Iraq. Tehran’s
priority lies in preventing Iraq from becoming a military or political or ideological
threat as the case in the days of Saddam Hussein. Iran’s strategy in Iraq also sought
for having a manageable kind of chaos there, which would neither push Iraq for a
successful alternative democratic and religious model which would appeal to the
citizens of Iran, nor would push Iraq for a complete failure that would create a
fragmented Iraq where the state of Kurdistan could exist and fuel independence
feelings within the Kurdish community in Iran. Therefore it supported establishing
an electoral democracy in Iraq since it will carry Iran’s followers (Shi’a political
parties) to power owing to their big size in the Iraqi society, brokering coalitions
during elections and funding them and their militias. Besides these political tools of
interference, Iran enhanced its intelligence presence in Southern Iraq, Baghdad and
50 Interview with a Saudi Journalist Khaled Tashkindi.
29
the Kurdish cities through a widespread network of paid informers, Iranian
Revolutionary Guard elements, funded religious propaganda and social welfare
campaigns51.
Iran started to play an important role in the Iraqi politics by exercising more
influence over different Iraqi Shi’a actors and increasing its support to them. Taking
into consideration the weakness of the Iraqi state after dissolving the Army and
Police apparatus, the Shi’a militias enjoyed a competitive advantage over other Iraqi
counterparts. Iran supported the establishment of the Supreme Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), later changed its name to Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI) formed by Al-Hakim family, and al-Dawa party under the
rule of Saddam regime and they became the major Iraqi Shi’a political actors after
the fall of Saddam. They were established in exile with (Badr Brigade) militia that
was trained and armed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard during the Iraq-Iran war
in 1980-1988. During the exile time, The Iraqi Shi’a political actors declared the
Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei as their source of emulation. They
returned back to Iraq after the fall of Saddam regime, as well as the commanders of
Badr brigade with their weapons and became active in the political process in Iraq
after Saddam Hussein52.
Iran also extended its influence and support to other Shi’a groups and families who
did not defect to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war like Al-Sadr family. The Iranian
revolutionary guard has trained the militia of Al-Sadr family known as (Al-Mahdy
army) and supplied it with weapons since 2007. The Sadrists enjoy a recognisable
popularity within the Shi’a community in Iraq, since they are presenting themselves
as Arab and not under the dominance of Iran. They also have strong social base in
Najaf and Karbala. Iran also extended its support and help for other small groups
51 Iran in Iraq: how much influence, International Crisis Group, March 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2005/mena/iran-in-iraq-how-much-
influence.aspx.
52 Eisenstadt, Michael, Knights, Michael, and Ali, Ahmed. “Iran’s influence in Iraq”, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 11, April 2011,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus111.pdf .
30
(military/education) in the Shi’a community like Asaib Ahl El-Haq group that split
from Al-Mahdy army under the leader of Qays Khazali who was loyal to Moktada
Al-Sadr (the religious leader for the Sadrists)53.
2.2.3 The rise of (Shi’a-Sunni-Kurdish) sub-state identities in Iraq:
The intercommunal boundaries and communal narratives within the Sunni and Shi’a
communities started to get solidified and have been bolstered at the expense of the
Iraqi national identity after launching the political process in Iraq. The Iraqi
governments formed after Saddam Hussein until the end of the period of this study
did not follow a strategy to construct an Iraqi national narrative or build an Iraqi
identity that could bring together the fragmented Iraqi state. Many Shi’a regarded
Saddam Hussein rule as a Sunni rule and that all state institutions were headed by
Sunnis, while after 2003, all Sunnis considered Iraq’s post 2003 political process
the rule of Shi’a and that the state became dominated by Shi’a. Sectarian terms
played a role in defining the – self - and the – other - in the Iraqi political scene54.
While the Kurdish parties took their opportunity to secure more self-governance in
the territories highly inhabited with Kurds fulfilling their desires for more political
autonomy.
53 Jonathan Spyer and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Iran and the Shi’a militia advance in Iraq”,
December 2014, http://www.meforum.org/4927/how-iraq-became-a-proxy-of-the-islamic-republic.
54 Al-Qarawee, Harih Hasan. “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis”, Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2014,
P.15, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/iraq_sectarian_crisis.pdf.
31
The political equation in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq can be explained from the
perspective of the interaction and the competition between the Iraqi (Shi’a, Sunnis
and Kurds) over power as influence, natural resources and territories, as Iraqi
political elites used all their tools in maximizing their shares in these fields.
Figure 1 New Political Complex in Iraq after 2003
The Shi’a political groups (the (ISCI), Al-Sadrists, the Daw’a party) united under a
coalition (the United Iraqi Alliance), brokered by Religious leader Ayatollah Ali Al-
Sistani and Iran, succeeded in securing 140 seats of the total 275 of the Constituent
Assembly on January 2015 which would write the new Iraqi constitution. The
United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurds went into a coalition where Ibrahim Al-Jafari
of the Al-Dawa party became the Prime Minister and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan became the President in April 2005 and the process of writing
the constitution started. The first constitutional parliamentary elections were held in
December 2005 and Nouri Maliki of Al-Dawaa party was elected as a Prime
TERRITORY
Shi’a
Sunni Kurds
32
Minister in replace of Al-Jafari in April 2006 and won another term after 2010
elections until 201455.
The Shi’a political groups were pushing negotiations towards a federal system in
Iraq during the sessions of the Constituent Assembly, in a way that would allow
forming a regional government in South Iraq and some parts of Baghdad similar to
the Kurdish Regional government. The Shi’a political actors, mainly ISCI, argue
that Federalism will guarantee that the Shi'a community will never suffer again
under the tyranny of a minority Sunni dictatorship. They started to find different
justifications of this proposed project from the Islamic Political Theory and the
writings of Imam Al-Khomeini or from the modern political systems in the United
States and Switzerland56. A federal region from Basra to Karbala’ would encompass
the richest vast oil fields of Iraq with the highest oil reserves in Iraq that would
ensure a wealthy future for a Shi’a federal entity of Iraq but would leave the Sunni
provinces in Al-Anbar, Ninawah, Salah Al-Din, and Diyala governorates without
any substantial oil reserves57.
Prime Minister Al-Maliki did not take steps towards reconciliation between the
Sunni-Shi’a communities and the Shi’a domination over the Iraqi state was further
consolidated under his rule58. He filled the top vacant positions in the army and the
administration with officials loyal to him personally from the Shi’a community
without the integration of the Sunni officers and the Sunni fighters (The
Awakenings) who fought Al-Qaeda in 2008. Al-Maliki augmented the power of his
55 Gause III, F. Gregory. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, Chapter 5, Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
56 Visser, Reidar. Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq, NJ:
Transaction Publisher, 2007, P.169.
57 Ridolfo, Kathleen . “Iraq: Divisive Federalism Debate Continues”, September 2006,
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071323.html.
58 Behneer, lioneel. “Impediments to National Reconciliation in Iraq”, January 2007,
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/impediments-national-reconciliation-iraq/p12347#p2.
33
office and the network related to him to his person by using his exclusive authorities
as a chief executive. He worked on subjugating the judiciary to lower any chance of
a parliamentary check on him and his government and to target his Sunni rivalries
through charging them with either being members of Al-Baath party (Saddam
Hussein’s party) or supporting and financing Sunni insurgency. In addition to that,
the Prime Minister Maliki had infiltrated the Iraqi official media to follow his
political stream since the Shi’a traits are highly noticed there and official Iraqi TV
Channels are charged of failing to represent an Iraqi inclusive narrative59.
The Kurds had achieved another progression for their benefit in the Power,
Territory and Resources equation in the new Iraq. They held their elections in the
governorates of Duhok, Erbil (Hawler) and Sulymaniya in 2005 and Masoud
Barzani (Kurdistan Democratic Party) was elected as the head of the cabinet of the
KRG in 2005 after forming an electoral coalition with his historic rivalry Jalal
Talabani (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and secured 104 seats out of the 111 seats.
According to the new Iraqi constitution, the Kurdish Regional Government
exercises authority over the Kurdish governorates which represents around 18% of
the Iraqi territories and inhabited by more than 6 million and make up between
17%-20% of the total Iraqi population and Peshmerga forces (Kurdish official
troops) are responsible for preserving the public order and security in these region60.
However the Kurds, inspired by their ultimate desire for statehood, managed to
seize more Iraqi cities during the political crisis in Baghdad while forming the
government ahead of 2014 election and the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). They succeeded in taking the city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds
historically claim it has a Kurdish identity and it is widely known for its vast oil
reserves (13 billion barrels) and other cities in Diyala and Ninawa. Despite that
there is no official recognition of the presence of Kurds in these areas; the Kurds
59 Al-Qarawi, Op.Cit, P.17.
60 “About the Kurdistan Regional Government”, September 2008,
http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/About_Kurdistan_Regional_Government__2008_09_10_h
13m52s30.pdf.
34
exercise a defacto authority over these cities until they reach an agreement with the
central authority in Baghdad61.
The oil reserves in the northern Iraq under the authority of the Kurdish entities are
estimated to be around 4 billion barrels, but after adding the reserves in Kirkuk,
these reserves increased to be 13 billion barrels62. With a low cost of production
(USD5 per barrel) and a lower price for selling the barrel (USD65 per barrel), Iraqi
Kurdistan can secure annual revenues estimated at USD35 billion in additions to
USD12 billion secured as an annual share from the overall national Iraqi oil
revenues63. These revenues can secure an independent budget for a state which is
inhabited by only 6 million capita. Although there are problems concerning these
oil reserves like the way of transporting the Kurdish oil production (either through
Baghdad or through Turkey) or the quality of the crude produced oil compared to
the Iraqi oil, the KRG diversified the international oil companies while signing
contracts with them in 2005 to include American, Canadian, Turkish, Emirati,
European, Chinese, Indian, Russian and Korean companies64. In addition to that, the
KRG markets its regional entity as a heaven for foreign direct investment and new
city that needs huge infrastructure and construction investments. It succeeded in
attracting USD5.5 billion as foreign direct investment with the UAE standing only
for USD2.5 billion from these investments and hosting nearly 2,724 foreign
61 “Peshmerga launch major assault on ISIS in northern Diyala”,
http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/19112014.
62 Walt, Vivienne. “Iraq’s big Kurdish Oil Deal”, http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/iraqs-big-kurdish-
oil-deal/.
63 Mills, Robbin M. “Northern Iraq’s Oil Chessboard: Energy, politics and Power”, Insight Turkey
Vol. 15, No.1, 2013, P.52,
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/20130107123353_insight_turkey_vol_15_no_1_commentarie
s_05_mills.pdf.
64 Interview with an Iraqi Kurdish oil consultant Dr. Aziz Barzani
35
companies and 17,160 Kurdish companies, which provides the economy of the
region with a USD7000 income per capita65.
2.2.4 The Saudi Policy towards the region and Iraq:
Saudi Arabia perceives itself as an important actor not just in the regional system of
the Middle East but in the international system shaped after the fall of the Soviet
Union. The strategic location of Saudi Arabia between the Red Sea and the Persian
Gulf, being close to the Suez Canal, Hormuz strait and Bab Al-Mandab strait puts
Riyadh in an important position on the map of the international trade routes66. In
addition to that, the location of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, where the interests
of great powers are impeded in and the stability of the global economy relies on its
oil reserves, contributes to its importance and shows it as an international power
that can play an active role in the Gulf region67. An example on that was the crisis
of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 which was a regional issue, and then
became an international issue. Saudi Arabia was an active member in the
international coalition for liberating Kuwait, appeared as an active member in the
international community and continued to play a role in the post-1991 scene in the
Gulf68.
As a result of the new position of Saudi Arabia in the international system, the goals
of Saudi foreign policy became more focused on enhancing the stability of the Gulf
region and GCC regimes and ensuring its national security. Saudi Arabia became
more sensitive towards any events or outcomes that would threaten the stability of
65 “Foreign Investment in Kurdistan at USD 5.5 billion”, January 2014,
http://rudaw.net/english/business/22012014 .
66 Al-Turki, Majed bin Aziz. The Development of Saudi Foreign Policy, Institute of Diplomatic
Studies: Saudi Foreign Ministry, Riyadh, 2005, P.240.
67 Obid.
68 Al-Mankori, Hassan. “Saudi Arabia And The New International System: From A Geopolitical
Perspective”, Saudi Studies, Vol. 6, Riyadh, 1992, P. 126.
36
the Gulf region and regional status quo like chaos, wars and regime changes69. It
recognizes itself in the main front lines against the Iranian expansion in the Gulf
and the wider circles of the Middle East (mainly the Levant) which borders the Gulf
region from the north and in the second front lines of the Arab-Israeli conflict after
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan70.
The new regional landscape created after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 carried
wide challenges to Saudi Arabia the Saudi foreign policy goals71. The rise of the
influence of the non-Arab regional powers mainly (Iran and Turkey) in Iraq, the rise
of sub-state identities (Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds) and non-state actors in different
Middle Eastern countries were serious threats to the stability of the Levant circle of
the Middle East and the Gulf region72. The political empowerment of the Shi’a
community in Iraq and later in Lebanon (through Hizballah) would have a domino
effect on the Shi’a communities in Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries that are
politically and socio-economically marginalized under the ruling Sunni regimes73.
Moreover, the high presence of Iran in the political scene in Iraq, its meddling in the
internal affairs of Lebanon through supporting Hizballah and in the internal affairs
of Palestine threatened the influence that Saudi Arabia has in the Middle East as a
regional power, exposed the stability of the Gulf region into the danger of Iran’s
expansionist policies and showed clearly the passiveness of the Arab Regional
System (which Saudi Arabia is a member of)74.
69 Al-Mankori, Hassan. Op.Cit.
70 Al-Turki, Majed bin Aziz. Op.Cit., P.245.
71 Salem, Paul. Op.Cit.
72 Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian
Question”, Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 2, March 2007.
73 Jones, Toby. “The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia”, Middle East Report, Middle East Research and
Information Project (MERIP), Winter 2005, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042471 .
37
Saudi Arabia started to play a more active role in the Levant circle of the Middle
East in the sake of consolidating its place as an Arab leader, regional stabilizer and
a bulwark against Iran75. It enhanced its relations with other Arab countries that
approach the Gulf stability and the rising Iran closely to the Saudi approach like
Egypt and Jordan in a kind of Sunni-Arab regional alliance. It sought developing
good relations with Turkey under the rule of the AKP in order to extend its regional
influence and as a possible friend in the region76. Saudi Arabia has extended its
political and financial support to Sunni and Arab nationalist’s parties in Iraq,
Lebanon and Palestine in order to empower them in face of the Shi’a groups
supported by Iran77. Finally Saudi Arabia has followed a strategy of enhancing its
military capabilities and increased the military investments78; it has the fourth
largest military budget in the world by spending nearly USD 80.8 billion annually
on its military budget79, in order to secure its ruling regime and other GCC ruling
regimes80.
74 Korany, Bahgat. The Changing Middle East: A New Look at Regional Dynamics, The American
University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 2010, P. 37.
75 “Published Interview with Nawaf Obaid”, May 2014,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/24254/saudi_arabian_defense_doctrine.html . 76 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “bitter frenemies the not-quite-alliance between Saudi Arabia and
Turkey”, Op.Cit.
77 Beehner, Lionel. “Iran’s Saudi Counterweight”, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2007,
http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-saudi-counterweight/p12856.
78 Obaid, Nawaf. “A Saudi Arabian Defence Doctrine: Mapping the expanded force structure the
Kingdom needs to lead the Arab world, stabilize the region, and meet its global responsibilities”,
Defence and Intelligence Projects, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School, May 2014.
79 “Trends in World Military Expenditure”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April
2015, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=496 .
80 Obaid, Nawaf. “A Saudi Arabian Defence Doctrine: Mapping the expanded force structure the
Kingdom needs to lead the Arab world, stabilize the region, and meet its global responsibilities”,
Op.Cit.
38
Saudi Arabia was hardly keen on the US military operations that started in Iraq and
it cooperated militarily in a low profile way81; Saudi Arabia allowed the United
States to use Prince Sultan airbase as a command and control center for U.S.
aircraft. U.S. aerial re-fuelling tankers, reconnaissance planes and other noncombat
aircraft were allowed to land and take off there, but denied requests to use its bases
to attack Iraq, unlike its position on the Desert Storm operations led by the US in
Iraq 1991-199282. The Saudis were resisting the use of power against Iraq without
an UNSC authorisation (which would be vetoed by Russia and abstained by France)
and during the first days of the operations, Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saudi Al-
Faisal recommended stopping the operations and reactivating talks and negotiations
with the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein.
The non-supporting stand of Saudi Arabia can be explained by the strong opposition
of its domestic public opinion which was against an the occupation of an Arab-
Muslim neighbouring (like Iraq) by a non-Muslim country (like the US) 83. Despite
that, by time the Saudi official stance shifted slowly towards accepting the US
invasion and not working against it, not to complicate the US-Saudi relations which
were strained after 11th September 2001 attacks on US and to ease the negative
impression the American public opinion had on Saudi Arabia. At the same time,
Saudi Arabia was keen on playing the role of the rising regional power in its
periphery (the Gulf and the Middle East) and beyond (the wide Muslim world) and
according to Saudi decision makers’ opinion. Therefore, charting an independent
and active course in Iraq would risk the American displeasure and America’s non
sponsoring of the rise of Riyadh. Out of the way Saudi Arabia followed to handle
81 Gause III, F. Gregory. “The International Politics of Gulf”, in Fawcett, Louise Editor.
International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, P.295.
82 “US to Move operations from Saudi Base”, April 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/29/sprj.irq.saudi.us/.
83 Al-Rashid, Madawi. “Saudi Arabia: The Challenge of US Invasion of Iraq”, in Hinnebusch,
Raymound Ed. & Fawn, Rick. Ed. The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, Lynee Rienner
Publishers, P. 157.
39
the Iraqi issue, it succeed in pulling out the US military bases from its territory in
April 2003 without harming the US-Saudi Relations, which used to embarrass the
Saudi royal family at home and at the public opinion of most Muslim countries84.
The US invasion of Iraq and the rise of a Shi’a dominated government has left
Saudi Arabia with little options in managing the crisis in a neighbouring country.
While Iran was supporting the Shi’a groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia faced a dilemma
in supporting the Iraqi Sunnis who were adopting insurgency as a strategy against
the US troops and the other Iraqi political actors in a way that would risk the Saudi
alliance with the USA. Saudi’s passive Iraq policy relied on the presence of the US
troops and the idea that the American administration was not thinking about a quick
withdrawal from the Iraqi territories and which would represent a check on the
Iranian influence from growing extensively85. However, after the Democrats’
victory in the congressional elections in 2006, and the rise of the idea of a US
withdrawal from Iraq in US think tanks’ reports, Saudi Arabia thought that US
would no longer be a bulwark against Iran in Iraq and it is the time to dump its
passive policy and step in to confront the Iranian influence and defend the Sunnis in
Iraq86.
Saudi Arabia supported the Sunni and Arab Nationalist Iraqi by using the Wahhabi-
Salafi religious rhetoric in supporting the Iraqi Sunnis against Shi’a and politically
after their acceptance to enter in the Iraqi political life and dumping the insurgency
strategies87. Religious calls and fatwas from Wahhabi clerics who are connected to
84 Al-Turki, Majed bin Aziz. The Development of Saudi Foreign Policy, Institute of Diplomatic
Studies: Saudi Foreign Ministry, Riyadh, 2005, P. 270.
85 Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian
Question”, Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 2, March 2007.
86 Ibid.
87 Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian
Question”, Op.Cit.
40
Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia were issued to support the embattled Sunni
minority in Iraq against the Shi’a, and referred to them as “Al-Rafida”, defamatory
label identifying them as “rejecters” of the true Islam and the Crusaders (the US),
while some Salafi activists started issuing fatwas declaring Shi’a as infidels. The
usage of the Wahhabi card in the Sunni-Shi’a issue in Iraq and other countries was
aiming at mobilizing the domestic public opinion in Saudi Arabia (and in Egypt and
Jordan as well) to support them in the confrontation against Iran, not mainly for
sectarian reasons that would backfire at home and badly affect the social peace of
the Arab societies. However it helped in mobilizing the Arab Sunnis in Iraq for
taking all possible measures to secure their existence in their country88. Saudi
journalists wrote articles that Saudi Arabia will take all measures to defend Arab
Sunnis and its interests in Iraq after a US withdrawal, despite that no reports talked
about direct military or financial Saudi official support to the Iraqi Sunni and the
small share of the Saudi citizens fighting besides the Sunni Iraqi insurgent89.
The Saudi political support went to the Shi’a secular pro-Arab political leader Ayad
Allawi who gathered other Sunni parties in his electoral coalition (the Iraqi National
Movement or I’itilaf al dawla al Iraqiya). On February 21st 2010, Ayad Allawi has
paid a visit to Riyadh where he had a meeting with King Abdullah and the head of
the Saudi intelligence Prince Muqrin bin Abdel Aziz before holding the March 2010
elections: many Iraqi and foreigner political analysts described this visit (beside
other Sunni leaders’ visit to Egypt and Syria) as a kind of support given by Arab
regional countries to him90. After Ayad Allawi’s getting the highest number of seats
in the elections by 91 seats ahead of the list of Prime Minister Maliki which got 89
seats, Saudi Arabia invited Iraqi political leaders (Masoud Barzani, Jalal Talbani
and Ammar al-Hakim) to discuss forming the new government in Iraq led by Ayad 88 Ibid.
89 Obaid, Nawaf. “Stepping Into Iraq”. Washington Post, November 29, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html.
90 “Alawi defends his visit to Saudi Arabia”, February 2010,
http://elaph.com/Web/news/2010/2/536935.htm.
41
Allawi91. However the Saudi role failed and Prime Minister Maliki got his third
term as a Prime Minister and Allawi was appointed as a head of an advisory council
responsible for setting strategies that should be followed by the Iraqi state92.
Saudi Arabia’s behaviour towards Iraq was not in favour of fuelling a wide open-
ended sectarian regional war as it did not close its doors in front of the Iraqi Shi’a
political actors. Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting between top Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a
clerics on October 2006 in Mecca (the holiest Islamic city) that issued a statement
condemning sectarian violence, the shedding of the blood of fellow Muslims and
Iraqi blood, attacks on religious sites and forcing people to leave their homes. In
his first regional appearance, the Shi’a religious leader Moktada al-Sadr appeared in
2006 in Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage season and he was told by Saudi
officials that he is a “guest of King Abdullah”, a kind of hospitality provided to
important political leaders93. On April 3rd 2010, Saudi Arabia hosted the Iraqi
religious cleric Ammar al-Hakim (the son of Abdel Aziz al-Hakim and the head of
the ISCI after the death of his father in 2009) as a part of the Saudi brokering role
for having an Iraqi government under Ayad Allawi’s premiership after March 2010
parliamentary elections. However its relations with the central government in
Baghdad remained in a low profile and it did not appoint an ambassador there until
2015.
2.2.5 The Turkish Policy towards the region and Iraq:
Turkey under the rule of AKP started to follow a new foreign policy based on
integrating itself in the Middle East through following a regional activism and
regional balancer’s agenda which helps Turkey to emerge as an important
91 “Ammar al-Hakim visits Saudi Arabia”, April 2010,
http://www.almejlis.net/news_article_2796.html.
92 “After Months, Iraqi Lawmakers Approve a Government”, December 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/world/middleeast/22iraq.html.
93 “Moktada al-Sadr in Mecca”, January 2006, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2006/1/12.
42
diplomatic regional actor94. The AKP has developed this approach towards the
region in a way that fulfils Turkey’s national, economic and security interests in the
region like the Kurdish issue, water issue with Syria and Iraq, enlarging economic
and trade relations with Arab countries and Iran. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu
(chief advisor of Prime Minister Erdoğan at that time), “it is essential to get free
from the prejudices against the Middle East and to mount a campaign for economic
and cultural cooperation with the region as an initial condition for appreciating the
potential of being the successor of the Ottomans”95. Turkey began to see itself as a
regional super power that can play a very active diplomatic, political and economic
role in the old geographical reach of the Ottoman and Byzantine empires where
Turkey was the center, and it can adopt an activist policy with soft power tools in
the former Ottoman territories where Turkey has strategic and national interests96.
The economic motives started to play a strong factor in the Turkish foreign policy
widely before the rule of AKP in order to obtain necessary loans, open up new
markets for the Turkish goods and to strike deals with foreign governments and
private companies97. Under the rule of AKP, the economic dimension highly
presented itself on Turkey’s behaviour in the Middle East and became an important
determinant of the Turkish foreign policy as Davutoğlu argues that economic
interdependence is important for achieving a stable order in the Middle East98.
94 Larrabee, Stephan. “Turkey’s new Middle East activism”, In: F. Burwell (ed.) The Evolution Of
US–Turkish Relations In A Transatlantic Context, Carlisle: SSI Publications, P.78, April 2009,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB861.pdf .
95 Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu, Kure Yayinlar, Istanbul,
2001.
96 Ömer Taşpinar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”,
Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment Center, September 2008,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf.
97 Kirişci, Kemal. “The Transformation Of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise Of The Trading State”,
New Perspectives of Turkey, No. 40, 2009, P.38, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/news_id_412_5%20-
%20Article%20Kemal%20Kirisci.pdf .
98 Davutoglu, Ahmed. Op.Cit. P.85.
43
Kemal Kirişci looks at this behaviour through applying the trading state model on
Turkey99; and that the economic interdependence between Turkey and the Middle
East provides markets for Turkish products and businesses. He argues that the rise
of the interest business groups inside Turkey played a role in the transformation of
Turkish policy100. On the other hand, these economic motives can be understood
domestically, as the Turkish economic openness on the Middle East benefits the so
called conservative “Anatolian businessmen”, who represents the economic base of
the ruling AKP101.
Turkey started to deal with the new regional security problems created after the US
invasion of Iraq in a way that differs from the US approach concerning Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon and Iran102. Turkey activated the High Security Commission established in
1997 with Iran in order to discuss the PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party) and PJAK
(The Party for Freedom in Kurdistan)103 and developed strong economic and
political relations with Syria and Iran to strengthen an anti-Kurdish alliance in the
region, at the time Syria and Iran were regarded by the US from the axis of evil.
Turkey adopted an activist policy to intervene and mediate in different conflicts in
99 Kirişci, Kemal. Op.Cit. P.38.
100 Ibid, Business interest groups like the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association
(MÜSİAD), the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), and the Turkish
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TİM),
the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), the International Transporters Association (UND),
and the Turkish Contractors Association (TMD).
101 Altunisik, Meliha Benli, Themore, Martin. “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the
Middle East under AKP”, Turkish Studies, Volume 12, No. 4, 2011,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2011.622513?journalCode=ftur20, See
Also: Barkey, Henry. “Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East”, Ceri Strategy Papers, No. 10,
SciencePo, June 2011, http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/n10_06062011.pdf
.. 102 Oğuzlu, Tarik, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from
the West?”, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, February 2008,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683840701813960?journalCode=ftur20#.VbTNVP
mqqko .
103 Elik, Suleyman. Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualising the Dynamics of Politics,
Religion and Security in Middle-Power States, Routledge, March 2013, P. 87.
44
order to avoid any implications these conflicts may have on its national security and
to secure its economic opportunities in the region. It offered mediation between the
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in
2007, between Syria and Israel in 2007 and brokered a deal, in cooperation with
Brazil, between the West and Iran on the Iranian nuclear program104.
Ankara was ambivalent about participating in the US invasion of Iraq from the
beginning, despite that the status quo in Iraq before the invasion was against
Turkey’s interests because of the economic sanctions on Baghdad and Kurdistan
Workers Party’s (PKK) presence in North Iraq as a defacto, Ankara’s fear out of the
US invasion was on the territorial integrity of Iraq. Beside the opposition of the
Turkish public opinion to participate in a war led by the USA which reached 90%
according to polls105, the main concern of Turkey out was a rise of Kurdish
nationalism in Iraq accompanied by a new wave of violence from the PKK and the
political future of North Iraq. The Kurdish issue has become a dominant issue in
both the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey during the 1990s and it shaped a big
part of its diplomacy in the Middle East. The Kurdish rebellion continued to gain
momentum in the Turkish political arena during the 1990s while the Turkish state
and the Turkish military exerted efforts to eradicate its dangers. Moreover, other
states in the region tried to use this rebellion movement against the Turkish state by
supporting them106. Another source of fear was the status of Mosul and Kirkuk in
Iraq (owing to their diversified ethnical composition and their vast oil resources)
after the invasion as the Kurds claim that they are Kurdish cities and the safety of
the Iraqi Turkmen living in northern cities of Iraq during the invasion. The
economic repercussions of the war on the Turkish economy also represented a
104 Oğuzlu, Tarik, Op.Cit.
105 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey’s Iraq policy”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies
Volume 14, No. 2, 183 –196, August 2006.
106 J.Barkey, Henri. Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, United States Institute
of Peace, 1996, P.32.
45
source of concern for Ankara in addition to the probable wave of refugees who
would move to Turkey during the military operations107.
Turkey gave different and conflicting signals about its decision of taking part in the
war besides the USA. On one hand it showed its suspicions from the outcomes of
the war on the territorial integrity of Iraq, Kurdish rise and the future of ethnicities
in its neighbouring countries. It supported the continuation of using diplomacy with
Saddam Hussein and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit sent a letter Saddam Hussein
asking him to cooperate with the UN inspectors. Turkey also had launched the
“Iraq’s Neighbouring Countries Platform” led by the Turkish Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gül which included Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Jordan
in order to concentrate diplomatic efforts and prevent the use of force against Iraq
which resulted in forming a committee that would follow the proceedings in the
United Nations concerning the Iraqi issue108. On the other hand, Turkey started
negotiations with the USA on its conditions for taking part in the military
operations. It put sticking topics in the negotiations like increasing its military
contingent in north Iraq to place the refugees in North Iraq not in Turkey and to
counter any possible wave of violence from the PKK, being the mere foreign
military power present in North Iraq, putting limitations on the political future of
Kurds in Iraq and the status of Mosul and Kirkuk besides securing an economic aid
package from the USA. This ambiguity reflected the division in the opinion of
Ankara’s journalists between who oppose Turkey’s participation in the war and
who supports it. Another issue related to Turkey’s reluctance was who will take the
responsibility of the decision to take part in the War. The newly established AKP
did not want to take the responsibility of a decision opposed by 90% of Turkish
citizen, while the military was hesitant about the future outcomes of the war and
considered this decision as a political decision not a military one109.
107 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey’s Iraq Policy”, Op.cit.
108 “Relations between Turkey and Iraq”, Turkish Foreign Ministry,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-iraq.en.mfa .
109 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey’s Iraq policy”, Op.Cit.
46
The Turkish government eventually signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
the USA in February 2003 that allowed the usage of Turkish air bases by the US
troops and agreed on some conditions with the US on the economic aid package and
military cooperation in Northern Iraq. However the Turkish Grand National
Assembly refused to pass the memorandum on 1 March 2003 with some No votes
also coming from the AKP. This development caught the US administration with
surprise which not only perceived Turkey as an essential component in the
successful conduct of an Iraq operation but also felt betrayed and deceived by an
ally110.
However to ease the relations, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved
sending Turkish peacekeeping forces in October 2003 in the shadow of the UNSCR
that broadened the role of the United Nations and other nations in Iraq111 but the
Iraqi Governing Council and Kurdish parties refused the presence of Turkish troops
on the Iraqi soil, which left Ankara with no military, political and economic tools to
influence the events in Iraq. Ankara threatened to use force again against the
Kurdish PKK in Northern Iraq after a wave of attacks launched inside Turkey as
PKK declared the renunciation of the declared ceasefire in 1999112, witnessing the
high profile cooperation between the USA and Kurds to keep stability in Iraq and
fears from a possible Kurdish takeover on Kirkuk. The Turkish Grand National
Assembly granted the Turkish military the right to interfere in Northern Iraq on
October 17th 2007, however Turkey halted down its high tone of intervening in Iraq
after getting promises for further strong intelligence cooperation between the US
110 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “The Middle East in Turkey–USA Relations: Managing the Alliance”,
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2013,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19448953.2013.775036?journalCode=cjsb20#.VemGa
xGeDGc .
111 “Turkish Parliament agrees to send peacekeepers to Iraq”, October 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/07/international/middleeast/07CND-TURK.html .
112 Cağaptay, Soner and Parris, Mark. “Turkey after Iraq War”, The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, Conference Report, 2003, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/turkey-after-the-iraq-war-still-a-u.s.-ally .
47
and Turkish intelligence during Erdoğan’s visit to the USA in November 2007, and
accepted other regional mediatory roles to posture its regional statue like mediating
between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli President Shimon
Peres. In addition to that the Turkish government succeeded in preventing the US
congress from passing a law that recognizes the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman
Turks113.
As a part of its regional foreign policy and its new approach to the Middle East, the
Turkish government paid importance to economic dimension of its relations with all
Iraqi groups including the Kurds. Turkey thought about using its economic leverage
to gain political influence on the Kurds as its territories represent an access for the
KRG’s to the global market and a strong economic neighbouring power that can
develop Arbil’s infrastructure. On the other hand, Turkey established a diplomatic
mechanism with the KRG while it was conducting operations against PKK and
asked it to have a say in the issue of PKK who are operating from North Iraq114.
Moreover, the development in relations with the Iraqi Kurds helped in mending the
relations between the Turkish government and Kurds in Turkey and lowered down
the wave of attacks from the PKK who did not want to spoil relations between Iraqi
Kurds and Turkey, in a step which reflects the transformation of Turkey’s security
dominated policy into a pragmatic one115. Turkey dumped the idea of empowering
the Iraqi Turkmen as a counter balance to the Kurds, as it found in pragmatism a
way to deal with the Iraqi Kurds and discovered that the Iraqi Turkmen Front is not
113 Noureddin, Mohamed. “The kurdish Issue between the American Interests and the Turkish
Desires”, Swiss Info, November 2007, http://www.swissinfo.ch.
114 Iraqi official: PKK presence at Turkish border ending, Hurriyet Daily News, 2005,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/8956823.asp?gid=231&sz=23180 .
115 “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation”, International Crisis Group, Middle East
Report No. 81, November 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
africa/iraq-iran-Gulf/iraq/081-turkey-and-iraqi-kurds-conflict-or-cooperation.aspx .
48
popular within the Turkmen community116. It started to respond positively to the
Kurdish calls for developing economic ties and making Arbil a base for Turkey’s
economic activities in the rest of Iraq, it opened a consulate in Arbil117, the Kurdish
crude oil was trucked directly to Turkish refineries, with the refined product sent
back into the KRG and the Turkish Genel Energy is exported around 20,000-30,000
barrel of oil per day from Kurdistan’s TaqTaq field directly to Mersin in
Turkey118.Turkish construction companies have a strong presence in Sulimanya and
Erbil with projects estimated by USD200-USD300 million in addition to 1200
Turkish company and 50,000 Turkish citizen doing trade worth some USD7 billion
a year119. Turkey comes the second after the UAE in the list of countries having
major investments in Erbil.
Politically, Ankara engaged with the other Shi’a political actors in Iraq and adopted
an open door policy with them. It appointed a special envoy to Iraq in autumn 2005
for developing relations with Iraq and opened a consulate in Mosul (populated by
Sunnis) beside the Turkish embassy in Baghdad. It accepted the Iraqi Shi’a cleric
Abdel Aziz al-Hakim on January 2004 where he declared that, “Turkey should have
a say in Iraq”120. Ankara hosted the son of Abdel Aziz al-Hakim: Ammar al-Hakim
after getting the position of his father in the ISCI in November 2009 where he gave
assurances to the Turkish politicians and Turkish public opinion about the
importance of keeping the neutrality of Kirkuk. Also he showed his full respect to 116 Barkey, Henri J. “Turkey and Iraq: The Making of a Partnership”, Turkish Studies, Volume 12,
No 4, 2011.
117 “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation”, International Crisis Group, Op.Cit.
118 OBIG Research Team. “Iraq – Kurdistan’s Billion-Barrel Oil Investment”, March 2013,
http://oilandgas-investments.com/2013/investing/iraq-kurdistan-oil-investment/ .
119 “Turkish Investment in KRG”, http://vvanwilgenburg.blogspot.com.tr/2009/02/turkish-
investment-in-krg-region.html.
120 “Al-Hakim: Turkey Should Have a Say in Iraq”, January 2004,
http://www.todayszaman.com/international_shiite-leader-al-hakim-turkey-should-have-a-say-in-
iraq_4952.html
49
the Iraqi Turkmen minority in addition to praising the Turkish foreign policy and
Turkish model of democracy121. During the crisis between Baghdad and Ankara in
2012 upon Ankara’s hosting of Tarek al Hashimi (Iraqi vice President who was
charged of supporting terrorist attack by al-Maliki’s government) and Ankara-Erbil
high profile cooperation on oil, al-Hakim paid another visit to Ankara where he
discussed the crisis between Iraq and Turkey122. Prime Minister Erdoğan has paid a
visit to Iraq in 2011 and during his visit he went to Najaf’s Shi’a mosques and
declared that he comes here as a Muslim not as a Shi’a or Sunni. He visited the
shrine of Imam Ali to be the first Sunni leader who visits the shrine and hold talks
with Imam Ali al-Sistani123.
Ankara played mediatory roles in the Iraqi political process in order to prevent the
domestic rivalry between Sunni and Shi’a from any escalation that would lead to
the division of Iraq and as a part of its regional mediation policy that boost
Ankara’s credit and provide it with political influence in different spots in the
region. It proposed to mediate between Iraqi Shi’as and Sunnis by launching a
National conference for reconciliation between the Sunni and Shi’a groups in order
to solve al-Hashimi crisis, while Turkey would moderate the conference and the
head of the Turkish religious directorate Mehmet Gormez would deliver Turkey’s
message124. It tried to mediate between the KRG and central government in
Baghdad on the issue of exporting the Kurdish oil directly from Arbil. Finally
121 Kanbolat, Hassan. “Al-Hakim’s Visit to Turkey”, Todays Zaman, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/hasan-kanbolat/al-hakims-visit-to-turkey_193819.html .
122 “Iraqi Shiite leader visits Turkey amid high tension”, January 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iraqi-shiite-leader-visits-turkey-amid-high-
tension.aspx?pageID=238&nID=12334&NewsCatID=338 .
123 “Turkish PM becomes first sunni leader to visit shrine of Imam Ali”, March 2011,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/71829/turkish-pm-becomes-first-sunni-leader-to-visit-shrine-of-
imam-ali
124 “Turkey to bring Iraqi Shiite, Sunni groups together in İstanbul”, February 2012,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-to-bring-iraqi-shiite-sunni-groups-together-in-
istanbul_270177.html .
50
Turkey mediated between Baghdad and Damascus after a massive attack that took
place in downtown Baghdad in 2009 as Baghdad charged Damascus with the
incident.
Despite Turkey’s neutral policy, it chose its favourable political party in the Iraqi
elections in 2010. Further reports have spoken that Turkey would favour to see
Ayad Allawi as a Prime Minister of Iraq ahead of March 2010 elections by
convincing Kurds to accept his premiership125 and recieving Allawi before the
elections. Turkey’s support for Iraqi Sunni does not come out of sectarian reasons;
as sectarianism could harm Turkey’s relations with the Shi’a counter parts, could
lower its credentials for playing regional mediatory roles and harm Turkish
economic interests in the Shi’a dominated regions in Iraq. It took such a step to
counter balance the rising Iranian influence in Iraq which and to further secure more
presence of Turkish investment companies in Iraq in the future and to protect the
agreements it signed with the KRG. But the sectarian charge did not stay with
Turkey for long due to Turkey’s open door policy with other Shi’as; Prime Minister
Erdoğan paid his second visit to Iraq on March 2011 where he visited Baghdad,
Najaf and Erbil.
2.3 The Regional Security Complex in Lebanon
2.3.1The spill over of the Iraqi effect to Lebanon:
The Implications of the US invasion of Iraq and the new outcomes in the Iraqi
political scene exceeded the Iraqi borders to find a place in Lebanon. While located
at the heart of the Middle East and being sensitive to any regional changes, the
outcomes in Iraq has led to create a new security complex in Lebanon that became
quite familiar to the Iraqi complex in issues related to the rise of the regional role of
the US, the enhanced rivalry between non-state Sunni and Shi’a actors (14 March
Alliance and Hizballah), and the rise of the Iranian influence.
125 Taha, Nadya. “Arab Press Reaction to Ayad Allawi’s Election Success”, March 2010,
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/arab-press-reaction-to-ayad-allawis-election-success/ .
51
Beside Iraq, Syria was included in the axis of evil presented by the neoconservative
US policy makers who had seen Lebanon as a point of vulnerability for Syria. If
Syria could be forced out of Lebanon126, a pro-western Lebanese government could
be brought to sign a peace treaty with Israel and the Syrian regime might collapse if
it get isolated and suffered a major loss of prestige and economic benefits. The
submission of the Syrian and the Iranian regime to the new Middle East created
after the invasion of the Iraq was in the desire of Washington’s neoconservatives’
policy. In December 2003, the US House and Senate passed a bill with
overwhelming majorities demanding Syria to stop undermining international peace
and security, end it ‘، Occupation’ of Lebanon, enable it to achieve full restoration of
its ‘sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity’, deploy its army in
the south and evict all ‘terrorist and foreign forces’, including ‘Hizballah and the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards’127. In September 2004, the United Nations Security
Council has issued its resolution No.1558, under a US and European pressure
(mainly France), that asks Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and for Hizballah to
disarm itself128.
The US administration tried to make connections between what happened in Iraq
after toppling down Saddam Hussein and the Lebanese Intifada or the protests that
broke out in Lebanon carrying slogans of - SYRIA OUT!! - after the assassination
of Lebanon’s strong Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was known for his close
relations with the US, France, Egypt and Gulf monarchies as he carried Saudi
nationality129. The administration got into the act and named the protests as the
Cedar revolution, thinking that this is the Iraq’s domino effect in Lebanon and
126 Hirst, David. Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East, Faber and
Faber Publisher, 2010, P.297.
127 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, December 2003,
http://www.clhrf.com/unresagreements/syria_accountability%20act.htm. 128 UNSCR 1558, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/751%20SRES%201558.pdf.
129 Hirst, David. Op.cit, P. 308.
52
things will be fixed out on the way towards democracy through a “constructive
chaos”130. While addressing the Lebanese people, President George W. Bush said
that “the American people and millions across the earth are on your side”. He added
that “once democracy had taken root in your country, it would ring the doors of
every Arab regime”131. Moreover, Israel waged a military operation on Lebanon in
June 2006 that aimed at knocking down Hizballah’s rockets launching sites132 and
breaking the honour of Hizballah in Lebanon to facilitate the job on the Lebanese
government to dismantle the military and political power of the organization, which
would facilitate the political empowerment of its political rivalry the 14 March
alliance133.
2.3.2 The rise of the Iranian influence in Lebanon:
The developments in Lebanon provided a new ground for Iran to actively get
involved in the Lebanese political process in a way similar to its involvement in
Iraq. The importance of Lebanon in the Iranian foreign policy stems from its having
a Shi’a community that represents a recognizable share in the Lebanese society and
which was oppressed under a political system that was dominated by the Christians
in the 20th century. The significance of the Shi’a community in Lebanon to the
Iranian foreign policy rises from the role of the Islamic ideas in the Iranian foreign
policy. Tehran thinks that, as a leading country in the Muslim world, it has a
mission for exporting its revolutionary model to the other Muslim communities who
fall under the American and western influence. Moreover Hizballah who adopts the
130 “Lebanon Not Isolated from Constructive Chaos Scheme”, July 2014, http://www.nna-
leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/30647/Khreiss-Lebanon-not-isolated-from-creative-chaos-scheme .
131 “Bush sees Lebanon changes as move to free Middle East”, The Guardians,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/09/syria.lebanon .
132 Knickmeyer, Ellen. “2006 War Called a 'Failure' for Israel”, January 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html .
133 Harel, Amos, and Issacharoff, Avi. 34 Days: Israel, Hizballah and War on Lebanon, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2008. P.76.
53
concept of Welayet al-Faqih plays an important role in linking the Lebanese Shi’a
community to the Iranian religious ideology134. The second reason for Lebanon’s
being important to Iran is its involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict with a direct
frontline with Israel and being the only state after Syria that did not reach a peace
agreement yet with Israel. By supporting Hizballah in his confrontations with Israel,
and Hamas and Al-Jihad organizations in Gaza, Iran could emphasize its vision of
islamising the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition to that, through supplying Hizballah
with weapons and advanced missiles that could reach every part of Israel, Iran has
an indirect front line with Israel that would use it in case of any sudden Israeli or
American attack on its nuclear facilities135.
Iran’s influence in Lebanon can be noticed in supplying Hizballah with weapons,
money, military trainings and intelligence for its confrontation with Israel, financing
social welfare programs and religious programs in the south of Lebanon and
contributing in the reconstruction of south Lebanon after the end of the Israeli
military operation in 2006. Iran has sent 2500 volunteers from the revolutionary
guards to support Hizballah in his war against Israel in 1982, 1500 of them stayed
in Lebanon and opened camps to develop Hizballah’s military capabilities and train
its members. Iran also extended its aid to Hizballah through supplying it with
complicated explosive devices, intelligence reports on Israeli premises in foreign
countries that can be targeted by Hizballah. Moreover, Al-Quds forces – an elite
brigade in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – were present in Lebanon to train
Hizballah’s members on how to use advanced and sophisticated weapons supplied
to them by Iran136. It has supported Hizballah in financing the educational and
134 Abdul Hussein, Hussein. “Hezbollah: State within A State”, Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology, Volume 8, 2009, P.80. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=101542.
135 Dikok, Atim Karnak. “The Arab Israeli Conflict and The Iran Goals in The Region”, Al-Sharq
Al-Awsaat, August 2006,
http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?article=377945&issueno=10121#.VemcHRGeDGc.
136 Zisser, Eyal. “Iranian Involvement in Lebanon”, INSS, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 3,
No 1, May 2011, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1308129458.pdf.
54
social welfare programs launched for the Shi’a community in the south of Lebanon
since 1980s. As it was reported tens of millions of dollars were directed annually to
the organization in order to open more hospitals, schools, mosques, religious
centers, charity organizations for the families of the Shi’a martyrs and financing
basic infrastructure projects like building roads, water supplies to Shi’a villages,
etc137. After the end of the Israeli war on Lebanon 2006, Iran has directed around 1
billion dollar to the reconstruction of the bombed cities in the south of Lebanon138.
2.3.3 The rise of Shi’a sub-state identity in Lebanon:
The Lebanese politics became more responsive to the sectarian outcomes came out
of the Iraqi effect, since Lebanon has its own Shi’a community139. The outbreak of
the war in Iraq and the Shi’a activism there either in facing the American
occupation or in facing the Sunni insurgency or through the consolidation of their
political power in Iraq have made the Shi’a community in Lebanon more concerned
with the fate of their fellows and their own fate. Hizballah’s leader Hassan
Nasrallah made different comments on what happens in Iraq based on his Shi’a
sectarian affiliation and not on his national Lebanese affiliation. On the other hand,
fears started to rise from the Salafi Jihadists returning from Iraq to north Lebanon
start to radicalise the quite Sunni population as the Ayn al-Helwa refugee camp was
a major way station for the recruitment and transfer of foreign Arab volunteers to
Iraq140. The empowerment of Shi’a political groups, beside the geopolitical reasons,
contributed to Hizballah’s strategy of consolidating its power in the south of
Lebanon (highly inhabited with Shi’a community) and in the Lebanese political life
137 Ibid.
138 “Iranian Money Amplifies Influence in Lebanon”, http://www.voanews.com/content/iranian-
money-amplifies-influence-in-lebanon-104962429/128044.html.
139 Wehrey, Frederic. Dassa, Dalia. Watkins, Jessica. Martini, Jeffrey. and Guffey, Robert. Op.Cit,
P.88.
140 Ibid, P. 87.
55
in general. Hizballah worked on enhancing its popularity and legitimacy within the
Shi’a community in Lebanon through establishing its own welfare system that
includes hospitals, clinics, and schools in the south, beside the religious
programs141. Hizballah has used intimidation and violence in a way to defend its
political presence in the political scene; it threatened taking foreign investigators of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (held on the Murder of Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri in 2005) as hostages as a the tribunal found the involvement of Hizballah in
cooperation with the Syrian intelligence elements behind the murder142.
Another reflection of the sectarian politics was the intensification of the political
division in Lebanon between the 14 March Alliance (mostly Sunni like Tayyar el
Mostakbal led by Saad Hariri with some Christians and loyal to Saudi Arabia) and 8
March Alliance (mostly Shi’a of Hizballah, Amal movement, Afwaj el-Mukkawma
el-Lubnaniyya and the free patriotic movement of the Christian politician Michel
Aoun) which get developed into military clashes in May 2008 when the Lebanese
government (formed by the 14 March Alliance) took a decision of dismantling the
telecommunication system of Hizballah which was not under the control of the
Lebanese authorities. Hassan Nasrallah declared these actions as ‘A Declaration of
War on Hizballah’ and his supporters rash to the streets which led to Hizballah’s
takeover of around half the city of Beirut, occupying the pro-government media
outlets (Future Television, Future News, Al Mustaqbal Newspaper, and Radio
Orient) and forcing them to close, series of street clashes in Beirut, in Mount
Lebanon, in the North (Tripoli) and near the south in Mount Barook that separates
the Druze heartland of Shouf from the mainly Shi'ite southern end of the Bekaa
Valley. During the two weeks clashes (7 May-14 May 2008), it was reported that
around 60 persons killed and more than 100 wounded including civilians. These
escalations had threatened a break out of a civil war in Lebanon, as King Abdullah
141 Cammett, Melani. and M. MacLean, Lauren. The Politics of Non-State Social Welfare , Cornell
University Press, 2014, P.204.
142 “Hizballah Threatens an Explosion in Beirut Over Tribunal”, November 2010,
https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/hezbollah-threatens-explosion-beirut-over-tribunal.
56
of Jordan warned, however Hizballah and 14 March Alliance signed the Doha
agreement in May 2008 that ended the clashes143.
2.3.4 The Saudi Policy towards Lebanon:
Saudi Arabia tried to fix the shift happened to the regional balance of power
towards Iran in the region through rolling back its influence and supporting the
Sunni or Arab nationalists who were at the top of the governments in these
countries. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia fully supported the Lebanese government led
by Fuad al-Sinyora (14 March Alliance) on its stand on the issue of disarming
Hizballah. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal declared that the Saudi
government believed that the only way to achieve stability in Lebanon is through
full control by the Lebanese government over its territory and that this goal could
not be achieved without disarming Hizballah144. Saudi Foreign Minister also
warned the Arab world against being “captive of regional and international powers
that have their own agenda”145. When Hizballah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and
killed eight others, an action that triggered the Israeli military to launch a military
operation on Lebanon, the Saudi position was opposite to Hizballah’s actions and
Saudi Arabia declared that there should be “differentiation between legitimate
resistance and the uncalculated adventures of some elements within the states and
overseas, who without resource to the legitimate authority in its , and without
consultation or coordination with the Arab states, trigger an extremely serious
situation which could subject all Arab nations and their achievements to destruction,
without taking into consideration the opinion of these states”146. The statement was
143 Lebanon’s Political Conflict Turns Violent, May 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/07/us-lebanon-strike-idUSL0761005520080507.
144 Korany, Bahga. and A. Fattah, Moataz. The Foreign Policies of Arab States, American
University in Cairo Press, 2008, P.375.
145 Ibid.
146 “Saudi Arabia: There is difference between legitimate resistance and uncalculated adventures”,
June 2006, Al-Sharq Al-Awsaat,
http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=373172&issueno=10091#.VemjohGeDGc.
57
issued few days before the start of the Israeli military operation and it marked that
Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt and Jordan, had sided the US-Israeli plan of
eliminate the source of threat and instability in the region147. However the Saudi
official position ended up smoother on it as the military operation failed on
eliminating Hizballah, the death tool and destruction of Lebanon were grave and
Saudi diplomacy’s failed to practice more pressure on the US administration to stop
the war which left the moderate Arab countries in an embarrassing position in front
of the Arab public opinion.
The Saudi’s take on Hizballah did not change after the 2006 war, during the internal
clashes in May 2008 because of the government decision to take a Shi’a officer
close to Hizballah, from his post in the security department of Rafik Hariri airport
and cracking down on Hizballah’s telecommunication system, Saudi Arabia’s
supporting stand to the government was highly apparent and its critiques on
Hizballah and Iran were harsh. Saudi Foreign Minister declared that “Saudi Arabia
supports the Lebanese legitimacy represented in the Lebanese government on the
issue of the airport security officer and Hizballah’s telecommunication system”, he
added that “Hizballah’s actions are perceived by the kingdom as a coup against the
Lebanese legitimate government and that these actions were prepared by Hizballah
from before”. Saud Al-Faisal also hold Iran responsible for the violence in Lebanon
and said that Iran’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world would be strained
after its support to what he named as a “coup” against legitimacy in Lebanon148.
However as the 14 March alliance seemed losing in front of the 8 March alliance
forces and Hizballah, Saudi Arabia accepted the agreement brokered by Doha
which solved the issue of Presidential elections and delayed the disarmament of
Hizballah.
147 Korany, Bahga. and A. Fattah, Moataz. Op.Cit, P.374.
148 “Saud Al-Faisal: Iran’s Support to Coup against Legitimacy in Lebanon Will Worsen Its
Relations with Us”, http://www.alriyadh.com/342587.
58
2.3.5 The Turkish Policy towards Lebanon:
In the Lebanese issue, Turkey has expressed unrest with the Israeli attack on
Lebanon and Prime Minister Erdoğan issued a statement where he condemned the
attacks and said “No reason can justify bombing civilians and laying waste to cities
in a merciless manner”149. The Lebanese Prime Minister has asked the Turkish
Prime Minister to intervene for achieving a cease fire150, while the efforts to reach a
cease fire was complicated, Turkey succeeded in gaining the acceptance of Syria
and Israel to position 1000 Turkish peacekeeper troops in the south of Lebanon
between Hizballah and Israel. Despite that there were many objections from within
Turkey on this issue151, Kemalist political opposition’s claiming that Turkish troops
instead should be sent to fight PKK in northern Iraq, and from within some
Lebanese communities mainly the Armenian one, the Turkish parliament approved
sending the Turkish troops on September 19th 2006152. Turkey has supported
humanitarian aid programs with 50 million dollars provided for the restructuring of
Lebanon to be among the first 15 countries in terms of aid sent to Lebanon. Along
with building around 41 schools all over the country which were established
without regard for sectarian and regional differences153.
During the internal clashes in Lebanon in the summer of 2008 between 8 March
Alliance and 14 March Alliance which had raised the fear of a new Lebanese civil
149 “Erdoğan: "İsrail'in derdi nedir?",
http://www.cnnturk.com/2006/turkiye/07/15/erdogan.israilin.derdi.nedir/201873.0/index.html.
150 “Lebanon Asks Turkey to Mediate”, July 2006, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Lebanon-
asks-Turkey-to-help-mediate.
151 “Sending Turkish troops to Lebanon”, September 2006, www.jamesinturkey.com .
152 “AKP Agrees in Principle to Send Troops to Lebanon”, September 2006,
http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_akp-agrees-in-principle-to-send-troops-to-
lebanon_36073.html.
153 “Turkish-Lebanon Relations”, ORSAM, Report No 5, August 2009,
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2009820_rapor_05_eng_webIc.pdf
59
war that would destabilize the region and marks a big blow to the Turkish wide
economic interests in Lebanon and in its neighbouring countries. The Turkish
government was asked by the Lebanese government to interfere in the internal crisis
and to mediate in the talks between the clashing groups. Unlike Saudi Arabia,
Turkey did not have any prejudgement on Syria and Iran’s role in Lebanon as long
as its economic interests were safe and it saw that their inclusion in finding a
solution for the Lebanese issue is necessary to move on an agreement. Turkey had
used its good offices in Syria and Iran, and Prime Minister Erdoğan used his good
relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Iranian President Ahmadinejad
to practice more pressure on 8 March Alliance in the talks154. Turkey mediated
directly between the Lebanese government of 14 March Alliance and other regional
supporters of 8 March Alliance in cooperation with Qatar to reach Doha agreement
which ended the Presidential elections crisis and it was later invited to attend the
ceremonial swearing of Lebanese President Michael Suleiman who later visited
Turkey in 2008 to be the first Lebanese President visiting Turkey in 54 years155.
2.4 Implications of RSCs in Iraq and Lebanon on Turkish Saudi Relations
2.4.1 Changes in Regional Role Perceptions of Turkey and Saudi
Arabia:
The new outcomes of the regional security complexes created in Iraq and Lebanon
which resulted in varied security externalities have affect both Turkey and Saudi
Arabia. There was a convergence in the regional interests of both countries in Iraq
since they were worried from the repercussions of the US invasion in 2003. They
shared fears about the territorial integrity of Iraq and they found the rise of Iran’s
influence problematic for them. In Lebanon, their stands were not convergent but
not divergent, as Saudi Arabia continued to support 14 March Alliance while
154 “Turkey to press ahead with mediation”, May 2008, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-
News/2008/Jan-04/50269-turkey-to-press-ahead-with-mediation.ashx .
155 “Turkish-Lebanon Relations”, ORSAM, Report No 5, August 2009,
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2009820_rapor_05_eng_webIc.pdf.
60
Turkey preferred to play the mediatory role between 14 March Alliance and 8
March Alliance.
As a result of that, a change in the perception of the regional role of both countries
has taken place and this contributed positively in developing the bilateral political,
economic and militarily relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. A famous
Saudi journalist, Khaled Tashkindi, has described Turkey’s foreign policy shift as a
sign of “Turkey’s return to the embraces of the Muslim world”. He said it was
appearing that the government of AKP is going to stay more in power owing to its
success in solving Turkey’s economic crisis and achieving an economic take off,
which would encourage Saudi Arabia to boost its relations with Turkey156. In
addition to him, many prominent Saudi public figures perceived that the rise of the
Iranian influence in the region will push Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form a
regional alliance to counterbalance Iran157. The wide understanding in Saudi Arabia
was that adopting Turkey, a US ally-member of NATO, an EU member candidate
and with its rising economy, in a regional grand strategy against Iran would
contribute to the Saudi regional policy. Another Saudi academician has added that
the rise of a pro-islamic party ruling a Sunni country like Turkey would contribute
to a strategic relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia which considers the
Islamic dimension in every policy it adopts and the Islamic Sunni background of
Ankara and Riyadh will push them towards the containment of Iran in the region.
On the other hand, there was an increasing support from different Turkish political
actors (secular liberals, Islamists and conservatives) to the new foreign policy of
Turkey and its openness towards the Middle East. In order to be able to play an
active role and mediate in different regional conflicts, developing good relations
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia is considered to be an essential step as Saudi
Arabia has a wide influence and presence in different regional conflicts. The ideas
156 Interview with Khaled Tashkindi, Editor in Chief of Okaz Newspaper in Saudi Arabia, May
2015.
157 Field Research Trip to Saudi Arabia.
61
of regional stability and countering sectarianism, finding a solution to the regions
long conflicts like the Arab-Israeli conflicts through a Turkish contribution were
occupying a large area in the Turkish perception. The new political elite in Turkey
has found that the GCC region generally and Saudi Arabia mainly could be a good
market for the Turkish goods and businesses which could enhance regional
economic interdependence and cooperative peaceful relations between Turkey and
the countries of the region.
2.4.2 Turkish-Saudi Political Relations:
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has paid a 3 days visit to Ankara from August 6th
until August 8th 2006 to be his fifth foreign destination proceeding to China, India,
Pakistan and Malaysia after ascending the throne in 2005. The visit is considered to
be the first official visit of a Saudi king since the establishment of the kingdom in
1932, away from Saudi King Faisal’s visit to Istanbul in 1966 which was scheduled
for attending an International meeting. The Saudi king was accompanied by a 300
members delegate came in 5 private jets, including businessmen like Sheikh Saleh
Kamel (chairman of the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry who later
bought the biggest shares of Albaraka bank in Turkey) and Abdel Rahman al-
Rashid (the chairman of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and
Industry). The delegate was warmly welcomed with the Turkish and Saudi flags
together and welcoming slogans to the king raised in the streets on their way from
the airport158. During the visit, Saudi King Abdullah has signed six bilateral treaties
on duties, trade and transport besides a memorandum of understanding pertaining to
the bilateral political consultations between the Foreign Ministries in both
countries159. During the visit, the Saudi -Turkish Joint Commission was formed as
well as Saudi -Turkish Businessmen Council and the king has attended the
158 “A Successful visit by King Abdullah”. http://www.alriyadh.com/179506 .
159 “Saudi King Abdullah Starts Friday Visit to Turkey”,
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/statements/Pages/NewsArticleI
D71336.aspx .
62
ceremonial opening of the council along with Prime Minister Erdoğan160. King
Abdullah has declared during his visit to Ankara: "the ties that bind our sibling
country Turkey to us are not the usual ones, but rather spiritual ones which are
based on shared beliefs, which is why any calculations of various financial interests
in each other are useless in terms of making our relations more valuable. Likewise,
any financial damage we incur to each other cannot weaken our relations "161. Also
the Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal declared during the visit that: “a new
chapter between the two countries will be opened”162.
The media in both countries described the visit of the Saudi King Abdullah to
Turkey as a very successful visit that opened a new chapter in the bilateral relations
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In the Turkish press, İlnur Çevik wrote an article
in the New Anatolia newspaper welcoming the visit of the Saudi king under the title
“King Abdullah is a main person for stability in the Middle East” and said that
Turkey is a stable oasis in the Muslim world and Saudi Arabia is a giant petroleum
regional country who both can affect global politics. Mehmet Barlas wrote an
article in Sabah newspaper under the title of “what we expect from the visit of King
Abdullah”; he praised the Saudi visit to Turkey and the status of the Saudi king as a
custodian of the holy mosque and he expected a push in the economic and trade
relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Upon the visit of the Saudi king,
Zaman newspaper has published an article for the Saudi ambassador in turkey
Mohammed Al-Hussaini before the visit by one day where he stated the importance
of the visit and its contribution to the Turkish Saudi relations.
160 Ibid.
161 “Saudi King Abdullah: Our relations with Turkey are spiritual”,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/saudi-king-abdullah-our-relations-with-turkey-are-
spiritual.aspx?pageID=438&n=saudi-king-abdullah-our-relations-with-turkey-are-spiritual-2006-08-
09 .
162 “Saudi King Abdullah’s Turkish Visit ’New Chapter’ in Relations”,
http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_saudi-king-abdullahs-turkish-visit-new-chapter-in-
relations_35450.html
63
The visit has received a wide positive reaction in the media especially al-Arabiya
satellite channel and other Saudi and Arab newspapers like al-Sharq al-Awsaat, al-
Riyad, al-Youm, Okaz and al-Hayat. These newspapers published long reports
covering all political and economic dimensions of the visit, stressing on the
declarations of both King Abdullah and Prime Minister Erdoğan during the visit.
The Saudi ambassador to Turkey gave interviews to the Arab newspapers like al-
Youm and Arab News where “he described King Abdullah’s visit as a turning point
for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey, not only because it comes from the Saudi side
after such a long period, but also because it was timely due to the escalation of
violence in the Middle East”. He added that “among the topics for discussion
between King Abdullah and Turkish officials would be the situations in Lebanon,
Palestine and Iraq, the Kingdom and Turkey had similar views on a wide range of
issues that include the situation in occupied territories in Palestine, the situation in
Iraq, the standoff between Iran and the West, as well as the stance against
terrorism”163. He commented on the Turkish active foreign policy by saying
“Turkey can play a role of a mediator since it has good relations with the Israelis
and the Palestinians, Turkey is also a member of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and the Turkish people were committed to their faith and a large
number of Turks visit Saudi Arabia every year to perform Haj and Umrah” 164.
Another sign on the noticeable positive change in the political relations between the
two countries, which was highly stressed by the Saudi public figures and journalists
during interviews held with them, is the election of the Turkish professor
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu by the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the OIC as
a new secretary general from December 31st 2004 until January 31st 2014. Saudi
Arabia and other GCC countries supported his candidacy in 2004 and in 2008 to be
the first Turkish diplomat to occupy this post. Saudi Arabia enjoys a wide influence
over the OIC which is located in Jeddah and its building is donated by the Saudi
163 “Saudi Envoy to Turkey speaks to Al-Riyadh newspaper: Turkish Saudi relations reflected
positively on Turkish Arab Relations”, Riyadh Newspaper, http://www.alriyadh.com/369067.
164 “King Abdullah to Make Historic Visit to Turkey”, http://www.arabnews.com/node/282954.
64
government to the organization, moreover Saudi Arabia fills the budget shortfalls of
the organization and sponsors its activities165.
Upon the election of the Abdullah Gül as a President of Turkey, the Saudi King
Abdullah paid his second official visit to Ankara in November 2007 in order to
congratulate him on his new post, signing new agreements between the two
countries and discussing various regional issues. As a good will gesture from
Turkey, the President Abdullah Gül awarded the Saudi King Abdullah the State
Medal of Honour which is given to Turkish Presidents, general chiefs of staff and
foreign statesman who build cooperation between their countries and Turkey. King
Abdulla is the eighth foreign statesman to receive this medal166.
The timing of the visit was a critical one as the crisis of choosing a Lebanese
President started to rise, there were preparations for the launch of the Annapolis
peace conference between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the security situation in
Iraq was deteriorating owing to the rise of terrorism and Turkey’s threatening to
invade Northern Iraq region, in addition to the wide regional and international
disagreement on the Iranian Nuclear program. The visit highlighted the common
stances between Ankara and Riyadh on different regional issues. The two countries
agreed on the peaceful solution as the only solution for the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict based on land for peace principle, on condemning terrorism and unifying
the efforts to counter terrorism, domestic reforms should come from within
countries not from outside, on the need to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq,
stopping interfering in its internal affairs, the necessity of launching a
comprehensive Iraqi national reconciliation between all Iraqi partners; and on the
necessity of having a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. Prince Saud Al-Faisal
declared during the visit that “No one can move with a neighbour owns a nuclear
165 Kayaoglu, Turan. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Politics, Problems and Potential,
Routledge, , 2015, Chapter 3.
166 “Saudi King Abdullah to receive state medal in Ankara visit”,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_saudi-king-abdullah-to-receive-state-medal-in-ankara-
visit_126676.html .
65
power”167. The Saudi King was accompanied in his visit by the head of Saudi
intelligence Prince Muqrin bin Abdel al-Aziz and the Saudi ambassador to the USA
at that time Adel al-Jubeer.
The two visits paid by the Saudi king Abdullah in a year and half came besides the
lower official meetings bilaterally or multi-laterally (on the regional level) to
discuss regional issues and mainly the Iraqi issue which was the master regional
issue in the take-off of the Turkish Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia attended the
meetings of the Iraq Neighbouring Initiative launched by Turkey in late 2002 on the
level of Foreign Ministers and attended other meetings of interiors ministers to
discuss the same issue. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, besides Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan
and Malaysia attended Pakistan regional conference for discussing the situation in
Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Iran on February 25th 2007168.
Turkey and the GCC have signed a memorandum of understanding in order to
launch a strategic dialogue for developing the relations between them on September
2nd 2008. The memorandum entails that an annual meeting to be held between the
Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Foreign Ministers of the GCC states which
chairs the annual round of the GCC169. The agreement opens the door for higher
level of cooperation and coordination between Turkey and GCC member states in
the fields of politics, security, defence and development. However the secondary
committees has reached actions plans on developing cooperation in the fields of
trade, investments, energy, transportation, agriculture, food security, electricity,
culture, media, health, education, tourism, environment while no action plans on the
fields security and defence have been discussed yet. The strategic dialogue between
167 “Saudi Envoy to Turkey speaks to Al-Riyadh newspaper: Turkish Saudi relations reflected
positively on Turkish Arab Relations”, Riyadh Newspaper, http://www.alriyadh.com/369067.
168 “Muslim states oppose use of force against Iran”, http://acturca.info/2007/02/26/muslim-states-
oppose-use-of-force-against-iran/ .
169 “Strategic Dialogue with Turkey”, https://www.gcc-sg.org/index001e.html?action=Sec-
Show&ID=609 .
66
Turkey and the GCC was widely recognized in the Turkish and Arab media as a
strategic dialogue over Iran, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan has declared
that “Turkey pays high importance to the Gulf security and it will from the first
countries affected from any deterioration of the security there”170; Samir Salha, a
Turkish journalist who speaks Arabic fluently, wrote an article in al-Sharq al-
Awsaat saying that the Turkish-Gulf treaty means Iran on the first level and it is a
direct message to revise its regional policies in the Gulf, its insistence on the
nuclear program and its aggression again the UAE171.
On January 4th 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan paid his first visit to Saudi Arabia as
a part of his visit to Egypt, Syria and Jordan upon the Israeli attack on Gaza in
2008-2009172. Turkey was trying to mediate to reach a cease fire through the USA
and Arab countries and Prime Minister Erdoğan hold meetings with the head of the
political bureau of Hamas Khalid Mashal and the Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas. The discussion of the Palestinian issue was occupying the talks with the
Saudi King Abdullah, as mentioned by the Saudi official Press Agency173.
After one month of Erdoğan’s visit, President Abdullah Gül paid another visit to
Saudi Arabia where he met with the Saudi king and Saudi crown prince Salman bin
Abdel Aziz and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal. The Turkish President gave
a speech on Turkey, the Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the Middle East in the
Saudi Shura Council to be the first Turkish President addressing the council174. He
170 Salha, Samir. “Turkish-Gulf Partnership: How will Iran Act?”, September 2008,
http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=486754&issueno=10882#.VenUrhGeDGc.
171 Ibid.
172 “Erdoğan'ın barış turu”, December 2008, http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-erdoganin-baris-turu-
49095/ .
173 “Saudi King and Turkish PM”, January 2009, http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=622335 .
174 “President Gul arrives at Saudi Arabia”, February 2009,
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-abdullah-gul-arrives-at-saudi-
arabias-news-photo/84620324 .
67
also paid a visit to the Jeddah chamber for commerce and industry where he led a
meeting between Turkish and Saudi businessmen175, King Abdel Aziz city for
sciences and Technology176, King Saud University177 and visited some of the Saudi
military factories178.
On January 19th 2010, Prime Minister Erdoğan paid another visit to Saudi Arabia
and he was accompanied by Turkish businessmen. During the visit he was awarded
the International Prize of King Faisal for Serving Islam179, a prize which the Arab
media said that it was rewarded because of his stance in Davos Economic Forum
against the Israeli President Shimon Peres and his harsh critic on the Israeli
operation on Gaza (widely known as One minute crisis) and he received an
honorary PhD from Um al-Qura university for his contributions to the Islamic
issues where he delivered a speech on the Palestinian issue and praised the Saudi
King’s achievements and the Saudi foreign policy180. In March 2011, Prime
Minister Erdoğan visited Jeddah Economic Forum where he was one of the keynote
speakers181.
175 “Turkish President Meets Businessmen in Jeddah”, February 2009,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=632954 .
176 “Turkish President Visits King Abdullah’s City for Science and Technology”, February 2009,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=632613
177 “Turkish President Visits King Saud University”, February 2009,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=632611
178 FNSS company in Saudi Arabia, http://www.bayt.com/en/company/fnss-middle-east-llc-
1511184/
179 “Turkish PM Visits Chamber of Commerce in Jeddah”, January 2010, http://www.spa.gov.sa/.
180 “Um al-Qura university gives Erdogan honorary PhD”, March 2011,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=875423 .
181 “Turkish PM Visits Jeddah”, March 2011, http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=875262 .
68
On the level of Foreign Ministers, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu
visited Riyadh on January 2nd 2011 where he held talks with King Abdullah on the
reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas, Peace process and the Israeli policy182 and
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal paid a visit to Ankara on January 12th 2011
through which he discussed the resignation of Fuad al-Sanyora government in
Lebanon and threats of renewal of clashes within Lebanon183.
2.4.3 Turkish-Saudi Economic Relations:
The revival of the political relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the
shadow of Saudi King Abduallh’s two visits to Ankara and the four visits of Prime
Minister Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül to Riyadh has provided an
atmosphere of confidence and encouragement for developing the economic and
trade relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. As argued by a Saudi
academician, Saudi investors felt confident about their investments as they see the
political relations between their country and Turkey is developing. In addition to
that, the economic dimension of the developing relations between Turkey and Saudi
Arabia received a lot of attention in Turkey more than Saudi Arabia. In their
declarations, Turkish officials (the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister) often refer to the size of bilateral trade volume in their press conferences
during their visits to Riyadh or during receiving Saudi officials, unlike the Saudi
side who pays more attention to the political side of the relations and the
environment surrounding the economic relations with Turkey. All these have
provided the Saudi investors with assurances that Turkey is a good place for
investment.
182 “Davutoğlu visiting Saudi Arabia, will meet with King Abdullah”,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_davutoglu-visiting-saudi-arabia-will-meet-with-king-
abdullah_197286.html .
183 “Saudi Arabia, Turkey Urge Hezbollah to Rejoin Lebanon Government”, January 2012,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/saudi-arabia-turkey-urge-hezbollah-to-rejoin-lebanon-
government-1.336661 .
69
The Turkish investors since old times are interested in the construction and
infrastructure fields of investment in Saudi Arabia. While the Saudi investors, with
regard to the wide prosperous fields of investments in Turkey, found wide investing
opportunities in sectors of Energy, Tourism, Real state, Petrochemicals, Banking,
Agriculture, Industry, etc. encouraged by the privatization programs proposed by
the Turkish government and the supporting Turkish governmental institutions for
the new foreign investors.
The Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia have increased more than three times since
2005 until 2013, figure 2. The trade volume between the two countries has been
boosted in this period 7 times bigger than the volume in 2001 as shown in figure 3.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
962,156
983,226 1,486,917 2,201,875 1,768,216 2,217,645 2,763,475 3,676,611 3,191,481
Figure 2 - TurkStat: Turkish Exports to Saudi Arabia in USD Thousand184
2001 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1.2 1.7 2.8 3.9 5.5 3.3 4.6 6.2 8.0 7.3
Figure 3 – TUIK: Trade Volume between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in USD
Billion185
The Saudi Ogur company owned by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri is one
of the first Saudi investors to enter the Turkish market after buying 55% of the
shares of the Turkey's fixed-line operator Turk Telekom for USD 6.5 billion in
184 Turkish Statistical Institute(TurkStat), www.turkstat,gov,tr .
185 Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, www.tuik.gov.tr .
70
August 2005 186 and 81% of the shares of Avea, which is one of the three GSM
operators in Turkey, the company now have a market value worth of USD 15.6
billion187.
During the first visit of the Saudi King Abdullah, Saudi investors show their interest
in investing in the GAP project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi) which includes
investments in sectors such as agriculture and irrigation, hydroelectric power
production, urban and rural infrastructure, forestry, education and health to raise the
living standards of the Turkish people living in South-eastern Anatolia (Adıyaman,
Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, and Şırnak)188. Upon
the food crisis that took place in Saudi Arabia in 2008, the government asked the
businessmen to focus on the agriculture projects and land reclamation in the
countries close to Saudi Arabia189. Saudi-invested Planet Food World and Tabuk
were among the Arab companies who focus on organic agriculture with wide
investments in Kilis that cost a total of USD 20 billion190. Besides Planet Food
world and Tabuk, The International Agriculture and Food Investment Co
(Agroinvest), a company formed by a group of Saudi Arabia’s leading investors
with USD 533 million worth of capital, declared their plans to invest in agriculture
projects in Turkey191.
186 “Saudi Oger says keeping shares in Türk Telekom”, January 2012,
http://www.todayszaman.com/business_saudi-oger-says-keeping-shares-in-turk-
telekom_270098.html .
187 Saudi Oger, http://www.saudioger.com/business_telecommunication.html .
188 Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, www.gap.gov.tr.
189 Interview with Saudi Academician Dr. Khaled Baturfi in Saudi Arabia, May 2015.
190 “Saudi to go to GAP in 2010”, June 2009, http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/infocenter/news/Pages/1206200917420.aspx
191 “Saudi's Agroinvest to raise $533m for farm investments”, April 2010,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-s-agroinvest-raise-533m-for-farm-investments-
156322.html#.VengexGeDGc .
71
In 2008, Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (BDDK) approved the sale of
shares of Turkiye Finans to National Commercial Bank (NCB) based in Saudi
Arabia which agreed to buy the shares of Boydak and Ulker groups (60% of the
shares of the bank) for USD 1.08 billion192. Turkiye Finans, in addition to
AKBANK which is managed by Citibank group where Prince al-Waleed bin Talal
has shares in it and Albaraka Bank are the biggest financial institutions in Turkey
where Saudis have more than 50% of their shares193.
In 2009, Abdul Latif Jameel (ALJ) Group Saudi based, the largest independent
distributor of Toyota vehicles in the world, has purchased 65 percent of shares in
ToyotaSA (Toyota Sabancı Pazarlama) for USD 49 million from Sabancı Holding
which distributes spare parts and vehicles for the market in Turkey and East Europe.
This deal made by (AJL) to be added to the already owned Daihatsu distributorship
in early 2000s194. Moreover, (ALJ) declared a plan of investing a USD 1 billion in
Turkey after inspections in the energy, tourism and real estate sectors. The company
declared that ALJ’s investments in Turkey have reached a quarter of a billion
dollars and its existing operations provide ALJ with about USD 1 billion in annual
turnover195.
The Kingdom Holding Company (KHC) led by Chairman, Prince Al-Waleed Bin
Talal, which manages and operate worldwide assets, has a strong presence in
Turkey in different sectors. The (KHC) manages hotels like The Four Seasons at the
Bosphorus, Sultanahmet, Bodrum, Çeşme, Swissotel in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and
192 “Banking watchdog approves Türkiye Finans sale”, March 2008,
http://www.todayszaman.com/business_banking-watchdog-approves-turkiye-finans-
sale_135294.html .
193 “Saudi group to invest in Turkish agriculture sector “, September 2009,
http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/0909200920079.aspx .
194 “ALJ buys 65% of stake in Toyotasa”, October 2009, http://www.arabnews.com/node/328867 .
195 “Saudi-based ALJ set to invest USD 1 billion in Turkey”, October 2012,
http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/031012-alj-group-investing-usd-1-billion-in-
turkey.aspx .
72
Bodrum, The Fairmont in Istanbul, Mövenpick Hotel Istanbul, Mövenpick Hotel
Izmir and Mövenpick Hotel Bodrum. It also manages financial and media sectors in
Turkey through Citigroup and Fox Turkey channel through News Corporation196.
On the other hand, the Turkish construction companies found varied opportunities
in the Saudi Market: Doğuş Construction company has signed a contract to build
Riyad Metro Project in 2014197, Baytur Construction Company reached a deal to
build four hotel towers in Jabal Omar Project198 and TAV airports has entered in a
joint with Alrajhi to maintain and manage various airports in Saudi Arabia through
which TAV Airports for several build-operate-transfer (BOT) airport projects in
Saudi Arabia199.
2.4.4 Turkish-Saudi Military Relations:
The take-off in the political bilateral relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia
had a positive impact on the military relations between the two countries.
According to the statistics of The Machinery and Chemical Industry Institution
(MKEK)200 which is responsible for producing most of equipment and tool
requirement of the Turkish Armed Forces, and for satisfying also the essential needs
of the civil industry. Saudi Arabia comes as the top foreign country bought weapons
196 “President of Turkey meets Prince al-Waleed”, May 2015,
http://www.kingdom.com.sa/president-of-turkey-meets-prince-alwaleed .
197 Dogus Insaat Projects, http://www.dogusinsaat.com.tr/DOGUSINSAAT/en/corporate/about-
us.aspx .
198 “Saudi Arabia’s Big 25 Constructor”,
http://www.almabani.co/News_highlights/2013/ConstructionWeek_Press_Release_April_2013.pdf .
199 “Business TAV, Al-Rajihi partner in running Saudi Airports”, November 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/business_tav-al-rajhi-partner-to-run-saudi-airports_192551.html .
200 “Makin eve Kimya Endusterisi Kurumu, http://www.mkek.gov.tr/en/Corporate.aspx .
73
product by MKEK estimated by 44.5 million TL after delivering SS30 rocket
systems to Riyadh in 2011201.
Saudi Arabia hosts a branch of the FNSS Middle East Company for Aerospace and
Defence which is a Saudi/Turkish/British joint venture which specializes in the
defense industry at land systems segment202. The company has a business volume of
USD 1 billion since 2004 and its vision is to be the biggest supplier of land systems
in Saudi Arabia. In 2007, the company became in charge of the management of the
Saudi military facilities in Al-Kharj city (the first military factory established by
Saudi Arabia in 1953for producing ammunition and light weaponry) as a part of a
deal worth USD200 million; through which the company would upgraded 300
M113 armoured vehicles after upgrading 64 vehicles in 2004-2005203.
In 2011, Saudi Arabia has signed a deal with ASELSAN to buy SK2 4700
telecommunication systems and it was delivered in 2013204. Turkey offered a
proposal to the Saudi National Guard under the commandership of Prince Metab ibn
Abdullah ibn Abdel-Aziz for buying the Turkish ATAK Helicopters T-129 (an
edited version of the Italian helicopters A-129) but no reports on finalizing such
deal205.
201 “MKEK, 5 kıtaya silah sattı kar rekoru kırdı”, March 2012,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/20052936.asp .
202 FNSS Saudi Arabia, http://www.bayt.com/en/company/fnss-middle-east-llc-1511184/ .
203 “Turkey’s FNSS to upgrade Saudi M113 armored vehicles”, August 2007,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkeys-fnss-to-upgrade-saudi-m113-armored-
vehicles_120473.html .
204 “2011 Faaliyet raporu”, http://www.aselsan.com.tr/tr-tr/yatirimci-
iliskileri/Documents/Yillik%20Faaliyet%20Raporlari/Aselsan_Faaliyet_Raporu_2011.pdf .
205 “Saudi Arabian National Guard, TAI and T-129 ATAK helicopter”, September 2011,
http://www.tacticalreport.com/view_news/Saudi_Arabian_National_Guard_TAI_and_T-
129_ATAK_helicopter/2170 .
74
Saudi Arabia took part in the Turkish military exercises “The Anatolian Eagle”
hosted by the Turkish Air Forces and held in Konya, Turkey in June 2011, June
2012 and June 2013 along with air forces from UAE, NATO, US and Jordan. The
Anatolian Eagle exercises are both national and international trainings that include
USA, Germany, Belgium, UAE, Jordan, NATO, Pakistan, UK, Italy and Israel;
however the participants differ each and Israel did not take part in these exercises
since its last participation in September 2008206.
In 2010, Prince Khaled bin Sultan the deputy defence minister of Saudi Arabia has
signed an agreement for training, scientific and technical cooperation in the military
field with the Turkish Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ, which would facilitate
inviting Saudi officers to receive military education and training in Turkey207.
2.5 Conclusion
The chapter paraphrased how the US invasion of Iraq created new political
configurations in the Iraqi political process and the outcomes of the war on Iraq has
spilled over to other Middle East countries like Lebanon. Turkey and Saudi Arabia
has securitized these outcomes and perceived them as a source of threat on their
national and regional interest. They found themselves on the same line in some
issues like protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq, fearing of the rise of Iran’s
influence, supporting Ayad Allawi in 2010 elections and sharing the need for
restoring stability in Lebanon upon the Israeli war in June 2006 and internal clashes
in May 2008. The regional approaches of Turkey and Saudi Arabia were positively
perceived in the Media of both countries and helped in forming a good perception
of each other. On the other hand, the degree of rapprochement created out of the
new regional outcomes has helped both countries to discover their potential in
pushing their bilateral relations on the political level, economic level and the
206 “History of Anatolian Eagle”, http://www.anadolukartali.tsk.tr/default.asp?loc=en&p=tarihce .
207 “Turkey Strikes Military Deal with Saudi Arabia”, May 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-strikes-military-deal-with-
saudi-arabia-2010-05-24 .
75
military level. Turkey has benefited politically and regionally from having good ties
with Saudi Arabia, as well Saudi Arabia. Turkey started to attract Saudi capital in
its market and Saudi Arabia made use of the Turkish construction companies in its
infrastructure projects. Finally Saudi Arabia benefited from the Turkish military
products and participated in the Anatolian eagle exercise which is held annually in
Turkey.
76
CHAPTER 3
THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX AFTER THE ARAB
UPRISINGS IN 2011 AND TURKISH-SAUDI RELATIONS
3.1 Introduction:
This chapter intends to examine the transformations occurred to the regional
landscape upon the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in late 2010, the regional
dimension of the Egyptian uprisings in 2011 and 2013 and the Syrian uprising in
2011 and How the Turkish foreign policy and Saudi foreign policy reacted towards
the Arab uprisings. After 2011, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood factor in Egypt
and Syria represented a source of conflicting between Saudi Arabia and Turkey and
left an impact on the perception of the other inside each country, wasted
opportunities for mobilizing their efforts against Assad regime in Syria and
worsened the political relations between them.
The chapter begins with exploring the major transformations in the geopolitical
regional landscape that appeared after the Arab uprisings and explains it further
through the Egyptian case, how the Turkish and Saudi policies were conflicting
clearly and the Syrian case and how the Turkish and Saudi policies met and
diverged on different stations. Finally the chapter ends with pointing out the effect
of these regional interactions on the political, economic and military relations
between Ankara and Riyadh.
77
3.2 The Regional Security Complex after the Arab Uprisings in 2011 and
Egyptian Uprisings
3.2.1 The Major Transformations in the Regional Landscape after the
Arab Spring
The Arab uprisings took place in December 2010 upon the broke out of the
Tunisian protests and later spilled over to different Arab countries by leaving the
Arab political geography with major transformations and dilemmas that lead to the
continuity of uncertainty like: the reproduction of old problems in a new context
within these countries, the empowerment of non-state actors vis a vis state actors,
and questioning the existence of some regional structures mainly the Arab Regional
System208.
These transformations created substantial dilemmas through which Arab states have
to deal with; the first is related to addressing the political and economic problems
that led people to revolt against their regimes in a new context where the power of
the people in the streets occupies a place in the new political equation209. The Arab
uprisings have marked the rise of a new paradigm through which the people,
protesting against their regimes, became able to control the situation and organizing
themselves through the usage of social media and internet210. On the other hand, the
old problems that were discussed in the pre-Arab Spring period like the proper
economic and political reforms agendas are coming back on the agenda in the new
context. The new ruling elites in the Arab spring countries seem to have no other
choice rather than following economic liberalization and privatization agenda in
order to receive more loans and attract foreign direct investment211 while these
208 Aras, Bulent. and Folk, Richard. “Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival in the Arab Spring”,
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, No 2, 2015, http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/26107/ .
209 Al-Akawi, Zaki Sami. “The Geostrategic Consequences of the Arab Spring”, Open Democracy,
November 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/zaki-samy-elakawi/geostrategic-
consequences-of-arab-spring .
210 Al-Akawi, Zaki Sami. Op.Cit.
78
agendas could not help the old regimes to survive and exacerbated social
inequalities in Arab societies212. Also the question of political and economic reform
appears in the countries that did not witness regime change (Jordan, Morocco, Gulf
monarchies) where their people are mobilized and waiting for policies that would
bring them more open free socio-political system. While these countries chose
gradualism in applying reforms, the respond of the masses in these countries to this
gradualism is not certain213.
The second dilemma is the empowerment of non-state actors with their territorial or
religious or political goals that are not abandoned by certain international rules or
regulations in the Arab countries in a way that challenges the established nation-
states214. The Arab uprisings have remarked the rise of the non-state actors and
social/religious movements (like Muslim Brotherhood, Hizballah, Hamas, Islamic
State of Syria and Iraq ISIS, Salafi movements, etc.) with their own political,
religious and territorial goals215. This has raised a lot of questions about whether the
non-state actors will be satisfied with forming political parties and adopting national
agendas or will they choose to keep on their structures, whether their ideology and
activeness will be abandoned by the national territories of the countries they rule or
will they aspire for a wider regional structures like what a Muslim Brother leader
called ‘a Muslim Brotherhood Mediterranean Chain’216 or the territories claimed by
211 Rohac, Dalibor. “The Arab Spring Needs Economic Reform”, National Review, July 2013,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/354256/arab-spring-needs-economic-freedom-dalibor-rohac.
212 Gause III, F. Gregory. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring”, Foreign Policy,
July-August 2011 issue, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-africa/2011-07-01/why-
middle-east-studies-missed-arab-spring .
213 Janardhan, N. “GCC response to Arab Spring: Continuity amidst change”, July 2011, Al-
Arabiya, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/18/158083.html .
214 Elhusseini, Fadi. “The Arab Spring and the rise of non-state actors”, June 2015, Todays Zaman,
http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_the-arab-spring-and-the-rise-of-non-state-actors_386883.html . 215 Elhusseini, Fadi, Op.Cit.
216 An interview in Alexandria with the head of foreign affairs committee in the Freedom and
Justice Party (the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt).
79
ISIS in Syria, Iraq and Libya after 2013. On the other hand, the Arab states that
witnessed regime change are facing deep crises related to internal disputes over
social justice, political participation, political rights which question the legitimacy
of the ruling regime, make people in these countries turn back to their formal tribal
and sectarian identity as trustworthy shelters217 and make facing these non-state
actors a more complicated issue in front of Arab nation-states218.
The third dilemma comes from the uncertainty and ambiguity of the regional
structure that will take place in the Middle East after the uprisings. The traditional
Arab Regional System has lived strong setbacks since the beginning of the 21st
century starting from the US invasion of Iraq to the NATO intervention in Libya
where the Arab countries became more exposable to foreign intervention without
opposition from the main actors in the Arab system like the League of Arab States.
The weakness of the Arab Regional System can be expressed in the low
performance of the traditional Arab regional powers: Egypt and Syria (who were
together with Saudi Arabia representing the leaders of the Arab order in the post-
Gulf war era 1991). Another feature of this weakness is the trials of ‘peripheral’
regional powers like Iran, Israel and Turkey to consolidate their involvement in the
politics of the Arab regional geography, which started after the US invasion of Iraq,
during the Arab uprisings like for example: Turkey’s support for Muslim
Brotherhood, Iran’s direct support for Shi’a in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and Israel’s
attacks on Gaza 2012 and 2014219. Finally the rise of non-Arab identities (like
Kurds, Syriac, Yezidis, Turkmen, etc.) as a trustworthy shelter for different groups
217 Bacik, Gokhan. “Who will lead the Middle East? The patterns of destructive competition”,
Todays Zaman, October 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists_who-will-lead-the-middle-
east-the-patterns-of-destructive-competition_329313.html .
218 Dissouki, Ali Elldin Helal. “The Question of Existence: The Arab Regional System in Face of
Division and Sectarianism”, Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya, Vol. 198, October 2014, P.44.
219 Ibid.
80
living in Arab countries represents a challenge to preserving the ‘Arab’ identity of
the “Arab Regional System”220.
3.2.2 The Fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt:
The uprising in Egypt, the most populated Arab country and the traditional leader of
the Arab world, can be stated as the strongest start point of the uprisings’ spill over
to other countries. It was Egypt that took over the international as well as regional
agendas and convinced the world that the protests marked something fundamentally
new221. The Egyptian regime, supported by the army was widely perceived as one
of the strongest regimes not to easily fall in less than a month (from January 25th
until February 17th 2011) and its downfall, despite the strong opposition of Gulf
countries, remarked the launch of a strong wave of change that would probably
sweep most of the Arab countries.
President Mubarak foreign policy’s doctrine has contributed to the erosion of his
political base. A state of dissatisfaction with the orientation of the Egyptian foreign
policy was appearing in the protests and demonstrations that took place against the
regime even before 25th January 2011.Many Egyptians saw Egypt’s foreign policy
as subservient to Washington and Tel Aviv, as the protests were calling for
restoring dignity to the ordinary Egyptians; for Egypt national dignity also means a
foreign policy that is made in Cairo222. The popular trend was against Egypt’s
growing reliance on the US, Egypt’s loss of its regional role and not being able to
220 Sayegh, Yazid. “The Arab Region is at a Transformation Point”, Al-Hayat Newspaper, August
2014, http://alhayat.com/Opinion/Writers/4241169/ .
221 Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprisings: The Unfinished Revolutions, Public Affairs Publisher,
January 2013, P.52.
222 Shehata, Samir. “Egypt Declined during Mubarak’s Rule”, The New York Times, October 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/07/is-egypt-losing-its-regional-power/egypt-
declined-during-mubaraks-rule .
81
influence in its periphery, its taking part in the siege of Gaza strip and losing the
prestigious position it gained under rule of President Nasser in African politics223.
The fall of President Mubarak and the rise of people’s call for a change in the
foreign policy opened the door for lots of uncertainties on the new path Egypt will
follow in its foreign policy. Under the rule of the SCAF (Supreme Council of
Armed Forces), the question of re-thinking Egypt’s foreign policy was raised up by
all Egyptian political parties. The SCAF chose the continuity of Mubarak’s foreign
policy without major transformations in the relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and the
Gulf states but in a new way that would absorb the domestic calls of making a
change in the foreign policy224. In the first month of SCAF rule (February 2011),
Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi sent a letter to the Syrian president
Bashar al-Assad saying that “Opening a new page in the Egyptian-Syrian relations
is an essential issue and he is looking forward to meeting with him” but the
relations did not witness a major breakthrough since mid-2011, as signs of another
uprising waiting for Syria started to appear225. In February 2011, the SCAF allowed
the passage of two Iranian warships through the Suez Canal for the first time and
Israel described it as a provocative action226. On March 29th 2011, the Egyptian
Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi (the then Secretary General of the Arab League)
has declared that Egypt is opening a new page in its relations with all countries,
including Iran227. However, the relations did not developed more than that, as the al-
223 Ibid.
224 Heydarian, Richard Javad. “Egypt’s Evolving Foreign Policy”, June 2011,
http://fpif.org/egypts_evolving_foreign_policy/ .
225 “Tantawi’s message to Bashar Assad”, March 2011,
http://arabic.people.com.cn/31662/7315469.html .
226 “Egypt is ready to restore diplomatic relations with Iran”, April 2011,
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/04/110404_iarnegypt.shtml .
227 “Egyptian foreign minister declarations on Iran”, March 2011,
http://twitmail.com/email/65998317/216/false .
82
Arabi declared Egypt’s support for the ruling family in Bahrain and its approval on
the GCC intervention in Bahrain by describing it as a “practical application for the
concept of Collective Security in the Arab Gulf region” and added that “stability
and Arabism of Arab states in the Gulf is a red line for Egypt”228. In May 2011, al-
Arabi said discussing the restoration of relations with Iran is premature issue229. In
the Palestinian issue, Egypt declared opening the Rafah crossing to Gaza
permanently on May 25th 2011230 unlike the days of Mubarak who was opening it
just for delivering humanitarian aids in order to press on Hamas to sign a
reconciliation deal with Fateh and to accept peace talks with Israel under the
conditions of president Mahmoud Abbas. While on the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty, Egypt did not take a major change towards it, not to risk any change in the
American economic and military aids to Egypt. It declared its respect to the treaties
it signed from before as long as the other side respects it and showed many times its
desire in editing the agreement to allow more troops to enter Sinai in order to be
able to curb the terrorist groups taking place in the mountains, but it did not get
positive responses from Israel. As a sign of Egypt’s upholding the peace treaty with
Israel, Egypt did not suspend the peace treaty with Israel upon three Egyptian
soldiers were killed by mistaken Israeli fires while following a group of terrorists
attacked Eilat port in Israel231 and escaped inside the Egyptian territories, an event
228 “Egypt supports GCC actions in Bahrain”, April 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/4/6/ .
229 Nagi, Mohamed Abbas. “Relations between Egypt and Iran on a light fire”, Al-Khaleej, June
2011, http://www.alkhaleej.ae/supplements/page/20ab2b56-425e-41e5-9816-e09c6cb5d1f1 .
230 “Egypt opens Rafah crossing permanently”, May 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/5/25/ .
231 “The incident of the Israeli embassy in Cairo”, September 2011,
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/09/110910_israel_security_egypt_details.shtml .
83
that sparkled a wage outrage in the Egyptian street and raised the calls for hanging
up peace treaty with Israel, mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood232.
3.2.3 The Rise and Fall of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt:
Under the rule of President Mohamed Morsi who ascended to power in June 2012,
Egyptian foreign policy has lived sorts of continuity in some aspects and major
transformations on others in the Middle East, owing to the change took place in the
foreign policy making process in Egypt. While the security agencies and foreign
ministry were the main institutions involved in the decision making process under
President Mubarak’s rule and SCAF’s rule, the Muslim Brotherhood guidance
bureau and the foreign policy advisors of President Mohamed Morsi were the new
actors in the process.
The new Egyptian government renewed its commitment to its strategic relations
with the US and stressed that is still a US ally in the region233. It carried on
upholding the peace treaty with Israel despite domestic calls to suspend the
agreement upon the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2012, mediated a cease fire between
Hamas and Israel, and the Egyptian security institutions continued to cooperate with
its Israeli counter partners on fighting terrorism. On the other side, major changes
happened in the relations between Egypt and Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE
and Iran. The Egyptian government chose to walk along with Qatar and Turkey in
some regional issues like managing the uprising in Syria and mediating a cease fire
between Hamas and Israel.
Egyptian-Qatari relations witnessed a noticeable improvement during the rule of
president Morsi; Doha has offered Egypt loans and investments totally estimated
around USD 10 billion from the total Gulf USD 20 billion economic aids promised
to Egypt. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa has paid a visit to Egypt in August 2012 as the
232 “Egypt asks for investigation on its soldiers’ accident”, August 2011,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/18/162901.html .
233 “Egyptian Foreign Policy orientation under the new president”, July 2012,
http://arabic.people.com.cn/31662/7878339.html .
84
first Arab leader to visit Egypt after Morsi took the rule and Doha lent USD 2
billion for the central bank of Egypt234. Qatar declared its plans for entering the
Egyptian market to invest in the mega power projects, infrastructure, Tourism and
the financial market with a capital estimated around USD 18 billion235. The Qatari
National Bank (QNB) signed deals to buy more than 50% of the shares of two
international banks (PNB Paribas bank and Societie Generale bank) who were
quitting the Egyptian market, and the Qatari firm Qinvest236 (a leading financial
services firm owned chaired by Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani)
negotiated a deal to buy 60% of the Egyptian financial firm Hermes which Gamal
Mubarak (son of president Mubarak) had shares in it237. Also as a sign on the close
relations between Cairo and Doha in this period, Sheikh Hamad al-Thani of Qatar
has paid a visit to Gaza strip through Rafah crossing in October 2012 accompanied
by an Egyptian minister, through which he was boarded on an Egyptian military jet
from al-Arish airport to Rafah crossing; to be the first Arab leader visiting Gaza
under the Israeli siege since his last visit there in 1999238.
Another transformation was noticed in Egypt’s relation with Hamas; owing to the
ideological relations between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Muslim
Brotherhood branch in Gaza, Hamas239. The Egyptian government carried on its
234 Ibid .
235 “Open Horizons between Egypt and Qatar”, September 2012,
http://www.raya.com/news/pages/5136368a-616d-4ff6-b8a1-bb78f49ffbbf .
236 “Qinvest Profile”,
http://www.qinvest.com/QInvest_NewDesign/QInvest/English/Q_ARTICLE.ASP?SecID=58&PageI
D=8&SubSecTitle=QInvest%20Profile .
237 “Fears rise in Egypt from the Qatari investments”, September 2012,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/02/235611.html .
238 “Qatari Emir arrives Gaza in a Historical Visit”, October 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/10/23 .
239 Felsberger, Stefanie. “The Future of the Egyptian Foreign Policy”, Austuria Institut Fur Europa,
Fokus 4/2014, http://www.aies.at/download/2012/AIES-Fokus-2012-04.pdf .
85
policy of easing the siege on Gaza and kept the Rafah crossing gates opened for the
Palestinians to travel and enter Egypt. Upon the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2012, it
took a harsh stand on Israel by withdrawing the Egyptian ambassador from Tel
Aviv, and keeping Rafah crossing gates opened for travel and humanitarian aids
entering to Gaza. The Egyptian Prime Minister paid a visit to Gaza under that attack
where he met with ex-Prime Minister Ismail Haniya and Cairo called for an urgent
meeting for the Foreign Ministers of the Arab league240. Also Egypt supported the
Qatari initiative for holding a small Arab summit to press Fateh and Hamas for
reconciliation and resumed mediation efforts between them upon Khaled Mishal’s
visit to Cairo in March 2013241.
Another transformation was on the relations with Iran. The ice of the Egyptian-
Iranian relations seemed to be broken by the visit of President Morsi to Tehran in
order to attend the annual summit of the Non-Alignment Movement in 2012, and
the visit of the Iranian president Ahmadinejad to Cairo in February 2013 to be the
first visit on the president’s level since the last visit of the Egyptian president
Anwar Sadat to Tehran in 1971. However, the Syrian uprising and Muslim
Brotherhood pro-Sunni stand along with Qatar and Turkey were the main hindrance
behind restoring the diplomatic relations with Iran. The ice breaking in relations
with Iran was simultaneous with the deterioration in the Egyptian-Emirati relations,
upon UAE’s hosting of the ex-Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik who was the last
Prime Minister of President Mubarak and the presidential candidate in front of
president Morsi. The UAE interior minister Dahi Khalfan gave offensive
declarations against Muslim Brotherhood by saying “The Muslim Brotherhood are
one of the sources of threat to the security in Gulf, not less than Iran”242. Also the
Egyptian minister of finance declared that there will be no economic aids coming
240 “Gaza between Mubarak and Morsi”, Aljazeera, November 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2012/11/20/ .
241 “Khaled Mishal Leaves Cairo”, March 2013, http://onaeg.com/?p=717151 .
242 “Who Overthrows Who: Dahi Khalfan or Ikhwan”, elaph Newspaper, November 2013,
http://elaph.com/Web/NewsPapers/2013/11/851005.html .
86
from UAE to Egypt243. The UAE arrested a group of 60 persons (including
Egyptians) from the Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in UAE and charged them in
early 2013 “with establishing an illegal organization, holding secret meetings and
being in contact with the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt to exchange
sensitive information and receiving lectures from them on methods of regime
change in Arab countries, in a way that threatens the national security of UAE”244.
Following a popular uprising against the ruling Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and
president Morsi, the Egyptian army intervened to dismiss the president in July 3rd
2013, suspended the constitution and declared the head of the constitutional court as
an interim president with a six month time table of having a new constitution and
calling for a new parliamentary and presidential elections. The Egyptian foreign
policy has witnessed another transformation in its orientation; from favouring the
alliance with Turkey and Qatar into entering in a strong alliance with Saudi Arabia,
UAE and Jordan (similar to the old axis of moderates in the days of Mubarak).
3.2.4. The Saudi Policy towards the Arab Spring and Egyptian
Uprisings:
The timing of the Arab uprisings was simultaneous with a steady loss of Riyadh’s
grip on the regional balance of power towards Iran and the heavy setbacks of its
Arab nationalist/Sunni allies in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. In 2010, despite Ayad
Allawi’s receiving the highest votes in the parliamentary elections, Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki succeeded in extending his premiership for a second term. In
Lebanon, the failure of 2006 Israeli operation and the benefits Hizballah got out
from Doha Agreement 2008 further strengthened its stance in front of 14 March
alliance. Hamas, in Palestine, was continuing to postpone the reconciliation with
Fateh and went further to enhance its control over Gaza strip which opens a new
243 “Egyptian minister of Finance: UAE Will Not support Us Financially”, August 2012,
http://www.aa.com.tr/ar/news/74637 .
244 “A Brotherhood Cell Sent to Prison in UAE”, January 2013,
http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/01/19/egyptian-uae-trial .
87
regional playground for Iran to extend its influence245. Saudi Arabia started to
watch its regime allies in the other countries falling down one after one in the first
half of 2011 like Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Tunisian President Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali (with exception to Muammer Qaddafi of Libya). The protests in
Bahrain against al-Khalifa royal family, if succeeded, would be a start of other
uprisings in Saudi eastern Shi’a provinces and in other GCC countries. The uprising
in Yemen, regarded as the backyard of Saudi Arabia, has forced Riyadh to play a
role in smoothing a power transition from Ali Abdullah Saleh to his vice president
Abd Rabou Mansour Hady (a Saudi ally)246.
Saudi Arabia adopted a new approach through which it will take the responsibility
of protecting itself and its allies and it will not be protected by others anymore
(especially the USA which abandoned its allies)247. In the wake of the uprisings,
Riyadh found a new opportunity of reasserting its Arab regional leadership in the
destabilized Middle East248, after halting down the protests that took place in its
eastern provinces. It benefited from its military and financial capabilities in
preserving the stability of the GCC regimes and activated its linkage to the Salafi
groups in the countries that witnessed regime change in order to ensure its influence
in front of the rise of Muslim Brothers249.
245 Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia in The New Middle East”, Council on Foreign Relations”,
Special Report No. 63, September 2011, P.16, http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-new-
middle-east/p26663 .
246 Rieger, Rene. “In Search For Stability: Saudi Arabia and Arab Spring”, Gulf Research Center
Cambridge, Gulf Research Meeting Papers, 2014.
247 Obaid, Nawaf. “Saudi Arabia gets forceful on foreign policy”, October 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/saudi-arabia-gets-forceful-on-foreign-
policy/2013/10/24/b037d03e-3c1a-11e3-b7ba-503fb5822c3e_story.html?hpid=z3 .
248 Kamrava, Mehran. "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution”, Orbis, Vol. 56, No.,
2012, http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-61403.pdf.
249 “How Saudi Arabia Controls the Salafi Stream in The Arab World”, France 24, September 2009,
http://www.france24.com/ar/20120924 .
88
On March 14th 2011, it sent about 1,200 Saudi soldiers equipped with armored
vehicles to Manama under the title of GCC Peninsula Shield Force in order to
protect the governmental facilities and royal palaces250. On March 10th 2011, the
GCC has offered financial loans to Bahrain and Oman estimated by USD 20 billion
for infrastructure and housing projects on a period of 10 years. Riyadh has called
for a political union between the kingdom and Bahrain, in a clear message for Iran
that the Gulf is a sphere of influence for Saudi Arabia. The Saudi king Abdullah has
asked the GCC member states to upgrade the GCC organization into a union since
the stability of Gulf is under threat, as he said in the GCC summit held in Riyadh in
December 2011251. Also Saudi Arabia recommended including Morocco and Jordan
to the GCC despite their geographical proximity, as a kind of solidarity with the
governments of these countries in face of their economic problems252.
In the Egyptian case, Saudi Arabia was opposing the protests against President
Mubarak in Egypt since its beginning until his downfall. The Saudi government felt
shocked that the US administration abandoned a loyal ally of decades like Mubarak
after only days of popular protests and did its best to convince the US government
to continue its political support for the Mubarak regime. As Prince Turki Al-Faisal
puts it, “King Abdullah held the closest relations with President Mubarak for 30
years, abandoning him or any close ally during a revolutionary uprising was not and
will never be a policy option for the Kingdom”253. Egypt was a strong ally in its
regional policy which was formulated on the purpose of the containment of Iran’s
influence in the region and rolling it back. President Mubarak shared the same view
with Riyadh on the threat of the Iranian expansion in different Arab countries and
250 Bronner, Ethan and Slackman, Michael. “Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down
Unrest,”The New York Times, March 14, 2011.
251 “Saudi King Calls for Unity”, Al-Arabiya, December 2011,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/19/183322.html .
252 Ibid.
253 Al-Faisal, Turki. “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, Issue 4,
December 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12044/abstract .
89
he was an important player in the axis of moderate Arab countries supporting 14
March alliance in Lebanon, Fateh in Palestine and Ayad Allawi and his Sunni allies
in Iraq, through which his fall would leave Saudi Arabia alone with Jordan in the
axis. However the developments on the ground and the Egyptian army’s decision to
ask Mubarak to leave power were stronger than the Saudi efforts. The concern
increased highly out of any possible spill over of the Egyptian uprising towards
other regimes in the GCC.
After the departure of Mubarak, Saudi Arabia worked on asserting its regional
leadership and extending its leverage on Egypt through its financial capabilities and
through its natural Salafi allies who were rising popularly in the street. Riyadh
declared providing USD 4 billion to support the Egyptian economy in form of “soft
loans, deposits and grants”254, at a time Egypt was suffering the departure of foreign
investors and high shortage in foreign currency as tourists were deserting the
country. On the other hand, wide media reports talked about Saudi financial support
to the Salafi movements and parties in Egypt255. The Salafist movement,
represented by Al-Nour party and who received 25% of the seats of 2011 parliament
and had their candidate Sheikh Hazem Abu Ismail for the presidential elections,
were the closest political actor to Saudi Arabia. They both share the same Wahhabi
Salafi conservative ideology of Islam, different than the Muslim Brothers’
interpretation. Egyptian Salafists found in Saudi Arabia their main regional ally as
the rise of the Wahhabi preach under Mohamed Ibn Abdel Wahhab (the main
intellectual leader of Salafi Wahhabism) started with the establishment of the
kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the famous alliance between Mohamed Ibn Abdel
Wahhab and Ibn Saud. While Saudi Arabia has found in the Salafist their proper
allies in Egypt, as they are popular, can be frenemies to the Muslim Brothers and
they oppose mending diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran. The Salafists
254 “Saudi Arabia gives USD 4 billion aids to Egypt”, May 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-21/saudi-arabia-gives-4-billion-egyptian-
economic-aid-spa-says .
255 “The Saudi Finance to Egyptian Salafists”, August 2011, http://www.alalam.ir/news/672974 .
90
used to raise the Saudi flags in their protests and call of the full application of the
Islamic sharia law in Egypt, while some media reports spoke widely about a direct
financial fund from Saudi Arabia to the Salafists; the Saudi ambassador in Egypt
denied that256.
Upon the rise of Mohamed Morsi to power in Egypt, Saudi Arabia feared any shift
in Egypt’s regional stance towards Iran. Saudi Arabia was concerned that Egypt
could aspire for different lines than the Saudi lines under rule of Brotherhood in
alliance with Turkey. It tried to deal with Egypt under Morsi and to keep the
channels open, unlike other GCC countries like UAE which looked at their rise to
power in Egypt as a threat. Saudi Arabia signed a deal to provide Egypt with loans
estimated by USD 500 million on June 24th 2013 and provided Egypt with USD 750
million as a credit line for oil imports257. Saudi Arabia was the first country visited
by President Mohamed Morsi on July 12th 2012 in order to assure the kingdom that
Egypt will not seek rapprochement with Iran on the expense of Egyptian-Saudi
relations and to assure the kingdom of Egypt’s opposing stance on Bashar al-Assad
in Syria258. Yet Saudi Arabia did not respond positively to Morsi’s initiative during
Mecca summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in August 2012 about
Syria and the Saudi envoy to Egypt attended two summits of this initiative259. When
the Brotherhood in Egypt started to show more softness for approaching Iran in
order to deter the UAE260, Saudi concerns about the Brotherhood intentions were
enhanced. Also Saudi Arabia got frustrated after the visit paid by the Egyptian
256 “Saudi envoy denies supporting Salafists in Egypt”, August 2011, http://www.an7a.com/54114/ .
257 “Egypt borrows USD 500 million from Saudi Arabia”, June 2013,
http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/egypt-borrow-us500-million-saudi-arabia .
258 “Morsi’s visit to Saudi Arabia”, July 2013, http://arabic.people.com.cn/31662/7874139.html .
259 Farouk, Yasmine. “More than Money: Post-Mubarak Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf”, Gulf
Research Center, April 2014,
https://www.academia.edu/6959702/More_Than_Money_Post_Mubarak_Egypt_Saudi_Arabia_and_
the_Gulf.
260 Al-Labbad, Mustafa. “Egypt’s Iran policy linked to Muslim Brotherhood”, February 2013,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/02/ahmadinejad-visit-egyptian-foreign-policy.html .
91
Prime Minister Hisham Qandil to Iraq in February 2013 for boosting Egyptian-Iraqi
economic relations261.
Saudi Arabia showed a firm supportive stand after the ouster of President Mohamed
Morsi from power by the Army. It was the first country to congratulate the
president of the interim period Adly Mansour. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-
Faisal paid a visit to Paris in August 2013262 where he met the French president
Francois Hollande, the British Foreign Minister William Hague and the advisor of
the German chancellor Cristopher Hisken to ask the EU to ease pressure on
Egypt263. The Saudi government declared that it will substitute any cut in the
American and western aids to Egypt in case it took place. When Washington
decided to suspend military aid to Egypt, Saudi Arabia along with the UAE
brokered a deal worth USD 2 billion of weapons from Russia to Egypt264. Upon the
bloody crackdown of the army against the supporters of ex-president Morsi, Saudi
King Abdullah said: “Let the entire world know that the people and government of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stood and still stand today with our Brothers in Egypt
against terrorism, extremism and sedition, and against whomever is trying to
interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs”265. Financially, upon the ouster of Morsi Saudi
Arabia along with UAE and Kuwait pledged USD 12 billion as total financial aids
in loans and grants to the Egyptian economy which helped in supporting the
Egyptian local currency and the Egyptian stock market.
261 Farouk, Yasmine. Op.Cit.
262 “Saudi Arabia call on EU to ease pressure on Egypt”, Al-Shaq Al-Awsaat, August 2013,
http://www.aawsat.net/2013/08/article55314043/saudi-arabia-calls-on-eu-to-ease-pressure-on-egypt .
263 “al-Faisal meets with British FM and a German official”, August 2013,
http://www.aleqt.com/2013/08/21/article_780084.html .
264 “KSA, UAE to finance Russian arms deal with Egypt”, February 2014,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/ksa-uae-finance-russian-arms-deal-egypt .
265 Alhomayed, Tareq. “King Abdullah’s Egypt speech was like a surgeon’s scalpel”, August 2013,
Al-Sharq Al-Awsaat, http://www.aawsat.net/2013/08/article55314019 .
92
3.2.5. The Turkish Policy towards the Arab Spring and Egyptian
Uprisings:
Turkey caught surprised by the quick developments to the regional status-quo and
the spill over of anti-regime protests from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya to Yemen and
then to Syria266. Ankara had invested in the regional pre-Arab uprisings status quo
by developing strong political, economic and military relations with the Arab
regimes disregarding their democratic nature267. Turkey reacted with the protests in
each country on a case to case basis, according to the level of relations it had with
each ruling regime268. In Tunisia, Turkey has welcomed the fall of the Tunisian
revolution since it had few economic interest in Tunisia. In Libya where Turkey had
large economic interests with Qaddafi (Turkish investments estimated by USD 20
billion), Turkey’s reaction was not rapid compared to its reaction to Egypt and
Tunisia. Turkey first favoured more managed transitions and to give time for
diplomatic efforts to persuade Qaddafi for reform; however taken by the
development of events in Libya and NATO’s intervention supported by the Arab
League and Assad’s refusal to make reform, Turkey has supported the calls for
regime change. While in Bahrain, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu
has described it as one of the “states not needing change” unlike the Arab
awakening countries, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen who were “states resisting
change”269.
266 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey After The Arab Uprisings: Difficulties of Hanging on in
There”, ISPI, Analysis No. 223, December 2013, http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/turkey-
after-arab-uprisings-difficulties-hanging-there-9591 .
267 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Challenges to Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East”, TESEV, June
2011, http://www.tesev.org.tr/challenges-to-turkey-s-soft-power-in-the-middle-
east/Content/162.html .
268 Ozcan, Mesut. “Turkey’s Policy towards the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab
Spring”, TEPAV, Turkish Policy Brief Series, Ninth Edition, 2013,
http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1367496675-
5.Turkeys_Policy_towards_the_Middle_East_and_North_Africa_after_the_Arab_Spring.pdf .
269 Fuller, Graham. Turkey and the Arab Spring, Bozorg Press, 2014, P. 253.
93
Turkey followed a ‘Democracy Promotion’ agenda after the Zero Problem with
Neighbours policy that resulted in strong economic, political and military relations
between Turkey and Arab countries. Different circles in the Foreign Policy decision
making process talked about a 2.0 version of Zero Problem with Neighbours, as
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu argued that “Turkey developed ties with these
regimes because at the time they were not at war with their own people. But when
they preferred to suppress the demands of their citizens, we sided with the people
and still remain committed to the same democratic vision for our region”270. In
addition to that, circles in Turkish foreign policy started to raise other principles
above the Zero Problem with Neighbours like the importance of achieving balance
between security and freedom. Ahmet Davutoğlu said: “We advised the regimes to
no longer ignore their people’s quest for democracy and asked them to establish the
balance between freedom and security. If security is sacrificed for freedom, it will
lead to chaos, while if freedom is sacrificed for security, it will result in dictatorial
regimes”271. Turkey’s vision for the region out of the so called ‘Balance between
Freedom and Security’ was about establishing a stable regional order where the new
regimes enjoys a harmony with their societies after abandoning the notion of
stability built on autocratic regimes272.
Turkey prioritized the use of soft power tools and public diplomacy in dealing with
the new outcomes of the Arab spring. The Turkish foreign policy started to be more
active in the region through the soft power capital it owns and by investing in the
270 Davutoglu, Ahmet. “Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring”, TEPAV, 2012,
http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1336135395-
4.Principles_of_Turkish_Foreign_Policy_and_Regional_Political_Structuring_by_Ahmet_Davutogl
u.pdf.
271 Ibid.
272 Kardas, Saban. “From zero problems to leading the change: making sense of transformation in
Turkey’s regional policy”, TESEV, 2012, P.6, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1346423043-
0.From_Zero_Problems_to_Leading_the_Change_Making_Sense_of_Transformation_in_Turkeys_
Regional_Policy.pdf.
94
rising political actors who are positive respondents to Turkey like Muslim
Brotherhood. Turkey owned an attractive image in the Arab public opinion as a
result of its foreign policies stances which were seen as independent: starting from
not allowing the USA to use Turkish military bases in attacking Iraq in 2003 until
Turkey’s stand on Israel during Lebanon war in 2006, Gaza war in 2008-2009 and
the famous stand of Prime Minister Erdoğan against the Israeli President Shimon
Peres in Davos 2009 which was called later by the ‘One Minute’ crisis273.
Moreover, Turkey succeeded in portraying an image of success in managing
economic and political transformation processes at home that has been viewed quite
positively in the Arab countries. There were wide academic discussions in the Arab
countries about the so called ‘Turkish model’ and wide arguments have been
debated on the experience of AKP in issues of civil-military relations, economic
performance and being a member in the G-20 economies and political Islam274. On
the other side, the high probable positive respondents to applying this experience
were the Muslim Brotherhood. The Tunisian El-Nahada and Egyptian Muslim
Brothers not only found in the rhetoric of the ‘conservative’ AKP their way for
achieving development as a public good to market this ruling model to the voters
before the elections but also they found in having close ties with Turkey the
opportunity to assure the western countries about their democratic credentials.
In the Egyptian case, Prime Minister Erdoğan was the first leader to call for
Mubarak to step down. Turkey did not have strong economic ties further than
economic plans of investments estimated by USD 2 billion. While Egyptian
President Mubarak was looking at Turkey’s high profile regional role as a
competitor to Egypt’s leadership regional mediator role in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
in the Saudi-Syrian dispute, in the Lebanese issue and in reconciliation between
Fateh and Hamas in Palestine. Egypt did not like the relationship between the ruling
273 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey: Arab Perspective”, TESEV, Foreign Policy Analysis Series,
No. 13, May 2010,
http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/Turkey_ArabPerspectives_II.bas%C4%B1m.pdf .
274 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Challenges to Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East”, Op.Cit.
95
AKP in Turkey and Muslim Brothers in Egypt and other Arab countries, since it
regarded them as the main rivalry to the Egyptian ruling regime, however it kept on
the relations with Ankara as an important regional actor275.
After the fall down of Mubarak, the Turkish president Abdullah Gül was the first
foreign leader to visit Egypt and to meet with the SCAF in March 2011. Turkey has
promised to provide Egypt with a loan worth USD 2 billion. It also provided
technical equipment (150 garbage trucks) to solve problems relating to municipal
services. At that time, it seemed that political Islamists (the Muslim Brothers and
Salafists), who were more politically organized in the street, will come to power
after the elections276. Turkey utilized its soft power and public diplomacy to build
strong relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Since mid-2011, the relations
between Turkey and Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) (Muslim Brotherhood’s
political party) started to develop in a noticeable way. The FJP admired the
experience of the AKP in curbing the influence of the Turkish army in the political
life and tried to do the same with the Egyptian military who is infiltrating the public
institutions through appointed retired generals. On the other side of Turkey, having
an ally like Muslim Brothers, would be a good score for the AKP to raise up its
image, support its regional activism policy in the ex-Ottoman territories, open new
markets for the Turkish products and allow Turkey to be more present in the
different regional problems like peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis
and reconciliation between Hamas and Fateh in Palestine277.
In October 2011, before the parliamentary elections by one month, the AKP signed
a twinning agreement only with the FJP in Egypt. A Turkish public affairs and
275 Ibid, P. 196.
276 “Turkey to send 150 Garbage Truck to Egypt”, May 2013,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-to-send-150-garbage-trucks-to-egypt_316689.html.
277 Düzgıt, Senem Aydın. “The Seesaw Friendship Between Turkey’s AKP and Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood”, Carnegie Endowment Center, July 2014,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/24/seesaw-friendship-between-turkey-s-akp-and-egypt-s-
muslim-Brotherhood .
96
media company (close to the AKP) visited Egypt to present political consultations
and propaganda strategies for the FJP before the parliamentary elections in and
before the presidential elections in 2012. Also different groups of the FJP youth
paid many visits to Turkey and had meetings with the youth of AKP, non-
governmental organizations close to the AKP and think-tanks278. The Turkish Prime
Minister Erdoğan has paid a visit to Egypt on September 2011 where he was
welcomed by thousands of Muslim Brother’s followers in the airport. Turkish
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that Egypt and Turkey could create a new
axis of power by saying “It will be an axis of democracy of the two biggest nations
in our region, from the north to the south, from the Black Sea down to the Nile
Valley in Sudan”279.
After the election of Mohamed Morsi in mid-2012, the Turkish Foreign Minister
was the first Foreign Minister to visit president Morsi to congratulate him after
becoming a president. President Mohamed Morsi chose Turkey along with Saudi
Arabia and Iran in an initiative to solve the Syrian crisis. Egypt was on the same
line with Ankara on the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad by asking him to leave
power. Moreover, Turkey was highly present in the cease fire talks between Hamas
and Israel in Cairo upon the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2012 and the head of the
Turkish intelligence (MIT) Hakan Fidan stayed in Cairo until a cease fire declared
between Israel and Hamas. President Morsi also paid a visit to Turkey in September
30th 2012 and took part in the annual congress of the AKP and thanked the Turkish
government for its stance on the Egyptian uprising in 2011280. Prime Minister
Erdoğan paid another visit to Egypt in November 2012 accompanied by 12 cabinet
ministers and 200 Turkish businessmen as Turkey gave the green light for a loan of
278 Ellabbad, Mustafa. “Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood: a bit with unsecured endings”, Assafir,
September 2012, http://m.assafir.com/content/1348446668181353200/Opinion .
279 “Turkey says seeking new axis of power with Egypt”, September 2011,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-says-seeking-new-axis-of-power-with-
egypt_257232.html .
280 “Egyptian President Visits Turkey on Sunday”, September 2012, http://www.albawaba.com/ar/ .
97
US$1 billion for projects in Egypt's battered infrastructure and Turkish companies
could win some of the expected deals with the Egyptian government281. Finally in
February 2013, President Abdullah Gül paid a new visit to Egypt for discussing the
Syrian issue and President Morsi declared that Egypt and Turkey look at the
regional issues from a similar perspective282.
Upon the popular uprising that broke out against President Mohamed Morsi in June
30th 2013, Turkey declared its opposition to the ouster of President Morsi by saying
“Turkey advocates the view that Egypt’s long term stability and development can
be achieved only by respecting people’s democratic will in this country”283 and
describing it as a coup d’état. The Turkish president Gul held a meeting with the
Egyptian ambassador in Turkey on July 15th 2013 where they discussed the
transitional roadmap in Egypt284 and the ambassador requested to hold a meeting
with the Turkish Foreign Minister on July 19th 2013 to discuss political transition in
Egypt285. On July 23rd 2013, Turkish president has sent a message to Egypt’s
interim President Adly Mansour to congratulate Egypt on its national day286. On the
other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan followed a hard line and said that "Currently,
my president in Egypt is Morsi because he was elected by the people; if we don't
281 Seibert, Thomas. “Turkey Seeks New Alliance With Visit to Egypt”, November 2012,
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/turkey-seeks-new-alliance-with-visit-to-egypt
282 “Morsi Hold Talks with Gull over Palestine and Syria”, February 2013,
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/07/morsi-holds-talks-with-gul-over-palestine-syria/ .
283 “Relations between Turkey and Egypt”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-egypt.en.mfa .
284 “Egyptian ambassador discusses transition with Turkish president”, July 2013,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/76510/UI/Front/Login.aspx .
285 “Turkish FM holds meeting with Egyptian Envoy to Ankara”, July 2013,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-foreign-minister-holds-meeting-with-egyptian-envoy-to-
ankara.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51081&NewsCatID=338 .
286 “President Gül congratulates Egyptian interim president on national day”, July 2013,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-gul-congratulates-egyptian-interim-president-on-
national-day.aspx?pageID=517&nID=51365&NewsCatID=338 .
98
judge the situation like that it is tantamount to ignoring the Egyptian people"287. The
Turkish government called for the release of Morsi who has been held
incommunicado at an undisclosed location and continued to harshly criticise the
interim period rulers in Egypt with high sympathy to the Muslim Brothers.
In August 2013 and upon the bloody crackdown on the supporters of ex-President
Mohamed Morsi in Rabiaa square, Prime Minister Erdoğan has asked the UNSC to
meet for discussing the events in Egypt and both countries recalled their
ambassadors. Turkey's ambassador returned to Cairo weeks later, but Egypt
declined to return its envoy to Ankara, saying it would reconsider only when
Turkey stops meddling in Egyptian affairs288. On 23 November 2013 Egypt decided
to downgrade its diplomatic ties with Turkey to the level of charge d’ affairs,
expelling the Turkish ambassador in Cairo and declaring him persona non grata289
after Turkish Prime Minister comments on Morsi which he said “I applaud Morsi’s
conduct at the court. I respect him, but I have no respect for those who put him on
trial”290, later Turkey declared the Egyptian envoy as a persona non grata in
accordance with the principle of reciprocity.
The AKP ruling party has securitized the downfall of Muslim Brothers in Egypt as a
kind of threat on their staying in power in Turkey. Istanbul has witnessed large
protests in Istanbul in May 2013 upon governments plan to restructure the famous
287 “Erdogan Says Morsi is my President in Egypt”, July 2013,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/76462/Egypt/0/Turkeys-Erdogan-says-Morsi-my-
president-in-Egypt.aspx .
288 “Expelled envoy arrives home as Egyptian ambassador packs for Cairo”, Todays Zaman,
November 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_expelled-envoy-arrives-home-as-
egyptian-ambassador-packs-for-cairo_332636.html .
289 “Egypt asks Turkey’s ambassador to leave”, Aljazeera, November 2013,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/egypt-asks-turkey-ambassador-leave-
2013112310229476406.html .
290 “Egypt downgrades Diplomatic Relations with Turkey”, November 2013,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/egypt-downgrades-diplomatic-relations-with-turkey-expels-
ambassador.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58413&NewsCatID=359 .
99
Taksim square, which widely spread to whole Turkey known by Gezi park
protest291. Ahmet Davutoğlu who later became a Prime Minister in August 2014
said that “That they did not succeed in doing it in Turkey; they went to make it in
Egypt and the brought General al-Sisi to power”292. Moreover, different articles and
op-ed pieces written in newspapers close to the AKP claimed that the GCC
countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and UAE has financed the protests against the
Turkish government by trying to create a youth movement similar to Tamaroud
movement that led the protests against Morsi in Egypt293.
After the deterioration in the diplomatic relations, Turkey unofficially has provided
shelter for different leaders and youth belonging to the Egyptian Muslim Brothers
after being cracked down by the government and after declaring Muslim
Brotherhood organization as a Terrorist organization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE
and Bahrain. Different meetings were held in Istanbul by the Brotherhood and they
opened TV Channels broadcasting in Arabic from Istanbul like al-Sharq TV
Channel and Rabiaa TV Channel where they condemn the actions and policies of
the interim period in Egypt.
The Turkish momentum that started with the rise of Muslim Brothers in Egypt
started to witness a shutdown. Turkey lost its diplomatic relations with Egypt and
risked its warm relations with Riyadh who opposed countries did not recognize the
political change happened in Egypt on 3 July 2013, to be left without good political
relations with Syria, Iran, Israel (upon Mavi Marmara incident in 2010), Egypt and
291 Akyol, Mustafa. “How Morsi Matters in Turkish Politics”, Al-Monitor, May 2013,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2015/05/turkey-egypt-mohammed-morsi-sentence-
erdogan.html .
292 “Türkiye'de olmayınca Mısır'da darbe yaptılar”, Sabah Newspaper, May 2015,
http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/05/17/turkiyede-olmayinca-misirda-darbe-yaptilar .
293 Selvi, Abdul Kadir. “Morsi in Egypt, Erdogan in Turkey”, Yenisafak Newspaper,
http://english.yenisafak.com/columns/abdulkadirselvi/morsi-in-egypt-erdogan-in-turkey-2010866 .
100
Saudi Arabia in what the head of foreign policy advisors of the Prime Minister
Erdoğan, Ibrahim Kalin named: the “precious loneliness”294.
3.3 The Regional Security Complex of the Syrian Uprising
3.3.1 The Survival of Assad’s Government:
The reasons of the popular uprising against Assad regime in Syria are similar to
other uprisings in the Arab world; rural poor citizens suffering from government
neglect, small businessmen crushed by corrupt and crony capitalists close to the
center of power and high rates of unemployment, bad governance, unfair
distribution of the country’s resources and besides corruption, arbitrary arrest and
police brutality295. However, the course of the events in Syria took a different path
unlike Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab countries.
Syria comprises different religious sects (Sunni, Alawite, Christians, Jews and
Druze) and ethnic groups (Arabs, Kurds, and Syriac). The ruling regime in Syria
enjoys the support of different minorities and from some Sunnis who started to fear
about what is next after his fall. The minorities in Syria like Kurds, Druze,
Christians and Jews feel that Assad (or the Alawite group) represents a strong
secular tradition that could protect them from any fundamentalist Sunni views that
might oppress them. Yet Sunnis under Assad were not deprived of power sharing,
the position of premiership and most of major ministries were usually in Sunni
hands with except to the sensitive security ministries that were controlled by Alawis
(Mustafa Talas the minister of defence of Hafez Assad and his son Bashar at the
beginning was a Sunni), in addition to the merchant class which is largely Sunni
294 “Başbakan'ın başdanışmanı 'değerli yalnızlık'ı açıkladı: Yalnız değiliz ama”, August 2013,
http://t24.com.tr/haber/basbakanin-basdanismani-degerli-yalnizliki-acikladi-yalniz-degiliz-
ama,237875 .
295 Seale, Patrick. “Averting Civil War in Syria”, November 2011,
http://www.agenceglobal.com/index.php?show=article&Tid=2688 .
101
and benefited largely from their close relationship with the regime. Those Sunnis
started to fear from the extremist forces that took part in the fight against Assad and
their possible replace of the regime graved high concerns about the character of any
successor to Assad296.
Another dimension of the Regime’s policy towards the ethnic makeup of diverse
religious minorities is the orientation of Syrian Arab nationalism adopted by the
regime. In order for an Alawite community (13 percent of the population) to be able
to rule over Sunnis (73 percent of the population), Christians (10 percent of the
population), Druze (3 percent of the population) beside the ethnic divisions Kurds
(7 percent of the population), Assyrian or Syriac (2 percent of the population) under
the rule of Arabs (90 percent), the regime follows modern Arab nationalism through
adopting an Arab nationalist rhetoric more than any other community and more
Sunni than the Sunnis. Assad redefined the Alawites as ordinary like mainstream
Muslims, they were brought under the same Sharia law rules as Sunnis and they
were not allowed their own religious courts (like other Shiites)297. On the other side,
the Syrian war started to take the sectarian dimension. For long time, the problems
of religious segregations in towns were not tackled by the regime and it felt better
able to control religious groups and the interactions between them298. Throughout
the war in Syria, the religious differences which were long hidden by the regime
started to appear during the clashes in a way that contributed to boosting the
sectarian dimension of the conflict, and Assad regime has utilized this successfully
for its own survival299.
296 Fuller, Graham. Op.Cit, P. 311.
297 Ibid, P.308.
298 Whitaker, Brien. “How the Assad Regime’s Policies Nurtured Sectarianism in Syria”, Muftah,
December 2014, http://muftah.org/assad-regimes-policies-nurtured-sectarianism-
syria/#.VcSD8_mqqko .
299 Diehl, Jackson. “Lines in the Sand: Assad Plays the Sectarian Card”, World Affairs Journal,
May/June 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/lines-sand-assad-plays-sectarian-card .
102
Another important aspect of the regional dimension of Assad’s regime policy is the
utilization of Arab Nationalist rhetoric in the regional behaviour of Damascus for
the sake of gaining more popularity in the Arab public opinion, which helped the
regime to be high on the US administration’s target list for overthrow over years300.
Assad behaved as Sunni more than other Sunni countries. He extended financial and
military support to Hamas movement in Palestine and supported the Sunni
insurgency against the US occupation in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. He
manipulated the Arab Nationalist rhetoric in facilitating the Iranian support to Shi’a
Hizballah in Lebanon who stands against 14 March alliance supported by the USA
and France. Upon the uprising and the squander of his Arab nationalist credentials
as a result of his bloody reprisals against the civilians, Assad utilized this rhetoric to
gain Arab public support against Turkey: by charging Turkey of seeking regional
expansionist ambitions using the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally he successfully used
that in the awake of Egypt’s 30 June uprising which helped him in gaining
sympathy of the groups who oppose Turkey’s role in Egypt301.
Assad regime has been adopting the alignment policy with others against its
opponents in order to achieve maximum diplomatic flexibility for the sake of
survival between the biggest regional powers that Syria is located in between like
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and Egypt. As a country that does not have big
population (24 million), lacks huge oil reserves, without a modernized Army and
not dependable on the western countries for aid or protection, the regime tried to
maximise the different cards it owns by maintaining its influence in the other
neighbouring countries which it calls the ‘Greater Syria’ and playing on different
balances for powers between different actors in order to avoid a total submission302.
300 Fuller, Graham. Op.Cit. P. 307.
301 “Syrian FM: Brotherhood are cause of all problems in the region”, http://www.mubasher-
misr.net/67472.htm/ and see also: “Assad: we ask Egypt to practice its historical role in the region”,
http://www.albawabhnews.com/1464814 .
302 Hinnebusch, Raymond. “Defying the Hegemon: Syria and the Iraq War”, Paper given at the
conference of European Consortium on Political Research Conference, September 2005,
103
For example, Syria avoided being invaded by the Bush administration in 2000s by
accepting to halt down funding Sunni insurgency against the US occupation in Iraq.
Syria has played on balances of power between the USA and the EU which was in
sharp distinction to US isolation policy of Syria; Damascus was enthusiastic about
opening a channel with the EU through Turkey, welcomed taking economic
liberalizations and developed new economic and legal institutions in conformity
with the EU.
During the uprising Assad regime did not abandon this strategy, it utilized the
different cards it maximized previously well in a way to preserve its stay in power
in Damascus and not to fully submit to its regional and global opponents. Assad
succeeded in bringing Iran and Hizballah to his war in Syria against his opponents
who are being supported by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the western countries.
Despite the severe loses he got in his military power and the heavy burdens he
represents on Iran financially and militarily, Assad persuaded his regional
supporters that this is not his war alone and it is part of their war with Saudi Arabia.
Later on Hizballah took an offensive action against Turkey by kidnapping two
Turkish pilots in Lebanon in 2012. Assad also sought reviving the old channels with
the Syrian Kurds and the Turkish PKK (which was shut down by his father Hafez
Assad) not to totally submit to Turkey303. In order to avoid a large scale military
operation by the US after claims of using chemical weapons in Syria, Assad
accepted to give up his arsenal of chemical weapons to the international community
to avoid a US strike that would threaten his survival304. Finally, as the war escalated
more and different Jihadists started to rush to Syria to take part in the war, Assad
https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/school-of-international-
relations/mecacs/workingpapers/defying_the_hegemon.pdf .
303 Ginsburg, Mitch. “Assad lets Kurdish PKK rebels operate against Turkey from inside Syria”,
Times of Israel, June 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/assad-lets-kurdish-pkk-rebels-operate-
against-turkey-from-inside-syria/ .
304 “Obama to halt attack if Syria destroys chemical weapons”, Financial Times, September 2013,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8cd56022-1936-11e3-83b9-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ktOmhEjj .
104
utilized the west’s concern from the radical Islam and different intelligence
communication channels were opened between his regime and western intelligence
services on this topic305.
3.3.2 Contrasts and Divisions within the Political and Military
Opposition:
On the side of the anti-Assad political opposition groups, the contrasts of the
political agendas, strategies, visions and their backgrounds contributed to
weakening the stand of the opposition on the international level and domestically in
front of Assad’s regime306. the varied and wide political support received was not
unified owing to the different political goals and determinants of the regional
powers and global powers supporting them against Assad (Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Egypt, France and the USA), in a way to achieve success and
they remained divided while the supporters of Assad (Russia, China, Iran and
Hizballah) has channelled their support to one unified destination: the Assad
regime.
Despite the establishment of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and
Opposition Forces (known as Syrian Opposition Coalition) in November 2012 as a
wider form to include all Syrian opposition groups, the conflicts preceded the
establishment of the Syrian opposition coalition continued to exist later on. The
main contrast fall between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who dominated the
Syrian National Council (main figures were: Ghassan Hitho and Mustafa al-
Sabbagh who are known for their close ties to Turkey and Qatar) and the other
components of the Syrian opposition coalition mainly those who were living abroad
and opposing Assad regime but not affiliated to the Brotherhood like Moaz al-
305 “Syrian regime from the conspiracy theory to fighting terrorism”, Al-Wake’ Al-Arabia
(Aljazeera TV Program), August 2014, http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/arab-present-
situation/2014/8/26/ .
306 Macfarquhar, Neil. “After a year, Deep Divisions Hobble Syria’s Opposition”, The New York
Times, February 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-is-
hobbled-by-deep-divisions.html?_r=0
105
Khatib (the first chairman of the Syrian Opposition Coalition) and Ahmad al-Jurba
(the second chairman of the coalition) who are affiliated to Saudi Arabia and the
UAE307. Moaz al-Khatib resigned from his post as he proposed making a
transitional government between opposition members and members from Assad
regime in order to prevent any chaos during the transitional period but the
Brotherhood refused that offer and asked for a provisional government replacing the
current government and excluding all Baath regime members308. When Ahmed al-
Jurba declared in the UN he would participate in an international conference in
Geneva aimed at finding a political solution the conflict in Syria, opposition voices
rise highly against him inside the coalition and mainly from the Muslim
Brotherhood voices309. Besides this main contrast, other contrasts started to appear
between the other components like the National Coordination Committee for
Democratic Change, mainly supported by Egypt, under the chairman of Hassan
Abdul Azim and Haitham Manna who accused the Syrian opposition coalition of
being beholden to Turkey and Gulf Arab states that provide shelter, financial
support and weapons to rebel groups and refusing the Muslim Brotherhood's
domination over the opposition. While The Kurdish Supreme Committee formed in
July 2012 as an alliance of 13 Kurdish parties including the Democratic Union
Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) stands for autonomous
regional governance for the Kurds in Syria310.
The Syrian uprising has suffered the lack of coordination in the military efforts
against Assad regime, although the Syrian opposition coalition was supposed to act
307 Hassan, Hassan. “How The Muslim Brother’s Hijacked Syria’s Revolution”, Foreign Policy,
March 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/13/how-the-muslim-Brotherhood-hijacked-syrias-
revolution/ .
308 “Guide to Syrian Opposition”, BBC News, October 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-15798218 .
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
106
as a main channel for financing the fighting groups and it could not have leverage
on the them. Instead of that, these groups sought securing finance and support
directly from national governments, wealthy individuals, non-governmental
organizations and the financial channels of global terrorism. The Syrian Military
Council (the highest military commandership of the opposition fighting groups) has
no structural hierarchy and its legitimacy is bottom-up voluntarily given by the
commanders that comprise it and with little coercive power to control its subunits.
The council includes representatives from the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian
Liberation Front, the Syrian Islamic Front, independent brigades, regional military
councils, and defectors from the Syrian army. The opposition fighting groups and
their subunits have a range of tactics, constituencies, and visions of what a post-
Assad Syria should look like despite that the unifying goal is ousting Assad 311.
In addition to that, the different political agendas of the regional supporters of the
opposition played a role in the dispersal of aids and military support. For example,
the USA trained rebel groups not affiliated to the Syrian Military Council on the
Jordanian borders with Syria and supplied them with weapons. Qatar has provided
direct financial and military aids to many independent groups like Ahfad al-Rasoul
brigade which has 15000 fighters on the ground and not affiliated to the Syrian
Military council. Saudi Arabia has provided aids to the subunits of the Syrian
Liberation Front (an alliance of 20 brigades and battalions across Syria with 37000
fighters) directly and not through the council as they are very critical on the military
council. Also wealthy individuals from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait supported
financially the Syrian Islamic Front (15000 fighters of Syrian Nationalist with
Salafi background but they don’t seek Islamic caliphate or affiliated to al-Qaeda)312.
Turkey, owing to its long borders with Syria and governments intention to facilitate
the flow of weapons to all fighters against Assad, opened channels with all
311 Sofer, Ken. and Shafroth, Juliana. “The Structure and Organization of the Syrian Opposition”,
The American Progress, May 2013,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/05/14/63221/the-structure-and-
organization-of-the-syrian-opposition/ .
312 Ibid.
107
opposition fighters and supported them with different degrees; directly to the Free
Syrian Army whose commandership is in Gaziantep or indirectly to other fighting
groups313.
3.3.3 The Saudi Policy towards the Syrian Uprising:
Saudi Arabia prioritized diplomacy for the sake of preserving regional stability and
preventing any spill over of chaos that originally came out of the Egyptian uprising
towards its ally regimes and GCC countries. However, the situation was escalating
on the ground in Syria; Saudi Arabia dumbed this passive policy and condemned
Assad’s actions in the holy month of Ramadan 2011314. Saudi government
requested its ambassador in Damascus for consultations in August 2011 and Saudi
King Abdullah asked the Syrian government to stop its killing machine against its
people by “Syria’s future stands between two choices: wisdom and Chaos, and
Saudi Arabia will stand its historical responsibilities towards its siblings”315. Also
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal met a delegation from the SNC in January
2012 and a representative from the council declared that Saudi Arabia and GCC
will recognize the council as a representative of the Syrian people316.
Saudi Arabia took place in the Friends of Syria group initiative called by France in
order to convene on the Syrian topic and it was chosen in the “Mini Friends of
Syria” group along with Egypt, Qatar, UAE, Jordan, Turkey, UK, the USA, France,
313 “Turkey Sets up Secret Base to Bring Aid to Syria Rebels”, Haaretz, July 2012,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/turkey-sets-up-secret-base-to-bring-aid-to-syria-rebels-
sources-say-1.454107 .
314 Ibid.
315 Historical Speech by King Abdullah”, Al-Arabiya TV, August 2011,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/08/161279.html .
316 “Saudi to recognize, fund SNC; Russia rejects Syria resolution”, January 2011, http://english.al-
akhbar.com/content/saudi-recognize-fund-snc-russia-rejects-syria-resolution
108
Germany and Italy317. It also participated in the Geneva conference on Syria held on
June 30th 2012 where the Syrian opposition and the Syrian government convened318.
Syria with a 73% of Sunni population being in a state of war with its Alawite
regime represents an important case for Saudi Arabia which claims its regional
leadership in the Sunni world. Saudi government pledged donations for the Syrian
refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan319, and sent food aids, medicines, relief
materials, fasting programs, winter aid supplies, heating fuel and winter clothes to
displaced refugees320. Riyadh asked the international community to arm the
opposition, and supported different Islamist Salafi fighting groups in Syria
financially and militarily like groups under the Syrian Liberation Front (moderate
Islamists) and the Syrian Islamic Front (Salafist but neither affiliated to al-Qaeda
nor seek Islamic caliphate).
The uprising against Assad also represents an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to
regain back the regional balances of power that it lost upon the US invasion of Iraq
in 2003 to Iran and the negative developments in Lebanon upon the assassination of
Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005321. Moreover any political change in Syria would enable
Riyadh to bring Syria back into its Arab, and Sunni sphere of its influence after long
317 “France, partners planning Syria crisis group: Sarkozy”, February 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/04/us-syria-france-idUSTRE8130QV20120204 .
318 “What is the Geneva II conference on Syria?”, January 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-24628442 .
319 “Saudi Aids for Syrians”, November 2012, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/saudi-aid-
syrians-arrives-mafraq, see also Saudi aids to Syrians in Turkey:
https://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news01211504.aspx and
https://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news01221501.aspx .
320 “Saudi Arabia sends tons of aid to Syrian refugees”, March 2013,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/03/31/Saudi-Arabia-sends-tons-of-aids-to-
Syrian-refugees-.html
321 Gause III, F. Gregory. “Is Saudi Arabia really counter-revolutionary?”, Foreign Policy, August
2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/09/is-saudi-arabia-really-counter-revolutionary/ .
109
time being Iran’s main gate to the Arab world. Finally, the space that would be left
by the downfall of the Assad regime could remove the cover over Hizballah in
Lebanon who uses Syrian territories in getting financial and military support from
Iran and 14 March alliance would practice more pressure for dismantling the
weapons of Hizballah.
Saudi Arabia managed to practice influence over the Syrian opposition groups
rather than the Muslim Brothers who are supported by Turkey and Qatar. Saudi
Arabia pressed on enlarging the Syrian opposition to be under full control of the
Muslim Brothers and the first two chairmen of the enlarged Syrian Opposition
Coalition, Sheikh Moaz Al-Khatib and Sheikh Ahmed Al-Jurba (who hold close ties
to King Abdullah), were widely supported by Riyadh inside the coalition against the
Muslim Brothers figures.
3.3.4 The Turkish Policy towards the Syrian Uprising:
Upon the break out of the Syrian uprising, Turkey sought about giving a chance for
diplomacy and talks in order to persuade Assad to take steps for making reforms.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid a visit to Damascus in August
2011 and sent a letter from Prime Minister Erdoğan to Assad asking him to take
urgent steps towards reform322. Ankara risked the deterioration of the friendly
Turkish-Syrian relations that developed under the AKP government and settled
down the main problems that formed the Syrian-Turkish security complex like the
Kurdish issue, and the water issue. However the uprising against Assad was
expanding into many parts in Syria, clashes became intensive between the
opposition and the regime forces and the Syrian government could not take steps
that fulfil the opposition demands.
Turkey assumed that the regime in Syria would be toppled in a short time either by
the people of Syria (like in Tunisia and Egypt) or through external intervention (like
322 “Davutoğlu to deliver harsh message to Damascus”, Today’s Zaman, August 2011,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_davutoglu-to-deliver-harsh-message-to-
damascus_253150.html .
110
in Libya), and thus wanted to take a clear, strong stance from the beginning to be
able to play an active role in the process later as well323. On November 2011, Prime
Minister Erdoğan said that "Turkey had lost confidence in the leadership of Bashar
al-Assad" and that "the Syrian leader will pay the price sooner or later"324. The
Syrian opposition supported by Turkey organized itself under the Syrian National
Coalition (SNC) (highly influenced by the Muslim Brothers) and opened its first
office in Istanbul in December 2011325. Turkey and Qatar backed the Muslim
Brotherhood figures in the larger Syrian Opposition Coalition through supporting
Ghassan Hitho and Mustafa al-Sabbagh against the election of Ahmed Al-Jurba for
the presidency of the opposition coalition. Turkey also hosted and supported the
officers detached from the Syrian army under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army
which based its commandership in Gaziantep in southern Turkey326. Later Turkey
extended its support to the Syrian Military Council (the umbrella of the military
opposition which is based in Turkey) and other militant opposition groups in
coordination with Qatar like Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade, Fajr al-Islam Battalion and the
Al-Haqq Brigade.
Turkey took part in the “Group of Syria Friends” and hosted the second meeting of
the group in April 2012 where the Saudi Foreign Minister was present and they
sharply criticized the violations of human rights by Assad regime, called for
suspension of diplomatic ties with Assad regime and decided to set up a Sanctions
323 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey After The Arab Uprisings: Difficulties of Hanging on in
There”, Op.Cit.
324 “Turkish PM: Lost Confidence in Syrian Leadership “, November 2011,
http://www.voanews.com/content/diplomatic-tensions-escalate-as-turkey-meets-with-syrian-
opposition-133921103/148222.html .
325 “SNC opens its first Office in Istanbul”, Hurriyet Daily News, December 2011,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/snc-opens-its-first--office-in-
istanbul.aspx?pageID=238&nID=9214&NewsCatID=338 .
326 Stack, Liam. “In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters”, The New York Times,
October 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/world/europe/turkey-is-sheltering-
antigovernment-syrian-militia.html .
111
Working Group, in order to achieve greater effectiveness in order to enforce the
restrictive measures put in force by states or international organizations against
Assad327. Turkey strongly opposed the reported usage of chemical weapons by
Assad regime in April, March and August 2013, condemned this action and asked
the US to take action in Syria as Prime Minister Erdoğan said “We want the United
States to assume more responsibilities and take further steps”328. On the refugee
issue, Turkey adopted an open door policy for the refugees whose numbers are
estimated by 2 million, and as reported it spent up to USD 5 billion until 2014, built
20 camps, and provided them hospital accesses and identifications for residence in
Turkey329.
The Turkish involvement in the Syrian crisis carried wide challenges to the Turkish
government since Assad stayed in power and did not fall quickly as it was expected
and Assad started to represent a serious threat on Turkey’s national security through
the PKK issue which remains as a main security problem in the Turkish-Syrian
security complex330. The Syrian Kurdish groups organized themselves and declared
a semi-autonomous region in Northern Syria where the PKK became the most
prominent force among the Syrian Kurds. Assad’s government allowed the opening
of PKK camps in Hasakah, did not enter in a clash with them and let them to control
cities like Derik, Afrin, Kobani and Kamışlı on Turkish borders331, in a way that
327 “Chairman’s Conclusions Second Conference Of The Group Of Friends Of The Syrian People, 1
April 2012, Istanbul”, MFA, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chairman_s-conclusions-second-conference-of-
the-group-of-friends-of-the-syrian-people_-1-april-2012_-istanbul.en.mfa .
328 Exclusive: Turkish PM Erdogan: Syria has crossed red line, used chemical weapons", World
NBS News, May 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/09/18148044-exclusive-
turkish-pm-erdogan-syria-has-crossed-red-line-used-chemical-weapons?lite .
329 “Başbakan Yardımcısı Kurtulmuş: Mültecilere 5 milyar dolar harcandı”, Radikal, January 2015,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/basbakan_yardimcisi_kurtulmus_multecilere_5_milyar_dolar_harca
ndi-1274507 .
330 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey After The Arab Uprisings: Difficulties of Hanging on in
There”, Op.Cit.
112
remarked a rise of an inner ‘Kurdish Spring’ within the Arab Sping332. Turkey
launched a peace process with the Kurds in March 2013 in order to solve its
Kurdish problem, however the process failed and the clashes were renewed again in
July 2015333.
Another challenge for the Turkish government is the waves of refuges coming from
the war in Syria. Turkey hosted around 2.5 million Syrian refugees with only 250
thousands of the refugees in the camps in southern provinces while the others are
spreading all over the Turkish cities causing heavy disturbance on the social and
political balances in some provinces, raising crime rates in some areas and making
Turkish inhabitants in southern provinces fearing any possible terrorist attacks334.
Turkey risked being involved in an open war with Assad regime in a way that
exposes Turkey’s domestic stability and security into danger owing to its long
borders with Syria (910 KM) and the support it provides to the Syrian opposition.
On June 2012, a Turkish F-4 Phantom II military jet shot down near the Turkish-
Syria borders335, On October 2012 an artillery field shell fired from Syria fall in the
border town Akçakale in Şanlıurfa province succeeded by conducting saturation
331 “Collaboration between Assad regime and the PKK terrorist organization”, Todays Zaman,
December 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/todays-think-tanks_collaboration-between-assad-
regime-and-the-pkk-terrorist-organization_300228.html .
332 Bacik, Gokhan, “Turkey and the new Middle East”, European Policy Center Commentary, 27
July 2012, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_2850_turkey_and_the_new_middle_east.pdf .
333 “PKK Group Says Turkish Cease Fire Over”, July 2015,
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/120720151 .
334 “Effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey”, Report prepared by ORSAM and TESEV, January
2015, http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/09012015103629.pdf .
335 “Ankara'ya göre 'Pilotlar öldürüldü' iddiası: El Yalan!”, Radikal, October 2012,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/dunya/ankaraya_gore_pilotlar_olduruldu_iddiasi_el_yalan-1102333 .
113
shelling by the Turkish armed forces on Syrian military posts336. In addition to the
car bombing incident that took place in Hatay province in May 2013 which left 52
Turkish citizens death casualties and the attackers arrested were linked to Syrian
intelligence337.Turkey’s being in a semi-state of war with Syria appeared clearly
when Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan said in a popular gathering in March 2014
during celebrating his party’s electoral victory in the local elections: “We are in a
state of war with Syria”338.
Finally Ankara has suffered economically from the Syrian crisis as many trade
routes to Iraq and the Gulf were closed because of the war and harmed badly the
Turkish economy339.
3.4 Implications of RSCs in the Egyptian and Syrian Uprisings on Turkish
Saudi Relations:
3.4.1. Changes in Regional Role Perceptions of Turkey and Saudi
Arabia:
The course of events during the Arab uprisings caused a change in the Saudi
perception of the Turkish regional role and Turkey’s regional agenda. The created
image of Turkey in the Saudi media in the late 2000s as a probable ally of the
kingdom against Iran and a country that seeks achieving regional stability shifted
after the political change in Egypt in 2013. The Saudi media changed its coverage
on Turkey by focusing on the anti-AKP ruling government Gezi protests in May
336 “Turkey-Syria border tension - Thursday 4 October 2012”, The Guardians, October 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/04/turkey-syria-threat-security-live .
337 “Reyhanlı saldırısı Esad'ın işi!”, Takvim, March 2015,
http://www.takvim.com.tr/dunya/2015/05/05/reyhanli-saldirisi-esadin-isi .
338 “Erdogan: Suryie bizimle savaş halinde”, Hurriyet, March 2015,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26120654.asp .
339 Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Turkey After The Arab Uprisings: Difficulties of Hanging on in
There”, Op.Cit.
114
2013, raising questions about the democratic credentials of the Turkish Islamists340,
and after the popular uprising against Morsi of Egypt, the Saudi media highlighted
the Turkish reactions against Egypt and described it as interference in domestic
affairs of Arab countries. As mentioned by a Saudi Journalist: “we did not know
what Turkey is doing, Turkey was interfering in the Egyptian internal affairs and it
worked on extending its regional influence. Saudi Arabia felt suspicious about
Turkey’s support to Muslim Brothers in general and its role in Egypt in
particular”341. Moreover, wide media outlets used words like ‘Ottomanist regional
ambitions’342, ‘Turkish regional hegemon’, practicing ‘Pasha’ism and Khedive’ism
on Egypt’343 while covering the Turkish reaction towards Egypt after July 2013.
On the other side, the image created on Saudi Arabia in Turkey as a leading Muslim
country was deformed, mainly by the media outlets close to the ruling AKP
government. Different Op-ed writers started to talk about a Saudi-Israeli plan to
topple down the Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi; that Israel planned the coup
and Saudi Arabia financed it344. Other media outlets criticized Saudi king Abdullah
in person for his open support to Egypt and described his policies incompatible with
Islam345. Besides the calls from Turkish officials for the secretary general of the
OIC Ekmelledin Ihsanoglu to resign from his post as the organization did not
340 Al-Rasheed, Abdel Rahman. “Which Erdogan we see”, Al-Sharq Al-Awsaat, June 2013,
http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=12608&article=731220#.VcherPmqqko .
341 Interview with Khaled Tashkandi, Editor in Chief of Okaz Newspaper.
342 Widely used concept by Arabic News channels like Al-Arabiya TV.
343 Noureddin, Mohamed. “The Turkish Role towards the Arab Environment”, Center for Arab
Union Studies, Arab papers, 14, Political affairs, 5, January 2012.
344 Karagul, Ibrahim. “Darbecileri paraya boğan şer ittifakı", Yeni Safak, July 2013,
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ibrahimkaragul/darbecileri-paraya-bogan-ser-ittifaki-38533 .
345 Sirma, Ihsan. “Suudi Arabistan Kralı''na açık mektup”, Yeni Safak, August 2013,
http://www.yenisafak.com/hayat/suudi-arabistan-kralina-acik-mektup-556059
115
criticise the ouster of President Morsi in Egypt346. Moreover, other media outlets in
Turkey started to approach the Saudi stand on Syria in a different way under the
effect of the Egyptian crisis. They charged Saudi Arabia with seeking mere control
over the Syrian opposition coalition by enlarging the opposition coalition in order to
minimize the role of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Also many Op-eds and TV
commenters charged Saudi Arabia and UAE with financing anti-Islamists protests
and claimed a Saudi effort to weaken the El-Nahda movement in Tunisia and its
leader Rached Gannoushi through supporting leftists, communists and Salafists
financially347. Finally, some media figures in Turkey claimed a relationship between
what happened in Egypt after 3 July 2013 and Gezi protests in Turkey in May 2013.
In November 2014, the head of the Foreign Relations committee of the AKP, Yasin
Aktay, charged the Gulf countries of supporting the Gezi protests in Turkey as they
supported the anti-Morsi protests and that they tried to give a hand to anti-Muslim
Brotherhood opposition in Tunisia and Yemen348.
3.4.2. Turkish-Saudi Political Relations:
The high level visits between Turkey and Saudi Arabia continued to take place
upon the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. The Syrian issue and the developments in
Egypt played a role in the rise and fall of the political ties between the two
countries. The outbreak of the Egyptian uprising had left a negative impact on the
political ties between the two countries; as mentioned by a Saudi ex-diplomat:
“Saudi Arabia did not assign a new ambassador to Turkey for seven months, after
the ex-Saudi ambassador Mohamed al-Husseini ended his mission following the
346 “Bekir Bozdağ ve Hüseyin Çelik'ten istifa çağrısı”, Rota Haber, August 2013,
http://www.rotahaber.com/gundem/bekir-bozdag-ve-huseyin-celikten-istifa-cagrisi-h392085.html
347 “Hakan Albayrak: Suud'un solcuları”, Time Turkey, October 2013,
http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2013/10/12/hakan-albayrak-suud-un-solculari.html
348 “AK Parti: Gezi'yi Körfez ülkeleri destekledi”, Star Gazette, November 2014,
http://haber.star.com.tr/politika/ak-parti-geziyi-korfez-ulkeleri-destekledi/haber-968351 .
116
Egyptian uprising in January 201”349. However the Syrian uprising prevented the
political relations from a total collapse. President Abdullah Gül paid a visit to Saudi
Arabia in August 2011350 and Prime Minister Erdoğan paid a visit to discuss the
Syrian issue with King Abdullah in April 2012 before holding Geneva conference
in June 2012. Also Crown Prince Salman bin Abdel Aziz (who later became the
king in 2015) paid a visit to Ankara on May 2013 where he discussed the Syrian
issue and signed an agreement with Turkey for cooperation on training military
personnel351. On the level of Foreign Ministers, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud
Al-Faisal led the delegation of the GCC Foreign Ministers in Istanbul for attending
the fourth annual ministerial meeting between Turkey and GCC on January 28th
2012352. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolgu also paid a visit to Saudi
Arabia on January 2013 again for discussing the Syrian issue.
The developments in Egypt after 3 July 2013 has left a heavy impact on the political
ties between the two countries and threatened its total collapse. Prime Minister
Erdoğan criticised harshly the Saudi stand on Egypt in July 2013 by saying “How
could a country claiming to uphold Islam and Sharia support the overthrow of an
elected Islamist president who came to power after fair elections?”353 While Saudi
Arabia did not comment on Turkey’s stand, it did not invite the Foreign Minister of
Turkey to the ministerial meeting of the mini Friends of Syria group held in Jeddah
349 Interview with ex-Saudi diplomat Dr. Abdullah Al-Shammari.
350 “Regional Developments on the Turkish-Saudi summit”, Okaz Newspaper,
http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20110815/Con20110815439839.htm. (Arabic Resource)
351 “Syria top priority as Saudi crown prince visits Turkey”, Al-Arabiya, May 2013,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/20/Syria-top-priority-as-Saudi-crown-
prince-visits-Turkey.html
352 “Historical visit by the crown prince to Turkey”, Al-Youm, May 2015,
http://www.alyaum.com/article/3082717 .
353 Al-Rasheed, Madawi. “Saudi Arabia and Turkey Falter Over Egypt”, Al-Monitor, August 2013,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2013/08/saudi-arabia-turkey-strained-
relations.html#ixzz3iK6KrWsg
117
in August 2014354. Saudi Arabia along with Egypt opposed the Turkish campaign
for gaining a non-permanent membership in the UNSC (2015-2016) and pressed on
different African countries not to vote for Turkey which led to the victory of Spain
with 132 votes and Turkey received only 60 votes. It was reported also that Saudi
Arabia and Egypt pressed to shut down the Arab League representativeness in
Turkey and to suspend the Arab-Turkish cooperation forum organized by the Arab
league but no steps taken in this regard355. Another incident was that Saudi Arabia
along with Egypt and UAE refused invitations sent by the African Union to Turkey
and Qatar in the crisis group meeting held on Libya in January 2015 and declared
their intention not to participate in the meeting if Turkey attended, which led to the
withdrawal of the invitations of Qatar and Turkey356.
3.4.3. Turkish-Saudi Economic Relations:
The economic ties between Turkey and Saudi Arabia did not witness a crack despite
of the tension in political ties upon their different stances on Egypt. According to
figure 4 and 5, the trade volume between the two countries increased from USD 6.2
billion in 2011 to USD 7.3 billion in 2013 and the Turkish exports increased from
USD 2.76 billion into USD 3.1 billion.
2011 2012 2013
6.2 8.0 7.3
Figure 4 – TUIK: Trade Volume between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in USD Billion
354 “Saudi Arabia to host Friends of Syria ministerial meeting”, Middle East Monitor, August 2014,
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/13687-saudi-arabia-to-host-friends-of-syria-
ministerial-meeting .
355 “Egypt and Saudi Arabia, deprives Turkey from being elected in the Security Council”, October
2013, http://www.youm7.com/story/2014/10/17/ .
356 “Egyptian FM: our stand from the attendance of Turkey and Qatar to Libya’s meeting was a
must”, Al-Shorouk, January 2015,
http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=29012015&id=e28ae991-cca4-4045-ad8a-
a836c5fb7efe .
118
2011 2012 2013
2,763,475 3,676,611 3,191,481
Figure 5 - TurkStat: Turkish Exports to Saudi Arabia in USD Thousand
However as mentioned by a Saudi academician: “the Saudi businessmen can guess
the nature of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and other countries in order to
have new investments in Turkey”357. Also the vice chairman of the Jeddah chamber
of commerce Ziad al-Bassam said that upon the crisis we decided to wait and study
carefully any plans for having new investments in Turkey but the ongoing Saudi
investments were kept without suspension358.
3.4.4 Turkish-Saudi Military Relations:
In 2011, Saudi Arabia has signed a deal with ASELSAN to buy SK2-4700
telecommunication systems and it was delivered in 2013. Turkey offered a proposal
to the Saudi National Guard under the commandership of Prince Metab ibn
Abdullah ibn Abdel-Aziz during his visit to Turkey in 13 June 2013 for selling the
Turkish ATAK Helicopters T-129 (an edited version of the Italian helicopters A-
129) to Saudi Arabia but no reports on finalizing such deal359. In 2013, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia reached a deal of selling unmanned aerial vehicles developed by
Turkish Aerospace Industries (ANKA) to Saudi Arabia360.
Saudi Arabia took part in the Turkish military exercises “The Anatolian Eagle”
hosted by the Turkish Air Forces and held in Konya, Turkey in June 2011, June
357 Interview with Dr. Khaled Baturfi in Jeddah, May 2015.
358 Interview with Ziad al-Bassam, Jeddah chamber of commerce, May 2015.
359 “Prince Metab Bin Abdullah Visit Turkey”, http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2013/06/14/867179 , June
2013.
360 “Turkiye, Suudi Arabistan’a ANKA Satti”,
http://www.technologic.com.tr/turkiyesuudiarabistanaankasatti/ , May 2013.
119
2012 and June 2013 along with air forces from UAE, NATO, US and Jordan.
However it did not take part in the 2014 military exercises held in Turkey.
3.5 Conclusion:
The chapter has showed how the popular uprisings in the Arab countries have
created complicated consequences in the Middle East and that the approaches of
Turkey and Saudi Arabia to this event witnessed points of divergences and
convergences. Both countries used different tools in dealing with the outcomes of
the uprising and followed different agendas in seek of their regional interests and
ambitions. The Egyptian uprising was a good example in examining the differences
between the Turkish and Saudi policies and how their interests were overlapping
and how they securitized the course of events during the Egyptian uprising as a
threat on their interests. While in the Syrian Uprising, the Turkish and the Saudi
stances witnessed stations that ranged from convergence and cooperation on the
official stands opposing Assad regime into divergence and contrast on the
backgrounds of the military and political opposition groups each country supports
against Assad regime.
The media in both countries have reflected the different regional approaches of
Turkey and Saudi Arabia in a way that affected negatively the positive perception
created on the Turkish-Saudi relations after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The
divergence between the reaction of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to the uprisings had
led to the deterioration of the political relations; however the economic and military
relations were not impacted similar to the political relations.
120
4. CONCLUSION
The thesis concludes that the regional complexes created after the US invasion of
Iraq in 2003 and the Arab uprisings in 2011 brought the regional interests of Turkey
and Saudi Arabia in an interlinked way. After 2003, there were different points of
intersection between their regional policy lines as it appeared clearly in supporting
the Sunni Iraqi political groups and also there were points of detachment between
their regional policy lines in Egypt after 2011 and 2013. The thesis expects that the
regional interaction between Ankara and Riyadh will become frequent in the near
future as a result of the new regional power configurations in the region and the
rising role of the non-Arab regional powers in the region. The thesis also expects
that the literature on the Turkish-Saudi relations might witness an increase in order
to analyse the interaction between both countries and how this interaction
contributes to the politics of the Middle East.
The regional contexts existed in the light of the US Invasion of Iraq and Arab
uprisings have left an increasing vacuum of power as a result of the weakness of the
Arab Regional System and traditional Arab regional powers like Iraq, Syria and to a
certain degree Egypt. Saudi Arabia follows a foreign policy that substitutes the
weakness of the Arab Regional System and ensures its regional leadership through
extending its support and influence on Arab Nationalists or Sunni parties in Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon against Iran and supported the political change in Egypt in July
2013 against the rising Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey. While Turkey has
followed an active foreign policy that sought increasing its presence in the ex-
Ottoman territories as a regional power through mediation, soft power, and
developing economic relations with different countries. It sought extending its
influence in the Arab geography after the popular uprisings in 2011 through
supporting opposition groups in Syria and Muslim Brothers in Egypt.
121
Meanwhile this distinctness exacerbated domestically by the differences of the
political systems in both Ankara and Riyadh, ideologies of the Saudi royal family
and the AKP governments in Turkey and how the governments in Ankara and
Riyadh conduct their foreign policies. However, as the thesis adopts the regional
level of analysis, it found that the divergence of their interests comes as both
Turkey and Saudi Arabia are two regional powers in the Middle East with two
different regional ambitions and regional interests seeking to fill this vacuum of
power created in the region and extending their influences over different countries
and non-state actors in the Middle East. After the US invasion of Iraq and the Arab
uprisings, Saudi Arabia appeared as a an important Arab regional power whose
interests and involvement are extended through the whole Middle East and its
leadership in the Arab world has been enhanced as the roles of the traditional Arab
regional powers declined. On the other hand, Turkey showed itself clearly as a
regional power with a power project and a vision for leading the region. Its agendas
varied from mediation after 2003 into democracy promotion after 2011 as it
supported the uprisings in some Arab countries which was bringing Muslim
Brotherhood to power.
Throughout the time frame of the study, there were stations of crossing and
detachment between the Turkish and the Saudi regional policy lines and their
regional interests found common grounds as shown in the Iraqi case, Lebanese case
and in the Syrian case. Despite that these common grounds create opportunities for
regional cooperation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and both countries are US
allies and Sunni regional powers, their different regional agendas, regional
ambitions and their distinct policy tools there are limitations on enacting this
cooperation. Therefore the thesis predicts that Turkey and Saudi Arabia will neither
enter in a permanent regional alliance nor in an open-ended regional conflict.
In Iraq, the stands of Saudi Arabia and Turkey with regard to the US invasion of
Iraq were parallel to each other’s. Saudi Arabia was reluctant to take part in the
operation and asked the US administration not to consider using its bases in any
operation against Iraq, on the Turkish side; the Turkish Grand National Assembly
had turned down a Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the USA
122
that granted the US troops access to Iraq from Turkey. Moreover their political
stands were the same on this topic and by time, not to gamble with their strategic
relations with the unipolar superpower (the USA), both countries contributed
militarily in a narrow way to the operation. Ankara and Riyadh shared the same
threats and nearly the same repercussions in the aftermath Iraq. However, their
causes, their behaviours and their agendas were different. They shared the fear of
the fragmentation of Iraq: Saudi Arabia feared of the rise of Shi’a sub-state identity
in Iraq which would agitate the Shi’a community in Saudi Arabia to call for a
change and leave the Iraqi Sunni Arabs out of any economic resources: a blow up to
the Saudi leadership role in the Arab Regional Context and the Muslim world.
Ankara feared of the rise of Shi’a sub-state and more so the Kurdish autonomous
region in Iraq that would facilitate the rise of a regional wave of Kurdish
independence, and consequently threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey. Both
countries worked on countering this issue through coordination and regular
consultation during their high official bilateral visits, but they did not follow the
same policy line on this issue. While Saudi Arabia regarded Iran as the source of
regional instability supported by Syria, Turkey approached Iran and Syria to form
an anti-Kurdish coalition (since these countries share the same fear of the regional
spill over of the Iraqi-Kurdish autonomy) and it activated the High Security
Commission between the Ankara and Tehran to discuss the Kurdish insurgent
activities in their countries who founded their training camps in the Kandil
mountains in the independent Kurdish Northern Iraq361.
Also the rise of the Iranian influence in Iraq had problematic implications on both
countries and this topic was present in their official talks. Saudi Arabia’s regional
and global role and leadership and the Saudi’s royal family rule were the main
target of the Iranian policy of increasing influence in Iraq. On the other hand,
Turkey’s economic interests, the economic opportunities of the Turkish economy in
361 Oğuzlu, Tarik, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from
the West?”, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, February 2008,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683840701813960?journalCode=ftur20#.VbTNVP
mqqko .
123
this country and Ankara’s soft power new ottoman diplomacy which regards Iraq as
an ex-Ottoman territory where Turkey can play a more active political, diplomatic
and economic role, fall under the threat of Iran’s rising influence. Like Saudi
Arabia, Turkey was interested in the Iraqi Sunnis. Ankara and Riyadh supported
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi in 2010 parliamentary elections against the Iranian
supported Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki362. Ankara’s favouring of Sunnis was not
because they are Sunnis or Arabs, but because the Iraqi Sunnis could represent a
bulwark against the Iranian influence in the Iraq. Therefore, Ankara did not have a
reason to close its doors in front of the Iraqi Shi’as and it managed to have three
diplomatic missions in Iraq (in Erbil, Baghdad and Mosul) and a special Turkish
envoy for Iraq since autumn 2003 until March 2008363, unlike Saudi Arabia which
did not appoint an ambassador in Baghdad until 2015. Ankara also managed to keep
open channels with different Iraqi Shi’a leaders like Muqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani and diplomatically to mediate between Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a from
time to time serving to its regional activism diplomacy364.
In Lebanon, the negative developments in Lebanon during the Israeli attack in 2006
and the domestic clashes in 2008 had both direct negative impacts on Turkey and
Saudi Arabia. They shared the interest of keeping Lebanon stable and curbing the
crisis not to be escalated regionally. However, the sources of the threat came out of
the Lebanese crises on Turkish national interests and Saudi national interests were
not the same. Saudi Arabia, as a leader in the Arab Regional System and in the main
362 “Alawi defends his visit to Saudi Arabia”, February 2010,
http://elaph.com/Web/news/2010/2/536935.htm
363 “Turkey’s envoy to Iraq becomes ambassador”, Today’s Zaman, May 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkeys-special-envoy-to-iraq-becomes-
ambassador_176344.html .
364 Kanbolat, Hassan. “Al-Hakim’s Visit to Turkey”, Todays Zaman, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/hasan-kanbolat/al-hakims-visit-to-turkey_193819.html ,
See also “Iraqi Shiite leader visits Turkey amid high tension”, January 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iraqi-shiite-leader-visits-turkey-amid-high-
tension.aspx?pageID=238&nID=12334&NewsCatID=338 , and “Turkey to bring Iraqi Shiite, Sunni
groups together in İstanbul”, February 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-to-
bring-iraqi-shiite-sunni-groups-together-in-istanbul_270177.html .
124
front line against Iran adopted a policy that supports the 14 March Alliance to roll
back Iran’s influence and it accused Hizballah of adventurism and exposing the
Arab interest into danger and charged Iran with supporting Hizballah to wage a
coup against the Lebanese state. On the side of Turkey, Ankara regarded territorial
integrity and mutual trust as essential elements for stability in the Middle East and
regarded Lebanon as an important area for regional stability: Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said “stability in Lebanon affects the whole Middle
East” 365. Despite that these elements were threatened by the rise of Hizballah’s sub-
state within the Lebanese state and rise of political/sectarian divisions in Lebanon, it
did not use such harsh rhetoric against Syria, Iran and Hizballah and chose to
include them in finding a solution to end the Lebanese crises. The Saudi line and the
Turkish line on Lebanon were different in the way of dealing with the developments
in Lebanon, but they were not opposite to each other’s as long as Ankara followed
its neutral policy towards all actors.
In the case of Egypt after the uprising in 2011, the Turkish and Saudi stances were
in opposite direction along the time line of the major events in Cairo since January
28th 2011, the election of President Mohamed Morsi in June 2012 until the military
intervention that took place on July 3rd 2013. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia tried to
be assured that the orientations of Post-Mubarak Egypt and the Egyptian regional
role will not be against their foreign policy orientations. Moreover they worked on
the adaptation of Egypt in a way that serves the goals and the grand vision for their
foreign policies. Turkey has sought developing relations with the Muslim Brothers
in Egypt, as Egypt would be a good gate for more regional activist roles played by
Turkey through having a direct access to the Palestinian - Israeli peace talks and the
reconciliation process between Fateh and Hamas. In addition to that, Turkey’s
alliance with Egypt under the rule of Muslim Brothers can provide Turkey more
space to maneuver with its regional competitors like Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
365 Arı, Tayyar. And Pirinç, Ferhat. “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And
The Perceptions In Syria And Lebanon, Akademik Bakış, Volume 4, No 7, Winter 2010,
http://ataum.gazi.edu.tr/posts/view/title/turkey%E2%80%99s-new-foreign-policy-towards-the-
middle-east-and-the-perceptions-in-syria-and-lebanon-47377.
125
For Saudi Arabia, Egypt under Mubarak represented a cornerstone in the Saudi
regional policy towards the Arab and regional affairs mainly with respect to Iran.
Saudi Arabia found in the Salafis its ally who can counter balance the Muslim
Brothers in Egypt and oppose them if they sought closer relations with Iran. After
the Egyptian army intervened in July 2013, Saudi Arabia acted as the strongest
foreign supporter to the new administration in Egypt. The importance of Egypt
within the Saudi foreign policy vision has increased, as a new power check on the
Muslim Brothers in the region and as a fang for the Turkish unlimited regional
ambitions. While Turkey has securitized the fall of Muslim Brothers in Egypt,
opposed the new political change and refused to recognize the new administration
in Egypt.
In the case of the Syrian uprising, the Turkish and the Saudi stances witnessed
stations that ranged from cooperation on the official stand towards the uprising and
opposing Assad regime into divergence and contrast on the backgrounds of the
military and political groups each country supports against Assad regime, unlike
Egypt where their stances were conflicting all the time. Turkey and Saudi Arabia
shared the stands on opposing President Assad on the international level and they
are members in the group of “Friends of Syria”. Turkey and Saudi Arabia had the
same line for dealing with the Syrian refugees escaping from the brutality of war.
Both countries had opposed the Assad usage of chemical weapons in Syria in
August 2013 and practiced pressure on the US administration to wage an attack on
Syrian regime. However Turkey chose to politically support the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood opposition figures while Saudi Arabia allied with the Syrian
opposition who were living in the exile rather than the Muslim Brothers. Also Saudi
Arabia provided military and financial support to Salafi fighting groups and
moderate Islamists while Turkey supported other different groups through
coordination with Qatar like the Free Syrian Army, Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade, Fajr
al-Islam Battalion and the Al-Haqq Brigade.
The role of the non-state actors increased in the Middle East and their presence in
the regional political scene has been noticeable and influential in compared to the
previous times. This rise of non-state actors had its own influence on the regional
126
power configurations in the Middle East and they are considered to be a new
important factor in the region. On the other hand, the rise of non-state actors had its
influence on the Turkish-Saudi relations in the time period of the study as both
countries sought approaching them, exercising influence over them and employing
them in their regional strategy. This argument appears clearly in the relations
between Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood or the relations between Saudi Arabia
and Salafi movements and the relations between different fighting groups against
Assad regime in Syria.
The rise of the non-state actors in the Middle East politics emphasizes the necessity
of developing the definition of the Regional Security Complex in order to include
not only states but also to include non-state actors as members in the Middle East
regional security complex and to shed the state-centric focus of the theory. The
inclusion of the non-state actors will help in understanding how the non-state actors
are new non-traditional security threats, how do they securitize and de-securitize
their security problems, how the regional powers perceive them and finally what
kind of challenges that these non-state actors are representing on the traditional state
actors in the Middle East.
The thesis concludes that the Turkish foreign policy and the Saudi foreign policy
pay attention to the regional dynamics in formulating their foreign policy and in
fulfilling their interests, in a way that makes the regional determinants important in
understanding the behaviours of the Turkish government and the Saudi government
in the Middle East. Turkey worked on integrating itself economically, culturally and
politically with the Arab countries and played different mediatory roles for the sake
of pursuing its interests like preventing the Kurds from declaring their
independence, avoiding the disintegration of Iraq and boosting its image as a
regional power. Saudi Arabia supported the Arab nationalist and Sunni political
actors in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine in a way that ensures Saudi’s stand as an Arab
regional power and as a part of its legitimacy at home and in the world as a Sunni
leader country.
The thesis also concludes that the regional balance of power plays an important role
in the making of the Turkish foreign policy and the Saudi foreign policy and how
127
each country regards its position in the regional equation importantly. Turkey found
an interest in supporting the Iraqi Sunnis in the 2010 Iraqi parliamentary elections
and later on during the Arab uprising, from one side as Turkey, perceives itself as
the inheritor of the Ottoman empire and has a responsibility towards the ex-
Ottoman territories, and from another side the Sunnis would check the rising Iranian
influence on the Iraqi Shi’a which limits Turkey’s economic and political mediatory
presence there. During the Arab uprisings, Turkey invested politically in the rising
Muslim Brotherhood and military and politically in the Syrian anti-Assad
opposition as it saw more integration in the post-Assad future of Syria as it boosts
its regional power status against the other regional power, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
On the side of Saudi Arabia, the perspective of regional balance of power was
dominant on its behaviour in the region after 2003. It sought enhancing its alliance
with Egypt and Jordan, developed relations with Turkey and supported the Sunni
Arab actors in order to counter balance Iran. During the Arab uprisings, Saudi
Arabia renewed its contacts with the Salafi groups in order to counter the rise of
Muslim Brothers, supported the Jordanian regime to face the domestic protests in
Amman and supported the political change in Egypt in 2013 as a counter balance of
the rising influence of Turkey and supported the uprising in Syria as a counter
balance to the regional influence of Iran.
The Regional Security Complex Theory that was adopted in the study explained
how Turkey and Saudi Arabia recognize each other as important actors in the region
and how they interacted after the US invasion of Iraq 2003 and during the Arab
uprisings in 2011. The regional interaction between Turkey and Saudi Arabia
started since the war on Iraq in 2003 and continued during the Arab uprisings as
they have interests in the regional issues of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and
Egypt.
The concepts of securitization and de-securitization were found important in
understanding how Turkey and Saudi Arabia securitized regional issues, how their
regional behaviours differed towards these issues and how their regional ambitions
and foreign policy agendas are different during the events after the war on Iraq and
during the Arab uprisings. Both Ankara and Riyadh deals with these securitized
128
issues in a different way as a result of their different regional ambitions and the
rivalry between them, in a way that refutes the arguments that call for forming a
political alliance between Turkey and Saudi Arabia against Iran and keeps
limitations on their regional relations. However sharing common interests in the
region from time to time might allow them to enter in limited ad-hoc short term
alliances (like supporting Allawi in Iraq in 2010 and opposing Assad regime in
Syria) while there different agendas and perspectives will stay appearing.
The regional interaction between Turkey and Saudi Arabia continues to play an
important role in the bilateral relations between Ankara and Riyadh. The regional
environment created after the war on Iraq in 2003 and the positive interaction took
place between Turkey and Saudi Arabia have created a suitable ground for boosting
the political, economic and military relations between Ankara and Riyadh. The
political relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia witnessed remarkable events
like the visit of King Abdullah to Turkey in 2006 (the first visit by a Saudi king to
Turkey since 1974) and another visit in 2007. Turkey signed an agreement of
strategic dialogue with the GCC in September 2008. Saudi Arabia supported the
candidacy of the Turkish professor Ekmelledin Ihsanoğlu as a secretary general of
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Also Turkish Prime Minister and Turkish
president paid many visits to Saudi Arabia in order to discuss regional issues and
explore new opportunities for developing economic relations between both
countries. The economic relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia witnessed a
rise as well; the trade volume between the two countries has increased from USD
1.2 billion in 2001 to USD 5.5 billion in 2008. Important Saudi investors started
entering the Turkish market for investment in sectors of Energy, Tourism, Real
state, Petrochemicals, Banking, Agriculture, and Industry like the Kingdom Holding
Group, Abdul Latif Al-Jamil Group, Ogur Company, and National Commercial
Bank. The Turkish companies also had found opportunities in the infrastructure
projects in Saudi Arabia like the metro line in Riyadh and managing Saudi Airports
in coordination with Al-Rajihi group. Conversely, the negative regional interaction
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia has left a negative impact on the political
relations between Ankara and Riyadh represented in the absence of the Saudi
Ambassador in Turkey for Saudi Arabia did not assign a new ambassador to Turkey
129
for seven months, after the ex-Saudi ambassador Mohamed al-Husseini has ended
his mission following the Egyptian uprising in January 2011, Saudi Arabia lobbied
with Egypt not to let Turkey win a non-permanent seat in the UNSC in 2014 and
received 60 votes only after getting 151 votes in 2008 UNSC elections, Riyadh did
not invite the Foreign Minister of Turkey to the ministerial meeting of the mini
Friends of Syria group held in Jeddah in August 2014. On the economic level, there
were no news on any new Saudi investments coming to Turkey or plans by Saudi
big investors in the Turkish market, however the current Saudi investments in
Turkey stayed without any impact and the trade volume between the two countries
increased slightly from USD 6.2 billion in 2011 into USD 7.3 in 2013.
The thesis contributes to the discussion about geographical proximity as a condition
for having a regional security complex. The study has proved that, although Saudi
Arabia and Turkey does not share direct borders in between, a status of
interdependence between the regional and national interests of Turkey and Saudi
Arabia existed owing to the spill over of Iraq effect, the externalities of the rise of
Sunni-Shi’a confrontation in Iraq, the developments of the Arab uprisings (mainly
in Egypt) and other regional issues. Therefore, it is important to mention that the
geographical proximity in some cases cannot be an essential factor for having a
security complex between states and that the interests of some states can be affected
with disregard to their geographical location as long as they are under the impact of
the same externalities.
The thesis also contributes to the debate on the role of Turkey in the Middle East
security complex; whether it is a player in the complex or it is an insulator between
different regional complexes (Middle East, East Europe and Middle Asia). The
thesis founded that Turkey, under the rule of the AKP, had become politically and
economically integrated in the Middle East to a high degree after the US invasion of
Iraq and during the Arab uprisings. After the war on Iraq, Turkey adopted a regional
mediator agenda and sought mediating different conflicts in the region as it enjoys
good political and economic relations with many Arab countries and Iran. It exerted
efforts between the Palestinians and Israel, Syria and Israel, Syria and Saudi Arabia,
Syria and Iraq, between different fractions in Lebanon through coordination Qatar,
130
between Iran and the West through coordination with Brazil. Turkey’s economic
relations with the Arab countries has expanded through the free trade agreements
between Turkey and different Arab countries, high strategic councils protocols
signed between Turkey and different Arab countries, in addition to that, the Turkish
exports to the Middle East represents more than 20% of the total Turkish exports.
However Turkey has lived many setbacks starting since 2013 and the downfall of
its Muslim Brotherhood ally in different Arab countries mainly in Egypt. Turkey
became not capable of playing the role of the honest mediator as it lost its neutrality
with many stakeholders in the region and after taking the side of Muslim Brothers
during the course of events of the Arab uprisings. Turkey’s involvement in the war
between Assad regime and Syrian opposition has exposed its security into danger
represented in the expansion of the PKK fighters in the Syrian territories, being in
an open regional confrontation with Iran and different Shi’a groups in Iraq,
Lebanon and Syria and losing the land trade routes used through the Syrian and
Iraqi territories for transporting Turkish products to the GCC countries. Turkey’s
high regional profile during the uprisings has led to the loss of confidence with Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, which would limit Turkey’s moves within the
regional security complex in the short term. Turkey also suffers a deterioration in its
image in the Arab world as a result of its lower democratic credits which were a
strong credit for its image starting from the protests took place in Gezi park in May
2013 and the strife between the ruling AKP and domestic opponent Gülen
movement. Finally the Turkish economy started to get into a recession since mid-
2014 represented in a low growth rate under 2%, a decrease in the value of the
Turkish Lira in front of the US Dollar, an increase in the unemployment rate to
exceed the 10% level and a decrease in the exports which contributes to lowering
the admiration of Turkey in the Arab world.
The Media analysis has been beneficial in understanding the discourse of Media
outlets of newspapers close to the government in Saudi Arabia and close to the
ruling AKP in Turkey towards each other. It reflects how policy makers in Turkey
and Saudi Arabia perceive each other and the degree of divergence and
rapprochement between the stances of Ankara and Riyadh concerning different
regional issues, in a way that makes the media discourse analysis a tool for
131
examining the relations between them and for categorizing the pattern of the
political and regional ties between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in different periods of
time. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and King Abdullah’s first visit to
Turkey, the media outlets in Saudi Arabia reflected positive gestures on the Turkish
political elite and the ruling AKP as a party that comes from an Islamic background
and seeks new partnerships with the Arab and Muslim world. The Turkish media
outlets were focusing on the mutual economic and political benefits of developing
strong relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the opportunities for Turkish
construction companies in Saudi Arabia and the news of the Saudi possible
investments in Turkey. Conversely, the media reflected the negative regional
interaction and the deteriorated political relations between Ankara and Riyadh after
the political change took place in Egypt in 2013. Saudi media outlet published many
articles and broadcasted different TV reports focusing on the Gezi protests in May
2013 and the Turkish support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Arab
countries. On the Turkish side, Turkish media outlets close to the ruling AKP
published articles and reports condemning the Saudi support to the new
administration in Egypt, accusing Saudi Arabia of allying with Israel against the
Muslim Brothers in Egypt to restore the old regional status quo.
132
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books:
Al-Rashid, Madawi. “Saudi Arabia: The Challenge of US Invasion of Iraq”, In The
Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, edited by: Raymound Hinnebusch & Rick
Fawn, Lynee, Rienner Publishers, 2006.
Al-Turki, Majed bin Aziz. The Development of Saudi Foreign Policy, Riyadh:
Institute of Diplomatic Studies: Saudi Foreign Ministry, 2005.
Aydın, Mustafa. “Twenty Years Before, Twenty Years After: Turkish Foreign
Policy at the Threshold of the 21st Century”, In Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st
century, edited by Tareq Ismail & Mustafa Aydin, ASHGATE publisher, October
2003.
Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, Wilde, Jaap de. Security: A New Framework of
Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998.
Buzan, Barry. “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis”, In South Asian
Insecurity and the Great Power, edited by Barry Buzan & Gowher Rizvi, London:
Macmillan, 1986.
____, People, States, And Fear: The National Security Problem In International
Relations, University of North Carolina Press, 1983, P. 106.
Cammett, Melani. & M. MacLean, Lauren. The Politics of Non-State Social
Welfare, Cornell University Press, P.204.
Cantori, Louis J. & Spiegel, Steven L. The International Politics of Regions,
California: Prentice-Hall Press, 1970.
133
Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu, Istanbul:
Kure Yayinlar, 2001.
Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, Robert Guffey, The
Iraq Effect: the Middle East after the Iraq War, Rand Corporation, 2010, P. 17.
Fuller, Graham. Turkey and the Arab Spring, London: Bozorg Press, 2014.
Gause III, F. Gregory. “The International Politics of Gulf”, In International
Relations of the Middle East, edited by Louise Fawcett, Oxford University Press,
2009.
____, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, Cambridge University Press,
2009.
Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces
1950-1957, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.
Harel, Amos, and Issacharoff, Avi. 34 Days: Israel, Hizballah and War on
Lebanon, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Hirst, David. Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East,
London: Faber and Faber Publisher, 2010.
J.Barkey, Henri. Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, United
States Institute of Peace, 1996.
Kayaoglu, Turan. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Politics, Problems,
and Potential, New York: Routledge, 2015.
Korany, Bahga. and A. Fattah, Moataz. The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Cairo:
American University in Cairo Press, 2008.
134
Larrabee, Stephan. “Turkey’s new Middle East activism”, In The evolution of US–
Turkish relations in a transatlantic context, edited by F. Burwell, Carlisle: SSI
Publications, April 2009,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB861.pdf .
Lake , David A. (ed.) and Morgan, Patrick M. (ed.) Regional Orders: Building
Security in a New World, Penn State University Press, 1977.
Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A. (eds) Regional Integration: Theory
and Research, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprisings: The Unfinished Revolutions, Public Affairs
Publisher, January 2013.
Visser, Reidar. Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in
Southern Iraq, NJ: Transaction Publisher, 2007.
Wæver, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization”, In On Security, edited by
Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Columbia University Press, 1995.
Peer-Reviewed Journals:
Abdul Hussein, Hussein. “Hezbollah: State within A State”, Current Trends in
Islamist Ideology, Volume 8, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=101542
Al-Shammari, Abdullah. “Turkish-Saudi Relations: How Ideological Differences
Surpassed Mutual Interests”, unpublished paper. (Arabic Resource)
Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle
East under AKP”, Turkish Studies, Volume 12, No. 4, 2011,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14683849.2011.622513#.VbPOAfmq
qko .
135
____, “The Middle East in Turkey–USA Relations: Managing the Alliance”,
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2013,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19448953.2013.775036?journalCode=
cjsb20#.VemGaxGeDGc .
____, “Turkey: Arab Perspective”, TESEV, Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 13,
May 2010,
http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/Turkey_ArabPerspectives_II.bas%C
4%B1m.pdf .
____, “Turkey’s Iraq policy: the war and beyond”, Journal of Contemporary
European Studies Volume 14, No. 2, 183–196, August 2006.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782800600892242#.Ve8UhhGeDG
c
Aras, Bulent. and Folk, Richard. “Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival in the Arab
Spring”, Third World Quarterly, Volume 36, No 2, 2015,
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/26107/ .
Ari, Tayyar. And Pirinçç, Ferhat. “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The
Middle East And The Perceptions In Syria And Lebanon, Akademik Bakış, Volume
4, No 7, Winter 2010,
http://ataum.gazi.edu.tr/posts/view/title/turkey%E2%80%99s-new-foreign-policy-
towards-the-middle-east-and-the-perceptions-in-syria-and-lebanon-47377.
Ayoob, Mohammed. “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key
Variables in the Construction of Regional Order”, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Volume 53:3, 1999.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00049919993845#.Ve7EqxGeDGc .
Barkey, Henry. “Turkey and Iraq: The Making of a Partnership”, Turkish Studies,
Volume 12, No 4, 2011.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2011.622508#.Ve8NNRGe
DGc
136
Barrinha, Andre. “The Ambitious Insulator: Revisiting Turkey's Position in
Regional Security Complex Theory”, Mediterranean Politics, Volume 19, Issue 2,
2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.799353#.VKFPSV4A
AA .
Binder, Leonard. “The Middle East as a Subordinate International System”, World
Politics, Volume 10, Issue 03, April 1958, P. 427.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009495 .
Buzan, Barry. “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”,
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 67, No. 3, July
1991, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621945
Cagaptay, Soner and Parris, Mark. “Turkey after Iraq War”, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Conference Report, 2003,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-after-the-iraq-war-
still-a-u.s.-ally .
Cantori, Louis J. and Spiegel, Steven L., “International Regions: A Comparative
Approach to Five Subordinate Systems”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume
13, No. 4, Special Issue on International Subsystems, December 1969,
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3013600?sid=21104899128981&uid=4&uid
=2&uid=3739192
Dissouki, Ali Elldin Helal. “The Question of Existence: The Arab Regional System
in Face of Division and Sectarianism”, Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya, Volume 198, October
2014. (Arabic Resource).
Ennis, Crystal A and Moman, Bessma. “Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the
Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi foreign policy strategies”, Third World
Quarterly, Volume 34, Issue 6, 2013,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/01436597.2013.802503#.Ve6y7h
GeDGc.
137
Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and
the Sectarian Question”, Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 2, March 2009,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=30995 .
Kamrava, Mehran. "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution”, Orbis,
Volume 56, No., 2012,
http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-61403.pdf.
Kirisci, Kemal. “The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the
trading state”, New Perspectives of Turkey, No. 40, 2009,
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/news_id_412_5%20-
%20Article%20Kemal%20Kirisci.pdf .
Koni, Hakan, “Saudi Influence on Islamic Institutions in Turkey Beginning in the
1970s”, Middle East Journal, Volume 66, No 1, Winter 2012,
http://yoksis.bilkent.edu.tr/pdf/files/5945.pdf.
Macfarquhar, Neil. “After a year, Deep Divisions Hobble Syria’s Opposition”, The
New York Times, February 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-is-
hobbled-by-deep-divisions.html?_r=0
Mills, Robbin M. “Northern Iraq’s Oil Chessboard: Energy, politics and Power”,
Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No.1, 2013,
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/20130107123353_insight_turkey_vol_15_no
_1_commentaries_05_mills.pdf.
Oguzlu, Tarik, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey
Dissociate from the West?”, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, February 2008,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683840701813960?journalCode=ft
ur20#.VbTNVPmqqko
Onis, Ziya. “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power
Influence in a Turbulent Middle East”, Mediterranean Politics, Volume 19, Issue 2,
2014,
138
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.868392?src=recsys#.
VKFPsF4AAA .
Taureck, Rita. “Securitization theory and securitization studies”, Journal of
International Relations and Development, 2006,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800072 .
Thompson, William R. “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a
Propositional Inventory”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, 1973.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013464 .
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of
Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, spring 1992,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents .
Op-eds and Articles:
“Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey”, ORSAM, Report No. 195, January
2015, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/201518_rapor195ing.pdf.
“Hakan Albayrak: Suud'un solcuları”, TimeTurk, October 2013,
http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2013/10/12/hakan-albayrak-suud-un-solculari.html
(Turkish Resource)
“Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation”, International Crisis Group,
Middle East Report No. 81, November 2008,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-
Gulf/iraq/081-turkey-and-iraqi-kurds-conflict-or-cooperation.aspx .
“Turkish-Lebanon Relations”, ORSAM, Report No 5, August 2009,
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2009820_rapor_05_eng_webIc.
139
“Turkish-Saudi Relatioship: From Partnership to Tension”, Rawabet Center for
Research and Strategic Studies, January 2015,
http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/2707.
Akyol, Mustafa. “How Morsi Matters in Turkish Politics”, Al-Monitor, May 2013,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2015/05/turkey-egypt-mohammed-
morsi-sentence-Erdoğan.html .
Al-Akawi, Zaki Sami. “The Geostrategic Consequences of the Arab Spring”, Open
Democracy, November 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-
awakening/zaki-samy-elakawi/geostrategic-consequences-of-arab-spring .
Al-Faisal, Turki. “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy”, Middle East Policy, Volume 20,
Issue 4, December 2013,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12044/abstract .
Alhomayed, Tareq. “King Abdullah’s Egypt speech was like a surgeon’s scalpel”,
Al-Sharq Al-Awsaat, August 201, http://www.aawsat.net/2013/08/article55314019.
Al-Labbad, Mustafa. “Egypt’s Iran policy linked to Muslim Brotherhood”, February
2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/02/ahmadinejad-visit-
egyptian-foreign-policy.html . (Arabic Resource)
Al-Qarawee, Harih Hasan. “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis”, Carnegie Middle East Center,
April 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/iraq_sectarian_crisis.pdf.
Al-Rasheed, Abdel Rahman. “Which Erdoğan we see”, Al-Sharq Al-Awsaat, June
2013,
http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=12608&article=731220#.
VcherPmqqko (Arabic Resource)
Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “Bitter Frenemies the not-quite-alliance between Saudi
Arabia and Turkey”, Foreign Policy, May 2012,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2012-05-15/bitter-frenemies .
140
____, “Challenges to Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East”, TESEV, June 2011,
http://www.tesev.org.tr/challenges-to-turkey-s-soft-power-in-the-middle-
east/Content/162.html .
____, “Turkey After The Arab Uprisings: Difficulties of Hanging on in There”,
ISPI, Analysis No. 223, December 2013,
http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/turkey-after-arab-uprisings-difficulties-
hanging-there-9591 .
Aras, Bulent. “Time to go it alone: Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey”, Al-Arabiya,
January 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-
east/2014/01/15/Time-to-go-it-alone-in-the-Middle-East-Saudi-Arabia-UAE-and-
Turkey.html .
Ataman, Muhittin. “Turkish-Saudi Arabian Relations During the Arab Uprisings:
Towards a Strategic Partnership?”, Indight Turkey, Volume 14, No. 4, 2012,
http://file.insightturkey.com/files/pdf/insight_turkey_vol_14_no_4_2012_ataman.p
df .
Ataman, Muhittin. “Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan Ilişkileri: Temkinli Ilişkilerden Çok-
Tarafli Birlikteliğe”, Ortadogu Analiz, Volume 1, No 9, September 2009, P.75,
http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/2009912_muhittin.sonints.p
df . (Turkish Resource)
Bacik, Gokhan, “Turkey and the new Middle East”, European Policy Center
Commentary, 27 July 2012,
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_2850_turkey_and_the_new_middle_eas
t.pdf .
____, “Who will lead the Middle East? The patterns of destructive competition”,
Todays Zaman, October 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists_who-will-
lead-the-middle-east-the-patterns-of-destructive-competition_329313.html .
141
Barkey, Henry. “Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East”, Ceri Strategy
Papers, No. 10, SciencePo, June 2011,
http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/n10_06062011.pdf .
Beehner, Lionel. “Iran’s Saudi Counterweight”, Council on Foreign Relations,
March 2007, http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-saudi-counterweight/p12856.
____, “Impediments to National Reconciliation in Iraq”, January 2007,
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/impediments-national-reconciliation-iraq/p12347#p2
Blanford, Nichoslas. “Why Iran is standing by its weakened, and expensive, ally
Syria”, The Christian Science Monitor, April 2015,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0427/Why-Iran-is-standing-
by-its-weakened-and-expensive-ally-Syria .
Bronner, Ethan and Slackman, Michael. “Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put
Down Unrest,” The New York Times, March 14, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html?_r=0
Düzgıt, Senem Aydın. “The Seesaw Friendship Between Turkey’s AKP and
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, Carnegie Endowment Center, July 2014,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/24/seesaw-friendship-between-turkey-s-akp-
and-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood .
Elhusseini, Fadi. “The Arab Spring and the rise of non-state actors”, June 2015,
Todays Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_the-arab-spring-and-the-rise-
of-non-state-actors_386883.html .
Ellabbad, Mustafa. “Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood: a bit with unsecured
endings”, Assafir, September 2012,
http://m.assafir.com/content/1348446668181353200/Opinion . (Arabic Resource).
Farouk, Yasmine. “More than Money: Post-Mubarak Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the
Gulf”, Gulf Research Center, April 2014,
142
https://www.academia.edu/6959702/More_Than_Money_Post_Mubarak_Egypt_Sa
udi_Arabia_and_the_Gulf.
Felsberger, Stefanie. “The Future of the Egyptian Foreign Policy”, Austuria Institut
Fur Europa, Fokus 4/2014, http://www.aies.at/download/2012/AIES-Fokus-2012-
04.pdf .
Flynt Leverett, “How much does Iraq matter to Iran”,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/influence.html.
Fulton, Will. Holliday, Joseph. and Wyer, Sam. “Iranian Strategy in Syria”, Institute
For the Study of War, May 2013,
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-
1MAY.pdf
Gause III, F. Gregory. “Is Saudi Arabia really counter-revolutionary?”, Foreign
Policy, August 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/09/is-saudi-arabia-really-
counter-revolutionary/ .
____, “Saudi Arabia in The New Middle East”, Council on Foreign Relations,
Special Report No. 63, September 2011, P.16, http://www.cfr.org/saudi-
arabia/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east/p26663 .
____, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring”, Foreign Policy, July-
August 2011 issue, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-africa/2011-07-
01/why-middle-east-studies-missed-arab-spring .
Ginsburg, Mitch. “Assad lets Kurdish PKK rebels operate against Turkey from
inside Syria”, Times of Israel, June 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/assad-lets-
kurdish-pkk-rebels-operate-against-turkey-from-inside-syria/ .
Hassan, Hassan. “How The Muslim Brother’s Hijacked Syria’s Revolution”,
Foreign Policy, March 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/13/how-the-muslim-
brotherhood-hijacked-syrias-revolution/ .
143
Heistein, Ari. “The True Winner in Syria: Iran”, Haaretz, July 2015,
http://www.haaretz.com/beta/.premium-1.664456 .
Heydarian, Richard Javad. “Egypt’s Evolving Foreign Policy”, June 2011,
http://fpif.org/egypts_evolving_foreign_policy/ .
Hinnebusch, Raymond. “Defying the Hegemon: Syria and the Iraq War”, Paper
given at the conference of European Consortium on Political Research Conference,
September 2005, https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/school-of-international-
relations/mecacs/workingpapers/defying_the_hegemon.pdf .
“Iran in Iraq: how much influence”, International Crisis Group, March 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2005/mena/iran-in-
iraq-how-much-influence.aspx.
“Iraqi official: PKK presence at Turkish border ending”, Hurriyet Daily News,
2005, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/8956823.asp?gid=231&sz=23180
Janardhan, N. “GCC response to Arab Spring: Continuity amidst change”, July
2011, Al-Arabiya, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/18/158083.html .
Kanbolat, Hassan. “Al-Hakim’s Visit to Turkey”, Todays Zaman, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/hasan-kanbolat/al-hakims-visit-to-
turkey_193819.html .
Karagul, Ibrahim. “Darbecileri paraya boğan şer ittifakı", Yeni Safak, July 2013,
http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ibrahimkaragul/darbecileri-paraya-bogan-ser-
ittifaki-38533 . (Turkish Resource)
Kardas, Saban. “From zero problems to leading the change: making sense of
transformation in Turkey’s regional policy”, TESEV, 2012, P.6,
http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1346423043-
0.From_Zero_Problems_to_Leading_the_Change_Making_Sense_of_Transformati
on_in_Turkeys_Regional_Policy.pdf.
144
Khoury, Nabil. “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of The Arab
Uprising”, Middle East Policy Council, Volume XX, No 2, Summer 2013,
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arab-cold-war-revisited-
regional-impact-arab-uprising.
Knickmeyer, Ellen. “2006 War Called a 'Failure' for Israel”, Washington Post,
January 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html .
Nagi, Mohamed Abbas. “Relations between Egypt and Iran on a light fire”, Al-
Khaleej, June 2011, http://www.alkhaleej.ae/supplements/page/20ab2b56-425e-
41e5-9816-e09c6cb5d1f1 . (Arabic Resource)
Noureddin, Mohamed. “The Kurdish Issue between the American Interests and the
Turkish Desires”, Swiss Info, November 2007, www.swissinfo.co (Arabic
Resource)
____, “The Turkish Role towards the Arab Environment”, Center for Arab Union
Studies, Arab papers, 14, Political affairs, 5, January 2012. (Arabic Resource)
Obaid, Nawaf. “Saudi Arabia gets forceful on foreign policy”, October 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/saudi-arabia-gets-forceful-on-foreign-
policy/2013/10/24/b037d03e-3c1a-11e3-b7ba-503fb5822c3e_story.html?hpid=z3 .
____, “Stepping Into Iraq”. Washington Post, November 29, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html.
OBIG Research Team. “Iraq – Kurdistan’s Billion-Barrel Oil Investment”, March
2013, http://oilandgas-investments.com/2013/investing/iraq-kurdistan-oil-
investment/ .
145
Omer Taspinar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies between Neo-Ottomanism and
Kemalism”, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment Center, September 2008,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf.
Ozcan, Mesut. “Turkey’s Policy towards the Middle East and North Africa after the
Arab Spring”, TEPAV, Turkish Policy Brief Series, Ninth Edition, 2013,
http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1367496675-
5.Turkeys_Policy_towards_the_Middle_East_and_North_Africa_after_the_Arab_S
pring.pdf .
Ridolfo, Kathleen. “Iraq: Divisive Federalism Debate Continues”, September 2006,
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071323.html.
Rieger, Rene. “In Search For Stability: Saudi Arabia and Arab Spring”, Gulf
Reasearch Center Cambridge, Gulf Research Meeting Papers, 2014.
Rohac, Dalibor. “The Arab Spring Needs Economic Reform”, National Review,
July 2013, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/354256/arab-spring-needs-
economic-freedom-dalibor-rohac.
Salha, Samir. “Turkish-Gulf Partnership: How will Iran Act?”, September 2008,
http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=486754&issueno=10882#.
VenUrhGeDGc. (Arabic Resource)
Sayegh, Yazid. “The Arab Region is at a Transformation Point”, Al-Hayat
Newspaper, August 2014, http://alhayat.com/Opinion/Writers/4241169/ . (Arabic
Resource)
Seale, Patrick. “Averting Civil War in Syria”, November 2011,
http://www.agenceglobal.com/index.php?show=article&Tid=2688 .
Seibert, Thomas. “Turkey Seeks New Alliance with Visit to Egypt”, November
2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/turkey-seeks-new-
alliance-with-visit-to-egypt
146
Selvi, Abdul Kadir. “Morsi in Egypt, Erdoğan in Turkey”, Yenisafak Newspaper,
http://english.yenisafak.com/columns/abdulkadirselvi/morsi-in-egypt-Erdoğan-in-
turkey-2010866 . (Turkish Resource)
Shehata, Samir. “Egypt Declined during Mubarak’s Rule”, The New York Times,
October 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/07/is-egypt-losing-
its-regional-power/egypt-declined-during-mubaraks-rule .
Sirma, Ihsan. “Suudi Arabistan Kralı''na açık mektup”, Yeni Safak, August 2013,
http://www.yenisafak.com/hayat/suudi-arabistan-kralina-acik-mektup-556059
(Turkish Resource)
Sofer, Ken. and Shafroth, Juliana. “The Structure and Organization of the Syrian
Opposition”, The American Progress, May 2013,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/05/14/63221/the-
structure-and-organization-of-the-syrian-opposition/ .
Spyer, Jonathan and Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “Iran and the Shi’a militia
advance in Iraq”, Middle East Forum, December 2014,
http://www.meforum.org/4927/how-iraq-became-a-proxy-of-the-islamic-republic.
Stack, Liam. “In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters”, The New
York Times, October 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/world/europe/turkey-is-sheltering-
antigovernment-syrian-militia.html .
Taha, Nadya. “Arab Press Reaction to Ayad Allawi’s Election Success, March
2010, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/arab-press-reaction-to-ayad-
allawis-election-success/ .
Ulgen, Sinan. “Turkey could form an alliance with Gulf states”, Al-Sharq Al-
Awsaat, January 2014, http://english.aawsat.com/2014/01/article55327539/debate-
turkey-could-form-an-alliance-with-the-Gulf-states .
147
Walt, Vivienne. “Iraq’s big Kurdish Oil Deal”, http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/iraqs-
big-kurdish-oil-deal/.
Whitaker, Brien. “How the Assad Regime’s Policies Nurtured Sectarianism in
Syria”, Muftah, December 2014, http://muftah.org/assad-regimes-policies-nurtured-
sectarianism-syria/#.VcSD8_mqqko .
Zisser, Eyal. “Iranian Involvement in Lebanon”, INSS, Military and Strategic
Affairs, Volume 3, No 1, May 2011,
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1308129458.pdf.
Al-Rasheed, Madawi. “Saudi Arabia and Turkey Falter Over Egypt”, Al-Monitor,
August 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2013/08/saudi-arabia-
turkey-strained-relations.html#ixzz3iK6KrWsg
News Reports:
“2011 Faaliyet raporu”, http://www.aselsan.com.tr/tr-tr/yatirimci-
iliskileri/Documents/Yillik%20Faaliyet%20Raporlari/Aselsan_Faaliyet_Raporu_20
11.pdf . (Turkish Resource)
“A Successful visit by King Abdullah”. http://www.alriyadh.com/179506 . (Arabic
Resource)
“Ankara'ya göre 'Pilotlar öldürüldü' iddiası: El Yalan!”, Radikal, October 2012,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/dunya/ankaraya_gore_pilotlar_olduruldu_iddiasi_el_yala
n-1102333 . (Turkish Resource)
“Başbakan Yardımcısı Kurtulmuş: Mültecilere 5 milyar dolar harcandı”, Radikal,
January 2015,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/basbakan_yardimcisi_kurtulmus_multecilere_5_mi
lyar_dolar_harcandi-1274507 . (Turkish Resource)
148
“Başbakan'ın başdanışmanı 'değerli yalnızlık'ı açıkladı: Yalnız değiliz ama”,
August 2013, http://t24.com.tr/haber/basbakanin-basdanismani-degerli-yalnizliki-
acikladi-yalniz-degiliz-ama,237875 . (Turkish Resource)
“Bush sees Lebanon changes as move to free Middle East”, The Guardians,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/09/syria.lebanon .
“Business TAV, Al-Rajihi partner in running Saudi Airports”, November 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/business_tav-al-rajhi-partner-to-run-saudi-
airports_192551.html .
“Collaboration between Assad regime and the PKK terrorist organization”, Todays
Zaman, December 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/todays-think-
tanks_collaboration-between-assad-regime-and-the-pkk-terrorist-
organization_300228.html .
“Davutoğlu visiting Saudi Arabia, will meet with King Abdullah”,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_Davutoğlu-visiting-saudi-arabia-will-
meet-with-king-abdullah_197286.html .
“Egypt asks for investigation on its soldiers’ accident”, August 2011,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/18/162901.html . (Arabic Resource)
“Egypt downgrades Diplomatic Relations with Turkey”, Hurriyet, November 2013,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/egypt-downgrades-diplomatic-relations-with-
turkey-expels-ambassador.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58413&NewsCatID=359 .
“Egypt is ready to restore diplomatic relations with Iran”, April 2011,
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/04/110404_iarnegypt.shtml . (Arabic
Resource)
“Egyptian ambassador discusses transition with Turkish president”, July 2013,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/76510/UI/Front/Login.aspx .
149
“Egyptian Foreign Policy orientation under the new president”, July 2012,
http://arabic.people.com.cn/31662/7878339.html . (Arabic Resource)
“Egyptian minister of Finance: UAE Will Not support Us Financially”, August
2012, http://www.aa.com.tr/ar/news/74637 . (Arabic Resource)
“Erdoğan: "İsrail'in derdi nedir?",
http://www.cnnturk.com/2006/turkiye/07/15/Erdoğan.israilin.derdi.nedir/201873.0/i
ndex.html. (Turkish Resource)
“Expelled envoy arrives home as Egyptian ambassador packs for Cairo”, Todays
Zaman, November 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_expelled-envoy-
arrives-home-as-egyptian-ambassador-packs-for-cairo_332636.html .
“Faysal Finans'ı "Prens" sattı “,
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/10/12/ekonomi/eko01.html. (Turkish Resource)
“History of Anatolian Eagle”,
http://www.anadolukartali.tsk.tr/default.asp?loc=en&p=tarihce . (Turkish Resource)
“Hizballah Threatens an Explosion in Beirut Over Tribunal”, November 2010,
https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/hezbollah-threatens-explosion-beirut-
over-tribunal.
“How Saudi Arabia Controls the Salafi Stream in The Arab World”, France 24,
September 2009, http://www.france24.com/ar/20120924 . (Arabic Resource)
“Iranian Money Amplifies Influence in Lebanon”,
http://www.voanews.com/content/iranian-money-amplifies-influence-in-lebanon-
104962429/128044.html.
“King Abdullah to Make Historic Visit to Turkey”,
http://www.arabnews.com/node/282954.
150
“Muslim states oppose use of force against Iran”,
http://acturca.info/2007/02/26/muslim-states-oppose-use-of-force-against-iran/ .
“Obama to halt attack if Syria destroys chemical weapons”, Financial Times,
September 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8cd56022-1936-11e3-83b9-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3ktOmhEjj .
“Peshmerga launch major assault on ISIS in northern Diyala”,
http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/19112014.
“President Gül congratulates Egyptian interim president on national day”, July
2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-gul-congratulates-egyptian-
interim-president-on-national-
day.aspx?pageID=517&nID=51365&NewsCatID=338 .
“Relations between Turkey and Egypt”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-egypt.en.mfa .
“Saud Al-Faisal: Iran’s Support to Coup against Legitimacy in Lebanon Will
Worsen Its Relations with Us”, http://www.alriyadh.com/342587. (Arabic
Resource)
“Saudi Arabia call on EU to ease pressure on Egypt”, Al-Shaq Al-Awsaat, August
2013, http://www.aawsat.net/2013/08/article55314043/saudi-arabia-calls-on-eu-to-
ease-pressure-on-egypt . (Arabic Resource)
“Saudi Arabia, Turkey Urge Hezbollah to Rejoin Lebanon Government”, January
2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/saudi-arabia-turkey-urge-hezbollah-to-
rejoin-lebanon-government-1.336661 .
“Saudi Arabia: There is difference between legitimate resistance and uncalculated
adventures”, June 2006, Al-Sharq Al-Awsaat,
http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=373172&issueno=10091#.
VemjohGeDGc. (Arabic Resource)
151
“Saudi Arabia’s Big 25 Constructor”,
http://www.almabani.co/News_highlights/2013/ConstructionWeek_Press_Release_
April_2013.pdf . (Arabic Resource)
“Saudi Arabian National Guard, TAI and T-129 ATAK helicopter”, September
2011,
http://www.tacticalreport.com/view_news/Saudi_Arabian_National_Guard_TAI_an
d_T-129_ATAK_helicopter/2170 .
“Saudi Envoy to Turkey speaks to Al-Riyadh newspaper: Turkish Saudi relations
reflected positively on Turkish Arab Relations”, Riyadh Newspaper,
http://www.alriyadh.com/369067. (Arabic Resource).
“Saudi group to invest in Turkish agriculture sector “, September 2009,
http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/0909200920079.aspx .
“Saudi King Abdullah Starts Friday Visit to Turkey”,
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/statements/Pa
ges/NewsArticleID71336.aspx . (Arabic Resource).
“Saudi King Abdullah to receive state medal in Ankara visit”,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_saudi-king-abdullah-to-receive-state-
medal-in-ankara-visit_126676.html .
“Saudi King Abdullah: Our relations with Turkey are spiritual”,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/saudi-king-abdullah-our-relations-with-turkey-
are-spiritual.aspx?pageID=438&n=saudi-king-abdullah-our-relations-with-turkey-
are-spiritual-2006-08-09 .
“Saudi King Abdullah’s Turkish Visit ’New Chapter’ in Relations”,
http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_saudi-king-abdullahs-turkish-visit-new-
chapter-in-relations_35450.html
152
“Saudi-based ALJ set to invest USD 1 billion in Turkey”, October 2012,
http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/031012-alj-group-investing-
usd-1-billion-in-turkey.aspx .
“Strategic Dialogue with Turkey”, https://www.gcc-
sg.org/index001e.html?action=Sec-Show&ID=609 . (Arabic Resource).
“Syrian FM: Brotherhood are cause of all problems in the region”,
http://www.mubasher-misr.net/67472.htm/ .
“Assad: we ask Egypt to practice its historical role in the region”,
http://www.albawabhnews.com/1464814 . (Arabic Resource).
“Syrian regime from the conspiracy theory to fighting terrorism”, Al-Wake’ Al-
Arabia (Aljazeera TV Program), August 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/arab-present-situation/2014/8/26/ . (Arabic
Resource).
“Turkey Sets Up Secret Base to Bring Aid to Syria Rebels”, Haaretz, July 2012,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/turkey-sets-up-secret-base-to-bring-aid-
to-syria-rebels-sources-say-1.454107 .
“Turkey to bring Iraqi Shiite, Sunni groups together in İstanbul”, February 2012,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-to-bring-iraqi-shiite-sunni-groups-
together-in-istanbul_270177.html .
“Turkish Investment in KRG”,
http://vvanwilgenburg.blogspot.com.tr/2009/02/turkish-investment-in-krg-
region.html.
“Turkish Parliament agrees to send peacekeepers to Iraq”, October 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/07/international/middleeast/07CND-TURK.html .
153
“Turkish PM becomes first sunni leader to visit shrine of Imam Ali”, March 2011,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/71829/turkish-pm-becomes-first-sunni-leader-
to-visit-shrine-of-imam-ali
“Turkish President Visits King Abdullah’s City for Science and Technology”,
February 2009, http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=632613 (Arabic Resource)
“Türkiye'de olmayınca Mısır'da darbe yaptılar”, Sabah Newspaper, May 2015,
http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/05/17/turkiyede-olmayinca-misirda-darbe-
yaptilar . (Turkish Resource)
“Who Overthrows Who: Dahi Khalfan or Ikhwan”, elaph Newspaper, November
2013, http://elaph.com/Web/NewsPapers/2013/11/851005.html . (Arabic Resource)
“Saudi to recognize, fund SNC; Russia rejects Syria resolution”, January 2011,
http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/saudi-recognize-fund-snc-russia-rejects-syria-
resolution .
“France, partners planning Syria crisis group: Sarkozy”, February 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/04/us-syria-france-
idUSTRE8130QV20120204 .
“Chairman’s Conclusions Second Conference Of The Group Of Friends Of The
Syrian People, 1 April 2012, Istanbul”, MFA, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chairman_s-
conclusions-second-conference-of-the-group-of-friends-of-the-syrian-people_-1-
april-2012_-istanbul.en.mfa .
“Bekir Bozdağ ve Hüseyin Çelik'ten istifa çağrısı”, Rota Haber, August 2013,
http://www.rotahaber.com/gundem/bekir-bozdag-ve-huseyin-celikten-istifa-cagrisi-
h392085.html
“AK Parti: Gezi'yi Körfez ülkeleri destekledi”, Star Gazette, November 2014,
http://haber.star.com.tr/politika/ak-parti-geziyi-korfez-ulkeleri-destekledi/haber-
968351 .
154
“Regional Developments on the Turkish-Saudi summit”, Okaz Newspaper,
http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20110815/Con20110815439839.htm. (Arabic
Resource)
“Syria top priority as Saudi crown prince visits Turkey”, Al-Arabiya, May 2013,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/20/Syria-top-priority-as-
Saudi-crown-prince-visits-Turkey.html
“Saudi Arabia to host Friends of Syria ministerial meeting”, Middle East Monitor,
August 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/13687-saudi-
arabia-to-host-friends-of-syria-ministerial-meeting .
“Egypt and Saudi Arabia, deprives Turkey from being elected in the Security
Council”, October 2013, http://www.youm7.com/story/2014/10/17/ . (Arabic
Resource)
“Egyptian FM: our stand from the attendance of Turkey and Qatar to Libya’s
meeting was a must”, Al-Shorouk, January 2015,
http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=29012015&id=e28ae991-
cca4-4045-ad8a-a836c5fb7efe . (Arabic Resource)
“Turkey says seeking new axis of power with Egypt”, September 2011,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-says-seeking-new-axis-of-power-
with-egypt_257232.html .
“Turkish PM: Lost Confidence in Syrian Leadership “, November 2011,
http://www.voanews.com/content/diplomatic-tensions-escalate-as-turkey-meets-
with-syrian-opposition-133921103/148222.html .
“US to Move operations from Saudi Base”, April 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/29/sprj.irq.saudi.us/.
155
“Al-Hakim: Turkey Should Have a Say in Iraq”, January 2004,
http://www.todayszaman.com/international_shiite-leader-al-hakim-turkey-should-
have-a-say-in-iraq_4952.html
“Moktada al-Sadr in Mecca”, January 2006,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2006/1/12. (Arabic Resource)
“Lebanon Asks Turkey to Mediate”, July 2006, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-
East/Lebanon-asks-Turkey-to-help-mediate.
“Sending Turkish troops to Lebanon”, September 2006, www.jamesinturkey.com .
“Banking watchdog approves Türkiye Finans sale”, March 2008,
http://www.todayszaman.com/business_banking-watchdog-approves-turkiye-
finans-sale_135294.html .
“Turkey to press ahead with mediation”, May 2008,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Jan-04/50269-turkey-to-
press-ahead-with-mediation.ashx .
“Lebanon’s Political Conflict Turns Violent”, May 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/07/us-lebanon-strike-
idUSL0761005520080507
“About the Kurdistan Regional Government”, September 2008,
http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/About_Kurdistan_Regional_Government
__2008_09_10_h13m52s30.pdf.
“Erdoğan'ın barış turu”, December 2008, http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-Erdoğanin-
baris-turu-49095/ . (Turkish Resource)
“Saudi King and Turkish PM”, January 2009,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=622335 . (Arabic Resource).
156
“President Gul arrives at Saudi Arabia”, February 2009,
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-abdullah-gul-
arrives-at-saudi-arabias-news-photo/84620324 .
“Turkish President Meets Businessmen in Jeddah”, February 2009,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=632954 . (Arabic Resource)
“Turkish President Visits King Saud University”, February 2009,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=632611 (Arabic Resource)
“Saudi to go to GAP in 2010”, June 2009, http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/infocenter/news/Pages/1206200917420.aspx
“ALJ buys 65% of stake in Toyotasa”, October 2009,
http://www.arabnews.com/node/328867 .
“Turkish PM Visits Chamber of Commerce in Jeddah”, January 2010,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/. (Arabic Resource)
“Alawi defends his visit to Saudi Arabia”, February 2010,
http://elaph.com/Web/news/2010/2/536935.htm. (Arabic Resource)
“Ammar al-Hakim visits Saudi Arabia”, April 2010,
http://www.almejlis.net/news_article_2796.html. (Arabic Resource)
“Turkey Strikes Military Deal with Saudi Arabia”, May 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-strikes-
military-deal-with-saudi-arabia-2010-05-24 .
“Egyptian Foreign Minister declarations on Iran”, March 2011,
http://twitmail.com/email/65998317/216/false . (Arabic Resource)
157
“Tantawi’s message to Bashar Assad”, March 2011,
http://arabic.people.com.cn/31662/7315469.html . (Arabic Resource).
“Turkish PM visits Jeddah”, March 2011,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=875262 . (Arabic Resource)
“Um al-Qura university gives Erdoğan honorary PhD”, March 2011,
http://www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id=875423 . (Arabic Resource)
“Egypt supports GCC actions in Bahrain”, April 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/4/6/ . (Arabic Resource)
“Egypt opens Rafah crossing permanently”, May 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/5/25/ . (Arabic Resource)
“Saudi envoy denies supporting Salafists in Egypt”, August 2011,
http://www.an7a.com/54114/ . (Arabic Resource)
“The Saudi Finance to Egyptian Salafists”, August 2011,
http://www.alalam.ir/news/672974 . (Arabic Resource).
“The incident of the Israeli embassy in Cairo”, September 2011,
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/09/110910_israel_security_egypt_deta
ils.shtml . (Arabic Resource).
“Saudi King Calls for Unity”, Al-Arabiya, December 2011,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/19/183322.html . (Arabic Resource).
“Saudi Oger says keeping shares in Türk Telekom”, January 2012,
http://www.todayszaman.com/business_saudi-oger-says-keeping-shares-in-turk-
telekom_270098.html .
158
“MKEK, 5 kıtaya silah sattı kar rekoru kırdı”, March 2012,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/20052936.asp . (Turkish Resource)
“Egyptian President Visits Turkey on Sunday”, September 2012,
http://www.albawaba.com/ar/ . (Arabic Resource)
“Fears rise in Egypt from the Qatari investments”, September 2012,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/02/235611.html . (Arabic Resource)
“Open Horizons between Egypt and Qatar”, September 2012,
http://www.raya.com/news/pages/5136368a-616d-4ff6-b8a1-bb78f49ffbbf . (Arabic
Resource)
“Qatari Emir arrives Gaza in a Historical Visit”, October 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/10/23 . (Arabic Resource)
“Turkey-Syria border tension - Thursday 4 October 2012”, The Guardians, October
2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/04/turkey-syria-threat-security-
live
“Gaza between Mubarak and Morsi”, Aljazeera, November 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2012/11/20/ . (Arabic
Resource)
“Saudi Aids for Syrians”, November 2012,
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/saudi-aid-syrians-arrives-mafraq.
“A Brotherhood Cell Sent to Prison in UAE”, January 2013,
http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/01/19/egyptian-uae-trial . (Arabic Resource)
“Khaled Mishal Leaves Cairo”, March 2013, http://onaeg.com/?p=717151 . (Arabic
Resource)
159
“Saudi Arabia sends tons of aid to Syrian refugees”, March 2013,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/03/31/Saudi-Arabia-sends-
tons-of-aids-to-Syrian-refugees-.html .
“Turkey to send 150 Garbage Truck to Egypt”, May 2013,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-to-send-150-garbage-trucks-to-
egypt_316689.html .
“Egypt borrows USD 500 million from Saudi Arabia”, June 2013,
http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/egypt-borrow-us500-million-saudi-arabia.
“Erdoğan Says Morsi is my President in Egypt”, July 2013,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/76462/Egypt/0/Turkeys-Erdoğan-
says-Morsi-my-president-in-Egypt.aspx .
“Morsi’s visit to Saudi Arabia”, July 2013,
http://arabic.people.com.cn/31662/7874139.html . (Arabic Resource)
“Guide to Syrian Opposition”, BBC News, October 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15798218 .
“What is the Geneva II conference on Syria?”, January 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442 .
“KSA, UAE to finance Russian arms deal with Egypt”, February 2014,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/ksa-uae-finance-russian-arms-deal-egypt .
“Lebanon Not Isolated from Constructive Chaos Scheme”, July 2014,
http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/30647/Khreiss-Lebanon-not-isolated-
from-creative-chaos-scheme . (Arabic Resource)
160
“Iraqi Shiite leader visits Turkey amid high tension”, January 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iraqi-shiite-leader-visits-turkey-amid-high-
tension.aspx?pageID=238&nID=12334&NewsCatID=338 .
“Morsi Hold Talks with Gull over Palestine and Syria”, February 2013,
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/07/morsi-holds-talks-with-gul-over-
palestine-syria/ .
“Erdoğan: Suryie bizimle savaş halinde”, Hurriyet, March 2015,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26120654.asp . (Turkish Resource)
“Reyhanlı saldırısı Esad'ın işi!”, Takvim, March 2015,
http://www.takvim.com.tr/dunya/2015/05/05/reyhanli-saldirisi-esadin-isi . (Turkish
Resource)
“Saudi's Agroinvest to raise $533m for farm investments”, April 2010,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-s-agroinvest-raise-533m-for-farm-
investments-156322.html#.VengexGeDGc . (Arabic Resource).
“President of Turkey meets Prince al-Waleed”, May 2015,
http://www.kingdom.com.sa/president-of-turkey-meets-prince-alwaleed . (Arabic
Resource)
“Historical visit by the crown prince to Turkey”, Al-Youm, May 2015,
http://www.alyaum.com/article/3082717 . (Arabic Resource).
“Turkish FM holds meeting with Egyptian Envoy to Ankara”, July 2013,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-foreign-minister-holds-meeting-with-
egyptian-envoy-to-ankara.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51081&NewsCatID=338 .
“Al-Faisal meets with British FM and a German official”, August 2013,
http://www.aleqt.com/2013/08/21/article_780084.html . (Arabic Resource)
161
“Turkey’s FNSS to upgrade Saudi M113 armored vehicles”, August 2007,
http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkeys-fnss-to-upgrade-saudi-m113-
armored-vehicles_120473.html .
“AKP Agrees in Principle to Send Troops to Lebanon”, September 2006,
http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_akp-agrees-in-principle-to-send-troops-
to-lebanon_36073.html.
“Egypt asks Turkey’s ambassador to leave”, Aljazeera, November 2013,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/egypt-asks-turkey-ambassador-
leave-2013112310229476406.html . (Arabic Resource)
“After Months, Iraqi Lawmakers Approve a Government”, December 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/world/middleeast/22iraq.html.
Master Dissertation:
Cengiz, Sinem. ““Turkish-Saudi relations within the context of internal and regional
dynamics during the 1990s and the 2000s”, Master Thesis, Middle East Technical
Unniversity, Ankara, Turkey, March 2015.
Interviews:
Interview with the Mohamed Soudan, head of foreign affairs committee in the
Freedom and Justice Party in Alexandria, April 2012.
Interview with Khaled Tashkindi, Editor in Chief of Okaz Newspaper in Saudi
Arabia, May 2015.
Interview with Saudi Academician Dr. Khaled Baturfi in Saudi Arabia, May 2015.
162
Interview with an Iraqi Kurdish oil consultant Dr. Aziz Barzani.
Interview with a Saudi ex-diplomat Dr. Abdullah Al-Shammari.
Interview with Ziad al-Bassam, Jeddah chamber of commerce, May 2015.
Websites:
Dogus Insaat Projects,
http://www.dogusinsaat.com.tr/DOGUSINSAAT/en/corporate/about-us.aspx .
FNSS company in Saudi Arabia, http://www.bayt.com/en/company/fnss-middle-
east-llc-1511184/
Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, www.gap.gov.tr.
Saudi Oger, http://www.saudioger.com/business_telecommunication.html .
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, December
2003, http://www.clhrf.com/unresagreements/syria_accountability%20act.htm.
Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), www.turkstat,gov,tr .
Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, www.tuik.gov.tr .
“Makin eve Kimya Endusterisi Kurumu,
http://www.mkek.gov.tr/en/Corporate.aspx.
163
“Qinvest Profile”,
http://www.qinvest.com/QInvest_NewDesign/QInvest/English/Q_ARTICLE.ASP?
SecID=58&PageID=8&SubSecTitle=QInvest%20Profile .
Lectures:
Youssef, Ahmed. “Arab Regional System”, Cairo University, 2012, Lecture.
164
Appendix A: Turkish Summary
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin 1923, Suudi Arabistan Krallığı’nın 1932 yılında
kurulmasından bu yana, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler Ortadoğu’daki bölgesel
meselelerden etkilenmektedir, her bir ülkenin bu meselelere olumlu veya olumsuz
yaklaşımlarını etkilemektedir. Bu ikili ilişkiler, Ortadoğu siyasetinde meydana
gelen ve her bir ülkeyi etkileyip ülkelerin bu olayları ele alırken kullandığı
(pozitif/negatif) yaklaşımları yönlendiren bazı önemli olaylardan da
etkilenmektedir. Bu tezde, Ortadoğu’da meydana gelen bölgesel olaylar ve her bir
ülkenin bu olaylara yaklaşımlarının Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan ilişkileri üzerindeki
yansımaları tartışılmaktadır. ABD’nin Irak işgaline sahne olan 2003 yılında,
Ortadoğu’ya yönelik yeni bir yaklaşım geliştiren Siyasal İslam yanlısı Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)’nin yükselişiyle birlikte Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan ilişkileri
yeni bir ivme kazanmıştır. 2003 yılında Irak’ta meydana gelen savaşın etkisi hem
Irak’ta hem de diğer Ortadoğu ülkelerinde Ankara ve Riyad’ın bölgesel ve ulusal
çıkarlarını bir araya getirmiş ve bu sayede her iki ülkenin kendi güçlerini
farketmesini ve bu gücü ikili ilişkilerin düzeyinin arttırılması ve ortak çıkar
amacıyla kullanmasını sağlamıştır. 2003 yılının ardından, iki ülke arasındaki ilişki
grafiği üst düzey ziyaret, ikili anlaşmalar, ticaret dengesi, yatırım hacmi, silah satışı
gibi konularda ve daha da önemlisi Suudi Arabistan’da Türkiye, Türkiye’de Suudi
Arabistan imajının geliştirilmesi ve güçlendirilmesi açısından başarılı olmuştur.
Diğer taraftan, Arap ülkelerinde meydana gelen ayaklanmalar, iki ülkenin bunlara
karşı sergiledikleri farklı yaklaşımlar ve aralarında bu konuya ilişkin var olan
bölgesel çıkar çatışmaları nedeniyle Türk-Suudi ilişkileri üzerinde olumsuz bir etki
yaratmıştır. Gerçekleşen ayaklanmalar Türkiye’de, Arap toplumu ve bu toplumun
yeni yöneticileri arasında uyumlu bir ilişki ve en nihayetinde elde edilecek bölgesel
barış ve güvenlik için atılacak önemli bir adım olarak görülürken, Suudi Arabistan
bu ayaklanmaları uzun sürecek bir kaos ve bölgesel istikrarsızlık olarak
165
değerlendirmiştir. İki ülkenin bu konuya yaklaşımları ve bölgesel amaçları
arasındaki fark hem 2011 yılında Mısır’da gerçekleşen Mübarek karşıtı gösterilerde
hem de 2013 yılının Temmuz ayında gerçekleşen siyasi değişim esnasında açıkça
görülüyordu. Türk-Suudi ilişkileri ABD’nin Irak işgalinden sonra kazanmış olduğu
ivmeyi kaybetmiş, üst düzey resmi ziyaretler yerini alt düzey ziyaretlere bırakmış
ve ticaret dengesi 2003-2011 yılları arasında kaydedilen yüksek rakamlara
ulaşamamamıştır.
Suudi Arabistan’ın 2014 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi seçimlerinde
Türkiye karşıtı lobi faaliyetlerinde bulunmasıyla, siyasi ilişkiler de eski canlılığını
yitirmiştir.
Bu çalışma, 2003 yılında Irak’ta meydana gelen savaşın ve 2011 yılında patlak
veren Arap Baharı’nın Türkiye ile Suudi Arabistan arasındaki siyasi, ekonomik ve
askeri ilişkiler üzerindeki etkisini karşılaştırmalı olarak irdeleyerek, bölgesel
olayların sonuçları ve her iki ülkenin bu sonuçlara verdiği tepkilerin ikili ilişkilerde
nasıl bir rol oynadığını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.
Araştırmanın verilerinin elde edilmesinde,Türk ve Suudi devletlerinin resmi
kurumlarının ve her bir ülkenin yöneticilerinin, Dışişleri Bakanlarının veya diğer
resmi kurumların resmi açıklamalarının, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’daki ticaret
birlikleri ve çeşitli şirketlerin hazırladığı raporların derlenmesi yöntemi
kullanılmıştır. İki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler ve Türk-Suudi ilişkilerinin her bir ülkenin
Ortadoğu’daki bölgesel yönelimlerine ilişkin gidişatının incelenmesinde Türk ve
Suudi medyası oldukça yararlı bir kaynak oluşturmaktadır. Son olarak, yazar 2015
yılının Mayıs ayında Suudi Arabistan’a gerçekleştirdiği ziyarette, araştırma
konusuyla ilgilenen Suudi gazeteciler, eski diplomatlar, akademisyenler ve
işadamları ile yaptığı görüşmelerden oluşan bir saha araştırması gerçekleştirmiştir.
Bu çalışma Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan ilişkilerinin 2000’li yıllardaki gelişimini
anlamak amacıyla bölgesel düzeyde bir analiz sunmaktadır. Çalışmada, Türkiye ve
Suudi Arabistan arasındaki bölgesel etkileşimin ve ülkelerin, bu çalışmanın devam
ettiği süreçte birbiriyle örtüşen bölgesel ve ulusal çıkarlarının incelemesinde
Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi’nin yanı sıra, bu teorinin Suudi Arabistan ve
166
Türkiye’nin 2003 yılındaki Irak Savaşı ve 2011 yılındaki Arap Baharı’nın bölgesel
neticelerini nasıl güvenlikleştirdiğini çözümlemede etkinliği kanıtlanmış olan
‘Güvenlikleştirme’ ve ‘Güvenlik dışılaştırma’ gibi kavramlar da kullanılmaktadır.
İlk bölüm Türk-Suudi ilişkileri üzerine genel bir literatür taraması ve bu ilişkilerin
tarihi arkaplanına dair kısa bir bakış sunmaktadır. İlk bölümde ayrıca, Bölgesel
Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi, Güvenlikleştirme ve Güvenlik dışılaştırma gibi teori
ve kavramlar kullanılarak bölgesel düzeyde bir analize yer verilmiştir.
İkinci bölüm, Irak’ta oluşan yeni bölgesel güvenlik kompleksinin, ABD’nin 2003
yılındaki Irak işgalinin ardından Irak’ta yükselen İran nüfuzu, Irak ulusal
kimliğinde artan Sunni/Şii/Kürt kimlikleri, bölgesel güç dengelerinin yeniden
yapılanması gibi temel özelliklerini konu almaktadır. Bunlar, ortak tehdit
unsurlarıyla karşılaşıldığında ve Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistab’ın bölgesel
yaklaşımlarının yakınlaştığı durumlarda her iki ülke için de bazı tehlikeler
taşımaktaydı. Bununla birlikte, iki ülkenin Irak’taki bölgesel güvenlik kompleksine
karşı farklı şekilde yaklaşmaları ve farklı tepkiler vermeleri nedeniyle, her zaman
aynı siyasi çizgide ilerlemedikleri söylenebilir. Suudi Arabistan ve Türkiye’nin
Irak’taki ortak çıkarı, bölgenin toprak bütünlüğünü korumak, ortak korkusu ise
Irak’ta yükselen İran nüfuzuydu. İki ülke bu konulara ilişkin üst düzey ikili
görüşmeler esnasında kurulan düzenli müzakereler aracılığıyla işbirliğinde
bulunduysa da, farklı bölgesel siyaset gündemleri nedeniyle tek bir siyasi çizgiyi
takip edemememiştir. Her iki ülke de 2010 seçimlerinde Sünni Iraklıları
desteklemiştir. Türkiye kendisini eski Osmanlı topraklarında bölgesel bir güç olarak
gördüğünden, Sünni kesimi de Irak’taki ekonomik çıkarları için bir siper olarak
değerlendirmekteydi. Suudi Arabistan ise İran’ın Irak üzerindeki nüfuzunu
dengelemek amacıyla, Sünni Arap bölgesel gücü olarak Sünni halkın üzerindeki
etkisini ve bu kesime verdiği desteği güçlendirmiştir.
İkinci bölümde, Irak’taki yeni güvenlik kompleksinin özelliklerinin yayılma etkisi
ve Lübnan gibi diğer Ortadoğu ülkeleri üzerindeki sonuçlarının yanı sıra, bu
özelliklerin Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın ulusal ve stratejik çıkarlarına nasıl temas
ettiği de incelenmektedir. Bu konuda her iki ülkenin tutum ve duruşları, biribirinden
farklı olsa dahi, Türkiye Lübnan’ın tüm ulusal ve bölgesel aktörlerine karşı tarafsız
167
bir duruş sergilediği için birbiriyle çatışmamaktadır. Türkiye ile Suudi Arabistan,
Lübnan’ın istikrarının devam ettirilmesi ve 2006 yılında gerçekleşen İsrail
saldırılarının ve 2008 yılında bölgesel olarak tırmanan yurtiçi çatışmaların yarattığı
krizlerin azaltılması gibi ortak amaçları paylaşmaktaydı. Bununla birlikte,
Lübnan’daki bu gelişmelerle ilgilenirken sürdürdükleri siyasi çizgi açısından iki
ülke birbirinden ayrılmaktaydı. Suudi Arabistan İran’ın bölgedeki nüfuzunun
azaltılması amacıyla 14 Mart İttifakı’nı destekledi ve Hizbullah’ı 2006 yılındaki
maceraperestliği nedeniyle ve İran’ı da 2008 yılında Hizbullah’ı darbe konusunda
desteklemekle suçlamıştır. Türkiye Lübnan’ı bölgesel istikrarın temini için önemli
bir bölge olarak değerlendirmiş ve Suudi Arabistan’ın Suriye, İran ve Hizbullah
karşıtı sert söylemi yerine Lübnan krizinin sona erdirilmesi amacıyla yürütülen
arabuluculuk faaliyetlerine bu unsurları dahil etmeyi tercih etmiştir.
Bölgedeki gelişmeler (özellikle Irak ve Lübnan) Suudi Arabistan’da Türkiye’nin,
Türkiye’de ise Suudi Arabistan’ın bölgesel rolünün algılanışına yönelik bazı pozitif
değişimler yaratan önemli bir rol oynamıştır ve bu sayede Türk-Suudi ikili
ilişkilerine siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik olarak önemli katkılarda bulunmuştur. Her
bir ülkenin birbirinin bölgesel rolü hakkında edindiği pozitif görüşler, iki ülkenin de
siyasi isteğini 2003-2011 yılları arasındaki dönemde temasları güçlendirmek
yönünde arttırmış, böylece siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri düzeyde ikili ilişkiler
yoğunlaşmıştır.
Üçüncü bölümde 2010 yılının sonlarında patlak veren Arap Baharı’nın ardından
bölgede meydana gelen değişimler, 2011 ve 2013 yıllarında gerçekleşen Mısır
ayaklanmaları ve 2011 yılındaki Suriye ayaklanmalarının bölgesel boyutu
incelenmektedir. Bu bölümde ayrıca, Türk ve Suudi dış politikasının Arap
Baharı’na verdiği tepkiler irdelenmektedir. Mısır ve Suriye’de 2011 yılından sonra
yükselen Müslüman Kardeşlerin Suudi Arabistan ve Türkiye arasında bir
anlaşmazlık kaynağının habercisi olmasının yanı sıra, her bir ülkede diğerinin imajı
üzerinde de etkili olmuş ve Suriye’deki Esad rejimi karşıtı girişimlerin harekete
geçirilmesinde yararlanılabilecek fırsatların kaybedilmesi ve iki ülke arasındaki
siyasi ilişkilerin gerilemesine yol açmıştır.
168
Mısır’da 2011 yılında başlayan ayaklanmaları takiben sırasıyla 2011 yılında 28
Ocak’ta Kahire’de patlak veren ayaklanmalar, Muhammed Mursi’nin Haziran 2012
seçimlerinde cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesi ve 3 Temmuz 2013’te yapılan askeri
müdahaleye kadar devam eden Mursi başkanlığı gibi noktalarda Türk ve Suudi
tarafları birbirine zıt yaklaşımlar sergilemişlerdir. Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan
Mısır’ın adaptasyonunda kendi bölgesel politikalarının amaçlarına ve vizyonuna
hizmet edecek biçimde çalışmalar yürütmüştür. Türkiye, Mısır’daki Müslüman
Kardeşlerle ilişkilerini geliştirmeyi ve bölgede daha aktif roller üstlenmeyi
hedeflerken, Suudi Arabistan, Mısır’da 3 Temmuz’dan sonra kurulan yeni hükümeti
Müslüman Kardeşler üzerindeki yeni bir güç kontrolü ve İran’ın bölgesel yayılımına
karşı yeni bir müttefik olarak ele alarak bu gelişmeleri olumlu karşılamıştır.
Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın Suriye devrimi konusundaki tutumları hem bazı
ortaklıklar hem de farklılıklar göstermiştir. İki ülkenin yaklaşımları Suriye’deki
devrimi ve mültecileri destekleme açısından ve yükselen muhalif Esad rejimine
karşı uluslararası arenada işbirliği yapma düzeyinde ortak bir paydada birleşirken,
destekledikleri muhalif gruplar açısından birbirinden farklılaşmıştır.
Suudi Arabistan ve Türkiye’nin Arap Baharı’na yaklaşımları arasındaki uyuşmazlık,
iki ülke arasındaki siyasi ilişkileri de etkilemiştir. 2011 ve 2013 yıllarında meydana
gelen Mısır ayaklanmaları ikili ilişkileri aşağı çekerken, Suriye krizi ilişkilerin
topyekün çöküşüne engel olmuştur. Türkiye eski büyükelçisinin Ocak 2011’de
görevini sonlandırmasının ardından Suudi Arabistan yeni bir elçi
görevlendirmemiştir. İki ülke arasında daha sonra Suriye meselesi hakkında üst
düzey ziyaretler gerçekleşmiştir. Fakat, 2013 yılında meydana gelen Mısır
ayaklanmasının ardından Türk-Suudi siyasi ilişkileri, Riyad’ın, 2014 yılında yapılan
Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi seçimlerinde Türkiye’nin geçici üyelik
adaylığına karşıtı yürüttüğü lobi faaliyetleri nedeniyle sekteye uğramıştır. Suudi
hükümeti Türkiye’yi Suriye’ye ilişkin olarak Riyad’da düzenlenen konferansa davet
etmediği gibi, Türkiye’nin Afrika Birliği’nin Ocak 2015’te Libya hakkında
gerçekleştirdiği görüşmeye davet edilmesine de karşı çıkmıştır. Diğer yandan,
ekonomik ve askeri ilişkiler her ne kadar ivmesini kaybederek Arap Baharı
169
öncesindeki yüksek seviyelere ulaşmasa da siyasi ilişkilerdeki gibi ciddi bir
gerilemeye sahne olmamıştır.
Sonuç:
Bu çalışma, ABD’nin 2003 yılındaki Irak işgalinin ve 2011 yılındaki Arap
Baharı’nın ardından oluşan yeni bölgesel komplekslerin, Ankara ve Riyad
arasındaki bölgesel etkileşimi arttırarak, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın bölgesel
çıkarlarını birleştirdiğini savunmaktadır. Bu çalışmayla, sözü geçen etkileşimin
gelecekte de devam edeceği ve Türk-Suudi ilişkilerinin literatürde iki ülke
arasındaki böyle bir etkileşimin analiz edilmesi amacıyla daha sık inceleneceği de
öngörülmektedir.
Bu iki önemli olay (ABD’nin Irak işgali ve Arap Baharı) ışığında oluşan bölgesel
bağlamlar, Arap Bölgesel Sisteminin ve Irak, Suriye ve kısmen Mısır gibi
geleneksel Arap güçlerinin zayıflığına bağlı olarak bir güç vakumu yarattı. Diğer
yandan, Ankara ve Riyad bölgede liderlik arayışı ve nüfuzunu farklı ülke ve
grupları etkileyecek biçimde genişletme gibi amaçlarla birbirine rakip olan iki
bölgesel güç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.
Suudi Arabistan, Arap Bölgesel Sisteminin zayıflığını giderecek bir dış politika
izlemiş ve desteğini ve nüfuzunu Irak, Suriye ve Lübnan’da İran’a karşı Arap
Milliyetçileri ya da Sünni partileri etkileyecek biçimde genişletmeye çalışmanın
yanı sıra, Müslüman Kardeşler ve Türkiye’ye karşı Mısır’da Temmuz 2013’te
meydana gelen siyasi değişimi de desteklemiştir.
Eski Osmanlı topraklarında bölgesel bir güç olarak aktif rolünü ve varlığını
arttırmayı hedefleyen Türkiye ise arabuluculuk, yumuşak güç ve farklı ülkelerle
ekonomik ilişkiler geliştirme gibi amaç ve araçlar yoluyla aktif bir dış politika
izlemiştir. Türkiye, Suriye’deki muhalif grupları ve Mısır’daki Müslüman
Kardeşleri destekleyerek bölgedeki nüfuzunu arttırmayı amaçlamıştır.
Çalışmanın yapıldığı zaman çerçevesi Türk ve Suudi siyasi çizgileri ve bölgesel
çıkarları arasında tezde işaret edilen bazı (pozitif etkileşimi sağlayan) yakınlaşmalar
ve (negatif etkileşime neden olan) uyuşmazlıklara sahne olmuştur. Bu nedenle, bu
170
çalışmada Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan’ın ne daimi bir bölgesel ittifak (her iki ülke
ABD müttefiği ve Sünni ülkeler olmasına rağmen) ne de (farklı yaklaşım ve
bölgesel siyasi gündemlerine rağmen) açık uçlu bölgesel bir çatışma içinde
bulunmayacağı öngörülmektedir.
Bu tezde ayrıca Ankara ve Riyad arasındaki bölgesel etkileşimin iki ülke arasındaki
ilişkileri etkilemesinin yanı sıra, her bir ülkenin diğerinin bölgesel rolü hakkında
sahip olduğu algıyı da etkilemiştir. Çalışmada bölgesel etkileşimin özellikle de
siyasi düzeydeki ikili ilişkileri etkilemeye devam edeceği tahmin edilmektedir.
171
Appendix B: Sample Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu
TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU
ENSTİTÜ
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü
YAZARIN
Soyadı : ELLITHY
Adı : AMR MOHAMED HASSAN
Bölümü : ULUSLARARASİ İLİŞKİLER
TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Turkish-Saudi Relations: From A Regional Perspective
TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora
1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir
bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.
TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:
![Turkish Van Cat and Turkish Angora Cat: A Revie · Turkish Van Cat and Turkish Angora Cat: A Review 156 Fig. 6 Some morphological properties of Turkish Angora cat [15]. Table 2 Turkish](https://img.pdfslide.us/doc/110x75/5f0387937e708231d40981f4/turkish-van-cat-and-turkish-angora-cat-a-turkish-van-cat-and-turkish-angora-cat.jpg)
